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*** Book Title Page

Knowledge, Authority and Change in Islamic Societies

Studies in Honor of Dale F. Eickelman

Edited by

Allen James Fromherz and Nadav Samin

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*** Preface

Before Dale F. Eickelman, the study of Islamic societies was largely the domain of the Orientalists. Those towering old world figures - Caetani, Levi Della Vida, Margoliouth - loom large in the backdrop of Dale’s first mature work, an inventive, anthropological study of the pretender Musaylima’s failed mission in seventh century central Arabia (Eickelman 1967). To that venerable trade and remote time and place, Dale brought a gnawing sense of the dynamism of historical change and social transformation. Musaylima failed, Dale argued, because his message could not transcend his own tribal kin group, the Bani Tamim, whereas Muhammad’s message did. The theological rupture with the past, he insisted, did not dictate

a comparable social rupture in every instance. Ideas matter, but how and why they matter can be understood only within a specific context, one rendered intelligible through mastery of the language of the locale and intensive engagement with its residents, however many centuries separate them from the object of scholarly inquiry. In “Musaylima” we see the first evidence of Dale’s capacity for crisp argumentation and narrative (a Midwestern trait?), his synthesizing of diverse concerns and interests, and, most importantly, his creative ambitions. Drawing links between Arabia past and present, we also observe the scholar’s first encounter with the question of knowledge, authority, and change in Muslim societies, that is, the first outlines of a conceptual framework that would so influence the fields of anthropology and Middle East studies.

Dale moved swiftly out of the seventh century and into the world of modern Muslim learning and knowledge production in North Africa. In this he followed Clifford Geertz, but more explicitly the great French ethnographer and colonial administrator, Jacques Berque (d. 1995). Eickelman lauded Berque for almost singlehandedly preserving - against the euphoric attractions of modernization - scholarly interest in styles of contemporary Muslim learning in North Africa. For Dale, Berque’s iconoclastic scholarly tastes enabled an historically informed approach to the study of religious education in North Africa. When the world was clamoring for new knowledge on such topics in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979, Dale was able to map that uncharted space with nuance, clarity, and contrast - the stuff of great scholarship. In his obituary for Berque, Dale took further inspiration from the French scholar’s efforts “to break down the barriers to international scholarly communication” (Eickelman 1995: 150). It is hoped that the present volume, which includes contributions from Pakistan, Morocco, Israel, France, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States, serves as a fitting tribute to Dale and to his own commitment to global scholarly communion.

Eickelman combined Jack Goody and Benedict Anderson’s groundbreaking theoretical paradigms with the linguistic facility and bibliophilia of the major Orientalists. He then wrapped this new synthesis in Geertz’s ethnographic focus and ambition to produce one of the most influential bodies of work in Middle Eastern and Islamic studies, as well as in his core discipline of anthropology - and he is by no means done yet. By concerning himself not only with Islamic texts, but with the economy and social life of their production, Dale helped establish a method for the anthropological study of Islamic societies. The study of Muslim societies demanded this kind of social science - in the postcolonial era, the Islamic world could not remain the exclusive domain of philologists and linguists. But social science, and anthropology in particular, needed Islam, too - Dale’s work continues to call attention to the fact that the symbols, rituals and social practices of a significant proportion of the nonWestern world are tied inextricably to a moment of scriptural revelation. That relationship between scriptural proof text and everyday culture was described famously by Talal Asad as a discursive tradition. Dale’s later work demonstrates how changes in the technologies of communication and the structures of religious authority in Muslim societies altered the parameters of this discursive tradition, leading to changes in the very meaning and understanding of Islam itself.

In his concluding remarks from Knowledge and Power, Dale (Eickelman 1985: 168) anticipated some of these transformations:

The carriers of religious knowledge will increasingly be anyone who can claim a strong Islamic commitment, as is the case among many of the educated urban youth. Freed from mnemonic domination, religious knowledge can be delineated and interpreted in a more abstract and flexible fashion. A long apprenticeship under an established man of learning is no longer a necessary prerequisite to legitimizing one's own religious knowledge. Printed and mimeographed tracts and the clandestine dissemination of 'lessons' on cassettes have begun to replace the mosque as the center for disseminating visions of Islam that challenge those offered by the state.

The fragmentation of Muslim religious authority (Eickelman and Piscato-ri 1996), augmented by the incursions of new media (Eickelman and Anderson 2003), have produced myriad new expressions of Muslim religiosity. From American female imams to aspiring jihadist caliphs, Dale has given us a framework for making coherent sense of these changes. His contributions to anthropology, Middle Eastern and Islamic studies, and the broader humanities and social sciences are recognized by a diverse and eclectic group of scholars within those disciplines. If there is one thing about which the wide spectrum of opinion in those associated fields can agree, it is the excellence of Dale, and the worthiness of his legacy.

Nadav Samin

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*** Abbreviations

| AFD | Alternative for Germany party |

| AIMS | American Institute of Maghrib Studies |

| AIU | Alliance Israelite Universelle |

| AKP | Justice and Development Party (ak Parti) |

| ALN | Armee de liberation nationale (National Liberation Army) |

| AMDH | Association Marocaine des droits humains (Moroccan Association for Human Rights) |

| AUK | American University in Kuwait |

| BAMF | Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) |

| CAORC | Council for American Overseas Research Centers |

| CCDH | Commission consultative des droits de l’homme (Consultative Human Rights Commission) |

| CDU | Christian Democratic Union (Germany) |

| CNDH | Conseil national des droits de l’homme (National Council of Human Rights) |

| EEC | European Economic Community |

| EU | European Union |

| FETO | Fetullahgi Teror Orgutu (Fetullahist Terrorist Organization) |

| IER | Instance equite et reconciliation (Equity and Reconciliation Commission) |

| IS | Islamic State (formerly isis) |

| MESA | Middle East Studies Association |

| PKK | Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) |

| PVE | Partijvoor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom) |

| PYD | Partiya Yekltiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party) |

| RSF | Reporters sans frontieres (Reporters Without Borders) |

| SSRC | Social Science Research Council |

| TALIM | Tangier American Legation Institute for Moroccan Studies |

| UNFP | Union nationale desforces populaires |

*** Figures and Tables

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** Introduction: Dale Eickelman on Knowledge, Authority and Change

Allen James Fromherz

For this book to be worthwhile, it is not necessary in my view that it should be assumed to embody the truth for years to come and with regard to the tiniest details. I shall be satisfied if it is credited with the modest achievement of having left a difficult problem in a rather less unsatisfactory state than it was before.

Levi Strauss 1964

Dale Eickelman (1976) quotes this challenge from Claude Levi-Strauss in his early, groundbreaking book, Moroccan Islam, Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center. He not only provides a portrait of an important pilgrimage site in Morocco but also leaves the understanding of religion, knowledge, power, truth and change in a less unsatisfactory state than it was before. Eickelman (1976: xviii) presents a new “vision of the nature of social anthropology and its relation with history.” In doing so, he breaks down the old divisions and assumptions about the difference between popular and orthodox expressions of religion. This sweet and sour baking of categories, especially those previously considered incompatible, is a feature of Eickelman’s later work as well. Instead of focusing on one wavelength or another, he examines the spectrum. His work shows what many assume to be opposite is often complimentary; what has long seemed the same may, in fact, be more radically different than imagined. Eickelman’s method provides a set of tools for questions of meaning that may, at first, seem ambitious, questions such as what is Islam?

It is not surprising that the late Shahab Ahmed (2015: 8) in his work, What is Islam? quoted Eickelman (1987: 18) in the first pages: “the main challenge for the study of Islam is to describe how its universalistic or abstract principles have been realized in various historical and social contexts without representing Islam as a seamless essence on the one hand or as plastic congeries of beliefs and practices on the other.” In addressing such challenges on a broad scale, Dale Eickelman joins Claude Levi-Strauss and other major names in anthropology, such as Clifford Geertz, who called for “thicker” thinking about larger problems with relevance beyond the field. Eickelman looks up from field notes and footnotes, breaches the walls of discipline and clarifies not only the big issues faced by anthropologists of the Middle East and North Africa, but also broader discourse about the nature of religion, authority and social change. In short, his work causes scholars and non-scholars alike to think different, to reach beyond established categories and assumptions,

creating ripple effects into the far beyond the tributaries of Middle East and North African anthropology.

The challenge of describing and commemorating the career and impact of an anthropologist is similar to the challenge of anthropology itself. While it would be easy to get caught up in fascinating minutiae or incremental advances, his bibliography is impressively varied and wide ranging. It could be the subject of its own study on the nature of academic networks and exchange. Eickelman did not limit himself to Morocco. He knew it would be necessary to move around, to compare, to hold a mirror up to multiple examples and manifestations. As Islam Observed (Geertz 1971), which compares Islamic societies in Indonesia and Morocco showed, a description may be “thick,” but it won’t completely “stick” unless there is something or some variant reference to which it can be stuck. In this respect, Eickelman (2005) has certainly continued the footsteps of Geertz, who was his professor at the University of Chicago.

In an early article on Musaylima, Eickelman (1967) not only engaged the latest scholarship, he also posits important questions and observations of the social anthropology of seventh-century Arabia. In his later works, Eickel-man’s keen collaboration and community building within the academy stands out. Although he wrote the influential textbook, The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach as a single author, Eickelman also regularly teamed up with a large number of scholars, providing that rare combination of a book accessible to undergraduates but also on the vanguard of the discipline. On their own, his writings would be evidence enough of his collaborative tendencies, of his ability to apply his ideas to a larger world even as he describes how ideas interact in real world contexts.

Clifford Geertz uses Eickelman as an exemplar of modern ethnography, “ethnographers have a clearer understanding [now] of what they must do if they are to comprehend people different from themselves - start a conversation and maintain one” (Geertz 1985: 11). Eickelman has followed this method in the field. His conversations, however, go beyond the confines of ethnography. He has also started and maintained conversations outside of purely academic pursuits. His bridge building is not confined to written scholarship. His leadership as President of the Tangier American Legation Institute for Moroccan Studies (talim), and his work with the American University in Kuwait (auk), and other organizations has improved education and cultural understanding from Pakistan to Morocco. Eickelman has reached beyond the library and the academic conference circuit; he converses with the public sphere.

It would take much more than a chapter to adequately summarize Eickel-man’s contributions both inside and outside of the academy. Our goal, however, must be a more modest achievement. While a bibliography of his works is included in this book, we cannot consider the entire corpus, let alone the entire matrix of connections that emerged from

Eickelman’s work. Instead, the chapters in this book represent only a portion of his wide-ranging impacts. To commemorate Dale Eickelman’s far-reaching impact, this volume shows not simply examples of his contributions to the acquisition of tiniest details. The chapters reveal how Eickelman’s scholarship as a versatile, intellectual toolbox, useful for thinking about the nature of knowledge, authority and change in a variety of contexts.

*** 1. Knowledge

In his book Knowledge and Power in Morocco: The Education of a TwentiethCentury Notable, Eickelman (1985a) shows that power is knowledge. His discussion and analysis of the social networks surrounding the rural nobleman and qadi, Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman al-Mansuri, made this far from the usual biography. Instead, he uses the life of this man to make important observations about the nature of knowledge and power more broadly.

It is both engaging and scholarly. For example, Eickelman (1985a: 21) provides an intriguing anecdote about the way he gathered information for the book, a story that says as much about the social architecture of power (and an awareness of his own role as an outsider) as any specific legal ruling.

In Boujad, the qadi decided I must sit with him and his clerk, since I could not sit with the litigants. I always moved my chair to the edge of the table to indicate that I was not a part of the proceedings. Nonetheless, some tribesmen unfamiliar with court procedures recognized me as a foreigner and sometimes saluted.

He goes on to describe the role of the bailiff, the court clerks and the judge, even suggesting that some in the court may have assumed Eickelman (1985a: 21), was yet another clerk or secretary of the rural Islamic court.

North African, rabbinical courts bear surprising parallels and distinctions, but also serve as important symbolic bearers of the social networks that create knowledge and authority. Connecting his own work on the Eickelman’s experience in Boujad, Harvey Goldberg’s engaging chapter, “An Anthropologist’s ‘Day in Rabbinical Court’ in late Ottoman Tripoli” is the first in this volume. The meaningful parallels between Goldberg’s research on a Jewish court in the metropolitan center of Tripoli, Libya, and Eickelman’s work in a Muslim court in rural Morocco, show the social basis for knowledge as power as similar across multiple religious and geographical categories. Even though Goldberg was unable to meet his subject, Mordecai Hacohen (d. 1929) personally, his chapter demonstrates the social and familial networks that continued to make Mordecai a locus of knowledge and power, even after his death. The message here is striking. The social power of knowledge is one of the few that can actually increase, and emerge unexpectedly, long after the end of life.

Education, the production and reproduction of knowledge as a means of instilling students with degrees of social power, is explored in “Islamic Education in Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century India” by Muhammad Qasim Zaman. His essay provides insights into the madrasa tradition in late Mughal and early colonial South Asia. Synthesizing moral philosophy with an anthropology of Islam pioneered in part by Eickelman, Zaman treats the madrasa not as a physical institution but as a set of practices, norms, and expectations that collectively constitute an educational tradition. Zaman surveys some of the harmonies and tensions that he discerns in the tradition of madrasa education as it adapts to changing circumstances. He provides textured sociological profiles of the teacher-scholars who embodied the madrasa tradition and describes the competing social and political networks shaping of the curricula that they taught.

Knowledge and power are also expressed and transmitted within the field of anthropology itself. Moundib’s comparison of the early works of two great anthropologists of Islam, Geertz and Eickelman, anchors our volume in important ways. Moundib’s close reading of Eickelman and Geertz demonstrates the broad methodological concordance of these post-structuralist scholars with respect to their reading of Moroccan social formations.

Seeing is not the same as knowing, or is it? Is a preference for evidentiary, “scientific” notions of knowledge an expression of power and dominance over sincerely (or even insincerely) held belief in the jinn? This is the compelling question behind the Simon O’Meara chapter, “Out of Sight in Morocco, or How to See Jinn in Museums?” The questions posed by Simon are both serious and compelling; they challenge anthropology and anthropologists in general to revise the usual presumptions of their fieldnotes, to engage with the jinn, even if unseen, as the only way to understand significance, their power to make the museum more than an objectification of culture.

*** 2. Authority

President of the Middle East Studies Association (mesa), in 1991 Eickelman gave an address about the changing nature of frontiers, state authority and the nation-state. Traditional notions of the frontier were “obsolete” (Eickelman 1991). Eickelman noted very early, the importance of “mass higher education” and “mass communication” well before the rise of Al-Jazeera on the religious imagination and the so-called Arab Spring.[1] Eickelman’s call for studies on the “academic frontier,” for new work on transnational mass communication, media and their influence on religion and identities beyond the traditional ambit of “area studies” was well received. The innovative studies of this section prove that Middle East studies has, indeed, been transformed. The challenge remains to explain why major, structural changes in the Middle East over the past decades have not, except in Tunisia, have not led to the “irreversible democratization” that Eickelman optimistically predicted in his address. Instead, the forces he points to have been even more disruptive than could have been imagined in 1991. They have been turbulent to such an extent that democratic

institutions are under strain throughout the world, including the West. The fragmentation of identities and traditional authorities and the rise of extreme thinking and polarization online and in the media means we must reconsider assumptions about the public sphere. In Muslim Politics, Eickelman and James Piscatori (2004) clarified the impact of recent changes in the Muslim world, showing how being Muslim has been transformed. The blurring of tradition and modernity, the rise of Muslim communities in the West, the fragmentation of political authority and the changing role of women have all overturned answers to Ahmed's (2015) question of "What is Islam?" But, changes in Muslim politics and society have also led to questions outside the strictly religious ambit, such as what is freedom?

In "Rethinking New Media in the Public Sphere: Beyond the Freedom Paradox," Jon Anderson builds on his pioneering collaboration with Dale Eickel-man in New Media in the Muslim World (Eickelman and Anderson 2003) to ask new and probing questions about the transformative influence of the Internet on social group formation and interaction. Anderson synthesizes important Susan Slyomovics, in her chapter "New Moroccan Publics, Prisons, Cemeteries and Human Remains," also reconsiders the public sphere and challenges to authority. In her interviews of political prisoners from 1999-2000, Dr. Slyomovics described the legacy and impact of the "Years of Lead." The post-Hassan ii (d. 1999) era has allowed for the creation of "New Publics" and a reckoning with the past. Focusing on the human body of dissidents, not the Internet or the media, as a means of communicating public resistance Slyomovics shows how the Moroccan state has dealt with its recent past.

El-Sayed el-Aswad in "Rethinking Knowledge and Power Hierarchy in the Muslim World," surveys Eickelman's pioneering contributions to a range of subfields within the anthropology of Islam, Middle Eastern and Islamic studies, and the broader social sciences. New media, politics, education, and religious change comprise Eickelman's expansive oeuvre, el-Aswad explains. Uniting these diverse interests is Dale's concern for knowledge. In particular, there is his examination of the way knowledge is produced and contested in Muslim societies. Historical and political context shapes these contests differently in different circumstances. El-Sayed el-Aswad's valuable survey underscores the breadth of Dale's scholarly curiosity and reinventive spirit.

Simeon Evstatiev's chapter "Salafism as a Contested Concept" shows the diverse meanings of modern, transnational Salafism. Using methods of analysis laid out by Eickelman, he questions whether Salafism should be seen as a product of encounter with the "West," as part of the deconstruction of modern frontiers, or part of a process of "historical origins." Evstatiev encourages a reconsideration of Salafism as a "contested concept," showing that "who gets the past" in Salafism is loaded with meaning and variation. Deftly examining the diversity of Salafi thought, Evstatiev shows that while Salafism attempts to show an immobile continuity with the earliest period of Islamic history, it too has, in fact, been subject to change and context when in "popular use."

Eickelman is expert at asking simple but profound questions that get to the heart of academic debates. In “Who Gets the Past?,” for example, Eickelman (2015) shows that Islamic authority and religious knowledge are subject to changes in information media, the transmission of knowledge and the rise of new public spheres. This emphasis on change in Islamic societies extends not only to the present but also to concepts of the past. Despite persistent problems facing many Middle Eastern societies, the dream of a renaissance of past glories remains.

*** 3. Change

There are few more striking examples of the impact of change in Islamic societies than Oman since 1970, the year of the accession of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Bu Saidi and the beginning of the “Nahda” or Omani Renaissance. While other Gulf states, such as Qatar, have similarly changed in visibly dramatic ways, none has had the social depth, diversity and population density of Oman (Fromherz 2017). Eickelman’s scholarship on Oman, both before and after 1970 was on the frontier, they (Christine Eickelman 1993; Dale Eickelman 1985b) questioned the ingrained assumptions about this once-isolated country, making it a case study of change in modern Islam. In addressing change in Islamic societies, Dale Eickelman challenges the assumptions of modernization theory, which suggests the decline of religion and religious influence. Instead of being marginalized by modernity, religious traditions, even as they are capable of change, “coexist and shape the experience of modernity” (Eickelman 2000). Disagreeing with clash of civilizations arguments, he suggests religion and culture are not a stark alternative or an immobile independent variable. Eickelman (2016) similarly contests other supposedly static categories of Gulf society. “Tribes” and “tribal” identity in the Gulf are not necessarily a stumbling block in modernization theory.

Mandana Limbert examines the role of religious tradition and change in “Religiosity, Men of Learning and Oil Wealth in the Land of the Imamate.” She points out that in 1978-1979, when Eickelman first visited the sultanate, Qa-boos bin Said al-Bu Saidi bin Said al Bu-Saidi had only been in power for eight to nine years. Limbert moves us forward forty years to 2018 and the changes experienced in the Omani town of Hamra, but also the resonances with the challenges witnessed by Eickelman. She shows how Eickelman influenced anthropologists to reconsider religion as an adjective, not a noun.

Jenny White’s contribution, “The Unbearable Lightness of Being Turkish,” also shows how change, in particular language reform in the past, has had a major impact on the meaning of Islam in Turkey, skewing it towards “popular understandings” of the faith. More recent including government embrace of a homogenized idea of Islam and the influence of extremist groups have pushed these same popular manifestations in other directions as Turks in various ways try to appear as “good Muslims.”

In “The Radicalization of Islam in Germany” Gilles Kepel suggests that Islamism is less distinct in Germany than it is in France, as was initially assumed. There is a need for refreshing our approach to the rise of Islamist militancy in Europe to deal with the challenges it poses. The radicalization of Islam in Europe, as troubling as it may be, is a classic example of Dale’s notion of religiosity being as important, if not more important, than supposedly static ideas about the supernatural.

Muhammad Khalid Masud shows us the flip side of radicalization in “Ma-drasas Promoting Social Harmony? Debates Over the Role of Madrasa Education in Pakistan.” Again, Eickelman’s notions of religiosity over religion, as a taught, cultural process, not a set identity or set of distinct beliefs, means that education can be a way out of extremism.

Eickelman’s oeuvre, as shown by the bibliography at the end of this volume, demonstrates an astonishing range and mastery of multiple subjects across many fields, areas and geographical zones. His books are single authored and co-authored, texts for advanced students and more specialized monographs. He has explored Islam and gender, education, the media and the public good. From Russia to Central Asia, Oman, Morocco and China, his scholarship spans the global frontiers of the Islamicate world. Social, economic and political studies of the Middle East, the very Brill series in which this book appears, although he was never made aware of this particular volume in his honor, shows his skill as editor and builder of academic communities and the breadth and depth of his expertise. As the chapters of this volume testify, Eickelman’s scholarship has been influential on generations of scholars in multiple continents, encouraging new ways of thinking about knowledge, authority and change.

Yet, Eickelman’s impact goes beyond his scholarship. While many of us who are paid to think, teach and write, focus on understanding what something “is,” there is similarly, whether we can avoid it or not, something important about doing, not just thinking. What something “does” and how that “doing” impacts lives. Dale shows how an academic can be at once a thinker and a doer. His contribution is more profound than simply being on an academic vanguard of certain intellectual trends. Eickelman’s work as president of Tangier American Legation (talim) and as human relations and relationship coordinator/ director of the Dartmouth-American University of Kuwait (auk) Program, for instance, not improves mutual understanding between peoples. He locates culture out in the open, not in locked boxes, lids closely shut with the key held by the elite, but in a vast diversity of communities, connections, and conditions. Thus, Dale Eickelman doesn’t just study communities in new ways. He helps create and sustain them.

Eickelman inspires academics to rethink what it means to be a scholar. We face the hollowing out of tenure, the rise of adjunct labor models, the decline of humanities and social sciences, the slow rooting out of faculty governance, the imposition of corporate-consultant profit models. For some, it is a journey into the empty quarter of the mind, a space where responses are few, mirages are many and harsh chance, as much as effort or

ability, prevails. By avoiding elitism, by welcoming many into his camp who would otherwise not think to speak with one another, Eickelman leads his intellectual companions to meeting places where conversations of meaning can occur. Moreover, nonacademics are invited to his majlis and to drink at the well. Through his mentoring, his persistent humor and kindness, Eickelman has worked to create a community of his own, a community with many branches in many parts of the world and many ways of experiencing the world. Dale Eickelman's first instinct is not to exclude or embargo or define others, or himself, in discrete categories, but rather to bring as many into conversations of meaning as possible. Eickelman starts and maintains discourse even at times and in places where silence prevails. He makes the understanding of what it means to be human not only more possible but also more enjoyable.

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* Part 1: Knowledge

** 1. An Anthropologist’s “Day in (Rabbinical) Court” in Late Ottoman Tripoli

Harvey E. Goldberg

In the preface to Dale Eickelman’s Knowledge and Power in Morocco, Clifford Geertz points to several ways in which the book advances anthropological research.{1} The study offers a new “sense of what description and explanation amount to in anthropology” (Eickelman 1985: xii), epitomized by the image of “a young scholar and an indigenous scholar, thirty years his senior, bent over such manuscripts, admiring calligraphy, hunting for traces of economic dependencies, [or] reading between the lines of political gossip” (Eickelman 1985: xii). When I encountered this book, it became a significant reference point for me, because several years before I was deeply engaged in the manuscript of a scholar from the other end of the Maghrib, Mordecai Hacohen of Tripoli (1856-1929).[2] This, however, did not entail interpersonal contact. Haco-hen died ten years before I was born. What brought me to begin to explore his work in detail in 1968 was that his scholarship had an anthropological side to it. A significant portion of its five hundred plus Hebrew pages describes the lives of Jews in the hinterland of Tripoli, most of whom migrated to Israel between 1949 and 1951, and some of whom had been the subject of my doctoral fieldwork in 1963-1965 (Goldberg 1972, 2015-2016: 8-33). As I delved into the manuscript, learned more about its context, and for a few years encountered several of Hacohen’s children, my relationship with him - by then both intellectual and personal - deepened. This process continues today, and the current chapter has a dual purpose. One is to explore an aspect of Hacohen’s work from which I previously have kept a distance: his involvement with the rabbinic court in Tripoli at the end of the Ottoman period. The second is, aided by juxtaposing my encounter with Hacohen’s book to Dale’s experience with Qadi ‘Abd ar-

Rahman, to reflect upon the challenges and unexpected outcomes faced by an anthropologist assuming a task usually carried out by historians.

Comparing the experience of a fieldworker engaged with a living scholar to plumbing an unpublished text whose author is deceased requires a conceptual leap, so I offer two scenes from Knowledge and Power in Morocco that reinforced this act of imagination. When Dale began to attend weekly sessions of the Islamic court in Boujad, the qadi decided that he should sit near him and his clerk, rather than with the litigants. Dale followed suit, but when entering that situation concretely, moved his “chair to the edge of the table to indicate that I was not part of the proceedings” (Eickelman 1985: 21). Upon reading this, I was reminded of Hacohen’s describing a situation in Tripoli from the midnineteenth century. Under renewed Ottoman rule that began in Tripoli in 1835, steps were taken to establish a court that could accommodate Muslims, Christians, and Jews. In the 1840s, the head of the Jewish community - Rabbi Ya‘a-kov Mimun - was assigned a seat in the court but it was placed to one side and was not decorated (Goldberg 1990: 41; Ha-Cohen 1978: 148). The two historical situations were quite different, while the messages conveyed by the placement of seats in a courtroom still bore a “family resemblance.”

A second associative image arose upon reading that Dale and the qadi “began to regard one another as colleagues because of our work on a common project” (Eickelman 1985: 30). In the next sentence, Dale refers to ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s “own ethnographic efforts.” In my translation of Hacohen’s descriptions of Jews in the hinterland towns, I stressed the closeness of Hacohen’s perspective to anthropology (Hakohen 1993: 18). This was questioned, in a review, by a colleague (Rosen 1982: 628-29). I do not insist upon an anachronistic category, but am comfortable viewing Hacohen as an “ethnographer.” Like the qadi, Hacohen’s interests were far broader than one might guess from any official title. Over the years, and after many revisits to his text, my appreciation of his insights continue to grow, parallel to my expanded grasp of Hacohen’s context and a growing sensitivity to the specificity of the words he chose. In the present chapter, after introducing Mordecai Hacohen and the background to his book, I illustrate that enhanced appreciation by closely following his depiction of the rabbinic court - beit din - in Tripoli. The essay then concludes with further reflections on this anthropological excursion into the territory of textual scrutiny.

Mordecai Hacohen was born in Tripoli in 1856 to a family of Italian origin, and died in Benghazi in 1929 (Goldberg 2004: 1-30, especially n.45; Hakohen 1993: 3-4, 36-39). His father, a merchant, had died in a shipwreck off Crete, and the family became impoverished, while still holding Italian nationality. Mordecai grew up speaking Italian at home, and read and wrote it to some degree, though without formal training. No private tutor taught him Italian at home as might have been the case had his father lived. His Hebrew-religious education was in a traditional framework in the synagogue. Learning quickly, he earned a pittance there by assisting the rabbi in instructing younger pupils. In that setting he also learned to use the Hebrew alphabet to write the local Judeo-Arabic. Hacohen had some systematic knowledge of formal Arabic, undoubtedly as an autodidact, while I am unable to assess its extent or depth.

Mordecai supported himself in a variety of ways. He learned to fix watches and for a while was a merchant trading between Tripoli and communities in the Jebel Nefusa. At one point he taught in the school set up by the Alliance Israelite Universelle in Tripoli. From about 1904, he began to contribute articles to haskala (Enlightenment)-oriented Hebrew newspapers in Europe and also in Ottoman Palestine. Somewhat earlier, as will be discussed below, he delved into the world of rabbinic learning and acted as a representative of plaintiffs in the beit din. In 1920 he moved to Benghazi when the community invited him to serve as a judge in the beit din there.

Close to the turn of the century he began to work on his book (see note 1 above), finishing the final part some time after the Italian occupation in 1911. It is written in Hebrew in a script popularly called “Rashi script,” legible to people with a traditional Hebraic education anywhere, and is a mine of information on Jewish life in Libya placed on a background of a general description of the country and its history. He entitled the work Higgid Mordecai (Mordecai Narrated) and it reflected a range of research activities. Hacohen copied extant Hebrew manuscripts from the late eighteenth century, interviewed old people about past times, explored cemeteries looking for inscriptions, provided wordlists of a local Jewish argot, described political and cultural events of his own day, extracted discussions of local customs from the books of rabbis active in Tripoli, and devoted a section to the Jews in small towns in the Tripolitanian countryside. The full manuscript reached the library of the growing Hebrew University in the mid-1940s (see below), while portions of it appeared in the world of scholarship earlier (Hakohen 1993: 29-31, and see more below). It was published in Jerusalem in its entirety only in 1978, stemming - as noted - from a convergence of ethnographic and historical interests. After describing and discussing the section of the book that focuses on the beit din, I will consider the “second life” of the manuscript from an anthropological perspective.

*** 1. Hacohen and the Beit Din in Tripoli

Section 86 of Higgid Mordecai (Ha-Cohen 1978: 255) cites six cases brought before the beit din in Tripoli at the end of the nineteenth century, with some linking discussions. Some cases appear in detail while others are depicted succinctly. Like in other topics he presents, Hacohen first provides historical background. He begins by mentioning the role of a Rabbi Shim'on Lavi in the sixteenth century, whose origin was in Spain, and who is seen as establishing Jewish communal life in Tripoli after a period when little or none existed (Huss 2000). At the end of the section he includes a liturgical memorial text recounting rabbinic communal leaders from that period to the present (Goldberg 1994: 280-81). These framing paragraphs indicate the importance Hacohen attached to rabbinic leadership in the life of the community, even while much of the section is critical of the judges in his time: their decisions that overlooked rabbinic sources, and their practical procedures and decisions.

My chapter consists of some direct translations from Section 86 along with summaries of other parts (particularly the specific cases), interlaced with discussions of specific points and themes. In some instances, discussion is moved forward by reference to Jessica Marglin's recent valuable study describing rabbinical courts in Morocco: both similarities and differences are helpful in probing Hacohen's text (Marglin 2016). For example, Marglin (2016: 32) states that ordinarily judgments were not written down, except at the request of one of the parties. All the cases in Hacohen's Section 86 are written judgments (in Hebrew), with the understanding that they would be delivered to the "winning" party with the aim of enforcing them. This does not constitute a "contradiction" in the accounts. Hacohen's selection may reflect high-profile cases, and also instances on which he can base his documented discussion. Another difference in the accounts is that Hacohen's description does not mention the role of a "notary public" - sofer, which Marglin (2016: 30-31) described in detail, while presumably there were individuals in Tripoli carrying out the activities entailed.[3] These comparisons are not a search for homogeneity; their purpose is to identify the significant parameters. What seems to be shared in both settings is the minor role (if any) of a communal depository of records.

With regard to my summaries, they adopt a style that takes for granted the accuracy of Hacohen's reporting. Beyond my appreciation of the precision of his descriptions, there are no other sources against which I might assess them. Aware of this caveat, I spare the reader frequent reminders that a certain event or development is "according to Hacohen's account." This does not mean that everything in the text is immediately clear. Some of the following footnotes point to uncertainties of meaning, possible alternative understandings of terms, or ambiguities. Other notes focus on details of cultural content that may be of interest to readers. With these guidelines in mind, I turn to an exposition of Section 86.

The second paragraph of Section 86 portrays the leadership of judges in the past. They (according to Ha-Cohen 1978: 255)

would guide the people along upright paths and would make just decisions in civil matters (bein ish u-vein re'ehu) in areas like damages entailing neighbors, estates, wills, gifts, commerce, and all monetary law; in addition: the sale of land and IOUs, and so forth - everything was done by the court. Also, [ritual] matters of what is forbidden or permitted, marriage and divorce procedures, levirate marriage and release from it, punishment for adultery, violation of the Sabbath, and so forth.

The order of the subjects is worth noting, particularly in light of Hacohen's description - to follow soon - of changes in the arenas over which the court had jurisdiction. The first topics fall into a category one could consider "civil law," and only after that - rounding out the list - does he mention topics that today would fit into rubrics like "religion" or "ritual." In his following paragraph, after summarizing how decisions regarding civil affairs were enforced, Haco-hen refers to these blatantly "religious" matters with the term shimtot. This reflects medieval theology that distinguishes between "rational" biblical

commandments (sikhliot), that prime facie are based on reason, and those based on the authority of God's revelation or "voice" - the stem Sh M ^c reflecting both "listening" and "obeying" (without necessarily understanding).

One rubric - partaking of both of these elements - appears in the "middle" of the list cited: "marriage and divorce." This entails both monetary commitments and issues defined by religious rules. This realm remained in the hands of religious authorities under the Ottoman reforms, a factor relevant to understanding Hacohen's subsequent description. In terms of Western "democratic" sensibilities, the latter part of the overall list is most immediately associated with "religion." Overall then, in Hacohen's opening account of the duties of the judges, civil matters head the list.

Another aspect of Hacohen's summary, appearing later in his following paragraph (cited above), is somewhat surprising but welcome to anthropologists. He mentions semi-formal mechanisms of social control, some of which do not stem from the content of rabbinic law (halakha) per se. Hacohen states that the ability of the rabbinic court to enforce judgments resides in the authority delegated to it by the Muslim regime. This includes the power to imprison or to inflict corporal punishment, while he does not provide details of what such punishments looked like. Added to that was "excommunication" - her-em - which, as in Jewish communities elsewhere, probably reflected halakhic principles and took on different degrees of severity. Less common, however, is his mention of spies or snoops within the community. Again, examples are not given for the earlier period, but I have heard accounts of religiously motivated snooping regarding the Italian period, for example to discover if the Sabbath is secretly being violated (Goldberg 2018). Another depiction, of the public shaming of a woman deemed as sexually wayward, is - as far as I know - rare ethno-historical documentation.

Abruptly, after this historical summary, Hacohen (1978: 255-56) presents a contrast with present times - the late nineteenth century under Ottoman rule.

This is not like the present situation, because the Ottoman government has delimited the jurisdiction of judges in some measure, and they cast the whole yoke from off their necks. They delimited themselves (my emphasis) sevenfold, for even in cases like a [divorced or widowed] woman claiming what is due from her marriage contract (ketubba) and support, matters which according to Ottoman law are under the jurisdiction of the heads of the millets - and government officials will enforce compliance to the rulings of the head of the millet - the judges drag their feet even in matters that are clear as day. They delay their judgment, going to and fro, and a claimant only gets a decision after a long and tiresome effort. A fortiori, this takes place regarding other claims where the Ottoman government did nothing to restrict judges from hearing litigants who [have made the choice to] turn to them of their own will.

The slowness of the judges were the circumstances by which they themselves swiftly disseminated lawlessness within the rank-and-file, to undermine accepted norms, devaluing other aspects of civil law.[4] The principles of [transmitting] estates were destroyed. Many women, who already received portions of their dowries while their father was alive, requested an inheritance along with their brothers according to non-rabbinic law, even if their father had died before the proclamation of the Ottoman constitution that provided equal rights - because sons and daughters inherit equally in all the lands of the Ottoman Empire.

In earlier times, judges would receive payment from the winning party upon providing it with a written judgment (against the opinion of Maran in the Shulhan Arukh),[5] but in 5673/1912 the community prohibited judges from accepting this payment.[6] Instead, they received a budget from the communal fund to meet their needs. Judges would write down a judgment without citing the paragraph on which they based their decision, and no one dared face them with the demand: “show me from where you made this judgment!,” or turned to a higher court. Such a thought never arose.

This description moves to the present period in which reforms emanating from Istanbul increasingly became a central factor. There is no detailed account of the stages within Tripoli itself, but Hacohen’s book includes a story, which - if it is historical - would reflect the first dozen years after the Ottoman reconquest of the city, and suggests initial moves whereby Jews and Christians are involved in the local court along with the Muslim majority (Goldberg 1990: 48).[7] Lisa Anderson’s account of general administrative reform in Tripoli, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, suggests that the process had its ups and downs (Anderson 1986: 88-95), and parallel irregular movement probably characterized legal reform as well. Hacohen uses the Hebrew phrase nimusei Togarma to refer to the new Ottoman laws.[8] Later in that section he distinguishes between the nimus of the Mejelle (which he calls the ‘Muhammadan’ law), and the Kanun (which he calls the nimus of Togarma).8 Terminology aside, most pertinent to our discussion is Hacohen’s focus on the responses of the judges to the new formal framework, which he implicitly assumes was not the only possible path that they could have taken in the emerging politico-legal situation.

In the following paragraphs of Section 86, Hacohen (1978: 256-57) offers the reader an example of a written decision prepared in 1899. Like several other examples in the section, it concerns inheritance, in this case a dispute among brothers regarding their father’s estate. Before the document was signed by the three judges who heard the case, Mordecai intervened, citing a principle in the rabbinic codes that the judges were ignoring. He does not explain his connection to this case, while in other examples in the section his involvement in the cases is formal: he appears as a murshe - an attorney-like representative - for a plaintiff, and even as a plaintiff himself in one instance. In this first example, he does present the reader with the content of his debate with the judges over the contested decision.

This first description concludes by reinforcing Hacohen's general point about the slowness of the judicial process. The judges withdrew the (unsigned) written judgment and held on to it while suggesting that the claimants reach a compromise. It was only after "days and years" that the plaintiff (one brother against two others) became fed up and relinquished part of his claim. They had witnesses sign a document that recorded their oral agreement. After the conclusion of this incident, Hacohen presents another general description:

The learned scholars (talmidei hakhamim) of the previous generation studied the Talmud only, not books of general knowledge (haskala) and certainly not the books of the rabbinic decisors, which could enable them to encroach upon territory of the judges (^cadat ha-dayyanim).[9] [10] Mur-shim [pl. of murshe] in the court were appointed only from among the rank-and-file who would accept any decision pronounced by the judges. They could not at all raise questions about the decisions of the court, and the learned scholars did not have the ability to examine privately the literature of the decisors.[11]

This brief paragraph raises a range of questions. It is clear that the extensive world of rabbinic learning is broader than the literature within it presented in condensed and organized legal precepts, which at times emerged in response to specific questions directed to rabbis. But a stark statement setting apart the two realms in such a formal manner is rare. Hacohen's account suggests one explanation: protecting the group of judges so that other learned people could not encroach upon their domain and livelihood. But this may have been a norm more deeply rooted than that of protecting self-interest. From the same period a source from Jerba echoes a similar situation, along with a critique of it. Thus, "Rabbi Yosef Hacohen would complain about certain scholars who would spend the day studying Talmud alone, and do not study the corresponding directives of Al-fasi and Maimonides or Our Rabbenu Asher" (Khalfon Ha-Cohen 1905: 22b).[12]

Thus, there may have been an established norm of separating these realms in the eastern reaches of the Maghrib (Goldberg 1994: 290-91; Tsur 2007), but more information is required. Other background factors may be relevant as well. Historically, relatively small numbers of printed books were found in Tripoli (Goldberg 2018). An introduction to the work of a scholar active there at the turn of the nineteenth century - Avraham Khalfon (1741-1820) - indicates that much of his effort was devoted to copying manuscripts that reached him (Hirschberg 1981: 153-55, 179-83; Khalfon n.d.: 65). Beyond that, it is worth considering whether this division of scholarly rabbinic labor may correspond to Muslim patterns, where different roles are played by muftis and qadis (Ackerman-Lieberman 2013: 688-89). Hacohen's book attributes great importance to Khalfon; part of its historical section is copied from a chronicle he authored in Judeo-Arabic. This work was mostly lost; in fact, none of Khalfon's books were published during his lifetime.

Returning to Tripoli in Hacohen's day, the complete acceptance of the decisions of the court seems to depart from the pattern analyzed by Marglin in Morocco where "an informal system of appeal operated" (Marglin 2016: 31). A person could turn to another court within a city if one existed, or even elsewhere when not satisfied by a judgment. This may have been partially a "logistic" difference between the two regions rather than one of principle. There were several important centers of rabbinic culture in Morocco, while historically it might have been necessary for appeals from Tripoli to be directed to cities like Tunis or Jerusalem. In addition, as evident in Hacohen's cases discussed below, the Ottoman legal system was open to Jewish claimants. One of the inheritance cases he describes involved property owned by a Tripolitan Jew in Italy. Later, I note other "transnational" aspects of the rabbinic-legal situation in the city.

The cases described by Hacohen run from 1876 through 1900. Four out of six of them are issues of inheritance. They bring home his point that cases dragged out, and sometimes never were resolved. In one case, an estate included a building that eventually was abandoned and eventually torn down in 1912-1913 after the Italian conquest. Another recurring theme is the prominence of procedural challenges during this period of political and legal shifts, including the changing position of a murshe acting in the court.

Each of the six cases that Hacohen describes reflects a different aspect of rabbinic law, but a thread that runs through several incidents is the greater activity and initiative on the part of a murshe. His account suggests that a murshe partially paralleled the wakil depicted by Marglin (2016: 38) - an Arabic term she translates as representative. The Hebrew term murshe - literally "one who has been given permission" - is rooted in Talmudic literature, but what a mur-she was or was not empowered to do evolved historically (and in some cases might be translated "agent"). Section 86 of Higgid Mordecai captures a fluid point in the Jewish community of Tripoli, when the passivity of a murshe was changing. Hacohen himself appears as an "agent" in this development, in both the formal and the sociological senses of the term.

In the first case he presents (cited above), that provides the full wording of the judgment, Hacohen does not explain what led to his involvement. It seems that at this time (1899) he was a common presence within the arena of the court's activities, including functioning as a murshe. This, however, is not stated.

In the second case that Hacohen describes, he notes that 1883 was the first time a learned talmid hakham was chosen as a murshe by a plaintiff, and appeared before the court. It involved a childless man who bequeathed his house to the community, charging that it be turned into a synagogue. The rest of the estate should be used to run the synagogue, and to help the poor of the city. The judges confirmed the will, but other potential heirs challenged this decision, turning to a talmid hakham

to present their case. The latter cited a section of the Shulhan Arukh that deals with court matters, and argued that in a situation like this the law does not allow local judges to decide. They must turn to a court in another city. The murshe's suggestion was to send the case to a court in Jerusalem. This was rejected by the local judges who upheld the original will.

In three following cases, Hacohen explicitly appears as a murshe. In the second (the fourth out of the sixth cases), there is no information on the content of the dispute, but he states that then he began to study the laws of the Me-jelle, and appeared both in the Mejelle court and that of the Kanun.[13] He next mentions an incident - without stating explicitly in which court - where his opponent, another Jew, claimed that Hacohen should be disqualified from appearing before the judges because he is an Italian subject. The response of the head of the court (whom I assume was a Muslim), was to silence this objection, warning Hacohen's opponent not to be contentious (Ha-Cohen 1978: 260).[14]

In the third and fifth of the six cases, Hacohen's personal involvement is prominent. In the former, he indirectly had a personal stake (this is the case in which the abandoned house was demolished under the Italians): his wife was one of the heirs making a claim on the estate four years after having acquiesced to the initial disposition of property and chattel. Mordecai thereby had an interest in her receiving a portion which, in terms of the history of the institution, created a basis for assigning him as "representative." The next step was to convince the other relatives to appoint him as their murshe. With this authority, he challenged the court's earlier decision regarding the will, citing arguments from the decisor literature. Initially, the judges did not respond to his challenge, but after a while asked a rabbinical emissary from Jerusalem, who was spending time in Tripoli, to be an additional adjudicator in the case. The Jerusalem rabbi backed Hacohen's formal arguments but suggested to the local judges to reach a compromise with the plaintiffs. A partial compromise was reached, while - as indicated - other aspects of the claim remained unresolved up to the Italian period.

The fifth case is the most dramatic. Both in this case and the previous narrative of Mordecai - describing himself in the third person as "the murshe" - he stated how the judges' reaction to his arguments angered him. The incident begins with the death of rich man (whose holdings included property in Europe) in 1876, who had been married to two women (it is not stated whether because of death or divorce), with children from both of them. At the time, an elder son from the first marriage was appointed "executor" of the will, while some of the arrangements were later challenged in 1900 when the children of the second wife were grown and demanded what was due to them. Their case began by sending a letter to Hafez Pasha, the Ottoman governor from 1900 to 1903. The Pasha turned to the current head rabbi (Hakham Bashi), stating that the court must adjudicate these claims, and ordering the Hakahm Bashi, Yehuda Qimhi (d. 1902), to be present at the deliberations.[15]

The striking feature of this case are several procedural attempts to keep Mordecai from serving as a murshe. The plaintiffs asked him to represent them after the Pasha decided that their case should be heard, but the judges sought to dissuade him from appearing before them. Their claim was social rather than legal: that the brother, the defendant who initially was appointed as executor of the will, is highly respected and it would be inappropriate to challenge him in court.[16] Mordecai refuses the judges' request (citing a source in the decisor literature), explaining that he already received part of his payment. Another opinion, backing the judges, was proffered by the head of the court (av beit ha-din), named Haim Cohen, stating that Mordecai is related to him and the law restricts him from sitting in judgment regarding a relative. Mordecai rebuts this argument too, citing the Shulhan Arukh, and showing that this case does not fall under the rule that would disqualify the judge.

I am not aware of any kin connection between Haim Cohen and Mordecai that confirms this claim. According to one source, Haim Cohen (d. 1905) was born in Jerba and moved to Tripoli, living there many years. He authored at least seventeen books (mostly published in Leghorn and in Jerba), taught many students, and became the head of the court.[17] In providing a list of his books, Mordecai Hacohen places him under "Jews of Tripoli" (Ha-Cohen 1978: 271). Mordecai's family history differed; its origin was in Genoa about a century earlier (Ha-Cohen 1978: ii8n34; Hakohen 1993: 38-39),[18] while he probably assumed - in traditional terms - that his kohen ritual status links him to biblical Aaron. I surmise that the overriding reason for trying to dismiss Mordecai in the case was that by this time he had become a familiar thorn in the side of the court.

Regarding the case itself - some of the arguments are presented in detail - Mordecai does in fact vigorously challenge the esteemed executor and the documents he brought to court. At one point a judge intervened to defend the position of the respected defendant. Mordecai retorted immediately that it is not proper for judges to answer on behalf of one of the parties. The debate deepened and again a judge responded to a question Mordecai presented to the executor. At this point Mordecai became angry, turned to the head rabbi, and stated that he withdraws from this case because a judge is not supposed to answer on behalf of one of the parties. "Please tell the Pasha," he requests, that the judges do not know how to conduct a case properly.

This step unsettled the judges and tension grew. They themselves withdrew in turn saying that it was Mordecai who did not know the law. The socially prominent executor wrote a letter to the Pasha saying that the murshe was uncultured; it was he who caused the judges to be angry and that is why they withdrew. The Pasha in turn asked the head rabbi what happened and, according to Hacohen, the latter was angered when he learned the details. He agreed that a judge should not speak in place of one of the parties.

After that, the executor received a written decision from the judges and dispatched it to Istanbul with one of his sons. The officials there nullified this written judgment stating that nowhere in the laws of any religion may a judge speak on behalf of one of the parties. Eventually, a compromise was reached between the parties through the mediation of the head rabbi in Tripoli, but the hostility between the court and Mordecai continued. The judges drew up a document agreeing among themselves that Mordecai could not appear as a murshe anymore. Head Rabbi Qimhi, however, refused to confirm that document.

Turning to the last (sixth) brief account, it appears surprising in light of the information already presented, and therefore underlines how much of the context we do not know. His attempt to keep Mordecai out of the aforementioned case notwithstanding, Haim Cohen did not approve the attempt by other judges to prevent Mordecai from appearing as a murshe. In fact, he subsequently hired Mordecai to represent him. There was a complex arrangement between him and the community in Tripoli, providing him with long-term residence there. Haim Cohen lived in a house the community owned, while also making a loan to them. The house was a kind of collateral, while there also existed an element of rent paid by him. A dispute arose in which the community claimed payments owed them, and he turned to Mordecai as a murshe. The latter succeeded in getting a decision favorable to him.

Towards the end of the section Mordecai explains how he continued to function as a murshe, even when the court would not authorize him, by “selling” legal arguments to one of the parties while not appearing in court himself to present them. A brief statement in his introduction to Higgid Mordecai indicates that this provided him a comfortable income. I assume that his presence continued to irritate the court, and that his relationship to the organized community remained tense, but his abilities in the realm of rabbinic law were recognized. In 1920 he moved to Benghazi when he was appointed to the rabbinical court there.

*** 2 The Second Life of Higgid Mordecai

At this point I shift gears. Mordecai’s rich text brought me to explore the changing rabbinic-legal culture in Tripoli while leaving open significant questions. Were there others like him, trying to upgrade the standards of the rabbinic court while learning how to function in new legal arenas? Another question might be: what insights do we gain regarding the role of the Ottoman-appointed Hakham Bashi in Tripoli, and perhaps elsewhere, being asked to “keep an eye on the court” by the Pasha, without being an ultimate arbiter? Or which of these patterns continued into the Italian period? De Felice suggests that when, in 1913, a new legal order prescribed that “disputes between ‘indigenous’ Jews, relating to their civil status, family law, and inheritance could be submitted either to the rabbinical court or the Italian court, ... [the] measure was received favorably by the more modern Jews” (de Felice 1985: 37, 308n29). I do not have the tools to further explore these

questions, and neither is there a great deal of material available to supplement Higgid Mordecai.[19]

Instead, I turn to reflections upon my long-term engagement with Haco-hen's manuscript, running from his account of Jewish communities in the hinterland through his actions in court which at times had wide reverberations, that might have relevance for other anthropological forays into heavily-textualized arenas. The ensuing discussion thus deals with the "second life" of Higgid Mordecai, subsequent to Hacohen's last revisions of it in the second decade of the twentieth century.

The discussion may be framed as follows. What would be the nature of our knowledge, surrounding a rural qadi in Morocco on the one hand, or an intelligent and active, but maverick, talmid hakham in Libya on the other, without the anthropological input that serendipitously entered their life-stories?[20] In the case of Qadi 'Abd ar-Rahman, one part of the story has an obvious answer: - events entering the notes of anthropologist Eickelman that left no other record. Some of these events relate to Jews who lived in the region.

The appointment of 'Abd ar-Rahman to the position of qadi, in 1957, meant moving to a new town. According to Eickelman (1985: 121):

he was aware that an era had come to an end . [and] prepared a list of men of learning who had been entertained at his brother's house (who also was a learned notable) . from its construction . until Moroccan independence. The heading of the list specifies ulama wa-shurafa (scholars and descendants of the prophet), but only those shurafa who were also men of learning are included.

That list certainly would interest future historians as it was composed, but because of his personal contact with the qadi, Eickelman was able to add further context: "Jewish men of learning, like the French, were not (my emphasis) enumerated, although 'Abd ar-Rahman recalls that one of his elder brother's respected local friends was a rabbi . who visited him regularly." This direct rapportage upends simplistic distinctions between the tasks of historians and anthropologists.

Turning to the second part of this "what-if?" procedure, I now sketch several stages over six decades, at which scholars from outside of Libya were exposed to Hacohen's manuscript, in order to speculate why it was intervention by an anthropologist that finally brought the manuscript to its full publication. Some episodes partially have been discussed before, but I weave them together here into an account of anthropological input to the work of a traditional (and innovative) North African scholar. The occurrence of which we have the

fullest (but by no means complete) knowledge is Hacohen's meeting with Nahum Slouschz (1871-1966) in Tripoli.

Slouschz made several trips to North Africa. He reached Libya in 1906 (then under Ottoman rule), sent by the Alliance Israelite Universelle to report on the local aiu school and the situation of Jews there. In Tripoli, he was directed to Hacohen who was familiar with some of the smaller communities, and earlier had sent a report to the aiu on the Jews in the "remote" Jebel Nefusa.[21] Haco-hen agreed to be Slouschz's guide, taking several trips, including one to Cyre-naica (by boat). This "native guide," however, not only knew the territory but shared intellectual interests parallel to those that drove Slouschz. At the time, Hacohen was close to finishing his manuscript on the history, institutions, and customs of the Jews of Libya.

Slouschz asked Hacohen to keep a diary (in Hebrew) during their trip in Tripolitania, something that became clear only with the publication of Slous-chz's personal papers (Ha-Cohen 1969: 45-90). From these we can see how extensive was the knowledge gained by Slouschz from Hacohen, and there also are records of fourteen letters between them up through 1910 (Hakohen 1993: 23-24). In one letter, Slouschz asked for additional material to be sent, and in another the idea appeared of Hacohen's manuscript being published in Paris (I assume this meant published in translation, but the letter is not explicit). There is no further mention of this project, but another manuscript by Hacohen, corresponding to a portion of Higgid Mordecai, was given to the National Library and possibly was sent to Slouschz with publication in mind.[22]

Up to the late 1960s, the most widely-known account of the small communities in Libya was that published by Slouschz (1927).[23] As an anthropologist examining Slouschz's account in relation to that of Hacohen, I was struck by Slouschz's insertion of what he learned about "the Jebel" into an evolutionist perspective wherein societies are located on a conceptual ladder, and his application of this notion to Jewish history (Hakohen 1993: 25), while Hacohen, though he acknowledges being influenced by the trip together with Slouschz, eschews grand schemes. In the early report he sent to the aiu (see note 20), he remarks upon Jewish antiquities scattered throughout the Jebel Nefusa towards its conclusion. In Higgid Mordecai, he begins the section on the Nefusa with this information, but not in terms parallel to those proposed by Slouschz. The lasting value of Hacohen's description is his detailed ethnography.

Thus, Hacohen played a central role in Slouschz's becoming "the expert" on Libya within the expanding "republic of Hebrew letters" of which Slouschz was a known participant. Slouschz acknowledges Hacohen's assistance, but not to the extent that one would expect by today's conventions (Goldberg 2004: 1112). Might one speculate that Slouschz did not energetically push the plan for publishing Hacohen's manuscript because it might detract from the impact of his own efforts? We cannot uncover his motives, but my guess is that Slouschz's initial suggestion was genuine. As time passed, however, the link between the two men weakened,

allowing Slouschz, consciously or not, gradually to minimize Hacohen's role in his own accomplishments.

A second stage of outside attention to Hacohen's writings occurred as Italian control of Libya consolidated. Martino Mario Moreno, a scholar trained in Semitic languages, was assigned to Libya by the Ministry of the Colonies, and his duties included bringing knowledge of the local society to Italian readers. I imagine that, like other experts from abroad, he was directed to Hacohen, and also surmise that he welcomed discovering a book on the local Jewish community "ready-made," that only had to be translated from the Hebrew. The first product of this collaboration was published in Benghazi in 1924, and a second, slightly modified version, appeared later in Rome (Cohen n.d.). Relatively recently, Robert Attal (1993) acquired and published a copy of the contract signed between Moreno and Hacohen in Tripoli in 1915, indicating its terms. Moreno committed himself to come four hours a day to Hacohen's house, and to complete the work within a certain time limit. When the translation (plus material added for the envisioned readership) appeared, Moreno explained in the introduction that it is one segment of a larger work, and described Haco-hen as contributing to history, folklore, and ethnography. My hunch is that for Hacohen, this publication was acceptable closure of his efforts to bring Higgid Mordecai to a scholarly audience. Below, I add one more detail about Haco-hen's work with Moreno, but first turn to the stage whereby the manuscript first reached Jerusalem.

There was another copy of the manuscript. After Hacohen's death, one of his sons - Yehuda (Leone, in Italian) - was in charge of it. His children understandably wished to publish the full Hebrew work. An opportunity arose when Tripoli came under British control early in 1943. Within the Allied forces were Jewish volunteer soldiers from Mandate Palestine. Among the military chaplains assigned them was Ephraim Urbach (1912-1991), later to become professor of Talmud at the Hebrew University and also serve as president of Israel's National Academy of Sciences. In 2008, Urbach's diary kept during his military service was published; it mentions Yehuda Hacohen and the manuscript (bound like a book) in his possession (Urbach 2008: 184-85).

Yehuda approached Urbach who took the manuscript to examine it. The latter recorded this event, as well as an appointment he made to meet Yehuda and discuss his father's book. Urbach remarks in the diary that the book includes some odd (Hebrew: muzar) subjects, and also mentions a promise to write a brief description of it. There is no record of Urbach's writing anything, but he apparently persuaded Yehuda that the safest place for the future of the manuscript was the National Library in Jerusalem.[24]

Few scholars paid attention to the manuscript after it arrived. Eventually, it was examined closely by Haim Z. Hirschberg and one of his students (see below). The family owned another copy that remained in Tripoli, reaching Israel when Yehuda and several siblings arrived with the large immigration between 1949 and 1951. They also possessed a collection of their father's papers that they later gave to the National Library as well.[25] At a certain

point, librarians came to the family and took the materials that interested them, while leaving several cartons of papers deemed unimportant. I later saw these cartons when I first met the family (in the mid-1970s), specifically with Toni (Fortuna) Mosseiri, a younger sister who took charge of this literary estate after Yehuda died. Among the remaining papers were hand-written pages containing Hebrew and Italian; I believe they were working drafts of the joint project of Hacohen and Moreno. One might muse that had Hacohen been a major contemporary writer, or had lived centuries ago, librarians would have found value in these preliminary documents as well. Eventually Mosseiri donated them to the Porat Yosef Yeshiva, a prominent institution of Sephardic Jewry. While many factors were involved, it is possible to see a tendency towards peripheralization, both in Urbach's quick assessment of the book and also in the library's lack of interest in the broader context of Hacohen's work.

At this same period, the first stirrings were felt in Israel that more attention must be paid to the recent history and culture of Middle East Jewish communities. An important marker was Hirschberg's 1965 two-volume publication; he consulted and cited Higgid Mordecai (Ha-Cohen 1978) extensively. A few years later, in his contribution to the Encyclopaedia Judaica on "Libya," Hirsch-berg (1971) wrote, "most of the information in [Slouschz's] books about the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries stems from his guide, Mordecai Haco-hen, whose history based on earlier sources is still in manuscript." Hirschberg directed a 1969 M.A. thesis utilizing the manuscript in detail.[26] When I met its author - a student born in Libya - in the 1970s, he said that there had been discussion of his publishing Hacohen's manuscript but certain health considerations kept him from undertaking the task.

There also was a parallel initiative from another source, Rabbi Frija Zuaretz (1907-1993), a prominent leader of the Libyan Jewish community in Israel (Goldberg 1992), but for some reason that I did not explore, some misunderstandings between him and the Hacohen family kept the idea from moving forward. Zuaretz had no link to events early in the twentieth century, but my sense was that his standing in Israel tainted him with memories of the tension between Mordecai and the former community leadership, introducing an aura of suspicion into the attempted cooperation and eventually undermining it. When I broached the idea of publishing the part of the manuscript describing the hinterland communities (and an English translation) - concerning which I felt I had some scholarly competence - to Hirschberg and to Zuaretz, they each welcomed the idea. Further consultation with the Ben-Zvi Institute, the institution most likely to host such a project, led to their encouraging me to edit the full Hebrew manuscript. I agreed, and from then on worked in close cooperation with the institute, as well as with others who helped me with various parts of the text. The project came to completion in 1978.

Another, pragmatic, aspect of the undertaking awaited closure as well. It was felt that publishing the book required the assent of the Hacohen siblings. The Ben-Zvi Institute approached them - through Ms. Mosseiri - and they assented to the idea while also contributing to the publication costs. My conjecture is that their relationship with me that began on a personal basis, and also the more formal connection to the institute, were perceived as separate from the past troubled involvement with "the community." I believe

they felt that “finally,” their father’s book was not being ignored. At the end of an evening event taking place at the Ben-Zvi Institute after the book appeared, Ms. Mosseiri remarked to me that I could be considered her father’s grandson.

Summing up, was it just a “coincidence” that the end to this “ignorance,” which took various forms, was facilitated by an anthropologist, or, might the effort be seen as growing out of that discipline’s cold-and-warm alignment with historical and other expressions of textual-based investigation? The story of Slouschz’s relation to Hacohen is too complex to summarize in a phrase (Goldberg 2004), but it is obvious that he should have given Mordecai much more credit. Moreno’s writing about the book was respectful to Hacohen. In fact, I once asked Toni Mosseiri about her father’s close associates. She did not name other Jews, but did include Moreno among the three people she cited (Hakohen 1993: 13). In terms of the wider setting, the Italian publication appeared in a framework of getting to know the “others” in the North African colony.

There also is further irony to Urbach’s responsible but not too interested treatment of the manuscript. Slouschz’s writings were known to Urbach, not because of any special interest in North Africa, but because Slouschz belonged to a generation of people, some of whom were his friends from teenage years in Odessa, who made significant contributions to developing Hebrew culture (Goldberg 2004: 8). At one point during his assignment, Urbach traveled to the interior of Tripolitania using Slouschz as a guidebook to contemporary and earlier Jewish life there (Urbach 2008: 130-33). He had no inkling that the somewhat “odd” manuscript he encouraged Yehuda Hacohen to send to Jerusalem was an important source of Slouschz’s knowledge.

Why, then, do I think that anthropological input was an ingredient yielding Higgid Mordecai’s ultimate publication? I cannot neatly define a feature of anthropology analytically distinct from what historians do, but instead evoke a mixture of metaphors in seeking to specify what was at work. Accompanying all the phases of the sustained effort was my earlier intense fieldwork with actual people from Tripolitania. That experience constituted a kind of ethnographic yeast that kept expanding, implicitly pushing me to imbue Hacohen’s text with lived dimensions.

At the same time, the overall process cannot be understood without acknowledging a cautious readiness by textually-anchored scholars to receive an extra-disciplinary excursion into their realm. I, having become hooked via ethnography to Jews from Libya, perhaps became the “bait” that invited some researchers to look more closely at the unfamiliar but intriguing “creature” - Mordecai Hacohen - who had been circulating in their pond for some time.

Loose as these metaphors may be, I hope they persuade that anthropological input to publishing Higgid Mordecai, albeit elusive, was very real.

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** 2. Islamic Education in Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century India

Muhammad Qasim Zaman

Focusing primarily on South Asia, this chapter seeks to briefly explore the question of what it means for the madrasa and Islamic learning in late medieval and early modern India to have existed as a tradition and to provide a glimpse of some of the practices that went into making and sustaining that tradition. I seek also to illustrate some of the ways in which wider intellectual trends interacted with local contexts in helping forge an intellectual tradition. Another question that informs this overview relates to the presence of rival trends within the realm of the madrasa and how they have competed for relative influence even as they have coexisted in various measures.

*** 1. Practices, Institutions, Traditions

From their beginnings in Khurasan in the tenth century, and their gradual spread in both eastern and western Islamic lands from the late eleventh century onwards, many a madrasa has brought both learning and distinction to its locale. The most famous of the early madrasas were the Nizamiyyas, founded in more than ten cities in Iran and Iraq under the patronage of the Seljuq vizier Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092) (Arjomand 1999: 270). Later madrasas had their own claims to distinction. The Mustansiriyya, established by the Abbasid caliph al-Mustansir (r. 1226-1242) in Baghdad in 1234, was, for instance, the first to be endowed by a caliph and the first to have professorships in all four of the Sunni schools of law that had emerged as pre-eminent by that time (Hillenbrand 1960-2002. For an account of the founding of this madrasa, see Ibn al-Fuwati 1997: 80-86). Madrasas established in Iran in the age of the Il-Khanids (c. 12601335) and the Timurids (1370-1507) were often part of what have been characterized as “educational-charitable complexes” that included not only mosques but also Sufi convents and hospitals and, as such, represented a vast increase in scope and function over even the grandest of the earlier madrasas (Arjomand 1999:271-76, especially 272).

Yet, fundamentally, and for much of its history in many - though not all - Muslim societies, the madrasa is best understood not as the name of a particular kind of institutional structure dedicated to the transmission of learning but rather as a set of practices concerned with such transmission. In a seminal study of a prominent madrasa in early twentieth-century Marrakesh, Dale Eickelman (1985: 86) noted that the

Yusufiya had no sharply defined body of students or faculty, administration, entrance or course examinations, curriculum, or unified sources of funds. In fact, its former teachers related with amusement the frustrated efforts of French colonial officials to determine who its “responsible” leaders were and to treat it as a corporate entity analogous to a medieval European university.

Writing in 1910, Shibli Nu'mani (1934a: 102-3), a traditionally-educated religious scholar of colonial India who died in 1914, had characterized the difference between Western and Islamic styles of learning as follows:

An imposing building, a group of specialists in particular fields, a series of lectures, a limited number of hours (after which the building becomes lifeless) - these are the things that, in combination, constitute a university or a college. In earlier usage, however, a college meant the presence of a particular person. A college would come about wherever he happened to be located [literally: wherever he sat down]. A vast number of people would gather around him to benefit from him, and his grace (fayd) would pour forth on them all the time. Day or night, whatever he said was an academic lecture. His actions, his comportment, his mannerisms - all comprised practical but silent lectures. The chains of his students would continue to expand so that this living college soon became a great university.[27]

Though an idealized portrait, of course, Nu'mani's statement has the merit of drawing attention to the central role that the person of the scholar-teacher, rather than his institutional setting, had in the transmission of learning. This is not to say that madrasas had nothing to do with learning, only that they did not assume a necessarily, or primarily, institutional form.[28] The broader point to which Nu'mani alludes here is that the learning in question was part of a set of practices tha[[t th]]e professor was expected to embody and exemplify.[29] That learning itself comprised particular practices: these included training students in how to engage in what Khaled El-Rouayheb (2015: 97-128) characterized as a "deep reading" (mutala'a) of texts and of the relevant commentaries on them (cf. Wali Allah 1858: 3); teaching them how to resolve the difficulties posed by the material under study and to enter into debate and disputation about the problems they raised; having them acquire the skills for writing a gloss or a commentary on a text (Wali Allah 1858: 8); and so forth. In turn, those practices related to others that, as Nu'mani put it, were in the nature of practical but silent lectures. These could take the form of norms of comportment, of how one conducted oneself as an aspiring scholar. Other areas of intellectual, religious, spiritual, and social life were often part of the madrasa's universe, too, and some of these merit a brief comment here.

A key role was played in this regard by Sufism. In the foregoing passage, Nu'mani speaks of the master's grace pouring forth at all times on those around him. The specific word - fayd - he had used in this connection is an evocative Sufi term. According to the great Andalusian mystic Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 1240), "the way of gaining knowledge is divided between reflection (fikr) and bestowal (wahb), which is the divine effusion (fayd). The latter is the way of our companions" (Chittick 1989: 169, quoting Ibn al-'Arabi 1911: 1, 261). Yet, the two forms of acquiring knowledge were often part of the same set of practices, as the following examples should suggest. In an autobiographical essay, the noted eighteenth-century hadith scholar and Sufi Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762) of Delhi, on whom I will say more in what follows, has given us a brief but vivid account of his education, much of which he had received from his father. At age fifteen, he had been initiated into the Naqshbandi Sufi path by his father and, alongside works on Qur'anic exegesis, the reported teachings of the Prophet Muhammad

(hadith), law, theology, logic, and philosophy, he had studied a number of Naqshbandi and other Sufi texts (Husain 1912: 17172).[30] Tellingly, his reading of the Qur'an at this time was itself inflected with Sufi piety:

One of the great blessings [on me] was that I was present with [my father] on several occasions when the Qur'an was read by way of reflection on its meanings and on the occasions of its revelation, and with reference to its commentaries. This [opportunity] became the cause of a great opening [fath-i ^razim] forme.

husain 1912: 172

Wali Allah's Persian translation of the Qur'an is titled Fath al-Rahman - with fath bearing unmistakable connotations of a Sufi-inflected unveiling. He goes on to note that, following the completion of his education and the death of his father, he taught "religious (kutub-i diniyya) and rational books" for about twelve years and that "in those days of [mystical] opening, unity and expansiveness came to be accompanied by the experience of [divine] attraction and of progress along the Sufi path, with the mystical sciences (^culum wijdaniyya) descending [upon me] in droves" (Husain 1912: 173).

Wali Allah was not quite unusual in this regard, as another example from the generation following his should illustrate. Mulla 'Abd al-Ali (d. 1810), better known by his title, Bahr al-'Ulum - "the ocean of the sciences" - belonged to one of the most notable scholarly families of late Mughal and early colonial India, the Farangi Mahall of Lucknow. Over the course of a distinguished career, 'Abd al-'Ali wrote a learned book on core Islamic rituals (arkan) as well as commentaries and glosses on a number of philosophical, theological, and juristic works. He was devoted to the teachings of Ibn al-'Arabi and he wrote what became an influential commentary on the Masnavi of Rumi (d. 1273) in the light of Ibn al-'Arabi's teachings. Like Wali Allah, his scholarship and his career as a teacher were clearly shaped by his strong Sufi proclivities, which may also be assumed to have guided the scholarly practices he had sought to inculcate among his numerous students.[31]

Just as Sufi piety provided some of the context in which scholarly practices were pursued and inculcated, so did patronage. The case of 'Abd al-Ali Bahr al-'Ulum is again instructive in this regard. He had begun his career in Lucknow, which is where his extended family resided. His grandfather, Mulla Qutb al-din (d. 1691-92), had been murdered because of a local feud and the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707) had given his family a mansion in Lucknow that had previously belonged to a European merchant. That is how the family had come to be known as the Farangi Mahallis - namely those associated with the "European's residence" ('Inayat Allah 1988: 43-55). 'Abd al-'Ali would have to leave his native Lucknow on account of his alleged involvement in a conflict with the locally dominant Shi'a. At a time when the Mughal empire was in chronic decline and quasi-independent

rulers governed their local principalities, he would find many patrons in succession, namely the ruler of Shahjahan-pur in what is now Uttar Pradesh; of Rampur, also in today's Uttar Pradesh; of Buhar, in Bengal; and of Carnatic, in south India. Significantly, the English, too, were among his patrons, for they seem to have had some role in getting him invited to Bengal (Hasani 1947-1970: vol. 7, 284). Some of his patrons are reported to have built madrasas for him, but he was a traveling madrasa in his own right. It is telling that he tended to proceed from one center of patronage to another with an entourage of students even as he attracted others to his presence; nearly a hundred students are said to have traveled with him when he moved to Bengal (Ansari 1881: 123).[32] He was the kind of person who best fitted Nu'ma-ni's characterization of the madrasa as the site where a distinguished scholar happened, at any given time, to be located.

Grand madrasas were built, too, though far less commonly in India than in some other Muslim societies.[33] Royal and other governmental patronage did not need to take the form exclusively of monumental structures, and it was no less substantial for taking other forms. Such patronage was also a form of practice, one intertwined with the many other practices that went into the making and sustaining of a religious and scholarly tradition. About the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, it is reported, for instance, that he "assisted students, in proportion to their proficiency, with daily stipends, so that they might apply themselves [to their studies] with all their hearts. They say that the students of Mizan received one anna, of Munsha'ib [both elementary works in Arabic grammar] two annas, and up to Sharh-i wiqaya [a work on Hanafi law by 'Ubayd Allah b. Mas'ud al-Mahbubi, d. 1346] ... eight annas per diem. The eight annas allowance was continued until the student had attained complete proficiency. After this they were set apart to teach others and worship the Creator, and received a grant from the revenue of mu'afi [tax-exempt] villages and a daily allowance according to their needs" (Faiz Bakhsh 1888: 104-5; see also Kazim 1868: 108586; Khan 1927: 258. All these references are cited in Umar 1993: 261).

The relationship between educational practice and the enabling role of royal oversight and patronage is illustrated by an analogy provided by Wali Allah. Discussing the co-relation between legitimist claims to political authority and the actual assertion of political power with reference to the case of 'Ali (r. 656-661), the fourth of the Rashidun caliphs and the first imam in the Shi'i reckoning, Wali Allah gives the hypothetical example of a teacher appointed by a king to teach at a madrasa. Despite the king's command to the students to study with that teacher, for some reason or other, no teaching sessions actually take place. In this circumstance, observes Wali Allah, it could equally be said that there is a teacher in the madrasa but that people do not study with him or that there is no teacher in this madrasa since no teaching is in fact taking place there (Wali Allah 1976: vol. 1, 142-43). Wali Allah's example here is incidental to his point, which is that it is possible that someone might have all the attributes of legitimate rule and yet not be able to rule so that it could be said of him equally truly that he is or that he is not the ruler. His chosen example is nonetheless instructive for our purposes. It illustrates, on the one hand, how royal authority was recognized as creating some of the conditions in which educational practices took place. On the other hand, it suggests that even the presence of a teacher, let alone the existence of the madrasa as a physical entity, did not suffice for the pursuit of learning. It also required

certain kinds of practice, and those might or might not come about even if other things appeared to be at hand.

An anecdote from the recorded discourses (malfuzat) of Wali Allah's son, Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 1824), is worth considering, too, for the additional light that it sheds on the madrasa as the site of particular sets of practices.

A singer of devotional songs (qawwal) once came to 'Abd al-Aziz at his ma-drasa to request him to name his newborn daughter. Having suggested a name, 'Abd al-'Aziz asked him to perform the raga Dhanasari. The qawwal complied for a while and then suggested that he perform something different, such as some of 'Abd al-'Aziz's own Arabic poetry. The revered scholar, intent upon continuing to listen to the same raga, responded: "this is not a madrasa, such that it [the recitation] would need to be in Arabic; Hindi is perfectly good for the occasion" (Bashiruddin 1897: 65; for a slightly different translation, see Rizvi 2004: 77-78). What is remarkable about this report is, of course, that it was, indeed, a madrasa at which this performance was taking place. 'Abd al-'Aziz's point was nonetheless that it was only when people engaged in certain kinds of practice that the place became a madra-sa; otherwise, it was just a location, one where a classical Indian raga could be enjoyed without any sense of unease.

*** 2. The Transregional and the Local

As seen in the case of Bahr al-'Ulum, scholars were mobile, moving from one patron or locale to another. The relevance of this point extends beyond questions of patronage, however. It also has to do with the introduction of particular practices as well as of texts in particular regions. The introduction of a book into a particular locale might depend not on its intrinsic quality alone but also on its availability - on whether a scholar had it in his possession, whether he could make a credible claim to having been authorized by his teachers to teach it to others, whether it could be fitted into the local intellectual culture and aligned with the tastes of its audience. Works regarded as indispensable in one culture might well remain unheard of in another, just as many works would regularly continue to fall out of circulation. Some jurists specifically required that the texts on which a mufti relied to issue his fatwas ought to be in broad circulation for his legal pronouncements to be credible (Ibn al-Humam 1970: vol. 7, 256; cf. Wali Allah 1965: 35). Thus, a scholar who might, in one locale, have easily drawn on a well-recognized work would be unable to invoke it in his fatwas in another, where it might simply be unavailable. They could always be introduced by him there, of course, but it is unlikely that they would acquire sufficient currency rapidly enough for him to base his juristic responsa on them. Being in possession of a chain of transmission through which one claimed to have acquired the right to teach and transmit a text was likewise an acceptable way of putting it to use (Ibn al-Humam 1970: vol. 7, 256; Wali Allah 1965: 35), but even this may have worked better with, say, hadith reports than with large works of substantive law in a milieu where they were previously unknown.[34]

Mahmud b. Ahmad al-Bukhari (d. 1219), a Central Asian jurist of the Hana-fi school of law, had noted in the preface to his Muhit al-Burhani - a major compendium of Hanafi law - that the legal writings of his ancestors were all in circulation, that they were relied upon by judges and muftis, and that he had compiled his Muhit in order to join their scholarly company (al-Bukhari 2003: vol. 1, 22-23). Ironically, however, the Muhit itself fell out of circulation, and some scholars - notably the Egyptian Hanafi jurist Ibn Nujaym (d. 1563) - disallowed fatwas with reference to it (Ibn Nujaym 1998: 291). Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hayy (d. 1886), the pre-eminent Farangi Mahall scholar of the late nineteenth century, notes that, like some others before him, he had assumed the disallowing of fatwas on the basis of the Muhit to have been a function of the book’s poor quality. But, having chanced upon a copy of the manuscript, he found it to be a generally sound work. “It then became clear to me,” ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Laknawi (1973: 206) wrote,

that [Ibn Nujaym’s] interdiction of fatwas on its basis had to do, not with the intrinsic qualities of this work or [the credentials] of its author, but only with the fact that the book had become inaccessible. This is a matter that varies from one age or region to another. Many a book is extinct in one place but available in another, hard to find at one time and plentiful at another. ... Consequently, if a work [like the Muhit] is found to be in wide circulation at a particular time or place, the [earlier] ruling [concerning its inadmissibility in fatwas] is revoked.

Related to but going beyond the availability of particular texts to people at a certain time and place is the larger question of how intellectual traditions interacted with the particular regional contexts in which they might come to find themselves. What did it mean for texts originating in Central Asia or Iran or Anatolia or Egypt to be studied in, say, northern India? In writing a commentary or gloss on a particular text, as was standard practice in the milieu of the madrasa, a scholar was not simply explaining it to his students and readers. Nor was he only adding to his resume, establishing his scholarly credentials, instructing his students in the relevant crafts, and seeking patrons. He could be and often was doing all of that, but such writing could serve also to appropriate a text to a particular milieu, to make it intelligible in a particular time and place (Brentjes 2018: 225).

In a short tract called Risala-yi danishmandi, which was concerned with the principles of pedagogy that ought to guide a teacher as he trained his students in the fundamental intellectual skills that would allow them to become scholars and teachers in their own right, Wali Allah noted that the teacher ought to make his discourse easily understandable (sahl al-tanawul) (Wali Allah 1858: 7).[35] He had also given other basic advice to teachers: to explain difficult and unfamiliar terms in the text under study and to illustrate complex ideas with examples (Wali Allah 1858: 5-6); to distinguish in a text things liable to be conflated with each other and to try to harmonize seemingly conflicting things (tatbiq-i mukhtalifayn), or explain how to account for the divergence in question (Wali Allah 1858: 6); translate the passages under discussion into the native language of his students (Wali Allah 1858: 7); and, not least, “combine the author’s text with [the teacher’s] own [discourse] in a way that the result is a harmonious blend” (Wali Allah 1858: 7). This is the kind of advice that would have been good for any aspirant to

pedagogical success, but at least some of it helped to indigenize an otherwise foreign intellectual tradition to local conditions.[36]

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, one can see some of these principles at work in Wali Allah's own intellectual career. His concern with making things simpler and translating them as needed is best illustrated by his translation of the Qur'an into Persian. He spent a good deal of his intellectual energies on harmonizing the differences between rival schools of Sunni law, between law and Sufism, and within Sufism. Wali Allah's Izalat al-khafa ^can khilafat al-khulafa, a large work that seeks to highlight the merit of the first two Rashidun caliphs, Abu Bakr (r. 632-634) and 'Umar (r. 634-644), against Shi'i detractors, proceeds by way of extensive quotation from hadith and is an excellent example of the "blending" (mazj) of the texts under discussion and the teacher's own discourse that Wali Allah advocates in his Risala-yi danishmandi. Finally, it is worth noting that Wali Allah's writings are replete with illustrations drawn from his natural and cultural environment in India. For instance, enlarging on his signature argument that God communicates with people in an idiom and in terms of ideas and practices to which they are already accustomed, Wali Allah (2010: vol. 1, 258; as translated, with some modification, by Hermansen 2003: 265), observes:

a speaker of Arabic who only knows the Arabic language, when knowledge is represented to him through verbalization, will find it only represented to him in Arabic, not in some other language. Likewise, in those countries where elephants and other animals of ugly appearance (sayyi al-manzar) are found, the visitation of the jinn and the frightening of the devils appear to its inhabitants in the form of these animals, while this is not so in other countries.

Many of Wali Allah's fellow Indians would not have agreed that an elephant was an animal of ugly appearance but they would have concurred, of course, that the sight of a wild elephant could inspire great terror. In any case, to an Indian audience, it is a readily accessible example. To take another instance, in speaking of the Qur'an's aesthetic qualities, Wali Allah invoked Indian ragas - which he had heard country folk perform - to note that what people had in common was their ability to find pleasure in melody, but that the principles governing it and their particular tastes in it necessarily varied from place to place (Wali Allah n.d.a: 30).

On the question of how a wide-ranging intellectual tradition might be indigenized, it is worth noting, too, that, in India, as indeed elsewhere, the texts that were often taught to students included not only old classics but also books of relatively recent vintage. Bahr al-'Ulum's father, Mulla Nizam al-din (d. 1748), is often credited with formalizing a curriculum of madrasa education and, though that curriculum would continue to evolve, the imprint Nizam al-din had put on it is highlighted by its very name - the Dars-i Nizami. In a work devoted to scholars and saints of the Farangi Mahall, Wali Allah Ansari (d. 1853), a scion of the family who died just a few years before the formal establishment of British colonial rule (and is not to be confused with Shah Wali Allah of Delhi),[37] speaks frequently of "textbooks"

(kutub-i darsiyya) (Ansari 1881: 9) and, indeed, of “the textbooks used in these regions” (kutub-i darsiyya-yi in di-yar) (Ansari 1881: 35). This suggests the role someone like Mulla Nizam al-din may have played some generations earlier in helping standardize the curriculum, though that standardization would presumably have built upon texts that were already well-established in his part of the world. The receptivity of the curriculum to works produced in India, and written in living memory, is worth noting. Several of the works included in Nizam al-din’s curriculum were by scholars more or less contemporary with him, notably the Sullam al-Ulum, a work on logic by Muhibb Allah Bihari (d. 1707); the Musallam al-thubut, on legal theory, also by Muhibb Allah Bihari; and another legal work, the Nur al-anwar, by Mulla Jiwan (d. 1717). These were fellow Indian scholars (Nu‘mani 1934b: vol. 3, 100; Zaman 2007: 66; for a similar point, though not with specific reference to India, see Brentjes 2018: 225). It was common for subsequent generations of "ulama to write glosses on such works and, in the process, to indig-enize the tradition still further.

*** 3. Rival Traditions: Competition and Confluence

I turn now to the question of rival traditions in the literal and figurative space of the madrasa. In broad terms, it is possible to distinguish two streams of education in northern India in the eighteenth century - the rationalist, which was represented by the Farangi Mahall scholars, though not by them alone, and the traditionalist, represented by Shah Wali Allah. [38] Yet, a positing of such differentiation would be misleading if we do not first note the considerable overlap that existed between these two streams. As Wali Allah’s aforementioned Risala-yi Danishmandi itself shows, luminaries in the rationalist tradition such as Sa‘d al-din Taftazani (d. 1390), Jalal al-din Dawani (d. 1504), Habib Allah Mirza Jan (d. c. 1586), and Mir Muhammad Zahid (d. 1689-90) were part of his intellectual genealogy.[39] About Wali Allah’s son Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, often remembered like his father as muhaddith Dihlawi - the hadith-scholar from Delhi - it was said that he “was immensely learned in the religious sciences (al-Ulum al-diniyya) and was knowledgeable (‘arifan) in logic and philosophy” (al-Hasani 1970: vol. 8, 210, quoting the rationalist scholar ‘Abd al-Haqq Khayrabadi who died in 1900). Students and scholars routinely drew from both rationalist and traditionalist streams. Sadr al-din Azarda (d. 1858), who had served as a mufti and judge for the British before getting into trouble on suspicion of having issued a fatwa in support of the Mutiny of 1857, is reported to have acquired the “transmitted” sciences - that is those not primarily concerned with reason and rationalism - from Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and other members of his family and the rational sciences from Fadl-i Imam Khayrabadi (d. 1828), a noted scholar in those areas of inquiry (‘Ali 1914: 93).[40] For his part, ‘Abd al-Razzaq b. Jamal al-din (d. 1889), a prominent Sufi master from the Farangi Mahall family, had studied hadith with students of Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (‘Inayat Allah 1988: 153).[41]

Yet, if there were significant overlaps between the rationalist and the traditionalist streams, the distinctions between them could also be substantial. In his Tafhimat al-Ilahiyya, Wali Allah castigated those training to become ‘u-lama for

“busying themselves with the Greek sciences (‘ulum al-Yunaniyyin) and with morphology (al-sarf), syntax (al-nahw), and rhetoric (al-ma‘ani) and thinking that this was knowledge [proper].” He (Wali Allah 1967: vol. 1, 282-83) continued:

Knowledge [proper] comprises [rather] a clear verse from the Book of God, which you [ought to] study together with the exegesis of its peculiarities and its difficulties as well as the occasion of its revelation. It comprises, too, the normative example of the Prophet of God, so that you learn how the Prophet performed the ablutions; ... how he fasted, undertook the pilgrimage, and conducted warfare; what his speech was like, the guarding of his tongue, and his manners, so that you can follow his guidance. . Also [included in this knowledge proper is] righteous obligation (farida ‘adila), which you ought to learn - the elements of ablutions, ritual prayers and their parts, the minimum amount on which zakat becomes due and how much one ought to give away, and the shares from the inheritance of the deceased. Additional to this are the accounts of military expeditions (al-siyar) and the stories of the companions [of the Prophet] and their successors, which serve as an exhortation [to be mindful] of the hereafter. As for what you have busied yourself with, and have gone to excess in pursuing, it is not knowledge conducive to the hereafter (^culum al-akhira) but rather worldly knowledge (^culum al-dunya).

In his Altaf al-quds, too - a work in mystical thought that sought to steer clear of both the rational and the transmitted sciences - Wali Allah (1894: 95) had offered a stinging denunciation of

the followers of the philosophers, who, in regard to the beliefs they hold in opposition to the beliefs of the prophets of God, ... are dogs, indeed worse than dogs. A dog does not sniff at an old bone whereas these wretched ones are sniffing at and licking two thousand year old bones.[42]

The Farangi Mahall scholars, for their part, were typically concerned with precisely the kind of sciences of which Wali Allah was highly critical. And they allowed a much smaller space in their curriculum to scripture, commentary and hadith than what Wali Allah had studied with his father or what he would be concerned with in his own teaching and writing. For instance, the aforementioned Wali Allah Ansari (d. 1853), a prolific Farangi Mahall scholar, was the first of only two scholars in this family ever to have written a commentary on the Qur’an (‘Inayat Allah 1998: 281).[43] Ansari was unusual among the Farangi Mahallis for his interest in the transmitted sciences, but there were some others, too. One notable instance is represented by Anwar al-Haqq b. Ahmad ‘Abd al-Haqq (d. 1821), a leading Sufi master of the family. Though a student of the famed ‘Abd al-‘Ali Bahr al-‘Ulum, Anwar al-Haqq had a dim view of the rational sciences: “the fruit of the speculative sciences (^culum-i nazariyya) is nothing but disputation and argumentation,” he is quoted as saying. “It is useless for the Hereafter, though in this world

it does help overcome the opposing side; such sciences are best abandoned” (Ansari 1881: 36).[44] ‘Abd al-Hayy Laknawi, whose comment on works falling out of circulation was cited earlier, was likewise unusual for the extent of his interest in hadith studies.[45]

Conversely, even apart from the evidence of his own education and that of his sons, Wali Allah’s polemic against the rational sciences remains misleading. His magnum opus, the Hujjat Allah al-baligha, though focused on hadith, is premised on the conviction that not only are shari‘a injunctions concerned with the protection and promotion of human interests (masa-lih) but also, crucially, that the way in which these interests are promoted is rationally discernible and demonstrable. In concluding the first part of that book, he had noted (Wali Allah 2010: vol. 1, 451; translation, with minor modifications, from Hermansen 2003: 478, emphasis added), in evoking tradition, reason, and mysticism, that

God, may He be exalted, put into my heart ... a measure by which to recognize the cause of every difference arising in the community of the Prophet Muhammad, may peace and blessing be on him, and of what is correct according to God and His messenger, and He enabled me to confirm this by rational and shari‘a proofs (al-dala’il al-‘aqliyya wal-naqliyya) so that there should remain no ambiguity or doubt.

In the end, his criticism of the rational sciences had more to do, perhaps, with a desire to distinguish his own intellectual tradition from the more uncompromising votaries of the rational sciences than it did with a disavowal of those sciences.

Besides a difference of emphasis in terms of content, there were differences in pedagogical styles as well. Mulla Qutb al-din and his son, Mulla Nizam al-din, the putative founder of the Dars-i Nizami curriculum, had tended to impart knowledge of the various sciences to their students through a focus on one or two books from each discipline. The books in question tended to be highly demanding and the rationale in focusing on them was that once they had been mastered, the students would find it relatively easy to study other books in that discipline (Nu'mani 1934a: 123-24). The concern was evidently with inculcating the ability for “deep reading” - (mutala'a) - a feature common to styles of learning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Nu'mani 1934b: vol. 3, 99-100; el-Rouayheb 2015). Anchored as it was on a small number of key texts, this approach enabled “a student of average intelligence” (mutawassit al-zihn), as Shibli Nu'mani would have it in the early twentieth century, to complete his education by the time he was sixteen or seventeen (Nu'mani 1934b: vol. 3, 100).

Despite Nu'mani’s generally favorable comment on the pedagogical style of Mulla Qutb al-din and Mulla Nizam al-din, it is unclear that merely “average” students really did thrive on this approach. To the extent that they were able to master the texts in question, though Nu'mani did not say so, it would often also have had to do with the family background of the

students. Scholarly norms and a grounding in facets of an intellectual and religious tradition did not after all come only from formal exposure to books and participation in study circles, but also from the experience of growing up as part of an educated family. That experience - in the words of Bourdieu (1973: 80), the “linguistic and cultural competence and that relationship of familiarity with culture ... produced by family upbringing” - is what would have allowed one to complete his education while still in his teens (cf. Eickelman 1985: 88. For a somewhat different perspective, see Brentjes 2018: 131-35). By the same token, youths from less fortunate families would have had to struggle harder, and longer, to acquire the learning requisite for scholarly recognition.

Putting the most demanding texts at the core of pedagogical training may, however, have posed challenges even to the children of the intellectual and religious elite. Commenting on the study of logic in the madrasa, Shibli Nu'mani himself had acknowledged that the 'ulama of his own and of previous generations were not well-grounded in it even after they had read many books relating to it. He (Nu'mani 1934a: vol. 3, 124-25) attributed this to an unwholesome admixture of various philosophical topics with the science of logic properly speaking, but it may also have been the case that teaching students the most demanding of the available texts was not the most efficient way of introducing them to a discipline (cf. Ibn Khaldun 1858: vol. 3, 252; Rosenthal 1967: vol. 3, 293).

Wali Allah (1858: 4) too had complained that the various sciences had become mixed up with one another, with the result that those studying them as part of their education failed to develop a mastery in any of them. His intention in explicating the principles of pedagogy was precisely to facilitate the acquisition of the different sciences by those seeking them. In marked contrast with the characteristic approach of many Farangi Mahall scholars, his emphasis, as noted, was on simplicity of discourse (suhulat-i taqrir) and on its being accessible (sahl al-tanawul) (Wali Allah 1858: 7).

Although the madrasa curriculum in South Asia still bears the imprint of its association with the Farangi Mahall, it is the influence of Wali Allah and his sons, not that of the Farangi Mahall, that has come to loom the largest on the madrasa in the Indian subcontinent as well as in the South Asian diaspora. It is tempting to think that this has had something to do with the sustained engagement of Wali Allah and his sons with the Islamic foundational texts: as noted, Wali Allah had translated the Qur’an into Persian, two of his sons produced separate translations of it into Urdu, and another son, Shah ‘Abd al-Aziz, had written a partial but substantial commentary on it in Persian. Wali Allah had also given a good deal of attention to the study of hadith. He had written two commentaries on the Muwatta of Malik (d. 795), which he regarded as the most authoritative of all collections of prophetical norms, and the key arguments of his Hujjat Allah al-baligha are anchored in hadith. In hindsight, this scripturalism looks well-suited to developing the kind of eminence that Wali Allah did in fact come to enjoy in traditionalist circles in South Asia. Yet it was not inevitable that Wali Allah should have come to enjoy this eminence or, for that matter, that even scripturalism should have become a dominant strain in modern and contemporary Islam.

How Wali Allah’s legacy came to be cemented in the nineteenth century is a complex story that cannot be taken up here except in one respect. This relates to the role that those associated with the network of Deobandi madrasas played in extending Wali Allah’s influence in India and beyond. In 1866, fewer than ten years after the formal establishment of colonial rule in India, a madra-sa was founded in the north Indian town of Deoband; over the following decades, it would spawn numerous others throughout the Indian subcontinent. Deoband’s founding fathers counted members of Wali Allah’s family as part of their intellectual genealogy. There was also an affinity between Wali Allah’s interest in hadith and that of the Deobandis. In becoming part of Deoband, Wali Allah’s legacy found a home that was not destined - despite hadith scholars like ‘Abd al-Hayy Laknawi - to be available to the Farangi Mahall or any other intellectual tradition.[46] Some of the success of Wali Allah’s legacy may also have owed itself to his pedagogical approach, namely making things simpler and more digestible rather than approaching them through the most difficult texts of the genre.

The Farangi Mahall and the Deobandi traditions have had within them scholars who were not just capable of but also willing to adapt their tradition to changing needs. ‘Abd al-Bari (d. 1926), one of the last of the Farangi Ma-hall scholars of some standing, had written many glosses on standard madrasa texts, but he had also authored, reportedly in no less than thirty-four parts, a work on science and theology (Risala-yi science o kalam) (‘Abd al-Bari n. d.: 22; ‘Inayat Allah 1988: 181-82). For his part, Muhammad Qasim Nanotawi (d. 1877), one of Deoband’s founding fathers, was notable for his interest in the rational sciences and, unusually among his contemporary "ulama, had expressed some interest in learning the English language as well (Gilani 1980: vol. 1, 348-84, vol. 2, 299-300). The dominant strain among the Deobandis was, however, to be the study of hadith and law.

There is no reason intrinsic to the "ulama’s rationalist tradition that may have caused it to lose to the more traditional sciences. But there are extrinsic reasons for this outcome, two of which go some way towards accounting for the gradual marginalization of the madrasa’s rational sciences. First, as Western learning, anchored in modern rationalism, began to gain currency from the late nineteenth century, the madrasa’s rationalist tradition came to lose its prestige in ways that Islamic scripturalism did not. Indeed, the very decline in the appeal of the madrasa’s rational sciences would have strengthened the hold of the Qur’an and the hadith not just within the madrasa but also outside it, including in Western educated Muslim circles. Here, an important confluence might be observed between the scripturalism inherited from the likes of Wali Allah, on the one hand, and, on the other, the appeal to the Islamic foundational texts, and of a Qur’an-and hadith-based legal tradition, as a way of anchoring Muslim identity in conditions of colonial rule. Second, and on a different note, the organizational model of the Deobandi madrasas lent itself to survival and growth in colonial India in ways that the Farangi Mahall tradition did not, with the result that the intellectual concerns characteristic of the Deo-bandis thrived while those of the Farangi Mahall did not. As observed earlier, the careers of the Farangi Mahall scholars were typically tied to the

largesse of rich and powerful patrons. The case of ‘Abd al-‘Ali Bahr al-‘Ulum is unusual only in the range of his patrons, not in the pattern of patronage itself. Though Deobandi madrasas could also have some rich patrons, they typically depended on the support of relatively ordinary people. It was not through substantial endowments but rather through small, often quite humble, financial contributions that Deobandi madrasas would often be sustained in their local contexts. This made for financial instability in a madrasa’s life, but it also helped create a network of supporters. And where the destruction or resumption of a charitable endowment or the decline of a great house spelled the end of the relations of patronage, the backing of smalltime contributors could long keep madrasas afloat. This organizational model, which would extend from Deobandi madra-sas to madrasas belonging to other doctrinal orientations in South Asia, meant that while the institution of the madrasa saw severe decline in many Muslim societies with the onset of colonial rule it experienced remarkable growth in colonial India. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the madrasa as a formal institution of learning, rather than as a set of practices typified for students and colleagues by a scholar, really only emerged in India on a wide scale in colonial times (on a related note see Cantwell Smith 1981: 197-212).

While Deobandi madrasas are the most successful examples of this institutionalization, an unsuccessful effort in that regard is equally telling, and it merits a brief discussion. Scholarly work on the life and career of Shah Wali Allah and of his sons refers frequently to the Madrasa-yi Rahimiyya, which Wali Allah’s father, Shah ‘Abd al-Rahim (d. 1719), is said to have founded. This institution features prominently in an influential biography of Wali Allah, Hayat-i Wali, by the early twentieth-century scholar Rahim Bakhsh Dihlawi. According to Rahim Bakhsh, Wali Allah taught for twelve years after his father’s death at this madrasa. He subsequently went to the Hijaz on a pilgrimage and resumed his teaching at this madrasa upon his return (Dihlawi n.d.: 229-31, 261; see also Ahmad 1919: vol. 2, 585-86). Though he cited no source for the institution he called the Madrasa-yi Rahimiyya, Rahim Bakhsh was probably indebted for this information to one Sayyid Zahir al-din, a great-great-grandson of Shah Wali Allah and the proprietor of a publishing house, the Matba‘-i Ahmadi, active in late nineteenth-century Delhi. Zahir al-din was better known as Sayyid Ahmad and he would sometimes add “Wali Allahi” to his name to highlight his descent from his distinguished forebear. He had made it his mission to publish the writings of Wali Allah and of his sons, and in the fiercely competitive world of late-nineteenth-century book publishing, an association with Wali Allah was apparently a rewarding proposition. But Zahir al-din had an additional goal, too, and that was to revive the family’s madrasa.

Books published by Zahir al-din’s press in the 1890s often introduced it as associated with the Madrasa-yi ‘Azizi, a madrasa that purported to have belonged to Wali Allah’s aforementioned son, Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. (Zahir al-din was the maternal great-grandson of Shah Rafi‘ al-din, a brother of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz.) Announcements appended to editions of Wali Allah’s books and those of other family members regularly informed readers of Zahir al-Din’s efforts to revive “the old madrasa” (madrasa-yi kuhna) of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, which, by the 1890s, was said to have been defunct for some four decades. Indeed, family members living in that building had ceased to be aware that it had once been a madrasa; and the building itself had been demolished during the Mutiny of 1857.[47] It was that

madrasa that Zahir al-din sought to revive, and the publication of Wali Allah's manuscripts - a part of the family heritage - was intended to support that enterprise (Wali Allah n.d.b: 108). Zahir al-din's published announcements implored people to make financial contributions to help sustain that madrasa as a matter of religious obligation.[48] And buying books published by his press was a step in the same direction.[49] The madrasa, where teaching had begun in late 1892, proved to be much less successful than the publishing house, however, and it appears to have fizzled out shortly after its inception. Though I have not come across an explicit reference to the Madrasa-yi Rahimi-yya in any of Zahir al-din's numerous announcements, he had clearly left a mark in the public (and scholarly) imagination that the madrasa he had been trying to revive was the same institution, indeed located at the very site, at which Wali Allah and 'Abd al-Aziz, among others, had once taught.[50]

Yet, in marked contrast with the near ubiquity of the Madrasa-yi Rahimiyya in the scholarship on Wali Allah, it is remarkable that his own writings and those of his sons and associates are entirely silent on it. For instance, in his brief autobiographical note, Wali Allah does not identify the place he taught at for twelve years following the death of his father. Nor does Muhammad 'Ashiq Phulati's (d. 1773) al-Qawl al-jali fi dhikr athar al-Wali (Phulati 1989), the single most important source on the life and mystical thought of Wali Allah written by a close relative and disciple, mention any institution called the Madrasa-yi Rahimiyya.[51] I know of only one scholar, Mahmud Ahmad Barakati, the author of a valuable study on the family of Wali Allah first published in 1976, who explicitly recognizes that the name Madrasa-yi Rahimiyya was coined by Zahir al-din, Wali Allah's great-great-grandson. Even Barakati (1976: 81-82), however, goes on to assert that the Madrasa-i Rahimiyya had indeed existed from the time of Wali Allah's father, except that it had lacked that name until Zahir al-din came up with it (Barakati 1976: 8i-82).[52]

My point here is not to deny that a particular site with which Wali Allah or his sons were associated could have been referred to by them or by others as a madrasa. Indeed, it was. Towards the end of Wali Allah's life, Mughal Emperor 'Alamgir ii (r. 1754-1760) had made a land grant to him "for religious uses for a mudrissa." That land grant was later resumed by Mughal authorities and subsequently restored to Shah 'Abd al-Aziz by the British.[53] 'Abd al-Aziz had remained associated with that madrasa and, as has been seen, it was at his madrasa that he had once asked a devotional singer to perform an Indian raga. My point is rather that such sites were far less institutionalized than hindsight would have it. Part of Wali Allah's house seems to have been used in his lifetime, and in that of 'Abd al-'Aziz, for teaching purposes (Barakati 1976: 87, 91). And, as 'Abd al-'Aziz told the devotional singer who had visited him there, it only became a madrasa when people engaged in their studies there. By the late nineteenth century, madrasas clearly had an institutional existence, as typified, above all, by those associated with the Deobandi orientation. Zahir al-din, the publisher, was probably thinking of the competing Deobandi ma-drasas when he asserted, in his advertisements, that "the organized manner in which religious and worldly education is imparted to Muslim children [at his madrasa] is unparalleled anywhere else" and that people ought to attend to its needs before they did to those of any other (statement appended to 'Abd al-Ra-him n.d.: 40). Yet, in the absence of any serious effort to

cultivate time-honored pedagogical and scholarly practices, even the prestige of the Wali Allah family name did not suffice to sustain that madrasa.

Although Zahir al-din did not say anything specific about his madrasa's curriculum, it is not surprising, given the institutional form that madrasas had come to acquire, that their curriculum also became more stable in the colonial era. Even as they were meant to provide an alternative to the colonial system of public education, the madrasas founded in the late nineteenth century were modeled on the public schools: they had a standardized curriculum - this, indeed, is when the Dars-i Nizami became an India-wide curriculum - and they had classrooms, annual examinations, convocations, prize-giving ceremonies, and vacations (Metcalf 1982: 87-137). Yet, even in that age of standardization and of much rhetoric among the Ulama on the need to preserve their religious tradition unchanged, significant experimentation could and did continue in the substance of the Dars-i Nizami. The different doctrinal orientations - the law and hadith-centered Deobandis, the Barelawis with their devotional practices focused on holy men, the Ahl i-Hadith or Salafis who tended to deny the authority of the schools of law - all had their own madrasas, and their curricula, while having many features in common, reflected their particular orientations. There was also experimentation within particular orientations. Early in his teaching career, the influential Deobandi Sufi and scholar Ashraf Ali Thanawi (d. 1943) had devised two versions of the Dars-i Nizami curriculum - one offering the full range of transmitted and rational sciences and the other for those who were not inclined to study the rational sciences. He had also devised an abbreviated thirty-month curriculum to benefit those who did not have the time to study the full breadth of the Dars-i Nizami. This shortened curriculum, he said, "brought together the essentials, with which one could fortify one's faith, and indeed become a religious scholar, of middling status but with broad learning" (quoted in Zaman 2008: 20). This was obviously for the benefit of people whose primary vocations were other than those of the 'ulama but who nonetheless wanted to partake in the 'ulama's tradition. Colonial and postcolonial madrasas have been slow to accommodate the public school curriculum into their fold. This has had to do with the suspicion that the government was trying to take over the madrasa - the last bastion of Islam, as the rhetoric often goes - and that a mixed curriculum would produce people who were mediocre all around. Yet, here, too, it has in fact become common for madrasas to combine the public school curriculum in various measures with religious learning and it is no longer unusual for recent madrasa graduates to be able to read works in the English language.

The madrasa tradition has continued to evolve even when those associated with it have viewed that evolution with misgivings and have resisted it. Ultimately, as I have tried to show, it is not as an institutional structure or even as a body of texts but rather as a set of practices that the madrasa is best understood. It is through these practices that knowledge has been transmitted and imbibed, students trained to become 'ulama - or other things, for that matter - and networks of scholars fostered. These practices have helped forge a relationship with earlier authorities and they have served, as they still do, to establish new claims to authority. They have provided the framework in which the old and the new, the cosmopolitan and the local, the religious and the political, and, indeed, the divine and the human can interact and inform one another. In this sense, the madrasa is a

far more lively, and contentious, space than its modern or medieval embodiments would seem to suggest.

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** 3. Interpretive Anthropology and Islam in Morocco: A Comparison between Geertz and Eickelman

Abdelrhani Moundib

Clifford Geertz (d. 2006), Dale Eickelman, Lawrence Rosen, Hildred Geertz and Paul Rabinow are surely the most prominent anthropologists who studied Moroccan society. They represent the interpretive approach, whereby they tried to understand the nature of the Moroccan social system, and pinpoint the mechanisms of change that derive from the concepts with which people form their individual and cultural representations of a worldview and build their social relationships. This theoretical conception drove both Geertz and Eickelman, as outstanding figures within this interpretive trend, to focus more on studying religious beliefs and related practices as a key to understanding the social system in Morocco.

The present chapter aims to display the most important findings of the interpretive trend on Islam in Moroccan society, and to do this through a comparison of the works of Geertz and Eickelman.[54] Even if Eickelman rejects the idea of an interpretive school (of which he is a part with the others), I believe that a careful reading of their books clearly shows that what binds these two great anthropologists is much stronger than what separates them (Eickelman 2009). It is true that each of these two great anthropologists of Islam has his own style of writing and analysis, yet they still share the same ideas and employ the same methods in their approach to Islam in Morocco. The chapter aims to demonstrate, in detail, the areas of similarity and difference between the works of the abovementioned scholars.

*** 1. The Theoretical Framework: The Weberian Theory on the Interaction between Cultural Systems and Religious Beliefs

All anthropologists acknowledge that Clifford Geertz is one of the greatest contributors to the development of the study of cultural and symbolic systems within the range of anthropological practices in connection with theory and methodology.[55] Since his article “Religion as a Cultural System,” Geertz has developed a general definition of religion that might fit all possible religious forms. According to him, religion is “a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz 1996: 4). By this definition, he means that religion connects the core image of truth to a set of coherent according to which men ought to live. He thus tends to accommodate human activities to the general order of existence, and thereby displayed representations of such an order that transcend human existence. Despite the criticism that Geertz’s analytical model of religion attracted, I think that it is clear and practical, for it supports the Weberian conception that transcends a more simplistic view, and sets a dichotomy between the

illusion of absolute autonomy of the religious discourse and the reductive view that makes that discourse a direct reflection of social structures. Bourdieu (d. 2002), later adhered to and approved of this Weberian perception (Bourdieu 1971: 299).

Dale Eickelman took the same path. Actually, he said that “ideas and systems of ideas, especially those which fundamentally shape men’s attitudes towards the world and their conduct in it, cannot be analytically construed as ahistor-ical Platonic entities, unaffected by the ravages of time” (Eickelman 1976: 3). According to him, Weber’s style of sociology implicit in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, is “amenable to the analysis of specific historical situations, and also has the advantage of lending itself more easily to a conceptualization of sociological variables over time than the style of argument in which historical dimension is presented only in superimposed synchronic layers” (Eickelman 1976: 5). In addition, Eickelman often referred to the ideas of Geertz that support the Weberian thesis. He made use of them to draw the milestones and frontiers of the theoretical references and backgrounds that shaped his study on Boujad.

In light of the above, it is clear that both Geertz and Eickelman relied, at least to a certain degree, on the Weberian paradigm, according to which studying religious identity was groundless unless handled within the religious system of which it formed a part, as well as the social context from which it was derived. Accordingly, both anthropologists managed to study Islam in Moroccan society within a context of social change. In other words, it was set in its historical context.

*** 2. Connecting Historical and Social Structure

The interpretive trend is mainly characterized by its use of the tools of both the historian and the anthropologist to study religious systems. Since the theoretical bases of this connection have already been outlined, in the forthcoming section I will look to highlight the practical implementation of this methodological trend throughout the aforementioned works of Geertz and Eickelman.

Geertz considered Moroccan history to be basically a religious one.[56] It is in the first place made by the religious figure of the saint who is actually a martial leader who builds cities and destroys ramparts. Idris ii (d. 828), who is the first substantial king of Morocco, was at once a descendant of the prophet (d. 632), a vigorous military leader, and a dedicated religious purifier. The latter two traits stand as the determining factors in establishing his kingship over the country. In addition to this, Geertz (1971: 8) wrote, “both the Almoravid and Al-mohad movements were founded - the first around the middle of the eleventh century, the second towards the middle of the twelfth - by visionary reformers returning from the Middle East determined not just to inveigh against error but to dismember its carriers.” Moreover, the so-called maraboutic crisis that marked Moroccan history for more

than two centuries, caused the decline of the Almohad ideology and the collapse of the dynasty. It was to the ascendant Alawite dynasty to put an end to that crisis.

Both Geertz and Eickelman embrace the view that Islamic civilization in Morocco was essentially forged by the “mobile and aggressive tribes” (Geertz 1971: 9), who represented the core of the cultural weight. However, Eickelman adds a touch of relativism to that idea. He believes that, from the advent of Islam to its arrival in Morocco, cities have engaged in economic exchange with rural tribes. Additionally, cities played a major role in the fabric of political activities. As he (Eickelman 1976: 18) put it, “from the advent of the Muslim conquest they [cities] progressively became and remained very much interdependent economically with their rural hinterlands and involved in the same range of political activities. Only since the onset of the protectorate has the gap between the two again widened.” Geertz supposed that the impact of religious scholars grew stronger due to the French and Spanish occupation of Morocco, at least compared with “ancient Morocco,” when it was quite limited. Not only did the European invasion trigger wrathful reactions against the of invading Christianity, but also against ancient maraboutic tradition. While Eickelman had been inclined to believe that the reformist ideology failed to make up for that of the marabouts and saints, Geertz thought that Islam managed to maintain its social character and identity during the period of the occupation. However, it was the Berber daher (decree)[57] that spurred the emergence of both the Salafist and national movements. Actually, Morocco managed to sustain its spiritual unity thanks to the institution of the monarchy. Mohammed v (d. 1961) brought the idea of the saint back to life, for he embodied the convergence of both pious saint and competent politician. Consequently, the monarchy in Morocco, which embraces both intrinsic and contractual traditions, is key to understanding not only the nature of the political system, but also the religious system of this society (Geertz 1971: 77).

Eickelman, in his turn, focused on the crisis of the marabouts that lasted from the fifteenth to the end of the seventeenth century. He studied in detail all possible causes, such as the loss of the very lucrative trans-Saharan gold trade with the development of alternate routes, the Spanish and Portuguese occupation of the Moroccan coasts, the Marinid sultan’s renunciation, and the presence of the Ottomans in Algeria, who were not under direct pressure from Christian power, and who supported the opposition against the policies of the Marinids. In addition, Eickelman refrained from ascribing the isolation of Morocco, which lasted from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, to natural factors such as mountain ranges and the lack of natural harbors. Instead, he imputed the isolation to the succeeding monarchs who reigned during that period. As he (Eickelman 1976: 16-17) explained, the importance of these mountains and the lack of natural harbors in isolating Morocco have often been exaggerated. The use of such geographical factors as natural barriers to explain the course of Moroccan history has primarily a metaphorical utility. During most of the Middle Ages of Europe, the fortunes of Morocco were closely linked with those of the Iberian Peninsula; for certain extended periods, the Iberian Peninsula was even ruled from Morocco. From at least the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries it was less any natural barriers than the policies of its successive rulers which isolated Morocco both from Europe and, to a lesser extent, from the Middle East as well.

Comparing the ideas on Moroccan history of both Geertz and Eickelman reveals that, although Eickelman shared the same general conclusions as Geertz, his knowledge of the prominent historical events, and the ongoing debates about their significance and impact on the course of Moroccan history, was perhaps deeper and more accurate. While reporting historical data, Eickelman chose a strategy based on painstaking detailing. In his craft, he was amply engaged in theoretical argument with a view to highlighting the deficiencies of the writings of the colonial era, in connection with which he named certain researchers such as Alfred Bel (1938) (d. 1945). Furthermore, there are others whose names he failed to mention, such as Ernest Gellner (d. 1995), David Hart (d. 2001), and Geertz himself, in some delicate details of Moroccan history. The reader might conclude that Eickelman avoided referring explicitly to areas of difference with Geertz. Indeed, he worked at displaying and emphasizing the areas of similarity.[58]

Compared with Geertz, Eickelman opted for a more practical historical perspective in the study of social reality. Yet, both demonstrated that understanding the present was closely associated with knowing about the past.

*** 3 Islam in Morocco according to Geertz and Eickelman

Clifford Geertz based his observation and analysis of changes in religious life in Morocco on historical and field data collected about the topic. He started from the major theoretical assumption that religion is a social institution, worship a social activity, and belief a social power. Therefore, studying the religious life of a specific society ought to start from analyzing the systems of significance that individuals use within their social life. “To trace the pattern of their changes is neither to collect relics of revelation nor to assemble a chronicle of error. It is to write a social history of imagination” (Geertz 1971: 19).

Based on this methodological conception, Clifford Geertz set forth the analysis of the story of the Saint Lyusi (d. 1691). According to him, the story symbolizes for Moroccans “the real image of spirituality,” regardless of who the man was in reality. Lyusi became a mythic figure bearing a broad and deep cultural significance. Through his analysis of the figure of this saint, as it is perceived and dealt with in the Moroccan popular imagination, Geertz reveals the core meaning of the baraka, which is not merely a religious concept but an integral religious doctrine. It means thereafter that the sacred gets manifested in the world as a divine gift endowed to elect people (Geertz 1971: 44). The righteous saint owns the baraka in the same way as people acquire power, bravery, beauty or other gifted qualities and it can also be acquired through being a direct descendant of the prophet. The issue of possessing the baraka - whether through one’s lineage, miraculously, or both - symbolizes most of Morocco’s cultural and historical dynamism. The story of the relationship between Saint Lyusi and Sultan Moulay Ismail (d. 1727) is a representation of the actual existing relationship between the lineage and miraculous

aspects of the baraka, and how the second gains recognition and legitimacy from the first.

The saints, the owners of the baraka par excellence, were the real founders of consciousness and the model shapers of society in “ancient Morocco.” However, things started to followed a new track at the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, the religious life of Moroccans has noticeably changed. Naturally, that has been expected since “religion is not the divine, but a conception of it. People deal basically with perceptions on religion connected necessarily to spatial and temporal specific functions” (Geertz 1971: 56). Actually, Moroccans worked hard to limit the growth of contradictions that arose due to the changes that affected their society throughout the experience of colonialism, to include the erection of new institutions that emerged with the recovery of national sovereignty. The Salafist movement strove strongly to prevent the clash between religion and science by making the latter focus its concern on material questions whose outcome did not necessarily embrace religious facts. “Science is deemed as science and religion as religion” (Geertz 1971: 106). Since the task of religion is to make life less difficult to grasp for believers and less contradictory with common sense, and since religious belief is the origin of the common sense that forges and shapes social action, the modified religious traditions of Morocco remain subordinate to the continuity of the lifestyle that they depict. This explains in great part how “in Morocco the bulk of the ordinary life is secular enough to suit the most dedicated rationalist” (Geertz 1971: 112).” Despite the density of religious considerations in Moroccan society, they do not play the requisite role of behavioral guide except in some limited cases. Furthermore, they largely withdraw off the stage when it is a matter of trade and political issues.

The discrepancy between the forms of religious life and the essence of everyday life is thus running inevitably into a point of spiritual schizophrenia. Geertz believed that religious life in Moroccan society did not witness any noticeable changes from the end of the 1960s (the period of publication of his book Islam Observed) to the beginning of the 1990s (the period of publication of the French translation of the book) due to the continuation of the political regime. Unlike many other Islamic countries, Morocco did not compel religion to submit to violent changes perpetrated by some form of central authority (see introduction to French translation in Geertz 1992). According to Geertz, this provides a real safety valve against all religious protestations. It explains how the state has managed, throughout successive governmental strategies, to limit the jeopardy posed by Islamic movements, whose influence has been confined to the sanctuary of the universities and some marginal areas. Geertz (1992: 2) elucidated,

The spiritual view of Moroccans is integrated, not fragmented into dissonant trends. Therefore the central issue is to implement this view in daily life. In addition to that, the adaptation, the reconciliation and the changes in attitudes which have occurred due to recent alterations, have taken the feature of practicality rather than that of ideology.

Concerning Dale Eickelman, through his aforementioned work, he sheds light on two aspects of the religious life of Moroccan society. On the one hand, he carried out a meticulous analysis of the nature of the concepts that shape the Moroccan worldview. On the other hand, he worked on deconstructing and reconstructing the religious beliefs that govern what he calls “the ideology of Maraboutism.”

Eickelman noticed that the majority of the studies produced about Islam and Islamic society were confined to analyzing written texts and the explicit religious ideology that the religious intelligentsia diffused. Indeed, reformist movements with plain and clear ideologies attract numerous researchers who are keen on studying the topic. However, popular beliefs, whose defense appeals to almost nobody, have but a few researchers who make the topic an object of study and who analyze their sociological context. As Eickelman (1976: 11) explained:

Relatively few studies of Islam have ventured beyond the presentation and the analysis of written texts and the explicit ideologies of an articulate of religious intelligentsia. In contrast to various reformist movements that have explicit ideologies and representatives willing to discuss them, little attention has been given to the description and analysis of popular “tradition” beliefs and their social context.

In fact, the studies made first by Jacques Berque (d. 1995) and later by Clifford Geertz represent the most prominent and brightest signs in this context. Therefore, in Moroccan Islam, Eickelman sought strenuously to approach Islam as it is perceived and lived by the people in Moroccan society, and to provide sociological significance to certain changing forms in one of the greatest religious traditions. “The primary goal is to make sociological sense of the changing forms in which certain key, contradictory elements of a major religious tradition have been understood in a specific locale over the last century” (Eickelman 1976: 4).

A Moroccan view of the world is founded, according to Eickelman, on five basic concepts, namely l-mektub (God’s will), ^cqal (reason), hshumiya (propriety), haaq (obligation), and ^car (compulsion). These concepts engulf logical significances that are proportional to each other. They are like puzzle pieces that are differently shaped, but when put together form a harmonious, congruent and meaningful structure. The concept of l-mektub, which apart from God’s will also means destiny or fate, explains the reality of things in the present and in the future. It legitimizes the disparities that occur when social positions and privileges are allocated among individuals, for it ascribes this differential to God’s will. People who believe in l-mektub are not only those who accept the volition of God, but also those who strive to adapt their deeds to harmonize with the divine will. The concept of qal implies having empirical knowledge and the capacity to harness the rules of behavior - in other words, the rule that matches, from an analytical point of view, the requirements of the world of significations that all Moroccans share and in which all Moroccans live. In fact, that world is permanently susceptible to

change, negotiation and renegotiation. Affirming the possession of qal is based on the extensive capacity of individuals to demonstrate their familiarity with the “rule” (in the Moroccan wording) that is specific to each situation.

The concept of hshumiya (propriety) is defined as the caution or prudence needed to adhere to the rules that all members of society share. Hshumiya is not merely that innate ethical consciousness that governs individuals’ public behavior in their regular relationships, but it also means not infringing the framework of expectations associated with highly esteemed others. The fourth concept, haaq (obligation), which shapes the Moroccan view of the world, has various meanings that depend on the context but, apart from obligation, also include destiny, privilege, commitment, share and undertaking. The meaning that Eickelman intended to convey, though, pertained to the connections that result from the relationships of obligation that individuals have with one another and that constitute the tissue of society. In most cases, such connections are characterized by their lack of balance. In fact, all obligatory relationships impose the fulfillment of certain commitments, the outcomes and worth of which are preliminarily set. The fifth and last concept, ^car (compulsion), is the moral burden imposed on an individual or group whose disposal is contingent on fulfilling the concomitant request. Eickelman (1976: 14) drew a distinction between two types of ^car. The first, ^car kbir (greater compulsion) is used to settle conflicts between tribes and large groups.

The ^car kbir, which virtually disappeared upon the establishment of French control, involved the mediation by marabouts or their descendants of disputes between tribes, tribal sections, or local communities. The prestige of the marabout called upon was commensurate with the gravity of the dispute involved. At least ideally, marabouts even interposed themselves between contesting groups to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Alternatively, the flag from a “dead” marabout’s sanctuary or the cloth shroud (ghota) of his tomb, carried by one of his descendants, could be used to compel a truce or settlement.

Second, there is ^car sghir (lesser compulsion), which is confined to using among individuals, who resort to it when they feel it is necessary. This latter type of ^car still persistently exists. Eickelman considers that the concept of compulsion is the ultimate expression of a relationships of obligation, which people resort to when the other procedures that characterize this type of relationship fail. It is used eventually in some cases to fix broken relationships, or to force an individual to answer a given request. One of the most important and implicit principles is that one abstain from questioning the validity of the situation that led to the compulsion.

The analysis that Eickelman presented about the constitutive concepts of Moroccans’ worldview, despite the fact that some readers found it hard to accept or remained unconvinced by certain interpretations, remains strong and coherent to a great extent. It

sheds light on an important aspect of religious life in Moroccan society that has been obscure for a long period of time.

Eickelman believed that these major concepts lay at the core of Moroccan common sense. Actually, the common-sense view of how things should normatively be is an essential determining factor in the formation and interpretation of social experience. The common belief that the concepts that shape the Moroccan world view necessarily spring from Islamic principles, which are what accord it its legitimacy. He also sees that, despite the presence of certain religious symbols in the commonsense view, we could not consider the religious beliefs as a mere symbolic expression of the social organization. Nevertheless, the commonsense and religious views remain entangled and interconnected. In this respect, Eickelman (1976: 153), cites Geertz as follows, “as Clifford Geertz has written, religious symbols formulate a basic congruence between a particular style of life (if, most often, implicit) metaphysic, and in so doing sustain each with the borrowed authority of the other.”

Eickelman has in fact shown how Moroccans give greater value to the particularity of their social organization and commonsense, which are characterized by a certain realism and flexibility. Concerning what he designs as the ideology of maraboutism, he underlines that it is a system of beliefs that are fashioned within the Moroccan society and believed whose permanence is connected to a specific social process. These beliefs have, for four centuries, assigned a meaningful form of Islam to tribes and city dwellers alike, and this form is still necessary to some of them. Although the protectorate regime managed to reduce the singularity of the social process that maintained the ideology of maraboutism - alternative forms of Islamic belief appeared in cities and gave an ideal normative form to how the supernatural could be - the reformist ideology failed to make up for all maraboutic ideological instances. Thereafter, Eickelman sees that although knowledge of the principles of orthodox Islam has become stronger than it was in the past, the Islam that the reformists are claiming is less compatible with Moroccan social organization and common sense. Islam, like other great religious traditions, is subject to reformulation and reinterpretation of beliefs by its adherents through successive generations and in novel contexts, even if the adherents themselves are unaware that they have already done so.

*** 4 Geertz and Eickelman: Areas of Similarity and Difference

Through what has been shown, it is clearly salient that there is no discrepancy between the theses of Geertz and Eickelman about Islam in Morocco.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that one paraphrases the other (especially with respect to Eickelman’s thesis, which was produced after Geertz’s). The relationship between the two can be fairly apprehended in terms of areas of similarity and difference, rather than antagonism or imitation.

**** 4.1 Areas of Similarity: Methodology and General Conclusions

The comparison of two significant works of Geertz and Eickelman (Islam Observed and Moroccan Islam) revealed numerous areas of similarity related to the methodological steps the authors adopted, as well as the general conclusions they reached. The two scholars agreed about the following general and basic issues.

First, due to their lack of adequate analytical tools, the researchers who came before them had failed properly to understand the nature of religious life in Moroccan society. Eickelman, for example, despite their quantitative importance, regarded colonial studies as, cognitively outdated because of their shortage of requisite analytical tools, as well as their connection to the colonial machinery. As he (Eickelman 1976: 21) remarked,

The most elaborate assessment of the Maraboutic Crisis remains that developed by French colonial historians, basing themselves upon historical and ethnographic research conducted in the first part of this century. Such studies were primarily undertaken by individuals directly or indirectly concerned with establishing or maintaining the machinery of the protectorate.

In fact, “with few exceptions, even later colonial literature ... reads more like police dossiers on the potential influence of various orders, together with certain formal, written elements of their doctrines, than an attempt to understand their popular character [as] an appeal” (Eickelman 1976: 29). “The main features of North African Islam have often been taken for granted or otherwise misrepresented in much of the literature on the region” (Eickelman 1976: 6). Nonetheless, “it is clear that Westermarck [1926] (d. 1939) was an extremely talented ethnographer. One constantly regrets that he lacked a concept of culture as [an] interrelated set of symbols and meanings” (Eickelman 1976: 63). He then went on to say that, “lacking an adequate conception of social structure as based on culturally accepted means by which dyadic bonds between persons are contracted and maintained, ethnographers instead sought, and failed to find, order at the level of ‘on-the-ground’ social relations and the use of physical space” (Eickelman 1976: 91). Geertz (1971: 119), on his part, did, however, acknowledge that

there is much useful information in Terasse [1950] (d. 1971) and some original and valuable ideas, but there is also a pervasive colonial bias and a rather, to my mind, simplistic interpretation of the course of Moroccan history. In the English abridgement of this work ... its virtues are discarded and its faults concentrated. ... On saint worship, perhaps the best descriptive work is E. Dermenghem [1982] (d. 1971), Le culte des saints dans l’Islam maghrebin ... but there is not much in the way of sociological in it.

Geertz (1999: 21) was critical of segmentary theory, and his criticism was recurrent throughout the works of Ernest Gellner (1969) (d. 1995) and David Hart (1973) (d. 2001). He believed it to be a ready-made theory seeking pattern and example in North African societies. As he (Geertz 1999: 21) put it:

The book as a whole gives a picture of an overplanned enterprise getting instructively out of hand. And although, from a point of view, this is testimony to the fact that Gellner is acute enough to rise above his principles, from another, it suggests that the best way to solve the intricacies of North African society is not to descend upon it with a finished theory looking for an instance.

Second, the relevance of their choices of study fields with respect to validating their generalizations on a national (Moroccan) level, was associated with segmentary studies on Moroccan society having encountered much criticism because of this issue. In fact, to realize the ideal conditions in which to implement the segmentary theory, Gellner, Hart and all the researchers who followed their paths chose tribal regions, which were shut off from all forms of external influence, including that of the central authority (Makhzen). Nonetheless, the interpretive researchers, Geertz and Eickel-man being among the most prominent, took the precaution of choosing urban and rural areas that were subject to the direct authority of the Makhzen. Despite the chosen areas (Sefrou for Geertz and Boujad for Eickelman) not being middle towns in Morocco, namely cities that encompassed all the characteristics of a Moroccan city, they amply defended their choices and their relative representativeness. This would maintain the rigor and credibility of their studies when it came to the question of generalization. Many prominent Moroccan researchers, however, remained unconvinced by this generalization (Guessouss 2002: 18).

Third, to comply with the prevailing social organization and common sense, as specified earlier, religious beliefs and related practices in Moroccan society are incessantly being submitted for reformulation.

The fourth and final area of similarity between the two authors concerned the importance and influence of the central authority in reproducing shared ways of thought and religious organization, and the orientation of the religious enthusiasm of Moroccans.

**** 4.2 Areas of Difference: Writing Style and Categorization

Geertz’s writings and research on religious beliefs are generally characterized by a unique style of writing, presentation and categorization. He writes in English with a quite complicated literary style, full of metaphor and simile, and plenty of appositive clauses and parentheses. His style is eloquently articulate, although he opens many brackets and brackets within brackets. Only Bourdieu (1971) in his French language would run in the same

fashion. Besides that, his method of categorization distances itself from traditional academic styles. This seemingly turgid writing style, and peculiar method of categorization, confers a touch of ambiguity on his style. Yet, this can be explained by the impromptu framework in which comparative religious studies have been wrought (Geertz 1971: 23). Accordingly, many of his critics - like Talal Asad, Paul Shankman, and Henry Munson Jr. - qualify his studies on religion as suffering from a great disproportion between theory and practice (Asad 1983; Munson 1986; Shankman 1984).

The complete opposite of that is the style of Eickelman, which one might describe as flowery and eloquent. Eickelman presents his ideas with pure lucidity. Furthermore, he carefully makes his categorizations and partitions readily understandable and easy to assimilate without losing depth and intricacy. Alongside his painstaking concern for detail, is a deep and meticulous knowledge of the history and social structure of Morocco.

Dale Eickelman displayed the capacity to build firm and sound social relationships with his informants. These ties were not founded on transient interests, but characterized rather by the kind of warmth and permanence that enabled him to earn the trust of everyone with whom he interacted during his fieldwork. Moreover, his familiarity with Moroccan Arabic and French paved the way for him to approach notable individuals in possession of accurate and useful knowledge of Moroccan history, which, because of the predominance of an oral over a written tradition in the society, had never before been recorded. Consequently, his knowledge of Moroccan history is more inclusive and more accurate than that of Geertz.

Despite interpretive anthropology having long been an analytical trend and an established anthropological school, the works of both Geertz and Eickel-man on religious life in Morocco have exercised, and continue to exercise, an important influence on the Moroccan academic field. In addition, the scientific and personal relationship between the two men remains surprisingly sound, even in the aftermath of Geertz’s death.[59]

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** 4. Out of Sight in Morocco, or How to See the Jinn inthe Modern-day Museum

Simon O'Meara

A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.

ludwig wittgenstein

This chapter explores Dale Eickelman's counter-intuitive insight that seeing in the modern-day museum is something that needs teaching. Exploring this pedagogical desideratum in the cultural context to which it pertains, namely, Islamic culture, the chapter highlights the extent to which the modern-day museum strives for absolute visibility and shows how this aspiration fits awkwardly with Islamic culture, which is as much about invisibility as visibility. Responding to a recent challenge in visual anthropology that scholars should try to build a knowledge of their subject from a place epistemologically equivalent to the Quranic al-ghayb (the unknown, or invisible), the chapter first grapples with the museological display of Islamic art from the place of the mostly invisible jinn. Second, it

explores the extent to which the modern-day museum is embedded within a wider urban culture wed to a desire for total visibility and a certain type of pictoriality. This modern Western visuality, the chapter concludes, is in a certain way the opposite of Islamic visuality.

As anyone who has witnessed Dale Eickelman working in Morocco will tell you, he does not stand apart from his interlocutors, but fits right in. To the extent that it is possible, he closes the gap between observer and observed, not through imitation and costume but empathy and the absence of all superiority. Remaining in plain sight, he yet disappears. Often he does so while pursuing his interests in aspects of the country that are themselves hidden from view, the cloak of power having rendered them invisible, as with, for example, the operations of the king's bureaucracy, the Makhzan. Taking my cue from these interests and his modus operandi, I propose to explore further the issue of invisibility by centering my argument on the disappearing jinn. I shall investigate the jinn's resistance to the space and representational system of a cultural institution that developed in Europe in the nineteenth century: the

modern-day museum. Whereas Eickelman is an out of sight anthropologist to those with eyes to see, to visitors of the modern-day museum the jinn are not just out of sight but not even in the picture. How, then, might one see the jinn there, and why?

*** 1. How to See in Museums

In the president's newsletter for the Tangier American Legation Institute for Moroccan Studies (talim) of December 2017, Eickelman speaks of the institute's ongoing mission to help protect the cultural heritage of Morocco. "One recent project," he recounts, "has been to compile online lesson plans on 'How to See in Museums,' intended for intermediate and secondary school teachers in the region" (Eickelman 2017: 2).

At first glance, this teaching initiative seems plain wrong, for what could be more transparent to the eye than a museum, a primary purpose of which is to exhibit, or hold out objects to sight? (Basu and Macdonald 2007: 2.) Graeme Davison underscores this pivotal function of the modern-day museum when he takes the Panopticon, a planned but unbuilt eighteenth-century circular prison with a glass surveillance tower at its center, and compares it to a precursor of the modern-day museum. The precursor in question is London's Great Exhibition of 1851, which was housed in transparency itself - the purpose-built Crystal Palace in Hyde Park. Davison (1982/3: 7 cited in Bennett 1995: 65) remarks: "The Panopticon was designed so that everyone could be seen; the Crystal Palace was designed so that everyone could see." The V&A Museum originated from what the visitors saw there.[60]

How one negotiates the culturally coded space of the modern-day museum might need the mediating presence of a teacher, a possibility that Carol Duncan (1995) exposed in her celebrated book on the art museum as a ritual site. The objects exhibited might also be

deemed in need of pedagogic intervention to render them legible (Costantino 2008; on legibility itself, see Bennett 1998). But seeing in the museum is surely immediate, in need of no intervention, for the modern-day museum is predicated on sight.

To be sure, sight's dominion there has a history, and the museum has a history of techniques to facilitate this dominion (Bennett 2006). Additionally, recent developments in museum practices suggest that the sovereignty of sight may be giving way to sound and touch (Bennett 2006: 267; Promey 2017: xxii). Even so, because the museum's exhibitionary order overlaps with other modern exhibitionary orders, each reinforcing the other, sight is not going to be overtaken soon (Bennett 2006: 279). Principal among these other orders is the shopping arcade and, especially, the department store, with its encyclopedic range of products on display in carefully curated vitrines (Cummings and Le-wandowska 2000; Mitchell 1988: 10-11; Whiteley 1994: 110-11). As Gudrun Konig (2016: 43) notes: "The association between the museum and the department store, trumpeted as a post-modern phenomenon, [is] a relationship with a long history."

What is Eickelman talking about, then, when he speaks of learning how to see in the museum? To answer this question means asking if the sight the museum facilitates is culturally and historically specific. If it is, one might indeed need to learn how to see there if one were from a country with only a limited history of museums; for example, the countries of the Arab Gulf, where the rapid development of state-sponsored museums commenced only in the 1970s (Exell 2016).

It is exactly this question of museum vision that is addressed in the present chapter. It is my contention that a very specific type of sight is promoted in the modern-day museum that is at odds with, and even defies, quotidian ways of seeing in Islamic lands. As I shall contend, this sight, or "museologi-cal gaze" cannot register the peripheral, penumbral dimensions of seeing in Islamic lands. It cannot accommodate, I shall argue, a visuality (a technical term I shall shortly define) sutured by worldly and otherworldly invisibility - by, for example, the jinn of the natural world and the evil eye (al-^cayn) of the supernatural world. For all its powers of penetration, and perhaps because of them, the museological gaze is insensitive to Islamic visuality, seeing through its shadows. As I shall demonstrate, it cannot account for a dimension of the Islamic cosmos that defines the realm of Islam writ large, namely, the invisible, divine world: the world of the unseen (^calam al-ghayb).

The argument is not that the Islamic art on display in museums represents the evil eye, the jinn, and the unseen, and that this representation does not somehow register in the museological gaze. Rather, the argument is first that the visuality this art indexes is incompletely accommodated in this gaze; and second that the index itself, the artifacts comprising the art, becomes present in a different way before this gaze. The representational system of the modern-day museum presents the index afresh: it represents it. For all that a museum might claim that it has on exhibition this or

that never-seen-before artifact from this or that distant land, what one sees in the museum is the artifact’s representation as a museum object, not the thing itself. As W. J. T. Mitchell notes (2005: 156-57) regarding this distinction between an object and a thing:

Objects are the way things appear to a subject - that is, with a name, an identity, a gestalt or stereotypical template, a description, a use or function, a history, a science. Things, on the other hand [signal] the moment when the object becomes the Other, when the sardine can looks back, when the mute idol speaks, when the subject experiences the object as uncanny.

Museological representation is one of the ways through which things become objects.

This museological representation has nothing to do with the meta-level questions of representation that the modern-day museum is perennially engaged: how and why an artifact is selected for display and the choices that are made regarding, say, the lighting of that display. It has to do with something more fundamental: the transformation of the artifact by what Svetlana Alpers (1991: 27) calls the museum effect, or “the tendency to isolate something from its world, to offer it up for attentive looking and thus to transform it into art like our own.” Donald Preziosi (2006: 50, emphasis in original) speaks of a similar effect when he explains that “the act of collecting and exhibiting artifacts, of passing them across an exhibitionary threshold, is much more than an act of removal from some prior place, context, or condition. The object is not simply transported but transformed.” It is the museum effect, Alpers argues, that leads to the following default museological condition: “It is to ourselves ... that we are representing things in museums” (Alpers 1991: 32).

Does this museum effect matter? That depends on who we are. It might matter if we were, say, secular Europeans and wanted our audience to include more Muslim Europeans.[61] Whoever we are, the effect could certainly benefit from unpacking. Hence the timeliness, not to mention the correctness, of Eick-elman’s pedagogical initiative.

*** 2. Islamic Visuality

The term visuality is first found in the work of Thomas Carlyle (d. 1881) (Sand 2012: 89). Islamic art historians have sometimes used it, but without defining it (e.g. Necipoglu 2007: passim; Ruggles 2007: 132). In one or two of these usages, it would seem to be a synonym for the term visual culture, a parallel that would echo the usage of one of the foremost students and theorists of visuality, the aforementioned W. J. T. Mitchell (2002: 166-67). This leaves us, then, with the meaning of visual culture.

As Mitchell (2002: 178) explains, the study of visual culture is the equivalent of “ordinary language philosophy [in that] it looks at the strange things we do while looking, gazing, showing and showing off, such as hiding, dissembling, and refusing to look.” For Mitchell, this explanation means at least two things. First, that the study of visual culture, what is often called visual studies (Elkins 2003: 1-30), entails, inter alia, “a meditation on blindness, the invisible, the unseen, the unseeable, and the overlooked” (Mitchell 2002: 170). Second, it means that this study cannot be limited to the “study of images or media, but extends to everyday practices of seeing and showing, especially those that we take to be immediate or unmediated” (Mitchell 2002: 170).

Attempting to encapsulate this capacious field of study, Mitchell offers the chiastic aphorism that visual studies has for its object of study the social construction of the visual field and the visual construction of the social field. By the second part of the aphorism, he means that “it is not just that we see the way we do because we are social animals, but also that our social arrangements take the forms they do because we are seeing animals” (Mitchell 2002: 171). Visuality and visual culture are the two interchangeable names for this object of study; Islamic visuality and Islamic visual culture, the names for when the object pertains to Islam. Because it names this object of study, there is no plural: there are not Islamic visualities, for example, which is not to say that the visuality in question cannot comprise a number of different scopic regimes. For example, the visuality of the modern West is substantially informed by the scopic regime that Martin Jay calls “Cartesian perspectivalism” (because it derives from the quattrocento invention of linear perspective), but it is not reducible to this regime (Jay 1988: 4). An equivalent regime informing Islamic visuality would be the concept of modesty (haya’) (Maghen 2007: 342-90; O’Meara 2007: 49-56). Historically variable scopic regimes such as these act on the human organism’s physiological drive to see, or its scopic drive.

*** 3. Islamic Visuality and the World of the Unseen

It is debatable whether the aforementioned evil eye constitutes one of the historically variable scopic regimes of Islamic visuality or is a hard-wired part of it. That it might be the latter is because of the awesome power ascribed to it, the Prophet alleging that the evil eye was as strong as death itself, with the ability to outstrip divine destiny, or fate (qadar). He is reported as saying, for example: “After natural causes, the evil eye is the greatest cause of death in my community” (Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani 2001: vol. 10, 287); and “Were anything to outstrip (sabaqa) destiny, it would be the evil eye” (Muslim 1994: vol. 7, 425). This unearthly potency would suggest that the evil eye was related to the world of the unseen, which in turn would suggest that it formed the immutable core of Islamic visuality; for as Shahab Ahmed (2015: 345-48) has so persuasively argued, to be Muslim - to be Islamic - is to be in continuous engagement with the world of the unseen.

As an aside, the following interpolation by a nineteenth-century Muslim translator of a French book on the “customs and mores of nations” is indicative of the place of the evil eye

in Islamic visuality and suggestive of how this visuality differs from modern Western visuality. In the French book, there is a sentence on the Middle Eastern belief in the evil eye, which reads as follows: “Throughout the Orient, the people fear what they call the evil eye” (Dep-ping 1826: 189). In the translation, it is rendered as: “One of the beliefs (^caqa^cid) of the Europeans is that the evil eye has no effect” (al-Tahtawi 1833: 86). Having lived in Europe for five years, the Middle Eastern Muslim translator knew well that the Europeans recognized the evil eye as much as they recognized the jinn. Neither phenomenon registered in their sight.[62]

Just as the evil eye’s relationship to the world of the unseen is uncertain, so too is the jinn’s relationship to that world. That is because although the Qur’an implies that with the coming of Islam no more can the jinn “steal the hearing” from heaven (Q 15:18, 72:8), it also says that they try to linger at heaven’s boundary, straining to hear the “high assembly” (Q 37:8, 72:9). The occasional snatching of divine secrets would therefore seem to be a possibility still open to them, something the Qur’an appears to confirm (Q 26:221-22) (cf. Hawting 2006: 27; but see also Chabbi 2001-6: vol. 3, 43, 46, who excludes that possibility). This possibility is borne out in the popular imagination, where by and large the jinn retain their pre-Islamic status as beings capable of accessing the unseen world, and even being of it (Mittermaier 2019: 21-22; Padwick 1924: 426; Pandolfo 2018:90-98,269).

For present purposes, whether or not the jinn belong to the world of the unseen is not of importance. What matters, rather, is the jinn’s ability to appear and disappear from sight, to transform from seen to unseen beings; for this ability visually replicates what divides the seen from the unseen world. This ability is important, for the following reason.

In her book on the jinn, Amira El-Zein argues that these feared beings are intermediary beings, because they perpetually traverse the divide between the seen and the unseen worlds. This divide, she blankly asserts, is the basis of “the whole of Islam” (El-Zein 2009: xviii). Given the signal importance of this divide in the thought of the aforementioned Shahab Ahmed, specifically as expressed in his posthumous publication What is Islam? (Ahmed 2015: 343-86, esp. 377ff.), El-Zein’s assertion is not unreasonable.

Recently, another scholar, Amira Mittermaier, has effectively asked scholars to be jinn-like, by challenging them to traverse intellectually this divide between the seen and the unseen worlds so as to read Islamic culture through the lens of the unseen (al-ghayb) (Mittermaier 2019: 18). Al-ghayb, Mittermaier explains, should be understood not just as an ontological zone but a “site of epistemological reflection [because it] presupposes a particular attitude and relationship to the world, in which the very condition of not-knowing is the foundation not only of faith but also of any knowledge” (Mittermaier 2019: 20). As such, she provocatively concludes, scholars of the Islamic world should in turn try to build a knowledge of this world from a “place of al-ghayb,” a locution I read figuratively to mean a place epistemologically equivalent to al-

ghayb, it being impossible for scholars to be of the unseen (Mittermaier 2019: 30). With specific reference to anthropologists, she then adds that writing from a place of al-ghayb “means asking not simply how to do an anthropology of the invisible but also how al-ghayb can inflect anthropology” (Mittermaier 2019: 30).

In the section that follows below, I tentatively and very provisionally take up Mittermaier’s challenge for Islamic art history, including its public face, the Islamic art museum, by engaging with the jinn as a proxy for al-ghayb.

*** 4. Dis/appearing Jinn

In the Qur’an, Earth is effectively split into two domains, that of humankind and that of the jinn; numerous are the verses in which God simultaneously addresses both categories of sublunary created beings (Chabbi 2001: 46). The two domains are not, however, sealed off from each other, such that humans can, mostly inadvertently and unwillingly, enter the jinn’s domain and the jinn can, less inadvertently and unwillingly, enter the humans’ (Chabbi 2001: 44). With the exception of certain extraordinary individuals and the rarest of instances, the jinn are invisible to humans; they can, however, assume the form of an animal or even a human, and in that way appear and disappear before our very eyes. (The literature on this subject is vast, but for an introduction, see El-Zein 2009: 22-26, 89-120.) This means that Islamic visuality is not just fundamentally informed by invisibility, in that, as per Shahab Ahmed, Islam is structured by the divide between the seen and unseen worlds of the Islamic cosmos; but more mundanely, and equally Quranically, Islamic visuality is riddled by dis/appearance. For phenomenologically speaking, the jinn are dis/appearance itself. “Appearance,” writes Heidegger, “does not mean that something shows itself; rather it means that something which does not show itself announces itself through something that does show itself” (Heidegger 2010: 28).

If in modern Western visuality the phenomenon of dis/appearance is accounted for by the history of art - an art of optically registered appearance since the quattrocento until the rise of abstraction in the twentieth century[63] - the same is not true in Islamic visuality. For Islamic art is only exceptionally about the appearance of things; only rarely is it optically naturalistic.[64] In Islamic visuality, the phenomenon of dis/appearance is accounted for by the jinn. To display Islamic art as if it were, in Alpers’s words, an “art like our own,” namely, an optically naturalistic depiction of the appearing, physical world, and to do so without bringing into the picture the jinn, is to transform Islamic art, exactly as she says. Not only does the Islamic world comprise the jinn, but Islamic art rarely depicts the world.[65]

*** 5 Glass Boxes

At the heart of the problem of the display of Islamic art in the modern-day museum is the fact that the museological gaze is part and parcel of modern Western visuality, not Islamic visuality, as I shall explain below. Stickers almost need to be affixed to the display cases to announce the fact, in the same way that stickers are often affixed to plate glass windows and doors to prevent people walking into them. Doing so would not constitute a pointless joke, because the display cases contribute to the creation of the museological gaze. As Khadija von Zinnenburg Carroll (2017: 24) notes: “The glass between the artefact and the viewer is the [gaze’s] epistemic membrane crystallized around an object.”

The display cases might even be what create the gaze. As the same author writes elsewhere: “Built within the very architecture of the museum, vitrines are a structure of thinking. That structure frames any subject and object that enter the space but typically remains unanalyzed despite its effect on the formation of the ideas on display” (Carroll 2013: 318). According to this argument, the display box acts like a lens, similar to the lens of a microscope, telescope or camera. The lens establishes both the subject, who utlilizes the lens, and the object, which is scrutinized through the lens.

Carroll’s argument is not hyperbolic. Lewis Mumford, for example, considers that early-modern European developments in glass-making, coupled with the widespread introduction of transparent glass these developments led to, gave birth to the modern scientific world. He writes: “[Transparent] glass helped put the world in a frame: it made it possible to see certain elements of reality more clearly; and it focussed attention on a sharply defined field - namely, that which was bounded by the frame” (Mumford 1934: 125-26; cf. Onians 2016: 269). Mumford (1934: 180-81, fig. 2) even lists the plate glass window alongside the microscope and telescope: one of the panoply of dioptric instruments invented in this period (cf. Friedberg 2006: 110).[66] Others have interpreted woodcuts by Durer (d. 1528) showing the use of just such dioptric instruments as an encapsulation of the scientific method itself, namely, the establishment of an object over which a subject stands in unblinking scrutiny (Figure 4.1).

In the top woodcut, we see an artist using an eyepiece and a pane of transparent glass to create a linear perspective drawing of a vase or ewer. In the bottom woodcut, we see an artist using an eye-pointer and a pane of gridded but otherwise transparent glass to create a linear perspective drawing of a reclining nude, up whose parted thighs he stares. Regarding this bottom woodcut, inter alia, this interpretation has followed: the objectification of woman/nature by the male artist/scientist subject via his framed, instrumentalized, penetrative sight (Nead 1992: 11; cf. Dunn 2002: 223; Anderson 2003:328-29).[67]

[[a-j-allen-james-fromherz-nadav-samin-knowledge-aut-10.jpg][Figure 4.1 Woodcut illustrations of draughtsmen making linear perspective drawings of a vase and a reclining nude, from Albrecht Durer (d. 1528), Underweysung der Messung (instruction in measurement) (Nuremburg, 1538). Page dimensions:

31.9 x 21.5 cm.
Source: courtesy: the metropolitan museum of art, new york; gift of felix m. warburg, 1918; accession number 18.58.3; image in the public domain.]]

*** 6. Linear Perspective

It is no coincidence that the glass-wielding artists in Durer's two woodcuts are making linear perspective drawings. As Samuel Edgerton asserts in his book The Mirror, the Window, and the Telescope: How Renaissance Linear Perspective Changed Our Vision of the Universe: "No rocket ship to the moon could ever have been invented, let alone be built and function, without the humble heritage of Renaissance linear perspective" (Edgerton 2009: 171). Although Edgerton's assertion sounds exaggerated, there is no shortage of assertions that could replace it. For example, the historian of modern science, David Wootton (2015: 14-16), refers to the invention of linear perspective as the beginning of the "mathematization of the world," and thus the seed of the scientific revolution and origin of the modern world (cf. Harries 2001: 14-16).

In view of these assertions, we should take seriously Preziosi's (2006: 53) claim about the representational logic of the modern museum and its mu-seological gaze. "Museums," he says, "put us in the picture, by teaching us how to appear picture-perfect." The reason we should take it seriously is because our being in the picture is also the effect of linear perspective. The linear perspective painting is an extension of our own space: we are the subject of it, paradoxically constructed by it. Linear perspective, in the words of Norman Bryson (1984: 77, emphasis in original), "is a personal construction, where the image recognises (more accurately, constructs) the viewer as a unitary subject, master of the prospect, unique possessor of the scene." In Preziosi's claim, the modern museum acts similarly, recomposing the fractured identity of the modern subject into a coherent picture. As he (Preziosi 2006: 53) explains his claim:

[The museum is a place that enables the] modern social subject to be constituted as an anamorphosis of the bits and pieces of its own life and experience: a place from which to view those bits in such a way as to realign them in a (previously hidden or invisible) order, a "story" that makes a certain sense. ... What the museum subject "sees" in this remarkable institutional space is a series of "mirrors" - possible ways in which it can construct or compose its life as one or another kind of centered unity or consistency which draws together in a decorous and telling order its sundry devices and desires.

For all that the museum is about the objects it exhibits and archives, it is also all about me. As when viewing a linear perspective painting, in the museum I stand tangible, corporeal and whole, possessing - and possessed by - a world of absolute visibility (cf. Bryson 1983:

106; see also below). This world is no world of the jinn, fleeting shadows of dis/appearance. As Christian Suhr (2015: 109) has argued regarding the ultimate dioptric instrument of linear perspective construction, the camera, the jinn are outside the picture.[68]

Next, when I step outside the museum, not only do I find its world of absolute visibility reinforced by that of the department store and shopping arcade, as mentioned earlier, but also by that of the city as a whole. Exactly as Middle Eastern visitors to the world fairs of nineteenth-century Europe also experienced, there seems to be no outside to the exhibitionary order of the museum, because the city replicates it (Mitchell 1988: 5-12). The city, too, is arranged for my view, as a picture. This arrangement speaks of an urban practice whose origins date to trecento Italy, specifically Florence and its new satellite towns. As Marvin Trachtenberg (1987: 181-84) says of this period of Florentine history in his award-winning book The Dominion of the Eye:

Trecento painters shared with urban planners an intense engagement with the observer, with controlling the location and angle of vision and coordinating what is seen with where it is ideally seen from. This scop-ic desire led to the devising, respectively, of illusionistic and real spatial structures that fixed the ideal viewing point of both painting and monumental architecture, sometimes with extraordinary precision. Both media solicited the ambulatory viewer’s immobility at a particular station, where the spatially structured and structuring pictorial and scenographic image was ideally to be sensorially produced and visually consumed. Whether this new experience was essentially “pictorial” or “architectural” is rather moot.

Trachtenberg argues that the quattrocento invention of linear perspective in Florence was dependent on the trecento city’s incipient early-modern visuality, and that the historical linkage between the two was provided by Brunelleschi’s (d. 1446) lost perspective-demonstration panels. These panels are said to have represented two of the city’s principal monuments, the Palazzo Vecchio and Baptistery, both built or reworked according to the principles of trecento urbanism. As such, Trachtenberg (1997: 52-54) argues, the panels tie trecento visuality to the quattrocento invention of linear perspective and further cement the bond between urbanism and painting initiated in the trecento.

For Trachtenberg (1997: 260), the Panopticon-like visuality that the trecento gave rise to was deliberately produced and reproduced by the Florentine state as an instrument of authority. It is not hard to see its apotheosis in Baron Haussmann’s redevelopment of Paris in the mid-nineteenth century (see Benevelo 1993: 124-71 on the historical role of perspective in urban design). Although the following eye-witness account by a Tunisian visitor to Haussmann’s Paris refers to the experience of seeing a photographic panorama of the redeveloped city at the Paris world fair of 1889, not the city itself, the words of the visitor are nonetheless revealing: “No different from reality … the observer sees himself at the center (fi wasat) of the city, surrounded by its buildings, streets, and gardens” (al-Sanusi 1891: 242). The visitor feels as if he is in a picture.

Haussmann’s Paris epitomized modernity. The replication of aspects of its perspectivally ordered space was thus not infrequently sought by Muslim states wishing to display their modern credentials (AlSayyad 2011: 206-12; McChesney 2002: 88). However, the visuality to which this exported space belonged to was at a variance to the visuality it was imported into. That is because, for the most part, medieval and pre-modern Islamic urbanism eschews perspectivally ordered public spaces. On the occasions where something approaching perspectivally ordered public space is found in the Islamic context, as for example at the royal square of Safavid Isfahan, these represent the exception, not the rule. In the words of D. Fairchild Ruggles (2000: 107):

The opening up of space to allow long sight lines and sweeping views was more dramatic in the medieval Islamic context than a modern reader might initially realize. In the medieval environment, walls, doors, screens, and veils curtailed vision at every pass. . Even in the supposedly public spaces of the city ... there were few occasions when long-range views encompassing large spaces and many people were possible.

Against this Islamic urban background, it is hardly surprising that the aforementioned Middle Eastern visitors to the world fairs of Europe found the cities there astonishing in their perspectivally ordered pictoriality, or intizam almanzar (literally, organization of the view) (Mitchell 1988: 12-13). The reverse was no less true for the same period’s European visitors to the Middle East. They found the Islamic medinas incomprehensible and impenetrable, lamenting their lack of a “point of view,” or linear perspectival ordering principle (Mitchell 1988: 21-26). Only by heading for elevations beyond the perimeter walls could these Europeans see them as they wanted: as pictures (Mitchell 1988: 24-26; O’Meara 2020: 469).

*** 7. Bigger Boxes

The gradual demise of the department store and shopping arcade in the twenty-first century city has not ended the reciprocal relationship between the modern-day museum and the city. As cities inexorably succumb to what is called “brand urbanism,” or the co-opting of public space by a corporate revisioning of it, in many ways Apple Inc. leads the way with its iconic glass storefronts. First among these storefronts is the cubical one on Fifth Avenue, New York. What, however, is this structure if not a museological vitrine writ large? It is a display case, albeit one wherein the item exhibited is not an Apple product but the Apple logo itself, the company’s merchandise having been relocated to the store proper, below ground.[69]

In the light of the connections this chapter has drawn between the early modern and modern history of Western urbanism, the department store and the museum, it might strike the reader as odd to learn that this Apple storefront in downtown New York, this “temple of consumerism,” was originally mistaken by some Muslims for a copy of the Kaaba and a

mockery of Islam. The problem was the black cladding temporarily used to protect the glass during the storefront's construction in late 2006; for with the cladding on, there was a resemblance between the under-construction building and the Kaaba in Mecca. That resemblance led to an online outcry (O'Meara 2018: 140-41).

I have written about this outcry elsewhere; for present purposes, what is interesting about the virtual storm the storefront occasioned is the fact that Apple's cube and Mecca's Kaaba belong to different visualities. In fact, a case could be made that these visualities are in a certain way opposites, the two sides of the same coin, such that perceiving the Kaaba in the storefront could hardly have been more wrong and yet also hardly more correct. My reasoning is threefold.

First, as the point to which every Muslim is instructed to turn and face (Q 2:144), the Kaaba is where sight ends. Sight vanishes in the Kaaba. The same is true of linear perspective. At what is called the vanishing point of linear perspective, namely, the point that anchors this mathematical systemization of the visual field, sight disappears.

Second, as the place in Islamic creation myth from which the world is said to have been born, the Kaaba is not just the Islamic world's axis mundi but also its matrix mundi (O'Meara 2021). The same is true of the vanishing point: from this point the modern scientific world was born, exactly as noted by Courbet (d. 1877) in his version of the creation myth, L'Origine du monde.[70] Courbet's infamous painting is, of course, not itself the birthplace of this scientific world, but its title names it and its irreligiously frank, objectifying and, to some, phal-locentric and exploitative viewpoint reveals its site-cum-sight (ur-sites constructing their sight) (O'Meara 2018: 147-52; Uparella and Jauregui 2018: 82ff.; Wigley 1993: 61). From this site, in this sight, with this viewpoint, nature is open to examination. Durer's woodcut of the reclining nude does something similar, albeit more coyly: the draughtsman possesses the objectifying viewpoint, not the viewer, who, as an extension of the draughtsman, possesses it at one remove only (Wolf 1990: 196-97). The viewpoint of Courbet's painting and the embedded viewpoint of Durer's woodcut reveal the sight of the modern scientific world. The linear perspectival construction of both pictures speaks of this sight's site, namely, the vanishing point outside of the view, which anchors the view, establishes the viewpoint, and owns the viewer who possesses this view-point.[71] In Bryson's words once more: "The vanishing point is the anchor of a system which incarnates the viewer, renders him tangible and corporeal [as] a measurable, and above all a visible object in a world of absolute visibility" (Bryson 1983: 106, emphasis in original).

"If we look closely," writes Baudrillard (2009: 10) with reference to the thought of Hannah Arendt, "we see that the real world begins, in the modern age, with ... the invention of an Archimedean point outside the world (on the basis of the invention of the telescope by Galileo and the discovery of modern mathematical calculation)." What Baudrillard here calls "the discovery of modern mathematical calculation" was made possible by the arrival into

medieval Europe of the meta-sign zero (Kaplan 1999: 106ff.; Rotman 1987: 13; Seife 2000: 78ff.). In linear perspectival constructions, a visual version of this meta-sign - visual zero - is the equivalent of what Baudrillard refers to here as the “Archimedean point” (Rotman 1987: 13-22). There is good reason to think that the Kaaba is the point’s architectural equivalent: tectonic zero (cf. Chod-kiewicz 2002-4: vol. 2, 23). Like visual zero, it is the anchor of a symbolic economy, namely, the symbolic order of Islam.

Third, these foregoing commonalities between the visualities that the Kaa-ba and the Apple storefront respectively belong to are also what divide the vi-sualities. As noted earlier, the Kaaba belongs to a visuality sutured by divinely proclaimed invisibility, al-ghayb; whereas the storefront belongs to a visuality that aspires to total transparency and absolute visibility. Both visualities can exist side by side in the same geographical location without that fact posing a logical contradiction; contemporary Mecca, with its modern planning and high-rise buildings surrounding and dwarfing the Kaaba is a case in point. In the modern-day museum, however, only the second visuality obtains. Recognizing that situation - teaching it - is the start of undoing it.

*** 8 Conclusion

As desirable as it would be to conclude this chapter knowing how to see the jinn in the modern-day museum, such a result was only ever very distantly on the horizon, the chapter’s title notwithstanding. The matter is beyond complex, and presumably for many if not most Muslims, also unnerving, with the goal being unwelcome because it is frightening. The goal of the chapter has realistically only ever been about establishing why it was necessary to create the conditions for the display of Islamic art so that the jinn could in principle be seen in the museum - so that the jinn and the unseen world, the ^calam al-ghayb, had a place there.

To be absolutely explicit, there is nothing wrong with the display of Islamic art in the museum as it currently stands. However, at a moment of academia when decoloniality is high on the agenda, asking how better to display art that belongs to non-Western visualities is a worthwhile question. Prescient as ever, Dale Eickelman has led us to this question. We now need some answers. With regard to Islamic art, my sense is that one answer will concern the fact that looking through windows onto carefully calibrated views, the principal activity of visitors in front of museum vitrines, was something only for the powerful and patriarchal in medieval and pre-modern Islamic urban culture. For those few people, the open (but unglazed) windows they looked through formed part of pictorially organized views (Arnold 2017: 36-121). For most other people, however, open windows at body height were rarely encountered, being generally screened. These screened windows did not allow looking through, but at best peering through, and were not part of pictorially organized views. As Ruggles (2007: 155-56) has noted, they additionally made one self-conscious about the act of looking itself: in confounding vision, they teased and drew attention to the eye. The

shadowy fissures these screens threw across sight are reminiscent of the jinn lurking in the shadowlands between visibility and invisibility.

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* Part 2: Authority

** 5. Rethinking New Media in the Public Sphere: Beyond the Freedom Paradox

Jon W. Anderson

A paradox of the public sphere is that it implies structure without itself being that structure. For the philosopher and sociologist Jurgen Habermas, it was a regime of communication lodged in macro structures, of ritualized communication in dynastic and ecclesiastical structures and of formally “rational” communication which conveyed bourgeois ascendency (and, for Habermas, its realization in the technocratic state). Critiques of his formulation dwelt on people that it excluded - notably women and other social classes - and the problematic role it assigned to religion (Calhoun 1992); more significant has been his limited view of communication in constituting a public sphere - meaning shared and in the open among persons otherwise strangers rather than in known roles. Beyond defending his claims for “rational” communication (namely, that stands on its own), Habermas came around to respecifying the public sphere as “a network for communicating information and points of view” (Habermas 1996: 360), which still consigns how one emerges to largely historical-descriptive inquiry and a sociology of before-and-after comparison.

For the Middle East and Muslim world, the question of how a public sphere emerges has been subordinated to structural views of alternative sites and actors. Identifying new sites and actors was a first step (Eickelman and Anderson 2003), affirmed by much subsequent documentation of contemporary Islamic spaces (Bunt 2000, 2003, 2009; Graf 2007; Graf and

Skovgaard-Petersen 2009; Sisler 2011). In our New Media in the Muslim World (Eickelman and Anderson 2003), we presented romance novels, movies, satellite television, Internet portals, new legal journals, religious goods and community organizing as empirical sites where new actors - by comparison to traditional or existing and, by implication, establishment ones - advanced new interpretations in new media that organized and conveyed them. It has subsequently become apparent that new media have a deeper history and more extensive sociology in the Muslim world, from Sufis' quickly taking up new print technologies in the nineteenth century to Rashid Rida's discussing Islam in journalistic formats (al-Manar) at the turn of the twentieth century, to later circulations of sermons beyond mosque and madrassa on audio and video cassettes (Ernst 2005; Hamzah

2008, 2013; Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994). But there is more here than proliferating alternatives or alter-natives.

First of all, communication is more than the passing of messages. Communication has context and genre, it registers identities of speakers and hearers, and it is intertextual and encoded. In addition to having more variables than Habermas considered, it is fundamentally interactive and emergent, extending and emerging over time and through interaction with myriad others. This is especially the case with new media, which are not finished products reproducing structural transformation but typically, and empirically, works in progress. Focusing on structural transformation, which opened the subject, ontologizes a utopianism in new media that leaves over data and flattens experience, which is precisely opposite the effects of new media. Beyond the gross fact of a public sphere, which can be problematic, is the prior question of how one emerges as a sphere of communication that comes to be shared and in public.

Understanding how a sphere of communication becomes shared, and in public is key to undoing the ontological utopianism in construing new media primarily as alternatives. Actors may imagine utopias, and may associate those with particular media and pursue utopias through new media, but these depend on how a sphere of shared meanings emerges and becomes both structured and in public - then as a public - in the first place. Here, I want to bring these processes better into view by aligning treatments of the Internet in the Middle East as new media with research on the Internet from elsewhere, and with the richer descriptive base that has accumulated. This is particularly the case with the advent of so-called "social" media (aka, Web 2.0) in the Middle East, which have outrun technical and functional concepts that are typically applied to it there too casually as alternatives.

*** 1 The Problem with Internet Media

Thinking about the Internet in the Middle East has overwhelmingly focused on two principal ideas. One, rooted in modernization theory, has viewed networked communications as revolutionary "technologies of freedom" (Pool 1983), increasing access to and flows of information. Manuel Castells (1996: 500) went on to characterize networked communications as the "material basis" of a "new social morphology" whose diffusion

“substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture.” The other idea frames it overwhelmingly as media and operationalizes such structural transformation through comparisons to mass media. Both focus on decentralization of communication and on enhancements of agency as key structural transformations fostered by the Internet as a system of (more) open communication and by the Internet as media. But these essentially backwardlooking comparisons to industrial mass society can be deeply problematic, not least for ignoring other features of the Internet (as well as of communication more generally) beyond message-passing. A prominent example is the way stories and celebrations of digital revolutionaries conveying and amplifying, even helping to organize, uprisings in the Arab Spring (2010-2011) were overtaken almost as they occurred by debunking accounts that quickly carried the day. “The revolution will be tweeted,” enthused the web journalist and managing editor of Foreign Policy (Houndshell 2011). No, came back the vade mecum of an historian (Alterman 2011) with deep research experience in Egypt, it will not. Stories of young bloggers and Facebook revolutionaries (Aiello 2011; Che-bib and Sohail 2011; Faris 2012; Lotan et al. 2011; York 2011) quickly gave way to second thoughts on how the dynamics of the Internet’s new media fail to prevail against the static inertia of its authoritarian states and societies (Harb 2011; Lynch 2011), and think-tank projects were mounted to explain why (Aday et al. 2012; Zayani 2015). This is itself a familiar story about new media in the Middle East since television in the 1950s (Lerner 1958).

Such indeterminacies partly lie in how analysts and players share views and make the same arguments about media and politics. Players’ adopting analysts’ frames of reference - in effect joining and competing with them - puts analysis in the position of adjudicating players’ applications of the same body of ideas. Conversely, analytical conceptualizations of new media (as agencydispersing and agency-enhancing) become part of local knowledge in a shared search for “impacts” of new media through comparisons with mass media, understood primarily as message-passing and its outcomes. This epistemological problem compounds the ontological one in theorizing about media primarily as message-passing and focusing functionally on outcomes (or want thereof). So, an indeterminacy that creeps into media theory, which is already part of what it purports to explain, meets the over-determination of too few variables in that theory.

In anthropology, the epistemological side of this problem has been treated as how to position description where observer and observed use the same terminology, particularly in encounters in contemporary societies that collapse social distance into unmarked transparencies (Riles 2000). A way out of this conundrum is indicated in Eickelman’s (1992) essay on “Mass Higher Education and the Religious Imagination in Contemporary Arab Societies.” There, he identified religious imagination in terms of techniques rooted in a two-generation long rise in mass education, and particularly mass higher education, providing a new “intellectual technology” that was applied to thinking about Islam in more objectifying terms that modern education encourages than the hermeneutic techniques of mosque and madrassa. The insight is not that modern education is inherently superior (epistemologically), or inherently secular (ontologically), but that it became more widely spread than the textual literacy of the ^culama because mass education reached more people, and success in its type sites encouraged applying it to

others, notably religion. His finding was not that modern education led to secularism or diminished interest in religion, the standard interpretation since modernization theory. Quite the contrary: its social effect in that domain showed up and could be traced more immediately in “new ways of knowing and the emerging networks for communication and action produced by mass higher education and contemporary religious activism” (Eickelman 1992).

This identifies a meeting ground between structure and agency that aligns with the view that Habermas came around to, and that Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) endorsed for combining structural with the more contingent data they called “cultural,” which bring agency into the analysis. Linking “ways of knowing” and “emerging networks for communication and action” helps in grasping that the Internet engages engineering, computer science, telecommunications, and extensive actor networks that brought those to general publics, to publishing, to imaginaries of “cyberspace,” the arts and creativity. Ways this proceeds are both increasingly pervasive and mostly out of sight for newer users, which is of intense concern to some (Mueller 2002, 2010). They are mostly evanescent as information, transient as performances and variously cast as a “second self” (Turkle 1984), new human spirit (Negroponte 1995), or the “new social morphology of our societies” (Castells 1996: 469). However, it is largely as media that the Internet has entered analysis in the Middle East, and then overwhelmingly through comparisons to mass media. In what has become the standard model, the Internet structurally provides a dispersed any-to-any model of communication that functionally provides freer flows and more diverse sources of information. Where mass media are concentrated and one-to-many, the Internet is non-hierarchical, open to anyone, a veritable space of freedom; and that register is enhanced in social media. But how? Testimonies and stories from bloggers, where available (Faris 2008; Herrera 2012; Kallander 2013; Pepe 2012; Radsch 2008; Shapiro 2009; Weyman 2007), typically begin with self-expression and keeping up with friends online in a space of their own. For technocrats who introduced it and businessmen who followed them online, it was developing services and, before that, developing the Internet itself (Anderson 2000, 2011).

These priorities and the broader range of activities are elided in comparisons to mass media and its communications theory from the Frankfurt School’s critical focus on production and American sociologists’ on outcomes to Stuart Hall’s semiotics of interpretation. These cast communication primarily as message-passing, and the main problem to be reception, measured as changes in knowledge, attitudes and practices, which has always been problematic. Focusing on message content and reception (registered as behavioral or attitudinal change) overlooks what people are doing even with mass media of broadcasting and publishing (Spitulnik 2002, 2010; see also Peterson 2010). A first step away from this limited conception of communication is aligning study of media more closely with its practices (Couldry 2010, 2012), which integrate additional data about how communication can be strategic, improvised, multiply structured, emergent in time, and situated - all of which are treated as externalities of communication conceived as message-passing and its “impacts.” Shifting attention to what actors are doing might introduce more about the speaker into what have been largely hearer-centered theories of communication concerned with getting the message through, and it might work for mass communications to re-center actors in a fuller range of practices. But this still falls short of what people are doing on the

Internet and through its various “ways of knowing and emerging networks for communication and action.”

Whatever people are doing on, with, or through the Internet - blogging, tweeting, chatting, surfing, hacking, shopping, searching or researching, playing games, writing or reading email, building websites, storing and accessing files, even computing - they are all interacting with and through computer-mediated communication in the form of programs. Computer-mediated communication is fundamentally interactive in two senses, or along two dimensions: one of interacting with others through media, which is foregrounded in so-called social media, and another of interacting with those media through manipulation, which includes learning from them about them, applying them to tasks and, in a sense that will be important here, continuing their programming. Common and recurring fears that users might somehow be absorbed - “addicted” is a common metaphor, isolated is another - in a mysterious cyberspace overlook how just the reverse is the case (Hampton and Wellman 2001; Nie 2001; Wellman 2001). A basic finding about life online is that even the most absorbed users do not retreat into cyberspace; they use it to extend their networks on their margins (from Toronto, see Hampton and Wellman 2001, 2003; Wellman 2001; Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002; and from uc-Berkeley’s School of Information, see boyd 2006, 2008, 2010; Ito 2010).

Facebook and Twitter rose to fame in the Arab Spring uprisings as exemplars of Internet social media, which include myriad other programs that turn on user-contributed content from Wikipedia (and Google) on to others, such as Friendster, that have fallen by the way. Users first engage these and extend their social networks in a process or stages that proceed from lurker to newbie to adept to master and some to celebrity outside the field. They enter this process by learning from each other and peer mentoring, which proceeds through establishing relations and identity (reputation) with others in the field. The sites and social frames of these activities constitute what Lave and Wegner (1991) “communities of practice” through which informal learning proceeds as what they called “legitimate peripheral participation” by contrast to the more didactic routines and regulated attendance of formal teaching. Informal learning includes watching, sharing tips and tricks, and episodic mentoring among actors who come and go. Over time, these forms of participation that they unite as “peripheral” convert lurkers and newbies into adepts. Not to put too fine a point on it, the first form of interaction with and through social media - and, I would argue, with the Internet generally - is learning on it how to use it, which is primarily from others. This fact has typically been elided in thinking about communication as message-passing and, in the Middle East, by focusing on blogging, tweeting and Facebook as political cyber-activism from journalism to mobilizing through social media.

Such casual comparisons elide how their practices develop or collapse development into individual effort. They elide not just how people learn, but how they learn from each other and in what social settings. But not always. In an account of Egyptian bloggers who played roles in the Kefaya and the April 6 Youth Movement well before the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, Courtney Radsch (2008) described the prior emergence of what she called a blogger elite, which had grown around experimenting with and networking through blogs and ties

among techies ranging from Linux developers to website designers who formed communities of practice through peer learning, sharing tips and tricks, and informal mentoring. From this base, and to it, came activists with backgrounds in Egypt's long history of labor protests and quasi-parties and others, sharing objections to rising economic inequalities and shrinking opportunities under the Mubarak regime's marketization policies that benefited only a few. In her arresting phrase, "bloggers became activists and activists became bloggers" (Radsch 2008). Among the latter, the Muslim Brotherhood built an online presence, while an example of the former might be Esraa Abdel Fattah, who worked for a dvd publisher and created a Facebook page for the April 6 Youth Movement. She had originally joined Facebook to keep up with her friends and then joined groups for fans of Egyptian singers and the national football team as well as others from discussions of the Qur'an to the latest styles. She used the accumulated expertise of this experience to create an April 6 Facebook page with an activist partner, became widely known even among people not using the Internet as the "Facebook girl," and was arrested. Upon being released from jail and publicly recanting, she was ostracized by political activists who took over the page, changed the password and excluded her from it (Shapiro 2009). In other words, a sympathizer brought her technical expertise to more politically engaged actors with less of it. For her part, she added another domain to her online activity.

These extensions exemplify what sociologists call "weak ties" that sustain one relationship but not many (Granovetter 1973) that became apparent when the activists subsequently excluded her from the very Facebook account she had created. By comparison, "strong ties" of close friends and family are multistranded, such as had come to be the case among Radsch's blogger elite who had been interacting and collaborating for years on using the Internet from its technological sides to connections with the arts. Two things are worth noting here. First, the initial draw of the Internet is more commonly for personal expression and interacting with friends, including interacting around the technology, than for political expression and activism (Ogan and Cagiltay 2006; Weyman 2007),[72] which more typically began in defense of blogging after police begin arresting bloggers (Haugbollle 2007). Second, among both techies and non-techies, the first community that forms among bloggers is around blogging as an activity in and of itself (Amr 2008; Taki 2010; on Lebanese bloggers and their pathways, see Haugbolle 2007; Jurkiewicz 2018).

In this case, underlying networks of strong-tie nodes linked by weak ties to others coalesced among techies, hackers, bloggers, Linux programmers and open-source software advocates, web designers, and website developers around a "culture of the net" before the Arab Spring, when they provided some of the connective tissue of Radsch's blogger elites and their links to political activists (Pollock 2011; Valeriani 2011). Among them, Augusto Valeriani identified practices of participation, peer-production and "remixing" in overlapping networks forged around "values, behaviors, skills and strategies that define the cultural dimension of the web" and that provided "connective leadership" in the Arab Spring demonstrations (Della Ratta and Valeriani 2012). The significance of this coalescence, beyond Valeriani's careful documentation of the network ties, is the reflexive consciousness of a "culture of the web" applicable outside the Web that emerged through interaction on and over these very technologies and built collaborations into trust around expertise and reputations for managing that expertise and those collaborations. Thus, from otherwise lightly organized

communities of practice emerge what Christopher Kelty in a study of open-source software developers called “recursive public spheres” (Kelty 2005, 2008). Kelty linked consciousness as a community to working on its means of production - in his case, open-source software - as an explicit alternative to existing regimes - in their case, proprietary commercial software. The value and pertinence of Kelty’s work goes beyond affirming Valeriani’s “culture of the net” to placing it in a network of specific social relations. Key here is the emergence of self-identification in a community of practice as a community of distinguishing practices, where community emerges out of collaboration and is enacted through that collaboration - more specifically, through practices that unite intellectual technology and the emerging networks of communication and action that convey its practice.

Kelty’s recursive public spheres and Valeriani’s networks focused by and on a culture of participation, peer production, collaboration and remix practices, are strong forms of Lave and Wenger’s communities of practice such as underlay Radsch’s blogger elite. Viewed comparatively, they display an evolution from reference groups (categorical identities shared by people who watch but do not necessarily interact with each other) into communities of practice through interaction (particularly learning and sharing), and on to Kelty’s recursive public spheres that focus consciousness of membership in a group on sharing and actively extending its means of production. What makes Kelty’s the stronger form is that while members of communities of practice come and go and pass from lurker to newbie to adept to master (and some on to celebrities beyond the field), participation in Kelty’s recursive public spheres focuses on sharing the development of its means of production or, in Eickelman’s term, “intellectual technology.” While Kelty is careful to avoid generalizing beyond the case of open-source software developers, he does aver that the notion could be projected back on the Internet itself, which also developed as an alternative to an existing regime of communications in cobbling together its intellectual technology and an intense focus on its means of production (Braden et al. 1999; Leiner et al. 2009). That development proceeded from assembling component technologies from multi-user, multi-tasking, networked computing to assembling the cultural surround of finance, regulation and support for the Internet project (Abbate et al. 1999; Hart et al. 1992), then extending it from the engineers who created it for their own work and around their collaborative work habits and values to scientists, other academics, the professionals they trained, and thence to the publics those professionals served.

*** 2. How the Internet Is Interactive

Arguably, the Internet has been interactive from its beginnings, and in three foundational ways. In addition to learning on and through it, the Internet was built to be interactive. Specifically, it was built as a collaborative project for other collaboration, and then extended by programming ever more user behavior into its “stack.”[73] It has never been a single technology but always a congeries of technologies, starting with time sharing, interactive (instead of batch) processing, and networked computing. Its original design incorporated these technologies and added others from signals processing to new software. The creators’ initial purpose was to establish a single, open platform for interaction with distant (and disparate) machines, to which the first addition, email, added interaction between their

operators (in the first instance, about the machines). The original concept extended the underlying design of all modern computers as general-purpose machines that could be programmed to do anything to a universal network of (potentially) all machines. This underlying design and its early extensions in newsgroups and listservs for collaboration are largely unknown and irrelevant to users who were introduced to the Internet in its later iteration as the World Wide Web, originally an application for linking research material that morphed into a publication medium through its first native application, the portal. What are today called “social media” were retrospectively conceived as extending the limited interactivity of Web portals to social transactions (O’Reilly n.d.).

Among the first but not the first to become famous as specifically social media in this sense were weblogs or blogs, which took the diary form online and made it interactive by adding facilities for reader comments and distribution by links to other blogs and sources of information. Prior to blogs were precursors of Facebook, starting with dating sites that, with Friendster, came to be identified as social networking (boyd 2008; boyd and Ellison 2007), and subsequently Twitter, initially cast as mini-blogging. While lumped together and with an array of similar programs characterized by “user-contributed content” (O’Reilly n.d.), such as Wikipedia, there are significant differences in how they accumulate and distribute information interactively. Blogs are organized as serial entries (posts) that may or may not be accessible to any Internet user but universally include a facility for linking to other blogs (as well as to other sources of information) and so may take the form of extended conversations, which typically start with groups of friends. Twitter is both more telegraphic in format and distributed by subscription to topics and following those who tag them, taking the form of a multi-user game of recognition management (Heffernan 2011). Facebook takes an intermediate form of shorter entries accessible to subscribers (friends) who may comment on or simply signal recognition (likes) of postings on each other’s sites (wall) on which their actions and interactions with others are registered. Each features user-contributed content, which they share with the interactive production of Wikipedia, and distribution through user-constructed networks (blogroll connections of blogs, friends on Facebook, followers on Twitter) that distinguish them from the broadcast distribution of mass and print media. Reception, here, is not just a matter of being in a stream of messages but positive interaction that leads to others with and then through these programs that run from signaling through more extensive exchanges to collaboration. They are all based technologically on contentmanagement software back to the Web on which they are stacked.

Taking Facebook as the central example and a point of comparison, research has consistently shown that users, and particularly youth, almost never go “on Facebook” alone but almost always with friends and typically to join friends (boyd 2006, 2008, 2011), and then selectively extend those nodes through weaker ties to friends of friends or through some elective affinity.[74] The result is high interaction, strong-tie cores with weak-tie links to others through individual members, such as the tech-adepts described by Radsch and Valeriani might have with friends in other networks. Likewise with blogs: few attract many readers, and most attract none or vanishingly few on their own (Shirky 2006). Instead, they acquire readers, or at least connections, through links (via blogrolls and rss feeds) to and from others; so each blog is a node in a network of links, some with densely overlaid (strong)

ties marking regular interaction, others of single (weaker) links marking occasional interaction or mere recognition. In either case, weak ties become stronger through regular exchanges that expand a relationship to more people in a node and by connecting to additional subjects. Twitter users likewise choose to follow topics or individual posters and to post to them, which theoretically could take the form of a massive conversation but is more immediately like a strategic game of attracting attention among imagined followers (Heffernan 2011). Each differently prioritizes interactions, which users may repurpose or extend. Some examples are the activists that Radsch describes who turned Facebook's posting personal "news" about "friends" into a bulletin board for political mobilization, the bloggers Valeriani describes who turned ties with digital freedom and human rights organizations into activism (Pollock 2011; Stolberg 2011), or the way in which Twitter, along with its visual counterpart YouTube, was repurposed to pass news to wider audiences that were in the habit of seeking information on them instead of longer-form mass-media platforms. (See Tusa (2013) for an interesting comparison of the communicative properties of the prominence of blogs in articulating senses of grievance to Twitter's shorter-form for getting out information about demonstrations.)

This network structure of weak-tie links and strong-tie nodes is robust sociology first developed in studies of job-seeking (Granovetter 1983) which found that close friends and family provided less help in finding employment because they essentially shared the same and limited information, while friends of friends and more distant acquaintances, interacting only occasionally and sharing little, had different information.[75] Put differently, strong-tie networks are characterized by high informational redundancy - the same thing over and over, as in families - compared with weak-tie networks that link bits of information not already shared to dense and more comprehensive strongtie relations. The significance of this structure is how it distributes information - more affirmation than information in networks of strong ties, with new information entering via weak ties to others. The communicative profile in strong-tie networks comes to resemble ritual that affirms solidarity - it forms rather than informs - while what passes through weak ties is, literally, news.

This distinction helps to identify the development of interaction in communities of practice as expansions of single-stranded weak ties into multistranded stronger ones. If their stronger forms are recursive public spheres, then the weaker forms are merely reference groups of "people like us" but who do not know or interact with each other to affirm that. Informationally, the significance of weak ties is that people learn something new through them and by shifting from passive to active learning - or, in the digital vernacular, from lurkers to newbies. In a community of practice, it is not the community they first learn about but what the community knows, which they learn through informal peer learning, mentoring, sharing tips and tricks that may develop into more extended collaborations, which expand weak ties into stronger ones, eventually of a recursive public sphere. Thus Radsch and Valeriani's data indicate actors who belong to multiple nodes with disparate weak-tie links between them through which new information, skills and learning flow that turned bloggers into activists and activists into bloggers. Valeriani makes the further point that the habitus of such outreach was developed, learned - and improvisationally, rather than formally taught - in tech adepts' communities of practice that assembled heterogeneous skills and knowledge into collective identities. Such communities may assemble cores of adepts whose continuous

and focused interactions forge bonds of familiarity and trust in the form of reputations as well as their shared expertise. Such would be Radsch's blogger elites, to whom activists loosely connected to them turned for their particular knowledge. Such a community of practice emerges in practice as a hierarchy of insiders, peripherals, passers-by and outsiders who bring weak ties to other nodes that pass additional information. The currencies of these informal settings are participation, expertise, and cultivating reputation for it, then claims to "universal" values that transcend more specific local values of ontological communities or represent themselves as an underlying "culture of the net" (Dean et al. 2006).

Interactive media provide sites or platforms of this habitus for interacting with media (as objects) and for interacting through media (as subjects). What began in each case as sociologically rather primitive instantiations (engineers' design parameters for automating information distribution) are broadened by adding higher-level interactions and through continuous learning. What makes them interactive in the first instance is learning programmed routines and facilities, to which sociologist Barry Wellman (2002) applied the concept of "affordances" from the field of human-machine interaction for action possibilities designed into machines in preference to stronger conceptions of determination. A commonplace of software design is that users typically employ less than the designed capacities of a program and often for purposes not designed into them, such as activist uses of Facebook and YouTube for political mobilization in the Arab Spring (Lewinski and Mohammed 2012). From the Internet's beginnings, programmers have encoded progressively higher levels of interaction by turning applications, such as the World Wide Web invented for linking information "on the run" (Berners-Lee and Fischetti 1999) into platforms for programs engaging additional user-contributed content. Interaction that begins with the machine and moves to its operators continues through their user-contributed content, which is not just about users' social relations

but, in the form of social media, increasingly more of the substance of higher order interaction through machines.

*** 3 The Social Life of Information

If interactions with and through media begin with learning techniques and in networks formed with them, how does this work? Engineers tend to project outcomes (connection, collaboration, information-seeking) as design features and political analysts to concentrate more on externalities. To square these circles and capture the sort of activity that Radsch characterized as bloggers becoming activists and activists becoming bloggers or Valeriani found in the extensions of heterogenous networks, Lawrence Lessig (2008) borrowed the concept of "remix" from music. Apart from a postmodern nod to creativity, the concept goes little further than modernist metaphors such as diffusion of innovations (from one place, site or activity to another), favored in political communications studies (a recent example being Howard 2010) to link information flows to interactions that convey them. Viewing communication interactively shifts the problem from what messages add to recipients to

what is added to move messages through weak-tie links into nodes of strong ties where they come to carry additional information.

This process is known in linguistic anthropology as “entextualization.” In one of its type sites, Joel Kuipers (1990) described it as the establishment of “textual authority,” by which he meant that highly situated, deeply contextualized, personal information is progressively recast into more general, more shared, abstract or categorical terms. Examples could include medical diagnosis, or police detective work that assemble bits of disparate information into meaningful units; his site was a process of divination in which a specific individual complaint is successively recast into a diagnosis, a passage from having to know the context to knowing the code. Its “textual authority” confers what boyd and Ellison (2007) identified as the permanence and transparency of information on social network sites where users construct profiles, build their networks, and record comments on each other’s that float free and independent from their original settings. What Kuipers points to is not reinterpretation (change of meaning), but change of register from highly contextualized, locally and temporally contingent information to more portable, abstract categories that contain general values and evoke what is at stake. In a specifically media context, Swidler (2001) refers to such categories as “anchors” of significance in authoritative representations and enactments.

Something like the entextualization process that Kuipers located in a stepwise ritual process - its resolution of ambiguities, multiple local meanings and especially conflicts - can be seen also in the refinement of myriad individual grievances that connect diverse single incidents into an authoritative text, master frame, or anchor such as emerged in the Arab Spring demonstrations between December 2010 and February 2011. Between the April 6 Movement in support of a workers’ strike in 2008, the Kefaya movement four years earlier, and 2010, accumulating grievances over unemployment, the combination of crony capitalism and shrinking economic prospects, police brutality, particularly against bloggers who exposed it, and ire over the prospect of a Mubarak-son succession filtered through the Egyptian blogosphere and coalesced in a smaller group of authoritative texts that united many single incidents and personal experiences. One was the Facebook page, “We are all Khaled Said,” created in June 2010 to commemorate a blogger who, after posting a video of police misbehavior, was dragged by them from an Internet cafe and beaten to death. Graphic images were posted and reposted on Facebook pages, YouTube, and blogs that literally put his battered face on what was wrong in Egypt (Lim 2012). The Facebook page was created by a co-founder of Wikileaks Arabic, Abdelrahman Mansour, who had brought skills developed as an online reporter for Al-Jazeera and on the website of the popular television preacher, Amr Khaled, and by Wael Ghonim, a Google marketing executive with whom Abdelrahman had worked on the Facebook page for opposition presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei (Herrera 2013). Mansour also created another Facebook page, Thawrat Shaab Misr (Egyptian People’s Revolution), in early 2011 to turn a national holiday commemorating the police into more generalized protest against them that, through street demonstrations, coalesced heterogenous activism into a broad, inclusive demand for the end of the regime.

Mansour, a media activist since his student days and former adherent of the Muslim Brotherhood, marks these connections explicitly as transitions in his account quoted by Linda Herrera: “I wanted to be part of a broader movement, something bigger than the Brotherhood. I wanted to continue working but not necessarily by belonging to one party or a single organization.” His example aligns the sociology of network flows with the sociolinguistics of entextualiza-tion that connect separate experiences into one: the flows are not or not only of messages from one network to another but of individual bits into shared texts (“memes” in some media theory) that give those individual experiences a shared anchor. This is what Hirschkind detects in the Arab Spring as “a new political language that cuts across the institutional barriers that had until then polarized Egypt’s political terrain,” and developed specifically in the Egyptian blogosphere as “a political language free from the problematic of secularism and fundamentalism that had governed so much of political discourse in the Middle East” (Hirschkind 2011). In other words, he was essentially restating Mansour’s point and drawing out its un-spoken implications. Other elements in this particular conjunction in the blogosphere include collaborations that grew among Egyptian and Tunisian bloggers between the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt (Kirkpatrick and Sanger 2011; Pollock 2011); online and other consultations with Otpor, the anti-Milosovic youth movement in Serbia; studying social media use in the 2009 Iranian Green Movement (Is-hani 2011); and training in non-violent protest tactics allegedly adapted from an American activist (Shane 2011; Stolberg 2011), which had spread online and as a pamphlet subsequently reproduced in The Atlantic (Madrigal 2011).

This is far beyond Lessig’s remix. Its underlying pattern is passing little local stories (what’s happening to me, now, here) into bigger general ones (what’s happening to us, our time, the world) that acquire the authority of shared meanings to anchor individual experiences in values that unite what is at stake. What seems to happen is entextualization passing through network dynamics where specific, individual experiences (I can’t get a job, afford to get married; a blogger was beaten by the police; the president wants to install his son as successor) congeal in nodes of strong ties that focus on those ties (the police are beating bloggers; the government is un-Islamic; the regime is undemocratic; the economy is failing to generate employment) and feed through weak links between them into a master text that could be shared between them and more widely, as in the slogan, ash-Shab yurid isqat an-Nizam (“The People Demand the End of the Regime!”) that condensed the grievances of demonstrators in Tahrir Square (and in other countries).

For the middle parts of this process, Ethan Zuckerman (2008) applied the term “bridge bloggers” to actors who actively forge such connections, who cast their messages in the terms, for instance, of human rights or net-freedom campaigns, or obversely are sought out for moving local experiences into more global categories because they have ties in both.[76] In this sense, entextualiza-tion may be strategic, actively pursued in a field of contending interpretative performances, as well as a cumulative process of restatement, such as in the intervals between the Kefaya and April 6 Movement and those of the Arab Spring. So, we have three analytically distinguishable kinds or sites of entextu-alization - the ritual process that is Kuipers’s type site, a cumulative process over an extended period of increasing interaction, and a strategic version that is reflexive.

These analytical types describe a hierarchy of interactivity that instantiates a public sphere (and stratifies participation in it) from the relatively passive (reference groups, lurkers), through the tentative and transient (communities of practice, newbies) to the recursive (entextualization in the hands of master spokespersons) that link the socialization of users to the design functions of programs on the one hand and to the socializations of their uses into more comprehensive registers on the other. Such progressions underlie the incorporation of user behavior into computer programs, which users further extend with their own programming. That process has been implicit in the Internet from its beginning and has become ever more explicit with new social media. User-contributed information is not new: all information on the Internet is user-contributed by design, since its engineers created it for their work. Web portals arrayed it as networks; and social media made the incorporation of user-contributed content both explicit and reflexive in the applications that model user interactions and that invite them to extend the process with more interactions.[77] Viewed as a process and not an outcome, the sequence begins with learning about and through interactive media and proceeds by extending its uses through what sociologically amount to elective affinities. Sites of these processes are communities of practice, in which information is consolidated into shared understandings. Information in this sense does not diffuse, it coalesces through networks of weak-tie links in strong-tie nodes by entextualiza-tions that give it denser and more general registers of value, which, in network terms, consist of shared knowledge of individual nodes compared with the bits of information that are passed between them.

*** 4 Intermediate Conclusions: How Do New Media Expand the Public Sphere?

The formula of new interpretations by new interpreters in new media forging, or at least fostering an emerging public sphere, was adequate when Internet media and studies of new media in the Middle East and Muslim world were themselves new, but is now increasingly showing its age. It has neither kept up with a growing empirical record, not least of sites, nor have comparisons with the older mass media overcome their fundamental limitation of viewing communication as outcomes (impacts) of the passing of messages. Most fatally, such comparisons engage limited aspects of the Internet because the closer one gets to real social action, the more likely it is that the media, nearly always the political media, and its message-centric view of communication, will produce indeterminate results. Filling in the outlines of new interpretations, new interpreters, and new media has documented an emerging public sphere, but one that remains under-developed insofar as communication is primarily theorized as message-passing and the Internet primarily as media.

That becomes harder with social media, which foreground an interactivity that was always in the Internet and which social media make plain by shortening the cycles and expanding the scope of interactions through it. Interaction starts with learning and extends through communities of practice that share knowledge through networks of weak ties which pass information and consolidate knowledge in nodes of strong ties that refine it into shared, public understandings. It entails more middle range phenomena, such as are highlighted

here. First are communities of practice where knowledge is shared through layers of participation by actors who come and go but, unlike reference groups, interact with each other. Theirs is at least partial, part-time or “peripheral” participation, which may scale up to more intensive and reflexive participation central to the purpose of a group, such as Kelty found among Linux geeks and may be the case with some blogger networks that become intensely focused on blogging itself. Second are networks of weak ties through which information (knowledge) passes to nodes of strong ties where it is refined into shared understanding. Third is the sociolinguistic process of entextualization whereby highly specific and deeply contextualized information is recast into more context-independent or abstracted understandings that can circulate unaided. This entextualization may unfold as a ritual process, or cumulatively over time through increasing interaction, or as a reflexive strategy of turning individual experience and knowledge into social experience and knowledge that is shareable, has general value, expresses identity as a group, and consolidates in symbols.

If new interpretations by new interpreters using new media identified the structural transformation of an emerging public sphere in the Middle East and Muslim world, communities of practice, networks of weak ties linking nodes of strong ties, and entextualization provide a clearer picture - and a less interested account - of how this emergence continues through interaction on and incorporation into the Internet, which projects reference group phenomena into the public sphere. This has two benefits denied to views of the Internet as media and limited to message passing and agency enhancement. Both agency and messages are transformed, in a sense of becoming not only more public but also more reflexively coherent, through normal practices (sharing, abstraction, reflexivity) by which communities of practice grow and entextualization proceeds. Second, bringing these into focus takes advantage of a much enlarged and more diversified descriptive base to look past initial assessments, which were framed primarily as exceptions, to a more normal sociology comparable with what research elsewhere is showing about how the Internet actually shapes the emergence of a public sphere. A remaining question is whether and where the magic of media to extend characteristic forms of interaction in small groups and networks conveys intimacies and immediacies that similarly scale up.

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chapter 6

** 6. New Moroccan Publics: Prisons, Cemeteries and Human Remains

Susan Slyomovics

Under extreme conditions, the acts of writing,[78] witnessing, and speaking are carried on as a last resort - not to communicate among disparate audiences, but rather as desperate gestures into the void. As innovative origins for the public sphere, I consider the ways in which the acts of last resort that emerge from open cemetery graves and closed prison cells resituate emerging Moroccan public spheres and plural democratic vistas. Thus, this enquiry extends anthropologists Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson's (1999: 1-2) descriptions of "an emerging Muslim public sphere ... situated outside formal state control ... at the intersections of religious, political and social life." Accordingly, the public sphere expands exponentially towards a metaphorical, imaginary, visual or even a moral space as well as an actual bounded physical place, or in their words (Eickelman and Anderson 1999: 1-2):

Facilitated by the proliferation of media in the modern world, the Muslim public can challenge or limit state and conventional religious authorities and contribute to the creation of civil society. . This combination of new media and new contributors to religious and political debates fosters an awareness on the part of all actors of the diverse ways in which Islam and Islamic values can be created and feed into new senses of a public space that is discursive, performative, and participative, and not confined to formal institutions recognized by state authorities.

The complexities and modalities of the public sphere, viewed through examples of several generations of Moroccan political prisoners in discursive, performative and participative

modes, underpin a vast social sciences literature on resistance, human rights, and what Eickelman and Anderson termed “boundary crossings of these messages” and “asymmetries between senders and receivers, and between producers and consumers” (Eickelman and Anderson 1999: 4). It is the Habermasian space of communicative action (Habermas 1984-1987).

Moroccan historical contexts for asymmetries in communicative action point to the prison and cemetery framed by French colonial control and normalized as the perpetual state of emergency (etat de siege). This began in 1914 and lasted until the end of the French Protectorate, the year of independence in 1956 (on consequences of the state of emergency, see Agamben 2000). The next phase saw these various instruments of repression - laws, penal bureaucracy, the police and prison system - indeed, an entire apparatus built by the French Protectorate to oppress Moroccans, and operationally Moroccanized: what allowed the French to control, dispossess and oppress Moroccans would permit Moroccans to do the same to Moroccans through the uninterrupted use of the government decree or dahir that legislated for impris-onment.[79] In both colonial and independent Morocco, a legal edifice specific to the worlds of political prisoners derived from several such decrees: these were the dahir of 8 August 1930, which created the category of political prisoners separated from ordinary prisoners (droit commun) to exempt them from forced labor and divide them according to Protectorate distinctions between native and Europeans; the dahlr of 29 June 1935, which mandated prison for demonstrations and actions to disturb order, peace and security; and the dahir of 26 July 1939, which added phrases to prohibit making, distributing, and selling tracts.[80] The post-independence Moroccan authorities inherited and exploited the apparatus of the French Protectorate to condemn large numbers of Moroccans for non-violent crimes of opinion. These mass arrests and trials with lengthy prison sentences were evidence; they automatically designated for international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, the category of prisoner of conscience. Not until 1998, according to Law 23/98 on prison reform enacted by the Moroccan parliament (published in the Bulletin officiel as the decree of 25 August 1998), did the first major reorganization and recategorization of the French-inspired carceral system break definitively with Protectorate decrees. The new laws of 1998 governing the status of political prisoners appeared just before the death of King Hassan ii, whose lengthy reign from 1961 until his death in 1999 is often referenced as the Years of Lead, due to mass repression and incarceration.

If these laws represent political asymmetries between the producers of state sovereignty and governmentality through the disciplinary institution of the prison, then political prisoners are the presumed receivers as subjects to be isolated and punished. In this chapter, I consider examples in which Moroccan political prisoners breached the confined spaces of the state-controlled cell and the cemetery through “discursive, performative, and participative” modalities adumbrated by Eickelman and Anderson. Focusing on the post-Hassan ii historical turning point, I return to 1999-2000 when, funded by a year-long Fulbright fellowship, I conducted numerous interviews with Moroccan political prisoners. These encounters occurred in public spaces newly opened to overlapping communities of political prisoner associations and human rights organizations.[81] Here, I am especially indebted to Marxist

former political prisoner Mohamed Srifi (who endured nineteen years of political detention mainly in Kenitra Prison), for offering me his radical perspective (during an interview in Tangier on 2 July 1997), which was at odds with descriptions of Moroccan imprisonment. He believed that a Moroccan prison may function as a university where human rights are nurtured because, paradoxically, this was the only free space in his country during the Years of Lead. Prison as a university is especially apt given that a heterogeneous population of Marxist, Amazigh nationalist, Islamist, and Sahrawi students had been thrown together in the cells of Kenitra Prison, Morocco's pre-eminent penitentiary. That political prisoners established vibrant worlds in which clandestine journals were published, meetings held, and messages sent outside and abroad has been amply documented historically and cross-culturally. Literary critic Simona Livescu (2011: 185) described the political prisoner's "spiteful euphoria" (a term she borrowed from a Soviet gulag inmate) and the ways in which their "abrupt initiation into prison happiness, at times individual and at times collective, infuses political prisoners with unique civic values that reverberate in their communities after release." Having demanded that their jailers, torturers, and politicians adhere to international human rights norms, once released into the population, she concluded that the political prisoner's so-called happiness was contagious.

As I look back twenty years to the serendipitous political and personal fieldwork conjunctures of 1999/2000, which included Hassan ii's death, his heir Muhammad vi's enthronement, and my joy at witnessing an apparent end to the Years of Lead, in hindsight I note unexpected outcomes of an enforced prison education. Generations formed in prison were armed with knowledgeable analyses and organizational abilities that did indeed reach wider publics. The events of the year 1999/2000 caused me (Slyomovics 2012) to ask where do Moroccan claims to the public sphere about prisoner and political rights begin? Is it from inside the prison or at the cemetery, and how does one document these intimate and emergent processes ethnographically? Despite regimes that criminalize all manner of cultural activities, censor literary productions, and control the sociability of cafes, Internet networks, national demonstrations, and local meetings, in what follows I discuss the avenues available to political prisoners for getting the word out.

*** 1. The Photograph an] d the Prison Cell of Islamist Political Detainees[82]

Consider this clandestine prison photograph in which two, possibly three sets of arms appeared from behind prison bars.

[[a-j-allen-james-fromherz-nadav-samin-knowledge-aut-9.jpg][Figure 6.1 Clandestine prison image photographer unknown. gift from khalid bakhti. author's collection.]]

Limbs seemingly detached from their owners configure the letters "A" and "I" to stand for Amnesty International. A fist on the viewer's right is raised high in the international gesture of struggle and solidarity to grasp a single red flower dotting the letter "I" above the arm.

Incised along the horizontal cell crossbar that locks inmates out of sight are prison graffiti to caption the staged photograph: “Detenus d’opinion Groupe 26 Oukacha” (Prisoners of Conscience Group 26 Oukacha). These arms belong to three political prisoners incarcerated during the decades of mass political trials in Morocco in which affiliations to socio-religious movements were effaced to reorganize groups of political prisoners according to the numbers arrested followed by the date of their trial. The designation Group 26, 2 September 1985 trial, refers to the twenty-six Moroccan Islamists in Casablanca’s Oukacha civil prison, who were arrested in 1984 for non-violent crimes of opinion and who proclaimed that they were exercising the “moral economy of protest” in the public sphere. (On cyclical uprisings and bread riots in the public sphere being “disciplined and with clear objectives,” see Gallisot 1989 Thompson 1971: 76-78.)

Their so-called crimes occurred during Ramadan at the hour of breaking the fast on 20-21 June 1983. Groups hung posters and painted slogans around beach and port areas, in the town center, and on highway overpasses to commemorate the anniversary of the 1981 Casablanca uprisings in the towns of Mohammedia and Casablanca, in the neighborhoods of Sidi Bernoussi and Ain Sebaa. Former Islamist political prisoners described these acts to me as the politics of tahaddl (or def in French), ephemeral public resistance. Calligraphy and posters, largely the work of activist artists Khalid Bakhti and Mohamed Hakiki, were deliberately designed to resemble election posters. Police swarmed the neighborhoods and quickly painted over wall graffiti, which then reappeared in the coming weeks. Some banners and posters were deliberate variants of leftist slogans decrying the lack of democracy and justice, the high cost of living, and calling for freedom of speech. When exhibited in court, Islamist-inflected slogans were incorporated into trial records and came to light: “if religion were installed in the country, there would be justice and human rights,” and “Hassan ii al-tagut,” a Quranic epithet for tyrant (Qur’an 4: 51, 60). Although their sole crime was to post anti-royal banners and graffiti, Islamists faced authorities who ramped up sentencing disparities with false accusations of fomenting Casablanca’s so-called bread riots (Darif 1999; Haou 1994: 13; Munson Jr. 1991: 331-44; Santucci 1985: 650-52; Tozy 1999). On 11 July 1984 when two men were caught covered in red paint in the town of Mohammedia, this was proof enough for police to have them forcibly disappeared inside Casablanca’s Derb Moulay Cherif torture center (Slyomovics 2001-2:53-56).

The trajectories of interrogation and torture that all Moroccan political prisoners shared reserved specific mistreatments for each category. According to my interlocutors, while the torturers forced Marxist-Leninist groups to recite the sahadah, the Muslim profession of faith, Islamist political prisoners were in turn prevented from performing ritual ablutions and praying out loud, on the grounds that their torturers defined these actions as a forbidden form of communication among themselves. Deemed especially dangerous were cases involving political prisoners accused of “threats to the security of the state” (atteintes a la surete de I’Etat) where incommunicado detention could be extended and, according to some Moroccan legal experts, construed as a period of unlimited duration meted out routinely to political opponents (Essaid 1971: 334, esp. n.57). Former political prisoner, lawyer, and activist with the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (amdh), Abderrahman Benameur, linked political imprisonment to nonauthorized views

emerging from any political act, whereby political acts interpreted by the state tarred so vast a group of activists as to constitute an absence of any semblance of judicial neutrality. He stressed that the continuities in social and political structures were rooted in the early years of independence that continued after independence and, as he (Benameur 1982: 3-4, 1983: 8-9) wrote in French and Arabic respectively:

Detention for political and union offences is not a contingent fact in contemporary Moroccan history, nor purely a series of provisional measures required by particular circumstances, nor a kind of extortion on the part of certain officials exercising the authority conferred by their job. On the contrary, detention for crimes of opinion, political and union activity is a method constantly used to destroy non-official opinion.

The state, in effect, having criminalized all manifestations of political activity and thought that promote l'opinion non-officielle also barred political acts such as writing tracts, painting graffiti, holding meetings, and demonstrating.

Figure 6.1, by contrast, is a visual and political riposte to the state because it presupposes someone outside the photographic frame, a photographer momentarily freed from his cell, with an illegal camera and the will and creativity to produce a symbolic, clandestine but factual document in 1992. Smuggled out of prison, disseminated to supporters in Morocco, and sent abroad to international human rights organizations, the photograph assumed that the very idea of a literate act is initially produced without an audience and only bare prison walls as company, unless one counts the torturers and prison guards. Never successfully silenced by the authorities, political prisoners saw themselves actively communicating beyond their prison walls in public debates about the future of Morocco. In this case, the urgent information to be disseminated involved Group 26 of the Islamist political prisoners proclaiming to be non-violent, thus supported and mentored by Amnesty International. After their arrest, an open letter (risalah maftuhah) was smuggled from prison with twenty-nine signatories affirming no affiliation with other existing Islamist groups such al-Sabibah al-Islamiyah, and proclaiming their commitment to non-violent opposition (La 'alaqah lana bi-munadammah al-sabibah al-islamiyah 1985: 6). A copy of the photograph was presented to me in 1999 during meetings in Casablanca organized by a human rights group for political prisoners headed by Driss Benzekri from the Marxist poitical group Ila al-Amam, and who until his death from cancer in 2007 served as president of Instance Equite et Reconciliation (ier), Morocco's truth commission (Sly-omovics 2005). While the photographer insisted on anonymity, Islamist former political prisoner Khalid Bakhti confirmed to me that he had been the subject and co-producer of the image, for which he used his own arms as part of the Amnesty International logo.

The passage of the political prisoners' pain, isolation, and torture into the realm of shared public discourse, no less than the ideas these prisoners espoused, drew on circulating photographs, reconfigured Muslim rituals, newspaper articles, and the performance of sahadah. In Morocco since the 1970s, the Arabic word sahadah

has come to express a prayer, an affirmation of faith, but also testimonio as defined (by Beverley 1989: 14) for Latin American literature:

The word testimonio translates literally as testimony, as in the act of testifying or bearing witness in a legal and religious sense ... in which it is the intentionality of the narrator that is paramount. ... [It implies] an urgency to communicate, a problem of repression, poverty, subalternity, imprisonment, struggle for survival, and so on, implicated in the act of narration itself.

Definitions of sahadah encompass a range of meanings from simply being present, to seeing events, to witnessing (Messick 1993: 161-63) and testifying orally, a continuum that unfolds semantically, experientially and publicly with greater intensity and purpose (Gimaret 1997: vol. 9, 201). The political prisoner as witness crafts the message in the form of photographs, eulogies, cemetery visits, and oral histories sustained by the authenticity of the carceral experience, while the implied audience changes as these occasions, images, and performances come to public notice. In this case, initial audiences were cellmates, widening to prisoner support groups and family members, then reaching international human rights organizations (including me, the foreign anthropologist) because the photograph is a genre of expression that is infinitely reproducible throughout the world. Properly contextualized, a photograph may inform, gather, and even create an audience committed to human rights for Moroccans inside and outside the country because it works artistically, its reception is politically explicit and subversive, and it reports on resistances that remain invisibly intimate and behind the scenes. Images educate as they too are forms of “intellectual technology or forms of transmission of knowledge available in a society to shape and accommodate social and political change,” concludes Eickelman (1978: 487). Another bonus is that powerful pictures transcend Morocco’s linguistic battles by choosing the gut punch of visuality, while eliminating discourses about the relative communicative values of the country’s Arabic, French, or Amazigh languages.

*** 2. The Cemetery Eulogy and Public Oral Testimony

Complex enactments of witnessing, testimony, political prisoner histories, and the history of Morocco’s radical left converged at a gravesite on Friday 31 March 2000 at Casablanca’s Martyrs Cemetery. Ritual burial practices were elaborated with innovative acts of political performance during the funeral of Brahim Meslil, nicknamed Hallaoui after his profession “the candy-maker.” Hallaoui’s body had been carried by cortege from his home to the Casablanca cemetery. His grave had been prepared and as he was lowered into the ground, the outline of his body, wrapped in a simple white sheet, was visible. Figure 6.2 depicts the crowd of activists, former political prisoners, and immediate family listening attentively to Mohamed Mehri’s eulogy, traditionally not delivered in the cemetery but in this case close to the shallow open grave displaying the shroud that bore traces of Hallaoui’s blood.

[[a-j-allen-james-fromherz-nadav-samin-knowledge-aut-8.jpg][Figure 6.2 Hallaoui’s interment, Casablanca cemetery, 31 March 2000 photograph by Susan Slyomovics]]

To Mehri’s right stands Salah El Ouadie, the poet and former political prisoner from the Marxist March 23 Movement who, on this atypical funerary occasion (Slyomovics 2002), is holding up a tape recorder, thus recognizing the role of testimony and witnessing. Funerals at Moroccan cemeteries are formal male ceremonies, so it was unusual that the women of Hallaoui’s immediate family, his wife and four daughters, attended and participated, although they only spoke at later commemorations (Guessous 2009).

In Figure 6.3, Meriem Meslil, one of Hallaoui’s daughters is holding aloft her father’s photograph, a powerful conjunction of her father’s portrait over his remains, while Mehri was narrating the trajectory of a militant Moroccan nationalist, a life in which the speaker himself was implicated (Figure 6.4). Mehri’s testimony gained power with each word uttered in this venue at that moment.

[[a-j-allen-james-fromherz-nadav-samin-knowledge-aut-7.jpg][Figure 6.3 Hallaoui’s interment, Casablanca cemetery, 31 March 2000 photograph by Susan Slyomovics]]

He performed the multiple roles of witness, actor, comrade and mourner to make urgent claims about rewriting the memory of Morocco’s contested and violent past history during the first decades after independence.

Mehri’s eulogy counters the primacy of the police report, a genre of authoritative essay writing that locates a political detainee in the specific historical and juridical context of presumed criminality.[83] There is always an imbalance of power between the written police documents of the authorities who incarcerate and the oral testimonies of former political prisoners who witness, for the latter represent performative forms of political opposition, perhaps even liberation from the prison spaces of surveillance.

[[a-j-allen-james-fromherz-nadav-samin-knowledge-aut-6.jpg][Figure 6.4 Hallaoui’s interment at the site of the gravestone photograph by Susan Slyomovics]]

I photographed and scribbled in my notebook the gist of Mehri’s narrative: Hallaoui had been born in 1935 in a small village near Taroudant in the Atlas Mountains. In 1942 at the age of seven, he had moved with his family to Casablanca, part of the massive influx of dispossessed rural southerners that fueled the city’s booming wartime industrial economy (Burke 1987; Clement 1992; Gallisot 1989; Le Saout and Rollinde 1999; Montagne 1952; Rachik 1999). In the waning years of the French Protectorate, Hallaoui joined the local Communist Party youth cell, attended its night schools and in 1948, at the age of thirteen,

participated in Casablanca street demonstrations against the partition of Palestine. In 1952, he switched his allegiances to the nationalist Istiqlal party, which the French had banned but which was operating clandestinely. Mehri recounted Hallaoui's pride at participating in the 1952 Casablanca uprising, one among many demonstrations repeated throughout the Maghrib in protest against the assassination of Tunisian union leader Ferhat Hached. Famously, Hallaoui claimed to be the first to decolonize by force the segregated Roxy cinema in Roches Noires, which barred entry to native Moroccans. By 1953, he had already been arrested and tortured by the French police for writing slogans on neighborhood walls proclaiming "Long live Morocco, long live Muhammad v" during the monarchy's enforced exile to Madagascar. Thereafter, Hallaoui took up arms and was active in Casablanca's urban underground resistance movement. After independence, he switched to the radical left political party, Union nationale des Forces populaires (unfp), under the leadership of Mehdi Ben Barka and Mohamed "Fqih" Basri, following the 1958 split from the Istiqlal party.

Mehri's eulogy on 31 March 2000 over Hallaoui's body in the cemetery followed precedents. On 20 December 1999, a scant three months before his own death, Hallaoui had spoken over the freshly excavated gravesite of Ahmed Jawhar, another comrade-in-arms known as Abaakil. Jawhar had been born in 1946 in the Tiznit region and migrated along with large numbers of Tashelhit Berber-speaking southerners to the city where, at the age of twelve, he became a worker in a Casablanca sugar factory. Again, Hallaoui provided oral testimony at a second public ceremony held at a public auditorium on 29 January 2000 to mark the arba'in, fortieth-day commemoration, of Ahmed Jawhar's death.

Twice he testified, first at the intimate and spontaneous cemetery eulogy, then in scripted testimonies about their shared political beliefs that had led them not only to take up arms against French colonialism during the Protectorate but also to continue the armed struggle for violent regime change after Moroccan independence. For the fortieth-day event, a memorial book in commemoration of Ahmed Jawhar's life, one of many examples in circulation of ephemeral printed programs accompanying written tributes at public performances (Figure 6.5), was distributed to the audience.

[[a-j-allen-james-fromherz-nadav-samin-knowledge-aut-5.jpg][Figure 6.5 Public venue for Ahmed Jawhar's commemoration, Casablanca, 29 January 2000. Photograph by Susan Slyomovics.]]

Each venue - prison cell, cemetery, and public theatre - and each medium and method - photograph, burial eulogy, public commemoration, memorial book - "undermine[s] the theatre of the state ... making evident the multiple connections of this expanding public sphere ... [to] offer self-consciously alternative forums for alternative voices" (Eickelman and Anderson 1999: ix-x). Performances in the public sphere, such as conferences, sit-ins, vigils, rallies, public testimonies, funeral eulogies, and commemorative days, invite critical reflection about the ways in which performance, coupled with new media, plays a role in wider socio-political contexts. Such performances are social practices deeply connected to

Moroccan history as attempts to uncover, write, and revise that past. To sustain the notion that the social life of human beings can be viewed through performance and new media, these accounts allow us to reconstruct mechanisms of abuse, with some attention to complex underlying social and political causes and contexts against which communal cultural enactments are composed. These new performance-oriented historiographical approaches relied on participatory structures, audience-speaker interactions, the role of the interview and public lecture as a genre, the status of speech as socially communicative action, and a community of political prisoners to create new understandings of living history. Notably, the eulogy and interviews illuminated the key roles of Jawhar and Hallaoui in what is known in Moroccan history as the revolt of Cheikh El-Arab.

*** 3. Tales of Cheikh El-Arab

Nicknamed Cheikh El-Arab or Chief of the Arabs, this was a man of many names and escapes from authority. Ahmed (or Hmad) Ben Mohamed Ben Brahim Bouchlaken, also known as Hmad Fouzi (or Faouzi), was born in Agouliz, southwestern Morocco, and died on 7 August 1964. A police ambush, orchestrated by General Muhammad Oufkir and based on a presumed betrayal by a member of Cheikh El-Arab's entourage, Ahmed Ouzzi, perhaps speaking under torture, unfolded in the Sidi-Othman neighborhood of Casablanca. Five months earlier, Cheikh El-Arab had escaped from both Oufkir and from a second prison sentence that had been pronounced in absentia. Condemned during the Rabat trial of 14 March 1964, he evaded this first mass trial, which had been notorious for creating large numbers of political prisoners in postindependence Morocco by incarcerating the leadership of the unfp political party, the main opposition to Hassan ii, alongside the remaining armed cells of the Armee de liberation nationale (ain), the national liberation army also known as Jays al-tahrir. After a gun battle in Casblanca's Derb Milan neighborhood, Hallaoui, outnumbered and surrounded by police, exited from his safe house firing his guns and was felled by a police bullet to the leg. Hallaoui's 1999 tribute to Jawhar recounted that Cheikh El-Arab chose to commit suicide with his last bullet rather than be taken by the forces of repression. According to an apocryphal version by French journalist Gilles Perrault (1990: 82-4), Oufkir sought Cheikh El-Arab alive but when at last they faced off, Oufkir was told: "You wanted me alive, I regret I have only one bullet but it's for me."[84]

Who was Cheikh El-Arab? Who belonged to his group? And how should one understand the first decade of Morocco's independence (1956-1964), given that cemetery eulogies, testimonies and representations are subjecting its history to revision in 2000, the year after Hassan ii's death? Popular tales about Cheikh El-Arab endure despite official amnesia, despite contemporary newspaper accounts with opposing political agendas publishing confused, selfserving oral testimonies. Limiting Cheikh El-Arab's story to his violent glorious demise in 1964 represents the official version, one that dovetails with those of the Moroccans I interviewed who held that abuses during Hassan ii's reign were necessary to combat violent groups like Cheikh El-Arab's. Their questions to me were what if a one-party, socialist junta had succeeded in taking back power in the 1970s? Would there be more justice, less oppression of the opposition, more room for effective civil society, given the example of neighboring Algeria, a hostile socialist state that supported many Moroccan

insurgents? Their conclusions were that Morocco remains blessed in having a stable monarchy because “anarchy is worse than killing” (al-fitnah asaddu min al-qatl). In marked contrast, the goals of Hallaoui and Mehri, according to their respective testimonies, were to retrieve the political climate and memory of what had been a powerful refusal on the part of thousands of Moroccans in the immediate post-independent years who opposed political and economic policies that served merely to Moroccanize colonial hegemony and exploitation. Hallaoui and Mehri spoke about violent asymmetrical repression, first by the French, then by the Moroccan state, against forms of leftist-cum-nationalist dissidence whenever recurrent worker or student uprisings erupted (Monjib 1992: 305-14).[85] A concerted focus on revised histories of the post-independence decade has, since 1999, seen the emergence of former political prisoners willing to speak out as one component of the rich array of actors involved in the actual events.

Cheikh El-Arab is one such protagonist who bridges the worlds of colonial and post-independent Morocco. Born in 1927 in Agouliz, in the Igherm region of south-west Morocco near Tata, he was from the Tashelhit-speaking Berber tribe of the Issafen. At the age of twelve, he left for the capital Rabat to join his father - legend has it that he walked the entire 675 kilometers. In Rabat, he was educated at the nationalist M’hammed Guessous School, which Ahmed Belafrej had founded in 1934 to counter the limited educational opportunities available to Moroccans (Aherdane 1991). He joined the Istiqlal nationalist party at its formation in 1944 to fight for independence and the restoration of the monarchy. Nobody doubts that he was an active member of Morocco’s aln. Arrested in 1954 by the French, he was sent to the French-built penitentiary of Kenitra Central Prison to serve a two-year sentence. After his release, he lived clandestinely through the year of independence. He was a man who made daring escapes. During the crucial battle of 1958, when combined French and Spanish forces obliterated all but remnants of the southern arm of the aln near Ifni, he emerged unscathed (Smith 1999: 195-97). Was he a combination of Zorro and Robin Hood for the Moroccan south and coastal urban shantytowns (Boukhari 2004; Diouri 1987; Louma 2003) or a bandit of wounded patriotism fighting for his country’s dispossessed? Was his group criminalized by the monarchy attempting either to assimilate former independence fighters into the Moroccan army or effectively marginalize them (Hobsbawm 1959)? According to Mohamed “Fqih” Basri’s disputed revelations, further versions describe Cheikh El-Arab as an apolitical weapon, a thug and a desperado whom the prominent Moroccan leaders Abderrahmane Youssefi and Mehdi Ben Barka conscripted to topple the monarchy after independence. This latter narrative depicts betrayals and palace plots to destroy the unfp opposition party with Cheikh al-Arab as the palace-instigated provocateur on the police payroll and advocating the monarch’s assassination (see Bennouna 2002: 58-62; Daoud and Monjib 2000: 287-93; Perreault 1990: 71-84; Poulsson 1964: 473-74 on the trials and events surrounding Cheikh El-Arab).

Historian John Waterbury’s measured judgment did not engage with convoluted palace machinations or the existence of a genuine armed opposition. Instead, he presciently deplored human rights abuses during their trials (a discourse that Hallaoui and Jawhar elaborated four decades later when they felt free to recount their systematic torture): “the police and court handling of the accused violated most norms of judicial procedure” (Waterbury 1970: 293; confirmed by Poullson 1964). The demise of Cheikh El-Arab led to

another massive round of arrests of union leaders, as well as members of the aln, and of the unfp opposition party, all of whom were accused of plotting against the king in the “23 July conspiracy.” About 1,700 known party militants and 5,000 more people were held incommunicado in detention until their mass trials from 22 November 1963 to 14 March 1964. The year 1963 was a watershed moment in the chronology of Moroccan state repression, already foreshadowed by the new Moroccan constitution of 1962, which placed governance under royal authority, permitted royal dissolution of Parliament, and enshrined legal principles enabling laws to be promulgated by the king alone (article 26), including the right to declare a state of emergency (article 35). Although prison abuse was and is prevalent in Moroccan jails and political prisons, 1963 saw the organization, institutionalization and widespread use of torture on a grand scale. When unfp leaders were arrested and accused of plotting against Hassan ii in 1963, they were taken to the villa of Dar El Mokri in Rabat to await transfer to a mass torture center that by 1964 had been set up in the basement of the Casablanca police commissariat of Derb Moulay Cherif. Muhammad Oufkir, who was responsible for eradicating Cheikh El-Arab’s group, had been recently named general, a step to becoming the feared minister of interior and brutal head of security who established a parallel network of secret services and torture centers. These events of 1963-1964 were turning points in the expansion of Morocco’s surveillance system, mass arrests and sweeps by the authorities, torture and more extensive sites of secret imprisonment, and forced disappearance scaled exponentially higher to accommodate larger numbers of those deemed to be dissidents (Buttin 1997).

What separates fact from fiction, and what, amid competing historical interpretations of past plots, trials, and imprisonment by a range of Moroccan political actors, is the truth? Indeed, the post-Hassan ii period has become an era for research, public debate, testimonies, publications by mass-circulation newspapers, truth commission reports, memoirs, novels, comic books, poems and photographs portraying contingent truths about the country’s history of repression and thereby expanding ways of narrating the story of opposition to the monarchy (El Guabli 2017; Hegasy 2017: 83-112; Miller 2016). The events surrounding the Cheikh El-Arab group, as interpreted over decades and through successive modes of communication, include public testimonies by surviving actors as well as the current generation of Moroccans’ quest for knowledge about the dark periods of the past that live on in the present. Morocco’s search for documentation and interpretation about the past, for the actual bodies of the disappeared and for the names of the torturers is an elaborate and frustrating process, filled with confusion and moral complexity.

Between Mohamed Louma’s scholarly historical reconstruction of the Cheikh El-Arab revolt and the history of its retelling in the context of current Moroccan politics, it is worth noting that the public testimonies of Brahim Hallaoui, Mohammed Mehri and Ahmed Jawhar about their shared past in the early days of independence served a new objective. These testimonies intersected with journalists’ post-1999 exposes of torturers, many of whom were still in powerful posts or held elected political office. Hallaoui delivered eloquent interviews between December 1999, the date of Jawhar’s death, and his heart attack in March 2000. These media appearances by Halloui and Jawhar served two purposes. On the one hand, they vocally denounced certain government functionaries in power, including Youssfi Kaddour, a senior civil servant and known torturer at Derb Moulay Cherif and Mahmoud

Archane, a former police officer, torturer at the Rabat Commissariat, and a member of Parliament until his defeat in the election of 27 September 2002.[86] While human rights denunciations of carceral crimes were crucial to the creation of various Moroccan government human rights bodies in the twenty-first century, articulate armed militant fighters of the 1960s were at the same time being reconfigured into depoliticized victims of torture and disappearances after 1999. In doing so, these new human rights attempts to undo political repression consciously modeled powerful international human rights discourses (Dwyer 1991; Karem 1991; Mayer 1999; Missoffe-Rollinde 2000; Waltz 1995). According to Driss Benzekri (1997: 7), the term “human rights” was not part of Morocco’s official rhetoric until 1990.

Torture and disappearance linked these two decades of the postindependence period, whether it was the first decade of the 1950s and early 1960s when political outcomes seemed fluid, or whether it was the new openings in 1999 after Hassan ii’s death. However, nationalist fervor exemplified the first period after independence in 1956, while a focus on torture and the disappeared bodies of family members characterized the discourses of witnesses from the cell and graveside. Even so, there is a caveat whenever descriptions of torture are necessary and ubiquitous at public events and commemorations.

Transforming armed resistance fighters into torture victims risks privileging memories of human rights abuses that were disconnected from historical knowledge of the Moroccan past. To testify and to witness are two kinds of speech activities with different messages and audiences implied. Testimony is narrating personal witness, but this puts it in a situation-specific register that differs from bearing witness as a personal experience narrative. How do judgments of facts enter the Moroccan discussion, whether in court or in writing? Are there ways in which the public performance of dissent articulates and straddles distinctions between public and private once the prison cell and the grave are introduced?

As I reread my fieldwork notebooks describing the innovative performative practices evoking Morocco’s prison past, which on occasions I witnessed in the Casablanca-Rabat-Kenitra coastal urban agglomeration when channels of communication shifted from speaking to prison walls and beside graves in cemeteries and that could only imagine the various publics, I discerned the creation of venues of performance in many different registers in the post-1999 era. Still to be analyzed are such questions as how are audiences created and assembled, who is now doing the judging, and what social repair work is being made possible? As long as the tortured human body is alive, it lends its capacities to eulogies, photography, and witnessing. The pathways of human rights performances about Moroccan history are sometimes surprising. Even corpses have begun to speak. In what follows, I discuss occasions when the emergence of dead bodies and mass graves, produced through state atrocities against its own Moroccan citizens, entered the public sphere (on the forcible disappearance of Omar El Ouassali, see Kilani 2008; Menin 2016).

*** 4. The Gravestone Project for Human Remains

The year 2005, with a minor extension into 2006, was the end date for the mandate of the ier (Instance equite et reconciliation), the Moroccan truth commission. A follow-up group overseen by the Consultative Human Rights Commission (ccdh) continued to research the fates of those forcibly disappeared, as well as the whereabouts of mass graves and unidentified bodies from the Years of Lead (cndh n.d.; Crossland 2013; Laqueur 2015). The protocols under ier commission president Driss Benzekri were to leave behind human remains wherever found, while creating programs to study and maintain unsorted, disarticulated and commingled body parts in mass graves into which deceased prisoners had been thrown, buried, and subsequently discovered.

Perhaps at the limits of this approach to the public sphere, gravestones were scattered as memorials throughout a site physically aligned as much as possible with a single body, yet marked with an individual epitaph that the ier envisioned could become a place of mourning. In following these ier-instituted practices, the management of spaces dedicated to the dead passed entirely into the hands of the state, supplanting rituals between religious authorities and local actors.

The legal principles attached to corpses and body parts differ from other material objects in terms of acquisition, ownership, disposition and deaccessioning. Human remains are not usually recognized by law as property or cultural property (Ferllini 2007; icrc n.d.). Historically, no property interest could prevent bereaved migrants from bringing the dead with them from town to town by repeatedly exhuming loved ones. Lawmakers wishing to avoid gruesome prospects of repeat exhumation granted to the next of kin only limited property rights for the purpose of burying or otherwise disposing of human remains (Marsh 2016). The questions facing the Moroccan truth commission were how to deal with rediscovered bodies and with the appearance of mass graves that proved the state’s atrocities. They came to consider this subcategory of human remains as a public good and related to the work of cultural heritage. In other words, rightful owners are no longer heirs by bloodline or last will in possession of legal ownership over the corpse unrestrictedly as a private asset to keep, move and rebury. Instead, corpses from human rights violations are patrimony, owned by the Moroccan people and only state institutions can adequately honor them as representatives of collective history and memory. Public interest outweighed the private to render human remains accessible and visible through a gravestone, a separate memorial in a cemetery, or a public institution such as a center or museum.

Although several ier members were involved in these state projects, among them Latifa Jbabdi and Salah El Ouadie, my interviews were with Abdelhak Moussaddak, a former political prisoner from the Marxist groups who became a long-time staff member of the ier. He was also put in charge of the dossiers of the disappeared, first by ccdh, then by the successor government body that became the cndh or National Council of Human Rights. In interviews in Rabat on 6 June 2011 and 27 April 2013, he told me how convening family meetings began the process of keeping the remains of loved ones on the site of the mass grave instead of exhumations and removal to family plots. His remit included one of the

most famous cases, the human remains from Tazmamart, Morocco’s most notorious secret prison in the remote southeastern hinterland (cndh 2015). These remains belonged to military personnel from the Rabat region who had been implicated in unsuccessful attempts at regime change in the 1970s. They had been kidnapped and taken far from Kenitra Prison, which is north of Rabat, where they were kept in the secret prison for eighteen years until their deaths. Keeping their remains in Tazmamart made it difficult to establish clear dna identifications for each cadaver, since decomposition and intentional destruction by the perpetrators had made intact skeletons a rarity. The French laboratory undertaking the dna examinations established only four definite identities from the remnants. Since such human remains straddle the divide between private property and cultural heritage, the gravestone project arose to restore cemeteries and mark spaces of burial for those who had died in secret prisons (cndh 2013). This is often a difficult undertaking because, in many cases, the gravestones of forcibly disappeared political prisoners have no real or symbolic meaning for the actual inhabitants of the village in which they died.

Having failed to obtain official permission to visit Tazmamart, I toured other former secret prison sites in the south (Nadrani 2009; Slyomovics 2015). In contrast to Tazmamart, a French-built colonial army camp that Hassan II had converted into a secret prison, the fortress of Kalaat M’Gouna lies along the southeastern tourist route to the Valley of Roses in the Dades region. According to local historians, Kalaat M’Gouna had also been a French military fort erected between 1942 and 1948 under the Protectorate’s corvee system of forced labor levied on the peasantry. It was a late addition to the string of French forts extending westwards from Tafilalet on the southeast border with Algeria to the Atlantic Ocean. It reinforced French pacification efforts by serving as a site of repression under the Pasha Thami El Glaoui, the French-designated Moroccan despot drawn from the regional ruling family. In the 1980s, under Hassan II, it was converted into a secret prison to house a mix of 400 forcibly disappeared people, who included Sahrawis from the southern coastal provinces, urbanbased students from the leftist movement of the late 1970s, and other random arrested groupings. For those who died in Kalaat M’Gouna secret prison, gravestones were erected, and enclosed behind walls below the citadel (Figure 6.6), while for Agdez they were placed across the road from the prison in the municipal cemetery (Figure 6.7) .[87]

The headstones placed within these delimited cemetery walls were made in Rabat and were identical to those in the other cndh cemeteries that had been set up, for example in Tazmamart. Each headstone was fabricated from thin white marble tiles with a rounded top edge. The face of the headstone was incised in flowing black script with a short inscription bearing the name of the hitherto missing political prisoner, the dates of their birth and death, and sometimes an epitaph.

[[a-j-allen-james-fromherz-nadav-samin-knowledge-aut-4.jpg][Figure 6.6 Kalaat M’Gouna walled cemetery for political prisoners, 22 April 2013 photograph by Susan Slyomovics]]

To account for the swift deterioration of these Rabat-style gravestones in the Moroccan south, anthropologist Lahcen Ait El Fakih advanced the notion of garlb, the stranger and its noun garabah, meaning strangeness, estrangement or the state of being an outsider in southern Morocco, one whose customs are foreign, therefore not ours to protect. His prime evidence is the culturally-estranging, marble headstones arriving from Rabat to commemorate the bodies of political prisoners deemed dangerous strangers who had been secretly brought from far away (interview, 23 April 2013, Errachidia). In other words, outsider representations were produced to make legible and reinforce the space of outsiders in communal local burial grounds. These Rabat-built structures meant nothing to the surrounding populations and bore no discernable relationship with local families or the region. Therefore, materially speaking, they are available for the taking, often to repurpose and add to existing homes and farms. In the rural areas of the southeast, a proper burial traditionally leads to natural decay and the eventual disappearance of an individual's remains, though the general place of burial spaces remains known and observed. Their own rural graves had neither headstones nor epitaphs, merely an unmarked flat stone at the foot of the corpse to designate a male or female body lying beneath the earth. Close family members retain the location of rural graves for a few generations, but eventually the cemetery becomes a vast undifferentiated field of stones over slight, elevated human-sized columns of hillocks. Memory and transmission modalities from a centralized state or an international funding agency did not align neatly with subaltern practices and claims when the binary persists between our local dead characterized by willed communal dissipation into the earth versus not ours, subject to neglect and vandalism. Locals recounted to me that this formation of not ours resulted from living with special military forces guarding the perimeters of the villages in which the secret prisons were located, pervasive official categorizations of prisoners as criminals, terrorists, anti-monarchy, and Sahrawi separatists, all terms to enforce secrecy, fear, and silence about their whereabouts.

[[a-j-allen-james-fromherz-nadav-samin-knowledge-aut-3.jpg][Figure 6.7 Agdez cemetery for political prisoners, Agdez Prison upper left, 25 April 2013 photograph by Susan Slyomovics]]

In the Moroccan south, cndh attempts to set up cemeteries were deemed contrary to local rural custom and the practices of outsiders. Instead, the adjacent saint's mausoleum gracing the rural cemetery would serve as the place of visitation rather than the actual gravesite. The historian, economist and sociologist, Mohammed Ennaji (2009, which I have translated from the original French), wrote about the cultural specificity of the gravestones in his ancestral village cemetery:

Personally, I still have deeply embedded in my memory the image of the cemetery in my village of several decades ago. A landscape conforms to a society and its beliefs. It has neither marble nor other form of ostentation in stone, no epitaphs either. From his holy shrine, a saint venerated in the region watches over the unmarked graves known only to the relatives of the deceased. Dust, nothing but dust and not figuratively. The expression of nothingness in which mankind finds itself in the afterlife. Thus, even before this, there is proof of the perfect equality of men after death. The fear of this, due to its offensive

presence, provides the incentive to close ranks around the sacred. The frequency of death that prematurely mows down a part of the family and threatens the rest because of the precariousness of subsistence makes the cemetery an essential site in the social life of the community. No extravagance, since there is no reason for it, was allowed. Individualism was synonymous with social death for anyone who already displayed it in his lifetime. Today, our cities have grown, the evolution of mortality rates and life expectancy allow us to turn our backs on death. The cemetery becomes a distant space in which reality is not often remembered. The glaring differences in everyday life are increasingly present in the management of the space of death as in the arrangement of graves. While physical and spatial diversity imposes social hierarchies and power relations, will this also emphasize different expressions in relation to death? Will modes of speaking about our experience call into question the “cultural and linguistic unity” characteristic of our passage from life to death?

The word sahld, both a martyr to a cause and a witness, along with sahadah, the act of witnessing, are related to the larger semantic range in which sahld also means gravestone or epitaph. Thus, between 2007 and 2011, through the gravestone project, the cndh Rabat mandate proceeded to memorialize those who had been forcibly made to disappear in the rural south. Their thin white marble headstones were actively standardized in all Moroccan cemeteries between 2009 and 2010, although earlier plans had preceded that one. According to Ahmed Herzenni, who took over from Driss Benzekri as president of the cndh, cemetery memorialization projects had been pioneered in Marrakesh, Fez and Nador: gravestones were obtained for the ninety-nine people killed during the 1990 Fez uprising who had been secretly interred in the city’s Bab El Guissa and Boubker Ben Larbi cemeteries, as well as for those in unmarked mass graves who had died or disappeared during the 1984 student uprisings in Nador (interview with Ahmed Herzenni, 18 April 2013, Casablanca; cndh 2016).

Another cndh cemetery intervention concerned those killed or injured during the 1971 and 1972 coups d’etat perpetrated by groups that ended up secretly imprisoned for eighteen years in Tazmamart. The families of the victims of the Tazmamart secret prisoners, whether soldiers who defended the monarchy against the failed military coup at the palace, or guests killed in the crossfire, received lower reparation sums than the generous ones allocated for life to their adversaries who had been imprisoned in Tazmamart for eighteen years (Slyomovics 2008: 95-114). They also formed a victim association calling for a monument with names and texts condemning the overthrow of the monarchy to be placed in the grounds of the palace in Skhirat where their loved ones had been shot or, failing that, in the town’s main square. The authorities rejected both sites, but a compromise was reached to erect a commemorative monument, albeit on a smaller scale than the architectural structure that the association had originally commissioned. Eventually, after more than two years of negotiations between the association representing the families of the Skhirat coup d’etat victims and the cndh, a monument was placed near the entrance to Rabat’s Chouhada cemetery. In that this monument is not physically linked to the bodies of any of the victims, it is considered a memorial within a cemetery as opposed to a mausoleum (Figure 6.8).

These sumptuous urban burial practices found in the Rabat cemetery or linked to human rights initiatives that deploy marble headstones at sites where mass graves are uncovered, for example the memorial to the dead and disappeared of the 1965 urban Casablanca uprisings, are at odds with rural customs in which graves, marked with a stone but no inscription, eventually disappear into the earth (see Slyomovics 2005 on the various Casablanca uprisings). It seems that a positive outcome of cemetery memorializations emerged from the work of researcher Jamal Bami, which exposed the state of Muslim cemeteries throughout Morocco. His 2012 report to the cndh scathingly described Morocco's many cemeteries as being in deplorable states of dilapidation, vandalized through lack of guards, used as garbage dumps or places of prostitution and assignation. He stated that a lack of funding and government oversight had led to such disrespect for tombstones, graves and cemeteries (Bami 2012). Even the tomb of Driss Benzekri, Morocco's remarkable leader of human rights associations and first president of the truth commission was reported to have been vandalized on 1 May 2013 (Figure 6.9).[88]

[[a-j-allen-james-fromherz-nadav-samin-knowledge-aut-2.jpg][Figure 6.8 Monument to the victims of Skhirat in Chouhada Cemetery Rabat, 27 April 2013 photograph by Susan Slyomovics]]

The conclusion of the Jamal Bam-cndh report contained proposals that envisioned turning cemeteries into landscaped places of greenery in which civil society played a major role both to maintain and enjoy. Moreover, responsibility for the management and maintenance of cemeteries should devolve to local elected council officials in collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Habous, the old neighborhood of Casablanca, or sometimes the Ministry of Culture when historic mausolea are involved.

[[a-j-allen-james-fromherz-nadav-samin-knowledge-aut-1.jpg][Figure 6.9 Grave of Driss Benzekri, president of the ier and ccdh, Ait Ouahi, Morocco photo by Susan Slyomovics]]

*** 5. The Return of Cheikh El-Arab's Body

Burials and gravestones fit Foucauldian notions of biopower that address the state's power over the individual through the manipulation of biology and society (Foucault 1980. The Moroccan infrastructure of cemeteries and prisons, aided by a state security apparatus for containment and disposal, serves to punish and hide the body of the political prisoner. Sometimes, however, a corpse dramatically unsettles and even rewrites history. This was the case of the missing body of Cheikh El-Arab. On 5 November 2005, during the last months of Benzekri's presidency, the ier discovered that the tomb of Cheikh El-Arab was in Casablanca's Sbata cemetery. A team headed by Salah El Ouadie and Abdelhak Mossaddak investigated the possible locations for Cheikh El-Arab's burial place by triangulating among the available hospital paperwork, cemetery registers, interviews with those who had witnessed the events, and cemetery personnel such as gravediggers. Their investigation

uncovered that Cheikh El-Arab’s corpse had swiftly been transferred for burial to Casablanca’s Sbata cemetery on the day of his death, 7 August 1964, recorded under number L295 with an accompanying note that the deceased had a bullet in the chest. Morocco’s folk hero had been interred in the section reserved for guraba’, strangers and unknown dead, where, as it happened, the corpses of other famous political disappearances had also been dumped. After finding the gravesite, Benzekri sent M’barek Bouderka of the ier to tell the family of Cheikh El-Arab who resided in Paris. Three days later, on 8 November 2005, forty-one years after Cheikh-El Arab’s death, Bouderka personally met the family, his widow Amina, daughter Nadia, and sons Karim and Toufiq Fouzi. They were grateful for the knowledge of their loved one’s burial site, for which I thank Aomar Boum (personal communication), who had interviewed Brahim Nouhi (on 25 May 2004, 15 July 2010, and 24 July 2017 in Akka and Tata in southern Morocco respectively) and who had helped to resolve the location of his burial place. Thus, those formerly labeled unknown guraba’ were individually identified, named with a gravestone marker, and reinstated to the world of the living who mourned them.

The human body - contained in prison and the cemetery - lies at the heart of the Moroccan truth commission. Its fate was and is as the nexus of resistance, synecdochically legible in the arms of Islamist political prisoners photographed in Oukacha prison, in the still-bloodied corpse of an anti-monarchist nationalist, and among the rediscovered human remains of numerous dissidents. The body may temporarily disappear behind prison bars and into the grave, and the wait for its reappearance and acknowledgment has taken too long. Yet, the absent body unleashes myriad social and political forces about its own fate at scenes of violence. The creation of new publics emerging from these restricted spaces awaited more favorable political contexts of the postHassan ii era in which archives were made available with new and better documentation practices created (Slyomovics 2016). Moroccan projects to study state violence, notably by the successor entities of the ier, ccdh, and cndh, received enormous impetus from political prisoners released into Moroccan society, who then formed human rights associations and populated the state’s human rights bureaucracies. Their goals, whether on a practical or symbolic level, are to reinstate all the disappeared dissident bodies to address the Moroccan public sphere about its recent past.

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** 7. Rethinking Knowledge and Power Hierarchy in the Muslim World

el-Sayed el-Aswad

Dale Eickelman’s scholarly themes and approaches have had an immense impact on the anthropology of Islam. The objective of this chapter is to provide critical insight into Dale Eickelman’s contribution to the anthropology of Islam in general and the anthropology of the Middle East in particular. I look at the underlying themes of Eickelman’s scholarly work on knowledge, power, hierarchy, forms of authority such as the sacred and the mundane, ways of knowing and learning (for example, through traditional religious madrasas or modern secular education), communication, and the transformation of the Muslim world. As his early published scholarship attests, Eickelman saw knowledge and power as central to understanding the core drivers that bring about, over time, changes in religious and political authorities, ideologies, and social hierarchies in Muslim societies.

In his anthropological work, Eickelman exceptionally applies key elements of the holistic interdisciplinary approaches and sources, including ethnography, social biography, travel, historical documentation and cross-cultural studies. He has dealt with different forms of knowledge - religious, traditional, secular and modern - as well as with various forms of communication and new media that have operated as drivers impacting Muslim countries such as Morocco, Oman, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran and Turkey, to mention but a few (Eick-elman 2004). There is an Arabic catchphrase describing the Arab world in geographical terms, from al-khalij (the Arabian Gulf) in the east to al-muhit (the Atlantic

Ocean) in the west. Inversely, Eickelman started his extensive work in Morocco, located at the western edge of the Middle East, and progressed eastwards to the Sultanate of Oman (the Arabian Gulf) and beyond.

As he himself acknowledged (Eickelman 2009a), Clifford Geertz's comparative historical approach clearly influenced Eickelman's (2005: 68) thinking on "the changing role of religious intellectuals and ideas of learning in Muslim societies." Eickelman's work was further inspired by Jurgen Habermas's (1991) ideas of the public sphere and forms of communication technologies in the context of structural transformations in education, politics, and the state. Eickelman also gained insights from Pierre Bourdieu's work on education and

symbolic capital as well as from Antonio Gramsci's notions of cultural hegemony and resistance (Eickelman 1992a, 2005). Such themes and influences resonate in much of Eickelman's work.

Throughout that body of his work, Eickelman has offered detailed examinations of the discourses that shape most contemporary Muslim societies. In his "Gender and Religion in the Public and Private Sphere" (Eickelman 2008), he critiqued structuralism for its bias towards viewing societies as static and stable structures and not as dynamic collectivities created and transformed by people through their daily social interactions. He has challenged the hegemony of one factor or indicator such as income as the sole representative measure of social transformation and human development.

Eickelman refuted Western writings on Islam that promoted theories to the effect that social and economic modernization is likely to result in the dominance of secularism over religion, and thus render the latter to a marginal status in the modern world (Eickelman 2009b, with Asad 1986; Davies 1988; el-Aswad 2012; and Said 1978). He also asserted that the awareness of religious pluralism and different interpretations of Islamic sacred texts predate European modernity (Eickelman 2010). In fact, Robert Bellah (1970: 150-51, quoted in Eickelman 2010: 142) had also pointed out that Islam in the seventh-century was "remarkably modern ... in the high degree of commitment, involvement and participation expected from the rank-and file members of the community.'' Furthermore, Eickelman has argued that religion has not lost its role, but rather has succeeded in attracting more religious commitment as education has generated political and religious awareness. In other words, religion is becoming increasingly important in the public sphere.

Eickelman's (1985) approach incorporated an awareness of a multiplicity of Muslim voices, which is imperative in comprehending not only the complicated topic of Muslim public space, but also the complexity of the anthropological inquiry in Muslim societies. For Eickelman, it would have been incomprehensible to portray religion with a single voice in Muslim countries where dissident voices from religious scholars ("ulama) and laymen are raised to challenge both religious and political authorities. What is significant here is that Eickelman

(1992b: 7) described religious activism in the political sphere as “a distinctively modern phenomenon” (see also Eickelman 2000).

The unique quality of Eickelman’s scholarship is that he pays attention to Middle Eastern and Muslim societies and related social and political movements from both the bottom (the general public, how it is influenced by mass education, and how mass media influence it) and the top (the socio-economic and political elite and the government). In other words, Eickelman’s work explores the interrelationships between the transitional outcomes (such as religious and political change) and the many factors influencing such outcomes, including educational, technological, socio-economic, and cultural drivers.

To his credit and for the efficacy of his work, Eickelman developed intimate and friendly relationships with informants and colleagues.[89] While studying the Sharqawi maraboutic descent group, Eickelman introduced himself to Hajj Abd ar-Rahman Mansuri, a judge (qadi) who served as an informant as well as an interpreter of the Sharqawi historical documents. Hajj Abd ar-Rahman was so personally interested and engaged in the Sharqawi papers that he and Eickelman (1985: 20) became “colleagues’’ working on a “common project.”

Knowledge practices represented in mass education, mass communication, new technology, travel, labor immigration and globalization have a great impact on the transformation of religious and political identities and authorities in the Muslim world. However, the drivers of social change in the Middle East vary according to what types of governmental and non-governmental agencies and actors operate in each country (el-Aswad 2019). The main question here is to what extent does Eickelman succeed in showing that such aforementioned factors as knowledge, education, technology, travel or migration bring about, over time, changes in the religious worldviews and power structures of Muslim societies? According to Eickelman, “mass higher education, mass communications, new media, and the greater ease of travel has facilitated the fragmentation of political and religious authority and the development of new voices that contest or ignore established authority” (Eickelman 2005: 71; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 121-35).

*** 1 Ethnography of Knowledge

Eickelman’s primary contribution to the social sciences has been to consider the centrality of knowledge, attained via education, media, information technology, travel, migration and globalization as the underlying force or power to transform socio-political structure and religious authority. At the same time, he has emphasized the idea that religion can change or transform without failing to be religion.

In his book Knowledge and Power in Morocco: The Education of a TwentiethCentury Notable, Eickelman (1985) looked at traditional intellectuals as counteractive to the predominant focus on Western-trained intellectuals. He focused on textual knowledge as well as on the way in which that knowledge is achieved and used by a religious intellectual. As his early published scholarship attests, Eickelman considers knowledge as central to understanding core drivers that bring about, over time, changes in religious and political authorities, ideologies, and social hierarchies in Muslim societies.

For Eickelman, knowledge, whether cultural or political, and symbolic production are vital factors in the socio-political construction of human society. “Politics can be conceived as cooperation in and contest over symbolic production and control of the institutions - formal and informal - that serve as symbolic arbiters of society” (Eickelman 2009b: 163). Politics, typically viewed as a struggle over population and resources, is a fight for people’s imaginations as well as a competition about the meaning of symbols. In the following sections, I elaborate on the major themes related to Eickelman’s overarching thesis of knowledge and power.

*** 2. The Power of Education and the Transformation of the Hierarchy of Power

Eickelman (1978: 485) was concerned with how the intellectual technology, or forms of transmission of knowledge shaped and accommodated social and cultural change in society. Education has been viewed as a major driver of both traditional and social reform movements in the Muslim world before and after the advent of new media. Put differently, education continues to be the most common driver of change and overall development in Muslim countries. In the scholarly literature, there has been great emphasis on education, particularly state-sponsored education as an essential driver for development in Middle Eastern and Muslim countries. Education enables people to exercise influence beyond the nation’s borders through participating in decisions taken on local and global measures (el-Aswad 2019).

Traditional and modern systems of education and religious beliefs generate distinct forms of authority. Old and new modes of understanding religion coexist in most Muslim societies. Many aspects of madrasa (mosque school) education remain significant in Muslim countries. For instance, despite the introduction of modern education and schooling provided by the state in Algeria and Morocco, Quranic schooling has been considered relevant to local needs and has served as a means of challenging state authority. In Morocco, the models of peer learning in madrasa education and in religious brotherhoods have been altered by religious activism (Eickelman 1992a).

Men of religious learning ("ulama) have regarded themselves as legitimate spokesmen for Islam (Eickelman 1978). In his study of the popular beliefs and practices of Muslims in an urban pilgrimage center of Morocco, Eickelman addressed various institutional

imperatives motivating and altering people’s social behavior. Concentrating on the Sharqawi descent group, a Moroccan maraboutic and sainthood center, Eickelman tackled the ways in which certain key concepts within the local interpretation of Islam served to provide a meaningful and coherent worldview guiding social action. For example, individuals followed the guidance of the Sharqawi, whom they believed to be able to serve as an intermediary between God and people, in order to achieve blessing (baraka) and awards in this world and in the next world (Eickelman 1976). Members of the Sharqawi descent group manipulated religious ideology and symbols to achieve certain goals and positions, gain power, and generate changes in the cultural ideology, which, in turn, restructured the social order to be hierarchical in contrast to the modernist-scripturalist Islam that emphasizes the equality of all people before God.

Eickelman discussed the conflict between scripturalist Islam and marabou-tic or mystic beliefs and practices. Adherents to scripturalist Islam have expressed reservations about the beliefs and practices of the followers of saints, viewing them as not representing the real or true Islam. The power of knowledge or education harnessed by Islamic reform movements has, within the historical context of the Muslim world, put pressure on the cult of saints, which are in relative decline, although there are people who still practice Sufism and sainthood in Muslim countries such as Egypt, Morocco and Sudan. Although there is a strong belief that priesthood or mediation should not be recognized or accepted by Islam, people in Shi'a communities in Iran, Iraq and Bahrain, among other countries, can choose a guide (marja" or source of emulation) who is viewed as a religious authority at both the personal and collective levels (el-Aswad 2012:15, 60-62).[90]

Traditional Islamic education in North Africa, particularly before 1930, was mnemonically acquired. Further, religious dogma or authority in earlier generations derived from the mastery of authoritative texts studied under established scholars (Eickelman 1978). However, with the impact of French colonialism, particularly after the establishment of the Protectorate in 1912 and the advent of modern schooling, there was a change from religious authority and knowledge that depended heavily on memorizing sacred texts of material that could be obtained and checked in books and other sources (Eickelman 1974). With the progress of education, religious knowledge could be attained and interpreted not only by men of religious learning (^culama), but also by any literate person showing serious commitment to religious beliefs and practices (Eickelman 1978).

Eickelman’s research linked Islamist movements to the spread of higher education and increasing literacy rates in Muslim countries. Mass higher education promotes direct and selective access to the printed word detached from earlier traditions of authority. However, the timing of educational expansion has varied from country to country, especially in the postcolonial era. Mass higher education began in Egypt in the 1950s, and the number of primary school students more than doubled there in the decade following the 1952 revolution. Corresponding increases in secondary and university education began in the mid-1960s. While educational expansion in North Africa, including Morocco, began in the 1960s, it began to expand in the Arabian Gulf countries, including Oman, in the 1970s (Eickelman 1992a).

The impact of mass higher education on the transformation of traditional religious authority in Oman started in the 1970s, particularly after the establishment of the Sultan Qaboos University in 1986. To assert its legitimacy, the State of Oman provided education to its managers and administrators, to teach them religious knowledge; yet the literate people disputed and opposed both state and religious authorities. As is the case with other Muslim countries, religious authority has shifted from elite specialists dominating religious texts to religious and political activists advocating more open religious discourses. This transformation has restructured politics and national cultures contesting state hegemony (Eickelman 1992a: 646-7).

In the secularized, democratic Muslim state of Turkey, religious beliefs and practices constitute significant aspects of the public sphere and are compatible with the secular nature of state institutions (Eickelman 2010). In Iran, where clerics continue to Islamize from the top-down, young Iranian people and mullahs, exposed to both traditional and modern schools, are able to represent traditional and updated interpretations of religious texts, creating and participating in Iranian religious public spheres (Eickelman 1992a, 2009b). Likewise, in Indonesia, mass higher education has empowered new voices that contest established religious and political authorities (Eickelman 2005).

In modern Muslim countries, plans are in place to elevate education to reach the level of global standards by increasing proficiency in technology, introducing advanced education techniques, updating curricula, developing innovative skills, and strengthening the self-learning abilities of students. Currently, state universities experience increasing competition from private universities and are forced to update their own institutional presentation and services (Eick-elman 2017; el-Aswad 2019). Women have benefited from the spread and improvement of education and have become involved in political and public life (Eickelman 2008). In fact, they now outnumber men in such Arab universities as those of the Arabian Gulf where gender segregation is prevalent. Eickelman has suggested that due to gender segregation (in which female and male students are not mixed in classes) education has seemed to be more important to Arab women than to Arab men in these countries as women have freedom and motivation to succeed (Eickelman 2017). Improving educational outcomes requires understanding the impact of educational policies, the influence of other social and political policy measures on pupils' learning, and also the role of non-policy drivers such as socio-economic environment and cultural background (el-Aswad 2019).

With the mass spread of higher education in the Muslim world, access to the Qur'an or sacred texts, as well as to other books and ways of knowing, shifted in form and number and Islamic publications multiplied. For example, 250,000 copies of an Islamic book written by the late Egyptian Shaykh Sha'rawi were sold in Egypt when previously the sale of 10,000 would have been considered a success (Eickelman 2004: 44).

One of the most important consequences of mass higher education and new media technologies is the objectification of religion that has taken place since the late 1980s. According to this concept, Islam has come to be viewed by Muslims as a self-contained religion in relation to other religions, and religious beliefs are seen as systems to be distinguished from one another. This means that treating Islam as a system of beliefs and practices implicitly highlights the differences between Muslims, who have become aware of the diversity of religious interpretations (Eickelman 1992a: 650). Believers who come to view religion as an object among other objects, selecting one aspect of that object, as with the movement towards the Islamization of society and/ or political Islam, over another, are distinct from traditional persons who take for granted religious beliefs and practices in much the same way as their forefathers. Such a process of objectification has broadened religious authority to include new religious intellectuals and laymen who, through attaining knowledge, information and ideas about Islam, dispute and challenge established traditional religious authorities. The new intellectuals and laypeople, including non-religious experts, have great impact on their cultures, even in subnational regions and countries that have high adult illiteracy rates, such as rural Egypt and Morocco.

One of the critical consequences of objectification is that the hierarchical system of religious authority, based on claims that Muslim scholars or state appointed religious authorities hold mastery over a fixed body of religious texts, has become sidelined and downplayed, ending the traditional religious experts' monopoly over the interpretation and management of sacred texts. In other words, religious leaders no longer have "a monopoly on sacred authority where Sufi shaykhs, engineers, professors of education, medical doctors, army and militia leaders, and others compete to speak for Islam" (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 211).

The grave problem is that while the governments of the Middle East have deprived religious scholars ('tiliimu) of their sources of financial support and their control of mosques and educational institutions, most traditional religious scholars have remained loyal to their governments. Meanwhile, educated people, independently of the state authority, have been centrally engaging in both religious and political activities. For example, laymen such as Hassan al-Banna, a teacher who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Sayyid Qutb, a fundamentalist thinker who was not trained as a religious scholar, declared Islam as a solution to the problems facing Muslim countries. Sayyid Qutb depicted Islam as a system (minhaj) of beliefs and doctrines. If one sees religion as a self-contained system, it becomes possible to make changes by assimilating elements from other systems, and thus increasing the feasibility of the system. When fundamentalists reveal that they are involved in the Islamization of their society, they are asserting that their religious beliefs are part of an objective system (Eickelman 1992a: 646-47).

*** 3. The Power of Technology and New Media

Communications technology refers to contribution of technological innovation, particularly information technology, to socio-economic progress in a society. Access to a mediated public sphere and communications technology, new and print media, has given rise to a quintessential shift in informationseeking behavior and is rapidly transforming the production, distribution, and consumption of knowledge and information in many parts of the world (Eick-elman 2002; el-Aswad 2014). Use of the Internet and social media has facilitated democratic revolutions and played a crucial role during the Arab Spring. To be more specific, the impact of the Internet, mobile phones, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other communications technologies was so strongly and wisely used in Egypt during the 2011 anti-government revolution, or Arab Spring, that Egyptian authorities, in their effort to silence the protesters, “shut down the Internet, turned off the servers, and disconnected all available electronic facilities” (el-Aswad 2016b: 72).

To maximize the benefits of advanced technology requires a certain level of knowledge or education. However, early technology, particularly audio cassettes and videotapes, empowered illiterate people to have access to religious knowledge and mundane information. Sermons on audiocassette gave the illiterate opportunity to listen to exegeses and interpretations that were otherwise inaccessible to them (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996). Eickelman examined the way new media extended Islamic knowledge and identity at the cost of existing hierarchies and established forms of authority (Eickelman 2008; Eickel-man and Anderson 1999). The entry of Muslim societies into an era of mass communication has encouraged debate among Muslims.

Bin Laden, a civil engineer who established the terrorist group Al-Qaeda, is an example of an educated layperson who criticized many Arab and Muslim governments for oppression, corruption and subordination to perceived Western and Israeli aggression. Bin Laden, who relied heavily on videos as the main vehicle of communication, used both conventional and new media to spread his messages and lectures. The early videos he used showed an awareness of the popular culture in the regions in which his Al-Qaeda group operated. It was because of his use of technology for violent causes that Eickelman (2002: 43) called Bin Laden a modern fanatic. Politically oriented extremist and terrorist groups like the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Da'ish or Islamic State (is formerly isis), and Boko Haram, which roughly translated means Western education is forbidden use Islam as a tool with which to justify their non-Islamic actions (el-Aswad 2016a; Sirgy et al. 2019).

In “The Arab ‘Street’ and the Middle East’s Democracy Deficit,” Eickelman (2002) foresaw the occurrence of an Arab revolt. He wrote, “the lack of formal outlets for opinion on public concerns makes it easier for zealots, claiming the authority of religion, to hijack the Arab street” (Eickelman 2002: 45). Such a statement encompasses the scenario of the Arab Spring in Egypt, in which followers of the Muslim Brotherhood forcefully emerged among Egyptian demonstrators who demanded that Mubarak and his regime step down. Indeed, by the following year (2012), Egypt was ruled by members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet, if we go back to the tragic event of the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 by the extremists of the Islamic Jihad, some of whom were highly educated, it becomes obvious that dissidence can lead to terrorism. It also becomes clear that through such rebellious

confrontations the state is rendered susceptible to losing its power to protect itself, as occurred to the Egyptian state in June-July 2013 (el-Aswad 2016a, 2016b; el-Aswad et al. 2020).

New media and advanced technology have transformed traditional religious authority and brought changes to political systems. More broadly, they also offer alternative social realities to people in the Middle East, particularly women and youth, with mobile telephones playing an important part in creating opportunities to establish social relations between young people of both genders (Eickelman 2008). Furthermore, in Saudi Arabia, a large number of people prefer satellite television to the state television channels because the former provides alternative voices with which to address people's daily concerns about such things as poverty, divorce, drugs, pollution, and the politics of the royal family (Lee 2010).

In Muslim societies such as Iran and Egypt, the informal economic roles of women have a greater impact than formal legislation on changing accepted gender roles in the public sphere. It is also difficult for the regime to suppress or control people's informal political activity empowered by social media because it occurs outside the formally recognized public sphere (Eickelman 2008). Furthermore, people use the informal economic and political activities in which they engage in their daily lives as mechanisms for coping with economic hardship and political aggression. For instance, family obligations and loyalty to one's parents and kin play an important role in sustaining an informal economy that, in turn, supports the needy (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; el-Aswad 2015, 2017).

New technology has facilitated and encouraged women's involvement in public space in Egypt, Morocco and other Muslim countries. The conventional view of inequality and the subordination of some countryside women to men has been contested and defied. Cross-culturally, and without belittling its negative and harmful consequences, the problem of female subordination or inequality is universal, not confined to a specific country or region (Ortner 1974). Some "fundamentalist Christians and ultra-orthodox Jews exclude women from many aspects of public life, and in countries such as the United States, Russia, and Japan marked inequalities persist in some regions" (Eickel-man 200: 143).

*** 4. Travel, Migration and Globalization

Modern technology and advancements in transport have expedited globalization and turned the world into a global village (McLuhan and Power 1989). Moving from the micro-ethnography and thick description of several Muslim communities in the Middle East to macro perspectives, Eickelman considered the impact of Muslim travel, labor migration and transnational activities on the emergence of a worldwide Islamic consciousness. Travel, trade and labor migration have created historic opportunities for Muslims, most of whom live outside the Middle East, to experience global mobility as well as socio-cultural exchange. Labor migration has played an important part in eroding frontiers between people. "Labor

migration has become for the spread of ideas in the twentieth century what pilgrimage was in earlier eras" (Eickelman 1992b: 7). Travel and labor migration necessitate cyber networks that, as a cultural medium, go beyond instantaneous tangible practices to include continuous reciprocity of material and non-material symbolic codes between people, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.

Travelers move to places beyond their homeland, interact with other people and adopt new lands as diaspora, or return home with rich experiences and new ideas. It is worth noting that most Muslims live outside the Middle East. Broadly and globally, for some Muslim "activities, a mosque in London or on Chicago's South Side may be as central as Mecca or Cairo for meeting counterparts from elsewhere in the Muslim world" (Eickelman 1992b: 6). The new media of the global era have contributed to the strengthening of ties to diasporas and also to other communities, including non-Muslim ones (Eickelman and Anderson 1999).

Over the last four decades, the global Islamic awakening has weakened traditional forms of religious authority, created new public figures, and encouraged public debates online and offline (Eickelman and Anderson 1999). What renders Muslim politics different from other politics is the fight for the ideas, values and symbols of Islam. Communal Muslim culture is centered on a vision that Muslim societies are united, whether actually, ideally or virtually, in one universal community (umma) guided by the Holy Book of the Qur'an and the Prophet's tradition (el-Aswad 2016a). By circulating their debates through the transnational media, members of the faith have opportunities to interact with each other socially and globally and to exchange ideas that, in turn, transform conventional understandings of religion. Sacred scriptures and interpretations of religious doctrines are accessible on the Internet, allowing people to read, interpret, and discuss religious texts. This, in turn, leads to a gradual decline in the hierarchical authority of traditional clerics at both the international and national level.

The virtual world of the Internet, encompassing virtual information on Islam and virtual dialogue, is not separate from the real world (el-Aswad 2012). Online forums concerned with Muslim culture and Islamic values provide both information and more interactive spaces in which various topics of Islamic heritage can be lived and negotiated. Many Muslim global movements show the positive side of globalization, in which Islamic transnational groups, through a calling for democracy, equality, freedom and more open societies, seek to improve the socio-political conditions of Muslim communities. Muslim intellectuals and activists are involved in transnational missionary activity (dawa) (Eickelman 2002). Many such intellectuals strive to construct positive images of Muslims at both the national and the global level through public lectures, sermons, conferences, workshops, and media programs. Much of the substance of Muslim worldviews is discussed, reproduced in new forms, and represented in various online Muslim virtual communities (el-Aswad 2013). Such global activities have undermined and weakened the ideology and agenda of the extremists and terrorists.

*** Conclusion

Although there are many studies on Islamic political thought and movements in Muslim countries, Eickelman's insights, which draw on ethnographic, historical and cross-cultural perspectives, offer a particularly comprehensive view into this critical area of inquiry. His major contribution towards bettering our understanding of human societies has been to highlight the power of knowledge ethnographically, historically and cross-culturally.

Following the model developed by Geertz, Eickelman proposed that sociocultural change comes about as the result of conflict between behavior and the beliefs or symbolic systems that are supposed to structure and guide social action. In Muslim countries, Muslim activists have emerged to demand revision of the place of religion in politics. Through better education, new technology, and ease of travel, Muslim societies have become more open and religion has become a matter of choice, not just heritage and habit.

Eickelman addressed the relationship between knowledge and power in the sense that knowledge leads to power and power may facilitate knowledge. Literate laymen and educated, secular Islamist intellectuals have played a crucial role in introducing social and political changes to most Muslim countries, and thus challenging the traditional religious authorities' support for authoritarian regimes and stalled or failed states. While it is true that the fragmentation of religious authority has enabled those who have generally been excluded from politics to act and have their voices heard, the Middle East still needs more people to participate in political life.

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** 8. Salafism as a Contested Concept

Simeon Evstatiev

In this chapter, I regard Salafism as a contested concept that stirs up heated debates in Muslim circles as well as among Western Islamicists and social scien-tists.[91] The narrative of Salafism in the West has been almost fully dominated by media discourses, policy analysts or experts in “security studies.” This tendency prevails until today and might have even created the misleading impression of an over-studied subject. Being concerned mainly with the political aspects of modern Islam, the prevailing, approaches to Salafism almost entirely miss the intellectual, theological, legal, and cultural aspects of this phenomenon, whence its role into the large of Islamic history.

Is Salafism an “essentially contested concept,” and are arguments about its right usage completely irreconcilable? Addressing this single major question, I discuss the recent conceptualizations of Salafism relevant to my approach by adducing evidence from Muslim sources in Arabic. That question, however, entails a set of sub-questions, some of which have broader implications for the study of Islam. What does Salafism tell us about “Muslim politics” and how does it combine with apoliticism? Should we analyze modern transnational Salafism as a novel phenomenon shaped when Muslim societies were challenged by their encounter with Western modernity, or do we need to search for its historical origins in the pre-modern age, even in the formative period of Islamic thought and practice? What are the implications of the definition we choose for the categorization of Salafism? How does its study help us to understand authority and change in religious traditions?

I suggest that - despite it being a contested concept - Salafism is a Sunni religious orientation based on a specific mode of scriptural engagement coherent enough to be analytically discernible in a set of interrelated views on matters of theology and law shared by modern Salafis and their pre-modern precursors whom I designate as proto-Salafis. Given that high degree of doctrinal coherence, how shall we then grasp the observed diversity within Salafism today? Should we see modern Salafism as a continuum encompassing quietist Salafis, politically engaged Salafis and Jihadi-Salafis? Although with some variations

In what follows, I start with framing the notion of essentially contested concepts as relevant to major discussions in Islamic studies and the conceptualization of Salafism. I then tackle Salafism as a contested concept through the disagreements on its origin. Finally, I deal with the definition of Salafism and its branches, proposing some nuances to its understanding as a mode of scriptural engagement encompassing theology, law, and politics in a way distinct from other religious orientations in Islam. My aim is to demonstrate that Salafism is not simply a “highly contested” or “hotly debatable” but an essentially contested concept - a task that unavoidably entails generalization. However, as Clifford Geertz once commented, the question is not whether we generalize - any science generalizes - but how we generalize (Geertz 1972: 463).

*** 1. Essentially Contested Concepts and the Study of Islam

A student of Geertz with his own standing and eminence in anthropology and Middle East studies, Dale Eickelman to whom the present volume is dedicated notes that in Islam, continuous debates around notions, such as the “common good” (al-maslaha al-[!]amma), the proper performance of religious duties (Eickelman 2015: 136; Eickelman and Evstatiev 2020) or “tribe” (qabila) make these terms essentially contested concepts, for which “there are irreconcilable arguments about the right usage” (Eickelman 2016).[92] Among Muslims, such concepts constantly stir up heated discussions and conflicts over the nature and the practical implications of how to be a true believer and how to interact with scriptures, religious authority, and the locally embedded notions of culture and tradition. Essentially contested concepts are pertinent to Muslim religious life and historical experience no less than to all other religions and comprehensive ideologies that serve as matrices for building the collective conscience,[93] and Salafism - as a complex concept - is no exception.

When introducing the term “essentially contested concepts” in 1956, the Oxford philosopher Walter Gallie (d. 1998) examined a number of organized and semi-organized human activities that, academically, belong to aesthetics, political philosophy, history and the study of religion. He mentioned that there are groups of people who disagree about the proper use of the concepts, for example, of art, democracy, social justice, or Christian tradition. Gallie adduced the following example from art. The statement that “this picture is painted in oils,” he explains, may be contested on the grounds that it is, in fact, painted in tempera. In this case, there is “the natural assumption” that the disputants will agree as to the proper use of

the term. However, this is not the case with the statement, “this picture is a work of art” - it is liable to be contested because of an evident disagreement and the consequent need for elucidation of the proper meaning of the term “work of art.” Essentially contested concepts are, therefore, such “concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their user” (Gallie 1956, 1964).

Gallie himself and some later commentators stress, however, that the notion of essentially contested concepts should not be confused with promoting any conceptual relativism that is analytically destructive and undesirable (Collier et al. 2006). Essentially contested concepts entail a widely shared agreement on a concept but not on its most proper use and realization. As the British political and legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart (2012: 160) (d. 1992) explains regarding the complex idea of justice, it consists of two parts, “a uniform or constant feature ... and a shifting or varying criterion used in determining when, for any given purpose, cases are alike or different.”

As ideals that overarch groups, societies and cultures, essentially contested concepts may remain unchallenged. Ideas as democracy, for example, enjoy such a standing today in many parts of the globe but contestations appear immediately as to how a group of people or society should use the concept properly. To explain this phenomenon among Muslims in the Middle East, Dale Eickelman elaborates on the notion of “objectification” of the religious imagination. In the consciousness of a large number of people, Muslim believers increasingly bring to the fore three kinds of questions: what is my religion? Why is it important to my life? And, how do my beliefs guide my conduct? Objectification, Eickelman (1992: 643) explains, does not mean seeing religion as a monolithic entity, although for many believers it is precisely this. Even those claiming a return to authentic established traditions can thus share a modern attitude to social life. Eickelman thus demonstrates how Islamic concepts and ideals gain relevance in people’s everyday life through questions about their nature and the meaning.

The “objectification of Muslim consciousness” involves commitment, including in the case of modern Muslim political activists - the Islamists - “who are committed to implementing their vision of Islam as a corrective to current ‘un-Islamic’ practices” (Eickelman and Piscatori 1966: 44).[94] For Muslim revivalists, to be committed (multazim) is not simply to obey God’s commands, but to develop a personality completely devoted to God’s law “in every respect and every moment” (Schielke 2015: 63). Today, Islamic identity clearly does make a difference in various places around the globe, leaving the impression of having a much higher political relevance than the adherence to Christianity or Buddhism (Cook 2014: 37). With the observed spread of Salafi commitment in the Arab world and elsewhere, Salafism becomes one of the essentially contested concepts the use of which is challenged by some so far as to suggest that their research requires defining it, “if at all possible” (Anjum 2016: 449).

However increasingly “objectified” individually and locally, Salafism remains deeply embedded in the universalistic scholarly tradition of Islamic textual normativity. Based on shared beliefs and ideological positions that claim to represent the constant truth of authentic Islam, Salafism has profound social implications built on two sets of factors. They are grouped together, first, around the established normative doctrine and, second, around the approaches to their contextualization in social practice. Contextualization fosters interpretation, or what Gadamer (2004: 321-36) would call “being in the world” - the cornerstone of a hermeneutics that is especially relevant for the study of law and the understanding of authoritative texts from the past with the aim of resolving present-day disputes.[95] Restraint on political participation, passionate (sometimes even violent) political engagement and - perhaps in between them - a more discrete but potentially powerful social commitment can entail therefore thoroughly different identity-based actions and strategies for navigating the communal boundaries.

In Islam, as in other monotheistic religions, these boundaries are drawn, maintained and negotiated on the basis of a set of norms that are textually fixed in scriptures, laws and canons, and preserved and passed down from generation to generation. From the perspective of believers, scriptures are supposed to remain intact, but they are subject to constant theological and legal interpretation whose relevance to politics and social action varies in different religions. Religious engagement underlies a deep sense of belonging to a community and a shared comprehensive doctrine.[96] Indeed, as other comprehensive doctrines, Islam has never been monolithic, which makes its objectification and contextualization possible. Even though, if we judge from certain fragments of reality, Islam is to be seen as sociologically “localized”][97] but among stricter and more mainstream Muslims today seems transformed and increasingly superseded by the “great” Islamic tradition (Evstatiev 2019: 98) - a process in which Salafism plays a specific and significant role.

The notion of essentially contested concepts, however, is here not an invitation to delve into the endless debates on “essentialism”[98] or “Orientalism” - designations that have become overloaded with negative connotations (Evstati-ev 2008). Within these debates, some academics try to repudiate the notion of academic distance from the subject matter by replacing it with an activist stance. Recently, one scholar of culture (Brennan 2010: 278, esp. n.5), discussing the “militant language of engagement and activism,” noted that many of the journals in his field have already become platforms for work in what might be called the “combat mode.” Scholars of the Middle East and Islam are well aware of how “essentialism” has been turned into a standardized accusation often raised by authors who claim they adopt an “activist approach.”][99] The pressure to pursue activist and often biased analysis dependent on a dominant ideology of the day is not a novel phenomenon and should not be confused with the predisposition to take up “heated” arguments.

A classical advocate of scientific neutrality as ensuing from modernity is Max Weber, who - by announcing the “disenchantment of the world” - added in his vocation lectures (1917 and 1919) that it is impossible to arbitrate “a conflict of ultimate worldviews” as they are mutually excluding in terms of basic assumptions and values, so one has to

“choose between them” (Weber 2004a: 79, emphasis in original). However, the aspiration to scientific neutrality does not mean for Weber that one should not be committed, for science requires a passionate “intoxication” (Weber 2004b: 8). Although to some more recent scholars he did not prove the neutrality of science in spite of his “heroic existentialism” (Anderson 2004: 6), Weber made a clear distinction. Despite the need to aspire for scholarly neutrality, every independent teacher should repudiate the claim that “all questions which run the risk of stirring up ‘heated’ arguments should be excluded” (Weber 1978). Moral indifference is not to be confused with scientific objectivity (Weber 1949: 60). Scholars should tackle such issues not as propagandists, but as analysts, especially in a field “under siege,” such as Middle East studies today (Eickelman 2012: 213). Scientific “neutrality” should also not mean indifference also in the discussions of essentially contested concepts.

The study of Salafism as a contested concept is relevant to the ongoing discussions of unity and diversity, convergence and divergence in Islam. As Gudrun Kramer remarks, social sciences and the humanities after the “pragmatic turn” deal predominantly with action, motion and interaction because of which agency becomes the key word while boundaries are never stable but always shifting and renegotiated: “things are in flux, people are mobile, ideas are constructed and developments contingent, nothing is uniform no choir sings in unison: the universe is a perpetuum mobile” (Kramer 2006: 181). In line with such a trend, are the attempts to “decompose” Islam into many “islams” signaled almost three decades ago by scholars, such as the Egyptian social scientist Abdul Hamid el-Zein (1977: 242-43), who was as devoted to interpretive anthropology as he was to Islam (Eickelman 1981). More recently, this trend did not fade away, though taking different forms.[100]

In an otherwise highly erudite book, Shahab Ahmed found the question “What is Islam?” highly engaging, but he was more cautious than others. Along with the classical long-established scholarly views of Islam “as law,” Ahmed (2016: 148) rejected what he called the “islams-not-Islam” approach. The problem with such approaches that seek fully “to deconstruct” religion, and in this case Islam, is their failure to formulate any tenable definition. Ahmed himself eventually suggests conceptualizing Islam as “meaningmaking for the self in terms of hermeneutical engagement” (Ahmed 2016: 405, emphasis in original). However, if Islam is any “hermeneutical engagement,” as Frank Griffel (2017: 13) rightly comments, “there is nothing left in societies dominated by Muslims that is not Islamic.” In his struggle against “essentialism,” Ahmed’s arguments remain unconvincing and he offers a total generalization, which does not differentiate idea and fact, religion and culture, norm and practice. Not surprisingly, he compares “the Orientalists” with “the Salafis” accusing them of adopting the perspective of “Salafi historiography” (Ahmed 2016: 219).

Interpretation in Islam, as in any other religion or ideology, is highly important but it is not an endless and arbitrary “hermeneutical engagement.” As in politics, what is possible to do in religion “is generally limited by what it is possible to legitimize. What you can hope to legitimize, however, depends on what courses of action you can plausibly range under

existing normative principles” (Skinner 1998: 105). Religious traditions may change but this is a gradual and time-consuming process against a “considerable inertia” (Cook 2014: xv) requiring continuity in order to remain legitimate. In the meantime, interpretations are not unlimited and fully contingent on subjective choices. A cautious approach to Islam would therefore entail what Dale Eickelman (1982: 11) defines as a “middle ground” - a balance between the consideration of the “universal” and the “local” in religious traditions. Yet, despite the agency of individuals and the ubiquitous local diversity in interpretation, essentially contested concepts must keep a certain degree of coherence and continuity in order to be analytically tenable.

An appeal to the past - either by searching history for precedents for new claims, or seeing history as a development towards an advocated or denounced contemporary standpoint - is crucial in commonly sustained ideological argument (Skinner 1965: 151). As part of a larger structure, essentially contested concepts range within a spectrum of legitimacy that sustains the longue duree of each “universal” religion beyond localities and across time. In Islamic history, together with the evolved forms of religious textualism and scriptural scrutiny, these evoked historical antecedents interact with the socio-cultural contexts to facilitate discussions and heated - sometimes even armed - conflicts around the shifting and continually contested boundaries of inclusion and exclusion (Eickelman and Salvatore 2006: 5). Muslim jurisprudents upon the divine authorship of Islamic law (shari'a) and reject any idea of human reason as taking part in the creation of law.

Consequently, Muslim religious and legal thought is dominated by textual-ism - “an approach to the formulation of the law that seeks to ground all law in a closed canon of foundational texts and refuses to accord validity to law that is formulated independently of these texts” (Weiss 2006: 38). Salafis do emphasize this insistence, but do it by embracing a specific mode of scriptural engagement that distinguishes their shared views on matters of theology and law from other trends in Islamic thought and practice. While many would agree on such a formulation, there are still irreconcilable views on the historical origin of Salafism.

*** 2 The Contested Origin of Salafism

A major reason for the existing disagreements on when we shall trace back the origin of Salafism is perhaps the fact that all Sunnis revere the “pious ancestors” and refer to them, though with aims different from those of the Salafis, who insist on emulating the salaf as much as possible and in all aspects of religious life by adopting a theological and legal view that makes such an ideal feasible. Insofar the Salafis bring to the fore the idealized experience and practices of the Prophet and the early umma, the designation Salafi is highly prestigious among Muslims - even among those who disagree with the Salafis on some secondary religious issues. Another reason for contesting the exact scope of Salafism is the fact that when used to trends in twentieth-century Islam, the term covered such a wide range of orientations and views that, if applied to all of them equally,

becomes too vague - it is as if it denotes the entire Sunni spectrum of Islam and not just a specific trend thereof.

As Ovamir Anjum (2016: 449) ironically notes, in the twentieth century the term has designated religious scholars as different as the pro-British Egyptian modernist Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), on the one hand, and “the likes of the Wahhabi puritanical cleric, Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Baz (d. 1999), on the other.” Consider that groups, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (isis) are also put in the same category, and the term Salafism is nothing but an almost useless vague designation. As clarified, even the most challenged essentially contested concept must have a constant core element and a set of meanhings on which those who discuss it have an agreement. Uniting Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), who referred to the glorious past of the ancestors in his attempt to reconcile Islam with modernity, and al-Bagh-dadi, the isis leader, under the same category, does not seem very encouraging as an analytical enterprise unless we broadly speak of different and even contradicting types of Muslim activism. Add the confusion caused by some Ottomanists and modern Saudi researchers who considered Birgivi Mehmed Efendi (d. 1573) and the subsequent seventeenth-century Istanbul movement of the Qadizadelis as “Salafi”, while they were strict Hanafis with Maturidi theology (Evstatiev 2015: 227-32), and the lines between the concepts are completely blurred.

It is, therefore, not surprising that there are vivid ongoing scholarly debates over when the rise of Salafism can be actually dated and thus of what and whom do we mean by “Salafi” referring to whether some modernist Muslim reformers, such as Muhammad Abduh, were in fact Salafis. If Abduh were to qualify as a Salafi, then that would mean categorizing him alongside Islamist groups such as Egypt’s present-day Nour Party, which was what Frank Griffel (2015) suggested in a heated debate with Henri Lauziere (2010) who, in turn, responds that “this is a false historiographical problem, because there is no need to frame the issue in terms of Salafism” (Lauziere 2016a; subsequently Griffel 2016). Reinhard Schulze (2000: 18), in turn, suggests the term “neo-Salafism” to describe modern Muslim activists like the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949) who, according to him, followed the “Salafiya movement ..., an Islamic variant of late 19th century classicism.”[101] Such a definition, however, is too broad, for it allows one to apply the term Salafi to any Muslim, regardless of his views on theology and law, who both sees himself as a modernizer and emphasizes the glory of the “pious ancestors.”

A caution is needed when dealing with so-called “modernist” or “enlightened Salafism, where many have got it wrong,” as Bernard Haykel puts it, for neither Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad ‘Abduh, nor his disciple Rashid Rida (d. 1935) shared Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 728/1328) anti-rationalist and literalist theological views on tawhid, or promoted hadith as unconditionally authoritative (Haykel 2009: 45-6). The views of such modernist Muslim reformists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century are at odds with the beliefs and practices of both the adherents of what is known today as Salafism and their pre-modern inspirers.[102] A possible exception to pro-Wahhabi inclinations can perhaps be found in the late period of Rashid Rida’s life when he supported

‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Sa‘ud (d. 1953) in Arabia and published some writings on that topic (Rida 1925).

Although some researchers look for the genealogy of Salafism in the early (Lauziere 2010: 380) or mainly in the late (Griffel 2015: 195; Weisman 2017: 34) nineteenth century, if we set aside the misleading ism in the designation, the intellectual trajectory of the modern movement can be traced back as early in Islamic history as the end of the eight and beginning of the ninth century ad and is related to the traditionalists (ahl al-hadith) - the hadith scholars of Baghdad. Scholars such as Bernard Haykel (2009: 28), Joas Wagemakers (2016: 30-2), and Jonatan A. C. Brown (2015: 118) support the idea that such a long-term trend in Islam eventually gave rise to what we today call Salafism.

The term traditionalists (ahl al-hadith) is used to refer to scholars who transmit or investigate traditions to establish the soundness of their authenticity. From the third/ninth century onwards, the term traditionalism in theology was also applicable to the ahl al-hadith who followed prophetic tradition as an authoritative source of religious knowledge and must be distinguished from those who followed ancient customs or unwritten traditions. Traditionalist doctrine, as opposed to rationalist theology, is based on three positive principles. First, traditionalists adhere to the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the consensus (ijma *). Second, they consider the religious content derived from these three sources to be homogenous. Third, traditionalists embrace those scholars who are responsible for the application of these devices. A negative principle is that they reject any innovation (bid'a).[103] In this sense, one should not necessarily see the Salafi orientation as a product of modern globalization and of the ongoing deterritorialization of Muslims (Haykel 2009: 36-37), but as embedded in the mode of scriptural engagement to which the third/ninth-century ahl al-hadith adhered. Indeed, transnational Salafism today fosters a process of deculturation in that Salafis are at war with locally embedded traditions and notions of culture (Roy 2004: 258ff.), although with some notable exceptions such as those areas in the Arabian Peninsula where Salafism itself - in its Wahhabi form - has been the dominant tradition for a long time.

In the third century ah, “the followers of the Prophetic tradition” (ahl al-hadith) [104] shaped as a religious movement considering the traditions (hadith) of the Prophet Muhammad as the main source of religious authority alongside the Qur’an. The hadith folk, to use the term that Marshal Hodgson (1947: vol. 1, 238) coined, were led by Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 240/855) against the “rationalists” (ahl al-ra’y) who adopted the theological views of Imam Abu Hanifa (d. 150/767) and the Mu'tazila, which influenced the Abbasid ruling elite for more than two decades after the time of Caliph al-Ma’mun (r. 198-218/813-833). Reminding us of Hodgson’s idiosyncratic translation of the name ahl al-hadith, Christopher Melchert (2002) analyzes their views delineating four most important features of traditionalist piety - seriousness; an overwhelmingly moralistic conception of the Islamic community; a contrast with Sufi piety; and a contrast with the piety of ahl al-adab (the cultivators of belles-lettres). [105] Shaped in the time of Ibn Hanbal, these features of traditionalist piety continued to

spread after the beginning of the tenth century ad, by which time the hadith folk had played their historical role in the Muslim convergence. In the next centuries, seriousness and conceptions about a moralistic community of the saved, as opposed to infidels and deviators from the straight path, combined with a sharp critique of any form of speculative intellectualism, kept their influence within certain Muslim schools and movements. The circle surrounding the paradigmatic proto-Salafi scholar Ibn Taymiyya (Bori 2010), and his influential disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) played a central role among them.

Ibn Taymiyya’s theology, often referred to as neo-Hanbalism or neo-Hanbali traditionalism (for example, El-Rouayheb 2015: 201, 272-311), passionately opposed and polemicized against the Murji’ite views of other Sunnis, particularly Hanafis and the followers of Ash'arite speculative theology (kalam). Ibn Tay-miyya revived and brought to the fore the principle of istithna’ as part of the search for a perfection of the faith (kamal al-iman) - a situation in which sins cannot harm faith as a whole - but he gave insufficient consideration to the conventional anti-Murji’ite stances that theologians like al-Ash‘ari (d. 324/936) himself would have adopted as compromises. According to Ibn Taymiyya, faith is not fixed; like other complex entities, it varies by increasing and decreasing (yazid wa yanqus), but keeps its nature and name even if part of it ceases to exist. Ibn Taymiyya distinguished between two categories of postponers - the more dangerous theological Murji’ites (murji’at al-kalam) and the jurisprudential Murji’ites (murji’at al-fuqaha’). The latter referred mainly to Abu Hanifa and his followers, whose errors Ibn Taymiyya more readily forgave (Ibn Taymi-yya 1995-2004: vol. 7, 323).

*** 3 Defining Salafism as a Mode of Scriptural Engagement

The Arabic-Islamic term Salafi, and hence the phenomenon of what is known today as Salafism, refers to a religious - mostly theological but also legal - orientation within the Sunni spectrum of Islam that is embedded in a specific mode of scriptural engagement. Salafism is mostly identifiable theologically through the creed (‘ aqida) with which their adherents passionately reject rationalist speculative theology (kalam), embracing instead traditionalist theology (^cilm al-usul or usul al-din).[106] The theological views embedded in the Salafi creed extend over the Salafi views on matters of Islamic law where they have legal consequences. The methods by which that specific combination of theological and legal views is implemented in religious practice entails varying implications for the socio-political engagement of those who belong to the different branches of Salafism.

**** 3.1 Foundations of the Salafi Creed

In a particular way, Salafis stress the need to return as strictly as possible to the beliefs and practices of the first three generations of Muslims - that of the “pious ancestors” (al-salaf al-salih) - or the initial two and a half centuries of Islamic history when a generation (jil) was perceived as around eighty years (Haykel 2009: 38-9). Some scholars emphasize “precisely the focus on the utopia of al-salaf al-salih” as a distinctive feature, which allows them to identify as Salafis the people who claim to follow the salaf “as closely and in as many spheres of life as possible” (Wagemakers 2016: 28). Salafis, however, shape their distinct Muslim subjectivity differentiating themselves from other Sunnis by privileging a set of specific beliefs and practices providing them with a strong sense of religious certainty.

If in Western modernity it is through reason and thought “that man escapes from the perils of uncertainty” (Dewey 1929: 6), under religious normativity individuals act differently in terms of agency, rational activity and subjective choice in that any legitimate human action must take into account the established and “firm” structural codes into account. Some anthropologists link certainty and religion by grasping fundamentalism as a refuge from uncertainty (James 2005: 1-16). Salafism inspires religious certainty in its adherents through the adopted direct approach to the textual sources of revelation, as well as through the claim that Salafis represent the most authentic form of Islam as it emerged at source - as it was revealed by Allah, evidenced in the life and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, understood and practiced by his Companions (sahaba), their Followers (tabfun) and the Followers of the Followers (tab'fu al-tabfin), that is by the salaf, or first three generations of Muslims.[107]

Salafis are thus among the most ardent defenders of scriptural certainty in Islam. They consider that the salaf understood the Qur’an better than anyone else and whoever dares to contradict their reading is completely wrong: “we know that the Qur’an was read by the Companions (al-sahaba), the Followers (al-tabfun) and their Followers (tabfuhum) who best understood its meanings (ma'ani) and interpretation (tafsir)” (Ibn Taymiyya 1972: 91). In the field of religious knowledge, modern Salafis, who since at least the 1920s have been known as Salafiyya (Lauziere 2010: 373), as well as their forebears the proto-Salafis,[108] whose religious orientation is identifiable in matters of theology and law from the pre-modern age, passionately defend the standing of the early religious scholars (salaf) and are critical of the opinions of the later scholars (khalaf). Ibn Taymiyya who is an inspiration for generations of Salafi-minded Sunnis, thus insisted that the innovators (mubtadi'in) prefer “the path of the later philosophizing scholars” (tariqat al-khalaf al-mutafalsifa)” before “the way of the salaf” (tariqat al-salaf).

Theologically, what primarily identifies Salafis is their understanding of tawhid, God’s oneness and unity. This understanding refutes anthropomorphism and the physical attributes (sifat) of Allah, entails a particular approach to the texts of

revelation and, by setting thick doctrinal boundaries with clear legal consequences and political implications, is able to distinguish believers from unbelievers. Salafis do not simply adhere to “monotheism,” as the term tawhid is usually translated in Western languages in opposition to “polytheism” (shirk), which implies associating other divinities with the unity and oneness of Allah.[109] Salafis adopt the universally accepted belief among Muslims that God is not only One (ahad) but also undivided, united in Himself (wahid). However, the Salafi creed ('aqida) differentiates between three interrelated categories of tawhid.

The first category is tawhid al-rububiyya (the Oneness of Lordship), the belief in the single supreme and sovereign power of Allah as the sole Lord of Creation, thus implying that attributing any part of His power to anyone else amounts to unbelief (kufr). The second is tawhid al-uluhiyya, or tawhid al-ilahiyya (the Oneness of Godship), also known as tawhid al-‘ibada (the Unity of Worship), the conviction that - as only Allah is divine - all forms of worship must be directed only and exclusively to Him while worshipping anyone else but Him is a form of unbelief. The third category is tawhid al-asma’ wa l-sifat (Oneness of the Names and Divine Attributes), meaning that Allah is unique in all His names and attributes mentioned in the texts of Islamic revelation. In dealing with this aspect of revelation, Salafis pursue imrar or tamrir - accepting the anthropomorphic passages from scripture[110] as they are - “without modality and anthropomorphism (ma‘a nafi al-kayfiyya wa l-tashbih)” (Ibn Taymiyya 1995: vol. 1, 56o), which result in the danger of unbelief.

The terms denoting the first two categories of tawhid seem to have appeared in the time of Ibn Taymiyya; the second one (tawhid al-uluhiyya) is particularly important for enforcing Salafi views in practice and worship (Haykel 2009: 39n.14). The third category of tawhid discerns Salafis from other Muslims by strictly adopting the Hanbali view that the revealed texts must be accepted without asking how (bi-la-kayfa), without the middle way followed by the Salafis’ constant theological adversaries, the schools of speculative theology (kalam) such as the Ash‘ariyya and Maturidiyya (Wagemakers 2016: 41). Later, Muslim scholars and leaders like Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) laid particular emphasis on the tawhid al-asma’ wa l-sifat to strengthen the core distinctive elements of the Salafi creed (see, for example, Lauziere 2016b: 97-8, 132, cf. 210, 234).

Based on a theology of faith dealing with questions such as “what faith itself is, and how one believes” (Lav 2012: 4, emphasis in original), Salafis draw strict boundaries between belief and unbelief, which include legally consequential procedures such as accusations of unbelief (takfir) (Evstatiev 2015: 218-21). A cornerstone of Salafi theology is the view that works, or acts, are an integral part of the faith and, according to Ibn Taymiyya (1995-2004: vol. 4, 156):

the way of the salaf (madhhab al-salaf) is that faith (iman) constitutes of speech and acts (‘amal), [according to which] it increases and decreases (yazidwayanqus). ... The way of the salaf is that the Qur’anic verses and the hadith on the attributes (sifat) of Allah are not subject to interpretation (la tata’awwal).

This view opposes the stances of the Murji’ites (al-murji’a) calling for a suspension, postponement (irja’) of judgement regarding the third and the fourth caliphs - ‘Uthman (r. 23-35/644-656) and subsequently Ali (r. 35-40/656-661), who had been condemned as infidels by the early activist movement of the Kharijites (al-khawarij)[111] who played an important role during the first civil war (fitna) in Islam (35-40/656-661).

Thus, the Khariji belief that a rebellion against Muslim rulers was not just allowed but necessary if the ruler has performed a grave sin (kabira), collided with the Murji’i view of postponement of the punishment remaining solely in God’s hands on the Day of Judgement if the ruler in question explicitly considers himself Muslim. This long-term struggle between “seceders” and “post-poners” is paradigmatic in Islamic history and continues until today between the different branches of Salafism. However, this does not mean that Salafis who consider themselves at the heart of ahl al-Sunna wa l-jama^ca[112] should be analytically confused with the Kharijites - despite the quietist Salafis’ current intra-Muslim accusations against their jihadi counterparts (Wagemakers 2011). From an historical perspective, the politically motivated insistence of the early proto-Murji’a to suspend judgement on wrongdoing rulers gradually evolved into a mainly theological doctrine adopted by the Hanafi tradition (Cook 1981: 30). Although Imam Abu Hanifa is widely known among Muslims as jurisprudent and the eponym of one of the four established Sunni schools of law, he had he had also specific views in the field of theology. According to him, faith (iman) is an indivisible unity of belief and speech to the exclusion of acts and cannot therefore increase or decrease. Under pressure from certain Qur’anic texts, some later Hanafis allowed for an increase but not a decrease of faith - a view adopted by the Maturidi theology, which intertwined with the Hanafi legal school.[113]

Salafis put a particular emphasis on the religious distinctiveness of true Muslims and privilege Islamic imperatives that firmly set the boundaries of faith (iman) as opposed to unbelief (kufr). They fight unbelief, particularly all forms of shirk associating other beings or things with Allah’s oneness. Salafis claim that the only valid sources of authority are the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad (equated by Salafis with the six canonical hadith collections). Believing that, after the Prophet, his sayings are best understood by the consensus of his Companions (sahaba), Salafis seek to purify Islam from any reprehensible innovation (bid'a) (Evstatiev 2018: 171-202; Haykel 2009: 39).

On the one hand, in dealing with the sources of revelation, Salafis draw strict boundaries between belief and unbelief through “markers of doctrinal distinction” (Loimeier 2017: 39). On the other hand, due to the religious certainty it inspires, Salafism is very successful in achieving a high degree of internal communal consolidation and cohesion among the Muslim groups that adopt it. With its direct approach to the sources of revelation, the Salafi orientation guarantees a stable identity affiliated to the single and exclusive victorious group (al-ta’ifa al-mansura) that will protect the saved sect (al-frqa al-najiya) from hellfire in the hereafter. The view is based on a group of had-iths stating that Jews and Christians divided into seventy-one or seventy-two sects (firqa) while this community, the Muslim umma, will split into seventy-three sects, all of which but one will be doomed to hell. This exceptional saved group (jama’a) is also known as al-ta’ifa al-mansura or al-frqa al-najiya - a notion that draws on what is considered to be a sound and authentic (sahih) Prophetic tradition: “a group (ta’ifa) of my community (ummati) will continue to engage in battle for the Truth (yuqatiluna ^cala l-haqq) until the Day of Resurrection” (Muslim, hadith No156; cf. al Bukhari, hadith No7311; al-Tirmidhi, hadith No2229).[114]

The standing of the saved sect and the purification of the individual and society from any form of unbelief and innovation is maintained through a particular emphasis on a set of Islamic boundary-drawing imperatives, such as loyalty and disavowal (al-wala’ wa l-bara’). The phrase includes two elements: its first part denotes the unreserved loyalty that Muslims have for evidence of Allah, Islam and the Muslim community, while the second refers to the obligation to reject everything that is un-Islamic (Wagemakers 2008: 1). According to David Cook (2005: 141), “this is a polarizing doctrine by which radicals ... maintain their control over what constitutes the definition of ‘Islam’.’’ In a legal opinion (fatwa), the influential Saudi Salafi religious scholar Muhammad b. Salih al-‘Uthaymin (d. 2001), for example, by drawing on Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, emphasized that “the greeting of infidels for Christmas (tahni’at al-kuffar bi-^cid al-krismas) is agreed to be forbidden (haram bi l-ittifaq). . This is a greater sin than greeting someone for drinking wine, committing a murder or an unlawful intercourse” (al-‘Uthaymin 1992: vol. 3, 45) and, if some Muslims tend to shun this Islamic imperative, Salafis use it to justify their call to minimize Muslim interactions with non-Muslims (Shavit 2014). A strict understanding of loyalty and disavowal characterizes the individual and social life of Salafi Muslims.

**** 3.2 Salafis in the Domain of Law

Although the theology embedded in the Salafi creed is what distinguishes it from other forms of Sunni Islam, its adherents also define themselves through a set of specific shared views on Islamic law developed in the field of jurisprudence (fiqh). Despite the emphasis on ^caqida, law can rival theology as the dominant concern for modern Salafis (Gauvain 2013: 11) whose purism engages them in shaping and maintaining a Muslim subjectivity that encompasses all aspects of individual and social life. In matters of law, Salafis generally tend to pursue la madhhabiyya - what

Griffel (2015: 205) translated as non-schoolism - meaning that Muslims with a knowledge of Islam should seek to transcend the boundaries of each of the four established traditional Sunni legal schools (madhhab s) - Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, or Hanbali.

In jurisprudence (fiqh), therefore, Salafis emphasize the need to access the foundational sources of revelation directly - through independent reasoning (ijtihad) that bypasses the blind emulation (taqlid) of the chain of authorities within the separate schools of law. Although Ibn Taymiyya was also a mujtahid, he was more dedicated to matters of theology. His disciple Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (2003: vol. 2, 11), however, explicitly formulated the need to transcend the madhhabs: “each of the religious scholars stuck to his authority and thus they made the fanatical adherence to the legal schools their religion (jalu al-ta'assub li-l-madhahib diyanatahum).” If on matters of theology they are traditionalists, in the field of law Salafis are thus markedly anti-traditionalist in that they contest the established Sunni legal schools.

The Salafi adoption of Hanbali credal, and indeed often legal, views is often mistakenly equated with their presumed following of the Hanbali school of law, which in principle is valid for the Wahhabis but not for all Salafis. Recent developments suggest that, even in Saudi Arabia, religious scholars ("ulama) are increasingly emphasizing ijtihad and tending to claim the status of mujta-hids more than their Wahhabi predecessors did in the past (Vogel 2000: 78). The eminent hadith scholar Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), along with his disciples who adopted the name Ahl al-Hadith, are known to have had heavily criticized the Wahhabis for following Hanbali law (Lacroix 2011: 82-86). Al-Albani himself went so far as to say that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was Salafi in creed ("aqida) but not in jurisprudence (fiqh), thus accusing him of being insufficiently knowledgeable in hadith (Lacroix 2009: 68).

Another ubiquitous conceptual confusion is to equate Salafism with Wahhabism and to use the two terms interchangeably. This particularly happens in so-called security studies where the latter term is equated with violence (Meijer 2009: 2) and thus turned into a rhetorical foil (Knysh 2004). It is noteworthy that as early as 1929 King ‘Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa'ud officially prohibited the use of the term Wahhabiyya and declared instead that the legitimate term was Salafi-yya (Mouline 2014: 8). What is labeled Wahhabism is only one branch of the broader Salafi orientation in Sunni Islam and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was more engaged with questions of theology than with jurisprudence.

**** 3.3 Salafis and Political Engagement: Quietist and Activist Branches

In principle, all Salafis share a set of common basic views on theology and law where they achieve a high degree of convergence, but they diverge deeply over their use through the

adopted program, or method (manhaj) of applying that creed. In particular, while the method of dealing with the sources of Islam is probably “universally agreed upon among Salafis” (Wagemakers 2012: 8), there is deep disagreement among them over the proper manhaj related to worship (‘ibada) and the issues of society and politics. The influential Saudi Shaykh Salih b. Fawzan al-Fawzan (b. 1935), who among the religious scholars deals extensively with method, analyzes manhaj in a discussion about the reasons for the split (tafarruq) among Muslims (Fawzan 2005: 12), or more notably among Salafis. The theological and largely legal unity thus turns into diversity of Salafi sociability and the existence of often contradictory approaches to society and politics. This feature strengthens Salafism’s nature as essentially contested concept and underlies the scholarly attempts to classify and categorize the branches of the movement.

The most widely accepted classification divides Salafis into three categories, two of which are activist and one quietist;[115] variations in the designation depend on the disciplinary background of the respective author. Initially, this broad threefold classification was proposed and elaborated by the political scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz. He divided Salafis into purists, politicos and jihadis, defined according to what he called their “different contextual readings of a shared creed” (Wiktorowicz 2006: 208). As we shall see, the first of the three is quietist while the next two are activist, though in a manner that does not allow one to presume that jihadis necessarily originate within the circles of the politicos or vice versa.

Wiktorowicz’s purists comprise the religious figures who focus mainly on maintaining the purity of Islam in accordance with the Salafi creed. They emphasize the missionary call (daWa) to what they believe is the true Islamic teaching. They stay aside from current political affairs, the struggles for power and party politics (hizbiyya), which, in accordance with Islamic doctrine, they consider a prerogative of the Muslim ruler (wali al-amr).[116]

Among the prominent purists was the above mentioned Nasir al-Din al-Albani, who brought his principle of “purification and education” (tasfiya wa tarbiya) to the fore: “without these two introductory steps,” al-Albani (2000: 31) clarified, “it is to me impossible to lay the foundations of Islamic rule or Islamic state.” Ironically, this Salafi scholar was known to have said something originally stated by Hasan al-Hudaybi (d. 1973), the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood (Olidort 2015: 16) whom he passionately opposed, namely “build an Islamic state in your hearts and it will be established for you in your land” (al-Albani 2000: 33). Apart from influential Saudi shaykhs such as ‘Abd al-Aziz b. Baz, Wiktorowicz’s purists also included religious scholars like Muhammad b. Salih al-‘Uthaymin and Rabi‘ al-Madkhali (b. 1931), who reject even peaceful engagement in party politics.

Some researchers found Wiktorowicz’s term purists inappropriate because all Salafis self-identify as purists, so suggested replacing it with the word qui-etists.[117] Aware of these

debates, others chose to keep to purists instead of quietists on the grounds that attitude to political participation alone does not differentiate purists from politicos (Pall 2018: 19). In a detailed revisiting of Wiktorowicz's categorization, Joas Wagemakers (2017; also 2016: 52-59) elaborated on the term quietist and proposed modifying the classification synthesizing some insights already available to Islamicists in which the term quietists had previously been used to describe this category of Salafis (Meijer 2009: 3ff.).[118] Wagemakers (2017: 16) thus proposed three sub-trends within the quietists - aloofists who remain completely aloof of political action, for example al-Albani; loyalists who refrain from direct active political engagement but are ready to counsel rulers like Ibn Baz and al-Uthaymin; and propagandists who actively propagate their loyalty to a regime, one example being the Saudi Rabi' b. Hadi al-Madkhali.

Apoliticism is perhaps the most contested concept within the quietist branch. Refuting that the notion of quietist could be applied to al-Albani, Jacob Olidort contended that political realism was a more appropriate term than quietism because al-Albani and his disciples had constantly touched on political issues and, in fact, had had a clearly political agenda. Olidort (2015) was therefore critical of Wagemakers for implicitly suggesting that "quietists avoid political discussions." Wagemakers later addressed that criticism by stating that it had been a misunderstanding of his work, for he had never made such a claim but rather meant that quietists "avoid political action and only write about political issues such as the Palestinian question and the war in Syria as religious issues pertaining to things like piety and doctrine, not political interests and the like" (Wagemakers 2016: 53, emphasis in original). This debate indicates that, however quietist they might be, Salafis pursue their reformist project through Muslim politics that can avoid any formal and institutionalized structures such as modern political parties or associations.

Salafis are primarily religious and social reformers wishing to reproduce specific forms of personal and communal identity and authority with a view, as Haykel (2009: 34-35) put it, "to create a distinct Muslim subjectivity, one with profound social and political implications." Salafis do not necessarily see politics as centered on power relations and interests alone, as they cannot account for how people interact with society. For them, as for other Muslims, politics is also "a struggle about people's imaginations" (Pekonen 1989: 127-43; see also Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 9). Overt political struggle is framed by implicit understandings of belonging that can often mean withdrawing from power relations and direct political participation. Michael Cook (2004: 113), for example, defined the ambivalence in Ibn Hanbal's quietism as apolitical politics. Quietist Salafis, in turn, are not disinterested in politics.

The second category of the threefold classification that Wiktorowicz (2006: 221-25) suggested includes the "politicos" (or "political Salafis" in Wagemaker's modification) who gained momentum from the 1960s. They adhere to a politicized manhaj that originated historically out of the entanglement between the Saudi Salafis and members of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt and Syria, who entered the kingdom seeking refuge from the secular, authoritarian regimes in their own countries. The Salafis of this category consider political activism as a requirement of the method for the application of their creed

and believe that this is the proper way for them to contribute for achieving social justice by implementing the right of God to legislate. Saudi Arabia's twin shaykhs Safar al-Hawali (b. 1950) and Salman al-Auda (b. 1956) - both students of Ibn Baz - are leading political Salafis.

A particular sub-trend is embodied in the activity of Abu 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Rahman b. Khaliq (b. 1939) - an Egyptian Islamist who graduated from the Islamic University of Medina but moved to Kuwait after the Saudis expelled him due to his extreme activism. His group is sometimes referred to as "organized Salafism" (Haykel 2009: 58) because of al-Khaliq's insistence on coordinated actions with the aim to gain political power. These tendencies were fostered by a movement known as Sahwa - the Islamic Awakening (al-sahwa al-islamiyya), or in Saudi Arabia called among some circles in the country "Sahwa insurrection" (intifadat al-sahwa) - a predominantly non-violent religio-political movement (Lacroix 2011: 3). The Sahwa movement reached its peak in the early 1990s, but there are contending visions of who precisely fostered the process. Authors like Kepel (2004: 152-96) emphasize the role of some members of the Muslims Brotherhood who immigrated to the Kingdom from Egypt and Syria pointing to the influence of leading Islamists, such as Muhammad Surur (b. 1938), on the Saudi Wahhabi milieu. Others tend to evaluate the role of these immigrants as less significant, so privilege the role of local Wahhabi factors as drivers behind the Sahwa. Madawi Al-Rasheed (2007: 73-4) contests Kepel's opinion, which she sees as coinciding with the view of the Saudi regime. In some other Middle Eastern countries like Egypt, especially after the so-called Arab Spring, political Salafism took parliamentary forms and the aforementioned Nour Party with its enormous electoral success is a typical example (cf. Lacroix 2012: 2-12).

The third category involves the jihadis (Wiktorowicz 2006: 225-28), increasingly known as Jihadi-Salafis (Haykel 2016). They are part of the dynamic jihadi current that self-identifies as "the school of jihadi Salafism (madrasa al-salafiyya al-jihadiyya)," or simply Jihadi-Salafism (al-salafiyya al-jihadiyya) (Bunzel 2017), to which the militant Sunni groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (is) in Iraq and Syria adhere. All Salafis, and in theory all Muslims, recognize the Islamic duty of jihad, at least in its normative religious sense of missionary warfare (Crone 2004: 364-5, 369). What then differentiates JihadiSalafis? Traditional Sunni jurisprudence stipulates that at least once a year a caliph must wage offensive jihad (jihad al-talab) against infidel powers to expand the domain of Islam and in that capacity jihad is a collective duty. Defensive jihad (jihad al-daf) is an individual duty incumbent on every eligible Muslim if the realm of Islam is under external attack. Some Jihadi-Salafis elaborate on the traditional notion of defensive jihad (Bunzel 2017: 7), but what makes them distinct is their view that jihad is to be conducted not only against infidels but also against the apostate regimes in the Muslim majority countries themselves.

This particular activist stance of armed confrontation against an unjust ruler (Cook 2004: 51) - together with the call for global jihad by groups such as Al-Qaeda - differentiates between the Jihadi-Salafis on the one hand, and the quietists and political Salafis on the other (cf. Wagemakers 2012: 9). Ibn Tay-miyya (1995-2004: vol. 28, 421) also emphasized that jihad is the best way for a man to strive towards cleansing himself of all his previous sins:

whoever has many sins (kathir al-dhunub), the best medicine for him is jihad. Those who want to be eased from what is forbidden (haram) and repent but are unable to turn to his fellows, let them take the path of Allah, for this is the best way towards his salvation, among other things, which he will obtain from the reward ofjihad.

Those who take this path and join jihadi groups do not, however, engage only in military activities. The fighters with their families develop a distinct jihadi culture in which religion provides the predominant theme and inspiration, but that also includes jihadi poetry in Arabic, Islamic songs (nashids) and films. In a study of the non-military activities of jihadis, Thomas Hegghammer (2017: 178) emphasized that, since they take their religion extremely seriously, they are first and foremost preoccupied with devotional activities - prayer, invocations, Qur'an recitation, and ablution. To gain a real understanding of Jihadi-Salafism would therefore require further study of its religious aspects without neglecting the other factors that have driven the rise of the jihadi movement - be they social or psychological.

The social and political issues underlying the categorization of Salafism are, no doubt, important, but the blurred lines between the different groups that enable a former quietist to join the Jihadi-Salafi movement suggest that one cannot overemphasize the importance of this contested classification for our understanding of the phenomenon. The most distinctive features of Salafism, those that make it attractive to Muslim over other religious trends in Islam, are rooted not in the classification but in the specific shared creed. Moreover, it is not only the Western observers who are contesting the categorizations, but also the Salafis themselves. Ali al-Halabi (2011: 49-51), a Jordanian Salafi leader and disciple of al-Albani, noted that only ignorant people and innovators (ahl al-jahl wa l-ibtida *) can speak of branches of Salafism (anna l-salafyya an-wa) for "Salafism is, in fact, an inherited divine method (manhaj rabbani mu-tawarath) that the later scholars (khalaf) have received from the early scholars (salaf)." These disagreements stem from a shared Salafi belief that there is only one proper manhaj for the application of their creed.

*** 4 Conclusion

Salafism is an essentially contested concept for which there are irreconcilable arguments about its right usage. It stirs heated discussions and constant disagreements among both Western scholars and Muslims of different backgrounds. That, however, does not mean that scholars should embrace a relativist stance by declaring the term indefinable. If we resort to Walter Gallie's example of the oil-tempera painting versus the work of art, we will need to admit that the ambiguities around Salafism encompass both types.

Alongside widely shared agreement on the scope of the concept of Salafism as understood today, is deep disagreement over its proper use and realization. Among scholars, Salafism is a highly challenged concept that provokes bold controversy surrounding its origin, along with much confusion and heated debate over who might qualify as a Salafi. Furthermore, classifications of Salafism are continuously being contested by secular and Muslim scholars alike. From within the field of Islamic studies, I have attempted to show how the ambiguities of the “oil-tempera painting” might be solved in such a way that the contradictions in our understanding of Salafism as a Sunni religious orientation based on a specific mode of scriptural engagement in the longue duree of Islamic thought and practice become less perplexing.

As any essentially contested concept, Salafism seeks to preserve its continuity with the earliest time of Islam from where its adherents believe they derive its religious legitimacy. This effectively makes the boundaries of the Salafi spectrum narrower than those of other trends in Islam. The many newcomers now joining the Salafi movement might be inspired by a variety of subjective reasons, but for them it involves an objectification of the religious imagination. They pose questions about being in the world and wanting to be committed. What happens subsequently to those committed believers may vary depending on different factors, but as soon as they join the Salafi movement, most of them are likely to find themselves in a structural situation. Many might have thought beforehand that Salafism is what they do with it and that it can be endlessly changed and renegotiated. Most probably, however, they will quickly learn what their general commitment to Salafism requires them to do.

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* Part 3: Change

** 9. Religiosity, Men of Learning, and Oil Wealth in the Land of the Imamate

Mandana Limbert

It is sometimes difficult to remember that in 1978 and 1979, when Dale Eick-elman first went to Oman, Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Bu Saidi had only been in power for eight or nine years and that hope, excitement, change, and, undoubtedly, a fair amount of uncertainty and suspicion dominated Omani life. Certainly, as I write this essay, an enormous amount has changed in the village and then town of Hamra where Eickelman focused his

ethnographic work. The increase in population size alone has been dramatic. In an article published in 1983, Eickelman refers to the population of Hamra in 1980 as 2,510, which was significantly more than the 1,200 calculated in the late 1940s, and yet about eight to ten times smaller than its population in 2019. And yet, Eickelman's descriptions from his first visits not only remind us of the challenges and sentiments of the time, but also remain hauntingly familiar, continuing to raise significant questions about the processes and meanings of religious life, the production of knowledge, and the ways material transformations shape, but never determine, social expectations and experiences.

This chapter reflects on Eickelman's work in Oman beginning from the late 1970s and early 1980s to recognize his insights about religiosity and the possibilities of an anthropology that would engage seriously with religious scholarship, oil wealth, history, and technology and of conducting field research in the Arabian Peninsula. In particular, this chapter traces some of Eickelman's work in Oman and his exploration of notions of tradition, objectification, and the conditions of life in a dramatically transforming petro-state.

*** 1. Religious Tradition and Religious Objectification

Throughout his scholarship, and as it became particularly evident in his work in Oman, Eickelman approached Islam and religion rather differently than most in his field at the time. For Eickelman, religion was neither an a priori (much less a bounded) set of practices or discourses pertaining to beliefs in supernatural powers as it had once been defined in anthropology, nor a system

of symbols that produces "moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and 'clothing these conceptions' with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic" (Geertz 1973: 90). For Eickelman, "religion" is a host of experiences, practices, and discourses that come to be understood as such within and through processes of authority and legitimacy that are never isolated from (though not determined by or attributed solely to) the socio-economic and political hierarchies of a society. In some ways, Eickelman seemed to distance himself from the noun "religion" (except when understood as part of a process of definition), preferring, instead, either the adjective "religious" or the noun "religiosity" in order to emphasize ways of being religious or pious, rather than an a priori object or form with any particular presumption about content.

Eickelman's first article about Oman, "Religious Tradition, Economic Domination and Political Legitimacy," published in Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Mediterrannee, rests on such an argument. Drawing on a comparison between his earlier research in Morocco and his subsequent research in Oman, the article focuses, first, on the notion of Islamic tradition. It should be remembered that anthropology had - through the 1970s - been primarily concerned with local variations and practices presumed to be mostly oral and far from the scholarly orbits and debates that were of interest to historians and Islamic studies scholars. A few anthropologists, including Eickelman, were interested in

the importance of scholarly learning and texts as well as the significance of Islamic centers and practices of intellectual life. Certainly, the Islamic revolution of 1978 and 1979 in Iran had affected how anthropologists like Eick-elman understood and approached Islam as not confined to local practices and beliefs. Anthropologists were increasingly, though tentatively, recognizing the potential political relevance of religious life and the ways that textual and scholarly practices shaped everyday understandings of appropriate piety.

Beginning with a discussion of the ways that “traditional Islam” had been taken to refer to particular practices and formations that diverged from a supposed true, essential Islam, Eickelman called for a more complex understanding of tradition. In particular, he approached tradition as ideological and reproduced through men of learning. He proposed considering tradition (like religion) to be “an analytic notion which designates an ideological type with specific relations to local social structure” (Eickelman 1980: 17). As his previous work in Morocco (Eickelman 1978) had illustrated, however, the practices of the men of learning did not necessarily correspond completely with social structures. Thus, while recognizing the significance of context for knowledge transmission, Eickelman had also highlighted the varied and multiple ideologies among the men of learning.

Talal Asad, famously, was also concerned with the idea of tradition. In his 1986 article, “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam” Asad developed his description of Islam as a discursive tradition. The article was aimed first and foremost at questioning presumptions, like those of Ernest Gellner, that Islam was a religion in which people did not generally seem to speak or think, but simply acted or behaved (Asad 1986: 8). Asad critiqued too the idea that Islam was divided into a binary social structure organized around a duality between city and country, shari'a Islam and tribal Islam. He developed instead, the idea of Islam as a discursive tradition to emphasize the founding texts of the Qur’an and hadith. In the 1986 article, Asad also critiqued Geertz’s (1968) approach to Islam in Islam Observed as primarily centered on behavior.

While in most of this 1986 piece, Asad focused on the significance of discourse in Islam, rather than behavior, he also engaged with the idea of tradition. He argued for an approach towards Islam that recognized it as “a tradition of Muslim discourse that addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular Islamic practice in the present” (Asad 1986: 14). As such, Asad emphasized the ways that tradition allows for both the weight and views of the past (and future) in the present, without remaining simply imitative. Indeed, as Asad wrote, Islam both carries pasts and addresses conceptions of it. Though Asad did not use the term “ideology,” as Eickelman had previously, he also, like Eickelman, distanced himself from a priori descriptions of content. Instead, Asad praised Eickelman’s call in “The Study of Islam in Local Contexts” to recognize and examine the middle ground between scholarly, ideal Islam and local variation. As some scholars, such as Yasmin Moll (2009), have noted, though Asad acknowledged shifts in interpretation and transformations in practice and recognized the significance of conceptions of pasts, his work has primarily been referenced to highlight the enduring legacies of intellectual and philosophical strains from medieval Islamic debates into the contemporary period.

Though notions of tradition continued to undergird some of Eickelman's questions about religiosity, as I note below, his work in interior Oman focused instead on different aspects of religious life. In particular, he analyzed the practices of authority and legitimacy in the former Imamate region and explored the processes through which Omanis increasingly came to see religion as a distinct realm of life and Ibadism (the branch of Islam dominant in Oman) as a particular identity. The question of what constituted religion and proper religiosity for Omanis dominated his work.

Eickelman saw in Oman some of what Clifford Geertz had argued in Islam Observed, though this is not always explicit: that there was a marked shift in religiosity from religiousness to religious-mindedness, a shift from "being held by religious convictions and holding them," especially with the rise of scriptur-alism (Geertz 1968: 61). The primary question that Moroccans and Indonesians were asking themselves, Geertz had argued in Islam Observed, was no longer "what shall I believe?" but "how shall I believe it?" Geertz (1968: 62) continued, "the transformation of religious symbols from imagistic revelations of the divine, evidences of God, to ideological assertions of the divine's importance, badges of piety, has been in each country [Morocco and Indonesia], though in different ways, the common reaction to this disheartening discovery." For Geertz, the "disheartening discovery" was that the depth and breadth of religious belief (not its validity) may have limits, and therefore demanded responses outlining how to be properly pious. It should be noted that while Asad critiqued Geertz's approach to religion and the ways Geertz (and Gellner) had approached Islam primarily through behavior, Eickelman drew from a somewhat different aspect of Geertz's work.

Instead, Eickelman focused on the increase of what Geertz had called religious-mindedness (a term Eickelman used in his 1987 article, "Ibadism and the Sectarian Perspective," discussed below) as well as the growing significance of self-defining and religious identity. Such processes of increasing religious-mindedness (and what Eickelman argued amounted to objectification), he noted, were strengthened and solidified as Omanis responded to criticism about their branch of Islam and sometimes with the evocation of tradition. Eickelman explored religious transformation and objectification more fully in his 1989 article, "National Identity and Religious Discourse in Contemporary Oman," and in the 1996 volume, Muslim Politics, co-edited with James Piscatori.

Distinctions between scholars who have emphasized the evocative power of tradition and those who have emphasized continuities also manifest around the notion of objectification and other concerns. In Politics and Piety (2005), for example, Saba Mahmood critiqued Eickelman's emphasis on objectification in his arguments about modern self-reflexivity, arguing instead that ethical religious pedagogies already and historically required self-reflection. In Questioning Secularism, Hussein Agrama (2012: 11) argued that Eickelman's approach to Islam not only treated tradition as ideology, but also began with an assumption that Islamic religiosity was "a problem to be explained." Certainly, the word "problem" is ambiguous, implying on one end a negative condition or situation to be

corrected and, on the other, a question that may be answered or, should at least, be asked. Agrama seems to suggest here that Eickelman and Piscatori used the former definition of "problem," rather than the latter.

Agrama, however, also noted his appreciation for Eickelman's attention to some of the processes of objectification that have been central to Eickel-man's work - the "tendencies to rule-generalizing and codification, expansive

ambitions towards social reform, the subjection of broader and more intimate spheres of social life to critical scrutiny and intervention, and a suspicious and increasingly strident politics of authenticity" (Agrama 2012: 17). For Eickelman, claims to and evocations of tradition were heightened in Oman by a new education system that also helped shape the tendencies to rule-generalizing and increased the strident politics of authenticity.

In addition to his attention to the politics and processes of tradition and objectification, Eickelman's ability to tackle some deeply held (and persistent) stereotypes about political systems in the Arabian Peninsula, to question presumed distinctions between religious and secular rule (in the Omani Imamate), to engage with religious and political history in Oman, to pursue research in a petro-state as well as to pave the way for further inquiry through his attention to ethnographic detail have remained especially influential for scholars of the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula. In his first article about Oman, "Religious Tradition, Economic Domination and Political Legitimacy," for example, in addition to tackling the notion of tradition, Eickelman (1980) also questioned presumptions about political and religious forms that perpetuated ideas of static social structures, segmentary models of social relations, and systems of political legitimacy and rule in the Arabian Peninsula.

Though few in number, scholars of Ibadism - the branch of Islam dominant in Oman - were trained in classical Islamic studies and focused on doctrine. In Europe, such work had been centered in Poland under the direction of Ta-deuz Lewicki, in England with the work of John Wilkinson at the University of Oxford, and in Italy at the University of Naples. Italian colonial experiences in North Africa had fueled fascinating work on Ibadism. Wilkinson's first book on Oman, Water and Tribal Settlement in Southeast Arabia (1977), as well as his slightly later book The Imamate Tradition in Oman (1987), were the first extensive English language accounts that drew on Omani sources of Imamate Ibadi history, not only for its early history, but for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well. As part of a shifting field of an anthropology that engaged the intellectual world of Islam, Eickelman did not shy away from considering the significance of scholarly training in Islam or from tackling the ways that scholars of Ibadism and Ibadi history in Oman had linked Ibadism and Ibadi history to a supposedly static social structure, the "tribe."

Thus, the second half of Eickelman's 1980 article unpacked presumptions about links between Oman's religio-political history (of presumed "cycles" a la Ibn Khaldun) and a

seemingly fixed segmentary model system that had been advocated by Wilkinson. He pointed out the speculative nature of such links, the ideological basis of descent, as well as the changing conceptions of “personal and collective obligations and identity.” (Eickelman 1980: 25) And, he provided a brief lesson (to scholars who were in the habit of drawing on notions of social structure from an imagined anthropology) on what anthropologists actually tend to do: “the task of the anthropologist then is not so much to hazard a reconstruction of “definitive” earlier identities, but to elicit the ongoing transformations of cultural forms and their relations to the economic and political contexts in which they occur (1980: 26).” Finally, Eickel-man questioned Wilkinson’s argument that considered “later” (that is, after the tenth century ce) Ibadi interpretations and practices as divergent from the “original.”

*** 2. Being Good, Being Ibadi

Within the next thirteen years, Eickelman published no less than seven more articles and book chapters about Oman, primarily about religiosity, authority, the transmission of knowledge, and scholarly practices. Eickelman’s detailed description in “Religious Knowledge in Inner Oman,” published in 1983 in the Journal of Oman Studies of religious knowledge and education in the village of Hamra exemplifies his extensive engagement with legal and literary traditions, political history, and questions about transformations in identity. In this article, Eickelman described the system of training, as well as the formation of the scholarly and governing authority of the Imamate administration in interior Oman, primarily in the 1940s and 1950s, with some continuing practices through his time in the late 1970s. And, Eickelman considered the false dichotomy between “religious” and “secular” rule, pointing out that there was no such distinction in Imamate governing.

The article, it should be noted, begins with a quote from a 1917 letter from Imam Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi to Shaykh Muhammad bin Salim al-Ruqayshi entrusting him to serve as his governor and to rule in accordance with Islamic law and the tradition of Caliph ‘Umar’s instructions. Here, Eick-elman was particularly interested in exploring how legitimacy and authority were established, conferred, and maintained, and how histories of scholarly practices informed those processes. Such evocations of tradition were clearly not “false” claims to authenticity. From an outline of Quranic schools as he observed them and was told about during his time in Hamra in 1979 and 1980, and the ways that literate men helped train their sons, Eickelman drew attention to scholarly status and hierarchies, including for those who became government employees. He described how there had been little emphasis on literacy, though certainly a small number of “men of learning” formed study circles and taught others the core topics of grammar and law. A system of reputation that conferred respect on scholars was sufficient recognition to proceed to teach others. The question most significant for Eickelman was the differences between these forms of conferring authority (and the types of knowledge admired), and those emerging later, not to mention the calls to “tradition” and “authenticity” as they became increasingly important in the “modern” world of Omani schools and Omani political life.

As suggested above, while literacy was limited, religious scholarship clearly mattered. Yet, for most inhabitants of towns like Hamra, what truly mattered was how to live life as a good person ought to live life, not in order to live that life as defined by the object “Ibadism” as distinct from other religious groups or according to absolute boundaries of required practice. To be sure, historians of the nineteenth century have noted the energy and extensive publishing endeavors of Ibadis in Oman, North Africa, and Zanzibar as they aimed to explain, defend, and protect its presence, thereby also working to define it. Indeed, many contemporary Omanis who have turned to such acts of selfdefinition have done so by drawing on texts and debates from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. That said, clearly, self-defining as Ibadi (or even Muslim) became more significant among a great number of people in the late twentieth century. Eickelman’s 1987 article “Ibadism and the Sectarian Perspective” might best exemplify his continuing interest in the processes noted above. Here, Eickelman described the ways that “in Hamra, for example, it remains the case that no activities are specifically bracketed as ‘religious’ ” (Eickelman 1987: 35), suggesting too that the category religious would itself have little meaning, as would a category like secular. Instead, what mattered was being a good person and living in accordance to values and proper practices, attested in texts and debates, that pertained to all aspects of life. And here too, he described the lack of interest in sectarianism.

This lack of interest in sectarianism (and self-defining) would soon change, however. As he explored in his subsequent article published in 1989, “National Identity and Religious Discourse in Contemporary Oman,” the Saudi national mufti Shaykh ‘Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz inadvertently sparked a “quiet revolution” in Oman. When Bin Baz issued a fatwa in 1987 criticizing Ibadis, Oman’s national mufti Shaykh Ahmed al-Khalili responded with a two-hour televised lesson defending and outlining Ibadism. I should note that ten years later, when I was conducting fieldwork in Bahla, this exchange between Bin Baz and al-Khalili continued to resonate, with almost visceral responses about the offence caused by the Saudi fatwa and its false understanding of Ibadism, not to mention the offence caused by their personal interaction in 1986 in Saudi Arabia. By 1989, as Eickelman explored in his article, rather than simply being a good person, defining and delimiting Ibadism and religion had become the guiding principles of Ibadi scholarship and debate. And, as Eickelman argued, the process of objectification was not only affirmed by al-Khalili’s lecture and subsequent publications and recordings, but reinforced through modern, mass schooling, which had actually downplayed sectarian differences.

As Eickelman (1989: 11-12) wrote:

an unintended consequence of making Islam a part of the curriculum is implicitly to make it a subject alongside others that must be “explained” and “understood.” Indeed, the defining of Islam, “explaining” it alongside other subjects, confines and objectifies it. However, treating Islam as a system of beliefs and practices implicitly also highlights differences within the Muslim community.

In other words, the introduction of Islamic studies as a separate subject in schools created boundaries between religion and other aspects of knowledge and life. And, despite the fact that the content of the material about religion in the curricula sought to downplay sectarian differences, the very form of religious education that defined religion as a system of belief and practices shaped expectations about delineating the differences of those beliefs and practices among different branches of Islam as well.

*** 3. Oil Wealth and Development Futures

While the majority of Eickelman's work in Oman analyzed what came to be religious life, Eickelman's work in Oman took on a different focus in another short article from 1983: "Omani Village: The Meaning of Oil" published in John Peterson's edited volume The Politics of Middle Eastern Oil. Here, Eick-elman (1983b) considered what the dramatic changes that villagers in Hamra were witnessing meant for them, thereby quietly articulating a revolutionary idea: that the politics and economics of oil could be examined from the perspective of everyday life, and not simply through the lens of sociological theories and models of the resource curse or wealth discrepancy and expectations, as had been the more common approach in studies of oil. Scholarship on oil need not, in other words, only be understood through the lens of geo-politics or tied to political loyalty. Instead, oil meant something for people in relation both to their understandings of the dramatic transformations around them and for how they understood their pasts, and futures. Eickelman, of course, was also highly attuned to the ways that the meanings of these transformations were hardly isolated from national representations of them, though this was not emphasized in his 1983 article. He focused instead on people's commitments (or claims of commitment) to community and village life, while remaining somewhat reluctant or even suspicious about the lure of elsewhere and relieved to be living in relative economic stability rather than under the strains of life just a few years earlier.

Oil, therefore, was not simply a commodity whose effects on politics and social relations should be examined exclusively in terms of its internal use, export, and conflict over the distribution of its claimed profits or the purchasing of relative docility. Oil was, and is, more than that; it means something in relation to other discourses about home, neighbors, family, not to mention interpretations of the past and future. In other words, oil enters a process of signification in which people's understanding of its presence (or even seeming absence) shapes how they see and act in the world. From Eickelman's ethnographic attention to oil, one could also begin to imagine how the process of signification, the meaning of oil, was and is not isolated from either national representations of it, nor from the skepticism, conflicting discourses, and practices surrounding its exploration, production, transportation, projections, and limits.

Nor is oil isolated from the material transformations that altered practice, sensory experiences, and histories - both official and unofficial. For me, the meaning of oil in Oman was also particularly evident in the materiality of "development," its infrastructure. Paved

roads, for example, have served an enduring national metonym for oil wealth and progress. State-sanctioned newspaper articles as well as popular Facebook posts exalting the engineering feats of road construction and “clean,” lighted, trafficless movement have, fifty years since the 1970 coup d’etat, not been uncommon. And, there have been reasons for this - the comfort and ease of travel on paved roads, rather than over graveled paths, cannot be overestimated, nor can the significance of travel itself for life in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Just as train travel, as Wolfgang Schivelbusch (1977) so beautifully described in The Railway Journey, altered people’s experiences of space, time, and sociality in the nineteenth century, so too has travel in cars, over perfectly asphalted mountain passes and even on congested highways. But, the meaning of oil is also evident in glistening airconditioned malls in urban centers, the desire for ready-to-wear (rather than locally tailored) fashions, and the availability of imported houseware, canned goods, as well as other imported foodstuffs (even coffee from Costa Rica) that have replaced locally produced crafts and foods. And, of course, such infrastructure and material goods could disappear in the future.

In his brief article about oil, Eickelman’s great attention to ethnographic detail paves the way for further inquiry. For example, here, he also mentioned loans, land, ethics, and futures. Eickelman wrote,

most of the minute parcels of land, some no more than two meters long and one wide, are locally owned and bought and sold only within the community. Yet, now as in the past, some land and water rights were transferred out of necessity to shaykhs of Hamra to raise cash in years of particular scarcity, and repurchased whenever possible.

Thus, as Eickelman extended the significance of oil to include property relations and changes in land-sale practices and, possibly, loans, one could ask: why were the parcels of land so small? Inheritance of course comes to mind, but these parcels may have also served as sources of loan sales. Why were they only bought and sold within the community? Or, if to shaykhs in Hamra, how was the repurchasing organized? In other words, what, exactly, were these sales? Were they the khiyar ones that Fahad Bishara (2016) has more recently described? How has oil affected land purchases, much less waqfs? Eickelman’s careful attention to ethnographic detail, as with his detailed attention to the scholarship surrounding Ibadi political life, has opened expansive lines of inquiry for those engaged with the complexities of life in Southern Arabia.

Eickelman also raised questions about local ethics and the social importance of remaining oriented to the village in the 1970s and 1980s. As Eickelman and others have noted, the 1970s not only witnessed emigration from villages to Muscat and other cities of the Gulf, but Oman was also experiencing the dramatic “return” of Zanzibaris after the 1964 revolution. Thus, one wonders whether the ethics of orientation to locality, as noted by Eickelman, might also have been linked to the intensity of such mobility and discussions about movement at the time.

Finally, in the brief 1983 article about oil, Eickelman addressed questions about the future, though here he asked broadly and openly what kinds of future Omani villagers imagined or hoped for as they saw their current world being transformed so dramatically around them. One could, of course, also ask what notions of the future and temporality might there have been or be, as has been (like roads and other infrastructural changes) of particular interest to me. How has the oil industry and the Omani state, for example, helped shape notions and uncertainties about the future through the public focus on depletion, and how have those ideas drawn on other experiences or accounts of the past as well as discourses about the limits of human knowledge itself? One could take such questions even further, as Gukge Gunel (2019) has in her study of the futuristic Masdar eco-city in Abu Dhabi, both as an experiment for post-oil economic sustainability in Abu Dhabi and for practices of science and scientific knowledge.

*** Conclusions

Eighteen years after Eickelman first went to Hamra, I was fortunate to spend almost a year and a half in Bahla, a town approximately thirty kilometers away from Hamra. I was fortunate not only because a generous family was willing to accept me - a single, female, foreigner who undoubtedly interrupted their lives - into their home for so long, but because reading Eickelman's work introduced me to the depth and richness of scholarly life of the villages and towns in the region and the ways that the world of the Imamate was both present and yet its legacy never static. Though clearly much had changed between Eickelman's first visit and his later visits, as well as between the late 1980s and the 1990s, the self-defining was palpable as was the continued lived memory of the Imamate. By the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the world of the Imamate may seem rather distant. And yet, concerns with proper piety, defining what is and is not properly Ibadi, and with how such piety might evoke the Imamate, remain significant. Eickelman's analyses about Imamate thought and politics, individuals and relationships, thus resonated not only in the 1980s and 1990s when living memory about its formation and politics easily circulated, but also for younger generations of Omanis who years later have accessed those times primarily through various texts and textual traditions and have been shaped in part by the processes of state education.

Whether among Imamate scholars and judges, in the Quranic schools of Hamra that were fast changing, or when considering what oil means, Eick-elman recognized that ethnographic fieldwork required a commitment and care to both the details of everyday life as well as to history. Drawing from local letters, from Bayt al-Mal account books, interviews, and various published histories that had only begun to be circulated even within Oman, Eickelman's work was revolutionary in its attention to the practices of the scholarly world of Islamic learning, its transformations, and its legacies.

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** 10. The Unbearable Lightness of Being Turkish

Jenny White

In a seminal essay, “The Art of Memory: Islamic Education and its Social Reproduction,” Dale Eickelman (1995) suggested that Islamic knowledge has two main aspects. One emphasizes fixity and memory, though also allowing for flexibility and variation, and requires discipline and communal obedience. The other emphasizes Islamic knowledge as a cognitive style that accommodates a popular understanding of Islam, often communicated through music and oral poetry, as well as by means of crafts and commerce. The Turkish experience of Islam in the twentieth century, I suggest, has been skewed towards the second aspect by the Republican destruction of Islamic learning and the institutions that taught and disseminated it and by other Republican reforms, like language reform.

During the Ottoman era, the ^eulama, men of religious learning, measured new forms of worship and pious practices against an assumed authoritative standard based on exegesis of the Qur’an and hadith and centuries of accreted juridical decisions. Without this steady background drumbeat of Islamic learning, piety and Muslim practice became principally alloys of other forces acting upon the population, such as media and market. As a result, since the founding of the republic, the state and different elements of the population have vied for authority over correct religious practice. Education, urbanization, globalization and the market all have played important roles in introducing and naturalizing new configurations of the national and Muslim self as lifestyle forms, with related consumption practices. In particular, the 1990s saw the rise of Islamic practice as a form of self-expression and marker of upward mobility and political identity.

The process of stylistic invention was given free rein by the law in 1929 that changed Arabic-based Ottoman to a reconstructed Turkish language in the Latin alphabet (Lewis 2002). This dramatically cut the Turkish Republic’s ties to its pre-Republican history by making documents in Ottoman unreadable to the next generation and making the educated elites of the time overnight illiterate. The scholarly literature has in recent years challenged the de novo exceptionalism propagated by the new republic, instead presenting compelling evidence of continuity between the Ottoman and Republican periods in personnel, political and economic structures, and culture as identities,

networks and hierarchies were absorbed into the nation’s new institutions (Meeker 2002).

Nevertheless, one can argue that certain reforms, like the transformation of the language itself and the wholesale reinvention of national history that posited that the Turks were direct ancestors of the Sumerians (2900 bc) and the Hittites (1600 bc) and that ignored five centuries of Ottoman Empire, of necessity created unprecedented linguistic, literary, architectural, and aesthetic breaks with the Ottoman past (Bozdogan 2002; Kasaba 1997; Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006; White 2012). The race to imagine Turkey led to innovations in all arenas of public life (Anderson 1991). The state propagated its social models through institutions, rituals, and schools, though attempts to penetrate all sectors of the population were thwarted initially by lack of communication and roads. Isolation allowed local cultural and religious variations to thrive in a largely rural, agricultural land (Kasaba 2009). It wasn’t until the 1940s that peasants could hop a bus to the city. Ever more moved there to work in the state-subsidized industries in the urban margins, until today more than three-fourths of

Turkey’s population live in cities (White 2010). Rather than adapt to Republican reforms, though, particularly those affecting lifestyle and religiosity, urban migrants developed their own urban subculture that discomfited the settled urban population by its perceived distance from and “pollution” of “civilized” modernity (Oncu 2002). Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community” of the nation state was challenged by other imagined communities that took some elements of early Republican invented traditions, like the Latin alphabet and nationalist history, but rejected or repurposed others, like dress, lifestyle, and religion. The language reform had effectively uprooted the Republican elites, while having little effect on the previously largely illiterate folk who brought their lifestyles and beliefs to the cities. Their religiosity had been shaped by the religious culture in their communities of origin, including a variety of Sufi orders.

*** 1. Islam as Bureaucracy and Embodied Practice

Shortly after the founding of the Republic, Islamic knowledge and practice underwent a seismic transformation. The ultimate, authoritative position of caliph as leader of the Muslim community was abolished on 3 March 1924 and Islamic lodges, brotherhoods and other religious establishments were declared illegal, though they continued to function clandestinely. Education was taken out of the hands of a patchwork of Muslim preachers and scholars and was unified under secular state control with a standardized curriculum. The Islamic calendar was replaced in 1926 by the Western Gregorian calendar and the day of rest was moved from Muslim Friday to Christian Sunday. The definition of the legitimate Republican Muslim self was defined by the state. The properties and wealth of Ottoman Islamic foundations and their educational facilities were absorbed into a Republican state-run Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), founded in 1924 and staffed by civil servants. The Diyanet trains and oversees religious specialists, supervises mosques, controls religious education in schools, interprets religious texts in a non-binding way, and writes sermons for Turkey’s 90,000 mosques. It was designed to implement laiklik (laicism, though often translated as secularism), the guiding principle laid down in the constitution that mandates state control over religion and aims to keep Islam out of the public sphere. Expressions of Islamic faith were expected to remain in the private realm. The state displayed little interest in officially regulating private life beyond its public attempts at social engineering through education and elite modeling of European habits of bodily comportment, conjugal relations, dress and secularity in lifestyle.

Without the institutions and financial wherewithal to engage in teaching and learning about Islam, ^eulama became extinct, turbans and other insignia of their calling were forbidden in public, and knowledge of them and their work was erased from public memory. All that remained was the physical memory of Islamic practice, much like a skill learned once from a master, and then handed down to apprentices who give it their own colorful twists. Even physical memory became attenuated as many secular urban elites were not taught the motions of prayer. The embodiment of a Muslim identity took on a polarizing social-class aspect. The conservative rural population and workingclass urbanites acted out and marked time by the rituals of Muslim prayer, while elite urbanites lived secular lifestyles managed by the clock, which became a symbol of the national revolution in

Western lifestyle, as brilliantly described in the contemporary satirical novel by Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar, The Time Regulation Institute. Remarkably for a country in which being “on time” remains a negotiable value, in 2013, the mayor of Ankara, Turkey’s capital, allocated 14.5 million dollars to build fifty-two clock towers, with the aim of making it the city with the most clock towers in the world (Boyacioglu 2014). By the late 1920s, Islam had become embodied in a different way, as an element of blood or lineage. This has only recently changed as a result of market forces and a new Muslim nationalism of the twenty-first century that is reviving Sunni identity and a pious lifestyle as markers of Turkishness, albeit in highly original forms (White 2012: 163-80).

Turkey is home to a diversity of Sufi or Sufi-inspired Islamic orders and brotherhoods that survived the state’s ban on their activities in the early republic (Yukleyen 2008). Operating underground, out of view of the state, these orders kept traditions embodied in rituals, such as zikir, the intense, rhythmic movement of body and breath in communal prayer. Others have “moved away from personal spirituality towards a more institutionalized social or political project” (Yukleyen 2008: 381). Silverstein pointed out that being broadcast on mass media has altered practices that embody Sufi communal identity through what he called “disciplines of presence” (Silverstein 2008: 141). This has transformed them into generalized “Islamic content” without an embodied component or the building of communal identity, and listeners may be entirely unaware of a Sufi connection. In the new republic, in other words, Islam was uprooted and transplanted into the sterile soil of state bureaucracy, popular media, and the market, but paradoxically has become more intimate through its infusion of the everyday with free-floating physical, aural and visual stimuli.

*** 2. Islam as Race

Turkish nationalism as the unifying ideology of the new Republic was built on several overlapping sets of premises, ranging from language and culture to ethnicity and race, each permutation having singular effects on who would be defined as a citizen and a Turk. Islam played a complex role in this, as a culturally distinct Turkish Islam and as an ethno-racial identity. The sociologist Ziya Gokalp (1959) provided the intellectual basis for the role of Islam in republican society. Influenced by Emile Durkheim, Gokalp believed that in order to survive as a nation, Turkey required a unitary national culture with a common language, religion, set of customs and morality. He suggested that this unity could be built through education, rather than based on race or ethnicity. These ideas were incorporated into a powerful nationalist ideology. Nevertheless, many non-Muslims in the early Republic believed that they could assimilate by speaking Turkish and adopting the cultural habits of the Republic. Jews in the early Republic began a “Speak Turkish” campaign to do just that. Gokalp defined Muslim customs and ethos as essentially Turkish, retaining elements of pre-Islamic Central Asian shamanistic tradition that he believed expressed democratic, gender-egalitarian and modern beliefs and that reflected the tolerance characterizing the Turkish Sufi tradition. Gokalp thus proposed a superior Turkish Islam purified of corrupting Arab influences from the Ottoman era. The notion of a superior Turkish Islam survives in public discourse to this day, despite the current Justice and Development Party (akp) government’s political outreach to fellow Sunni Muslims in the Arab world.

Soon after Gokalp’s death, European racial ideas pushed aside the notion of Islam as culture in favor of a religio-racial definition of Turkishness as Muslim. Only Muslims could be Turks, and this was expressed in the language of blood and national lineage (soy) (Eissenstat 2004). This allowed secular Turks to downplay their faith while claiming Muslim (Turkish) identity and to deny Turkish identity to non-Muslim citizens. Public discourse, the press, and schoolbooks commonly identified Turkey’s “internal enemies” as its nonMuslim citizens who appeared to be part of Turkish society, but whose loyalty lay with their co-religionists abroad who were trying to undermine the Turkish nation. As non-Muslims, they could be citizens, but not Turks.

*** 3. Public Muslims

Eickelman and Anderson (1999) observed that from such interactions among authorities and political leaders and their constituents, a new Muslim public sphere emerged. Muslims whose identities had been embedded in their family, neighborhood and community became caught up in Muslim identity politics at a national level, amplified by new media that packaged Muslim content in new forms. After the introduction of multi-party political contests in 1946, Sufi orders began to play a more public role as their shaykhs or leaders competed for political influence by pledging the votes of their followers. At present, different orders occupy the political firmament around the powerful office of president, where they compete for power and positions in state institutions. One such order, the Hizmet (Service) movement organized around the preacher Fethullah Gulen, worked closely with the present government for many years before falling out in 2013. The government closed Hizmet schools, cutting off an important financial resource for the movement, and prosecutors and police believed to be linked to Hizmet carried out a criminal investigation of high-level government officials on corruption charges. The akp government retaliated by declaring Hizmet to be a terror organization with the acronym feto and blaming it for the failed coup attempt in 2016 (White 2008: 377-78).

Eickelman (1995) points out that in Algeria and Egypt, as Islamic education was absorbed by the state and teachers became civil servants, the prestige and authority of Islamic education was undermined in favor of alternative education. Unlike Algeria and Egypt, Turkey does not have trained Islamic jurists or a nationally distinct brand of Islamic theology. Many of Turkey’s theologians have been educated in Western philosophy and are as likely to cite Paul Feyerabend as the Qur’an. Rather than organizing as a Sufi brotherhood and engaging in traditional rituals, Hizmet instead incorporated itself as a series of seemingly unconnected foundations that engaged in business and education, running hundreds of well-regarded schools in dozens of countries. The movement retained some aspects of Islamic learning as described by Eickelman, particularly lesson circles, peer learning, and the custom of social and economic sponsorship by established men in the order (Eickelman 1995). However, in Hizmet reading circles, the followers did not study the Qur’an, but rather the writings of Fethullah Gulen. Worship was embodied in service to the movement through educational activity and in regular communal meetings of local business networks, thereby cementing

what has come to be the leitmotif of Turkish Islamism, a fusion of piety and profit. Hizmet graduates populated the ranks of state institutions like the judiciary, police, education, security services and the military. Eickelman (1995) makes the interesting observation that in Morocco alternative education allowed the development of a secondary elite, “those who allow the rulers to rule” and whose networks exist to this day. In Turkey, the ruling party in 2015 accused Hizmet networks of creating a state within the state and declared it to be a terrorist organization, detaining and/ or firing over a hundred thousand citizens, primarily professionals, teachers, students and civil servants, on suspicion of being members.

Under the current regime, Diyanet has expanded its role beyond purveyor of state-sponsored Islam to become an arm of the state with deep reach into society and the private sphere. Diyanet’s budget grew at least fourfold since 2006 and it now employs 117,000 people, many of them women preachers (vaizel-er), whose mandate now includes delivery of social services like psychological counseling to the population, services that had previously been the purview of secular institutions (Economist 2018; Maritato 2015). For the first time, a state institution is able to penetrate into the most intimate spheres of people’s private lives, including the bedroom, through such services as sexual counseling. Islamic broadcasters have proliferated in recent years. They too have moved away from theological programming that focused on doctrine, scripture and ritual to embrace an explicit role in “assisting the state in fighting social problems” through family-friendly programs. Among other things, these programs impress upon the viewers their responsibility to take care of family members, in effect to provide social services in place of the government (Kocamaner 2017).

*** 4. Islamicized Politics

Islamist politics implies a coherent political program to incorporate Islam into political practice. I would argue instead that the akp regime has Islam-icized politics. That is, it has instrumentalized Islam as a means to gain and retain power by harnessing the discourse and imagery of a free-floating and thus malleable Islamic sensibility to the state’s economic, political and foreign policy projects. Just as the state has become intimately involved in people’s lives through institutionalized Islam and the media, newly devised state rituals perform Islam as a constituent element of a newly Islamicized Turkish national identity. Schools celebrate the Prophet’s birthday, while municipalities host elaborate public re-enactments of the 1453 conquest of Byzantium by the Turks, explicitly staged as the victory of Islam over infidels. In many cases, religiously colored rituals have replaced prior secular national rituals.

In the 1980s, Turkey moved from being a closed, state-led economy to being a globalized liberal one that allowed small provincial entrepreneurs to expand their businesses and amass wealth. This business class tended to be more pious and conservative than the state-subsidized industrialists who until then had made up the business elite. The new conservative elites put their support behind a series of openly Islamist political parties. The

current ruling Justice and Development Party (akp) is an offspring of these earlier parties. While still touting the superiority of Turkish Islam, these parties were nonetheless more open to a definition of Turkishness based not on Turkish racial purity, but on a redefinition of Turks as former Ottoman rulers of other Sunni populations in the region. This required a rewriting of national history, a rejection of ethno-racial boundaries defined by one's Turkish Muslim soy or lineage and a repatriation of the Ottoman Empire as Turkey's roots. Since a renewal of such a "special relationship" was not necessarily welcomed by the countries in the region that remembered their Ottoman overlords less than kindly, Turkey played up its identity as a fellow Sunni Muslim country. Turkey expanded its role in the region both economically and politically until the Arab uprisings of 2011 largely derailed its interests. The idea that Turks and Arabs (and Southeast Asians) share an identity as fellow Sunni Muslims undercuts the ethno-racial definition of Turks as Muslims by blood, and Turkish claims about the superiority of Turkish Islam. More importantly, this broader identification allowed Turks to expand politically and economically beyond the boundaries of the republic, though expectations of the Sunni Muslim world have failed to materialize.

*** 5. Cosmopolitanism, Commercialism and the Islamic Individual

The interaction with the outside world as "fellow Muslims" went both ways. It also allowed outside commercial and political interests, as well as cultural and ideological influences, to penetrate the previously inward-facing Turkish national realm. The introduction of transnational Islamic influences began in the 1970s with the translation of Islamic modernist thinkers, such as Hassan Al Banna, into Turkish (Kramer 2010; White 2005). Their ideas helped develop a set of fundamentally anti-Western, but pro-Turkish and pro-business ideas that the political leader Necmettin Erbakan set out in his party platform in 1972 as Milli Goru§ or National View (White 2008: 362, 366; White 2014). These views were moderated by the Justice and Development Party when it was first elected in 2002. At the time, the party claimed to have rejected the National View and that they were not Islamists, but rather pious Muslims running a secular government. This was a model of Islamic personhood that posited that piety was a personal characteristic that a pious Muslim took with him or her into elected office, but did not affect policy making.

Indeed, the early years of akp were marked by highly pragmatic, proWestern economic and foreign policies and outreach to non-Muslims and other minorities within Turkey. As Turkey's society globalized through travel, media and marketing, and as, for the first time in republican history, the pious population became upwardly mobile, Muslim identities increasingly became embedded in newly available market products. Aspects of Muslim practice, like veiling, became lifestyle choices and forms of individual expression. Young pious Turkish Muslims spoke to me about their choices in veiling styles and other Muslim comportment and practice as something that was important because freely chosen. They practiced §uurlu Islam, conscious Islam (White 2012: 164). Personal choice and self-expression, they explained, made their Muslim identity modern, unlike that of other women who veiled because of tradition. Companies selling wholly invented "traditions" of Muslim clothing echoed these aspirations in their advertisements. Selling their inventions as

reflecting Ottoman palace chic (Navaro-Yashin 2002), the businesses played on their pious customers' social class aspirations.

Having grown up during this decade of expansive globalization, commercialization, and identity experimentation, some pious young people developed cosmopolitan desires that echoed their experiences in other places in the world that were exposed to the same forces (Saktanber 2002). Piety sometimes took the form of "looking for meaning" and joining civic organizations that worked for social justice causes, rather than joining a brotherhood or mosque engaged in zikir and prayer (White 2012: 163-80).

While national rituals have become Islamicized, other performative references to politics and Islam have become personalized (and commercialized). Esra Ozyurek (2004) writes about how the worship of Turkey's secular founding father, Ataturk, has moved from the public sphere to homes, where small shrines of purchased symbolic objects are set up that allow people to imagine a personal relationship with what is really a political idea (Ozyurek 2004).

Likewise, the day a young woman covers her head for the first time, once an unremarked step in her lifecycle, has been transformed by market and media forces into a new kind of celebration, a communal party akin to an American wedding or baby shower, complete with gifts.

*** 6. Who Is a Good Muslim?

All of the forces described above have torn at the social fabric that defines what it means to be a good Muslim in Turkey. Outside influences, ranging from Islamic ideologies to Islamic products, have allowed both a narrowing of Muslim self-definition and a further untethering of Islam from its historical or institutional roots. Over the past decade, Turkey has been embroiled in complicated political intrigues and conflicts throughout the Middle East. The government's engagement with armed radical Islamist groups in places like Syria and their members' transit through and residence in Turkey has meant that hardline Islamist views, like Salafism, and al-Qaeda and isis-linked ideologies that had previously found little foothold in Turkish society and institutions, have been imported from abroad. They have found some resonance in scattered local environments and in political groups with Turkey-specific agendas, like Huda-Par, a radical Islamist political group active in Kurdish areas of eastern Turkey. Government discourse has echoed some of their extremist views, granting them public legitimacy and reviving the anti-Western sentiments of National View, the Islamist platform that initially had been disavowed by the akp. The hardening of Islamist views within Turkish institutions can be seen in a conservative bent in Diyanet pronouncements on social issues, as well as in its introduction of concepts like martyrdom as a religious duty, which was incorporated in a children's magazine published by Diyanet. Previously, the term martyr (§ehit) had been used by the Turkish state exclusively to refer to soldiers who had died in battle in service to their country. In the magazine, a father explains to his young

son and daughter that they should aspire to die as martyrs. While still associated with nationalism and dying as a soldier, martyrdom is justified in religious terms and recommended also to the girl, his daughter (Diyanet Qocuk 2016; Koger 2016). Hart (2009) writes about recent homogenization of religious beliefs and practices as villagers try to curry favor with the state by being what they think the state considers to be good Muslims. Government discourse about the Islamic prohibition of interest has filtered to the general population and created a demand for Islamic banks and other financial instruments presented as Islamic. The author was informed recently that pious Turks have begun buying “Islamic” insurance policies from Malaysia, causing Turkish banks to try to tap into that market as well. In this way, the transformation of Muslim identity and Islamic practice and beliefs in Turkey’s public and private sectors is being driven not by any theological understanding of issues like martyrdom or the prohibition of interest, but rather by an amalgam of political expediency, globalization, and an adaptive market.

*** Conclusion

The definition of Muslim has gone through a number of transformations since the founding of the Turkish Republic: Laicist occlusion and state control, ethno-racial identity, membership in brotherhoods harnessed to the political system, civil association activism, political branding, and entrepreneurship to meet the commercial demand for a “properly Islamic” lifestyle. In Milan Kun-dera’s (1999) novel, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, his characters struggle to find meaning in an environment where even the biggest emotions like love seem uprooted and dependent on coincidences and are, thus, fleeting and terrifyingly unsatisfying. Turkey’s artificially uprooted institutions and haphazardly formulated national identit(ies) make it particularly difficult for its protagonists to set out on any meaningful journey with an end in sight, be it modernity, Muslimhood or Turkishness itself. Even the meaning of being Muslim is buffeted by forces that have at times carved out distinctive Muslim cognitive styles and disembodied lifestyles, premised most recently on choice and marketed as brands of Islam - upwardly mobile, state-approved, racially or politically defined. Lacking Islamic knowledge that is rooted in a fixed, disciplined tradition, Muslims in Turkey, like Kundera’s characters, are forever looking for meaning and satisfaction in the awkward, competitive interplay between state definitions and popular understandings of what it means to be Muslim.

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** 11. The Radicalization of Islam in Germany

Gilles Kepel

I met Professor Dale Eickelman on the board of a Social Science Research Council (SSRC) committee in New York in 1986. Thanks to that opportunity, I was introduced as a very young foreign scholar to American academe at its very best. Dale played a key role in bringing me in, since his perfect knowledge of French (or Moroccan French) had enabled him to spot my first book in its original language. When it came out in English translation as The Prophet and the Pharaoh, Dale used to make fun of the way I was depicted to the reader on the book jacket as “a young French academic.” He facetiously gave me the nickname “Jeune Gilles,” which he has used ever since, wondering whether I would ever be called an “aging scholar.” Well, three decades later those days have come, though I secretly believe that both of us have remained forever young.

While we sat together on the SSRC committee dedicated to the comparative study of Muslim societies, I had embarked on fieldwork for my second book, on the birth of Islam in France - Les banlieues de I’Islam: naissance d’une religion en France - published in 1987. My US colleagues were curious that such a strange topic would be a matter for study. Yet, thirty years later, many volumes have been dedicated to European Islam, all the more so after the wave of terrorism that we experienced from 2015 to 2017, starting with the Charlie Hebdo massacre in January 2015. I myself contributed to this series of publications with Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West (published in French in 2015) and a sequel entitled La Fracture the following year. That book was translated into German, and I wrote a preface to it that I now have the pleasure to present in English translation on the occasion of Dale’s Festschrift. The chapter is a modest token through which “le Vieux Gilles” expresses his deep appreciation for the (rare) scholarly friendship that has endured between us since the 1980s, not to mention Dale’s invaluable guidance on the harsh path of latter-day Orientalism.

*** 1. French and German Jihadism in Contrast

On 19 December 2016, a black truck driven by the Tunisian national Anis Amri pushed hastily through the Breitscheidplatz Christmas market in Berlin. There

were twelve dead and more than fifty injured, and the operation was claimed by Islamic State. On 14 July 2016, in Nice, another truck, white this time, also driven by a Tunisian, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, had raced into the crowd celebrating the French Bastille Day, killing eighty-six people. The “ramming operation” was claimed in the same terms that would be used in Berlin by Amaq, Islamic State’s news agency.

The contrasting colors of the two trucks, black in Berlin and white in Nice, were chosen to imprint onto the memories of and amplify the shock in German and French civil societies. They recall the visual charter of Islamic State, whose banner, descending in white on black, is inscribed with the dual confessional of the Muslim faith: “There is no God but God, and Muhammad is His Messenger” - the logo of contemporary jihadism.

In each case, the “mass attack” operation, as defined in the language of Islamic State, aimed simultaneously at two objectives. First, a strong spiritual symbol - the Christian holiday of Christmas, and, six months before, the secular, republican festival commemorating the taking of the Bastille. They are emblematic of Christianity as well as of the Enlightenment, both plainly loathed by Islamic State, which thereby expresses metaphorically its desire to annihilate them, in the same way that it ransacked or leveled churches, museums, and mausoleums in the territory under its control, from Mosul to Palmyra. Second, European societies are at the same time struck in their flesh and blood, touched in their daily life during holiday shopping or at a summer vacation spot, so as to target the consumerism and hedonism that is despised within the doctrinaire Salafism that inspires the jihadist worldview.

The continuum between the two cardinal attacks on Germany and France also links the two pivotal states of Europe in the common destiny of confronting terrorism. They are the “soft underbelly of the West” that third-generation jihadists have made their favorite enemy, in line with The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, a 1600-page book that Syrian engineer Abu Mus'ab al-Suri posted online in 2005 (see Kepel 2015: 24). Al-Suri was educated in France, became a naturalized Spanish citizen, and was a longtime resident of “Londonistan,” that British haven of Islamists from around the globe at the turn of the century.

Yet, until the Berlin bombing at the 2016 Christmas market, a good part of the German political class and commentariat, while showing deep empathy and unfailing solidarity with each of the Paris attacks, remained persuaded that Islamist terrorism in Europe was primarily - if not mainly - a French problem. France has tallied by far the largest number of casualties from jihadist attacks in Europe. From the carnage of January 2015 at the headquarters of Charlie Hebdo and the Hyper Cacher supermarket in the Porte de Vincennes section of Paris, to the assassination of Father Jacques Hamel in his Normandy church on 26 July 2016 to the 130 victims of 13 November 2015, jihadist attacks have claimed 239

deaths. France’s particular social and economic context seemed to provide the reason for a French exception, which, because of that nation’s intrinsic flaws, had motivated jihadist revenge. The elements in question include an extremely high unemployment rate in the working-class suburbs, which the children of immigrants from Arab North Africa populate; France’s colonial history, concluded just 55 years before in the violence of the Algerian war of independence; and, its republican laicite, which many people east of the Rhine judge to be excessive. There was a thought that Germany would be better protected because of its history being immune from a colonial past, a more inclusive social model, and an accommodating approach to religion in a society traditionally balanced between Protestants and Catholics.

The existence in Germany of a more favorable industrial labor market for Turkish immigrants and their descendants[119] seemed to inhibit the shift towards social deviance or even violence among young people of immigrant origin. Meanwhile, in France, unemployment, which encompasses up to 40 percent of the youth in working-class, mostly immigrant, and frequently Muslim neighborhoods, fuels disaffection from society. Moreover, Turkish Islam, solidly managed by disciplined parties closely linked to an authoritarian political system in their country of origin, seemed mainly oriented towards that system and distanced from international jihadism, which was first expressed in Arabic - the language of culture and reference for North African immigrants in France, who constitute the majority of immigrants in that country. In addition, in relation to the immigrant populations of Germany, the absence of a German colonial past in the territory of the German mainland European empire helped to avoid overloading the collective memory with frustrations, wounds, and a spirit of vengeance. This is unlike the French situation, where a return of the repressed retro-colonial complicates adherence to a nation accused of crimes against one’s parents’ generation and one’s country of origin. Finally, the recognition of religious denominations as an integral part of civil society and their financing by taxation seemed to make for a more comfortable space for Islam in Germany than the strict separation of church and state in France. France’s “full secularism” is readily stigmatized east of the Rhine by the multiculturalists who are widespread on the German left and among the Greens, who carry much more political weight than they do in France.

*** 2. Jihadism in Germany

This view that contrasts France and Germany and highlights the social, historical and cultural differences between the two countries has been challenged by the similarities between the 2016 attacks on German and French territories and the strong parallels between the Nice and Berlin massacres. The latter had been preceded, as in France, by individual stabbings or explosive attacks. On 18 and 24 July in Wurzburg and Ansbach, Bavaria, an Afghan asylum seeker and a Syrian refugee took violent action, and Islamic State followed with claims of responsibility formulated in the same terms as the killings in France. Those attacks preceded the 10 October arrest of another Syrian refugee who had been planning an attack on Berlin airport and was later found to have committed suicide in his cell. Then, on 30 October, Islamic State’s Amaq News Agency claimed responsibility for the murder of a teenager

stabbed in Hamburg, again “in response to calls to target citizens of the countries of the Crusader coalition who are bombing the territory of the Caliphate.”

In November, a large sweep was launched against the Salafist True Religion association, which was banned for purportedly organizing the departure of 140 people to Islamic State-controlled areas in Syria and Iraq, in addition to the approximately 900 Germans who had already joined the combat zone. That figure made Germans the second largest European contingent of foreign Islamic State fighters after the 1,300 French and before the 600 Belgians. Founded in 2005, the True Religion association attracted attention in 2011 when, under the leadership of Ibrahim Abou-Nagie, a preacher from Gaza and an electrical engineer who had been trained in Germany, it started to distribute copies of the Qur’an in the streets. One might think that this strategy, known as “street-da'wa ” (calling others to Islam in the streets), was intended to provoke the German authorities into reacting in a way that would create a sense of victimhood among Muslims. It was taken a step further in September 2014, when another Salafist group began to patrol the streets of Wuppertal, in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, dressed in orange vests marked “shari'a police.” They would instruct Muslims not to drink alcohol, gamble, or listen to music, and enjoin Muslim women to wear the veil, in areas identified as shari'a-controlled. In a 2016 ruling by the Wuppertal Landgericht court, the seven participants in the patrol were charged, but out of respect for freedom of opinion, not convicted. The leaders of the movement, fireman Sven Lau and boxer Pierre Vogel, who had converted to Islam in 1998 and 2001 respectively, and had become active and charismatic Salafist preachers, were not implicated. Lau was already facing a more serious sentence in another trial. Since September 2016, he has had multiple appearances before the courts over an appeal against his conviction for supporting the jihad in Syria in connection with the Jaysh al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar militia, which was linked to Islamic State.

Also in November 2016, a member of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and a convert to Islam was arrested on suspicion of planning jihadist attacks in Germany. In addition, on 8 November, the Hildesheim-based Iraqi preacher Abu Walaa, who distributed so many videos that he was considered to be “Islamic State’s number one [man] in Germany,” was arrested. The initial investigation after the Berlin bombing indicated that Anis Amri, the driver of the black truck on Breitscheidplatz, had been in contact with him. This Tunisian national, who had no affiliation to Islamist circles in his country, had left Tunisia at the age of eighteen, taking advantage of the Jasmine Revolution to try his luck in Italy. He lived a reclusive life on Lampedusa and, after attempting to set fire to a school, was incarcerated in Italy. It was while he was in prison there that he came into contact with jihadist circles and turned from being a petty offender into a potential terrorist. This phenomenon was also commonplace in France; most of the activists who committed the main attacks of 2015 and 2016 had been trained in prison. In 2015, as a refugee in Germany after his release from prison, Amri was placed under surveillance because of his association with Abu Walaa. He swore his oath of allegiance to the caliph of Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi no later than the fall of 2016, a month or two before the attack. That can be inferred from the golden foliage on the trees and the warm blue-black parka he was wearing in the video, which was broadcast shortly after 19 December by Islamic State to support his claim. It was filmed on a bridge near the former river port of Nordhafen, in Berlin-Moabit, in

the borough of Mitte in an ultramodern section of the city built after reunification to embody the new Germany and not far from the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The challenge to the German security system seemed deliberate in the choice of this location, though the telephone surveillance of Amri had been lifted for lack of convincing evidence against him. Similarly, the French security services had lifted the supervision of the Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly on the same grounds a few months before the Charlie Hebdo attacks.

Berlin-Moabit is also home to the Fussilet 33 mosque, which Amri and other Islamists suspected of being Islamic State supporters frequented; three people were arrested there on 1 February 2017 for planning to travel to Syria or Iraq. It is also less than fifteen minutes from where the black truck was stolen. Amri swore his allegiance to the caliph in the same manner as the French assailants of 2016 had done, notably Adel Kermiche, who had murdered Father Jacques Hamel in Rouen on 26 July. He expressed himself in fluent Arabic, which he had learned in high school in his native Tunisia. His ritual text of allegiance to

Islamic State is augmented by his own commentaries on the punishments to be reserved for the crusader pigs (al-khanazir al-salibiyyin) in this world and in the afterlife - especially Europeans, among whom he was situated at the moment when he was recording his text - as well as a litany of hadith s or statements attributed to the Prophet and intended to reinforce his reasoning.[120] Amri in no way has the look of a bearded jihadist dressed in the traditional Salafist jallaba, but the appearance of a young man connected to this great multicultural city that is the German capital. As he speaks, Amri can be seen with the white threads of two earphones hanging from his ears, which stand out against his dark parka. The look testifies that he is a member of “Generation Y,” of those “digital natives” who constantly mix the real and virtual worlds, as if he were reciting a text that would be dictated to him from Mosul or Raqqa via the Telegram messaging app or another of Islamic State’s favored media. Similarly, most of the attacks that took place in France in 2016 were “remotely controlled” from the territory of the “caliphate” by telephone, via the Internet, or on social networks at the instigation of a French jihadist based there.

*** 3. The Denial of the Jihadist Phenomenon in Europe

In truth, the year 2016 in Germany brought to a climax phenomena which had already for several years been presenting a number of worrying signs, but which had been neglected within the political and media consensus. The makers of that consensus have experienced conceptual difficulties in addressing the challenges posed by the emergence of political Islam in the West and its transition to jihadist violence. The black truck at Breitscheidplatz has made these problems glaringly obvious, and concealing them is no longer possible. This is a dilemma that France had already experienced. There are two alternatives: either political leaders, the press, and academics can remain in denial about jihadism, about its relationship with Salafism and other forms of Islamism and, as a consequence, public opinion, which takes note of the violence and is legitimately concerned, will no longer trust those leaders and will be seduced by the simplistic explanations of the far right, leading to a

division of society along cultural and racial lines. Or, we can tackle the problem head-on by analyzing social facts and their cultural-religious expression in a dispassionate way, even if that means questioning various reassuring certainties inherited from our recent history that have proven false and are now out of step with the challenges of European societies.

In France, two factors have contributed towards blurring the phenomenon. On the one hand, half a century after Algerian independence there has been a return to the discourse of colonial repression, which has brought a retrospective lawsuit against French society for its guilt as the heir to colonialism. On 19 March 2012, Mohammed Merah killed a group of Jewish students of the Ozar Hatorah school in Toulouse and their teacher in a highly symbolic manner. This first act of contemporary jihad in France took place exactly fifty years to the day after the implementation of the ceasefire at the conclusion of the Algerian war of independence. Merah, henceforth in the name of jihadism, reinitiated the war on the territory of the former colonial metropolis. This framework of thought provided that child of a family of Algerian immigrants who hated France with an historical justification for violence, feeding it as a memorializing fuel. At the same time, in order to broaden his message beyond the ranks of the jihadists, he strove to capture the mixture of anti-Zionism and Judeo-phobia that is very present in the contemporary Arab political imagination. He thus sought to justify the barbarism and instinctive repugnance provoked by the massacre of small children, by weighing it against the “massacres of Palestinian children” that are routinely attributed to the Israeli army, according to a kind of lex talionis that would allow one to refrain from any other moral norm.

On the other hand, the vanishing of the proletariat as a messianic class carrying the redemption of a suffering humanity, at a time when the postindustrial era has reduced the working class to a shrunken husk and where the majority of French workers, threatened by the relocation of industrial jobs, now vote for the far-right identity party, the National Front, led a whole movement of far-left orphans of such proletarians to substitute Muslims in that redemptive function. The latter are constructed as an abstract and unambiguous category that ignores the social, cultural, political and even religious differentiations within them - as in any human community - and confuses them with the Islamist expression of a minority. In that confusion, the slogans of Salafists, Muslim Brotherhood groups and jihadists are mixed together, and adorned with an authenticity that is all the greater because they denounce the West. The “Crusader pigs” anathematized by Anis Amri in his video claiming responsibility for the attack of 19 December 2016 echo the “agents of imperialism and capitalism” of yesteryear. However, the new vocabulary used reflects a transformed vision of the world in which cultural-religious divisions have replaced class struggle and are shaping the closed identities around which the fractures of our societies are structured.

These complex mutations have facilitated a form of voluntary blindness in the face of the jihadist phenomenon. Without denying the monstrosity of certain acts, various observers have tended to relativize them, because they are, according to them, the emanation of a socio-cultural group characterized as oppressed - by imperialism and Zionism on an international scale, and by social marginalization and Islamophobia in the French context. The observers in question have thus failed to attend to a specific analysis of the

phenomenon, simply seeing here a contingent Islamization of radicality. It is to the category of radicality that they attribute a necessary, ontological, trans-historical character. That is the analysis of Olivier Roy, for example, for whom there is no difference in substance between the Italian Red Brigades or the Red Army Faction of yesteryear and ISIS today.[121] The intergenerational dynamics are similar in his view, since both types of groups express resentment against an adult society in which the youth cannot find its place. Translated yesterday into the vocabulary of Marxist-Leninism because it was the one available, their youthful aggression today borrows the Islamist lexicon because it is more widespread. It is simply a variation of color, from red to green, not any modification in the essence of the radicalism in question.

In Germany, this substitution of Muslims for the proletarians of yesteryear has found a comparable result at the summation of a different historical process. Indeed, if that country does not have to atone for a colonial empire, it bears the historical stigma of the Shoah, which could be transcended only by eradicating any potential discrimination against a religious minority group that might recall the persecution of the Jews. Moreover, it is the mutual renunciation of Nazism and colonialism[122] and the reciprocal purging of their memory by Germany and France, which in the two decades following World War ii formed the basis for the process of European integration. Each of those two great nations, in the person of their redeeming fathers (Adenauer and de Gaulle), absolved the other from a heavy past by projecting itself into a future that first by the Common Market, then the eec, and finally the EU, would aggregate into the European dynamic. At a time when Europe is being undermined from within by a poorly controlled enlargement, by Brexit, and by the simultaneous rise to power of Islamist Salafism and the far right, all against a backdrop of jihadist terrorism, the reluctance to implement a critical analytical distancing from Islamist ideology bears some connection to the guilt inherited from Nazism. Any assessment that moves away from abstract representations of Muslims as minorities and oppressed persons would testify a priori, here again, to an unacceptable Islamophobia that is comparable to anti-Semitism, which constitutes the abominable legacy of the Third Reich. France, confronted with the January 2015 attacks, also experienced this type of denunciation of Islamophobia, which was attributed to participants in the major protest march of 11 January. The writer Emmanuel Todd (2015) interpreted that denunciation as a remnant of traditional French anti-Semitism; behind the slogan “I am Charlie” he saw an incentive to “spit on the religion of the weak” - today Islam, yesterday Judaism (see also Kepel 2015: 181).

However, the denial of the jihadist phenomenon on European soil, and its concealment on the pretext that Islamophobia is a more significant social phenomenon, contributes, to use the language of psychoanalysis, to what Jacques Lacan calls “foreclosure,” following Sigmund Freud’s Verwerfung (repudiation). It is a defense mechanism that drives out of the psyche an event that is not only forgotten, but also perceived as never having existed. It is a mechanism that leads to delirium or denial. It would come out in the so-called “burkini” affair. This episode occurred in the summer of 2016 on French beaches, at the instigation of the Islamist movement, just after the Nice attack, and in the very place where the attack occurred, the seaside Promenade des Anglais. In the course of a few days, the affair transformed France from a victim of jihad with 239 deaths in a year and a half -

then suddenly foreclosed - into the republic of tormenting Muslim women in burkinis, the Gulag of Islam, with laicite in the role of Stalinism.

In addition, there exists a refusal to see that the community hostage-taking of our Muslim compatriots, in which they are trapped by the jihadist process of provocative attacks, is in fact the game of the extreme right. The attacks are designed to elicit violent reactions in the majority European population against Islam, its mosques and its followers, or, at the very least, to encourage a massive increase in votes in favor of an extreme right-wing identity. In France, February 2017 polls had been showing that the National Front's candidate for the April-May presidential election had been in the lead in the first round for more than a year, and might be a possible winner in the second round (which Emmanuel Macron actually won against Marine Le Pen). Among the party's themes, the rejection of the "Islamization of France," the reversal of migratory flows (or remigration) and the denunciation of the "Great Replacement" of populations of European origin by children of Muslim immigration remained the most popular. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany Party (AfD), founded in 2013, began to achieve significant electoral successes in September 2016. Winning 21.4 percent of the votes in Mecklenburg-Pomerania, Chancellor Angela Merkel's stronghold, it overtook the Christian Democratic Union (cdu) there. It then achieved good results in the Berlin Landtag, which became the tenth state assembly to include elected party representatives, despite Berlin being the symbol of German cosmopolitanism. In January 2017, a senior AfD leader, though he was partially disavowed later, pleaded for a revisionist attitude towards the official discourse on the Shoah and for a "180 degree change in Germany's politics of memory" towards the Nazi past.

The lifting of this type of taboo, the broader implications of which are beyond the thematic scope of this chapter, is grounded in existential anxieties fueled by a confusion between several simultaneous events, which belong to three different registers. There is, first, the controversial arrival in 2015 of more than one million refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, by the chancellor's decision, summed up in the optimistic slogan "Wir schaffen das! (We can do this!)." Next, there were the 2015 New Year's Eve events in which more than a thousand women were sexually assaulted in Cologne and Hamburg by mostly North African asylum seekers and illegal residents, but whom elements of the press and public opinion confused with refugees.[123] Last, there was the rise of the jihadist phenomenon on German soil, which, as we have seen, culminated in 2016 in the Berlin bombing of 19 December.

As in France, although in a different social and historical context, the development of the jihadist threat in Germany is fueling the rise of the extreme right.

If civil society and the political class fail to proceed to a dispassionate analysis of the phenomenon and continue to take refuge in magical thinking, then it will lead to a fracturing of society on identitarian terms. Identity conflicts are unlike the class oppositions that the political system has normalized through civilized clashes between left and right in

parliament, thereby replacing street violence with oratorical combat in its precincts. Identity conflicts are not soluble within the traditional practice of politics as established by the democratic system, but instead lead to violence between reified ethno-religious and cultural entities for whom there is no possibility of compromise. In this sense, one must take seriously the wish to foment civil wars in Europe contained in Abu Mus'ab al-Suri's Call to Global Islamic Resistance, a process that for him begins with the establishment of autonomous territorial enclaves in ghettoized areas where the Islamist norm can be imposed in its Salafist and rigorous sense. This is the same logic that advocated that "shari'a police" should patrol the streets of Wuppertal in 2014. In al-Suri's model, a war of attrition precedes a generalized confrontation. It is not that the hypothesis is realistic as such in the short term, but it nonetheless feeds the political imagination of the European jihadists, and informs us about their modus operandi and worldview.

*** 4. Conclusion: Jihadism, European Politics, and the Rising Far Right

In this context of a jihadist threat, Germany confronts a structural change in the equilibrium between its global society on the one hand and its population of Muslim immigrants and converts to that religion on the other. The German Muslim community, estimated at 4.5 million at the end of 2015 (bamf n.d.), was traditionally dominated by Turks who in 2011 represented 67.5 percent of that population. They are now only 50.6 percent, while Muslims from the Middle East - mainly from the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq - form the second largest group at 17.1 percent of the total. In fact, 1.2 million Muslims, along with some illegal immigrants from North Africa, are officially registered as having entered Germany between 2011 and 2015. However, as we have seen, despite intense differences in orientation, Turkish associations are mainly in charge of the political management of Islam in Germany. Unlike those of the much more fragmented Arab Islam, these associations share the common characteristic of being quite strongly hierarchical and closely linked to parent organizations in the country of origin, thus promoting the emergence of clear interlocutors for the German authorities. The war in the Middle East and its consequences for Europe have brought some structural changes to this situation, and have introduced new constraints into Germany, which have uncertain implications.

First, Erdogan's Turkey, while busy consolidating its authoritarian power, of which repressing the summer 2016 coup attempt was a culminating point, engaged in a complex relationship of conflict and blackmail with the European Union, especially Germany. Tensions had arisen over the regulation of the flow of migrants from the Middle East, who were fleeing areas of conflict or deprivation and whom Ankara was allowing to penetrate EU territory, via the Greek islands or Thrace, with a view to reaching the labor markets of Germany. The 18 March 2016 agreement concluded at the German chancellor's initiative by Brussels with Ankara to finance the detention of refugees in Turkey undeniably reduced the demographic pressure on Europe. At the same time, it strengthened "Sultan Erdogan's" controversial influence and capacity to intervene, especially with respect to the Turkish populations in Germany. In this context, there has been an increasing polarization between opponents and supporters of the latter within the German Turkish diaspora, which is weakening security cooperation with Berlin. First, the ostracizing by German Turks linked to Mr. Erdogan's akp of

the followers of Fethullah Gulen, who was accused of instigating the July 2016 putsch, posed problems of public order. Second, Ankara’s change of course in 2016 regarding Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime opened up new security challenges with respect to Turkey’s ability to remain a reliable interlocutor for controlling its emigrant population in Germany. Indeed, the year 2016 saw a significant change in Ankara’s Syria policy. Prior to that year, Mr. Erdogan’s regime had supported the rebels, including the Islamists of the Nusra Front linked to Al-Qaeda, and had turned a blind eye to the activities of isis, keeping its southern border open for European jihadists to join the territory of the caliphate, and welcoming tankers carrying oil pumped from it. This change, which resulted in a rapprochement with Vladimir Putin, Bashar al-As-sad’s main supporter along with Shi'ite Iran, made the fight against Kurdish irredentism Turkey’s main priority. Mr. Erdogan began to promote a Turkish nationalist policy in response to the threat posed by the conjunction between the Syrian Kurds of the pyd, whom the United States had been heavily arming to fight isis, and the Turkish Kurds of the pkk, who recovered some of these weapons from the pyd and used them against the Turkish army and police.

To combat the Kurdish challenge better, Ankara began a rapprochement with Damascus under the auspices of Moscow, thereby abandoning the Syrian rebels and facilitating the fall of eastern Aleppo in December 2016. Such a betrayal of the Islamist cause by President Erdogan was poorly received by a sympathetic Turkish movement that had been strongly encouraged by the Ankara regime, and has since entered into a violent armed confrontation against it. Heavily affected by both pkk and isis attacks in 2016, Turkey ended the year with the spectacular assassination of the Russian ambassador in Ankara by a presidential guard who said he was acting to avenge Aleppo. The assassination took place on the very same day as the Anis Amri attack in Berlin. Then came the massacre at the Reina disco in Istanbul on New Year’s Eve - claimed by isis - which targeted the unfaithful way of life of foreign and Turkish patrons, and was thereby reminiscent of the 14 July massacre of the Nigois hedonists on the Promenade des Anglais, or the shoppers at the Berlin Christmas market on 19 December. The extent of the violence then affecting Turkey - in the name of the pkk but principally isis - could not but influence the Turkish government’s ability to put pressure on its emigre nationals. One might fear that those nationals would reflect the tensions from their country of origin, in the same way that France, with its large population from Algeria, was affected by jihad in that country in 1992-97, which had spilled over into the northern Mediterranean and resulted in the deadly attacks of the years 1995-96 in the Paris and Lyon regions.

In addition to these changes in the Turkish population of Germany, and the risks of increased vulnerability to jihadist temptation due to the ongoing upheavals in Anatolia, the other element of structural transformation within the German Muslim scene is the massive increase in the proportion of Arab nationals from the Middle East, as seen above, particularly after the arrival of 890,000 asylum seekers in 2015, followed by 280,000 in 2016. As the German press (Die Welt 2016) pointed out, it remains extremely difficult to estimate the number of migrants in Germany, particularly because there are different categories - those who have obtained refugee status, asylum seekers, those who are not registered at all and whose numbers can therefore only be guessed at, and so forth. The

number of arrivals is therefore probably much higher, and many sources estimate that it exceeded one million in 2015.

While the considerable efforts made by the German authorities for those granted refugee status allow for some form of oversight, there are no organizations for recent arrivals comparable to those that bind together the previously resident Turkish population, and so knowledge of the newcomers remains, by comparison, very superficial. While the vast majority of refugees are engaged in learning the German language and civilization with the help of numerous local associations, the jihadist attacks linked to several of those associations in 2016, and the canvassing undertaken in these fragile environments by jihadist recruiters, have fueled the fears - or fantasies - of a portion of the German populace. This favored the unprecedented expansion of the far right vote which, without yet reaching the scale of the National Front in France, involved coordination and collaboration between their respective leaders, Ms. Frauke Petry and Marine Le Pen. And their ideas have been dramatically reinforced by Donald Trump, who has publicly described the refugee reception policy of the chancellor as a mistake. Meeting on 21 January in Koblenz with the Dutch Geert Wilders, whose Party for Freedom (pve) favoring a ban on the Qur'an was leading in the polls preceding the March 2017 parliamentary elections,[124] the three main leaders of the far right in Europe welcomed the measures taken by the new American president to ban entry into the United States of nationals from seven Muslim countries (including dual European nationals). "Trump did well, he shows us the example," said AfD vice-president Alexander Gauland, thus echoing the "Well done!" of Mr. Wilders.

Ten days later, a major raid in the state of Hesse, which mobilized more than a thousand police officers and led specifically to the arrest of a Tunisian national, recalled the permanence of the terrorist threat. He had been denied asylum after entering Germany with the wave of refugees in 2015. He was being pursued in his own country in connection with the attack at the Bardo National Museum in March of that year, and was suspected of having organized a terrorist cell of about fifteen members that was ready to take action in the footsteps of Anis Amri. At the same time, the amalgamations of Islam, Islamism, and jihadism to which the far right is committed are feeding more than ever the divide that now threatens both German and French society, and the whole of Europe. It is only by better understanding the unprecedented challenges facing those countries, by a precise and dispassionate analysis of the European jihadist phenomenon, by freeing ourselves from the ideological blinders that have obscured it from comprehension for too long, that the risk represented by this divide can be eliminated.

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** 12. Madrasas Promoting Social Harmony? Debates over the Role of Madrasa Education in Pakistan

Muhammad Khalid Masud

This chapter explores debates in Pakistan on madrasa educational reform. The study follows Dale F. Eickelman's pioneering research (1992) on mass higher education and its implications in the Middle East. The dominant discourse on the role of madrasa reform presumes the madrasa to be an institution of mass education. I follow Dale Eickelman's idea of mass education in exploring the distinction between mass education as basic education and the madrasa as an institution of professional religious education. According to him, mass education plays an important role in reshaping the meaning of religion and transmission of religious knowledge in modern settings. Most Pakistani observers, as well as the Government of Pakistan, consider the madrasa to be an institution of mass education. They believe that it should not only impart necessary religious knowledge but also reform its curricula to play a positive role in nation building, promoting literacy and human resources for development in the country.

Debates on the role of madrasa, which have been going on since the 1950s, intensified in 2017-2018. Participants in the debates remain, however, divided on the role of the madrasa. Most religious scholars argue that the madrasa imparts authentic traditional Islamic education that ensures peace and harmony, and that violence and religious extremism are caused by inauthentic Islamic education, not approved by the religious authorities. Implicitly, this argument claims the role of mass education for the madrasa. Focusing on two issues - the role of madrasas and the madrasa "mindset" - this chapter explores how ma-drasa education is reshaping perceptions of religion and religious education.

To modernists like Iqbal et al. (2015), who perceive mass education as a modern concept, madrasa education requires reform before it can become a vehicle for mass education. Traditionalists like Jallandhari (2011), who oppose reforms and modernization of religious education, regard the madrasa as essentially a professional system of education that caters to certain specific religious social needs. Islamists such as Saleem (2014), who call for de-Westernization and "Islamization of knowledge," approach the question of madrasa education from the ideological perspective and differ with the modernist and traditionalist

orientations towards madrasa education. Islamists call for decolonizing the existing Western and secular concept of mass education and for bringing it closer to the Islamic concept of knowledge and education. The governmental authorities perceive the madrasa as an institution of mass education to promote social religious harmony. The Paigham-e Pakistan, a detailed declaration against extremism issued on 10 January 2018, called upon the religious sector to discourage sectarianism in mosques and madrasas: " "ulama must play their role, where sectarianism and grouping are discouraged and all the mosques and madrasas are used only to either perform prayers or to disseminate education to our young generation in the light of the Holy Qur'an and Sunna" (Paigham-e Pakistan 2018: 31).

This perception of madrasas as an alleged source for fostering extremism has grown particularly in the post-9/11 era. Official statements at the international level in 2005 intensified this perception and since 2012, a number of publications have alleged that connection or explored the question of whether madrasas produce extremists and terrorists. Recognizing that all madrasas cannot be blamed for terrorism, questions were, however, raised about the nature of religious education and pedagogy in these institutions. Robert Jackson (2004: 15), an education scholar, noted that the events of 11 September 2001 in New York and their various ongoing concerns gave a sharp focus to issues such as the relationship between religion, national, and cultural identity, the nature of multicultural societies, and the widespread public ignorance about religions such as Islam.

In Pakistan, religious education is considered necessary for nation-building because religion is an essential part of national identity and ideology. Questions of reforms and the role of education were interrelated with the need and role of mass education in reshaping modern society and polity. Madrasas as institutions of religious education were also expected to play the role of mass education. Debates about the relevance of religion and religious education to modernization commenced as early as the colonial period. The tensions surrounding religious education remain unresolved and have complicated not only public debates but also government policies concerning basic education.

During the colonial period, madrasas were problematized as impediments to reform. In the nineteenth century they were considered opponents to enlightenment, rationalism, and scientism. In the twentieth century, they were conceived as obstacles to progress and development, and obstructions to nation-building and democracy. Since 2001, madrasas have also become a “security” concern, not only in Western but also in Muslim countries. The government of Pakistan has been trying to bring madrasas into the mainstream since 1979, accelerating these efforts after 2001.

These governmental efforts have been partially successful. Reports that the number of madrasas registered under a scheme for regulating educational institutions has seen a considerable increase is considered a positive development. Some madrasa networks have introduced English language and computer technology in their curricula. Several madrasas have launched English medium schools as part of their madrasa system. Most madrasas have introduced programs that allow students to sit for examination for regular matriculation, intermediate and bachelor’s certificates and degrees. The ambiguity about the role of Deeni, or religious, madrasas, however, still exists.

To explore this ambiguity, discussion in this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes the existing ambiguity about the concepts of mass, basic and madrasa education. The second provides an overview of the madrasa in Islamic and Pakistani history with reference to the two issues delineated above. Based on an analysis of the perceptions of participants, students and teachers, the third section offers some reflections on the religious mindset.

*** 1. Role of Madrasas

Madrasa in simple Arabic usage means place of learning (dars, lesson), school, or school of thought, not necessarily religious. In Pakistan, madrasa generally means an institution of religious education. How religious education came to be objectified as madrasa requires exploring two contexts: the modern context that objectifies learning in the broader meaning of mass or basic education, and the medieval context in which religious learning in a madrasa meant professional higher learning, distinguished from basic education called maktab. Let us first look at the concept of mass education.

**** 1.1 Mass Education

The perception of mass education has been diversified by different views about its objectives and functions in various societies. Mass education is sometimes described as a shift from education for the elite to educating the masses. It also refers to education for modernizing society, stressing shifts from religious to mass education. Sometimes it is considered necessary to forming the nationstate. Dale Eickelman’s studies on knowledge, mass education and social theory (Eickelman 1976, 1985; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, especially the chapter on social theory) are helpful for making sense of these questions. Eickelman views the relationship between these phenomena as a social process that reshapes the concepts of education, religion and authority in modern societies. His notion that mass communication and mass higher education impact religious consciousness, influence the rethinking of self, religion, nation and politics, facilitate the reconfiguring of religious thought and action, and encourage explicit debate over the meaning of religion is quite relevant to the current debates on madrasa education in Pakistan.

Mass education is often described to encompass compulsory and basic education. Contrasted with elite and religious education in the medieval period, it aims at breaking the equation between wealth and authority in society and between religion and authority in some cases. As mass, basic and compulsory education, it stresses basic skills like reading, writing and counting. Increasing literacy is thought to promote civic sense and national cohesion. The ideas of mass education differ in developed and developing societies in various stages of economic and political development. The distinction between basic and higher education sometimes refers to different levels of education. Basic education, also called elementary and primary, aimed to impart knowledge required for the masses to function as members of a progressive society. Higher levels of primary education meant technical and professional knowledge for which children were classified for employment in various fields. Mass educational systems were supported by newly emerging nation-states and more recently since 1989 when the United Nations declared elementary education as fundamental right of every child. Religious education continued as professional or specialized education but not as one of the components of mass education.

**** 1.2 Basic Education in Pakistan

In 1947, when Pakistan came into being, a national education conference was convened, where the universalization of primary education was emphasized. Two reasons were provided for this emphasis: to redress the lack of economic development of the country, and on account of the significance of religious education for nation-building. A national plan for education was launched in 1951, and a first five-year plan in 1957. These plans could not succeed because, according to a 1959 report, people lacked the required attitude towards civic duties. Enrollment in schools was less than 50 percent probably the reason why policy makers' attention shifted to religious moral education. The report recommended compulsory religious education for spiritual and moral development, and training in scientific thinking. The Government of Pakistan resolved "to transform Pakistan into an egalitarian and literate society" (Qaisara-ni and Khawaja 1989: 2).

Nasim Qaisarani and Khawaja (1989: 1) observed that the "continuous existence of high rates of illiteracy at mass level, coupled with low participation rates at primary level," posed a serious threat to national social and economic development. We need not go into the various causes of failing reforms. What is important in this discussion is the total absence of the concept of madrasa education in educational planning in this period. There is occasional mention of mosque schools as an opportunity to enhance literacy in 1979 (Qaisarani and Khawaja 1989: 13, 32); madrasa education was, however, not part of basic education planning.

Reviewing the history of educational policies in Pakistan, in 1999, Qaisar Bengali (1999) concluded that seven educational policies, eight five-year plans and six schemes had failed even to increase enrollment and reduce illiteracy, not to speak of higher objectives. He found that sharp swings in approaches to education and a lack of political commitment to literacy or education were mainly responsible for this failure.

The co-chair of the Brookings Institution's Pakistan Education Task Force, Michael Barber (2010: 2), also complained that the system of education was very poor. One out of three primary age children were not in school, and 35 percent of those in school had no concept of mathematics. Some 60 percent of schools were without electricity and 34 percent without drinking water. Despite his optimism and clarifications that Islam was not responsible for failure in what was a poor education system, he avoided discussing religious education. He suggested three potentially inspiring narratives for national identity - (1) Pakistan as the outcome of a successful political struggle for making a real political entity, (2) Pakistan as a country with a history of several remarkable ancient civilizations and rich cultures, and (3) Islam as a religion that brought spectacular scientific advancement and values of tolerance, generosity and community (Barber 2010: 3, 9) - but did not even once mention madrasa education.

A World Bank (2014) research paper also noted low educational attainment, unskilled youth, and lower educational enrollment at all levels, than its regional peers. But it is silent on religious education. The paper notes that Pakistan’s law and order situation remains volatile - “Pakistan ranks second (after Iraq) of 158 countries on the 2012 Global Terrorism Index.” Quite interestingly, however, it observes that violence is correlated with poverty as well as growth, and that a negative correlation between violence and education was well established.

Publications coming out of the seminars, training workshops and interactive sessions with students and teachers in 2017-2018, however, point to the ambiguity in understanding the role of madrasas as institutions of religious learning vis-a-vis regular schools and colleges as institutions of mass and higher education.

**** 1.3 Madrasa Education in Pakistan

Madrasa education in Pakistan is a continuation of the tradition of religious learning in the Indian sub-continent. Most of the current issues about the role, relevancy and curricula have roots in the period before the independence of Pakistan in 1947.

According to Shibli Nu'mani (d. 1914), the history of religious education in Muslim India differed from other Muslim societies. Madrasas in India were private institutions. The "ulama opposed the official establishment of madrasas on the pattern of Nizamiyya in the eleventh century Baghdad to avoid control by the rulers. They argued that it would not serve the purpose of religious education; students would come to madrasas to pursue worldly objectives, not to seek knowledge (Nu'mani 2009: 47). Several changes were, however, adopted during the nineteenth century such as the introduction of classrooms, a fixed number of school years, the use of textbooks and new methods of education. In this context, curricula were often revised as new books became available with new knowledge on many subjects. Therefore, unlike earlier periods focus shifted from books to subjects and compelled teachers to indulge in commentaries explaining terms and issues (Nu'mani 2009: 86-92).

Shibli Nu'mani explained that, in India, “transmission” of religious knowledge meant memorizing and “authenticity” meant isnad (continued chains of transmitters) of that knowledge going back to the early generation of Muslims. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there was increased interest in the rational sciences like logic, theology and philosophy, and in religious sciences like hadith and legal theory, and new curricula were developed to accommodate these developments.

The critique of the relevancy of the madrasa and the religious curriculum was typified during the colonial period by a story told by the French traveler Frangois Bernier (d. 1688) about the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (d. 1707). He faulted his teacher Mulla Salih (d. 1666) for wasting the monarch's youth by teaching him Arabic grammar and the rules of Islamic law, which had no relevance in the life of a king (Bernier 1934: 156-61, cited in Kundra 2013: 10).

In addition to private tuition like the one Aurangzeb received, there were several madrasas in India. Most of them were private and were known for specialized education. Firangi Mahal in Lucknow was one of them. The Dars-i Nizami curriculum, developed by Mulla Nizamuddin Sihalawi (d. 1748) of Firangi Mahal, responded to the above critique in the eighteenth century. Almost all Sunni madrasas in India followed Dars-i Nizami. It was supported for its accommodation of local knowledge and preference for textbooks written by local authors. Another madrasa was Darul Uloom Deoband (Metcalf 1978), which had borrowed its modern educational and administrative practices from the Arabic College (originally Madrasa Ghaziuddin), a school established by the East India Company in Delhi in 1692 and that the British East India Company reorganized to meet its own needs in 1825 (Alam 2012).

In the beginning, some madrasas, including Deoband, omitted rational sciences from this curriculum. This became a basis for questioning the relevance of madrasas in the nineteenth century. In 1887, Nu'mani (2009) wrote a critique of Muslim education in India and developed a new curriculum for the madrasas (Nadwi n.d.: 245, 581-613). He recommended teaching English, Hindi and Sanskrit languages, as well as physics (Nadwi n.d.: 486-93). He explained that some modern subjects were not included because "our traditional ^cula-ma are not familiar with modern sciences [because they were] not educated in modern schools. [Also, because the textbooks are not available] in Urdu or Arabic [they] cannot teach [these sciences to madrasa students with books written in the English language] (Nadwi n.d.: 505). Nu'mani had to justify that these subjects were necessary as they helped "to enhance student's ability to read books on any subject" (Nadwi n.d.: 106).

This question of relevancy continued in the modern period as well due to ambiguity over whether the madrasa was an institution of mass education or of professional and specialized teaching. Three new major Muslim educational institutions were established in the nineteenth century. These were Darul Uloom Deoband, Madrasatul Uloom Musalmanan-e-Hind, and Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama. They represented three different perspectives on religion and modernity.

With its reformist approach to religion, Darul Uloom Deoband, (established in 1867) by Mawlana Qasim Nanotvi (d. 1880), declared certain social and cultural practices heretical innovations and thus defined "religion" and "religious" differently from several other religious groups. Deoband opposed Westernization and modernity and decided not to teach modern sciences and English language.

Madrasatul Uloom Musalmanan-e-Hind, established in 1875 by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), and popularly known as Aligarh College, was critical of existing religious education and theology, but did not develop a separate curriculum and system for religious education. Sir Syed called for developing a new Islamic theology (jadld ^c'dm al-kalam) to respond to modernity. Aligarh's approach to education was opposed bitterly by Deoband as heretical and alien to Islamic tradition. The more effective opposition to Aligarh came from Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama, established in 1894 in Lucknow. The founders perceived this institution as a middle path between Deoband and Aligarh. It was closer to Deoband in its critique of Western modernity and nearer to Aligarh in adopting a critical approach to Islamic history. Embracing Arabic language as the medium of instruction, Nadwatul Ula-ma developed wider contacts with the Arab scholarship than the other two institutions.

Qari Muhammad Tayyib (d. 1983), grandson of the founder of Darul Uloom Deoband, India, and head of that institution, clarified that the founders used Dars-i Nizami as a model but introduced certain important changes. In view of the objective of preserving religious tradition, they focused on purely religious sciences. He noted that, in 1868, the number of books on logic had been reduced and that philosophy was regarded as a wicked and harmful (fann khabitha) field of study, and was thus excluded from the curriculum. The duration of the courses was extended to six years, and three-hour daily classes were introduced. He said that all these reforms were withdrawn in his day (Nadeem 2015: 17).

Commenting on the historical role of Deoband, he said that Darul Uloom Deoband had "resisted [the] transformation of Muslim society in the religious, cultural and moral domain," but for fear that Muslims would be swept away by the currents of change had instead clung to the Islamic principles of simplicity and religious piety (Nadeem 2015: 15). To achieve this objective Deoband resolved to "work for the masses rather than for the elite." While defining the role of religious education, Qari Tayyib also stressed its relevance for the masses. In a sense, madrasas were conceived as a sort of mass education but private and independent of the state.

In 1975, Mawlana Abdul Haq (d. 1988), head of the Haqqania madrasa in Akora Kahatak, Pakistan, reiterated that the job of Deeni madrasas in Pakistan was merely to preserve the religious sciences; madrasas had no capacity to do more than save the religion received from the elders, for they had neither the funds nor the resources to extend that role (Nadeem 2015: 7, citing Ahmad 2012: 80). The objective of preserving traditional learning came to mean authentic but exclusive religious education. After 2000, however, that objective came to include a broader vision. Ebrahim Moosa quotes Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani (2007) the vice president of Jami'a Dar al-Ulum in Karachi, saying that "one of the many noble goals of education is to strengthen one's identity, to internalize excellent human qualities, and to realize one's potential." These virtues make "each individual serve not only one's own country and community but [also] ... the whole of humanity" (Moosa 2015: 13).

Besides Deoband, several other institutions organized by the Shi'a, the Ahl al-Hadith, and Barelvis, also defined their role as preserving religion by focusing on religious sciences. This emphasis meant adherence to religious denominations and affiliation to specific schools of Islamic law and theology that defined their religious identities and that limited their roles in society on a sectarian basis. While Deobandis and Barelvis belonged to the Hanafi school of law; among the Shi'a, the Twelvers followed Ja'fari and the Seveners followed the Isma'ili school; the Ahl al-Hadith, Nadwa, Aligarh and Jama'at Islami movements did not adhere to a specific school and differed significantly in theologies and political views. This divide reflected very significantly the sectarian organization of madrasa systems in Pakistan.

**** 1.4 Organization of Deeni Madrasas in Pakistan

In Pakistan, Deeni madrasas, also called al-madaris al-‘arabiyya, continued along the traditional view that their role was to preserve denominational religious education. However, a noticeable change occurred in the 1950s with the introduction of autonomous boards to organize religious education. Each board (wafaq) was authorized to regulate examinations, curricula and other matters. The following were the main Deeni madrasa boards established during this period:

-The Ahl al-Hadith group’s organization, Jam'iyyat Ahl al-Hadith, established its board in 1955 in Faisalabad; it was later renamed Wafaq al-Madaris al-Salafiyya.

-The Deobandis, originally affiliated with Darul Uloom Deoband, India, established their board, Wafaq al-Madaris al-'Arabiyya, in Multan in 1959.

-The Barelvis, named after Mawlana Ahmad Rida Kahn of Bareilly (d. 1919), established their board, Tanzim al-Madaris al-Arabiyya, in 1959 in Dera Ghazi Khan.

-The Shi'a established their board, Majlis-e Nazarat-e Shia Madaris-e 'Arabi-yya in 1959 in Lahore (Malik 1996: 124).

Apparently, the purpose of these umbrella organizations was to pre-empt the legal impact of the West Pakistan Waqf Property Ordinance proclaimed in 1961. The government of Pakistan had then decided to integrate the madrasas and affiliate them to the educational system in Pakistan. According to Jamal Malik (1996: 125), boards were formed in reaction to the government policy of controlling the madrasas. Boards were autonomous in matters relating to curricula and standardization of examination systems.

The meaning of mass education with reference to madrasas gradually came to stress exclusivist rather than inclusive identity. The Islamist reformist movement for “Islamization of knowledge” in the 1980s that began with the resolve to decolonize knowledge aimed at mass education for Islamization also ended with Jama'at Islami establishing madrasas with its own board. Jama'at criticized traditional ‘ulama for their narrow religious vision (Rahman 2011), but in politics allied with them.

The madrasas gained political significance in the 1970s when religious political parties were organized. In 1977, a coalition of these parties called the Pakistan National Alliance launched a movement for establishing “the Prophet’s system” (Nizam-i Mustafa) in Pakistan. The religious sector under this alliance played a significant role in overthrowing what they considered an “anti-Islam” government ruled by the Pakistan People’s Party and paved the way for the Islamization of the country. In 1979, when the government promulgated the zakat ordinance, the madrasas began to receive government funds.

Madrasas remained divided into six denominations (masalik). In 1979, 354 madrasas belonged to Deobandi, 267 to Barelvis, 126 to Ahl al-Hadith, 41 to Shi'a, 57 to Jama'at Islami, and 900 to other non-specified groups. Among these, Khurshid Nadeem (2015: 7) points to an oddity; 20 percent of the population in the country are Deobandis, but they own 65 percent of the madrasas.

There were 249 Deeni madrasas in 1947, 472 in 1960, but in 1979 their numbers suddenly soared to 1,745 (Malik 1989: 279), which was clearly evidence of a growth of governmental interest in them. By 2015, the number of Deobandi madrasas stood at 20,560, with 251,482 students, and 121,879 teachers. A focus on the rising number, however, obscures more important aspects of these developments.

**** 1.5 Curriculum Reform

Curriculum reform remained a controversial issue between madrasas and the government, with the latter viewing it differently from the former. A national committee on Deeni madrasas constituted in 1978, described the following as its objectives - unifying educational and teaching systems, improving the standard of education in Deeni madrasas, enabling madrasa student participation in mainstream higher education, and providing opportunities for employment (Ministry of Religious Affairs 1979: 8, 65).

The madrasas revised their curricula, but according to their own perception of religion and religious needs. Khurshid Nadeem (2015: 12-15), for instance, explained that Dars-i Nizami classified sciences into three types of knowledge - religious, rational, and auxiliary - and selected texts for the curricula that had been written in the post-classical period, mostly between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. Curricular reform by the Deoband

wafaq meant reducing some or adding the number of books prescribed in the traditional Dars-i Nizami, but keeping the classification of sciences, as follows:

-The Dars-i Nizami’s religious sciences curriculum, which covered the Qur’an, hadith, and fiqh, contained twenty-seven textbooks, of which five were commentaries on the Qur’an, twelve were on hadith, nine on law and legal theory, and two on theology. The wafaq then added a further five on the Qur’an, eleven on hadith, five on fiqh, and two on theology (ilm al-ka-lam), while removing one from the list of legal theory books, and four from theology.

-The Dars-i Nizami’s rational sciences list comprised sixteen textbooks, eight on logic and eight on philosophy. The wafaq then removed eleven in all and added two new ones.

-The auxiliary sciences had sixteen textbooks, seven of which were on Arabic grammar, and two on semantics and rhetoric. The wafaq then removed one of the Arabic grammar books and two on Arabic literature, but added one to the grammar, two to the rhetoric and six to the Arabic literature components.

Academic studies on the Pakistan government’s educational policies and on the religious sector generally show a wide diversity of positions on the role of madrasas. Jamal Malik noted that the first scientific study of madrasas, organized in Pakistan in 1960 with Asia Foundation funding, was limited to a statistical survey, but he nonetheless observed that the colonial administration attached very little importance to traditional education (Malik 1996: 121, 125).

Carol Christine Fair (2009) viewed madrasas as institutions of mass education in the private sector. They were providing free education and free accommodation, food, books, and healthcare to 1.5 million children. Citing Mahmood A. Ghazi of the International Islamic University in Islamabad, she (Fair 2009: 90) quoted government officials as saying that “madrasas have contributed to the menace of sectarian violence and [an] obscurantist worldview in Pakistan” and that they produced "ulama who were irrelevant to the modern state of Pakistan. The criticism of madrasas, she found, stemmed from their failure to fulfil the role they were expected to play, namely to promote national cohesion and progress.

Fair noted resistance among the religious leaders against this expected role; they felt that madrasas had no need for reform. She (Fair 2009: 87) cited one of the madrasa administrators saying, “no one has the right to interfere in our institutions.” Citing other madrasa authorities, Fair sums up their views in the following remarks: “it is pressure from the US government,” “the Pakistan government is not sincere,” the “reforms are only

cosmetic," and there is "no need to introduce worldly subjects" (Fair 2009: 88). Fair concluded that the problem was "poorly understood outside Pakistan" and that the progress of the Pakistan government was so slow because the madrasas disregarded its views. Apparently, like the government officials, Fair was viewing madrasas as institutions of public education, but the madrasas themselves did not see themselves as such (Fair 2009: 91).

Explaining that whereas basic education was the responsibility of the state, and that the real purpose of Deeni madrasas was to train religious scholars or experts in religious sciences (Fair 2009: 409, 427), in 2011 the secretary of the Deobandi board of madrasas Mawlana Hanif Jallandhari (2011: 401), however, recommended that Deeni madrasas should promote social peace and civil harmony. He reiterated that the madrasas were already playing their part in narrowing the gap between rich and poor and creating a balance between the Westernized elite products of mainstream education and the ordinary people who send their children to madrasas.

Khurshid Nadeem (2015: 6) noted that Deeni madrasas in Pakistan had attracted virtually no serious academic attention until 1979, which was when global politics first began to recognize the significance of religion and of religious institutions to the region. This neglect made it difficult to predict that it would be a mistake to integrate and streamline madrasa education with independent wafaq boards that were strictly regulated by religious divides. These divisions, of course, allowed the madrasas to see their differences as issues of identity, and to indulge in sectarian polemics against each other. For instance, the syllabus that the Deobandi board approved included a refutation of Westernism, socialism, Qadyanism, Barlevism, Rafidism, Ahl al-Hadith, Christianity, and Zionism as alien ideologies (National Committee for Religious Education 1979: 124). The other wafaqs adopted similar approaches to their own religious identities, thereby generating religious fundamentalism, intolerance and conflict. Yet, neglecting the above-described institutional and organizational problems, the government persisted in its focus on cultivating the modern sciences in madrasas with a view to reforming the traditional mindset. The government's approach to religious studies in higher education fared no better, for teachers of Islamic studies at the universities and colleges of the various cities of Pakistan were critical of the government's authoritarian approach to reform, indifference to education and its objectives, and lack of interest in promoting research and critical studies (Mahmud and Siyal 2018).

*** 2. The Religious Mindset

Focused quantitative analyses of madrasa students' activities and perceptions of madrasa education have provided critical insights into how this social process of politicized reconfiguration of religion turned violent in the era of globalized mass communications. In 2017, The Pak Institute of Peace Studies conducted a survey among students and teachers in five madrasas in four cities of Pakistan. The project explored students' extracurricular activities, interaction among themselves and with teachers and interest in politics. The

project, entitled the “Role of post-noon engagements of Madrassa students in radical orientation,” surveyed their activities in several areas, including curriculum, co-and extra-curricular activities, use of social media, teacher-student engagement, and favorite political parties. An analytical report based on this survey was published in 2018 with the title After Study Hours, Exploring the Madrassah Mindset.[125] Even though the sample set for these findings is small, and the project is still a work in progress, it nonetheless provides significant insights about the objectification of religion and religious education in the ma-drasa environment.

The findings of the project suggest the following significant points for further exploration:

-Madrasa students are part of Pakistani society. They take part in extracurricular activities and are interested in politics and social activities, much like the youth in other educational institutions.

-Madrasa students are influenced by the social process; they interact with other youth and take an interest in public action, but their sphere of public engagement is limited. Unlike students in other institutions, theirs is a residential environment in which students have more time to interact with each other and with their teachers. This develops a bond between and among them. Most madrasa students admire their teachers, are influenced by them, and are satisfied with the curriculum and their teachers.

-Madrasa education is not mass education, but a response to the specific, professional and religious needs of the society. It emphasizes authority and authenticity, but in a manner that is different from that of mass education. This focus on authenticity and authority, moreover, discourages diversity.

-Modern education, in both madrasas and institutes of higher mass education, celebrates exactness and emphasizes authoritative approaches to knowledge. Students are not taught critical thinking, research, or teaching skills. This fosters a mindset that leads to fundamentalist and extremist views.

-Sectarianism is linked to the wafaq system of madrasa education, which sets the curricula. This system, moreover, does not allow a student to move to another wafaq for his or her education.

-State attempts to redesign mass education to raise literacy levels have been unsuccessful and the number of dropouts from primary schools is increasing (Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2018).

-In madrasa education, teachers influence students not only in class but also in extracurricular activities.

-Despite the challenges outlined above, the data about student worldviews and preferences demonstrate that the madrasa environment does provide opportunities for rethinking the role and relevancy of religious education in students' lives and reshapes their preferences accordingly. For example, students mostly describe the madrasa environment as open, and very few find it restrictive. This situation may be interpreted as an outcome of the interiorization of denominational identity. Yet the interest shown in this data regarding interaction with other Muslim groups and other faiths suggests also open spaces in this environment.

Most students spend close to one-third of their day in classes. The rest of their time is free for other activities, which may explain their feelings of relative liberty. More significantly, while the students rank Quranic sciences as their favorite subject, they rank Islamic law and theory as their least favorite, which may suggest some rethinking about religious knowledge. The most popular activity among students is participating in literary circles, and the least popular is taking part in discussion groups, in which the most discussed topic is education and the least discussed religious subjects. Most of the students read newspapers and Islamic religious magazines.

Facebook is the most popular social media platform, and the most favorite topics on it are religious. Read with the above, this choice shows that students want to discuss religious education but prefer to do so in a more open but discreet environment. Most students say that nothing in the curriculum stops them from interacting with members of other faiths or sects. A few, however, said that the textbooks and curriculum discouraged interaction; they referred specifically to subjects and texts about the faiths of minorities. Although the curriculum does not bar them from interacting with people of other faiths or from other sects, 20 percent said that they preferred not to do so.

Interaction with teachers is popular; most students spend between one and two hours a day with their teachers after study hours. Discussion with teachers pertains to the Qur'an and hadith, not Islamic law or sectarian issues. As mentioned earlier, the role of the teacher is central in religious education. The teacher is the ideal, guide, authority and model that the system expects the student to follow. Resistance to the teaching of modern sciences was also to do with the non-availability of teachers of modern subjects who would be appropriate for a madrasa environment. This perception of religious education fails to recognize anyone who has not received a formal madrasa education as a qualified religious scholar.

Notable religious leaders in India and Pakistan, such as Mufti Kifayatullah (d. 1952), Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani (d. 1957), Mawlana Ahmad Ali La-hawri (d. 1962), Mawlana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarawi (d. 1981), and Mawlana Yusuf Bannuri (d. 1977) did not consider Mawlana Mawdudi (d. 1979), the founder of Jama'at Islami, to be a qualified religious scholar, and fatwas announcing that Mawdudi was not a truly religious scholar were issued against him. In other words, he was not qualified to speak on Islam. Mufti Kifayatullah remarked that Mawdudi had neither learned from nor been disciplined by a scholar of repute; he was well read but his understanding of religion was weak. Similar controversies arose over Sir Syed, Abu’l Kalam Azad, Muhammad Iqbal and other Muslim thinkers.

In his fatwa in 2013, Shaykh Salih Fawzan, a popular Saudi scholar, condemned self-taught scholars as Khawarij, an extremist group in early Islam. . He and called upon the masses to consult only the true ^culama. He argued that although books are a source of knowledge, they do not explain difficult words and ideas, for only a true alim can do that. The "ulama know the correct methodology as they are the heirs of the Prophet. Viewers on various websites (for example, the Facebook page, “Islam’s Finest”) share and discuss this fatwa. The debate looks anachronistic in the present age of the Internet, open universities and open courses, but it reveals the concerns of the "ulama about religious education (al-Fawzan 2013). Shaykh al-Qaradawi (on thesunnivoice.com, 2015) claimed that most extremists were self-taught and did not listen to the "ulama. He explained that self-taught individuals did not have authentic knowledge.

These debates reveal that a madrasa is perceived as a formal institution of authentic religious learning. Religious knowledge cannot be sought by reading authentic books; it can only be acquired by studying with teachers within a formal setting that authorizes graduates to speak on Islam.

*** 3. Conclusion

Discourses, debates, seminars and dialogue forums in Pakistan between 2010 and 2018 seem to have focused on two issues - the role and relevance of ma-drasas to society; and madrasa responses to challenges to religion, religious education and its authenticity. Most of the participants in these debates expressed their concern about the polemical religious teachings in madrasas leading to religious extremism. Widespread sectarian violence in Pakistan in the 1990s, years before 9/11, was traced to madrasas. Speakers at various forums have called for the need to reform madrasa education, for madrasas have been functioning as private institutions with their own curricula and teaching methods. Others, however, have said that governmental attempts to bring ma-drasas into the mainstream have complicated the already ambiguous role of these institutions.

Studies on religious education in the modern period show that people’s perceptions of religion significantly influence their academic approaches to discussions surrounding curricula, pedagogy or even the purpose of education per se (Miedema and Biesta 2004), and have contributed to varying definitions of terms such as religion, religious knowledge, religious studies, and religious education (Zubaida 2016). These different approaches have, however, not only enriched the debates but also complicated people’s understandings of religion and education. Dale Eickelman accredited this diversity to the different ways of objectifying religion in modern society - differences that have no doubt greatly affected the religious, political, social and intellectual development of Pakistan. However, as Jamal Malik (1996: 121) observed, it was only after 1979 that scholars studying madrasas in Pakistan began to explore how this diversity of views was thwarting attempts to reform religion and creating tensions between the government and madrasas over the development of religious education.

Academics today find it difficult to decide quite where madrasas fit within the complex framework of religion and education. Is the purpose of a madrasa education to provide religious instruction, to study a religion or more than one religion, to learn theology, or to train students for a life in religious service? For policymakers in Pakistan, though, the problem that madrasas pose is in the realm of educational administration and social control. They see a madra-sa education as anti-modern and therefore in need of modernization. Recent studies have mostly approached madrasa education in terms of a conflict between tradition and modernity. I have tried to look at it as a contest between the state and the "ulama for religious authority.

Modern discourses are still unclear about what role religious education is supposed to play in Pakistani society. Is it to counter terrorism by promoting peace, harmony and national cohesion? Or is it simply to impart religious and professional learning? Is it impractical to expect madrasas to deliver basic or higher mass education given that their sectarian structure under the wafaq system objectifies religion in terms of identity, authenticity and authority?

As a contributor to this volume honoring Dale Eickelman, I would like to explain my presence here besides my long friendship with him. His studies on knowledge, authority, education, and religion have been a source of inspiration not only for the present chapter but also for my other writings. I am not an anthropologist, but Dale’s anthropological approach to studying Muslim history has sparked my interest in this field of knowledge. When I came to the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University in 1966 to study for my PhD, Dale’s ma dissertation on Musaylima (d. 632), known as a false prophet (kadhdhab) in Muslim history, was a popular topic of discussion among students in the common room. In his ma thesis, Dale had provided an anthropological appraisal of Musaylima in which he explained the refutation as a social phenomenon arising from a tribal struggle for power and authority. As a student of law and social change in Islam, this social theory that Dale called an “anthropological appraisal” made sense to me.

An anthropological approach to the study of Islam helps one to understand that, for a believer, the religious world is just as real as the social world is for a person living in a given society. By paying attention to the role of the madrasa teacher, the formal organization of curricula, and the residential quality of the institution, we can understand the madrasa as a world of its own. Religious education functions as a social process through which to develop a particular religious mindset. This process of knowledge production and socialization generates objectifications of religion and authority, which then populate imagined communities. The religious world is separate but not isolated from the social world. Interaction between the two worlds, even if limited, influences the objectification of religion and religiosity. The narrow classification of religiosity in sectarian terms, sensitized by the continued memory, keeps reminding the religious mind of its obligation to preserve its legacy against all odds.

*** Appendix

**** Summary of the Report: Curriculum and Activities (Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2018)

1. Satisfaction with the Curriculum

a. Satisfied:121/135 (around 90%)

1. Age: below 20 yrs. (40/121)

2. Denomination: Shi'a + Jama'at Islami (23/121)

b. Not satisfied:8/135 (6%)

1. Age:6/8:2o-25 yrs.

2. Denomination:Deobandis (4/8)

c. No answer:6/135 (4%)

2. Course Duration: Most of the Students Spent Close to One-third of their Day in the Classes

a. 6 to 7 hours daily: 36 (26.7 %)

b. 5 to 7 hours daily: 89 students (67%)

c. 5 to 6 hours: 53 (39.3%)

3. Favorite Subjects Within Curriculum

a. Religious sciences: Qur’an and exegesis (95/135); hadith (87/135); Ilm-ul-Kalam (21/135), Islamic law and theory (11/135)

b. Rational sciences: logic/philosophy (14/135) auxiliary sciences: Arabic grammar (13/135), semantics and Rhetoric (20/135)

c. Outside curriculum: highest history, lowest political science History 70/135); Urdu (55); computers (47).

Pakistan studies (45); and political science (44)

4. Co-curricular Activities

i. Literary circles (107/135); reading/study groups (93); discussion/ debates (53)

ii. Topics for discussion: education (65), religion (58). Most common topic was religion in all denominations, politics and society common in Deo-bandis and Barelvis, and Interfaith among the Shi'a students (14).

5. Extra-Curricular Activities Available in Madrasa

i. Extra-curricular activities available (123), not available (9), no answer (1)

ii. Not available: 4: Barelvis, 3 Deobandi, and 1 Shia.

iii. Nature of extra-curricular activities: most available sports, availed by 16 students

iv. Sports or exercise (112), library studies (77), Internet (49)

v. Students availing the facility: sports (16), Internet (14)

vi. Topic for discussion: most favourite religion, least favourite sectarian topics

a. Religion (96 students), educational (82) politics (60), global situation (51) teachers and students (50) society in general (33) as entertainment (17) or economic activities (14). sectarian topics (11)

b. Non-curricular engagements: most favorite religious, least favorite political processions

c. Religious programs (89 students), sightseeing (37), entertainment and sports (35), social welfare (49), political processions (7)

6. Political Activities

a. Favorite political party: most favorite jui, least favorite Majlis Wahdat

b. Affiliation

1. Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (jui): 37 (32 Deobandi students);

2. Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (jup): 20 (17 Barelwi);

3. Jama'at Ahl-e-Hadith (jAh): 12;

4. Tehreeke-Islami Pakistan:4;

5. Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat: 14;

6. Jama'at Islami: 10,

7. Tahreek Insaf: 10:

8. Pakistan People’s Party: 3;

9. pml-n: 5;

10. Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen:1

7. Social Media Usage

a. Most popular is Facebook, most favorite topic religion

b. 106 (78%) students use social media, 24 (18%) do not. Five students explained that social media do not enhance intellectual capabilities.

c. Type of social media: Facebook (99), WhatsApp (63).

d. Topics discussed on social media: religious topics (63), educational/schol-arly issues (52), political affairs (49), global situation (30)

8. Newspaper reading: 95 students read newspapers 32 do not

9. Interaction with teachers: majority spends extra 1-2 hours daily with teachers

1. 120 students said yes, 11 no.

1. Duration of interaction with teachers: longest duration: more than 2 hours (6 students), largest number spends 1-2 hours interacting students 112 (1-2 hours).

a. 2 hour and more (6), 1-2 hours (112), less than 30 minutes (20), 30-60 minutes (28).

Sample: Total number of students: 135, majority 18-25 yrs.

Table 12.1 Age groups of students

Age group	Number and percentage
26-30 yrs.	14 (11%)
21-25 yrs.	81 (60%)
18-20 yrs.	72 (53%)
16-17 yrs.	13 (10%)

Source: PAK institute for peace studies (2018)

Table 12.2: Teachers’ age groups

Total number 142

Age group	Numbers and percentage
51-60years	9 (6.33%)
41-50	29 (20.42%)
31-40	25 (17.6%)
25-30	29 (20.42%)

| 23-25 | 25 (17.6%) |

| 20-22 | 25 (17.6%) |

Source: PAK institute for peace studies (2018) |

Table 12.3 Students: Masalik divide and favorite subjects

| Subject | Deobandi | Brelawi | Shi'a | Ahl al-Hadith | Jama'at Islami |

| Qur’an, hadith | 76 | 54 | 14 | 13 | 7 |

| Islamic law | 23 | 32 | 11 | 2 | 1 |

| Theology | 23 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 1 |

| Logic/philosophy | 14 | 6 | 14 | 0 | 1 |

| Arabic language, literature and rhetoric | 4 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 3 |

Source: pak institute for peace studies (2018)

Table 12.4 Teachers: Expertise, favorite subjects

| No. of teachers | Expertise | Numbers | Favorite subjects outside the curriculum |

| 117 | Qur’an and hadith | 73 | Computer science |

| 59 | Islamic law | 68 | History |

| 10 | Islamic theology | 61 | Urdu |

| 10 | Logic and philosophy | 49 | Natural sciences |

| 37 | Arabic grammar | 49 | Pakistan studies |

source: pak institute for peace studies (2018)

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[1] The phrase “Arab Spring” has been widely contested in Tunisia. research from sociology, linguistic anthropology, and field sites in the Middle East to consider how producers of Internet content coalesce as novel communities of shared interest, and how this process might lead to new discourses and even political change.

{1} My thanks to Yaron Ben-Naeh, Yaron Harel and Ari Eitan for discussions on this chapter, and to Joshua Schoffman and Daniel Goldberg for help in understanding the cases discussed.

[2] The manuscript subsequently appeared as a book in Hebrew (Ha-Cohen 1978), but there is a translation of part of it into English in Hakohen (1993).

[3] The term sofer does appear as an appointed position - assisting the court - in a document reflecting Tripoli in 1915, after changes imposed by the Italian administration (see de Felice 1985: 37, 309n.28; and note 5 below). The individual appointed also uses the

Judeo-Arabic ktab beit din (be-trablus) to describe his role. See Henshke (2011) who notes that Hakmon also provided notarial services to individuals for a fee.

[4] I use “civil law” to condense Hacohen’s phrase: “laws regarding monetary matters (dinei ma-monot) and the ways of society.”

[5] The parentheses are in the original. Maran means “our teacher” and refers to Sephardi scholar Yosef Qaro (Toledo 1488-Safed 1575), author of the rabbinical compendium, the Shulhan Arukh (“Prepared Table”). This rabbinical code became standard in the Jewish world, and accepted among Ashkenazim with the intercalated glosses of Moses Isserles of Krakow (1520?-1572). By mentioning “our teacher,” Hacohen points to Qaro’s original compendium. As elsewhere, he here adds parenthetical remarks about the (prescriptive) law, in contrast to a practice he describes.

[6] Hacohen often provides both the Hebrew and Gregorian year. The correspondence is always partial, as the former begins in the fall. The early months of 5673 also could be 1911. The date here is of interest because that was the period of the Italian occupation that entailed - until subsequent changes - a halt in the operation of Jewish and Muslim courts (de Felice 1985: 37).

[7] This episode is part of the narrative cited above in Ha-Cohen (1978: 148).

[8] “Nimus” (singular) appears in Talmudic literature with a range of meanings, including law, accepted norms, and custom. Hacohen calls the Ottoman Empire Togarma, the name of a people appearing in Genesis 10:3 (and elsewhere). This usage became common in the Hebrew press in the latter part of the nineteenth century until Ottoman rule over Palestine ended. Some examples are found in Yuval Ben-Bassat, “At the crossroads: newspapers in the Yishuv [Jewish community in Palestine] and the Young Turk Revolution of 1908,” Qesher 37 (Spring-Summer 2008): 71-81 (in Hebrew).

[9] Ha-Cohen, Higgid, 260.

[10] In Section 86 and elsewhere, Hacohen frequently refers to the judges with this term. I believe it has dismissive echoes. The biblical noun 'edah translates as community, congregation, or assembly. It can be neutral, while in post-biblical Hebrew may carry negative connotations based on the story of Qorah - who rebelled against Moses and Aaron (Numbers 16-17) - whose followers are called 'adat Qorah. In addition to signaling divisiveness, Hacohen may imply that the judges joined forces to protect their interests. Earlier (p. 203), he uses the term 'adat ha-shohatim to describe the

ritual slaughterers in Tripoli whom he depicts as a guild. One also might infer that viewing judges as a “flock” detracts from an image of individual integrity. Yehuda Kahalon’s (1972) analysis of Hacohen’s discussion of the judges, regarding issues of education, reflects a similar sense.

[11] “Examine privately” is my rendition of le'ayyen be-seter, which ostensibly should be translated: “examine (study) secretly.” This choice stems from Talya Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud (2011: 52-53). She translates the phrase megilat setarim (based on the same stem, S T R) as “a sequestered scroll” (that is, not studied publicly), in reference to the Geonim in Iraq who widely transmitted Talmudic literature. Books of halakha were not “secret” in Hacohen’s time (while one needed an education to understand them), and I thus find his use of S T R as resonating with Geonic usage as interpreted by Fishman. Beyond that, if this analysis is correct, it suggests that there is much more to discover about the world of learning to which Hacohen was exposed.

[12] Isaac Al-fasi (1013-1103), Maimonides (113?-1204), and Asher ben Yechiel (125?-1327) were the three prominent codifiers on the basis of whose work Yosef Qaro composed the Shulhan Arukh (see note 4).

[13] One would like to know what constituted this “study” and if it entailed any knowledge of Arabic. Marglin (2016: 74-75), shows that a Jewish merchant might learn about Muslim law through being present in the courts or other experiences, and would provide advice to Muslims, and even serve as their wakil. Parallel situations, while not formally equivalent, have been described for Yemen (Wagner 2015).

[14] Hacohen also mentions appearing in Muslim courts while in an Italian court, when he was approached as knowledgeable about local history soon after the Italian occupation (Goldberg 1996).

[15] Ha-Cohen (1978: 170), describes Hafez Pasha’s firm steps to improve security and the administrative-legal situation in Libya: “He wiped away the tears of those oppressed in court, and justice was established on a firm base.”

[16] This explicit statement clearly invites the perspective of Lawrence Rosen (1989), who draws on both fieldwork and comparison to stress the social contexts and cultural underpinnings of Islamic courts in Morocco and elsewhere.

[17] Raccah (1960: 76-77) inserts a genealogy from one of Cohen’s books leading back to biblical Ezra, who was a kohen (priest). This reflects the belief of many priestly families in Jerba (Slouschz 1927: 287-92; Udovitch and Valensi 1984: 8).

[18] There is an open question regarding Haim Cohen. It appears, from the last case summarized below, that he had financial means. That he published so many books suggests that he, or his family, or a patron, could support this activity. Speculating further, it might also help explain why he held the position of av beit ha-din for so long: perhaps a person who was financially secure could be relied on as a judge?

[19] For a partial exception to this statement, see note 2 above.

[20] Serendipity is further illustrated in Goldberg (2012: 109-22).

[21] See the Library of the aiu in Paris, Manuscript A 325 H.

[22] That manuscript, Ms. Heb. 8°5775, was deposited by the literary critic, professor of Yiddish and politician Dov Sadan (1902-1989), who probably received it from Slouschz; in fact, Slouschz may have used it as the basis of his 1908 article.

[23] The Jewish Publication Society republished it in 1944, probably as a result of the United States entering North Africa and “finding” a large Jewish community there.

[24] It arrived in the mid-1940s and is now filed under Ms. Heb. 28°1292. The catalogue records that in 1967, Yehuda Cohen, his wife, and a sister named Sarah confirmed the donation to the library.

[25] Hebrew Manuscript division, 4°1256.

[26] This was Yehuda Kahalon, whose article based on the thesis (Kahalon 1972) is cited in note 9.

[27] The article was first published in 1910. See also Gilani (n.d. 339-60). My argument here is much indebted to these two works.

[28] For a sustained effort to separate the institution of the madrasa in medieval Islam from the transmission of learning, see Chamberlain (1994), who is concerned primarily with social rather than intellectual practices; to the extent that he discusses the latter, he is interested in exploring them as “ritual, mimetic and performative,” whereby the political and social elite strove to reproduce their ranks. See p. 108, for the quotation; pp. 125-30 on the “ritualization of knowledge,” and pp. 133-51 on “rituals of reading, rituals of writing.” See Bourdieu (1973: 71-112) on education as a means of elite social reproduction. As should be clear from what follows, my argument that practices rather than institutions explain pre-and early modern Islamic learning emphasizes rather than sidesteps the 'ulama’s intellectual and religious tradition.

[29] The moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1984: 187) usefully defines a practice as “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.” It is not easy to draw a sharp distinction between a practice and an institution, though an institution can be broadly understood as comprising mechanisms to regulate behavior and constrain practice. An institution is therefore usually more structured and less flexible than a practice might be. Unlike an institution, moreover, a practice finds its meaning, as MacIntyre noted, through the pursuit of goods internal to the activity in question. For an influential definition of institutions, on which I draw here, see North (1981: 201-2); see also Glaeser et al. (2004: 275).

[30] My references are to the Persian text, unless stated otherwise.

[31] On ‘Abd al-‘Ali, an important, near contemporary source is Ansari (1881: 121-27). The work was completed in 1836, though the published version contains a continuation of it by the author’s son, Muhammad In‘am Allah, which comes down to 1878 (see Ansari 1881: 138-40). Other sources and studies on ‘Abd al-‘Ali include Ahmed 2002; ‘Ali 1914: 122-23; ‘Inayat Allah 1988:207-12; al-Hasani 1947-70, vol. 7:282-87.

[32] Rather less credibly, perhaps, 600 students and scholars are said to have accompanied him when he decided to go to Madras, now Chennai, at the invitation of the ruler of Carnatic (Hasani 1947-70: vol. 7, 285).

[33] A significant contrast is to be observed in this respect between Sultanate and Mughal India, on the one hand, and the Ottoman Empire, on the other. On early Ottoman madrasas, see Atgil (2017: 28-45). On the relative dearth of similar institutions in pre-colonial India, see Gilani (n.d.:346-60).

[34] See Stewart (2004: 49-52) on the need to distinguish between the different sorts of authorization (ijaza) required to transmit and teach particular texts.

[35] Gilani (n.d.: 142-45) understands danishmandi to connote the basics of a religious education.

[36] For a discussion of tatbiq in its various forms, see Shah Rafi‘ al-din (n.d.): 42a ff. Rafi‘ al-din was Wali Allah’s son and a noted scholar in his own right. Wali Allah’s views on effective pedagogy have some broad parallels with those of Ibn Khaldun (1858: vol. 3, 292-98), though he does not appear to have been acquainted with the latter’s work.

[37] To avoid confusion between Wali Allah Ansari and the better known Wali Allah of Delhi, I include Ansari as part of the former’s name whenever I refer to him.

[38] Another rationalist stream was embodied by scholars associated with the north Indian town of Khayrabad, who were active in the second half of the eighteenth and especially during the nineteenth century. For a brief introduction to their work, see Ahmed and Pourjavady (2016:616-18).

[39] See Wali Allah (1858: 2). Also see Husain (1912: 164) and the translator’s notes, on which I draw here, for a listing of the key texts he had studied as part of his education. The works in question included Qutb al-din Razi’s (d. 1364) Tahrir al-qawa"id al-mantiqiyya fi sharh risalat al-shamsiyya (commonly known as Sharh-i shamsiyya or al-Qutbi); the commentary by Qutb al-din Razi on al-Urmawi’s (d. 1283) Matali" al-anwar; al-Taftazani’s (d. 1390) Sharh-i "aqa"id (which, in turn, is a commentary on al-Nasafi’s [d. 1142] "Aqa"id); al-Khayali’s (d. c. 1457) glosses on a commentary by Taftazani; and al-Sharif al-Jurjani’s (d. 1413) commentary on al-Iji’s (d. 1355) Kitab al-mawaqif. More generally, see Brentjes (2018:94-96, 149-55, 161-68).

[40] It is common to render al-‘ulum al-naqliyya (“the transmitted sciences”) as the “religious sciences,” but the “rational sciences“ (al-‘ulum al-‘aqliyya), from which they are distinguished, were arguably also “religious sciences.” On occasion, “religious books” (al-kutub al-diniyya) are nonetheless distinguished from those in the rationalist (‘aqliyya) tradition, as in Wali Allah’s Persian autobiography (Husain 1912: 173).

[41] The students in question were Mirza Hasan ‘Ali Muhaddith and Husayn Ahmad Malihabadi.

[42] I follow the English translation (Jalbani 1982: 84) with several modifications. On his wish to avoid the rational and the transmitted sciences in this work, see Wali Allah (1894: 2).

[43] This Persian commentary, Madin al-jawahir, was in seven volumes, but I have been unable to locate it. The only other Farangi Mahall scholar to have embarked on a commentary on the Qur’an was ‘Abd al-Bari (d. 1926), though he died before he had made much progress on it (‘Inayat Allah 1998: 281). As for the study of hadith, only the Mishkat al-masabih of Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah al-Khatib al-Tabrizi (fl. 1337) was usually taught in the area of hadith by Farangi Mahall scholars (Nu‘mani 1934b: vol. 3, 99).

[44] For Anwar al-Haqq’s studies with ‘Abd al-‘Ali Bahr al-‘Ulum, see Ansari (1881: 35). It is worth noting that Anwar al-Haqq found his mystical proclivities to be in accord with the transmitted rather than the rational sciences (Ansari 1881: 35-36). Shah Wali Allah would have concurred with this view.

[45] A notable example of his writings in this area is Laknawi (1995). This is a commentary on al-Sharif al-Jurjani’s (d. 1413) abridgment of Sharaf al-din al-Tibi’s (d. 1343) work on hadith methodology.

[46] Given Wali Allah’s hadith scholarship and his emphasis on ijtihad (the derivation of legal norms from the foundational texts) the Salafis, too, revere his memory. Yet his Sufism makes him an inconvenient figure for them. Many Deobandis, too, have not warmed to particular aspects of his thought, but they can embrace much more of it, including a good deal of his Sufism, than can the Salafis.

[47] See appendix titled “Khatimat al-tab‘,” to Wali Allah, n.d.b: 107-8). The appendix bears the name of Sayyid Zahir al-din, who is always introduced as the maternal grandson of Shah Rafi‘ al-din. In fact, as noted, he was the great-grandson of Rafi‘ al-din (Barakati 1976: 189).

[48] See the title page of Anfas-i Rahimiyya, a book by Shah ‘Abd al-Rahim, published at the Matba‘-i Ahmadi (‘Abd al-Rahim n.d.), and Zahir al-din’s announcement (“mufid-i 'amm”) appended to this work at p. 40.

[49] For various announcements to this effect, see Wali Allah n.d.c., appendix, (“Sahiban-i ‘ilm ko mizhda”); and Wali Allah n.d.d, appendix (“Ittila‘-i daruri”): 87-8. (I am grateful to Zain Shirazi for his help in obtaining a copy of this work.)

[50] Zahir al-din, “Mufid-i ‘amm,” appended to ‘Abd al-Rahim n.d.: 40. Ibid., for 1892 as the date when teaching had begun at Zahir al-din’s madrasa.

[51] For some examples of references to the Madrasa-yi Rahimiyya in modern scholarship, see Baljon 1986: 2; Metcalf 1982: 36; Pernau 2013: 47-55.

[52] For his full discussion of the Madrasa-yi Rahimiyya, see Barakati 1976: 80-95. I am indebted to this work for helping me identify some of the sources on which I have drawn in this discussion.

[53] See “Extract from the Proceedings of the Honourable Governor-General in Council in the Political Department under the Date the 18 July 1807.” Revenue Records of the Delhi Residency, Punjab Archives, Lahore. The quoted words are from a petition made on behalf of Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz to W. Spedding, the Superintendent of Revenue. (I am grateful to Mr. Abbas Chughtai, director of the Punjab Archives, for assisting me in consulting this item.) Much of this document is also reproduced in Rizvi (2004: 85-90).

[54] The focus of the current comparison is on Geertz’s (1971) Islam Observed and Eickelman’s (1976) Moroccan Islam, so does not include all the works on the topic by these scholars.

[55] Geertz built his analytical model on the idea that all anthropological studies conducted on religious beliefs and practices since the end of World War ii until the mid-1960s (prior to the 1966 appearance of his essay on “religion as a cultural system”) were devoid of theoretical novelty, since they were merely based on the conceptual heritage left by the pioneers Durkheim (d. 1917), Weber (d. 1920), Freud (d. 1939) and Malinowski (d. 1942). Geertz defined his duty as to develop the cultural dimension of the religious analysis, following thus the track of Weber and his followers.

[56] He believed that history began in Morocco with the introduction of Islam in the seventh century. One century later this religion became the unique power in the country. After three centuries, the great age of “Berber Islam” emerged through the succeeding Almoravid and Almohad dynasties. Morocco took shape as a nation in the period between 1050 and 1450, and Islam became its dominant religion (Eickelman 1976: 18; Geertz 1971: 5).

[57] The famous Berber proclamation (daher) of 16 May 1930 removed the Berber (Amazigh) speaking region of Morocco from the jurisdiction of Islamic law. The goal was to foster a separate Amazigh (that is a non-Arab and to a certain extent non-Muslim) identity. According to Jacques Berque (1962), the Berber daher was a French colonial attempt to create a Berber ethnographic reserve or national park.

[58] The conclusion is undoubtedly risky, but pertinent to state here because of its potential epistemological value.

[59] I was granted the opportunity to sit with the two men, both together and on separate occasions, and the respect, appreciation and firm friendship they clearly displayed for one another was notable. Eickelman's (2009) article on the influence of Geertz's works on anthropology in Morocco bears testament to the constancy of that relationship.

[60] [[http://www.vam.ac.uk/content/articles/s/study-room-resource-the-great-exhibition/] [http://www.vam.ac.uk/content/articles/s/study-room-resource-the-great-exhibition/]] (last accessed 18 March 2020). On the hand-in-glove relationship between the world fairs of the nineteenth century and the modern museum, see Konig (2016); and Rydell (2006).

[61] Figures produced at the start of the twenty-first century by Heath (2004: vol. 2, 628-29) regarding the interest of British Muslims in visiting British museums with permanent displays of Islamic material culture make for sombre reading. Although Heath subsequently published his (downloadable) dissertation, the book version (Heath 2007: 116-17) does not appear to include all the figures.

[62] On the translator and his time in Europe, with specific regard to what and how he saw there, see Naddaf 1986: 73-83.

[63] How appearance is understood, either as an optically registered, surface phenomenon that is seen solely in the presence of light or as something prototypical and more profound that is not seen solely in light, is a key distinction between modern (quattrocento and later) and medieval Western visuality. (On this distinction, see Greenstein 1997.) As John Berger (2001: 145) notes regarding the former (modern) visuality, "all drawing is a shadow around light." In this same modern visuality, as Henri Bergson (1929: 200) observed, there is no distinction between perception and the thing perceived. (For a penetrating exploration of the phenomenon of dis/appearance in optically naturalistic quattrocento and later Western art, see Hagi Kenaan 2020:53-113.)

[64] The Persian miniatures of the so-called atelier of Kamal al-Din Bihzad (d. 1536) are often said to be one of the rare moments of optical naturalism in Islamic art. See, for example,

Oliver Leaman’s (2004: 165-78) interpretation of these paintings as exhibiting “a concentration on the surfaces and shapes of things [and] little in the way of the representation of secrets behind ... appearance.”

[65] Notwithstanding the factual errors Hans Belting (2011) introduces into his analysis of Islamic theories of vision, specifically the theory of Ibn al-Haytham (d. c. 1040), and ignoring the predictably territorial and ungracious treatment meted out to it by certain Islamic art historians, in my view his counterposing of (predominantly anti-naturalistic) Islamic art and (naturalistic) quattrocento art is provocative and stimulating. Is A. Mark Smith correct when he asserts that Ibn al-Haytham’s theory of vision was, pace Belting, “profoundly iconic”? Did not Joel Snyder get the matter correct decades ago when he said that retinal impressions were first understood iconically - as pictures, not as forms (Eidos) - in quattrocento Europe by Alberti (d. 1472), and that this understanding led to the invention of linear perspective or at least to vision’s mathematical codification via the science of optics? (Snyder 1980: 520; Smith 2013:525-26).

[66] See Smith 2015: 325-26 for a more dispassionate account of the importance of early-modern developments in glass-making to lens-based science.

[67] See Anderson 2003: 329, who specifies that the gridded frame contains transparent glass, while others have supposed it to be unglazed; and Andrews 2016: 421-24, who analyses the historical development of the woodcuts and suggests that the bottom one may not be by Durer.

[68] On the direct connection between linear perspective painting and the camera, and thence photography, see Snyder 1980.

[69] See Lookofsky 2016: 211-14 for a finely nuanced discussion of what else this storefront is, including its connection to the Great Exhibition at Crystal Palace.

[70] As John Onians (2016: 311-12) points out, it is a mistake to view this painting as a kind of male locker-room joke, especially because Courbet made a number of “origin,” or source paintings, and only one involves female genitalia. In addition, this one particular source painting, which shows a mostly disembodied vagina, was preceded by some 150 years by a Tibetan Buddhist fresco of the same subject, except that the more obviously cosmic vagina of the fresco is totally disembodied and painted without regard for optical naturalism (Baker 2000: 64-65). As Uparella and Jauregui (2018: 90) have shown, Courbet’s painting was also preceded by a European Enlightenment tradition of anatomical representations of the female genitalia and uterus, which reduced the female body “to a pelvic body, with no arms, legs, or head,” exactly as Courbet’s painting does. That Enlightenment tradition was in turn preceded by a little-known quattrocento tradition of placing the vanishing point in the Virgin

Mary’s uterus (Moffitt 2008: 167-82). Courbet’s painting is thus not idiosyncratic, but belongs to what Uparella and Jauregui (2018: 81) call a “gyneco-scopic regime.” I thank Jonathan Bloom for alerting me to Uparella and Jauregui’s article, and John Gibson and Christian Luczanits for their help with the Tibetan fresco.

[71] The paradoxical reversibility of the vanishing point and viewpoint is explained by Bryson (1983: 107) as follows: “[The] vanishing point marks the installation within the painting of a principle of radical alterity, since its gaze returns that of the viewer as its own object: something is looking at my looking: a gaze whose position I can never occupy, and whose vista I can imagine only by reversing my own, by inverting the perspective before me, and by imagining my own gaze as the new, palindromic point of disappearance on the horizon.” On the basis of this paradox, it follows that “the epoch of the vanishing point [is] the transformation of the subject into object” (Bryson 1983: 107; see also Bryson 1984: 220n.15).

[72] In a personal communication, Teresa Pepe made the same observation about Egyptian bloggers when she said that “many Egyptian bloggers actually met online, by reading and linking each other, but then the online community also turned into a real social group that interacts and meets offline. Many young Egyptian, who were intentionally writing about themselves using their real names, used blogs as forms of self-expression but also to join a new social group.”

[73] Its engineers conceived and built the Internet as a stack of programs that give access to lower-level functions. The base software, tcp/ip, is itself such a stack: it “delivers” telecommunications signals to programming that organizes and sends messages. Programs for remote login and file transfer are stacked on those functions and in turn become platforms for adding others. The practical concept becomes reflexive ideology for Web 2.0 developers who use the World Wide Web as their platform and devise additional ones on which to attach others that encode “higher” levels of user behavior by weaving those into a web of “social networking” (Lacy 2008).

[74] Such elective affinities are what Facebook collects and targets for advertising tailored to its users (Mezrich 2009).

[75] They also found, and more controversially, this to be an advantage of the middle class, with more extensive networks of weak ties, while networks among working class people tended more towards strong-tie nodes.

[76] Zuckerman’s examples were early celebrity bloggers (like Hosein Derakshan, or Salman Pax), whom he treated as indigenous analysts, but with whom those who sought them out - indeed could seek them out - shared a language and online location.

[77] This is Google’s business model (see Levy 2011) and a contemporary version of the idea that automating lower level tasks frees operators for higher level ones, whose touchstone expression for computer designers has been the Atlantic Monthly essay by Vannevar Bush (1945).

[78] Transcriptions for Maghribi proper names and places follow protocols still in use and familiar to North African readers and scholars set forth in MacGuckin de Slane and Gabeau (1868), for example, “Cheikh el-Arab” and “Hallaoui” instead of variants of Shaykh al-Arab and Hallawi.

[79] Earlier Protectorate decrees regulating the prison regime were the dahir s of 11 October 1915, 11 April 1927, and 26 June 1930, which produced not only inmate labor in the service of the French empire on behalf of public works projects, internal prison labor, work in industry, or private colonization enterprises, but also institutionalized and racialized prisoner segregation of Europeans and Moroccans.

[80] A rare voice against destructive effects of French colonial decrees was Paul Buttin (1995), a French-born lawyer admitted to the Moroccan bar during the Protectorate. See Eickelmann (1974: 215-35) on maintaining the machinery of the Protectorate.

[81] I began my project on political prison literature in the early 1990s with limited access to a group of Marxist former prisoners thanks to introductions by Sion Assidon. Throughout the project in 1990-2000, I received the unqualified support of Dale Eickelman, Mark Tessler, Daoud Casewit and the Moroccan-American Fulbright Commission in Rabat, the American Institute of Maghrib Studies (aims), the Council for American Overseas Research Centers (caorc), my home universities, and various Moroccan human rights associations. Most interviews were in private homes until 1999 when interview situations were undertaken in public spaces of meetings, reunions, commemorations, and courthouses after the death of Hassan ii. For examples of meetings with Islamist political prisoner groups, I first encountered members of Islamist Group 26 at the Casablanca headquarters of the Association Ma-rocaine des Droits Humains (amdh) on 28 October 1999 during an open house campaign to register information about victims of human rights abuses; demonstrations such as the “National Day for the Disappeared” on 29 October 1999 held in front of the Rabat Parliament; on 10 December 1999 at events marking the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights held at the Casablanca home of the Manouzi family on behalf of the Comite de coordination des familles des disparus et victimes de la disparition au Maroc, where I was introduced to members of another Islamist Group 71. This snowballed into more interviews and meetings during public performances, such as the sit-in on 4 May 2000 in front of Casablanca’s Derb Moulay Cherif torture center. I spent long hours with the legal and human rights community of activists as an observer to the May-June 2000 trial of three Islamist political prisoners still in prison and accused of attempted escape from Casablanca’s Oukacha prison (see Slyomovics 2005).

[82] I echo their word “Islamist” because in interviews in 1999/2000, the members of Group 26 described themselves to me as Islamistes in French and Islamiyun in Arabic.

[83] Hamdouchi (1999: 45, n.76, n.77) notes that fourteenth-century written police reports in the Islamic world predate the French proces-verbal; he cites texts concerned with the duties of the police to take down written reports by the fourteenth-century Malikite judge, Ahmad ibn Yahya Abu al-Abbas al-Tilimsani, called al-Wansarisi (1937: 13).

[84] Cheikh El Arab’s aliases include al-Haj (French spelling as El-Hadj) and Agouliz, his birthplace as his surname. Newspaper coverage of the time was provided by Le Petit Marocain 14826 (8 August 1964): 1-3.

[85] See protest and action alert letter by Reporters sans frontieres (rsf) at [[http://www.ifex.org/fr/content/view/full/4327][www.ifex.org/fr/con-]] [[http://www.ifex.org/fr/content/view/full/4327][tent/view/full/4327]]; ‘La Verite sur le complot’ (in November 1963 special French language supplement of Al-Tahrir), the weekly newspaper of the UNfp’s student section in Paris.

[86] Moroccan newspapers published several individual testimonies by Archane’s torture victims (for example, Jamai 1999: 11). In 1999, the amdh issued a press release naming Archane among Morocco’s known torturers, as did articles by Ahmed Jawhar in the Arabic-language weekly al-Sahifah of 4-10 January 1999, though these were preceded by an interview and cover story in which Archane denied all charges. In fact, disputing the accusations, Archane successfully sued journalist Narjis Rerhaye of the francophone daily L’Opinion. A Moroccan court ruled in favor of Archane and ordered Rerhaye to pay him symbolic damages to the tune of one dirham (approximately 10 cents).

[87] Permission by the local pasha to enter the fortress of Kalaat M’Gouna and surrounding area was quickly granted to our group of researchers, but we were refused official permission to enter Agdez.

[88] Benzekri had died of cancer in 2005 at the age of 55 and was buried in his home village of Ait Ouahi, 60 miles from Rabat (see [[http://www.atlasinfo.fr/Maroc-profanation-de-la-tombe-de-Driss-Benzekri-ouverture-d-une-enquete-judiciaire_a42019.html][http://www.atlasinfo.fr/Maroc-profanation-de-la-]] [[http://www.atlasinfo.fr/Maroc-profanation-de-la-tombe-de-Driss-Benzekri-ouverture-d-une-enquete-judiciaire_a42019.html][tombe-de-Driss-Benzekri-ouverture-d-une-enquete-judiciaire_a42019.html).

[89] The global technology of videoconferencing has offered students lively educational experiences and cross-cultural exchanges. Dale Eickelman, at Dartmouth College, and I, at the United Arab Emirates University, coordinated and conducted several videoconferences in which students from across the globe took part in cross-cultural exchanges and discussions on a variety of topics.

[90] The Shi'a Muslims observe what is known as taqlid, a commitment to follow the advice or utterances of a certain religious scholar ("alim, marja", or mujtahid). Though the concept of taqlid is to a certain extent shared by both Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, there is a significant difference between them particularly in doctrine and practice. Taqlid means “accepting an opinion concerning a legal rule without knowledge of its bases” (Peters 1980: 135). Several scholars state that for Sunni Muslims, “the obligation of taqlid, however, was never universally accepted” (Peters 1980: 136). According to Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Kazim, without “this commitment the action and prayers of all Muslims were void even though in reality they were correct and in conformity with shari"a” (Moussavi 2005: 527). But these doctrines are completely different from the Catholic priesthood, in which a priest exercises authority over a person or group of people through a connection with the Divinity (el-Aswad 2012: 157).

[91] I would like to acknowledge the support of the Gerda Henkel Foundation for the work I undertook on Salafism during a 2016-19 fellowship.

and nuances recent research correctly foregrounds these three categories, I assume that all branches of Salafism can be subsumed under two major Salafi approaches to society and politics - activism and quietism. However, insofar as this issue is connected with much broader discussions of the highly contested concepts of activism and quietism in Islam, it is only touched upon while its more detailed analysis remains out of the scope of the present chapter.

[92] On Geertz as Eickelman’s teacher in Chicago see Eickelman (2005).

[93] Given the irony that the term “ideology” has itself become “thoroughly ideologized” (Geertz 1973: 193), I use it here in a “non-ideologized” sense. As an integral and constitutive aspect of all human culture, ideology is used here to denote “a relatively cohesive, dynamically evolving, set of collectively held ideas or beliefs” (Griffin 2006: 81).

[94] On the genealogy of the terms Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism, see Kramer 2003.

[95] On the relevance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to legal thought and the interpretation of authoritative texts from the past, see Mootz iii 2016.

[96] Recently, the notion of a “comprehensive doctrine” in relation to the “overlapping consensus” has been heavily weighed down with a Rawlsian theory of justice (Wenar 2004: 265-75). I use the term differently to designate the “more comprehensive” dimensions and scope of doctrines that transcend the “dogmatic” meanings of the teachings or canons and, by encompassing the social world, provide religious underpinnings to public morality, collective identity, and politics.

[97] For a recent example of an approach of this type, see Elbasani and Tosic 2017.

[98] As Bevir (2004: 201-3) explains it, “essentialists equate traditions to fixed essences to which they ascribe variations” while “traditions are not fixed entities people happen to discover. They are contingent entities people produce by their own activities.”

[99] In some cases, accusations of “essentialism” are even raised towards academic works, which can hardly be qualified as “essentialist” (Evstatiev 2019: 89).

[100] Some scholars presume that “there are as many Islams as there are situations that sustain it” (Al-Azmeh 2009: 1). Others even suggest that the “ ‘Muslim world” - like el-Zein’s Islam - has never existed and “the construction of the Muslim world was a product of Muslim subjecthood under empire and a means to criticize European racism” (Aydin 2017: 131).

[101] Schulze’s “classicism” might be seen as one of his polemical approaches to Islam and European history - in much the same way as he elsewhere used the term “Islamic Enlightenment” for the seventeenth century (Evstatiev 2013: 9-10).

[102] Although Salafis and their pre-modern predecessors have not been immune to literalism, as traditionalists in matters of theology they have, in fact, insistently privileged the bi-la kayfa (“without asking how”) formula. For further details on literalist inclinations among traditionalists, see Holtzman (2018: 267).

[103] For an overview, see Abrahamov 2016.

[104] Not to be confused with the modern Ahl i-Hadith movement (Metcalf 1982: 264-96), which gained momentum in India from the mid-nineteenth century onwards to oppose the local Sufi and Hanafi traditions and by linking up with the Wahhabis from Arabia (Commins 2006: 145).

[105] The ninth-century traditionalists preferred to call themselves simply ahl al-Sunna (followers of the Prophetic Sunna) as do many modern Salafis, including Wahhabis who also self-identify as ahl al-tawhid (people of monotheism) thus emphasizing their strict theological distinction.

[106] It is necessary to distinguish the term usul al-din (sources, or principles of [Islamic] religion; traditionalist theology) from usul al-fiqh (legal theory). In Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), legal theory deals with the methodology for retrieving legal norms from the sources (usul) of law (shari'a). Non-traditionalist Sunnis accept four sources of the legal theory - the Qur'an, the Prophetic Sunna (hadith), the communal consensus (jma'), and the analogy (qiyas) - approached depending on the concrete legal school (madhhab). As a discipline, usulal-fiqh correlates withJuru'al-fiqh (positive law) (Schacht 1964: 59-62).

[107] With slight variations, the Salafis found the proof-text (dalil) for such a view in the following hadith: "The best among people (khayr al-nas) are those who belong to my generation (qarni), then those who come after them (thumma l-ladhina yalunahum) and then those who come after them (thumma l-ladhina yalunahum)" (al-Bukhari, hadith No36511897; cf. Muslim No2534).

[108] For an earlier use of the term "proto-Salafi" adopted here as designating the historical trajectory of what is known today as Salafism, see Brown (2015: 118n.3).

[109] Shirk is considered the greatest sin in the Muslim religion, that is to say it is a crime, for which Islamic law ascribes appropriate punishments.

[110] This is about the traditionalist alternative to understanding foundational texts, as in Qur'an 33: 21; 42: 10-11; 38: 75; 67: 1; 54: 14; 32: 4, which mention attributes like God's "hand" (yad), His "face" (wajh) or "ascension to the throne" (istawa 'ala l-'arsh).

[111] From Arabic kharaja - to move out, secede. The Kharijites were "those who went out" or - figuratively - "those who rebelled," for they seceded from the camp of 'Ali, who had been elected caliph after 'Uthman's murder. The reason for this was that during the Battle of Siffin (36/657), the forces of the elected caliph got the upper hand over the Syrians led by the Ummayad caliph Mu'awiya b. Abi Sufyan (r. 41-60/661-680), but 'Ali nevertheless agreed to the arbitration suggested by his opponents, thus - according to the

Kharijites - contradicting God’s judgement (hukm Allah). Gradually, the name Kharijites started to denote not only the historical khawarij who protested against ‘Uthman and ‘Ali alike, but also anyone who rebelled against a leader or his representatives. For an overview of the historical khawarij and their role in the discourses on modern Muslim political activism (Islamism) in the Middle East, see Kenney (2006: 19-53).

[112] “People of the Sunna and the community” is the common conventional designation of Sunni Muslims in the Arabic language.

[113] For a synthesizing overview of this trajectory in the history of Islamic theology, see Rudolph (2016:280-94).

[114] See also Ibn Maja, hadith No6 where those who belong to the group are defined in the very text (matn) of the tradition as “victorious” (mansurin).

[115] On activism and quietism in Islam, see Cook (1981: 15-23); cf. Lewis (1986: 141-47). On the ambiguities and incoherence of the dichotomy between activism and quietism, see Abou El Fadl (2001: 4, 30).

[116] Or wali al-waqt (ruler of the time). On the legitimacy of the notion that under some conditions Muslims can tolerate a certain amount of immoral behavior in the ruler, see Crone, (228-32). For a discussion of the archetypal attitudes towards political authority, including as embedded in the traditionalist teachings of Ibn Hanbal, see Zaman (1997: 114-8).

[117] Lav (2012: 9) distinguishes “quietist” from “radical” Salafis; cf. Wagemakers (2012: 9).

[118] This category is sometimes referred to as “Scholastic Salafism” (al-sala fyya al-'ilmiyya) (Haykel 2009: 49).

[119] This was particularly due to the practice of apprenticeships, still rarely used in France, promoting a match between job supply and demand.

[120] Anis Amri’s rantings on the impious societies of Europe are reminiscent of the texts of the sermons given in the Al Quds mosque in Hamburg by Moroccan preacher Mohamed Fizazi in 2001, which many of the 9/11 terrorists attended, including the Egyptian Mohamed

Atta and the Lebanese Ziad Jarrah, members of the so-called Hamburg cell. This underscores the early establishment of contemporary jihadism on German territory. In 2003, on the basis of the legislation then in force, the Hamburg court ruled that this cell was not strictly speaking a terrorist organization. Yet, in 2007, the Moroccan Mounir al Moutassadeq was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for belonging to it, and the authorities finally closed the Al Quds mosque in 2010. See my commentary on Romuald Karmakar's film, Hamburger Lektionen (Kepel 2013).

[121] This analysis also misses another key point of context. This is that the emergence of Red Brigades and Red Army Factions in both Italian and German society also reflected the coming-of-age of the children of the generation that bore the weight of the engagement with fascism and Nazism. Beyond the ultra-leftist vocabulary used at the time, the murderous violence of the Red Brigadists and Baader Gang also reflects in this sense the symbolic murder of the morally guilty father of the 1930s and 1940s (see Roy 2016).

[122] Even if the two phenomena are not comparable in themselves.

[123] The extreme right-wing movement Pegida used the New Year's Eve attacks, which sparked a number of accusatory polemics against police services for underestimating the phenomenon and thus causing an upward reassessment of the number of victims, to aid its political recovery. This is indicated in the group's unabbreviated name, Patriotische Europaer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West), which is an expression par excellence of the ethno-cultural divide that is the subject of this chapter. Founded in Dresden in 2014, the movement gained momentum in early 2016 and, in addition to demonstrations, has helped instigate increased attacks on migrants and refugees. Its leader, a former thief who had occasionally appeared dressed as Adolf Hitler, was convicted for racial insults and banned from leading or participating in demonstrations in Dresden for five years.

[124] The PVE secured second place in the election with 20 parliamentary seats (out of 133).

[125] The report is available at the following link: [[https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Exploring_the_Madrassah_Mindset.pdf][https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Exploring_the_Madrassah_Mindset.pdf]].

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** [Front Matter]

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*** [Dedication]

To Christine

*** [Epigraph]

For this book to be worthwhile, it is not necessary in my view that it should be assumed to embody the truth for years to come and with regard to the tiniest details. I shall be satisfied if it is credited with the modest achievement of having left a difficult problem in a rather less unsatisfactory state than it was before.

Claude Levi-Strauss

The Raw and the Cooked

trans. John and Doreen Weightman

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** Note on Transliteration

Most Arabic words, even those which occur in written, classical Arabic, are transliterated as they are pronounced in the spoken Arabic of the region in which I worked. The text would have been unnecessarily complicated had I followed separate conventions for the spoken and written variants. For example, Boujad, the town in which I worked, is spoken as Bja‘d. written as Abu I-J ad. The word for “marabout” is mrabet in western Morocco, murabit in classical Arabic. In any case, specialists will easily be able to reconstitute the classical forms. There are exceptions to strict transliteration, primarily of words and place names that have fairly conventional European forms. Also, I have represented most words only in the singular, with plurals indicated by -5. The exceptions to this convention, like the others, are meant to make my text read as smoothly as possible. Plurals that commonly occur in Islamic literature in western languages (e.g., ‘ulama) have been kept intact. Similarly, descendants of the marabout Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, who figure largely in my discussion, are called Sherqawi in the masculine singular, Sherqawa in the plural. I have also found it easier to call a resident of Boujad a Boujadi, as he is called in Arabic, than to resort to awkward circumlocutions.

I have preferred Richard S. Harrell’s system for transliterating Moroccan Arabic vowels (Harrell, ed. 1966:xiii-xix) for two reasons. First, it is more accurate than the system of the International Congress of Orientalists (ICO), designed primarily for classical Arabic. Second, Harrell’s system contains the publishing advantage of eliminating the macron for long vowels. There are six vowels: e, very short but like the e in English masses; o, very short but like the u of put; a, usually like the a of mad; a, a shorter version of a; L exactly as in French vite; u, like the ou in French fou. The ICO system has, however, been retained for consonants, since it is more widely known.

Fifteen out of thirty-one Moroccan Arabic consonants are almost identical with those which occur in English. The others are listed below:

a glottal stop, like the tt in Brooklynese bottle b, Z, m, r, s, t, z: emphatic consonants q: similar to k but pronounced farther back in the mouth kh\ the same as the ch of German Bach

gh: described by Harrell as “similar to a light gargle accompanied by a musical buzz from the adam’s apple” (Harrell, ed. 1966:xvii)

h: “similar to an English ‘h’ pronounced in a loud stage whisper” (ibid.)

c: the Arabic ‘ayn, technically a pharyngeal fricative, with no equivalent in a European language

Z: like the I in French louche r : like the r in Spanish para

** Preface

The fieldwork on which this study is based was conducted in Boujad, Morocco, and its environs between October 1968 and June 1970. Boujad’s significance lies in its continuing domination by the Sherqawi religious lodge (zawya) located there, which makes it perhaps the most important pilgrimage center on Morocco’s western plains. I consider neither the Sherqawi religious lodge nor Boujad as a microcosm of any larger entity. They are merely the loci of an intensive social anthropological study of popular Islam which I conducted there. The data collected there merely form the evidential base for a series of hypotheses about what Clifford Geertz has called “the curve of social discourse” (1973).

In one sense this study is an ethnography and follows the canons of such a study. I do not intend it as just another narrowly circumscribed, brick-laid-on-brick ethnography. Meaningful work in any social science must be based upon the concrete and the specific, but I doubt whether most readers of this book will be motivated primarily by a desire to learn more about Boujad, the Sherqawa, or perhaps even North Africa. The intensive microsociological study I present here is meant to serve as a base for discussion of key traditional Moroccan conceptions of the social order and of the problems of providing an adequate description of religion in a complex Islamic society. In the course of the work, I implicitly present my own vision of the nature of social anthropology and its relation with history, which I consider to be its sister discipline. It is these issues that initially motivated and have continued to sustain this study.

Retrospectively, it appears that the study of a pilgrimage center has probably placed the outline of religious belief and ritual in bolder relief than would have been possible elsewhere. The relatively heterogeneous population of this center and the availability of rich manuscript and oral historical data provided a more solid substance to the “curve” of religious discourse over the last century than I could have expected from most other vantage points. I say that these advantages appeared retrospectively because during a large part of my early fieldwork the difficulties of studying a place with such religious significance were much more vividly apparent to me. Boujad is an important pilgrimage center in an implicit popular pattern of Islam that is in many respects incongruent with the formal tenets of Islam. Both Boujadi-s and tribesmen were quite aware of this and often were quite reserved with the inquisitive “Roman” (rumi) writer who evinced such an avid interest in the town and its religious practices. A Boujad merchant who in his youth had studied the traditional religious sciences (and who later became a leading local nationalist) told me that he had once written a newspaper article characterizing Boujad as namsi. a subtle Arabic term which indicates someone or something evasive, secretive, elusive, and, if need be, wily. Namsi was to him and to most

Boujadi-s a positive quality, a fact which I discovered only gradually, as my perceptions of the social world about me assumed a meaningful pattern. I appreciate the combination of sincere hospitality and discretion with which Boujadi-s initially welcomed me all the more for the trust and confidence which I was eventually accorded.

Many individuals in Morocco and elsewhere have contributed to this study. Many Boujadi-s and Sherqawa have preferred to remain anonymous, but this in no way lessens my gratitude to them. The qadi of Boujad during much of my stay was Hajj ʻAbd er-Rahman 1-Mansuri, a rare exemplar of the distinguished tradition of the religious sciences in Islam. After almost a year of my fieldwork he tacitly decided that, however curious my research techniques and goals might be, they constituted a “science” in their own right. Consequently he offered me sustained intellectual and practical support, particularly in bringing his legal and scholarly training to bear on criticizing and furthering my interpretation of manuscript historical sources. I alone am responsible for the result, but my work would have been greatly handicapped without his interest in it.

Claude Ecorcheville, a controleur civil of Boujad during the 1930’s, allowed me to consult his collection of transcribed royal proclamations relating to Boujad and an account of Boujad’s history which he prepared in 1938. These have been of great value to me in the present work. Mohammed Cherkaoui (Sherqawi) has also been kind enough to speak with me at length on the history of the Sherqawa.

The Moroccan Department of Urbanism and Housing, part of the Ministry of the Interior during my initial fieldwork and now a separate ministry, actively facilitated my work at every stage. To its officials and to others at the provincial and local levels of government I owe my sincere thanks.

One of the intellectual pleasures of working in North Africa and the Middle East is the interdisciplinary, international collegiality that characterizes most area specialists. I found this the case from my student days at the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University through those at the University of Chicago. I was particularly fortunate to be at Chicago during a period of sustained faculty and student interest in Islam and the Middle East in the Department of Anthropology. Clifford Geertz, Lloyd A. Fallers, Robert McC. Adams, and Nur Yalman were then all on the faculty. Through both formal and informal seminars, Cliff quietly but vigorously insisted that each of us develop individually a style of thought and analysis. Especially since several of us were working in the same region and freely exchanging ideas, it would have been easy to lapse into a “school.” Cliff delicately managed to convey his own rigorous standard of scholarship without “guiding” me. This has been the case from our first discussions to his reading the penultimate version of this book. I am deeply grateful. Hildred Geertz and Lawrence Rosen were active participants in the Moroccan discussion group that Cliff initiated in 1968, and both have commented on the manuscript of this book. To a certain extent all of us have been concerned with similar issues, particularly the ideas concerning social structure that I develop in Chapters 4 and 5. Our concern has been not so much with “owning” ideas as with testing them on each other. Rosen particularly has discussed his ideas with me at length; I am pleased to work with such open colleagues.

This manuscript was essentially completed in June 1974, a month before the tragic death of Lloyd A. Fallers. I regret that he never got to read it, because many of the interpretations of my material were developed through extended dialogues that began in 1970 and continued until a few weeks before his death. In 1973–1974 he invited me to return to

Chicago as a Fellow of the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations and of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. I hope that in some small way this book merits his confidence in me. Robert McC. Adams has also served for years as a skeptical devil's advocate. His ruthlessly constructive criticisms have been invaluable.

T. O. Beidelman, my colleague at New York University, patiently read several versions of this manuscript with the same critical intensity that he applies to his own work. Our many hours of discussion over the entire field of anthropology have been a major formative influence on me. Nicholas Hopkins of New York University, Ross Dunn of the California State University, San Diego, Robert and Elizabeth Fernea of the University of Texas at Austin, and Jacques Berque of the College de France have also provided generous and incisive comments. For helpful discussions I wish to thank Kenneth Brown, Edmund Burke III, Jacques Cagne, Ernest Gellner, Mohammed Guessous, David Hart, Abdelkebir Khatibi, Ira Lapidus, Remy Leveau, John Middleton, and Abdulhamid el-Zein. John Kirchner prepared the base for all the maps except Figure 3. Bouzekri Draioui of the University Muhammed V checked the accuracy of the transliteration. The book is dedicated to my wife, who has lived with it and shaped it since its inception.

My initial fieldwork was supported by the Foreign Area Fellowship Program and the National Institute of Mental Health. Additional work in Morocco, although not primarily in Boujad, was made possible in the summer of 1972 by the Smithsonian Foreign Currency Program and the following summer by the Social Science Research Council. An earlier version of the first half of Chapter 4 originally appeared in the International Journal of Middle East Studies 5 (1974).

** Introduction

This is a study of Islam as it is locally received and understood in a regional pilgrimage center of western Morocco. I am particularly interested in describing and analyzing the processes by which religious symbols and institutions are reinterpreted and modified to accommodate new and evolving social and historical realities. I am also concerned with describing how religious ideologies, implicit or explicit, themselves shape the social order.

I have attempted to portray certain aspects of a particular culture and society through time. Patterns of belief and ritual, like all systems of meaning, are maintained by persons in the course of social action. As Max Weber was concerned to demonstrate by his empirical studies of the major world religious traditions (e.g., Weber 1952), beliefs and ritual action are often invested with new meanings or change direction as they are introduced in novel situations and social frameworks different from those in which they were initially developed. For this reason, ideas and systems of ideas, especially those which fundamentally shape men's attitudes toward the world and their conduct in it, cannot be analytically construed as ahistorical Platonic entities, unaffected by the ravages of time. They are in a constant tension with social reality, shaping it and in turn being shaped. My intention, however, is not to write social history, although I think this study serves to document Marshall Hodgson's claim that the so-called "folk" culture of Islam shares substantially the same dynamic force that he found more visible in Islam's "high" culture (1975:1,80). My primary goal is to make sociological sense of the changing forms in which

certain key, contradictory elements of a major religious tradition have been understood in a specific locale over the last century.

Some anthropologists might consider the above objective primarily ethnographic, informed by theory but not devoted to it. I think that would be a mistake. My presentation implicitly explores the utility of what might be called a “Weberian” paradigm for the study of social and cultural change and as such constitutes a marked departure from many anthropological treatments of these topics. As Stephen Toulmin writes, anthropology and sociology, among other fields, have recently experienced a sudden transition of their dominant paradigms. For over half a century, both fields had been dominated by a theoretical preoccupation with static, ahistorical patterns and procedures (1971: 53–54, 56). Problems of historical change were relegated to second place or even considered outside the scope of “science.” For example, Talcott Parsons has argued that a synchronic, or functional, understanding of social systems has to precede a diachronic understanding (1964:480). His reason for this is that a comprehensive sociological theory must seek logical “closure,” attainable only if society is treated abstractly and as if it were in an equilibrium. To Parsons, Weber’s lack of concern for such closure in his own writings constituted his “failure” (introduction to Weber 1964:20–25)[1] Other social scientists have gone so far as to insist that sociological abstractions can be made only from ahistorical studies. They argue that, since processes of historical change are particularistic and nonrecurrent, they fall outside the domain of sociological abstraction (e.g., Devons and Gluckman 1964:159–160, 201). A less extreme variation on this argument has been to deal with historical change in synchronic form by juxtaposing several earlier and later descriptions of a single culture or society. The limitation of this strategy is that it serves more to contrast the end points of certain processes than to focus on the nature of the changes taking place. This encourages a conception of historical change in terms of discrete, episodic units, rather than as a continuous process.

There is an increasing awareness of the limitation of ahistorical paradigms for the study of diachronic processes, but it would be a mistake to look, as a consequence, for exclusively diachronic ones. There is no reason to assume a radical dichotomy between stringent historical nominalism and the use of sociological ideal types. Both historians and social scientists continuously interweave the two approaches in the narratives and explanations which they present. This study will try to document empirically the lack of an inherent contradiction between attempts to explain specific events and attempts to seek to confirm recurrent regularities.

Perhaps the clearest illustration of the sociological explanation of specific historical situations remains the paradigm implicit in Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Leaving aside the empirical accuracy of Weber’s argument, his basic problem focuses on a historically unique phenomenon, the emergence of what he calls “rational” capitalism in the West. He seeks to explain this in general, systemic terms by relating developments in the economic order to a particular religious ethos (Weber 1958:25, 166). Weber carefully specifies that the core of his argument concerns the dialectical interrelation of these two elements; but he does not postulate a sequence of unidirectional causation between them (1958:182–183). Weber was simply interested in showing that the two variables, as logically delimited, were in significant tension with each other. He did not seek to validate his thesis by presenting these two elements in a logically closed system. This lack of logical “functional” closure makes Weber’s style of sociology amenable to the analysis of specific historical situations. It also has the advantage of lending itself more easily to a conceptualization of sociological variables over time than the style of argument in which the historical dimension is presented only in superimposed synchronic layers.

The usefulness of such a paradigm for the study of society must be tested not by its pretensions to logical “closure” but by its capacity to provide the best available explanation —consistent, plausible, and in accord with all the evidence—for the problem at hand. This goal is both realistic and attainable if one assumes, as I do, that events in the social world always contain unpredictable and accidental elements and that any paradigm for the study of society must somehow take account of these elements in order to offer an adequate comprehension of social action. The compelling advantage of the Weberian paradigm over other approaches (such as those assuming historical “laws”) is its capacity to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the sociological features of particular historical developments. The purpose of comparative studies within such an approach is not the gossamer pursuit of general “laws” of history or society but the sharper understanding of particular historical situations and the social forces at work in them. I shall return to these issues throughout my discussion.

I realize that the questions that I raise regarding the nature of religious change in a complex society are difficult and capable of no easy answer. At times my discussion becomes necessarily tentative, and, in fairness to the reader, I will point out such instances as they occur. I have preferred this course to that of sacrificing what I feel are significant issues for less crucial ones that lend themselves to at least a surface elegance or a “neat” representation within more conventional explanatory paradigms used by anthropologists. Similarly, my argument is occasionally more detailed ethnographically and historically than may appear immediately necessary for my implicit theoretical argument. This is deliberate. The main features of North African Islam have often been taken for granted or otherwise misrepresented in much of the literature on the region. A fuller presentation, such as I have attempted here, at least permits the reader to check some of my more abstract conclusions and to discern other possible analytical implications than those which I have chosen to emphasize.

The fieldwork on which this book is based was conducted in Boujad, a town of eighteen thousand people (est. 1970), and its tribal and religious hinterland (see Fig. 1). The town’s significance lies in its continuing dominance by the Sherqawi religious lodge (zawya) located there, which was founded in the late sixteenth century by the marabout Sidi Mhammed Sherqi (d. 1601). Roughly one-third of the town’s population claims descent from him. Collectively, his descendants are called the Sherqawa. The powers attributed to them and certain of their enshrined ancestors form the magnet that attracts pilgrims from throughout western Morocco.

The most striking feature of North African Islam is the presence of marabouts, such as Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. They are persons, living or dead,[2] to whom is attributed a special relation toward God which makes them particularly well placed to serve as intermediaries with the supernatural and to communicate God’s grace (baraka) to their clients. On the basis of this conception, marabouts in the past have played key religious, political, and economic roles in North African society, particularly in Morocco. Until the end of the nineteenth century, maraboutism was virtually without contest the prevailing form of rural and urban Islam throughout North Africa (Merad 1967:58). The complex of beliefs surrounding marabouts was—and for many North Africans continues to be (although in significantly modified forms, as will become clear)—a central and integral element in a coherent vision both of the realities of the social world and of man’s relations to the supernatural.[3] A concrete indication of this is the proliferation of maraboutic shrines throughout the Maghreb, particularly in Morocco. In Morocco’s rural areas, one rarely loses sight of the squat, whitewashed, and—in the case of the more popular ones—domed maraboutic shrines. In towns, more lavish shrines with green-tiled roofs are often found,

with vast courtyards and adjoining mosques and hostels for pilgrims. The shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi takes this form, as do those of several of his descendants that are also situated in Boujad.

Tens of thousands of pilgrims, singly and in groups, visit these shrines throughout the year. The greatest influx is during the annual festival (musem) of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, held in late September or early October. For a two-week interval, the town doubles in size, as client groups, each of which stays an average of three days, renew their covenants with the Sherqawa. At other times of the year, the descendants of marabouts go out to their clients and say invocations on their behalf in exchange for customary offerings. In all, the activities associated with marabouts are impressive. Few others so thoroughly involve the active participation of the majority of the region's rural population and activate social ties that transcend ordinary economic, social, and administrative boundaries. This fact is not lost upon government officials, despite their formal assertion that maraboutism constitutes an atavistic ideological residue of the least "evolved" segment of the population. Seventy percent of the country's population was rural as of 1970 (as opposed to an estimated 93 percent in 1900) (Noin 1970:11, 100) and, as I shall indicate below, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of the rural population supports maraboutic activities in some form. In the past much of the urban population also supported such activities.

In this study I am not trying to generalize directly from Boujad to any larger entity. I consider neither the Sherqawi religious lodge nor Boujad as a microcosm of a larger whole. The study of such a pilgrimage center as Boujad undoubtedly places the outline of religious belief and ritual in bolder relief than would have been possible elsewhere. Moreover, manuscript and oral historical sources, both French and Moroccan, were available for Boujad. These were invaluable for tracing the curve of religious understandings and transformations of religious institutions over the last century, especially through the turbulent years that immediately preceded the French protectorate in 1912. Boujad's role as a "company town" for the descendants of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi notwithstanding, the activities of its population are heterogeneous, as would be expected in a regional market center, which the town also is. There are no more full-time religious specialists in Boujad than in other towns of commensurate size. What is important is that roughly the same range of coexisting understandings of Islam is found in Boujad as elsewhere in Morocco, although there is considerable variation in the pattern of religiously oriented activities or institutions.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-17.jpg]]

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-16.jpg][Figure 1. Morocco.]]

Understanding the character of Islam in Boujad, particularly the role of marabouts and its temporal transformations, goes in one key sense beyond its ethnographic importance for a particular region of Morocco or even North Africa. Figures similar to marabouts, ambiguously and often misleadingly labeled as saints, Sufi-s (mystics), or holy men, exist throughout the Islamic world. This is not to say that they all play similar social or cultural roles. They decidedly do not. But everywhere they popularly represent an implicitly

hierarchical conception of the relations between man and God.

Their supporters see marabouts and similar “holy men” as a hierarchy of intermediaries through whom the supernatural pervades, sustains, and affects the universe. Analytically, an observer may hold such a conception of access to the divine to be, in Weber’s sense of the term, a “magical” accretion to Islam; but from the viewpoint of tribesmen, peasants, and others who hold such beliefs and act upon them, intermediaries with God are part of Islam as they understand it. Supporters of this conception do not in general systematically articulate their beliefs, but they certainly would reject the notion that they are an amalgam of Islamic and non-Islamic elements. They regard themselves as Muslims, pure and simple. In what sense, then, can such beliefs be considered to form a part of Islam?

Ernst Troeltsch (1960) posed a similar question of the Christian tradition. He argued that, sociologically, Christianity could be seen as constantly in tension with social reality. Consequently, its sociological history is one of shifts at various levels between compromise and noncompromise with the world. A similar pattern can be seen in Islam. Maraboutic assumptions about the relations between man and God (and similar assumptions elsewhere in the Muslim world) are diametrically opposed to what most contemporary educated Muslims consider to be the “scripturalist” core of Islamic belief and ritual, but at the same time bear closer relation to the existing framework of social relations. Let me briefly, perhaps too abstractly, outline these opposed assumptions. Scripturalists and Islamic modernists assume that all men, including the Prophet Muhammed, are considered equals before God, even if they are not so in the eyes of each other. They also assume that there is no human or nonhuman hierarchy that has privileged access to God. There are supernatural beings besides God—angels, jinn-s, Satan, and saints (wali-s\ but none of these serve as intermediaries. These assumptions are explicit in the Qur’an and in the teachings of numerous reformist movements which have been an integral part of the Islamic tradition since the time of the Prophet (Merad 1967:29; Rahman 1968:245). These “formal” doctrinal tenets have been aggressively propagated by an articulate, reformist elite in recent decades (and periodically in the past— the first “reform” movements began not long after the death of Muhammed) and have had a decided impact upon popular belief, especially with the spread of “modern,” city-oriented life-styles. Characterizing these beliefs as “formal” Islam is not entirely satisfactory, but it reflects their emphasis upon the equality of men before God and the fact that most educated, articulate Muslims now adhere to these interpretations of Islam rather than to any others.

Those who remain in client relations with marabouts and their descendants are aware of the disfavor with which their beliefs are viewed by educated Muslims. For this reason, maraboutic beliefs and rituals are often denied before outsiders or dissimulated in favor of the formal tenets of Islam. Still, maraboutic beliefs are tenaciously seen by the clients of marabouts to be the way things really are in the relations between man and God.

Unfortunately, the hierarchical assumptions implicit in much of popular Islam are largely unrecorded and poorly understood. Relatively few studies of Islam have ventured beyond the presentation and analysis of written texts and the explicit ideologies of an articulate religious intelligentsia. In contrast to various reformist movements that have explicit ideologies and representatives willing to discuss them, little attention has been given to the description and analysis of popular, “traditional” beliefs and their social context (Merad 1967). The works of Jacques Berque and, more recently, Clifford Geertz constitute singular exceptions to this neglect. Most reformist Muslims and scholars of Islam typically attribute the continuing strength of traditional, maraboutic beliefs to an ignorance of “true” Islam on the part of many Muslims both now and in the past. Such “ignorant” persons are thus,

according to reformists, at the mercy of charlatans, parasites, opportunists, and other varieties of “spiritual delinquents” (Rahman 1968:185).

At least for North Africa, such accounts of the persistence of marabouts are exceedingly unconvincing. As I discovered early in my fieldwork, the supporters of marabouts are fully aware, at least in outline, of the interpretations of Islam offered by the scripturalists; yet they continue to regard maraboutic Islam as a meaningful religious representation of reality.

What then, are the implications of the coexistence of these antithetical notions of Islam? I think it is useful to anticipate part of my argument. In the Islamic tradition as it has emerged in various parts of the world, the conceptions of man’s relations to God as comprising or lacking intermediaries are correlative rather than mutually exclusive and are in a dialectical tension with each other and with social reality. Both now and in the past, these conceptions have been known at least in bold outline to all believers. Taken together in various syntheses according to temporal and social contexts, these two conceptions have enabled Islam to encompass many varieties of social experience and to be regarded at any given time as a meaningful religious representation of reality. I believe that the proper study of any world religious tradition involves understanding its variants over time and place and their interrelation. The career of maraboutism and of marabouts in Boujad provides a concrete instance of how a world religion has remained living and meaningful to those who sustain it.

The order of presentation of this study is somewhat unorthodox for an anthropological monograph. In order to make my discussion of the relation of religious ideologies to society as clear as possible, I have found it convenient not to follow a strictly historical progression. In any case, Boujadi-s themselves have multiple conceptions of the past which they often invoke with varying degrees of consciousness to facilitate their comprehension of social action. My own shifting between past and present has much the same intention. Only the first two chapters are ordered in strict chronology. Chapter 1 outlines in a very general way the implantation and early development of Islam in Morocco. In large part it is meant to orient readers unfamiliar with North Africa. lam particularly concerned with the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries, the so-called Maraboutic Crisis, during which maraboutic Islam gained hegemony. In a sense, the “filling out” of maraboutic Islam that occurred during this period is the inverse process to the chief concern of this book, the loosening hold of that same pattern over the last century. Although both Moroccan and foreign historians have been attracted to the analysis of this period, the social bases of maraboutism are generally assumed rather than described. Since traditional chronicles present only those aspects of maraboutism congruent with the formal tenets of Islam, this is not surprising. I try to correct some of these lacunae in my ensuing discussion of the preprotectorate history and sociological characteristics of the Sherqawi religious lodge in Chapter 2. Because precolonial sources for the political activities of marabouts are almost nonexistent, I discuss my sources in detail in an appendix.

The next major section of the book, Chapters 3–5, presents the economic activities and social institutions of Boujad and its rural hinterland, their social structure, and some of the basic common-sense assumptions that Boujadi-s and tribesmen make about the social order. These are not just “contextual” chapters prefacing the intensive discussion of maraboutism and the changing local consciousness of Islam, the subject of the final three chapters. Of course, maraboutism as an implicit, unarticulated pattern of belief and ritual action has derived much of its strength from a congruence with the values that guide everyday conduct. Such congruences have hardly gone unreported in the classic

monographs of social anthropology. But these congruences are neither total nor permanent. For this reason, of perhaps greater interest are those situations, both now and in the preprotectorate past, in which such congruences have been denied or questioned, and which have led to shifts in patterns of belief and ritual and, equally, to altered conceptions of the social order.

** 1. Morocco, Islam, and the Maraboutic Crisis

*** The Geographical Background

Of all the countries of North Africa, Morocco shows the most marked ecological diversity. In the Middle East as a whole, perhaps only Iraq shows a similar range of variation, although Morocco does not share the latter country's sharp ethnic and religious cleavages. Geographers divide Morocco into twenty-three distinct ecological zones, although these can be grouped into three major regions: the Rif and Atlas mountain chains, the coastal and interior plains situated roughly between Marrakesh and Fes, and the semiarid pre-Sahara of the south (Noin 1970:1,88–89). The first two of these regions show little marked discontinuity with the southern half of Spain, a resemblance complemented by others in traditional rural genres de vie and in the spatial organization of traditional towns.

Except for Marrakesh, Morocco's most important towns and cities are located on the plains to the northwest, especially the Sais, Gharb, and Shawya. This region also has the heaviest rainfall and the richest agricultural land. Consequently, with the exception of certain densely populated pockets of the Rif Mountains, it carries the highest population concentration of the country, roughly sixty persons per square kilometer. This density affords a dramatic contrast to the average of five persons per square kilometer in the arid southeast (Martin et al. 1967:57).

As one proceeds southward from these plains, Morocco becomes progressively more arid. This is especially the case south of the Umm er-Rbi' River. Nevertheless, large parts of these plains have been provided with modern irrigation since the 1930's and thus now form a part of what the French (and by imitation the Spanish, who administered a small northern zone) used to call le Maroc utile ("useful Morocco"), the agriculturally rich and economically exploitable regions that once attracted the major part of colonial settlement and investment. Prior to the protectorate the tribes of these coastal and interior plains were also "useful" to the Makhzen, or central government, in that taxes and other levies could be more regularly exacted from them than from the tribes of other regions. For this reason "useful Morocco" was also known as the "land of the Makhzen" (blad l-Makhzen). The term Makhzen literally means "a place to store treasure." Its popular connotations are obvious. The core of le Maroc inutile from the point of view of colonial economics was the two major mountain chains and the pre-Sahara. These regions also broadly coincided with what colonial ethnographers and Makhzen officials called the "lands of dissidence" (blad es-siba'), zones only sporadically under the control of the Makhzen.

Perhaps the most important ecological features which have affected Morocco's political fortunes are its two mountain chains. In the north, the Rif Mountains impede easy access from the Mediterranean to the interior of the country. To the west and the south, the

Middle and High Atlas mountain chains have been characterized as a “natural barrier” to the rest of the continent. Traditionally, these mountainous regions have offered natural zones of refuge from the Makhzen for the predominantly Berber-speaking tribes that populate them. Some of these tribes are sedentarized; others, even to the present, largely transhumant. Except during intermittent periods when charismatic religious and political leaders emerged to unite them, these tribes have remained relatively fragmented and autonomous. Even France, with the resources of a modern colonial power, took twenty-one years, from 1912 to 1933, to “pacify” all of its possession.

Nonetheless, the importance of these mountains and the lack of natural harbors in isolating Morocco has often been exaggerated. The use of such geographical factors as natural barriers to explain the course of Moroccan history has primarily a metaphorical utility. During most of the Middle Ages of Europe, the fortunes of Morocco were closely linked with those of the Iberian Peninsula; for certain extended periods, the Iberian Peninsula was even ruled from Morocco. From at least the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries it was less any natural barriers than the policies of its successive rulers which isolated Morocco both from Europe and, to a lesser extent, from the Middle East as well. General Franco, in launching his campaign against Republican Spain from Morocco in 1936 with significant numbers of Riffian tribesmen in his ranks, was only the last of a large number of conquerors to show the permeability of the boundary between North Africa and southern Europe.

Similarly, the Atlas Mountains to the south may have impeded, but in no way cut, communications. From the middle of the ninth through the fourteenth century, most of the gold trade from Black Africa to the Middle East flowed through Morocco. At the end of the nineteenth century there was a significant, if no longer flourishing, trans-Saharan caravan traffic linking sub-Saharan Africa with Marrakesh, Fes, and other major Moroccan cities (Dunn 1971). The remote Tafilalt oasis in Morocco’s southeast, far from being politically peripheral, was strategically situated along one of the major north-south caravan routes and was the birthplace of the ‘Alawi dynasty, which has controlled the Moroccan empire (a kingdom since 1956) from 1666 to the present. The earlier Sa‘adi dynasty (1555–1659) came from the Dra Valley. Both dynasties have based their legitimacy upon patrilineal descent from the Prophet Muhammed.

*** Islam in Morocco: The Early Stages

Islam first came to Morocco in 681 with the raid of the Muslim general ‘Uqba ben Nafi. This lightning expedition, which occurred less than fifty years after the death of the Prophet Muhammed, did not immediately lead to a permanent Arab and Muslim presence. Not much is known of the process of Islamization or the consolidation of Arab hegemony for this period, but they seem to have varied considerably according to tribal and other political divisions of any given region. More certain is that by the middle of the eighth century at least a nominal Islam had been firmly established throughout Morocco, but the systematic Islamization of the Berber-speaking tribes was a slow process which stretched out over the next few centuries and occasionally encountered determined opposition. The fact that some of the resistance was led by prophets claiming revelations in Berber dialects rather than Arabic reflects the formidable linguistic and, to a certain extent, cultural barriers which had to be overcome in the spread of Islam (Brignon et al. 1968:49–57; Bel 1938:166–188; Julien 1972:127–128, 370).

Throughout the early period of Islamization, there was a constant, although often

antagonistic, contact between the autochthonous Berber tribesmen and the Arab conquerors. At first, the cutting edge for the diffusion of Islam was the towns and fortresses (rbat-s) where Arab contingents were stationed. Arabic gradually became the language of the towns and of contact with the garrisons (Bel 1938: 363–365; Brignon et al. 1968:53–62). One of the first Arab dynasties of Morocco, the Idrissi (788–1016), dates from this period. It was founded by Idris I (d. 791), who escaped the massacre of his family in the Muslim Orient and fled to Morocco. As a claimed descendant of the Prophet Muhammed, he was enthusiastically received and supported by certain Berber tribes. The reign (803-828/829) of his successor, Idris II, a son by a Berber concubine, marked the beginning of an effective government, although essentially confined to the plains between the Rif and Middle Atlas mountains, and of a more profound and systematic Islamization of the Berber tribes.

Although from the ninth century onward the interaction of townsmen and tribesmen in Morocco was continuous and intense, it would be an error to reduce this to a simple manifestation of Arab-Berber conflict, or of mutually impermeable urban and tribal life-styles. As Clifford Geertz has pointed out, Morocco is at the frontier of the grain-growing world and developed no stable buffer of peasants between the cities and tribes as occurred elsewhere (1968:5–7). Colonial historiographers often portrayed Morocco's towns and cities as foreign bodies in a vast sea of tribesmen. But from the advent of the Muslim conquest they progressively became and remained very much interdependent economically with their rural hinterlands and involved in the same range of political activities. Only since the onset of the protectorate has the gap between the two again widened.

The fluid interpenetration of towns with tribal areas is particularly salient in the period 1050–1450, characterized as the Great Age of Berber Islam and the formative period of Morocco as a nation. In contrast with the superficial Islamization accomplished by the first wave of Muslim conquerors, in this period it was Berber tribesmen who enhanced Islam as a symbol of Moroccan identity. Both the Almoravid (1061–1147) and Almohad (1130–1269) dynasties were founded and consolidated by charismatic Berber leaders who, to use Geertz's striking phrase, combined "strong-man politics with holyman piety" (1968:8). They managed to fuse Berber tribes into effective political forces and incorporate towns and, for significant periods, even much of the Iberian Peninsula into their empires. For religious reasons both dynasties provided an impetus for Arabization. Moreover, a second influx of Arab tribal migrations in the eleventh century, the so-called Hilali Invasion of colonial historians, led to a further erosion of distinctions between Berber and Arabic-speaking tribes. This further strengthened the political base of these dynasties and contributed to the formation of a distinct Moroccan identity.

By the fifteenth century, however, the unifying ideology which sustained these two dynasties was exhausted and the political order which they forged had collapsed. It was in the period of intense ideological and political dislocation which followed, the Maraboutic Crisis, that Morocco developed a distinct style of polity and of religious expression which was to persist largely intact until the early part of this century.

*** The Maraboutic Crisis and Its Assessment

The Maraboutic Crisis lasted roughly from the fifteenth to the end of the seventeenth century. Its beginning was not sharply marked by any one event but rather by the constellation of several historical developments. As the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties declined, they were followed by that of the Merinids (1146–1546). This dynasty, in turn,

eased into a period of prolonged decline. A major economic factor contributing to this political weakness was Morocco's diminished control of the lucrative trans-Saharan gold trade with the development of alternate routes. Further, Spanish and Portuguese "crusaders" had established enclaves along Morocco's coasts. The Merinids had constantly to compromise with them and with the Christian powers of southern Europe. Many of the dynasty's subjects criticized it for yielding unnecessarily to Christian demands. The Ottomans in Algeria, who were not under direct pressure from Christian powers, played on this sentiment and exacerbated the difficulties of the Moroccan dynasty by supporting opposition to it.

In this same general period, Berber tribesmen from the extreme south of Morocco began a vast movement into the central regions and plains which was to continue over the next few centuries. The overall effect was to create a period of prolonged civil and dynastic strife (Burke 1969:70–75; Bel 1938:376–400; Lacoste 1974). Religious and political authority was open to competition at every level of articulation of society, hard to maintain, and subject to reversal (C. Geertz 1968). Under these conditions the sultanate, rather than being the center of authority and legitimacy, was just one of a number of competing centers of power.

I think it is useful here to specify exactly how a discussion of this period fits into this study. In one sense, that pursued by Geertz in Islam Observed (1968), it is important as the formative period that shaped much of Morocco's prevailing religious and political style for ensuing centuries. This is of interest because, as I have mentioned, it is the inverse of that same style that concerns me here. But the lack of sources that reveal the sociological nature of this period limits its possibilities for a comparative study. Instead, I want to concentrate here upon some of the ways in which this period has been construed historiographically and by contemporary educated Moroccans. This concern brings into sharp focus some of the obstacles to the study of Islam as popularly understood.

One component of understanding any historical action, at least for contemporary social historians, is an effort to see events as they were originally comprehended by participants in them. In reconstructing this aspect of the past, historians are professionally aware of the necessarily arbitrary process of selection and abstraction involved in their work. In other words, the comprehension of historical action involves the observer's consciousness about what is essential in past action interacting with what is known of past events. Consequently, it is possible to have multiple conceptions of the past. Far from being a sterile relativism or the despair of hard-bitten positivists, an attention to these problems of perception enhances the social historian's (and the social anthropologist's) sensitivity toward temporal shifts in cultural understandings prevailing at any given time. This applies to the investigation of the present as much as the past, since the shape of the past and attitudes toward it serve as major elements in defining contemporary social realities.

This has been the case for the Maraboutic Crisis. Despite the general thinness of sources for the period, it has been used by colonial historians and many educated Moroccans in recent decades as a sort of Rorschach protocol for elaborating their conceptions of Moroccan (or, alternatively for some, Muslim) society. Although differing in other respects, both colonial historians and Muslim scripturalists assume that Moroccan culture and society became "frozen" during this period and did not alter in essential form until the protectorate era. For the moment, I want to leave aside the question of the dubious accuracy of this assumption and concentrate upon what the historiography of the Maraboutic Crisis reveals about attitudes toward the popular understanding of Islam.

With the exception of the recent work of Abdallah Laroui (1970), the most elaborate assessment of the Maraboutic Crisis remains that developed by French colonial historians, basing themselves upon historical and ethnographic research conducted in the first part of this century. Such studies were primarily undertaken by individuals directly or indirectly concerned with establishing or maintaining the machinery of the protectorate. Like India for the English, Morocco tended to attract a higher caliber of French personnel than other colonies, so that the work of these scholars remains the starting point for reappraisals of Morocco's past. Or, to be more exact, the "colonial vulgate" is now an inherent part of that past.

Key elements of what the French saw as "traditional," here as in other colonies, were frozen into place to serve as the symbols of legitimacy for the "protecting" power. The French felt that, with their early ethnographic inquiries, often carried out by military intelligence officers, they had ascertained the essential features of le Maroc disparu ("the Morocco that was"), the colonial phrase used to describe Morocco as it presumably was for an indeterminate period prior to the protectorate. The French then formally maintained that their task as "protector" was to preserve and to enhance what they considered to be the positive features of preprotectorate Morocco. As French rule became established, the early ethnographic formulations of the nature of indigenous society tended increasingly to be invoked rather than reassessed in the light of changing conditions. At least in the early part of the protectorate, the French were able to make their view of Moroccan society a significant component of social reality.

French administrators and scholars occasionally described North African society as totally static from the exit of the Romans to the establishment of French control.[4] This state of affairs sometimes was attributed to the impact of Islam (e.g., van Gennep 1914: esp. 157—194) or, alternatively, to the fixed religious conceptions of the indigenous Berber population (e.g., Bel 1938). Lucien Levy-Bruhl's concept of the "primitive mentality" was avidly picked up by colonial specialists on Morocco as a way of theoretically justifying their assumption that Islam had such a grip on society that the minds of Moroccans were collectively stocked with a fixed set of images impermeable to modification or change (Brunot 1923; 1934; Hardy 1926).[5] As late as 1951 a leading French administrator and ethnographer wrote that in Islam "evolution is boundlessly slow. For Islam, even more than for other religions, one has to count not in years but in centuries" (Montagne, foreword to Drague 1951:5; italics added).[6]

Relatively few scholars engaged in the hyperbole of seeing the forms of North African society as fixed from the time of the Romans. But, as I have indicated, most were willing to see the Maraboutic Crisis as the decisive period in which Islamic beliefs and institutions were refashioned so as to be in accord with what were assumed, rather than demonstrated, to be certain "fundamental" notions of the indigenous population of North Africa.

*** The "Fundamental" Beliefs of Barbary

One of the most influential colonial accounts of the religious synthesis which occurred during the Maraboutic Crisis was that of Alfred Bel. Bel was a French orientalist who for many years taught in Algeria and Morocco and who, among other tasks early in the Moroccan protectorate, was responsible for reorganizing the traditional religious teaching at the Qarawiyin Mosque in Fes, which once was one of the great centers of Islamic learning in North Africa. In the 1930's his lectures on Islam, on which his La Religion musulmane en Berberie (1938) is based, were a standard part of the curriculum for

training the protectorate’s native-affairs officers. Jacques Berque has pointed out to me that Bel’s work was out of date by the time it was published. This is undoubtedly the case. But the fact remains that Bel had a prolonged influence on educated colonial officials and others and that better general accounts written for a wider public, such as Henri Terrasse’s Histoire du Maroc (1949–1950), became available only much later.

Bel’s account is particularly interesting because it tries to demonstrate thoroughly the complex interrelation between Moroccan religious beliefs and the political developments of the period which he discusses. His assessment of this interrelation contains obvious distortions, especially in his acceptance of a stratigraphy of religious beliefs and of an image of “true” religion as somehow independent from other aspects of society. Bel nevertheless carefully considers all available documentation.

Bel’s argument is an idealist one. He sees a long-term historical evolution which occasioned a gradual erosion of essential Islamic tenets. This purported trend is the result of his assuming an earlier period when Islamic beliefs were understood and practiced virtually in idealized, pure forms almost exclusively by the Islamicized urban elite of North African society. Almost no explicit sociological context is provided for this period. By adding sociological detail and depicting the understanding of Islamic beliefs in popular milieus for later periods, Bel manages to suggest the decline and compromise of Islam, which he indistinguishably conceives as a “religious faith” and as a civilization.

In many ways the structure of Bel’s study resembles that of Fustel de Coulanges’s The Ancient City. Like earlier commentators on Morocco (e.g., Doutte 1903), Bel presumes a stratigraphic model of the historical development of religion and society. His book begins with an account of what he assumes to be the first known religious practices of North Africa; later chapters deal successively with various periods up to the sixteenth century. A single concluding chapter presents religious beliefs as they presumably have remained over the last four centuries.[7] In this chapter alone, Bel frequently introduces ethnographic materials, but he apologizes for presenting “popular religious fictions” and “pious legends,” since these he considers only a “muddle” of actual historical events in contrast with written accounts (1938:390–400).

In detail, Bel argues that after Islam was first introduced in “Barbary”—the standard colonial term for North Africa prior to and after the Islamic conquest—both its formal rituals and Islamic mysticism (tasawwuf^ Sufism) were understood and practiced primarily by an urban elite. Tribesmen who came to towns to pursue the study of Islam were invariably assimilated into the towns and did not try to carry their knowledge to the countryside (Bel 1938:364–365).

Beginning with the thirteenth century, rural religious lodges (zawya-s) began to complement those already in the towns. The teachings of these lodges tended to emphasize Sufism over other aspects of Islam. The principles and ritual necessary to progress in the stages of the mystic way (jariqa) were a primary concern.[8] Each religious lodge was directed by a Sufi master, called a shaykh. It is indicative of his idealistic assumptions toward his material and an implicit comparison with institutionalized European mysticism that Bel glosses the term shaykh as directeur de conscience (“spiritual director”). Each shaykh had an entourage of disciples; collectively, shaykh-s and their disciples were known as foqra (sg., fqir), a term defined in Sufi texts as “those who have abandoned everything in quest of God.” The foqra of each religious

lodge were materially sustained by gifts and contributions made by the inhabitants of the surrounding region (Bel 1938:352–353).

The spread of zawya-s from the towns to the countryside provoked a fundamental change in the nature of Sufism. Bel writes that the strict rules, the severe rituals, the monotheistic conception of God, and the more subtle aspects of mystic doctrines were incomprehensible to "unpolished, minimally educated" tribal disciples. These were incapable of accurately comprehending the fundamental tenets of Islam. Islam in the countryside thus had to be "reduced" to the understanding of the "vulgar populace" (I'homme du peuple'). The abstract components of Islamic doctrine could not survive in the emerging synthesis of Islamic populism (Bel 1938:355, 369; also see Michaux-Bellaire 1927:4). Religious lodges in tribal areas humbly began as centers to propagate a "correct" understanding of Islamic doctrine and practice, writes Bel, but became increasingly enmeshed in local society and tribal politics. In the political disorders of the fifteenth century and later, the rural population turned increasingly to the religious leaders of these lodges to relieve them of oppressive government, repurchase captives held for ransom by Christian invaders, and alleviate other forms of need or misfortune (Bel 1938: 353).

According to Bel, the main reason that these rural zawya-s were incapable of "raising" the level of understanding of religion was the impermeability of what he calls the "fundamental religion" of the Berbers. Bel admits that the evidence for the nature of these beliefs is negligible or uncertain but says that, as far back as can be traced, Berbers seem to have believed in a mix of good and bad "forces" and in magical techniques of protection against vague, malevolent spirits. For Bel, one proof of the existence and pervasiveness of this religious substratum was the relatively short period of time during which the Almoravid and Almohad ideologies managed to hold sway over the Berber populations. Another indication of these fundamental beliefs for Bel was the rapid and widespread success of vulgarized Sufism, in which Sufi shaykh-s in rural regions were quickly assimilated into the pre-existing religious framework and had attributed to them the ability to convey supernatural blessings, baraka. Bel explains the popularity of this conception as follows: "Does not the idea of the tutelary God of Islam—more powerful than demonic spirits—lead to that by which God can transmit to certain meti, his friends [szc], a part of his power, his baraka? To become one of these men by Sufi exercises, to gather from these human fetishes (hommes fetiches) a parcel of their beneficent influence, which chases and destroys the forces of evil, was a perspective well in accord with everyone's aspirations" (1938:342).

A key element in Bel's presentation of the fusion of various concepts into an Islam compatible with pre-existing "fundamental beliefs" during the Maraboutic Crisis was the increasing significance attached to descendants of the Prophet Muhammed, collectively called shorfa (sg., shrif).

Prior to the fifteenth century the concept of descent from the Prophet and that of maraboutism were largely separate. Gradually, some of the more successful marabouts, such as the Berber mystic al-Jazuli (d. 1465/1466), who was reputed to have had twelve thousand disciples at the time of his death, claimed descent from the Prophet. Increasingly the concepts of maraboutism and descent from Muhammed fused. From the fifteenth century onward, writes Bel, there was an "epidemic" of claims by marabouts of descent from the Prophet. Even the names of many tribes changed during this period to indicate such descent.

Similarly, before the fifteenth century a marabout was “one who is tied to God” and thus was equivalent to a Sufi shaykh. The term also signified the early propagators of Islam, who lived in fortified enclosures (rbat-s—a word derived from the same triliteral root as mrabet, “marabout”). By the fifteenth century, however, the meaning of marabout had significantly shifted. By that time marabouts were regarded as saints (wali-s and saleh-s). It was popularly believed that for temporal success men had to attach themselves to marabouts. who were capable of communicating God’s grace (baraka) to them. In part, this capacity was considered hereditary. A reputation for being a marabout could be based upon varying combinations of descent from the Prophet Muhammed (or from ‘Umar ben 1-Khattab, his second successor, or caliph ^khalifa’, in all but prophetic powers), religious scholarship (7Zm), mystic insight, and the possession of uncanny powers. These attributes were permeable, in that possession of one frequently constituted evidence for the others. Thus, feats of religious scholarship gave one the reputation of being a marabout (e.g., Bel 1938:371). A reputation as a marabout conversely legitimated claims to descent from the Prophet (e.g., Levi-Proven$al 1922:201).

Throughout these developments, Bel writes that the carriers of Islamic learning (‘z’Zm) continued their teaching in the cities, although their scholarship, insulated from contemporary realities and popular acceptance, became increasingly pedantic and fossilized. Marabouts were left to purvey to the masses a “vulgar” mysticism and fatalistic resignation to the world, stripped of the more rigorous aspects of the Islamic tradition. Thus their synthesis of Islamic populism was devoid of a critical spirit. The hegemony of mara- boutism was, nevertheless, to last almost unchallenged until the early twentieth century. It signaled for Bel the general collapse (flechisse- ment) of Muslim civilization in North Africa (1938:369–372, 388).

The political consequences of maraboutism were far-reaching. The Sa‘adi and ‘Alawi dynasties of Morocco both claimed legitimacy on the basis of descent from the Prophet Muhammed. Marabouts helped both of these dynasties to power but at the same time struggled to establish and maintain their own local and regional political autonomy. By the late sixteenth century maraboutism was firmly established as the idiom of political action. Both the Ottomans, in possession of Tlem^en from 1555 and Tunis from 1574, and the Moroccan dynasties increasingly pursued a maraboutic style of politics and associated marabouts with their own political ends in order to maintain popular support of the “Berber” tribal majority. Religious lodges and marabouts claiming ties with the mystic shaykh al-Jazuli predominated in regions allied with the Moroccan dynasties. Those claiming ties with shaykh ‘Abd 1-Qader l-Jilani (d. 1166) were primarily allied with the Ottomans. As mentioned, Moroccan dynasties were compelled to temporize with the Christian powers, while both the Ottomans and marabouts (whether or not they were allied with the Ottomans) were able to call uncompromisingly for holy war (jihad) against the infidels.

Bel writes that, under these circumstances, Morocco found itself “prey” to marabouts who consciously exploited their reputation for sanctity as a conscious device for temporal aggrandizement. Citing approvingly an earlier source, Bel writes that, from the sixteenth century onward, marabouts “under the cover of religion” founded feudal “fiefs” (1938:376–388).[9] Such statements sharply reveal Bel’s implicit assumption of what is “properly” religious. But Bel does seem correct in emphasizing that from at least the sixteenth century to the protectorate there was considerable tension between marabouts and the sultanate. Both marabouts and the sultan shared some of the same bases of popular legitimacy. By formal accounts the sultan (since 1956 the king) is the temporal center of the Moroccan

empire. At the same time, by virtue of descent from the Prophet Muhammed, the sultan is also popularly considered to be the caliph, God's deputy on earth (khalifet Allah fel-l-ard)[10] As such, he is also Morocco's spiritual leader. Since French policy from shortly prior to the protectorate was to support the institution of the sultanate as the basis on which the French presence was legitimized, this doctrine was further elaborated in the early colonial era. But the sultan has a second popular basis of legitimacy that is ambiguously shared with marabouts. This is the possession of divine grace (baraka) and the ability to transmit it. This basis of legitimacy even figured in a proposed Moroccan constitution of 1908.[11]

The tension inherent in this ambiguity is apparent in a royal decree (daher) dated 12 July 1820 / 10 Shawwal 1235,[12] in which Sultan Mulay Sliman invested an eleven-year-old marabout as lord (sid or mqaddem) of the Sherqawi religious lodge. In the decree the boy is told that he inherits the "secret of your ancestors" (sirr aslafikum), that is, the powers of a marabout, and that he is responsible to God alone. There is no explicit mention of the duty of submission to the sultan, presumably because of the marabout's "special" relationship with God. But by investing the boy (and passing over an elder, more mature brother who had spent a considerable period of time in the sultan's entourage), the sultan in effect demonstrated a pragmatic, if not formal, dependency on his will.

Because of this shared basis of legitimacy, the sultanate was limited in its capacity to attack the ideological basis of maraboutism, although individual marabouts were on occasion killed, imprisoned, or exiled when their influence became a threat (e.g., Morsy 1972). Hence, according to Bel, the static nature of Islam and the Moroccan polity over a period of four centuries.

Clearly, some of Bel's assumptions about the nature of religion— Islam in particular—and its relation to other aspects of society have strongly influenced the form of his argument. A key assumption is that "true" religion expresses itself only in institutions independent of other aspects of society. Bel is not concerned with demonstrating that such a conception is held by Muslims themselves. Hence he asserts that the popular religious leaders who emerged during the Maraboutic Crisis merely used religion as a "cover," since they acquired military, political, and economic advantages. Presumably only when religious leaders lack such advantages does he consider them genuinely religious. Significantly, Bel's distaste for the leaders of popular Sufism is shared by many Muslim modernists. I have already cited one such scholar, Fazlur Rahman, who speaks of the popular development of Sufism throughout the Muslim world as in the hands of "spiritual delinquents" from the fourteenth century onward (1968: 185.) Rahman is much more precise than Bel on periodization and nuances of doctrine, and broader in scope, since he is concerned with the entire Muslim world. But his overall argument on the detrimental effect of popular Sufism as a doctrine upon the Muslim masses through at least the eighteenth century—and, in such areas as North Africa, well beyond—is largely in accord with that formulated by Bel (Rahman 1968:153–202, 237–260).

Given the emphasis of such colonial historians as Bel and of such Muslim modernists as Rahman upon the widespread appeal of popular Sufism, it is surprising how little detail is presented on the exact nature of such beliefs or, for that matter, of what prompts their popular acceptance. The issue of whether certain marabouts were "sincere" or charlatans is a red herring. Unless the Muslim masses at various historical periods are viewed as inert consumers of their religious tradition and passively open to all forms of deception (or, as Bel also argues, saddled with a religious understanding of the world fixed for all time), it

seems reasonable to attempt to formulate as explicitly as possible just what these popular beliefs are. Admittedly, there is a significant French colonial literature which traces the spiritual genealogies of marabouts and the assumed links between religious orders. Such studies thus follow the form of traditional legitimation used by marabouts (which I will later discuss in detail) and give little indication of why they are popular. These studies particularly flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The French were uneasy about the formation of a “pan- Islamic” movement which, spread through the transnational routes of the pilgrimage and the transcolonial links of religious orders, constituted a potential threat to European rule (e.g., Rinn 1884). With few exceptions, even later colonial literature (e.g., Drague 1951) reads more like police dossiers on the potential influence of various orders, together with certain formal, written elements of their doctrines, than an attempt to understand their popular character and appeal.

What, then, is the driving force of popular conceptions of Islam which have sustained rituals and beliefs associated with maraboutism over a period of centuries? Why do men maintain ties with marabouts? Claiming that many marabouts are “charlatans” or “spiritual delinquents” hardly constitutes a response to this basic question. Even if, as Bel says, there is a religious substratum so powerful in North Africa that it severely limited the form which Islam could take in that region, perhaps it will be rewarding to look unapologeti- cally in detail at what he terms “popular religious fictions” and “pious legends.” The following chapters are intended to construct a base for understanding such conceptions.

** 2. Marabouts and Local Histories: The Sherqawa

*** The Importance of Local History

The Maraboutic Crisis, like much of Moroccan history until the nineteenth century, consists of a plurality of local histories. One of their dominant themes is the struggle of various sultans to overcome and manipulate various regional and local loyalties and alliances. Marabouts played major roles in these struggles.

Still, little attention has been paid to marabouts and maraboutism. The contemporary Moroccan historian Abdallah Laroui suggests that the Maraboutic Crisis and maraboutism are regarded by Moroccans as issues that belong to a period of disunity and even “decadence.” As a consequence, he continues, Moroccan historians have hardly begun to investigate the resources available for their study (Laroui 1970:212–213, 256).[13] Admittedly, such inquiries present difficulties, particularly for historians confined to the study of written sources. Most discussion of marabouts and maraboutism in traditional chronicles has been accurately characterized as little more than stereotyped responses to questionnaires fixed by tradition (Levi- Provengal 1922:49, 56). These sources tacitly omit any aspect of maraboutism incongruous with the formal tenets of Islam. Marabouts are generally referred to only as pious religious scholars and as saints (wali-s) devoted to the praise of God, with highly circuitous references, or none at all, to their political and other mundane activities. One reason for this was that marabouts constituted real or potential threats to the power and authority of the Makhzen. Since most traditional chroniclers were attached to the sultan’s entourage or dependent upon his good favor for their well-being, it was circumspect to ignore the whole issue (Levi-Provengal 1922:43).

Nevertheless, at least some events concerning marabouts are signaled, if not described, in these texts. The structure of traditional chronicles indicates that they were intended for a discerning Moroccan audience intimately acquainted with the social fabric in which the actions they report took place, as well as with the key personalities whose actions are described. Such accounts are not intended to be complete in themselves. For their original audience, an oblique reference to an incident was sufficient to induce the reader to seek out, if necessary, alternative, nonwritten sources of information. Of course, the major transformations in the social fabric over the last century have led to the contraction and disappearance of such alternative sources and of interest in them. The result is that, for many Moroccans, even the events of the nineteenth century, let alone those of earlier periods, are no longer fully intelligible.

This chapter presents elements of a social history of the Sherqawi religious lodge. The period from the origins of the Sherqawa in the late sixteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century is presented primarily on the basis of traditional chronicles. These sources are complemented for the nineteenth century by the accounts of European travelers and, more importantly, by correspondence between the Sherqawa and various sultans, Makhzen officials, merchants, religious scholars, tribal councils (/m^a-s), overseers of agricultural estates, and, for the beginning of the twentieth century, the French. This material is invaluable for understanding the social and political context in which marabouts operated during the nineteenth century. It also clarifies earlier periods, for, as Laroui implies, there is no reason to assume any radical discontinuity in the Moroccan social order between the sixteenth century and the opening of the twentieth (1970:213). An appendix presents in more detail some of the complex political intrigues of the late nineteenth century. The relegation of this material to an appendix does not mean that I regard it as of secondary importance. To my knowledge, no other detailed account of precolonial maraboutic factionalism exists. Although such evidence is closely tied to my main argument, its presentation requires a more microscopic attention to detail than the other elements of this chapter.

*** The Rise of the Sherqawi Zawya

From its foundation in the late sixteenth century until the beginning of the French protectorate in 1912, Boujad was the only settlement of significance on the Tadla Plain and was considered one of the most important religious centers in the Moroccan interior (A. Nasiri 1906–1907:1, 346–347; Foucauld 1939:121; Levi-Provencal 1922:297–298), with a population composed of the maraboutic Sherqawa and their slaves and clients. The latter included a significant Jewish community.

Boujad’s location makes sense primarily in terms of the configuration of the maraboutic geopolitics of preprotectorate Morocco. To paraphrase Marc Bloch (1964:83–84), it is necessary to lay aside the spectacles of men of this century to understand the implications of maraboutism. Moroccans of the sixteenth century and later never lacked a vigorous realism. Part of this realism was attaching as much importance to marabouts, visits to their shrines, and pilgrimages to Mecca as to battles, trade, and contests over the sultanate. As a local pilgrimage center, Boujad served as a mediating point between local patterns of Islamic ritual and belief and those forms shared with the rest of the Muslim world. Largely as a consequence of this original role, complex lines of communication grew up around the town. Boujad emerged as a mediating point for trade and political negotiation with the Berber highlands to its immediate east and as a local market center. Nevertheless, the most important ties between the Sherqawa and their tribal clientele for at least the last 150 years have been with the Arabic-speaking tribes of the western plains, Shawya, Tadla, and

Dukkala. These ties continue to the present.

The town is located near, but significantly not at, points of former strategic importance. In the frequent campaigns of reconquest characteristic of the more ambitious sultans in precolonial Morocco, the main route of penetration of the western plains and the Middle Atlas Mountains was along the Umm er-Rbi‘ River. A religious lodge located along this route would have been more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of Makhzen politics. Similarly, settlement closer to the Middle Atlas Mountains would have left the town more open to attacks from the Berber highlands. Such threats remained significant several years after the French established a military post in Bou j ad in 1913. The town of Bni Mellal to the south, located directly at the base of the mountains, was still subject to the incursions of “dissident” tribesmen in the early 1930’s.

Although founded in the late 1500’s, the Sherqawi zawya did not become a significant factor in Morocco until a century later. Its ascendancy is closely linked with the decline of another religious lodge, that of ed-Dila, which played a critical role in the last stages of the Maraboutic Crisis.[14] A brief discussion of the vicissitudes of this zawya places the rise of the Sherqawa in perspective. The ruins of ed-Dila are located approximately fifty kilometers to the southeast of Boujad, near the present Middle Atlas settlement of Ait Ishaq. A fast-moving series of alliances and conquests culminated in 1650 with ed-Dila’s conquest of Fes, which was held for about a decade. At its apogee the marabouts of the zawya held a good part of the plains of northeastern Morocco, as well as the Middle Atlas Mountains, where they commanded the loyalty of the region’s Berberspeaking tribesmen. For a few years Meknes, Sale, the Gharb Plain, and the region from the south of the Middle Atlas Mountains to the outskirts of Tafilalt was in their domain. At the center of this “maraboutic fiefdom,” ed-Dila, the Qur’an was reportedly recited nonstop night and day.

Ed-Dila’s power against the sultanate is demonstrated by the fact that it served as a sanctuary for the ‘Alawi Mulay Rashid when he revolted against his reigning brother in 1659. Later, in 1668, during his reign as sultan (1664^-1672), Mulay Rashid saw ed-Dila as a threat, destroyed it, dispersed its client tribes, and sent its principal marabout and his entourage in exile to Ottoman-controlled Tlemgen, in what is now Algeria.

A grandson of the exiled marabout tried a comeback with Ottoman support in 1677, during the reign (1672–1727) of the strong-man consolidator of the ‘Alawi dynasty, Sultan Mulay Isma‘il. Ed-Dila was rebuilt and again supported by most of the tribes of both the Middle Atlas Mountains and the Tadla Plain. Mulay Isma‘il managed to destroy the lodge, but only after several unsuccessful, heavily resisted expeditions. Tribal resistance was only gradually broken. To keep it that way, by the late seventeenth century Mulay Isma‘il had established a chain of fortresses and garrisons along his principal lines of communication. One such fortress was Qasba Tadla (built in 1687), thirty kilometers to the southeast of Boujad (Chapelle 1931: 26–27; A. Nasiri 1906–1907:1, 65, 70, 92, 107).

The role of the Sherqawa in this vital conflict is uncertain, except that they were closely linked with both sides and at the critical moment managed to cast their lot with the ‘Alawi dynasty.[15] The historian al-Ifrani (d. 1670), who wrote at least part of his account of the earlier Sa‘adi dynasty while at Boujad,[16] portrayed the second principal marabout of ed-Dila, Sidi Muhammed ben Abu Bakr (1560–1637), as the disciple of a number of leading saints in the Maghreb until finally he declared that Sidi Mhammed Sherqi was his “spiritual guide” above all others. Thus Sidi Mhammed Sherqi acquired “an authority and

consideration superior to that of his contemporaries" (Ifrani 1888:276–280). Sidi Muhammed ben Abu Bakr's successor during ed-Dila's apogee, Sidi Muhammed 1-Hajj (15891671), is also said to have exchanged "correspondence and reproaches" with a grandson of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, Sidi Muhammed Mfaddel ben Hmed 1-Mursli (d. 1664) (A. Nasiri 1906–1907:1, 141–142). Neither al-Ifrani nor other writers further elaborate the nature of ed-Dila's ties with Sidi Mhammed Sherqi or any of his successors as marabout (see Fig. 2).

Such relations were clearly of paramount significance, since in the 1680's Boujad became the most prominent of the "loyalist" zawya-s supporting the sultan: "Sultan Mulay Isma'il, when he was certain that the Sherqawa had no desire for temporal power, showered them with consideration and honors; the tomb of the ancestor of the Sherqawa became one of the most visited sanctuaries of the Empire. By the end of the seventeenth century this zawya acquired an importance which had only previously been obtained in the Tadla region by the house of Dila" (Levi-Provencal 1922:297–298).

*** The Sherqawa through Traditional Sources

Traditional accounts, such as that of al-Qadiri (d. 1712), based on earlier manuscript sources, provide only stylized information concerning Sidi Mhammed Sherqi and his successors.[17] Al-Qadiri devotes a large part of his biographical notice to the proper orthography of the founding marabout's name, his patrilineal antecedents (including doubts as to whether he really is a descendant of the caliph 'Umar), a listing of his Sufi masters, the fact that he had moments of "mystic exaltation," and a brief anecdote suggesting his theological position on God's attributes versus that of Sidi Hmed bel Gasem, a neighboring marabout in Bni Mellal (Qadiri 1913:127–129).

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-24.png][Figure 2. Lords of the Sherqawi zawya.]]

1. Sidi Mhammed Sherqi d. 1601

2. Sidi 'Abd 1-Qader d. 1626

3. Sidi 'Abd 1-Khaleq d. 1648

4. Sidi Mhammed 1-Ma'ti d. 1662

5. Sidi Saleh d. 1723

6. Sid 1-Ma'ti d. 1766

7. Sid l-'Arbi d. 1819

8. Sidi ben Dawd le-Kbir d. 1889

Arbawi Sherqawa

Zawya Sherqawa

9. Sid 1-Hajj l-‘Arbi d. 1898

10. Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed d. 1913 ‘

11. Sid 1-Hajj

1-Hasan

12. Sidi Muhammed 13. Sidi ‘Abdallah

d. 1903

ben Sid l-‘Arbi “Weld Zohra” d. 1910

ben l-‘Arbi d. 1954

14. Sid 1-Hajj ‘Abd 1-Qader 15. Sidi ben Dawd d. 1946 d. 1956

17. Sidi Muhammed

16. Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed

For anthropological purposes, most of the traditional accounts appear at first to have a thin yield. There is no material that suggests the nature of maraboutic succession, the internal organization of zawya-s, or their economic activities, and exceedingly little on popular attitudes toward marabouts. For instance, al-Qadiri makes no attempt to elaborate the implications of ‘Umari descent as claimed by the Sherqawa and certain other maraboutic groups. In the political context of the seventeenth century such a claim could be considered as a means of placing marabouts and their descendants outside of direct contention for the sultanate, which required descent from the Prophet. At the same time, ‘Umari descent maintained all other distinctions from “commoner” descent, including the right to marry female descendants of the Prophet. Similarly, the marabout’s origin is said to

be the Werdigha tribe, which presently is one of the client groups to the Sherqawa. But no other mention is made of his relations with local tribes or the fact, at least in terms of the oral history of contemporary Sherqawa, that the marabout first established a zawya at Taghzirt, a village to the south of Qasba Tadla, but left there following friction with neighboring marabouts.

Al-Qadiri writes tautologically that Sidi Mhammed Sherqi was one of the great Sufi shaykh-s because of his widespread reputation and numerous disciples. “Through him God showered rewards on a multitude of faithful, of whom many distinguished themselves by their outstanding virtues and their baraka” (1913:127–129). No context is given which allows a more precise understanding of baraka, its recognition or transmission, the importance attached to claims of genealogical descent, or other issues which would clarify the significance of marabouts in Moroccan society. All such concerns are either taken for granted (a fact that in itself is critically important) or considered beneath mention.

Only a faint echo of maraboutic geopolitics enters the quasiofficial, Makhzen-centered traditional historiography. Sidi Mhammed Sherqi received religious and mystic instruction from his father, Sidi bel Gasem (not the same person as Sidi Hmed bel Gasem of Bni Mellal), and from two other shaykh-s^ who themselves had been instructed by Shaykh ‘Abd l-‘Aziz et-Tebba (d. 1508), al-Jazuli (d. 1465/1466), and (through other intermediaries) esh-Shadili (d. 1258). This particular chain (silsila’) of instruction places the Sherqawi marabout in the pro-Moroccan mystic tradition mentioned in the last chapter. Al-Qadiri’s anecdote regarding the relations of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi with Sidi Hmed bel Gasem of Bni Mellal states that the two were “like the grindstones of a mill, crushing anyone who came between them,” despite their theological differences on the nature of God’s attributes. A more politicized account of the relations of the two marabouts is provided by al-Ifrani. He writes that in the late sixteenth century the governor of Tadla, en-Naser 1-Ghaleb Billah, revolted against his paternal uncle, the Sa‘adi sultan Hmed ben Mansur (1578–1603). Sidi Hmed bel Gasem supported en-Naser, who was soon captured, paraded throughout the Tadla Plain, and finally beheaded. Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, who by inference was more successful in his alliances, is reported to have said of his unfortunate maraboutic colleague “Poor Baba Hmed! He saw en-Naser’s head enter Tadla and thought it was en-Naser!” (Ifrani 1888:101) .[18] Such political activities become clear only for the later period of the nineteenth century, when information beyond that of the traditional chronicles becomes available.

The traditional accounts are valuable at least in revealing aspects of the Sherqawi zawya that existed only in truncated form at later times. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Sherqawi lodge had a substantial reputation as a center of religious learning, so that in this respect it is accurately represented by the traditional paradigm of hagiographic historiography. Thus, during the lordship of Sidi Saleh (d. 1723) (2–5),[19] the historian al-Ifrani was resident in Boujad. At such close range to the Sherqawa, the historian must have been familiar with the full scope of their activities but generally recorded only those which fell within the available historiographical paradigm. The conclusion of his history of the Sa‘adi dynasty (1888: 310) is a panegyric to Sidi Saleh, at one point calling him “the seal [i.e., the most perfect] of the saints” (khatem el-awliya), a phrase echoing that reserved for Muhammed, “the seal of the prophets.” Al-Ifrani and the marabout carried on a frequent correspondence, through which the former often sought subsidies for his writings (Levi-Provengal 1922:119–120). Sidi Saleh himself appears to have been highly educated and in touch with, if not an internal part of, the network of urban-oriented religious scholars (^ulama, sg., ‘alern). As a youth he studied in Fes at the Medrasa Mesbahiya, the school of

the Qarawiyin Mosque-University which seems to have particularly attracted students from the Tadla. Among his teachers was Sidi Hmed ben Naser, later to become one of the principal marabouts of the important Nasiriya religious order situated in Tamgrut, in Morocco's pre-Saharan south (Ecorcheville 1938).

Sid 1-Ma'ti (d. 1766) (2–6), Sidi Saleh's son and maraboutic successor, studied the religious sciences under his father, a paternal uncle, and three non-Sherqawi religious scholars who were attached to the zawya. A fourth taught him medicine. From childhood he is said to have possessed mystic inspiration (JiaT) and to have often gone into trances (ghadb'). At least one account uncharacteristically refers to "magical" acts performed by him, although these are not described in any detail (Lakhdar 1971:227). Sid 1-Ma'ti was best known for a sixty-volume collection of prayers which he compiled with the aid of three of his disciples and secretaries. Both Sid 1-Ma'ti and his father had their biographies written by secretaries who came from Wlad 'Abdun (Shawya) and Bni Khiran (Levi-Provengal 1922:297–298; Niegel 1913:290), tribal groups over which the Sherqawa have exercised considerable influence since at least the nineteenth century and probably much earlier. Names of other secretaries and students (tolba^ sg., taleb) indicate provenance from most of the principal regions of Morocco; occasional references prior to the nineteenth century also suggest that Sherqawa established themselves in major cities elsewhere (e.g., A. Nasiri 1906–1907:1, 155).

The overall picture that emerges from these small details is that the Sherqawi zawya and its marabouts played an important role in Morocco's intellectual life. The sharp dichotomy between rural religious leaders and religious scholars which tended to characterize Morocco (with the possible exception of the Sus region in the south) during the colonial era and independent Morocco of the nineteenth century is thus no accurate indication of the earlier realities.

The Sherqawa were linked with many of the other major maraboutic centers in the country, although, barring new sources, it is impossible to trace these with any precision. Thus Sidi Mhammed 1-Ma'ti (d. 1662) (2–4) was initiated into the Nasiriya religious order by the marabout Mhammed ben Naser (d. 1674) (Drague 1951:205),[20] as was his son Sidi Saleh. Similarly, Sidi 'Ali ben Hamdush (d. ca. 1720), founder of the ecstatic Hmadsha order of Meknes, was a disciple of Sid 1-Hafyan ben Sid 1-Mursli esh- Sherqawi,[21] whose shrine in Boujad is regularly visited by Hmadsha pilgrims.

The last Sherqawi lord discussed in traditional sources is Sid l-'Arbi (d. 1819) (2–7). These sources are particularly interesting because they are complemented both by oral tradition of the Sherqawi elite and by the testimony of a foreign observer. The late-nineteenth century Moroccan historian, al-Nasiri, describes the Sherqawi zawya as "one of the most renowned of the Maghreb," which "for centuries ... has been directed by eminent men who have transmitted from one to the other the heritage of saintliness and preeminence" and who have been treated with "care and respect" by the 'Alawi dynasty. These remarks preface his report that Sultan Muhammed ben 'Abdallah (1757–1790), himself "glorious and noble," destroyed most of Boujad during a military expedition in 1784/1785. Al-Nasiri provides no explanation for the friction which existed between the two except to say that chiefs must act severely towards those they command and that no man is perfect except those whom God has so created (1906–1907:1,346–347).

Oral tradition, substantiated in part by written documentation, places the destruction of Boujad in 1784/1785 in a more meaningful context. Until the late eighteenth century, the

Sherqawi zawya served as a collective granary for nearby client tribes and as a sanctuary powerful enough to provide security for refugee tribesmen and Makhzen officials negotiating amnesties (aman-s) from the Makhzen. Sid l-'Arbi (2–7) had extensive land holdings (see Fig. 4) and reputedly possessed a vast fortune, considered by some to rival the sultan's (Ecorcheville 1938). Under these circumstances, the sultan appears to have seen the Sherqawi lodge as a threat. The tactics he used in destroying the zawya may have struck al-Nasiri as less than "glorious and noble," for he fails to report them. According to members of the Sherqawi elite in the 1930's, Sultan Muhammed ben 'Abdallah sent a message to Sid l-'Arbi to join the royal expedition as it approached Boujad. The first Makhzen troops began arriving just as the sid left Boujad. Sensing deceit, he quickly returned. Later, after destruction of the town and the granaries had begun, the sultan told Sid l-'Arbi that he was not taking action against the Sherqawa, only against certain non-Sherqawa who had sought refuge in Boujad. For two days the troops sacked the town, took tribesmen as prisoners, and left intact only the shrines of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi and Sid 1-Ma'ti and the houses which stood between them. 'When the pillaging ended, the sultan provided Sid l-'Arbi a convoy of sixty mules and brought him to Marrakesh (Ecorcheville 1938:49–51). The marabout remained in a sort of "forced residence" in Marrakesh and its region for eight years, at least two of which were spent in the nearby village of Bzu (see Eickelman 1972–1973:44).

Sid l-'Arbi's exile seems to have diminished neither his prestige nor his personal wealth. During it at least twenty-nine large estates in the Bzu-Demnat region were given him by tribes anxious to secure his intercession. These are still collectively owned by his descendants and yield substantial revenues. The sultan also recognized the marabout's continuing influence. At least twice, Sid l-'Arbi served as emissary (together with Mulay 'Ali, principal marabout of the zawya of Wezzan) to the sultan's son Mulay Yezid, who, with the support of Berber marabouts and tribesmen in the Rif and Middle Atlas mountains, had revolted against his father.

When Sultan Muhammed ben 'Abdallah died in 1790, Sid l-'Arbi was caught in an untenable position in the ensuing struggle over his succession. One of the sultan's sons, Mulay Hisham, was recognized as sultan in Marrakesh, where the marabout was residing. Mulay Yezid was recognized elsewhere. Sid l-'Arbi was compelled to give his oath of allegiance (Z><zy'«) to Mulay Hisham and was allowed to return to Boujad. After a bitter struggle which lasted two years, a third son, Mulay Sliman (1792–1822), was recognized as sultan throughout Morocco. Sid l-'Arbi went to Fes to appease him but was treated contemptuously and not allowed to return to Boujad until twenty months later (Drague 1951:86, 232; Ecorcheville 1938: 51–52; cf. A. Nasiri 1906–1907:1,347).

The continuing strength of the Sherqawa through this period is clear from the account of Ali Bey (Domingo Badia y Leblich). Ali Bey was in Morocco from June 1803 to October 1805 and saw a nephew of Sid l-'Arbi in Marrakesh. On the basis of what he learned, Ali Bey depicted Sid l-'Arbi and the lord of the zawya of Wezzan as the "two greatest saints of all the empire of Morocco ... These two saints decide almost on the fate of the whole empire, as it is supposed that they attract the blessings of heaven on the country." The region surrounding the Sherqawi lodge was described as having no representative of the sultan and paying no taxes to the Makhzen. The marabout's household was obviously substantial, as he is described as keeping, besides his wives and common concubines, eighteen young Negro girls. When Sid l-'Arbi visited other regions, he gave "orders and advice" to the governors of the sultan, received substantial presents and alms, and was avidly consulted by women and followed by crowds of poor people who sang his praises. He traveled surrounded by an armed retinue "ready to defend the divine cause with their weapons." The marabout himself was "easy on horseback, and a clever shot." Politically,

Sid l-'Arbi preached "submission to the Sultan, domestic peace, and the practice of virtue" (Ali Bey 1816: 176–177).

Sid l-'Arbi's relations with Mulay Sliman appear to have been generally satisfactory. As a youth, Mulay Sliman spent several years in Boujad, and later, as sultan, he maintained a large house there.[22] In 1805 he built what remains Boujad's principal mosque. These actions suggest close ties with the Sherqawa. Nonetheless, Ali Bey wrote that the sultan and the Sherqawi marabout had a falling-out, after which Sid l-'Arbi converted the mosque into a stable. To end the quarrel, the sultan sent the marabout a thousand ducats, which the marabout reciprocated with a thousand sheep, to indicate that the matter was settled. Ali Bey speculates that the quarrel rested on nothing but "some little want of attention" (1816:178).

North African maraboutism did not operate in a sealed vacuum throughout this period. Toward the latter part of his reign, Mulay Sliman was strongly influenced by Wahhabi emissaries from Arabia. These persuaded him to write a treatise condemning maraboutism as against the fundamental tenets of Islam and to issue a proclamation forbidding maraboutic festivals (musem-s) and visits to mara- boutic shrines (Abun-Nasr 1963:94–95). Such an attempt was markedly unrealistic in the context of North Africa. Sid l-'Arbi remained a loyalist when the sultan faced a series of revolts led by Berber marabouts. He also advised the sultan not to take a personal part in a punitive expedition to the Middle Atlas in 1818. The sultan ignored this advice, suffered a major defeat, and was taken prisoner (but, because of his bar aka, was personally unharmed) after having been betrayed by a qaid from Shawya. After the sultan was released, the rebel qaid sought sanctuary (horma) in Boujad, where he was later assassinated (Mission Scientifique du Maroc 1915:1,164). The inviolability of the right of sanctuary appears to have been weighed against the question of Sherqawi relations with the Makhzen.

The Makhzen paid equal attention to the nuances of Sherqawi affairs and presumably to those of other major maraboutic lodges. When Sid l-'Arbi died of the plague in 1819 (A. Nasiri 1906–1907: 11,50), Sultan Mulay Sliman delayed a year in confirming a successor. This probably was in order to assess the suitability of the various contenders to the Sherqawi lordship in the light of Makhzen interests as well as the strength of various contending factions. The elder son of Sid l-'Arbi had been in the sultan's entourage as a student (perhaps also as a guarantee of the marabout's loyalty?), but the sultan had earlier suggested to Sid l-'Arbi that his son should discontinue his studies "since it is impossible for a married man with one wife, let alone two, to pursue studies" (E, 6 July 1810 / 5 Rejeb 1225). He was passed over in favor of a younger brother, Sidi ben Dawd (2–8), then eleven years old. In a decree addressed to the elder brother, Sidi ben Dawd was invested with "possession of that which is due him by paternal, maternal, and fraternal succession," as well as with the "secret" of his ancestors (E, S, 12 July 1820 / 10 Shawwal 1235). Presumably the choice of the younger brother was to favor a faction within the Sherqawa that would be dependent upon the Makhzen for its well-being. In any case, there are numerous subsequent requests from Mulay Sliinan and succeeding sultans throughout the nineteenth century ordering Sidi ben Dawd to furnish the Makhzen with specified numbers of horsemen from tribes in a client relationship with the Sherqawa (e.g., E, 6 March 1821 / 26 Jumada I 1236) and to perform other services on their behalf.

Such incidents as the above indicate that a key determining factor in the roles played by the Sherqawa was their relative strength and capability in relation to that of the sultan and his entourage. Sherqawi power and influence were no more given, fixed elements in

“traditional” Morocco than any other component of society. There is evidence that the scope of Sherqawi political interest was remarkably wide. The Sherqawa followed not only the intricacies of Makhzen politics but also those of the Ottomans and those of the French in Algeria (e.g., E, Mulay ‘Abd er-Rahman to Sidi ben Dawd, 7 October 1844 / 24 Ramadan 1260). Undated notes in Boujad also indicate that travelers w[T]ere regularly questioned on the news of important personages in their own locality.

*** The Zawya in the Late Nineteenth Century

A fuller picture of the social role of the Sherqawi lodge can only be given beginning with the 1880’s. A particularly valuable, although not always accurate, source is the French explorer-priest Charles de Foucauld, who traveled through Morocco disguised as an Algerian Jew and stayed at Boujad from 6 to 17 September 1883. By that time, Boujad no longer served as a collective granary for tribes of the region—this function had presumably ended in the previous century. Boujad still served, however, as a major market center. Some Sherqawa participated in the market as merchants (as did many non-Sherqawa) and as guarantors of the market’s peace. The weapons of tribesmen were deposited with the lord of the zawya or one of his kinsmen for its duration. Sherqawa also served as escorts (zettat-s) for caravans of merchants and other persons seeking safe passage through their region of influence. A Sherqawi riding on a mule with a red saddle, followed, if he had sufficient prestige, by a slave holding a parasol, was a familiar sight alongside such caravans. Escorts were chosen and fees assessed according to the value of the caravan. A two- or three-hundred-camel caravan, for instance, was escorted by a close relative of the leading marabout (Foucauld 1939:130). The average fee during the reign (1873–1894) of Mulay Hasan I was one- half ryal per camel, according to an elderly Sherqawi notary. From manuscript letters between Sherqawa and leading merchants elsewhere in Morocco, it is clear that the main commercial route to Boujad was through Casablanca, a journey of approximately four days in good weather. Goods from Fes, Rabat, and overseas also came to Boujad through Casablanca, although a certain amount of trade was carried on directly with Marrakesh, an eight-day voyage. But this route was considered in general to be much more precarious, since many tribes of the Marrakesh region had no regular relations with the Sherqawa. Subsidiary caravan routes linked Boujad with Bni Mellal and Khnifra. Only exceptionally was there direct contact with Fes via the Middle Atlas Mountains, as when Fes, the Middle Atlas tribes, and a faction of the Sherqawa supported the insurgent Mulay Hafed against his brother Mulay ‘Abd l-‘Aziz in the struggle for the sultanate that erupted in 1907 (Martin 1923:473).

Principal goods included tea, rice, sugar, spices, cloth, perfume, jewelry, household utensils, and luxury clothing (Foucauld 1939: 127). These were exchanged for animal hides, wax, wool, horses, camels, sheep, goats, and grain from tribesmen. Most of the same range of animal products were offered the Sherqawa as donations from their clients. Much of this extralocal commerce was typically in the hands of dyadic trading partners who could claim complex, diffuse bonds of kinship or common origin. For instance, Sherqawa and other Boujadi-s lived in their own quarter in Khnifra, where they worked as muleteers and representatives for merchants in Bouj ad (F. Berger 1929:44—45). Similar arrangements existed in Bni Mellal, Casablanca, and other centers linked economically with Boujad.[23] The extent to which the Sherqawa actively engaged in this commerce is not clear from the sources. Regular correspondence and gifts were exchanged between prominent Sherqawa and leading merchants of Rabat and Casablanca, as well as with the sultan and other Makhzen officials. Those ties were not strictly limited to commerce. A letter from a major Fassi merchant, Hajj Tayyeb Gsus (Guessous), ensured Foucauld a good reception upon his arrival in Boujad (Foucauld 1939:128). Itinerant artisanal specialists, such as those from Marrakesh who carved the intricate woodwork characteristic of the houses of leading

Sherqawa and shaped the domes of shrines, were also engaged through such contacts.

Foucauld estimated Boujad's population at 1,700, including the Sherqawa, their slaves, and their clients. The latter included around two hundred Jews. In Boujad, as in Demnat to the south (Flamand 1952) and other Moroccan towns, Jews were not confined to a special quarter (mellah). Only the quarter containing the synagogue (3–10) was called the mellah by Boujadi-s, although Foucauld used the term to refer generically to any residential cluster of Jews, including two (3–11, 3–12) without synagogues. In the preprotectorate period, Jews clustered about the houses of the wealthiest and most prominent Jewish merchants. Foucauld makes no specific mention of the economic activities of the Jewish community. Both Muslims and Jews engaged in grain trading; largely Jewish specialties included work as bellowsmakers (rwabzi-s), itinerant jewelers, and cloth merchants. Many Jewish merchants and craftsmen made the rounds of the small rural markets. Others, such as butchers, dealt exclusively with the Jewish community itself. In general, each Jewish household had ties with particular Sherqawa and relied upon these for protection in time of crisis.

The religious and political influence of the Sherqawa extended considerably beyond the range of tribes which used Boujad as a weekly market. Foucauld wrote that almost all tribes within two days' journey of Boujad in any direction were in a client relation to the Sherqawa. These included the Bni Zemmur, Sma'la, Bni Khiran, Werdigha, Bni Meskin, Ait Rba', Bni 'Amir, and Bni Musa tribes. Regular gifts—Foucauld calls those of tribal collectivities "tribute"— also came from most of the tribes of the Shawya, as well as Middle Atlas tribes including Ait Seri and Ishqern (Foucauld 1939:117–118, 122).

1. Mosque of Mulay Sliman

2. Mosque of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi

3. Three Sherqawi shrines

4. Shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi

5. House of Sidi ben Dawd (2–8)

6. House of Sidi Umar

7. House of Sidi Muhammed ben Driss

8. House of Sid l-Hajj Driss

9. House of Musa Allun

10. Mellah (includes synagogue)

11. Jewish houses

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-15.jpg]]

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-14.jpg][Figure 3. Boujad. 188. (Based on Foucauld 1888:55.)]]

Foucauld estimated the gifts in wheat alone which arrived at the zawya as four hundred camel loads the week before his arrival and two hundred during his twelve-day stay (1939:122, 125). This figure must be adjusted seasonally, however, as September is the only time at which collective, tribal pilgrimages are made. These collective offerings were made primarily to the lord (sid) of the zawya, although many also were made to other Sherqawi marabouts having special relationships with particular groups. Some of this wealth was redistributed among the Sherqawa. The most prominent (and wealthy) saw to the well-being, or at least the maintenance, of their less fortunate kinsmen. A limited amount of Sherqawi wealth found its way back to the tribes in the form of seeds for fall planting and, in at least one case (Foucauld 1939:121), the construction of a fortified enclosure for the Bni Zemmur. Offerings and sacrifices made at other times of the year were primarily made by individual pilgrims or their proxies—tribesmen, influential merchants, the sultan, and members of his entourage. These were directed to any Sherqawi regarded as capable of obtaining God's blessings (baraka) for the supplicant. Neither Foucauld nor other commentators on maraboutic activities during the nineteenth century make any distinction between regular offerings and sacrifices made by tribal collectivities and occasional ones made by both tribal and nontribal individuals.

Foucauld wrote that the Sherqawa lived exclusively from offerings, but this claim is misleading. They also had revenues from commercial activities, the vast holdings of land in the hands of individual Sherqawa or their legal heirs (such as those of Sid 1-Hajj l-'Arbi [2–9]), pious endowments (ahbas', sg., habus), agricultural estates ('azib-s), and a substantial traffic in influence with the Makhzen.

The 'azib-s are particularly important for what they reveal of the nature of Sherqawi relations with other centers of power in Moroccan society. But the exact meaning of 'azib is also difficult to elicit from nineteenth-century sources. In a general sense, 'azib refers to any agricultural estate with an absentee owner (Aubin 1906:15). In reference to the Sherqawa and other marabouts, the term is more complex. According to context, 'azib can refer alternatively to an agricultural estate with special privileges recognized by the sultan or to workers or tribesmen attached to such an estate. Agricultural holdings beyond the pale of effective influence of the sultan, such as the holdings acquired by Sid PArbi (2–7), are never referred to by this term, although rights to them were firmly established in Islamic law and safe from tribal incursions. Much of the Sherqawi agricultural land in the Boujad region was held by individual Sherqawa or their descendants by Islamic law. Most of these holdings were irrigated orchards that were cultivated by slaves or other clients of the Sherqawa and constituted the only permanent rural settlements in Boujad's region. Evidently only the supernatural sanctions available to the Sherqawa were capable of insulating these enclaves

from the region’s general insecurity. Figure 4 represents both these individual holdings and those of ‘azib-s as they were roughly from the end of the reign (1873–1894) of Mulay Hasan I to the eve of the protectorate. Not shown are urban properties—houses, baths, subsidiary zawya-s—in Casablanca, Meknes, Fes, and Sale, as well as scattered holdings in the High Atlas mountains.[24] The status of ‘azib-s was more indefinite than that of the individual holdings. Some of these estates were occupied by Sherqawi clients; others were occupied by Sherqawa who had left Boujad and settled in tribal regions, often at the invitation of the host group. The documentation for these estates, consisting primarily of royal decrees (daher-s) and correspondence with Makhzen officials (E, S), indicates that both the estates and their inhabitants were exempt from direct Makhzen authority. Their inhabitants were not subject to corvee labor or to requests for troops, as was the case with other subjects of the Makhzen (e.g., E, decree of Sultan Muhammed IV, 3 September 1864 / 1 Rbi‘a II 1281). Royal decrees also specified that the taxes (zakat and ‘ashur) imposed on the inhabitants of Sherqawi ‘azib-s were to be paid directly to the lord (mqadderri) of the Sherqawi zawya in Boujad and used for his benefit. As the map indicates, most estates were concentrated in the Shawya region of western Morocco and were in the midst of tribes submitted to the direct Makhzen control. This location is in itself significant. Edouard Michaux- Bellaire, a prominent French ethnographer in the early days of the protectorate who was also concerned with various political affairs, arbitrarily saw ‘azib-s as a means of extending Makhzen sovereignty to peripheral regions by vesting it in maraboutic proxies. This may have been true in some instances but was decidedly not the case for Sherqawi holdings (Michaux-Bellaire 1913:229; cf. Eickelman 1972— 1973:42–46).

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-23.png]]

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-22.png][Figure 4. Western Morocco and the Sherqawa in the late nineteenth century.]]

Names of tribes and tribal sections are in roman type, names of small settlements or towns in italic.

Significantly, the status of these estates appears to have been constantly tested by the Sherqawa of Boujad, subsidiary groups of Sherqawa located outside of Boujad, tribes, local officials of the Makhzen, and the Makhzen itself. It is not always clear whether a royal decree was granted voluntarily by the sultan or whether it was simply the de facto recognition of a pre-existing situation.[25] The renewals of royal decrees show the range of these variations. Predictably, all decrees were renewed either singly or collectively at the accession of a new sultan. Many were also intermittently reaffirmed, indicating the constantly contested nature of these privileges (e.g., E: Mulay Hasan I, 29 November 1875 / 9 Qa‘ada 1292; Mulay ‘Abd PAziz to Sid 1-Hajj 1-Hasan, 3 June 1901 / 15 Safar 1319; Mulay ‘Abd l-‘Aziz to Sid 1-Hajj l-‘Arbi, 4 May 1896 / 21 Qa‘ada 1313; Mulay ‘Abd l-‘Aziz to Sid 1-Hajj 1-Hasan, 29 January 1901 / 8 Shawwal 1318). Sherqawi lords frequently complained to the sultan that local qaid-s and neighboring tribes did not respect or recognize presumed Sherqawi privileges. The Makhzen itself sometimes questioned the status of claimed estates (e.g., E: two decrees of Mulay Hasan I dated 22 September 1884 / 1 Dhu Hijja 1301; Mulay ‘Abd l-‘Aziz to Sid 1-Hasan, 28 May 1899/ 17 Muharrem 1317; Driss ben ‘Umar to Muhammed ben Dawd, February 1894 / Sha‘ban

1311). Qaid-s also complained that Sherqawi estates, over which they had no direct authority, were used as bases to raid neighboring tribes (e.g., E, Sultan Mulay ʻAbd er-Rahman to Sidi ben Dawd, 24 September 1853 / 20 Dhu Hijja 1269).

Certain estates were attached to subsidiary zawya-s founded by Sherqawa who had left Boujad, often at the invitation of client tribes. Sometimes these zawya-s were permanent settlements; in other cases they were local communities (dawwar-s) living in tents, which were transhumant like the tribal section to which they were attached. Most subsidiary zawya-s were situated on the Tadla and Shawya plains, although a few were located in the High Atlas and one in the Sahara at Tata, visited by Foucauld (Eickelman 1972–1973; Fou- cald 1939:136). Fields surrounding such a zawya often were cultivated for the profit of its maraboutic inhabitants, who then sent annual contributions to the lord of the Sherqawa at Boujad. In exchange for these donations, the Sherqawi lord in Boujad secured ʻazib status from the Makhzen for the subsidiary lodge. When the support of the Sherqawa in Boujad was no longer considered necessary, such offerings were cut to token amounts or were discontinued.

When this happened, a “subsidiary” zawya became autonomous.

The uncertain status of these Sherqawi estates directly reflects the fluctuating and complex nature of Sherqawi relations with the Makhzen and tribal groups, as well as internal tensions among the Sherqawa. Foucauld’s statement that the Tadla Plain in the 1880’s was a sort of “theocracy” subject only to the “authority” of the lord of the Sherqawi zawya (1939:121) is misleading.[26] This claim is based on what the Sherqawa told him. The Sherqawa most concerned with Foucauld’s visit believed that the direct intervention of France in Morocco’s affairs was imminent and thus were anxious to emphasize their prominence (Foucauld 1939:135–136). They also were aware of his French identity. Admittedly, there is no indication that taxes were regularly collected by the Makhzen from the tribes of the upper Tadla Plain. Nevertheless, Boujad had a qadi (judge of Islamic law) appointed by the sultan.[27] There was also at least a nominal qaid over the neighboring tribes during part of the reign of Mulay Hasan I, and an overseer (nadir) of pious endowments from at least the eighteenth century (E, decree of Mulay ʻAbd er-Rahman, 17 May 1827 / 20 Shawwal 1242). More significantly, the Makhzen often asserted a decisive role, as previously indicated, in the selection of Sherqawi lords. Reciprocally, the Sherqawa exercised considerable influence over the Makhzen policy toward the tribes of western Morocco. Correspondence indicates that, at least from the 1840’s, the Sherqawi lords were asked by the sultan to suggest qaid-s for the tribes of the immediate region: Werdigha, Smaʻla, and Bni Zemmur (E, Mulay ʻAbd er-Rahman to Sidi ben Dawd, 11 August 1845 / 7 Shaʻban 1261). These may have been only nominal appointments or only intermittently effective. In the 1845 letter, the sultan also asked the Sherqawi lord to report on the popular acceptance of the nominees. Any candidate unacceptable to the tribal councils (jma[(]a-s) of the groups involved was not to be confirmed. Clearly such qaid-s owed their position to the Sherqawa. Moreover, at least some of them built houses in Boujad, suggesting long-term associations with the Sherqawa. By the reign of Mulay Hasan I, the Sherqawa also had a strong voice in nominating qaid-s for the Shawya. Later accounts indicate that Sherqawi nominations were commonly purchased.

In return for the power of nominating qaid-s^ the Sherqawi lord was held responsible by the Makhzen for their performance. Among other obligations, the Sherqawa

were asked to secure the oath of allegiance from tribal councils at the inauguration of a new sultan (e.g., E, 31 August 1875 / 29 Rejeb 1292), provide troops from their client tribes upon request, arrange for the settlement of local disputes inimical to the interests of the Makhzen, and conduct other sensitive negotiations on its behalf. At the request of either the Makhzen or the tribes involved, the sid was often called upon to arrange amnesties (aman-s), not only for rebellious tribes of the Tadla, but also for those in Sraghna and, at least on one occasion, the Bni Mtir of the Meknes region, whose council (jma‘a’) had come to Boujad to seek an amnesty (E, Mulay Hasan I to Sidi ben Dawd, 26 January 1883 / 17 Rbi‘a I 1300). The settlement of intertribal disputes took the form of the “great [£]«r” (‘ar kbir), or contingent supernatural curse (see Westermarck 1926:518–569). After preliminary negotiations, a Sherqawi marabout interceded between the conflicting groups, often carrying the cloth cover (ghota’) of the sepulcher of one of his ancestors, and asked in the name of his maraboutic ancestor that hostilities cease. By popular belief, those who refused to cease fighting would sooner or later be struck with major misfortune. This form of compulsion is known primarily from sources for later periods; hence, I will discuss it at more length in a subsequent chapter.

More mundane tasks ordered by the sultan included taking an inventory of goods of a deceased qaid and the purchase of “young, prolific goats” for his herds (E, Sultan Mulay Hasan I to Sidi ben Dawd, 7 March 1886 / 3 Jumada II 1303). The lord of the zaivya or his counselors also arranged, for a price, the release of prisoners held by the Makhzen, the return of runaway slaves to their owners,[28] and the issuance of royal decrees certifying tribal groups as descendants of the Prophet (shorfa). Presumably such descent carried with it certain privileges, such as exemption from military service occasionally demanded by the Makhzen.

Throughout the nineteenth century, there is no question of the favor of the Sherqawa in the eyes of the Makhzen. Local qaid-s and members of the sultan’s entourage sought intermarriage with the Sherqawa and exchanged as presents concubines, animals, and other objects of value, especially on the occasion of major festivals. Likewise, the Makhzen saw to the repair of Sherqawi shrines.

To monitor events in the Makhzen entourage, close relatives of the Sherqawi lord generally accompanied it (or, as I earlier indicated, may have been obligated to remain with it). One was the elder son of Sid l-‘Arbi (2–7), already mentioned. Until he became the lord of the zawya himself, a later Sid l-‘Arbi (2–9) attended court, as did Driss ben ‘Umar, the grandson of Sidi ben Dawd (2–8), who acted as escort to Charles de Foucauld in 1883 and from 1904 on worked as a translator-informant for the French and Sherqawi factotum in Casablanca. In addition, the Sherqawi lord always accompanied the sultan whenever he passed through the region of Sherqawi influence.

For the late nineteenth century, there is documentation of the internal division of leadership among the Sherqawa. Typically, the leading marabout allowed a close kinsman to undertake the more mundane, often lucrative, political tasks in order to leave unsullied his reputation of aloofness from such concern. In the latter part of the lordship of Sidi ben Dawd and for a considerable period after his death, this role was filled by his son Sidi ‘Umar, a consummate politician. Foucauld and present-day elderly Sherqawa represent him as the zawya’s “grey eminence.” It was he who negotiated the release of prisoners with the appropriate Makhzen officials. During Fou- cauld’s visit, ‘Umar detailed his son Driss (d. 1915), then twenty- five years old, to remain in close contact with the explorer in order to discern the real intention of his visit. Prior to Foucauld’s visit Driss,

like many other prominent Sherqawa, had made the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca. On his return Driss had visited Tunis and many of the principal cities of Algeria (Foucauld 1939:125, 130). Foucauld writes that he possessed a fair understanding of France's activities in Algeria and the potential consequences to the Sherqawa of direct French intervention in Morocco.[29] Foucauld makes clear, however, that Driss and his father kept Foucauld's true identity from Sidi ben Dawd, asserting that the latter was old and did not "understand" how to deal with the French. Such concealment also kept major political decisions in 'Umar's control.

Foucauld was evidently unaware of a major political maneuver undertaken by 'Umar immediately prior to his visit. In the spring of 1881 'Umar had arranged a meeting in Boujad between Sultan Mulay Hasan I and the Berber chieftain Mha u Hammu ez-Zayyani, after which Mha was made a qaid (Arnaud 1952:61).[30] This was part of the sultan's strategy of extending his effective authority over the Berber-speaking tribes of the Middle Atlas Mountains. Mha received arms and ammunition from the sultan, the deliveries of which were escorted by the Sherqawa through regions where they had influence.

So preponderant was 'Umar's political role in Sherqawi affairs that one anonymous correspondent complained to Sidi ben Dawd that "some say it is his zawya. not yours."[31]

Relations between the Sherqawi marabouts and outside groups were clearly not fixed during the nineteenth century or, presumably, for earlier periods. The status of the lord of the zawya and at least some of his prerogatives were legitimated by proclamations of the sultan. But the extent to which he actually was regarded as a marabout depended only in part upon the sultan. The rest depended upon the marabout's own capabilities in dominating other rival Sherqawa and maintaining a sizable tribal clientele. Competition among the Sherqawa themselves; political manipulation by tribes, the sultan, and his entourage; and an uncertain flow of events caused allegiances to marabouts to be constantly realigned. Accounts of this competition are almost totally absent from the traditional sources and, for that matter, most ethnographic presentations. Yet they are crucial to understanding the social role of marabouts.

In Boujad itself, competition for prestige in the nineteenth century and at earlier periods was largely in terms of acquiring a reputation for bar aka, even if this was manifested (as in the case of Sidi 'Umar) by sagacious political negotiations on behalf of the zawya. Sherqawa unsuccessful in acquiring prestige on the basis of this attribute had the options of becoming dependent upon their more successful relatives, of leaving Boujad to form their own "subsidiary" zawya-s, or, to a much lesser extent, of leaving Boujad for the possibilities afforded by life in an urban center.

Fortunately, there is a fairly substantial documentation on the development of factions among the Sherqawa from the early 1890's through the beginning of the protectorate in 1912. This period is of particular interest because it is the last in which marabouts were considered capable of playing significant social and political roles based upon their "special" relationship with God. As mentioned, there are virtually no other accounts of internal factionalism in North African religious lodges outside of the circumstances of colonial hegemony. Hence I present this account in detail in the appendix, concentrating upon the problems of succession. In any case, this data will be more comprehensible after my ensuing account of contemporary Boujad and the Sherqawa. This is because many of the implicit understandings involved in these factional alignments and in the popular

legitimations of claims to maraboutic qualities become clear only in the light of later events known in a fuller social context.

There are two significant features of the conflicts over maraboutic succession that developed in the 1890's: their articulation with extralocal events and their persistence over time. Tribal disputes, Makhzen manipulations of local rivalries, internal splits within the Makhzen, and the perception of opportunities by individual Sherqawa—all were closely related to maraboutic succession. After 1907 (when the French occupied Casablanca and the Shawya), colonial manipulation of local and national disputes constituted an additional factor, although French intervention was soon to alter radically the nature of these rivalries and the assumptions held by Moroccans about the powers of marabouts. No person engaged in the contest for dominance or prestige knew with certainty what style of conduct would be successful in any given situation. Loyalty to a given sultan, which in some circumstances might carry with it significant rewards, could also be a handicap should the authority of that sultan be challenged or cease to be effective. Excessive zeal in support of the Makhzen was as dangerous for powerful individuals as a reserve toward it. Positions were constantly tested and adjusted in line with personal evaluations of "the way things were."

Such conflicts showed surprising continuity over time. Shortly after Sidi ben Dawd (2–8) died in 1889, Sultan Mulay Hasan I designated the eldest of his twenty-one sons, Sid 1-Hajj l-'Arbi (2–9), to succeed him. The very number of these sons, added to the descendants of earlier marabouts, gives some idea of the possibilities for intrigue among close kinsmen. All male descendants were technically entitled to equal inheritance from their father (with lesser amounts for daughters, wives, and other relatives). As indicated in detail in the appendix, even when a marabout chose his successor, there were often bitter and prolonged conflicts. Until the death of the sultan in 1894, there was no effective opposition to the Sherqawi lord, Sid 1-Hajj l-'Arbi. He enjoyed the unqualified support of Mulay Hasan I. After the sultan's death, a still minor son, Mulay 'Abd l-'Aziz (reigned 1894–1908) came to the throne. Some of his entourage were particularly hostile to the Sherqawa and sought ways to weaken their influence. The first step was to pay regular subsidies to another son of Sidi ben Dawd, Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed (2–16). Both 'Umar and his son Driss (who lived in Casablanca and from there kept in touch with the Makhzen and, after 1904, the French) had close ties with Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed. This rival faction was nurtured by the Makhzen until finally, in 1901, both Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed and his paternal nephew, Sid 1-Hajj 1-Hasan (2–11) (who succeeded his father, Sid 1-Hajj l-'Arbi, as lord of the Sherqawa on the latter's death in 1898), were called by the sultan to Marrakesh. There he announced that the zawya and its holdings were to be divided equally between them and that henceforth they were to be the co-lords of the Sherqawa (E, decree of 20 October 1901 / 7 Rejeb 1319). The timing of the announcement, just after the fall festival in which tribesmen massed in Boujad, avoided confrontation with the Makhzen. The sultan also detained Sid 1-Hajj 1-Hasan in Marrakesh for several months, enabling his rival, Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed, to consolidate his position. Henceforth the two rival groups of descendants (and clients) of Sidi ben Dawd were known as the 'Arbawi Sherqawa and the Zawya Sherqawa. The first were so named because their core consisted of descendants of Sid 1-Hajj l-'Arbi (2–9) and those who stressed close ties with them. The Zawya Sherqawa, led initially by Sid l-Hajj Muhammed, were so named because after 1901 they assumed control of the house (3–5) of Sidi ben Dawd, at which pilgrims were traditionally received. The whole quarter was, and is, known as the Zawya quarter. Although the minor personnel of these two factions could on occasion shift loyalties, their leaders were locked into positions that limited their room for sudden reversals.

The Makhzen's divisive move was successful. For years, the proponents of both factions

were engaged in bitter struggles over property rights and worked to draw clients away from each other. The Zawya Sherqawa were the weaker faction in terms of popular legitimacy; hence, they were more dependent upon the Makhzen for support. In 1907, the contest became even more bitter when a brother of Sultan Mulay ʻAbd l-ʻAziz, Mulay Hafed, rebelled and was recognized as sultan in Marrakesh, Fes, and the Middle Atlas Mountains. This major national movement had significant local repercussions. The ʻArbawi faction swore allegiance to Mulay Hafed. After a short interval the ʻArbawi lord was rewarded with a royal decree from Mulay Hafed declaring him the exclusive lord of the Sherqawa.

In effect, each of the two Sherqawi factions now controlled regional appointments for the sultans they respectively recognized. It was not uncommon for two rival qaid-s to be appointed over the same tribe. Alliances and loyalties rapidly dissolved into short-term strategic maneuvers. The Zawya Sherqawa, anxious over the loss of support for ʻAbd l-ʻAziz, intensified their ties with the French. They became the main conduit of French intelligence for the upper Tadla Plain and for several years managed to convince the French that the members of the rival faction were merely “malcontents” with no real following. At first, the French saw this alliance as useful in providing intelligence and influencing events in western Morocco. Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed was even accorded a consular Patent of Protection in 1910, exempting him from direct Makhzen authority. The French tended to accept the Zawya Sherqawa accounts of the nature of their “traditional” influence but gradually found that the Zawya lord did not possess the sort of firm political control over his clients that the French were led to expect, or even absolute control over the Sher- qawi lodge. But even in the light of direct evidence of the strength of the rival ʻArbawi faction, which accompanied a punitive military expedition in 1910, the French continued to regard the Zawya lord as the sole legitimate one.

As the French consolidated their hold over the Shawya, they increasingly regarded their reliance upon the Sherqawa and other marabouts as unnecessary. Gradually, the Sherqawa and other marabouts were denied certain prerogatives previously accorded them, including exemption from taxes and corvee labor for themselves and their clients. The French intended to separate what they considered “spiritual” from “temporal” power. The Sherqawa no longer were consulted on 7«z7/-ships in the Shawya, although in the first months of the protectorate Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed was still consulted on appointments of qaid-s for the upper Tadla Plain. After 1912, in recognition of their services as “friends of France,” the French gave the sinecure of qadi, or religious judge, to the ʻArbawi lord and that of qaid of Boujad to the Zawya lord. But in these offices they were treated the same as other local functionaries elsewhere in Morocco and no longer were called upon as marabouts to settle tribal disputes or other matters. The result, quickly perceived by their maraboutic clients, was a de facto secularization that later will be discussed at length.

*** Maraboutic Islam in the Nineteenth Century

Until now I have said relatively little about the popular religious beliefs that were at the base of Sherqawi prestige. It is clear that the Sherqawa and other prominent maraboutic groups enjoyed recognition and acceptance among all elements of Moroccan society, from the tribesmen of the Middle Atlas Mountains or the upper Tadla Plain to the sultan and his entourage (Doutte 1903:314–327). The prestige of marabouts was not confined to tribesmen. By the nineteenth century, the intellectual and scholarly activities of the zawya were on a much lower level than in earlier centuries. Foucauld reported that Sidi ben Dawd possessed an excellent but rarely consulted library. This is in accord with the report of the first Native Affairs officer in Boujad that after the death of Sid

l-‘Arbi in 1819, no Sher- qawi lord personally taught at the zawya, as had been the practice since the days of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi (Niegel 1913:291). Still, there were eighty students at the school (madrasa) connected with the zawya as late as 1908, supported by revenues from Sherqawi estates. The political disorders which followed reduced their numbers to fifteen, together with a single, non-Sherqawi teacher, by 1913 (Niegel 1913:292–293). Nonetheless, the prestige enjoyed by the Sherqawa for being living exemplars of the “maraboutic synthesis” of Islam—knowledge of the religious sciences, mysticism, the ability to convey God’s grace—remained intact. In correspondence, Sherqawi marabouts were addressed as sidna, “our lord.” In contemporary usage, this term is reserved exclusively for the king.

Throughout the nineteenth century and earlier, the difference between the “maraboutic synthesis” and the formal, “orthodox” teachings of Islam was recognized by religious scholars. As previously mentioned, foreign observers of Morocco in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries reported interviews with marabouts and religious scholars who sharply distinguished between maraboutism and the formal tenets of Islam (Chenier 1788:179–191; Ali Bey 1816:48–49). Although these remarks were made to foreigners, there was anything but evangelical fervor in the efforts of such learned men toward popularizing a “proper” comprehension of Islam. This passivity toward maraboutism among religious scholars lasted well into the twentieth century and can be interpreted as reflecting the strength of maraboutism (Doutte 1903:319; Merad 1967).

Significantly, such scruples about maraboutism were invoked only in private and to foreigners. With the exception of Sultan Mulay Sli- man, the idea of maraboutism encountered few significant popular or public challengers. Maraboutism was nourished by a quasi-orthodox interpretation and legitimation. As already indicated, the sultan invested marabouts. The proclamation which invested Sidi ben Dawd in 1820 was much more explicit in attributing to him the “secret of his ancestors” than were proclamations for marabouts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The later decrees only tersely conveyed the fact of investiture, but they were still issued as late as 1930. Maraboutic politics remained significant. Similarly, members of the urban-based religious elite kept in touch with their Sherqawi counterparts. To provide one instance at length, both Sidi ben Dawd and his son ‘Umar corresponded with ‘Arbi ben Sayh, a religious scholar (‘aleiri) in Sale. The undated correspondence between ‘Arbi ben Sayh and ‘Umar primarily concerns a theological discussion of how the hands should be positioned when making a request to God. Of more practical interest is a letter from Sayh to Sidi ben Dawd, requesting that an escort be provided for an associate of his (S, 20 November 1875 / 21 Shawwal 1292). The introductory section (isti’ar) praises Sidi ben Dawd in flawless Arabic prose as the eminence whose “light travels as far as the light of the sun, whose breath blows its bar aka over land and sea.” The marabout also is described as the point that mediates the formal religious sciences (al-ma’aref) with those known to the mystics (al-asrar) and that links his ancestors with his descendants in the transmission of these gifts. ‘Arbi ben Sayh also announces his intention of visiting Boujad before the end of the year. In a word, the letter affirms the continuing vitality of the maraboutic synthesis among all elements of the population.

There are other contemporary justifications of maraboutism by religious scholars. The Fassi scholar Muhammed al-Kittani in Salwat al-Anfas (1895) tried to demonstrate that a devotion to saints accorded perfectly with the letter of Islam, even if nothing was known of the saint. He argued that, even if a pilgrim got no profit from a visit to a saint, it would do him no harm (cited in Levi-Proven§al 1922:381–382). The same writer also wrote

of baraka on earth as causing “productivity and abundance of the means of the living” and being transmitted through saints. “Without [saints] the sky would not send rain, the earth would not cause its plants to grow, and calamity would pour upon the inhabitants of the earth” (cited by Abun- Nasr 1965:5–6).

The question remains as to what extent these implicit statements of religious ideology by a literate elite reflected more popular beliefs of, for instance, tribesmen who were clients to the Sherqawa. This is a difficult question, for, as I have shown, written sources are silent on many aspects of the popular concept of marabouts. The written sources that do exist, such as those cited above, suggest that there was no clear educated consensus in the nineteenth century of a “formal” Islam distinct from popular beliefs, such as was to begin to emerge by the 1920’s, at least for the literate urban intelligentsia. Hence, there was no sharp distinction between popular religious beliefs and those expressed by the literate elite. Fortunately, there is valuable confirmation in the form of correspondence (or drafts of correspondence) from Sherqawa (including Driss ben ‘Umar) with a faulty knowledge of written Arabic (S). Individuals trained in Arabic letters tend to substitute for concepts verbalized and understood by their contemporaries in colloquial Arabic those available from their repertoire of classical Arabic and its literature. This shift often alters meaning. Persons with imperfect knowledge of Arabic letters use colloquial Arabic more often and neglect to excise references to popular religious assumptions incompatible with the traditions of written, classical expression. Thus, one such letter from Driss bluntly stated to the tribal council (fma’a) of a specific group that their offering was insufficient and that their donation would have to be increased in order to have prayers said on their behalf. Another threatened a tribal council with a supernatural curse C«r) unless it saw to the return of sheep stolen from the herd of a Sherqawi marabout.

A second source of evidence is Foucauld’s brief description of Bou- jad. He states, accurately, that the Sherqawa are not a religious order (tariqa’) but a maraboutic descent group claiming descent from ‘Umar.[32] Foucauld writes that the principal marabout, Sidi ben Dawd, was the carrier of “special graces” which made his blessing “fertilize the earth and make herds prosper.” He further writes that the marabout’s blessing opened “the doors of Paradise for men and [assured] them of the intercession of ‘Umar (the Prophet’s Caliph) and all his saintly descendants on Judgement Day” (1939:122).

There are, of course, ethnographic accounts of maraboutism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Taken by themselves these accounts, like the material of this chapter, serve more to suggest the importance of marabouts than to present and analyze the beliefs which sustained them in their influence over most elements of Moroccan society. Outstanding among these accounts is Edward Wes- termarck’s massive Ritual and Belief in Morocco (1926), based upon fieldwork initiated several decades earlier and reflecting a careful reading of other ethnographers, especially Edmond Doutte. Unfortunately, Westermarck’s chapters devoted to magic, supernatural compulsion (‘«r), baraka, sacred groves, genies (/mrz), the seasons, and other topics are ordered by an external scheme which by its itemistic association of data does not attempt to elicit the underlying framework of Moroccan beliefs or place them in a specific historical context. It is clear that Westermarck was an extremely talented ethnographer. One constantly regrets that he lacked a concept of culture as an interrelated set of symbols and meanings.

Westermarck conveyed an image of a world in which the supernatural was all-pervasive. Signs of supernatural intervention were everywhere and capable of interpretation by

residents of any given locality. Rocks, trees, springs, the memory of uncanny events, maraboutic shrines, the gestures of daily life—all were part of a coherent, largely unquestioned way of looking at the world. Marabouts, at least in the form represented by the Sherqawa, provided concrete links between local, manifest representations of the supernatural and more universalistic patterns of Islamic belief. Even the pilgrimage to Mecca, symbolic of involvement with the wider Muslim world, seems to have been confined largely to the Sherqawa on the upper Tadla Plain. For some, the Sherqawa to this day are thought to provide a link with a more universalistic pattern of Islam, although this pattern of belief is rarely taken for granted as it was in the nineteenth century and at the time of Westermarck's research.

I am aware that the above brief description, which I have based as rigorously as possible upon documentation contemporary to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, leaves many lacunae. In one way, these sharpen the value of the extant evidence. To render intelligible the evidence for the nineteenth century, I have had to develop implicitly a set of working assumptions, or at least expectations, as to the shape of religious belief and ritual in particular social and temporal contexts. These assumptions do not spring out of a void. From an analysis of maraboutism in its contemporary context and an attempt to comprehend the fundamental assumptions which Moroccans now make about social reality, one develops a sense of expectation of what is crucial or often absent in evidence concerning earlier periods. This is not to assume blindly that the perceptions of reality of contemporary Moroccans have been identical over the period of a century or more. Rather, the careful examination of such perceptions serves as a sort of first approximation. Although my discussion of the nineteenth century comes before my discussion of the present, large parts of it were necessarily thought out only after considerable immersion in the contemporary aspects of maraboutic Islam. But in examining the contemporary role of marabouts, it became clear that something was missing, that what I saw were fragments of a pattern of beliefs, once solid, that was beginning to crumble. This idea was reinforced as I worked with informants capable of detailed recollections of past events and with manuscript correspondence. Soon I found it convenient to think of both past and present simultaneously, as it were, to make sense of various patterns of activity.

This approach to understanding the past—and the present—is not entirely an artificial strategem, although as a social anthropologist I have been concerned with making these assumptions much more explicit than a Moroccan (or anyone else, for that matter) would ordinarily find a need to do. It is the same means by which Moroccans, with varying degrees of interest and accuracy, also construe the past, whether the past in question is their personal, lived experience or a more distant past, such as that discussed in this chapter. Educated Moroccans have a sharp sense of historical transformations and present elaborate accounts of what marabouts were and how they became what they are today. Even tribesmen who maintain a firm belief in marabouts are aware that marabouts and their descendants play a different role today than they did in the past.

In the ensuing chapters, my discussion deals mostly with the present. My first concern is to describe how Moroccans conceive the social world. This description and the analysis of maraboutic Islam are largely complementary; hence the following three chapters are meant to do more than merely provide the social and cultural context for the explicitly religious issues of Chapters 6–8. Moroccan understandings of the nature of the social world are not a static backdrop but are themselves profoundly affected by changing patterns of religious belief.

** 3. Boujad: The Town and Its Region

*** The Town and the Rural Economy

Boujad's immediate hinterland is relatively homogeneous. The tribesmen of the region continue to follow genres de vie combining pastoral transhumancy, primarily of sheep and goats, with the extensive, seasonal cultivation of barley (zra') and hard wheat (gemh). The complementary ecological zones of the Boujad region are ideal for this mix. The mountains and their forested foothills (ghaba') serve as winter pastures, while the plains, after the harvest in late May or early June, provide forage throughout most of the summer.

The only exceptions to this overall pattern of land use are isolated patches of irrigated gardens and orchards. Prior to the protectorate, these were almost exclusively owned by Sherqawi marabouts, although many holdings have since been sold. In many cases they continue to be cultivated by descendants of former Sherqawi slaves. There are also occasional signs of French-inspired agricultural and pastoral innovations, confined almost exclusively to the lands of exprotectorate qaid-s and other wealthy individuals. The French innovations date principally from the 1930's, when efforts were made to introduce soft wheat as a cash crop. Its expense and greater risk than traditional, hardier crops in an uncertain climate discouraged its widespread adoption. Cattle raising was also encouraged, but the large amount of capital involved in comparison to sheep raising and the greater potential loss in case of disaster limited it to a peripheral role in the rural economy of the region.

The economic activities of both townsmen and tribesmen are directly affected by vicissitudes of the climate. The most significant divisions of the year are between winter (shta, literally "rain") and summer (sif). Spring (rbi') and autumn (khrif) are locally perceived as transient intercalations of the other seasons. Rains generally begin in late October and mark the onset of winter. Tribesmen try to sow their crops immediately before this period, although predicting the onset of winter involves a high element of chance. Rains fall most heavily in December and January, then gradually ease through March, when they almost entirely cease. The harvests in early June mark the return of transhumant herds to their summer pastures. The onset of each of these seasons is marked principally by the social activities associated with its typical climatic conditions, not by any fixed calendar. The most significant temporal marker is the annual festival (jnusem) of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, during which tribesmen make a pilgrimage (zyara) to Boujad to reaffirm their ties with the Sherqawa. Significantly, this celebration is tied with the annual pastoral cycle. Its timing depends upon the movement of transhumant tribal groups to their winter pastures and varies for each group. Even groups no longer transhumant continue to follow the same pattern. The lunar Muslim calendar figures in none of the activities associated with the Sherqawa.

Abrupt climatic variations constitute one of the significant factors which have always made agricultural and pastoral activities precarious in this region and throughout much of Morocco. Tribesmen see these fluctuations in terms of seven-year cycles, the content of which cannot, however, be regularly predicted. (Marabouts and miracles also frequently come in sevens, here as elsewhere in the Middle East; so use of the number should not be

taken as an effort toward empirical measurement.) Many tribesmen often attribute such abrupt seasonal and microecological variations in the weather to maraboutic intervention. Winters on the Tadla Plain[33] are relatively temperate: the average temperature is 3–7° C. (38–45° F.) in the coldest months, with only rare incidence of frost and none of snow. Summers are extremely hot, with the temperature frequently as high as 40° C. (104° F.). Precipitation records for the Tadla Plain indicate average annual variations between 286 and 480 millimeters, falling on 34 to 55 days annually (Gaussen, Debrach, and Joly, 1958). The other major factor affecting agricultural and herding activities, particularly since the protectorate, has been the fluctuating but increasingly unfavorable market conditions for traditional cultivators (M. Nasiri 1969). Each year tribesmen try to adjust their herding and agricultural activities to anticipated economic and climatic conditions, but the extreme annual variations of both make this exceedingly difficult.

The rural economy of the Boujad region can be characterized as “traditional,” although what is traditional must be considered in a temporal framework. The economic and political transformations engendered by the protectorate are particularly significant. Prior to the protectorate the pattern of transhumant pastoralism and seasonal cultivation outlined above prevailed over most of the Tadla, Shawya, and Dukkala plains (Foucauld 1939:117; Mission Scientifique du Maroc 1915:1, II). With the exception of Boujad’s immediate hinterland and a few other isolated regions, the traditional genres de vie have been directly overshadowed in most regions by the modern economic activities introduced by the protectorate. Boujadi-s say that a sign of the divine grace (baraka) of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi is that he chose to settle in a region devoid of economic interest to the French. Colons (French colonists) avoided the region, primarily because the soils of the Tadla Plain north of the Umm er-Rbi‘ are thin, calciferous, and easily eroded by intensive cultivation. Outside of a settlement at Wad Zem and a few other centers, there was minimal rural colonization on the northern half of the Tadla Plain.

There was a significant nonagricultural European presence not far from Boujad. About twenty-five kilometers to its north, phosphate deposits were discovered immediately prior to the protectorate; exploitation began in earnest toward the end of the First World War, mostly on the basis of corvee labor. A narrow-gauge military railroad was completed to Khuribga and Wad Zem in 1918 and by 1928 was converted to standard gauge. Wad Zem, twenty kilometers northwest of Boujad, initially became the center of mining activities. By the 1920’s it was replaced by Khuribga, roughly twice the distance from Boujad. To prevent the dislocation of the local European (predominantly Spanish) population of Wad Zem, the protectorate administration allotted agricultural lands to unemployed miners. These and other efforts to expand the lands under colonization, notably an attempt in the late 1920’s to establish a large commercial ranch in the region, encountered determined and effective hostility from the surrounding Sma‘la tribesmen. The ranch, to be located on expropriated tribal lands, was described in the conventional language of the period as a valuable “educational” experience for the tribesmen. Local officials feared a major tribal uprising and successfully advised against the enterprise and any other major expansion of colon holdings (Bonjean 1928:78) [34] In 1928 colons formed a Comite Regional d’Etudes Eco- nomiques (Regional Committee of Economic Studies) to further colonization on the Tadla Plain, but most of its effective activity was to the south of the Umm er-Rbi‘. Nothing came of the efforts of the delegation from Boujad—a Portuguese bar owner, a Polish truck driver, and a Greek grocer—to attract further colons.

In contrast, the rich, alluvial soils south of the Umm er-Rbi‘ River attracted a large number of settlers (Gadille 1958:18), especially after major irrigation schemes were implemented in the 1930’s. Although for over a decade Europeans were the principal beneficiaries of these

projects, by the end of the Second World War Moroccans also began to benefit on a large scale. The French intended to break the “undesirable” economic habits of traditional agriculture with technical assistance, making “the native’s way of living move as fast as the tractor” (Berque and Couleau 1946:18–25). Tribesmen often resisted these schemes because the authoritarian methods by which they were undertaken and technical errors made for several major failures. Nevertheless there were initial successes in introducing new agricultural techniques to Moroccans in some areas, but these were rapidly dissipated by stiff, decisive opposition from colons and certain pro-co/on protectorate officials (Julien 1972:308–310).

These various economic transformations significantly affected even peripheral regions, such as Boujad and its hinterland. Prior to and during the earliest years of the protectorate, virtually all tribesmen lived the entire year in tents (Foucauld 1939:117, 121). The spread of mining activities and agricultural colonization, coupled with administrative restrictions on transhumant movements and the use of forest lands for grazing, resulted by the late 1920’s in a significant trend toward sedentarization (Bonjean 1928:86) and a marked decline in the number of livestock in the region (see Fig. 5). For most of the year tribesmen now live in stone and wattle huts (nwala-s). The wealthiest live in stone or concrete dwellings. Since sedentarization occurred only after imposition of the Pax Gallica, dwellings are not clustered into villages as they generally are in the older settled regions of Morocco, but are located on individual landholdings. Tribesmen continue to live in tents only during the winter transhumant moves.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-21.png][Figure 5. Livestock in the Boujad region, 1928–1968. (Based on Kingdom of Morocco, Ministry of Finance, Circle of Wad Zem, 1951–1968; B.)]]

^a Figures not available for 1961 and 1963.

A rough index of the economic stagnation of the region is the slow rate of rural population growth over the last seventy years. Elsewhere on the Tadla Plain, the rural population has doubled from an estimated range of seventeen to twenty-six persons per square kilometer around 1900 to roughly thirty-six to fifty-five at the present. That of Boujad’s immediate hinterland remains in the range of seventeen to twenty-six (Noin 1970:1, 80, 91, 251).

The “stabilization” of Boujad’s hinterland had a direct impact on Boujad. The vast economic and political hinterland which Boujad possessed prior to the protectorate rapidly contracted. After 1912, the town no longer served as a major caravan entrepot for the interior plains of western Morocco and the Middle Atlas Mountains. While the Sherqawa of Boujad continued to receive substantial donations from pilgrims throughout the religious hinterland of western Morocco, the remainder of the town’s effective economic base rapidly contracted to its immediate, disfavored environs

Nevertheless, Boujad as well as other settlements in the interior of Morocco enjoyed a marked population growth at the onset of the protectorate. This quickly leveled off, despite the continued influx of immigrants from surrounding rural areas.[35] Of all the settlements on the upper Tadla Plain, Boujad has experienced the least growth. As a consequence, younger Boujadi-s tend to emigrate, given the real and imagined possibilities for work and the attractions of “bright lights” of the more dynamic coastal towns and nearby Khuribga.

Older Bou- jadi merchants and men of influence who initially concentrated their energies and investments in Boujad and its region have shifted their activities as far as possible to such cities as Casablanca and the prosperous, irrigated plains of the nearby Bni Mellal region.

Other towns in the region, some little more than weekly markets prior to the protectorate, became the major beneficiaries of the economic rationalization introduced by the French. In addition to Wad Zem and Khuribga, previously discussed, Fqih ben Saleh and Bni Mellal emerged as market and administrative centers for a vast irrigation scheme, to which sugar refineries and associated industries have recently been added. Qasba Tadla, little more than a ruined fortress in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Foucauld 1939: 139–140), regained life as a major military post early in the protectorate.

*** Boujad: Its Organizational Frameworks

There are four major organizational frameworks through which an outsider can begin to discern the internal ordering of the town: spatial, economic, religious, and administrative. Taken together, their value is in giving a concrete configuration of the town's major activities. To a certain extent these are also meaningful frameworks to Boujadi-s themselves. I qualify the extent to which they are meaningful "native" categories because there is a simpler, more basic set of assumptions which Boujadi-s make about the social order and which cut through the organizational frameworks presented here. Thus, in the following chapter I will present and analyze one aspect of spatial organization, the quarter system, in much more detail in order to make visible the relation between it and the more basic assumptions which are made about the social order.

Table 1.

Population of Boujad, 1883–1970

Year	Total	Jews	Europeans
1883	1,700	200	0
1913	4,000–7,000	400–500	^a
1926	8,879	1,010	138
1936	10,211	^a	158
1951–1952	11,389	^a	^a
1956	^a	336	53
1960	14,728	80^b	^a
1970	18,000 (est.)	2	17

Sources.

Foucauld 1939:125; Cimetiere 1913:282; B, 1926,1941, 1956; municipal electoral lists, 1963; Kingdom of Morocco 1961.

^a Not available.

^b Based upon municipal electoral lists, 1963.

Table 2.

Population growth of Boujad compared to surrounding towns, 1936–1960

1936	19511952	Growth over 1936 (%)	1960	Growth over 1951 (%)
Boujad	10,211	11,389	11.5	14,728	29.3
Qasba Tadla	7,409	8,789	18.8	11,733	33.5
Wad Zem	5,688	13,174	131.6	18,640	41.5
Bni Mellal	10,471	15,968	52.5	28,933	81.2
Fqih ben Saleh	3,187	6,654	108.8	13,484	102.6
Khuribga	8,011	20,365	154.2	40,838	100.5

Source: Kingdom of Morocco 1961:82.

One thing that I want to stress throughout the primarily ethnographic presentation of this chapter is the lack of clearly defined social roles in relation to formal economic, religious, and governmental institutions. That is, knowledge of a person’s occupation, descent, or other formal statuses in itself says very little about how he normatively conducts himself in reference to other persons in society. S. F. Nadel specifies that “true” roles always entail a “halo effect.” For instance, being a bureaucrat entails a significant set of “further characteristics” which hold for a variety of situational settings (Nadel 1957:28). In Morocco, knowledge that someone is a shopkeeper, government employee, or the like does not in itself give significant cues as to the role the person plays in society. This is not to argue that such formal institutions as the governmental apparatus, the “offices” provided by the mosque, the Qur’anic schools, or the economic institutions which I shall describe in this chapter are unimportant. These merely constitute components of wider fields in which particular activities—economic, political, religious—are carried out. Social action is played out between total social persons, making it difficult to conceive of persons solely or even predominantly in relation to sets of formal institutions, as is common in our own society.

Space

From a distance Boujad resembles an oasis, flanked on its western side by orchards, groves, and gardens. These yield a rich array of dates, nuts, carrots, cucumbers, olives, pears, and pomegranates. In recent decades many of those toward the north have been cleared for housing, although most toward the south remain intact. On its eastern fringe, Boujad is bordered by a rocky, barren plateau almost totally devoid of vegetation. Although in the sixteenth century Boujad was reportedly in the midst of a forest (one grove of trees, locally considered sacred, still remains), by the 1880's firewood had to be carried from the foothills of the Middle Atlas Mountains, nearly ten kilometers away at the closest point (Foucauld 1939:119).

The town possesses a certain beauty. Viewed from the west, its whitewashed buildings are framed in the background by the peaks of the Middle Atlas Mountains. This gleaming whiteness contrasts dramatically with the rectangular, emerald-green tiles of the domes of the major Sherqawi shrines. The major colonial contribution to this image was to enclose the main market (suq) on three sides with a profusion of arcades, each of which forms a portal to a merchant's stall (hanut). These were designed in the late 1920's by a French Native Affairs officer (officier des Affaires Indigenes), who was inspired by a photograph of the arcades surrounding the Ka'aba at Mecca. Since Boujad is also a pilgrimage center, he felt it appropriate that it replicate the Ka'aba. Strictly speaking, tribesmen and Bou- jadi-s distinguish between the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca, made during a specified season during each year, and "visits" (zyara-s) made to the shrines of marabouts.[36] The analogy with Mecca which inspired the arcades was one of the many colonial neologisms which with varying intensity affected the roles which Sherqawi marabouts were enabled to play in society. Nevertheless, construction of the arcades presumably improved the view of Boujad from the Bureau des Renseignements (Intelligence Office; now the offices of Boujad's qaid), located on a small promontory on the other side of the market (see Fig. 6).

Unlike most traditional Moroccan towns, the older part of Boujad is not enclosed by a defensive wall. Sherqawi baraka was considered sufficient protection from surrounding tribes, almost all of which are clients of the Sherqawa. Despite the lack of a wall, the oldest traditional part of town (medina) is sharply defined by the vestiges of portals to its interior passageways—the last of the actual gates was removed in 1965. These gates and the walls of the outermost houses allowed the town as a whole and each of its quarters (derb-s)[37] to be sealed off at night.

Much of the medina proper, particularly toward the north and east, dates from the beginning of the protectorate. Its outer limits are clearly defined, but no obvious pattern governs its internal labyrinth of narrow, winding streets, many of which are blind alleys. Most of these passageways, too narrow for cars, are generally cluttered with pedestrians, donkeys, handcarts, mules, merchandise, and children shouting and playing. In the somewhat less hectic residential quarters, women perform such household chores as drying grains on the side of the street and discreetly, or so they hope, gossip with their neighbors.

To a European, the overall impression is one of total confusion, since there is no generalizing principle which allows one to get from one place to another on the basis of abstract criteria. One only knows how to get from one point to another by having gone there before. Despite the modest size of the town, even Boujadi-s sometimes get lost in

unfamiliar quarters. Similarly, the facades of houses in the medina give few clues to the prestige or wealth of their inhabitants. Most of the buildings are rectangular, whitewashed structures, commonly two stories high, with no open space between them. Houses open on the street only by narrow entranceways and occasionally by small, iron-grilled windows on the upper stories. From the street, only a few of the most substantial mosques and shrines are distinguishable from other buildings, either by ornate entranceways or by open doors revealing their interiors. Distinctions of wealth and prestige become evident only within the concealed interiors of most houses. Wealthy ones often have open courtyards with fountains and gardens; poorer households have only a cramped, rectangular patch of concrete with a narrow shaft for air and frequently evince varying stages of decay and disrepair.

Despite its minimal European population, the influence of the colonial experience on the overall spatial organization of Boujad is substantial. In the late 1920's and early 1930's, the protectorate's Service de 1'Urbanisme (Urban Planning Service) developed plans for virtually every Moroccan town, including Boujad. Each town was explicitly divided into zones for "traditional" Moroccans, "evolved" Moroccans, and Europeans. Each zone was presumed to conform to the "mentality" of certain elements of the population. Thus the traditional medina was left virtually as it was, except for the eventual provision of sewers, water, and electricity.

To the west of the market, the limits of what was meant to have been Boujad's European sector are defined by a park, garden, tennis court, and swimming pool. Since only a handful of Europeans not connected with the administration ever lived in Boujad, the core of this sector retnains the Bureau des Renseignements (Ar. biru) , constructed in 1929. This building still houses most of the administrative and judicial functions of the central government. It also served as the personal quarters for Bouj ad's military Native Affairs officer until 1933. Military control gave way to civilian in that year, so that a succession of controleurs civils were lodged there until independence in 1956, when they, in their turn, were replaced by Moroccan qaid-s appointed from outside the region. Adjoining villas house the medical officer, public-works chief, and schoolteachers. Secondary schoolteachers and their families constitute the only remaining Europeans. On the principal highway behind this array of buildings are a gendarme post, a filling station, a bar-restaurant-hotel which serves as the town's roadhouse, and a soccer field, originally a landing-strip. A few buildings, mostly schools, have been added to this sector in recent years, but, as in the colonial period, only "outsiders"—non-Boujadi-s —live in it.

The third main provision in the 1931 urbanization plan was for a native housing project called New Boujad (Bja'd J did). This was initially intended to house the "evolved" Muslim bourgeoisie of the town. The streets in this zone are laid out in a monotonous rectangular grid. Houses at its core, dating from the early 1930's, follow elaborate specifications of design and material laid down by the French. This carefully regulated urbanization was progressively engulfed by adjacent, less controlled zones of growth in which governmental intervention was limited to insistence on maintaining the original rectangular pattern of the "new" town. Since the French tried to discourage immigration from rural areas in the latter years of the protectorate, much of this housing dates from the last two decades. The first years after independence saw a rapid, almost disorderly growth, followed by a period in which the former French policy of discouraging rural emigration was tacitly reintroduced and, since 1971 (as a consequence of the political climate?), again abandoned. In general, however, the main outlines of the colonial conception of forty years ago have remained intact.

The Economy

The major towns of the Tadla Plain—Boujad, Qasba Tadla, Wad Zem, Fqih ben Saleh, Khuribga, and Bni Mellal—are all linked in a series of rotating markets. A market is held in each town of the cycle on one day of the week. In turn, each of these towns forms part of a cycle of smaller rural markets which rotates around the larger one. In principle, markets are not held on Fridays, the day the weekly sermon (khotba) is given to the congregation in the mosques. Nevertheless, there are at least two small rural markets on the upper Tadla Plain which are exceptions to this pattern. Tribal informants claim that once there were more Friday markets but that they were actively discouraged during the rise of mass nationalism after the Second World War.

On Thursday, its market day, Boujad's population more than trebles. The buses and trucks which carry professional traders begin arriving before dawn. Some tribesmen arrive the night before, although most appear only on the market day itself. Other buses and trucks circulate throughout the region, collecting tribesmen and the animals and crops they wish to bring to market. Funduq-s—caravanserais in classical Arabic but empirically better described as market-day stables which also serve as storage depots, lodging for the town's neardestitute, and, occasionally, brothels—are packed with tribesmen and their animals. Similarly the nine public baths (hammams') and the major Sherqawi shrines are crowded with tribesmen.

Boujad's merchants do most of their business on market day. Similarly, the religious and civil courts have their weekly sessions, and the qaid hears reports from and gives orders to the government- appointed shaykhs and mqaddems responsible for tribal groups and listens to tribesmen's complaints (shikayas) and petitions. The medical clinic works to capacity, and the post office cashes money orders from overseas, distributes military pensions, and passes on to government shaykhs the handful of correspondence which arrives for the rural areas.

Prior to the protectorate the entire market was held in the large open area in front of the shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Sherqawi marabouts collected the firearms of the tribesmen and held them until the conclusion of the market. This custodial activity ceased once the protectorate was effectively established in the area. Despite a few modifications introduced by the protectorate administration, the principle by which the market is organized remains that of competitive settlement, as throughout most of the Middle East.[38] In other words, all sellers offering similar goods or services—vegetables, spices, used tin cans, jewels, small utensils, ready-made clothes, blankets, chickens, haircuts and shaves, and so on—are grouped together in the market.

Virtually every household in the town gets caught up in the market as buyer or seller, and generally as both. In the course of the day many people shift between the two roles. Sellers can be ranged along a continuum from full-time professionals who make the rounds of markets to those who only occasionally have animals, crops, or other goods to sell. The quantity of such goods is often minute. For example, a woman might wait all morning to sell half a dozen eggs and use the proceeds to make minor purchases later in the day. Similarly, the retainer of a prestigious family, who receives only meals for his services, gets cash by purchasing small quantities of fruits wholesale before dawn, as they arrive by truck in Boujad. Later in the day he sells them at a slightly higher price. The minute capital he needs is provided by one of the wholesalers, who thus secures the man as his client.

Townsmen, especially those with capital to invest, take as active an interest as tribesmen in the livestock market.[39] Many have jointventure arrangements (shorka-s) with tribesmen. These agreements are representative of the complex dyadic bonds which hold together most of the economy and the rest of society in that they are rarely- based on economic considerations alone. To ensure mutual confidence, such partners are generally linked by multiple bonds, including ties of kinship and patron-client relations. Typically, the townsman puts up part of the capital for a herd. Annually, his share of the profit (rebh) is mutually agreed upon with his tribal partner (sahelT). The division varies primarily by such factors as the skill and reputation of the tribesman and some of the noncontractual benefits of patronage which the townsman may be thought to offer.

Since more lucrative opportunities for major capital investment can now be found in other regions of Morocco, pastoral agreements are at present generally preferred only by townsmen with moderate amounts of capital who do not have the prestige or resources to oversee and defend investments in more distant regions. This has contributed to a further decline in the region’s rural economy.

Apart from herding agreements and similar arrangements which some townsmen have for the provision of grains for their household, the tie between buyers and sellers at the Thursday market tends to be exclusively economic, with a tendency to purchase only at the most advantageous price. This holds at least for those who can make cash purchases. In contrast, shopkeepers in Boujad maintain fairly stable and complex dyadic ties with their clientele, sustained by the judicious use of credit. The advantages of extended credit and other noneconomic considerations outweigh the slightly higher prices which most of these merchants charge.

Commercial and craft activities are more complex than can be assumed by the uniform appearance of most of the shops. In 1970 there were 838 craftsmen and merchants, grouped into forty-two distinct crafts and twenty-six distinct mercantile specializations, such as butchers, spicers, vegetable-sellers, salt-packers, tailors, weavers, barbers, bellowsmakers, locksmiths, carpenters, cloth merchants, and those who “buy and sell” u-shri) virtually anything of value, usually in minute quantities, often literally pinches of produce.

The handful of European merchants who were in Boujad during the protectorate left soon after independence. European enterprises included a cafe-hotel on the main road, a bus and truck service which ran to local markets, a grocery and dry-goods store which catered primarily to Europeans, a garage, and a small cement factory. All of these businesses were purchased by Boujadi Muslims after 1956, although virtually none has been subject to any further capital investment. Similarly, Jewish shops were purchased by Muslim merchants or left to Muslim apprentices in the years immediately after independence. How these various enterprises were disposed of depended on the particular circumstances of each trade. Thus the stocks of the itinerant cloth traders were largely taken over by rural Qur’anic teachers (/z/zTz-s), who used their close ties to and familiarity with the rural hinterland to their advantage.

Boujad never was a significant craft center. Even at the beginning of the protectorate, craft activities were characterized as ailing; most processed or manufactured goods came from

the coastal cities (Cimetiere 1913:285). Certain crafts enjoyed a temporary renaissance during the Second World War, when European goods were unavailable. Local shoemakers and tailors worked for the Vichy French and later the Allied forces. Otherwise, administrative reports throughout the protectorate reiterate the irreversible decline of most of the crafts. The ready postwar availability of superior manufactured goods, such as cheap, waterproof plastic shoes and ready-made or second-hand clothing, quickly cut the market for the locally made products of shoemakers and weavers. Only carpentry continues to thrive. The low cost of labor in Boujad encourages many coastal firms to contract piecework to Boujad.

Boujad's shops range from large depots (7zrz-s) owned by the town's nine major merchants to the more common merchants' stalls (Jianut-s), often only six feet wide and not much deeper. The most substantial of these merchants are known as "traders" (tajer-s) and generally deal in a wide variety of commodities; those with more limited capital are generally known by the commodity they sell, such as "charcoal-seller" (fekhkhar).

Very few shops are the result of cooperative ventures. In general, men avoid as far as possible situations in which they share responsibility as equals with others or in which they are subordinate to someone else. This preference cuts through all social activities and will be discussed at length in Chapter 5. Each merchant and craftsman tends to work for his own account, although a few acquire venture capital from close relatives and other individuals who have confidence in them.

The organization of merchants and craftsmen into "guilds" (hanta-s) does not constitute an exception to this tendency toward personal authority. In Boujad, the formal organization of guilds is a French administrative imposition of the 1920's rather than a preexisting form of corporate activity. Even the orientalist Louis Mas- signon, who asserted that craft and mercantile "guilds" were the institutional cement of Muslim cities, found little evidence for his contention in Morocco, the only country in which he essayed a sociological inquiry into the subject. In particular he singled out Boujad as the clearest representation of the "primitive" form of Moroccan guild, superficially Islamicized but still essentially "Berber," since there was no formal pattern of leadership. Decisions in each craft or trade were reached by informal consensus; "guilds" were not corporate organizations that had an existence independent of individuals (Massignon 1924:62). Although the forms of craft and mercantile organization in the larger cities of Morocco also failed to support his thesis that Islamic guilds were corporate, he explained this away by claiming that they too evidenced only superficially Islamic forms (1924:139). This strategy of assuming pre-existing societal forms to explain away inconsistencies between observed ethnographic reality and presuppositions concerning Islamic society is, of course, the same as that used by Bel.

There is no sharply ordered hierarchy of prestige between the various crafts and trades. Such a ranking is impossible, since all but the poorest merchants and craftsmen have many sources of income which are not reflected in the activities of their shop or craft. A

merchant who sells ready-made slippers (belgha-s) from Fes may have a minimal visible turnover of goods in his shop but derive substantial income from the rental of buildings and lands, speculation on the animal market, and other sources. Most merchants of rural origin similarly possess rights to land or produce which ensure them the basic foodstuffs needed for subsistence in town. Everyone tries to spread out his activities

to insure against the hazards of any single one. Thus occupation, taken in its common European sense, can be a very poor indicator of a person’s wealth or status.

Prestige is based primarily on the ranking of total social persons, not on the specific economic activities which they undertake. A few occupations, such as the dirty, nonlucrative work of tanning and potting, unequivocally signify low income and prestige, but this is not the case for most activities. Butchers, for example, are considered to be engaged in an unclean trade but often are considered more prestigious than schoolteachers and government clerks, since some are known to have more substantial incomes and higher life-styles. One of the few effective, though not determinant, general indicators of status is whether a merchant or craftsman is of urban or rural origin. Rural immigrants generally cluster in those activities which require the least capital, such as selling fruits or vegetables and “buying and selling.” Even in these cases, however, there are exceptions which Boujadi-s are quick to point out.

Religion

Most townsmen say that the formal complex of Islamic institutions centers around mosques, the Qur’anic schools (mesjid-s) generally associated with them, pious endowments established for the support of religious activities, and, finally, the religious court (l-mahkama dyal sh-shra^. Since the protectorate, the latter has been restricted to adjudicating law of personal status: marriages, divorces, inheritances, and certain land transactions.

This institutional complex is characterized as being shared in principle by all members of the Muslim community (umma). Many townsmen presently consider religious brotherhoods and the patterns of clientele associated with marabouts as being apart from the formal institutions because they are particularistic—their support comes only from a designated membership or clientele. Such views have become widespread only since the 1920’s. Most tribesmen and many older Boujadi-s make no such distinction.

Table 3.

Economic rank of Boujad’s merchants and craftsmen correlated with place of birth

Economic Rank	Place of Birth	Other (%)	N	Total (%)	N
Boujad	Boujad’s Rural Hinterland				
(%)	N	(%)	N		
Low	69.5	388	90.4	189	40.5	17	73.2	594
Medium	22.9	128	9.1	19	42.9	18	20.4	165
High	7.9	44	0.5	1	16.7	7	6.4	52
Total	69.1	560	25.8	209	5.2	42	100.0	811

Note: This table is based on an economic census of shopkeepers and craftsmen which I conducted in 1970. Economic rank was a judgment of informants.

Boujad has two principal mosques in which the Friday sermon is given by a prayer-leader (imam) before the assembled congregation. The older of these mosques was built by Sultan Mulay Sliman in 1805 (see Fig. 6). The communal sacrifices of the Little Feast ('Id le-Ftur), which marks the end of Ramadan, the month of fastings and the Great Feast ('Id le-Kbir), or Feast of Abraham, are held in it when the weather does not permit their being held at the communal prayer-ground (msalla) located on the eastern edge of the town. A second major mosque was completed in early 1973 but was already in use two years earlier. It is located on the northwestern edge of the medina, next to New Boujad. Once finished, this mosque began receiving formal support from the Ministry of Pious Endowments. But its construction was financed locally, primarily by wealthy non-Sherqawi merchants and a few Sherqawa. One of the latter is a leading local politician who received no substantial support from other Sherqawa in elections in the early 1960's. Consequently, he allied himself with his non-Sherqawi supporters and became prayer-leader of the new mosque.

The two principal mosques and many of the others associated with residential quarters have personnel regularly attached to them who receive stipends from the Ministry of Pious Endowments. Most of these are Qur'anic teachers (Jqih-s). Their meager official stipend is supplemented by monthly gifts in cash and produce from the parents of the children they teach and other gifts at the graduation of the children. Qur'anic teachers at smaller quarter mosques depend entirely upon such local donations and whatever annual amount is agreed upon with the household heads of the quarter. Other personnel who receive modest official stipends include a group of elderly men who each evening recite parts of the Qur'an at the mosque of Mulay Sliman, prayer-callers (mwedden-s) and the prayer-leaders of the two major mosques.

The funds for these stipends and for the maintenance of certain mosques and shrines of descendants of the Prophet Muhammed are distributed locally by a deputy overseer (na'ib) of the Ministry of Pious Endowments. This official, who also operates a cigarette shop, collects rents from the various properties held by his ministry. In Boujad these are limited almost exclusively to the merchants' stalls built into the outside walls of the larger mosques. Elsewhere in Morocco, particularly in the regions surrounding the major traditional cities, the Ministry of Pious Endowments has more substantial urban—and, until recently, rural—properties.[40] Prior to the protectorate and up to 1927 Boujad had an overseer (nadir) of pious endowments who was also a Sherqawi. In 1927 this office was shifted to Wad Zem, where a wealthy Sherqawi continued to hold the position; after independence the office again shifted and fell to a non-Sherqawi in Bni Mellal.

Finally, there are a small number of descendants of the Prophet (shorfa, sg., shrif) in Boujad who have a formal spokesman (naqib). They have no significant collective activities, although a certain prestige adheres to their descent. In the past various material benefits accrued to them as a result of it.

Except for the collective annual prayers on the two major feast days and the Friday gatherings in the principal mosques, there are no regular gatherings which symbolize the unity of the Muslim community. Of course, formal Islamic ideology has a profound effect on the daily and annual cycle of activities. Most adult male heads of households perform the

full cycle of five daily ritual prayers and regulate their activities in terms of these and other, more occasional, Islamic obligations. Nevertheless, formal religious organization does not inherently provide a vehicle for effective social action. Individuals, such as the politician-zm^m mentioned above, can utilize a religious office to legitimize their social honor and mobilize effective followings. But again it is the configuration of attributes possessed by persons, not any particular offices they might hold, which forms the key to understanding social action.

The most significant of the religious brotherhoods in Boujad are the Tijaniya, the Qadiriya, and the Kittaniya orders. When more active in the earlier half of the protectorate, the Tijaniya attracted mostly notaries and minor Makhzen officials; the other two orders had their greatest local appeal among moderately prosperous merchants and craftsmen. In principle, each brotherhood has a leader (mqad- deni) and a lodge (zawya) in Boujad. New recruits became scarce after the widening popularity of reformist ideas and the nationalist movement in the mid-1930's. The remaining adherents of these orders, who in no case currently exceed two dozen elderly men, gather each Friday afternoon after the midday prayer in their respective lodges or in each other's houses. There they recite the devotions associated with their particular order. On feast days their spokesman (mqaddem) takes the flag of their order to the house of the prayerleader of the town and breakfasts with him before they proceed together to the mosque or the communal prayer ground.

There are also disciples of the various ecstatic religious orders in Boujad—the Heddawa, Derqawa, Tssawa, and Hmadsha. These are considered by most townsmen to be much less reputable than the orders mentioned above. Their membership comes primarily from the urban Lumpenproletariat—beggars, charm sellers, some musicians, manual laborers, and the descendants of slaves. They gather at private houses, where they are often invited to perform exorcisms when possession by a malevolent jinn is suspected to be the cause of illness or misfortune. Only the Hmadsha have a zawya, attached to the shrine of the Sherqawi marabout Sidi 1-Hafyan, who is said to have been the mystic teacher of their founder, Sidi 'Ali ben Hamdush. The local Hmadsha often have their number augmented by pilgrims coming from elsewhere, especially during a small yearly festival (musem) attended only by members of the order.

The most significant complex of religious activities in Boujad, as measured by offerings, sacrifices, and the number of participants, consists of those centered around the Sherqawi shrines and the

Sherqawi religious lodge (zawya'). The latter is not a regular meeting place for clients of the Sherqawa, as are the lodges of religious brotherhoods. It is the residence of a Sherqawi who is considered by tribesmen to be a living marabout and who strives to cultivate this reputation by writing charms for supplicants and entertaining delegations of tribal clients.

Boujad has twenty-six marabou tic shrines, twenty-three of which are Sherqawi.[41] The most significant of these is that of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Associated with his shrine are those of several of his children, a mosque, and a recently completed hostel for pilgrims. The main shrine is lavishly, if crudely, adorned on its interior with mosaics, brass ornaments, large candles, hanging rugs, and a large collection of hand-wound European pendulum clocks. Substantial offerings are collected at this and the other principal shrines.

The remaining Sherqawi shrines are more modest, with relatively bare interiors, and doorkeepers (bewwab-s) present only on those days when there are enough visitors to make collection of their offerings worthwhile.

The largest influx of visitors and pilgrims comes in September and early October, during the festival (musem) of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Tribesmen in the immediate region of Boujad arrive on muleback and horseback with their tents. Groups from more distant regions, such as Shawya, now arrive by bus or truck. These visits are staggered over approximately a month, with the Sherqawa often arranging for antagonistic tribal groups not to be present at the same time. Each group stays for three or four days. In September 1969 approximately twenty-five thousand tribesmen came on pilgrimage during a two- week period in which I tried to make estimates of arrivals.[42] Moreover, the Sherqawa said that the number of pilgrims was somewhat attenuated that particular year because the qaid-s of several regions discouraged attendance. Formally, the qaid-s argued that the tribes under their jurisdiction were delinquent in their taxes and that the money that would ordinarily be spent on the musem should go instead to their taxes. However, tax arrears are a chronic problem in rural areas. Informally, the qaid-s utilized the tax-arrears argument primarily against those groups that indicated displeasure with the government candidates proposed for local elections to be held that year. Some officials thought that denying tribesmen participation in the musem would be particularly efficacious in breaking their resistance. In 1972 the same officials, again for political reasons, sought to encourage the festival but to link it to a show of loyalty to the government. The provincial governor made a substantial contribution at the principal shrine and local officials tried to obligate the tribes present to greet the governor ceremonially upon his arrival. Most refused, saying that they came to Boujad for the marabout Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, not for the Makhzen. Even the suggestion of reprisals did not alter their position. Provincial officials, reluctant to risk a major incident, dropped the matter that year, but achieved a compromise in 1973 by which tribesmen agreed publicly to greet the governor. These actions implicitly reflect the continuing strength of marabout- ism as a social force in rural Morocco.

The Makhzen

The contemporary Makhzen presence in Boujad has three foci—the local administrative bureaucracy, the courts, and the schools. Boujad was an administrative anomaly both during the protectorate and after independence. At present it is virtually the only annexe (melhaqa) in a national administrative apparatus which elsewhere begins at the higher level of cercle (da’ira). In the early protectorate, the entire Tadla Plain and part of the Middle Atlas Mountains were governed from Boujad, but it was soon relegated to a cercle, and finally to an annexe. Although the French progressively downgraded Boujad’s administrative significance, they retained it as an annexe because of the prestige they ascribed to the Sherqawa and the role of the Sherqawa as “friends” of France. As I mentioned in the last chapter, for the duration of the protectorate the town’s qaid-s were the marabouts of the Zawya Sherqawa. The marabouts of the other leading descent group, the ‘Arbawi Sherqawa, provided the qadi-s. Both qaid-s and qadi-s tended to pack the subordinate positions under their influence with their supporters, although, after several scandals in the 1930’s, the French began diluting Sherqawi hegemony over the subordinate local posts.

In 1913 the French briefly and unsuccessfully experimented with a Sherqawi qaid to administer the tribal hinterland. Four non-Sherqawi

qaid-s drawn from the tribes they administered or from neighboring tribes soon took his place. In the 1930’s the number of rural qaid-s was halved. All of these Officials were under—or, in the fiction of the protectorate, were advised by—a French controleur civil. All communications with the Makhzen and government agencies passed through the hands of the controleur, who thus ensured that the qaid-s under his supervision confined themselves to eminently local affairs.

Since independence a single qaid for both the town and the tribal hinterland, an outsider to the region appointed by the Ministry of the Interior, has assumed all of the duties of both controleur and qaid^ except for the judicial functions which these officials had during the protectorate. This qaid is directly or indirectly supported by a local bureaucratic presence which includes a clerical staff for himself and his assistant (khalifa’) and a paramilitary force of mokhazni-s. There are also various specialized services which he nominally coordinates: water and electricity offices, a gendarme post, a public-works office, a post office, and a medical dispensary, downgraded from a hospital in the early 1960’s. Although all local government officials and clerks are appointed from Rabat, most of the lower echelons (except for the gendarmery) are staffed by natives of Boujad or adjoining towns. Movement from these posts by promotion or transfer is minimal.

The local bureaucracy is formally complemented by an elected municipal council for Boujad and by rural communes for the surrounding region. Each of these has its own budget, with income from local market taxes, occasionally supplemented by central government subsidies. Due to administrative inexperience and the lack of personnel independent of the local Ministry of the Interior officials, these bodies are largely dependent upon the local qaid for their initiatives. In one recent year the only action of the municipal council of Boujad was to provide chairs for the qaid’s office, although since 1970 they have undertaken more substantial projects. Appointment to communal councils has been regarded in recent years principally as a sign of favor from the local and provincial officials of the Ministry of the Interior. This fact has not necessarily made such individuals dependent. One member of the municipal council was considered locally to be a “shadow qaid”—his intimate knowledge of the Boujad region, his general reputation for exercising influence, and his multiple contacts with government officials elsewhere gave him in effect more power than the officially designated qaid. Similar “shadows” are found throughout the local administrative apparatus.[43]

Since independence both the religious law court and the civil court have been under the separate jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and thus independent of the qaid and other local officials. The religious court, which in principle was autonomous throughout the protectorate, is staffed by a qadi, together with a staff of several clerks and notaries.[44] The civil court is staffed by a civil judge (hakerri) and several assistants. This judge is a Sherqawi who, because of his reputation for probity, is one of the few in Morocco allowed to preside in his native town.

The most pervasive Makhzen presence in Boujad is that of the school system. In Boujad as elsewhere, this has since independence undergone a massive expansion in both personnel and students, if not in quality. Prior to the Second World War, the French policy was to educate only those Muslims who in any case would traditionally have been educated. In the last decade of the protectorate the educational system expanded considerably but still enrolled only a fraction of the school-age population, predominantly urban and male. For Morocco as a whole in 1938, 1.7 percent of school-age children were enrolled in primary

schools and 0.1 percent in secondary schools. The respective figures for 1955 were 11.2 percent and 1.2 percent, with 90 percent of elementary-school children dropping out before attaining a certificate of primary education (Cerych 1964: 297–299). There was a similar drop-out rate for secondary education, since only 530 Muslims acquired the baccalaureat in Morocco during forty-four years of French rule (Waterbury 1970:84). In Boujad, those Muslims enrolled in school were at first exclusively the children of prominent Sherqawa, rural qaid-s, and a few prosperous merchants, although recruitment was somewhat widened by the 1950's. In contrast, nearly all of Boujad's Christian and Jewish school-age population received schooling, the latter through an Alliance Israelite school established in 1931. In addition, a limited number of students were educated in a private "free school" (medrasa hurra), set up in 1947 by local nationalists interested in providing for a truly Muslim education, primarily in Arabic. This school was assimilated into the government system shortly after independence.

Since independence the number of students has dramatically increased. Some 38 percent of the school-age population was enrolled in primary schools throughout Morocco in 1966–1967 (Tiano 1968:115). Presently more than half the children of school age receive some primary schooling, and roughly 6 percent go on to at least the first few years of secondary schooling. For Boujad, this means that almost all the sons of townsmen and a fair number of their daughters enter the primary schools. There are a few rural schools as well, but access to education in rural areas remains difficult and the quality low.

Literacy can now be assumed for younger townsmen. In 1969, 181 teachers were employed locally at the primary and secondary levels. There were approximately 5,500 elementary-school students and 1,200 in the first three years of secondary school. Students wishing to complete the remaining three years of the secondary cycle must at present go to other towns, although additional years of the six-year secondary cycle are to be made locally available shortly.

Almost all of the primary schoolteachers are Boujadi-s, including the school directors. Boujadi-s also predominate in the secondary schools, although outsiders are also employed. These included a dozen French instructors in mathematics, science, and history in 1969; nine remained in 1973. In recent years there have been modest efforts to place a few instructors from other parts of Morocco. But throughout their educational careers, most students continue to experience the same multiplex bonds linking them and their families with their instructors as pervade all other social activities.

*** Summary

This chapter has introduced some of the key institutional frameworks for social action in Boujad. By institution, I mean primarily a field identified with specific conventions or accepted ways of accomplishing certain sorts of social action. I have also tried to provide a concrete ethnographic representation of the town and its region in relation to recent historical developments. The account of economic institutions pointed directly to how persons relate to each other in the market setting. The accounts of government and religious institutions were more formal. How these and other institutions work or are thought to work will become clear only after the account of the social structure. By social structure, I mean the principles by which the units constituting a given society—persons or groups of persons—are defined and related to each other. The next chapter specifies these principles and elaborates them, first in an urban, then in a tribal, setting.

** 4. Social Structure

*** A Definition

Given its dominant association with the Sherqawi marabouts, Boujad is hardly the Moroccan equivalent of Middletown. Only two other towns in Morocco, Wezzan and Mulay Idriss, have such a singular importance as pilgrimage centers. However, the strategy of looking for a Middletown on the basis of a “lowest-common-denominator” typicality has contributed significantly to the present impasse in the characterization of social structure in North Africa, particularly in Morocco. Efforts to abstract a notion of social structure from superficial patterns and characteristics have resulted in a bewildering array of apparent local and regional structures in which tribes and localities are perceived as what Jacques Berque, in another context, has called “little monsters of social ingenuity” (petits monstres d’ingeniosite sociale) (cited in Lacouture and Lacouture 1958:80).

A review of recent attempts to characterize North African society has pointed to the fact that it is “not blocked out into large, well- organized permanent groupings—parties, classes, tribes, races—engaged in a long-term struggle for ascendance.... Structure after structure—family, village, clan, class, sect, army, party, elite, state— turns out, when more narrowly looked at, to be an ad hoc constellation of miniature systems of power, a cloud of unstable micropolitics, which compete, ally, gather strength, and, very soon overextended, fragment again” (C. Geertz 1971:20).

One reason for the difficulty in perceiving structure in North African society, and perhaps to a certain extent elsewhere in the Arab world, is that many standard definitions of social structure are narrowly conceived to account only for situations in which groups of persons are ordered in positions and statuses (e.g., Evans-Pritchard 1940:262; Turner 1969:125–126; Gellner 1969:35–69). In many parts of the Islamic Middle East and elsewhere it is increasingly apparent that social structure can also be conceived with persons as the fundamental units of social structure, rather than their attributes or statuses as members of groups. This is the case for Morocco, where, moreover, persons are not arranged in layer-cake strata in which broad groups of persons are seen as essentially equal. Instead, they are linked in dyadic bonds of subordinance and domination. Moreover, these ties are characteristically dissolved and re-formed rapidly and significantly. The relatively stable element in this type of social structure is not the patterning of relations between persons or groups of persons, as is suggested by many definitions of social structure. Rather, it is the culturally accepted means by which persons contract and maintain dyadic bonds and obligations with one another.[45]

This conception of social structure is implicit in the way Boujadi-s perceive regularities in the social order and proceed to act on these assumptions. Like other Moroccans, they discriminate with considerable subtlety between variations in wealth, power, the prestige of descent, patronage and clientship, and the effectiveness with which persons can utilize such attributes. The aggregate of influence a person possesses with respect to others is frequently expressed by the terms kelma “word” and wejh “face.” The assessment of who has these qualities is continually affected by the outcome of social action and is never taken for granted. Given the various resources available, each person is necessarily a bricoleur, or social handyman, viewing society less as definitely structured than as capable of being re-formed so as to maintain or increase his

own standing in it. The dominant image of society is a constellation of interpersonal ties, not any arrangement of groups—since groups, from the point of view of Moroccans, tend to have an ephemeral protoplasmic quality, from national political parties to the most informal local association.

Persons achieve social honor, in Weber's sense of the term, on the basis of varying, experimental combinations of their attributes— wealth, political office, residence in a quarter, maraboutic descent or descent from the Prophet, etc.—in no case can the social honor of a person be determined from an abstract knowledge of his attributes or statuses alone. Some of these statuses, such as those of kinship, might be relatively stable, even permanent in the case of blood relations, but the obligations and expectations which persons hold as a result of them are still a matter of significant variation and amenable to a wide latitude of revalorization. As already discussed, few Moroccans make any assumption about the social honor of a person solely on the basis of any formal status or office which he may possess. For instance, the attributes marabout and Sherqawi descent in themselves say little of the social status of the persons holding them. Like other bases of prestige, their significance has shifted significantly with the social and economic transformation of the last sixty years.

*** The Spatial Representation of Social Structure

The concept of social structure is inherently linked to how Boujadi-s conceive the spatial organization of their town. Like other units of society, the quarter (derb) is a cultural construct which for Boujadi-s is not defined in terms of an ad hoc listing of formal features. These serve only as indices of the underlying cultural concept.

An earlier generation of colonial ethnographers recorded the formal arrangements of quarters and, accepting the then popular theories of Levy-Bruhl on the nature of "primitive" mentalities, concluded that the evident protoplasmic disorder of quarters was a direct physical projection of the "alogical" disorder of the "indigenous" mind (e.g., Louis Brunot, cited in Hardy 1926:21). Lacking an adequate conception of social structure as based on culturally accepted means by which dyadic bonds between persons are contracted and maintained, ethnographers instead sought, and failed to find, order at the level of "on-the-ground" social relations and the use of physical space.

Boujadi-s presently divide their own town into anything from thirty to approximately forty-three quarters (see Fig. 6 and Table 4). The differences in perception are related to what informants know of the social history of the town, which varies with generation and experience, and how they have experienced it, which varies with social position. Only those clusters of households evaluated as sustaining a particular quality of life are known as quarters; thus some Boujadi-s do not consider certain sections of the town to constitute "real" quarters.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-9.jpg]]

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-8.jpg][Figure 6. Boujad. 1970. Numbers on the figure are keyed to Table 4.]]

Table 4.

Population of principal quarters of Boujad and birthplaces of aduh residents

Quarter	Total Adults	Total Residents (estimate)	Birthplace of Adult Residents Elsewhere in Boujad Moroc- Boujad Region co
	(%)	(%)	(%)
1. ʻArbawi	152	304	86	5	9
2.Zawya (ca. 1850)	286	572	64	19	17
3. Mkansa	94	188	83	11	6
4. Old Sellamiyin	215	430	64	26	10
5. New Sellamiyin	(ca. 1930)	^a	^a	^a	^a	^a
6. Ghazawna	136	272	75	14	11
7. ʻAllaliyin	197	394	64	21	15
8. Qadiriyin	293	586	74	15	11
9. Qsayra	192	384	54	26	20
10. ʻAziziyin	^a	^a	^a	^a	^a
11. Ghrari	73	146	67	23	10
12. Zalaghi (1900)	119	238	62	24	14
13. ʻAysha Haddu	^a	^a	^a	^a	^a
14. Hmid	224	448	63	21	16
15. Bni Musa	61	122	75	15	10
16. Ayt Stur	^a	^a	^a	^a	^a
17. Shbuki (Lahuna)	(post-1956)	193	386	20	71	9
18. Qaid Mhammed	^a	^a	^a	^a	^a
19. Gahda (post-1956)	77	154	26	68	6
20. Khaluqiyin (Smuniyin) (1935)	159	318	66	25	9
21. Kamun (1958)	177	354	34	50	16
22. Mimuna (post-1956)	161	322	27	52	21

| 23. Warezzin (1960) | 66 | 132 | 11 | 73 | 16 |

| 24. Mulay Driss (1935) | 108 | 216 | 70 | 24 | 6 |

| 25. “Burdil”^b (1930) | ^a | ^a | ^a | ^a | ^a |

| 26. Gar‘a | 138 | 276 | 53 | 41 | 6 |

| 27. Ghalem | 123 | 246 | 58 | 35 | 7 |

| 28. S‘idiyin | 28 | 56 | ^a | ^a | ^a |

| 29. Qtater (1950) | 416 | 832 | 29 | 61 | 11 |

| 30. Muludi | 221 | 442 | 69 | 24 | 7 |

| 31. Sqaqi | ^a | ^a | ^a | ^a | ^a |

| 32. Dawwar le-Makhazniya (1950) | 19 | 38 | ^a | ^a | ^a |

| 33. Fridiyat | (post-1956) | 285 | 570 | 44 | 45 | 11 |

| 34. Khuribga | 63 | 126 | 73 | 19 | 8 |

| 35. Sanya | 141 | 282 | 40 | 40 | 20 |

| 36. Sultan (Drawsh) | (1950) | 78 | 156 | 40 | 18 | 42 |

| 37. Bni Meskin | 97 | 194 | 74 | 19 | 6 |

| 38. Hasan | 44 | 88 | ^a | ^a | ^a |

| 39. Nwaser | 133 | 266 | 66 | 14 | 20 |

| 40. Kuwwasha | 48 | 96 | ^a | ^a | ^a |

| 41. Jdid | 59 | 118 | 44 | 49 | 7 |

| 42. ‘Amir | 68 | 136 | 44 | 38 | 18 |

| 43. Sid 1-Hafyan | 103 | 206 | 49 | 39 | 13 |

| 44. Biru (government offices and official residences) |

Notes: The figures for adult residents are based on the registration forms for the 1963 municipal elections. An adult is defined for electoral purposes as a person 21 years of age or older.

Because of the rounding off of decimals, percentages do not always total 100%.

Names of Sherqawi quarters are italicized. Identification numbers of quarters established prior to the protectorate are in italic type. Dates in parentheses are those of the founding of the indicated quarters.

^a No data available.

^b A direct borrowing from French bordel (“brothel”). The quarter was an official red-light district under the protectorate.

Ideally the households of a quarter are considered to be bound together by multiple personal ties and common interests. These complex ties are said to symbolize qaraba^ a key concept which literally means “closeness.” As used by urban and rural Moroccans, qaraba carries contextual meanings which range imperceptibly from asserted and recognized ties of kinship to participation in factional alliances, ties of patronage and clientship, and—the facet which will be developed here—common bonds developed out of residential propinquity. “Closeness” is acting as if ties of obligation exist with another person which are so compelling that they are generally expressed in the idiom of kinship. This is because kinship ties, especially those of blood, symbolize bonds which, however they are valorized, are considered permanent and cannot be broken. Most quarters have a cluster of households which claim relation to each other in this way.

In many respects “closeness” in present-day Morocco resembles the concept of “group feeling” (fasabiya) presented over five hundred years earlier by the North African philosopher and protosociologist Ibn Khaldun. In his exposition of the concept, Ibn Khaldun indicates the multiple bases on which “group feeling” can be asserted among both townsmen and tribesmen but ultimately opts for the ideological position that the “naturalness” of blood ties makes them superior to all other modalities as a basis for “group feeling” (Ibn Khaldun 1967:249–310, esp. 264). Present-day urban and rural Moroccans make the same claim. Such a position does not distinguish between “closeness” using kinship as an idiom in which social relations can be expressed and “closeness” as the presence of “actual” ties of kinship.

A quarter, then, can be defined as the extension of “closeness” in contiguous physical space. It can be said to have prestige in relation to the strength of the qaraba attributed to it by its component households and by other townsmen. A quarter should be able to assume a certain moral unity so that in some respects social space in it can be regarded as an extension of that of its component households. A household can belong to only one quarter, but there is flexibility over time as to which this can be, especially among households of lesser prestige.

“Closeness” in a quarter—just as between kinsmen, factional allies, and patrons and clients, in towns or elsewhere—can be symbolized by the exchange of visits on feast days and on other occasions, by assistance and participation in the activities connected with births, circumcision, weddings, funerals, graduation from school, and memorization of the Qur’an. The heads of households of a quarter (mwalin ed-derb) share certain minimal collective responsibilities; they often construct and maintain a mosque, hire a Qur’anic teacher (fqih) for it, and congregate there the night of Laylet 1-Qadr (the 27th of Ramadan) to listen to the recitation of the Qur’an until sunrise. They may also hire a night watchman (‘assas).

Because of the multiple ties which link the residents of a quarter, respectable women who never venture to the main market can circulate discreetly within it, since the residents are “known” (me^uf) to each other. For this reason, quarter residents are concerned with any scandal which may affect their own reputation and may occasionally try to force the departure of undesirable households or persons.

Even when “closeness” is maintained by overlapping ties of residential propinquity and kinship, as in certain Sherqawi quarters in Boujad, informants emphasize that the obligations between persons are not fixed. As stated previously, there is an existential realism toward “the way things are” which permeates their conception of the social order. Thus one elderly Sherqawi illustrated as follows the flexibility of alliances in blood feuds involving his quarter prior to the protectorate: “How can you say that it was always your brothers or your father’s brother’s sons who would help you in a fight? They might live far from you and, besides, they have their own household and affairs to look after. Why should they risk their lives for you as well?” The same informant made a similar point using the concept of hbab (sg., hbib) which literally means “loved ones” but which frequently is used to specify persons linked by blood relations. When necessary for context, the meaning of such terms is more strictly delimited. For example, Boujadi-s speak of some persons as being qrab (sg., qrib) or hbab be-sh shra\ to indicate those who are kinsmen within the definitions of Islamic law concerning marriage and inheritance. The rights ensuing from such ties are fixed in Islamic law, but in the context of Moroccan society these rights, like any others, are a matter of negotiation in light of the total social context.

Thus in the Moroccan context, kinship, including close blood relationships, constitutes a class of relations upon which specified social roles can be developed rather than a set of relationships with specified, fixed obligations attached to them. This is in substantial contrast with, for instance, the specific obligations attached to kinship ties in southern Iraq and some other parts of the Arab world (e.g.,

Salim 1962). In Morocco the presence of “actual” kinship relations between persons is not in itself a specific indication of the actual contours of the relationship.

For “closeness” to be said to exist in a quarter, it must be capable of mobilizing for effective social action in some contexts. An external parameter can be noted here. Most quarters are composed of two hundred to six hundred inhabitants. Those residential clusters considerably smaller or larger than this range tend to be the ones which are not regarded as quarters by all informants. Such a guide is very rough but suggests that, for bonds of “closeness” to be effective in terms of physical propinquity, there is an optimal quantitative range, above and below which such ties become untenable. Census figures (Kingdom of Morocco 1961) suggest a similar range for rural local communities (daw war-s).

In addition, each quarter has one or several “big men” (kobbar), or men with “word” (kelma) , who in some contexts act for the common interests of the quarter and can mobilize households within it. Quarters lacking persons with “word” are usually incapable of mobilization and are regarded by many as not being quarters at all.

Residential areas with a high proportion of rural immigrants are generally said to lack “closeness.” These immigrants settle wherever there is suitable accommodation available, rather than cluster by origin, and have a tendency to move frequently. Residents of such areas are said by older townsmen to be “unknown” to each other, even if they consider themselves a quarter. Generally they are unable to mobilize as an effective group, since they lack the economic resources and leadership to establish such signs of prestige as a quarter mosque. Since no one in them has “word,” such quarters tend to be the last to

acquire such urban amenities as sewers, water, and paved passages or (for the “new” quarters) roads.

Given the past competitive advantages of the Sherqawa, including education as “sons of notables” (fils de notables) in the early days of the protectorate and preferment in official positions, some have been able to maintain local and even national prominence by converting the waning power of maraboutism into assets more viable in altered social and economic positions. This is reflected by the continuing existence and prestige of several (not all) Sherqawi quarters over the last sixty years, especially the ‘Arbawi and Zawya quarters, inhabited by those claiming descent from the most prominent Sherqawi marabouts of the last two centuries. In these quarters more than others, the ties of residence, faction, and descent tend to coincide, although these identities are still amenable to considerable manipulation. Many residents hold rights in the undivided estates of their maraboutic ancestors in addition to shares of offerings made to the shrine of their founding ancestor. Residents of both quarters can point to numerous occasions in the recent past when effective alliances have been formed on a quarter-wide basis.

Sherqawi and other quarters unable to maintain such prestige are liable to dissociation—since the Second World War, prosperous Sherqawi merchants in some of the less prestigious quarters have moved to New Boujad and have downplayed their Sherqawi identity. Rural immigrants moving into such quarters then try to claim Sherqawi descent as one means of upgrading their own prestige. The “closeness” of the remaining original inhabitants can no longer be expressed in social action. Not infrequently, entire quarters disappear over relatively brief spans of time as a consequence of this process.[46]

In contrast, there are a number of quarters formed over the last few decades which now attempt to claim prestige equal or superior to that of the leading Sherqawi quarters. The Khaluqiyin quarter (6–20) has at its core the sons of a non-Sherqawi merchant who before and after the protectorate engaged in trade with Khnifra, in the Middle Atlas highlands. They became prosperous and early in the 1930’s purchased adjoining plots in the original French-designed New Boujad. Later, two of the brothers became active in nationalist politics and, publicly at least, were the leaders of rival parties. Most residents of the quarter claim links with these core households. These, in turn, have begun claiming descent from ‘Ali Smuni, a “rediscovered” brother of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi who, they assert, unlike the marabout, was a “progressive” ahead of his time. Thus they claim the prestige of distinguished ancestry without its supposed encumbrances. Quarters founded by rural qaid-s during the protectorate had a similar rapid ascendancy—and, in some cases, a precipitate fall.

*** Establishing “Closeness”: An Example

The rise and fall of quarters is related to their ability to sustain “closeness” based at least in part upon residential association. This section will outine the mechanics by which the claim to “closeness” was made in one particular quarter.

The Qsayra quarter (6–9), “The Little Fortress,” is so named because it adjoins the fortified, high-walled Sherqawi religious lodge which forms the nucleus of the Zawya quarter and, in fact, looks like a scaled-down version of that quarter.

Qsayra’s residents tend to claim “closeness” to each other by descent and marriage, although, as is also the case for Sherqawi quarters, in most cases no exact genealogical links can be demonstrated. Most residents of the quarter claim that they or their ancestors came from Ait Saleh, the tribal grouping to the immediate west of Boujad. Without denying Ait Saleh origins, others prefer to stress their relations with one Hajj Bu Bakr, himself reputedly of Ait Saleh, who founded the quarter at the turn of the century and whose household serves as the “core” with which other households claim affinity.

Bu Bakr was a tannery owner and grain merchant when the French arrived in 1913. Not long after this event, he made a fortune by selling grain in exchange for land and houses during a period of extensive drought.[47] Bu Bakr soon converted his fortune into social honor by making the pilgrimage to Mecca and thus acquiring the title Hajj, constructing an imposing house for himself, and marrying a second wife. As his sons matured and married, he built adjacent houses for them, in the manner of other men of prestige. He also constructed a small mosque for the quarter and made the major contribution toward paying the fqih hired to teach in it. He died shortly after the Second World War, although his sons and widows continue to reside in the quarter.

The means by which residents of the quarter claim “closeness” with Hajj Bu Bakr deserve some attention. There are some thirty dwellings in the quarter, although when I asked informants to enumerate them for me they invariably excluded several. These turned out to be those living units which somehow did not qualify as households—men sleeping in shops; the dwellings of several poor, childless couples; and all those excluded from the circle of “closeness” for some assumed moral defect. These “nonhouseholds” did not share the visiting patterns of the “counted” households of the quarter or engage in their multiple reciprocal exchanges.

The asserted ties of one informant will be examined in detail, since they orchestrate virtually the entire range of means by which “closeness” can be asserted. At first Ma‘ti (7–1), a shopkeeper who had attended the local college, claimed that Bu Bakr was of his “blood” (men demmi). This he elaborated by claiming that the relation was

(Ma‘ti)

Informant’s household

Asserted kinship link

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-20.png][Figure 7. Kinship ties of an informant in Qsayra quarter.]]

through his “father’s brother” (7–3), who had married a woman of Hajj Bu Bakr’s household.

In another context some months earlier I had asked Ma‘ti to tell me whom he considered

his kinsmen, so that I had a means of checking his statements. When I reminded him that previously he had said his father had no brothers, he replied that, since he was “close” (qrib) to Hajj Bu Bakr, then it must be through a half-brother of his father that he had never met or perhaps through a brother of his grandfather (7–5). In other words, “closeness” came first, then its ideological justification. He continued that there “probably” was a second link through the marriage of his mother’s sister (7–4), who also lived in Qsayra. Again, this tie could not be demonstrated. Finally, Ma‘ti said that Bu Bakr’s people act as if (b-hal) they are related (qrib); so they must be; and he cited at length the informal visiting patterns which prevailed between their households. No one can remember such ties clearly, he said; and since—in perfectly comprehensible Catch-22 reasoning—no one can verify them in any exact way, they must exist. He went on to link himself in a similar manner with a minor, but significant, local government official who figures prominently in the incident which is discussed below.[48]

*** The Great Shrine Incident

The perseverance of a quarter or any other group is contingent upon its effectiveness in ongoing social situations. Ties of kinship, occupation, and residence, among others, may form the base of active alliances. The emphasis placed on these ties varies with the situations in which they are used.

For many years residents of Qsayra regarded themselves as a quarter and were seen as such by other townsmen. But only after an incident in 1969, which involved effective collective action on the basis of quarter identity, was it commonly regarded as a quarter of high prestige. This event, which I have labeled the Great Shrine Incident, precipitated a shift in the boundaries of commonly accepted social categories by legitimizing the fusion of residence and kinship claimed by residents of the quarter. In the process, the Sherqawi prerogative of building shrines for their ancestors was effectively challenged.

The Great Shrine Incident began with the death in France of a man called Sherqawi, an artist who had emigrated to France some years earlier. Informants from the Qsayra quarter claimed that despite his name he was not a Sherqawi but of “their blood.” Moroccan friends of the artist in France had his body returned to Boujad, where at first it was placed in the common cemetery. When some of them later visited Boujad, they left money for a more “fitting” memorial with a minor local official who was a resident of Qsayra. He quickly consulted with other residents of the quarter—it is significant that he chose to pursue action along its lines rather than some other —and decided to erect a shrine (c/obba) for the artist. As one Qsayra resident later said: “After all, he was like [b-hal] a saint [wali], I don’t say he is, but how else do you distinguish a man except by building a shrine over his head?”

All informants agreed that it takes more than the construction of a shrine to make a marabout, but all shrines are regarded nonetheless as those of marabouts:

After you die [said another supporter of the shrine] your sons begin talking about how great you are and build a shrine over your head. Then they say that you have a high rank \daraja kbira] with God. Some people visit the shrine, kiss it, and ask for things. However, those that ask the most are the descendants of the shaykh [i.e., the person in the shrine]. They ask for animals and grain from the pilgrims. Then, as

the descendants of the shaykh increase in number, some continue to collect gifts and intercede with their ancestor; others become merchants and teachers and so on. That's all there is to it.

For residents of the Qsayra quarter, support for construction of the shrine was a means of upgrading their own social honor. A shrine would allow them to point to an "exemplary" ancestor in the manner of the Sherqawa and, moreover, distinguish them from other commoners. A successful mobilization against the Sherqawa would effectively validate their claim to "closeness."

The local official from Qsayra managed to supplement the initial contribution with funds from the municipal treasury on the grounds that the artist was an international figure and that the construction of a shrine for him would enhance Boujad as a tourist attraction. The site chosen was a promontory to the immediate north of the town, next to the main highway, where there already were five shrines for sons of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. A construction permit was obtained from the qaid, and a delegation from Qsayra went to Rabat informally to see persons in and out of government who might conceivably affect events in Boujad. This move indicated, of course, a sensitivity to informal constellations of power as opposed to the formal distribution of authority. Municipal work crews were used, and, by the end of the summer of 1969, construction of the shrine was almost completed. In fact, pilgrims began making small offerings despite attempts to stop them by Sherqawa who collected offerings at the adjoining shrines.

By now, a few Sherqawa had become concerned. As one of the active opponents of the Qsayra quarter later said, if the shrine were allowed to be completed, then others could claim that they, too, were descendants of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. The "real" Sherqawa would lose "word" by an inability to act effectively. At least some Sherqawa also stood to lose income from traffic with pilgrims.

The first men with "word" to act were two Sherqawi notaries from the prominent 'Arbawi quarter. Both were engaged in overseeing the collection and distribution of offerings at the main shrine and regularly emerged as spokesmen for Sherqawi interests. They tried to halt construction of the new shrine first by asking the local qaid, not a native of the region, to intervene. He refused (the local official from Qsayra was one of his close collaborators) on the grounds that the matter was internal to the Sherqawa and that the Makhzen was not about to intervene in their "family" affairs. The regional overseer of the Ministry of Pious Endowments, an early supporter of the Istiqlal (Independence) party and a reformist (Salafi) Muslim, also declined to intervene, arguing quite correctly that, since the Sherqawi shrines were not among his holdings, the matter was extraneous to his office.

The next move of the notaries was to prepare a petition in the name of "all" Sherqawa, only to find that, because of several recent and some not so recent disputes among Sherqawa, there was considerable resistance to its signing. Clearly, social action did not coalesce along simple, arbitrary lines of kinship or residence but depended upon each person's weighing the various alternatives for action open to him.

Eventually some sixty signatures were collected for the petition. Significantly, the most influential of the signers were prosperous Sherqawi merchants who had resided for years in Casablanca and thus were removed from local factional alliances. Armed with their

petition, the two notaries went first to a minister in Rabat. According to one of those present at the interview, his reply was markedly unsympathetic. “Once dead all Muslims are equal,” he replied, and would have nothing to do with the prerogatives claimed by a mara- boutic descent group. The notaries tried to argue that the shrines were “historical,” not “religious,” monuments, but this also fell on deaf ears.

Their next visit, to an influential private individual, was more successful. A single telephone call was placed to the qaid of Boujad, who immediately rode out to the shrine and forbade further work on it.

Informants from both sides of the dispute stressed that their formal arguments were much less decisive than the fact that someone with influence had acted.

Supporters of the shrine from the Qsayra quarter congratulated themselves that it took months for a mere stalemate to be effected against them—the nearly completed shrine was left standing—and regarded their setback as temporary: “We will stay quiet for a few years and then start building again. By that time even the Sherqawa will forget whether or not Sherqawi is a descendant of Sidi Mham- med Sherqi and will only remember his name.”

It would be misleading to interpret this incident primarily in terms of the successful attempt of nonmarabouts to acquire for themselves the symbols of maraboutic prestige. This would be perhaps too “traditional” a view of “traditional” Morocco in the light of the frequency of such occurrences in the past (e.g., Bel 1938:376–382). More to the point is the fact that a successful alliance was formed along the lines of residential propinquity, was sustained, and thus legitimized the assertion of quarter “closeness” as a social reality.

*** Social Structure: The Tribal Setting

The same underlying pattern of social structure which I have depicted in an urban setting applies equally to rural Morocco. To show this, I will describe in detail the social organization of the Sma‘la and Bni Zemmur “tribes”[49] of the upper Tadla Plain, both in the present and in the historically known past. These two tribes are no more representative of rural Morocco in general than is Boujad of Moroccan towns, at least in terms of formal characteristics. But, as I indicated earlier, it is pointless to make comparisons or determinations of typicality based on such characteristics. Since the question of personal and group identity is closely related to the conception of marabouts, it is worth discussing it in some detail. In describing tribal social structure, I want to distinguish two separate perspectives, a sociological one and that of native ideology. The latter can further be divided between “official” representations offered by rural strong-men, especially those who dealt most regularly with the precolonial Makh- zen and the protectorate government, and those of ordinary tribesmen.

The Smada and Bni Zemmur employ the idiom of agnation to describe relations between persons and groups of persons. This, of course, is one of the two features that are necessary for a society to be described in terms of segmentary lineage organization. The other feature is not present: segmentation is not the only idiom in which political relations are conceptualized; groups of persons do not primarily align themselves along the lines provided by asserted agnatic ties. Tribesmen are explicitly aware of this and, at least on

the Tadla Plain, do not assert that the precolonial past was different from the present in this respect.[50]

Members of both tribes that I am here concerned with use the metaphors of a tree and the human body to describe their internal divisions. For example, one tribesman spoke of the Bni Battu as the trunk of a tree, which in turn was divided into branches. The word used to indicate branches of a tree (‘ersh’) is not used, but rather several interchangeable terms—tribesmen are not immune to mixing metaphors. Among these terms are “group” (jarqa’), “thigh” (jakhda’), and “piece” (tarf). For convenience, I translate all these as “section.” Sections are further divided into ddwwar-s, a term which I translate as “local communities.” These, in turn, are composed of household units which, depending upon their economic and ecological circumstances, are called either “houses” (dar-s) or “tents” (khay- ma-s’). The relationships within and between these various groups are spoken of as qaraba and are symbolized in terms of blood. Thus the Sma‘la maintain that all members of their tribe are linked by blood, but explicitly deny that this tie obliges them to act in specified ways with regard to each other. Such a denial firmly excludes these tribes from the Procrustean bed of segmentation. As one tribesman said: “We are like the branches of a tree, but each section is on its own [koll farqa b-uhedha].” In other words, social and political action flows along numerous lines: residential propinquity, herding arrangements, kinship, patron-client relations, and other bonds of necessity or mutual interest. None of these ties, of course, is specific to the tribal milieu. The ecological, economic, and political conditions of rural society vary widely, although the latitude within which tribesmen can valorize actual or potential ties tends to be more limited than that available in an urban milieu.

How far the component of assumed blood relations is allowed to determine political action is a complex matter. It is not simply a question of relative autonomy from government or outside “interference,” as has sometimes been maintained. To the contrary, as will be elaborated below, the coming of the protectorate to the upper Tadla

Plain, and presumably elsewhere, appears to have strengthened the notion of the formal agnatic ideology of groups as a blueprint for political action. Second, the use of the ideology of agnatic relationships varies markedly with the role informants play in tribal society. This is an aspect rarely elaborated in anthropological accounts of such ideologies. Members of the rural elite are those who, by reason of their wealth or prestige, command a following and often act as spokesmen with the administration and other nontribesmen. It is these persons who are most capable of manipulating and describing the conceptual grid provided by agnatic relationships. The mark of a tribal strong-man is his ability to manipulate this grid and all other available ties to accumulate personal wealth and power. The only clear difference between the preprotectorate and the protectorate in this respect seems to be that, prior to the protectorate, a plurality of persons commonly acted as such an elite within each tribal group, while the protectorate enhanced the fortunes of a few by giving them the protection of official sinecures. When asking about tribal social organization, I was usually referred to such strong-men or to older men who “knew” such things. In many cases these informants turned out to be the nucleus of de facto clients and allies and expected such referrals to be made to them.

The agnatic conceptual grid elaborated by the tribal elite centers less upon the relations of local communities with each other or their role in higher organizational units than upon the relations among tribes and tribal sections. This grid, or variants of it, forms a potential base upon which relations among various groups can be legitimated and as such

constitutes an “official” native representation of the social structure (Bourdieu 1972:113). An example of such a conceptualization is presented in Figure 8. It is a version current among several elderly Sma‘la who were government shaykh-s during the protectorate (and who, by reason of wealth and clientele, continue to be “shadows” to younger tribesmen who now officially exercise the same functions). In it, the Sma‘la are descended from the Bni Jabir, an eponymous Arab tribe from which many tribal groups in western Morocco claim descent. Most of the other tribal groups of the upper Tadla Plain are made to have a similar origin: Werdigha, Bni Meskin, Bni Musa, Bni ‘Amir, and Bni Mellal.[51] However, my informants knew only their own tribe and the neighboring Werdigha with any exactitude. Contact with the other tribal groups of the upper Tadla Plain is presently almost nonexistent. In fact, the existence of some of them as groups which ever formed the basis for united action is questionable, outside of the assumptions made by early protectorate administrators. Nonetheless, it was this set of concepts which was given administrative reality by the French: qaid-s were set up over each of these groups early in the protectorate. These administrative categories were not entirely artificial, since the French determined tribal groups and boundaries early in the protectorate by meeting with those who convincingly portrayed themselves as “notables” for the groups involved and appeared capable of imposing their “word” on other tribesmen. Since many of the same notables became incorporated into the protectorate administration, it is reasonable to assume that they had an interest in sustaining this particular macro-genealogical framework.[52]

Figure 8.

Tribes of the Tadla Plain: a version of the tribal elite.

*** A Commoner Perspective: The Local Community

In contrast to the elaborate genealogical representations of the tribal elite, the perception of social organization of ordinary tribesmen is less comprehensive and differs considerably in emphasis. Most tribesmen can offer only a truncated outline of intra- and intertribal relationships. Thus, since Sma‘la is the plural of Ismahl, ordinary Smada tribesmen assured me that they claimed descent from an individual of that name. Similarly, all tribesmen could name the tribal sections of their own tribe, as well as the local communities of their own section and local communities from adjacent sections that were contiguous to their own or with which they had herding agreements. The enumerations of such units by different tribesmen never completely tally: the variant conceptual maps possessed by tribesmen of the rural social order are somewhat analogous to the townsmen’s delineation of urban quarters. The major difference is that, unlike town dwellers, all rural tribesmen belong to a local community, although their membership in specified local communities may shift in time. The analogy was probably more direct in the preprotectorate era when, for reasons of security, membership in an urban quarter was essential.

Most ordinary tribesmen describe their social organization first in terms of their local community, the group which most impinges upon their daily activities. This group relates in various ways to “higher” levels of organization.

Literally, the term dawwar means “circle.” In the insecurity of preprotectorate days, herding units of a local community pitched their tents in a circle during

transhumance, kept their herds in the middle for safety, mutually agreed upon their movements, and, to a certain extent, negotiated collectively the tenor of their relations with other groups. Such spatial representations of social order are now less clear. For one thing, local communities are not distinguished by clustered settlements. As I have already mentioned, sedentarization occurred quite late on the upper Tadla Plain, so that households settled on their lands rather than in villages. Nor is the ownership of or right to land in this region a direct clue. Local communities own no land collectively. The rights to certain pasture lands are vested administratively in tribal sections, continuing (although in a much less flexible manner) a convention which existed prior to the arrival of the French. In contrast to some other regions of Morocco, virtually all agricultural land on the upper Tadla Plain is held by individuals and in principle is transferred according to what is locally understood and enforced of Islamic law. The value placed upon agriculture was much less intense prior to the protectorate but operated by the same principles. Although most landowners now possess formal, written deeds (resm-s), preprotectorate usage was generally based upon tacit verbal understandings and conventions. Tribesmen often purchased land rights in other local communities or acquired them by inheritance and marriage. Similar principles of land use existed elsewhere, for instance in the Berber-speaking region of Bzu. Only a few exprotectorate qaid-s have taken advantage of the Torrens system of land registration, introduced under the protectorate, to obtain a title (titre) which fully removes their land from the jurisdiction of the Islamic law courts.

Members of local communities conceive of relations to each other in much the same way as do residents of urban quarters. They claim agnatic ties but are unable to demonstrate specifically that such ties encompass all members of their group. When asked to trace such relations in detail, tribal informants invariably responded that only someone older could do so. In turn, elderly informants vaguely referred to “earlier times” (bekri) as the period when the local community was entirely composed of traceable agnatic relations. Parenthetically, bekri is a temporal category used for all social action thought to have some effect upon the present social order but for which no specific context or verification can be provided. In actuality, local communities commonly consist of several agnatic cores, none of which necessarily predominates, which are interlinked by complex affinal and contractual ties.

For purposes of kinship and inheritance, a narrower, more precise range of relationships is specified. Most tribesmen are aware that by Islamic law, relationships (q ar aba) are constituted exclusively by designated agnatic ties and by marriage. Nonetheless, even these evidence considerable latitude. As one tribesman said, the qadi is in town, not in the country. By implication, even for purposes of inheritance, the legal definition of qaraba is not necessarily the decisive one in social reality.

In rural local communities, as in urban quarters, the significant criteria of group membership are a general support of its members in mutual interests and the capacity to act together with other members on certain ritual and political occasions. Contrary to Durkheim, it is not just performance of a ritual (or other collective action) which creates a feeling of solidarity. There is also a pre-existing community of interests which makes such action possible. There is a dialectical, mutually reinforcing relationship between ritual and social action. In the case of Morocco, the ensuing solidarity is symbolized by the notion of qaraba as sustained among its members.

Each local community has a council (jma’d), not to be confused with the

governmental councils present at the level of tribal sections (which in governmental neologism are considered to be rural coni- munes). Participants in the council of a local community are not formally designated. Any adult male head of a household who has an interest in the issues at hand participates, although the opinions of those who are economically or politically weak tend to be discounted or ignored in favor of those with more substantial material interests and skills. Such councils discuss the direction of movements during the winter months of transhumancy and agree when necessary on a spokesman (mqaddem) to represent them collectively. Frequently the same men are repeatedly selected as spokesmen, but they cannot as a consequence be said to hold formal "office." The decisive factor is what local community members consider the most efficacious representation of their interests, as well as internal constellations of wealth and power. Dissidents always have the option of breaking away and forming new local communities or, in some cases, of shifting their allegiance to other groups with which they have pre-existing ties.

There are a number of parallels between the performance of collective actions associated with urban quarters and those associated with rural local communities. Each local community constructs a mosque, although this may be no more than a tentor hut (jiwala') almost indistinguishable from other dwellings. The council of each local community usually contracts on an annual basis for a Qur'anic teacher to instruct its children in the rudiments of reading, writing,

and the Qur'an. The mosque often serves as the sleeping quarters for this teacher (fqih). One inhabitant of each local community, usually self-selected, serves as prayer-caller.[53]

Each local community also has associated with it the tomb of a marabout, although this is usually only a sporadically maintained, derelict, rectangular structure in the midst of their communal burial ground. Only rarely are new ones constructed. These marabouts generally are called fqih-s by tribesmen and are often compared to the impoverished, transient Qur'anic teachers, also called fqih-s, with whom tribesmen are familiar. Sacrifices are never offered at these tombs, although women occasionally offer candle stubs or coins, which children promptly pick up. In contrast with the leading Sherqawi marabouts, little is known of these fqih-s beyond their names, nor do they have claimed descendants. Occasionally such marabouts are drawn out of anonymity by having compelling or unusual dreams and other uncanny events attributed to their inspiration. In another case, a maraboutic shrine gained prestige when the brother of an ex-qaid restored a tomb near his lands and encouraged offerings to be made to it. He then persuaded some Smada to visit it each fall on their way to the musem of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi in Boujad. As a consequence, two local communities began leaving token offerings of grain at harvest time, assuming that the tomb housed a "forgotten" Sherqawi. "Closeness" to the Sherqawi was attributed by the tribesmen to the quid's brother because of the care he bestowed on the tomb.

Although each local community usually is associated with a maraboutic tomb, there is no one-to-one correlation. There are many more tombs than local communities. This allows for shifts in boundaries and identities. On the plains to the north of Boujad there are eighty-nine such tombs, an average of one for every six square kilometers and 150 persons. These maraboutic tombs constitute a framework in which aspects of the social order can be concretely symbolized as groups shift in their composition. Most local communities also maintain covenants with a major marabout, such as Sidi Mhammed Sherqi and jointly make offerings to certain of his descendants, called "visitors" (zewwar-s), who are

thought to constitute particularly efficacious links between the group and the marabout. These will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

Each household or tent in the countryside belongs to only one local community, just as an urban household belongs to only one quarter at any time. The refusal or inability of a household to contribute to any of its collective obligations does not in itself serve as a sign of dissociation from the local community, although it generally affects its capacity to have a say in the collectivity's affairs. When breaks occur, a household unit or group of them may decide to form a separate local community. This will be identified by a separate marabout's tomb, burial ground, mosque, and other indications of collective identity. A particularly useful means of tracing the realignments both of local communities and of tribal sections is their conduct at the annual festival of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi in Boujad. Conduct at this festival constitutes a form of publication of new social alignments. These are perceived by the arrangement of tents and the part taken by local communities and tribal sections in "powder plays" (tehrak-s) , competitive displays of horsemanship in which riders try to gallop in a line abreast and fire their muskets in unison on a given signal. Such "powder plays" are always accompanied by heavy, serious betting between the groups involved. Differences that develop during these contests often themselves engender new lines of social demarcation.

Tribal Sections and Alliances

The identity of tribal sections is more stable over time than that of local communities. In part this is because both the protectorate and the independent Moroccan administration invested what are administratively considered to be tribal sections (often "tribes" to tribesmen themselves) with collective rights and obligations. These included rights to collective pasture lands, permits for transhumant movements, taxes, and other administratively imposed obligations. To a certain extent the protectorate "froze" the lines of political maneuver by recognizing these units, although there still was considerable flexibility as to how rights and obligations were construed, allocated, and defended. Prior to the protectorate, sections also fulfilled defensive functions. The upper Tadla Plain is dotted with the ruins of fortified compounds (dshar-s), generally located on promontories, which served as places of refuge from which sections could defend themselves and their flocks. No similar enclosures existed at the level of local communities or, in general, at the level of tribes.

Arrangements for the use of grazing land are currently the best indication of the flexibility with which idioms of group relationships are interpreted. An informant from Bni Battu, one of the most "traditional" tribes in its genre de vie, stressed that the most important factor in such arrangements was that both parties be mutually "known" (me'ruf) to each other and confident of each other's trustworthiness. This was considered more important than abstract considerations of tribal and sectional allegiance. Asserted ties of agnatic descent or affinity, common bonds with Sherqawi marabouts, contractual ritual alliances (tata) (see below), and simple de facto agreements of cooperation are all regarded as sufficient for such confidence to exist.

Grazing agreements were not limited to negotiations between groups. They also occurred between individual herd owners who were not necessarily from the same tribal section or tribe. I use the past tense because of the marked decline in the size of herds and transhumancy since the end of the Second World War. Presently, transhumancy is confined to administratively approved seasonal movements among neighboring groups and shows

little yearly variation. Such agreements were often not ordered within the formal structure of intergroup agnatic relationships, although for administrative reasons the French in the early years of the protectorate encouraged such a conception. Some French administrators in the 1920's and 1930's argued, without providing specific examples, that collective, tribe-wide pastoral agreements were "traditional," while other types of arrangements were recent, spurious accretions. A controleur civil stationed in Boujad during this period, basing himself upon specific ethnographic data, argued in opposition that arrangements made by individuals and local communities appeared equally "traditional" (B.1331,4 July 1935).[54]

In many ways, the lines of authority of the French tribal administration were a more perfect representation of the principle of segmentation and the encapsulation of smaller political units in larger ones than the conceptions employed by the tribesmen themselves. The assumption that agreements were concluded only between large collectivities appealed to popular French understandings of how tribal men ought to act (and undoubtedly did in some parts of Morocco) and, more concretely, had the advantage of being administratively tidy: transhumance was bureaucratically defined as the passage of herds between administrative districts. When such movements led to intertribal clashes, settlement was complicated by the fact that local French administrative posts had to communicate indirectly with each other through hierarchical channels. Such communication was particularly onerous in the Boujad region. Boujad and the tribes attached to it were in the zone of civil administration after 1931. The mountainous zone to the east, traditionally used for transhumance, was a "Berber" region and under military control. In fact, to solve the administrative problem and at the same time maintain a clear separation between "Berber" and "Arab" tribesmen, a military administrator in 1935 seriously proposed the ban of all pastoral trans- humancy in the region. The Boujad controleur pointed out in reply that such a decision would bring economic disaster to the tribes of the Boujad region that were dependent upon access to the complementary ecological zone of the mountains.

The modalities of grazing agreements depended upon a range of political and economic factors. For instance, the Smada tended to deal with the Berber-speaking Zayyan in tribal sections. This was partly because long-range transhumance required a large number of personnel to be effective. Zayyan territory was also potentially hostile. In contrast, most Smada dealt with the Bni Khiran and Wer- digha tribesmen to their west as individual heads of residential units (khayma-s). These tribes occupied complementary ecological zones. One herder might possess rights to land more suitable for grazing in humid years; another, land more suitable for dry years. Depending on the total complex of relations existing between the two parties, such arrangements varied from direct reciprocal exchanges or generalized mutual aid, accompanied by no more than symbolic gifts, to the payment of cash or a specified number of animals of the herd in exchange for grazing rights (B. 1331, 4 July 1935; Bonjean 1928: 74–78).

The formality attached to such agreements varied widely. Two tribesmen, even of different tribes, who had such arrangements of mutual trust were descriptively called "companions" (saheb-s). The same term often applies to local communities with mutually supportive relationships. In a terminological variation, the Bni Tsa section of Bni Battu (Bni Zemmur) call their relation with the Wlad Khellu, also of Bni Battu (see Fig. 9), one of "brotherhood" (khaw- wa). These two sections share the same pasture land, together with the other sections of the Bni Battu, and are distinguished by having pragmatically supported each other's interests in grazing and administrative disputes over several decades. This relationship, however, entails no ritual or formal contractual alliance. Members of both tribal sections explained that a khawwa relationship simply

implied that they tended to act in each other’s interests over a prolonged period. None of the other sections of the tribe had any similar record of sustained mutual support.

Tribe

Section

Local Community

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-19.png][Figure 9. Bni Battu. (Based on information from Wlad l-Hya tribesmen^ 1970.)]]

Prior to the protectorate, local communities and sections could formally symbolize mutual support through a “contractual ritual alliance” (tata). This type of alliance existed in various forms in many other parts of Morocco (Bruno and Bousquet 1946; Vinogradov 1973; Hart 1973). On the upper Tadla Plain, such alliances were generally made between local communities or sections of different tribes, although I have recorded several instances of intratribal alliances. The contracting parties agreed to refrain from fighting and raiding each other and, in general, to aid each other against external threats. Informants explained that such alliances were like the existence of milk brotherhood except that intermarriage was permitted.[55] Such alliances were temporally too remote from my informants for them to describe in detail how they actually operated. In principle, one was supposed to treat a tata ally as a brother. I have already indicated some of the contingencies which effectively allow such obligations to be variously interpreted.

Tata was contracted in formal rituals. For instance, the Flalha local community of Bni Tsa section (see Fig. 9), concluded an alliance with the ‘Ababsa section of the same tribe.[56] The councils (/ma‘a-s) of the two groups met in Boujad at the shrine of the Sherqawi marabout Ma‘ti ben Saleh (2–6), clasped hands over his cenotaph, and swore their alliance.

The Wlad Khellu section of Bni Battu concluded a tata alliance in a different way. They have—or, strictly speaking, had—alliances with three tribal sections. Two of these had territory contiguous to theirs: the Arab-speaking Wlad ‘Ayyad (Bni Zrantel) and the Berberspeaking Ait Bu Haddu. The tie to a group spatially distant from them was with the Jriyyat section of Shegran. In one instance, tata was concluded by a communal meal between the councils of both sections. Afterward, each man present removed one of his slippers (belgha-s) and placed it in a pile along with those of other men of his section. These were then matched at random. All members of the two groups were henceforth in a tata relation, and those whose slippers were

paired generally approached the other group through their counterpart. In another case, lactating women of the two sections nursed each other's children after the communal meal of the two councils. In the final case, a cous-cous eaten by the councils had in it milk from the women of both groups.[57]

Once tata was contracted, any violation of it, such as theft, was thought to incur supernatural retribution. Since French pacification, no new alliances have been contracted. As one tribesman said: "Now we are all in tata with the Makhzen." Existing relationships, however, continue to be recognized, and the term is now used metaphorically. For instance, tribesmen ask for the price of tata (i.e., a low price) from Boujadi merchants who are by origin from a group in tata with their own.

Knowledge of such alliances tends to be highly concentric. Each tribesman tends to have knowledge only of the tata relations of his own section. Those of other groups are not systematically known. Such alliances involve only the two contracting parties, so that a group called upon to come to the aid of a tata ally could not call for the support of groups which in turn were allied to it.

The Evidence of the Past

It can be argued that the political and economic transformations of the last sixty years have been so substantial that tribal organization described primarily from contemporary ethnographic evidence or the contemporary remembrance of things past differs fundamentally from that of the preprotectorate era. Of course, some very basic shifts have occurred. Since the protectorate, government intervention has greatly restricted the possibilities of intergroup hostilities. Matters previously settled among the tribes themselves or through maraboutic mediation now almost inevitably involve government intervention. Under current conditions, tribesmen can be more flexible in contracting and honoring alliances. Nevertheless, as I have tried to indicate, the available evidence suggests a continuity in the fundamental assumptions about the social order, rather than a sudden and marked discontinuity.

There exists fragmentary but nevertheless significant evidence in addition to that which I have already cited for the tribal social organization of the upper Tadla immediately prior to the protectorate. This is the Journal Politique of the military intelligence unit of the

French Corps de Debarquement for western Morocco, covering the period 1908–1912 (JP). These reports tend to confirm the description of tribal organization which I am presenting here. Only after the administrative machinery of the protectorate was set in place were tribes and their subdivisions assumed to be sharply delineated groups—whose form and capacity for alliance with other groups corresponded exactly, and curiously, with the assumptions implicit in the rural administrative apparatus.

Particularly relevant is the manner in which resistance was organized against the French on the upper Tadla Plain. It indicates a flexible, even entrepreneurial perception of the mechanics of alliance formation. For example, in the summer of 1910, one Shaykh Mha PAttawi recruited tribesmen of the upper Tadla to form a raiding party against tribes in the

Shawya that failed to resist the French.[58] He was initially joined by two to three thousand men on foot and five hundred horsemen from Bni ʻAmir, Ait Rbaʻ, and several sections of the Bni Meskin. His method of recruitment on the upper Tadla Plain was to proceed with his followers from one local community to another. In the best tradition of pyramid sales tempered with extortion, he demanded a “contribution” for his holy war (jihad) and threatened confiscation of the herds and grain supplies of recalcitrant groups. “Contributors” then were allowed to join the raiding party and take a share of future exactions (JP, August 1910). There is no evidence that any formal apparatus based upon agnatic intergroup relations had any effect upon Shaykh Mha[r]s operations.

French reports suggest a similar situation with Weld Karda, vaguely described as a “war chief” of the Smaʻla, who later became one of the first protectorate qaid-s. His recruiting strategy resembled that of Shaykh Mha except that it was on a smaller scale. Most of his following was from the Smaʻla, and raids were limited to the contiguous Werdigha tribe, who at that time were reported to be “conciliatory” toward the French (JP, September-December 1910).

An incident particularly indicative of the latitude of options available to tribesmen in forming alliances occurred during the struggle for the sultanate between the brothers Mulay ʻAbd l-ʻAziz and Mulay Hafed which began in 1907. Bitter fighting broke out between supporters for the two contenders among the Bni Zemmur and Smaʻla, resulting in a large number of deaths. To the discomfiture of the French, support for the two contenders was determined not only by what the French considered “political” factors, which for them meant the contest for the sultanate, but also by what they considered “ordinary” (i.e., apolitical) local disputes. Thus, an October 1909 entry in the Journal Politique states: “The Ait Saleh section [fraction] of Bni Zemmur ... is fighting with the Wlad Gwawsh section of the same tribe [over water rights—a dispute which persisted into the 1930’s]. The former, being more directly under the influence of [the Sherqawi marabout who supported ʻAbd l-ʻAziz], professes sympathies for Mulay ʻAbd l-ʻAziz. Nothing more is necessary for the opposing section to place its cause in care of Mulay Hafed and to contract an alliance with the Hafedist Smaʻla tribe.” Three months later the author of the report corrected his assessment of the composition of the two factions and reported that the marabout of the Sherqawi lodge[59] had concluded a truce between the Smaʻla and the Bni Zemmur, “or rather between the Hafedist and Azizist leaders of these two tribes” (JP, January 1910). Tribal alliances clearly suggest a much more complex pattern than that allowed by the formal ideology of agnation.

I have tried to make two major points in this chapter. The first is to show that social structure in Morocco, both urban and tribal/ rural, is based upon the ordered relationships not of groups of persons, but of persons. Moroccans do not conceive of the social order as consisting of groups in structured relationships. Emphasis is placed on managing personal networks of dyadic relationships. This is enough of a departure from accepted sociological understandings of North African society, particularly that element designated as “tribal,” that I have presented my ethnographic account in detail. Tribes, tribal sections, local communities, quarters, agnatic descent, and so on merely constitute frameworks by means of which persons relate to each other. The constant element in this type of social structure is the means by which persons contract and maintain ties with each other. This is implicit in the concept of “closeness” (qarabafr by means of which Moroccans describe such relationships.

Second, in specifying that this underlying notion of social structure is relatively constant over time—at least over the period of roughly a century that is my chief concern—I am not

proposing an unchanging metaphysical formula. Nonetheless, because of the inherent flexibility of this type of social structure, it is capable of accounting for a wide range of patterns of social action in Morocco, including the transformations engendered by the protectorate. This becomes more apparent when attention is shifted from the sociological description of social structure, the concern of this chapter, to the matrix of social definitions of reality through which everyday life and actions become subjectively meaningful to Moroccans themselves.

** 5. Impermanence and Inequality: The Common-Sense Understanding of the Social Order

*** The Common-Sense Foundations of Social Experience

Social institutions are subjectively held ideas about social relations shared by members of a given society. The existing social order is a manifestation of this texture of meaning. Whatever specialized knowledge members of a society possess or whatever activities they perform, they share a “natural” attitude toward the social world (Schutz 1967). This attitude is made up of everyday, unsystematized, common-sense symbolic understandings of how the world “really” is. Under ordinary conditions, these basic assumptions about the social order are so taken for granted that they are not articulated by members of a society. But they form the implicit background against which social action is planned and carried out. Special frames of reference, such as formal religious ideologies, are elaborated against the background of such understandings.

World views, or “natural” attitudes toward the world, are made up of a number of key concepts that have a “logico-meaningful” (Sorokin 1937:18–28) fit to one another. Like the parts of the jigsaw puzzle, the concepts that compose a world view have no uniformity in direct relation to one another. Karl Mannheim compared the presentation of a world view to that of biography, in which the “inner world” of the subject must be reconstituted from fragments of meaning contained in outward actions or statements. Each of these fragments actualizes an underlying pattern of meaning and serves as a “document” of it (1952:73). The ultimate test of an adequate description of a world view, therefore, is not quantitative or statistical but consists of the description’s ability to render behavior intelligible in a given society.

In this chapter I present five of the key concepts through which Moroccans comprehend social experience. I deliberately say “Moroccans” rather than “Boujadi-s.” This study is primarily based on fieldwork in Boujad and its region, but subsequent work elsewhere in Morocco suggests that the same underlying assumptions inform comprehension of the social order throughout the country. Significantly, Boujadi-s (and other Moroccans) also make this presumption, although they are sensitive to regional nuances. I do not intend to argue that the assumptions of the nature of the social order described here stop abruptly at Morocco’s national frontiers. As I indicate below, many of these assumptions are expressed in terms of Islamic ideas that are hardly unique to Morocco or to North Africa. Had I worked near Morocco’s frontiers, the issue of cultural boundaries would probably have been more immediate, but for most Moroccans the significant others with whom they come in contact are thought to share the same assumptions.

These five key concepts are God's will (l-mektub'^ l-mqayyed, qod- ret Allah) * reason ('qal), propriety (theshshem^ hshumiya), obligation (Jiaqq) , and compulsion ("ar). To describe them briefly, the concept of God's will focuses man's attention on the empirical social order by attenuating speculation on other possible orders. Reason enables men to perceive this order and discern what is in their best interest. Propriety is possession of the self-control which enables men to act properly in the social order, while the nature of obligations contracted by men determines and maintains their social honor in relation to other men. Finally, compulsion is a means of restoring serious breaks in the web of obligations which bind men together. The emphasis given to these five concepts is admittedly arbitrary, but this is inherently the case in any attempt to describe a world view. Any such description is largely shaped by the range of social action that it attempts to render meaningful. For the problems of social identity and religious belief that form the core of this book, the five concepts that I present here are particularly significant. In passing, however, I mention a number of other related concepts. Were my primary concern with other ranges of social action, such as sexuality and sexual comportment (which figure in this chapter only as subsidiary issues), then my emphasis in describing aspects of the world view would shift as well.

The five concepts are not in a rigid, fixed relation with one another. They are maintained only insofar as they are actualized by individuals and seem to explain meaningfully and render coherent action in the social world. When they cease to do so, they tend to shift in emphasis, since men strive to perceive their social world coherently. Their interconnection can be compared to Edmund Leach's now- renowned elastic rubber sheet (1966:7). As they are used in different settings and by different persons, these key concepts are elaborated in different ways. Since they are interconnected, a change in the meaning of one leads to shifts in the meanings of the others. This flexibility accounts for their ability to accommodate and account for the major shifts in the loci of economic and political power over the last seventy years.

Certain of the Moroccan concepts that I will describe also have rich historical layers of meaning and are used elsewhere in the Muslim world. This is especially true of God's will and reason. Both of these terms occur in the Qur'an and have been the subject of an interesting study of the world view of seventh-century Arabs (Izutsu 1964). They also appear in James Siegel's account of changing perceptions of the world in northern Sumatra (1969: esp. 98–133). I am interested in seeing the elaboration and integration of these concepts principally in their Moroccan context, but I point out their uses elsewhere to show the range of variations attached to them. Popular uses of these terms in Morocco vary from those implicit in formal Islamic texts, including the Qur'an. Such divergences are not the concern of this study, for the simple reason that in ordinary situations most informants never considered the possibility that these terms could be understood in any way but theirs. The fact that these concepts are tacitly construed by Moroccans as Islamic, if not human, universals, makes their resulting vision of the world all the more reasonable and compelling.

*** God's Will and the Social Order

The inequality of men in this world (ed-denya) is too matter-of-fact to be a matter of speculation to most Moroccans. These inequalities are attributed to God's will, a concept which explains the present state of affairs as well as the outcome of any future sequence of events. God's will (qodret Allah) is a term from classical Arabic, although it is used by almost all informants, including tribesmen, as synonymous with "that

which is recorded or written” (l-mqayyed or l-mektub). Perhaps the most common expression of this concept occurs in the phrase “if God wills” (in sha Allah) , which invariably prefaces any expression of future action or events. These concepts have often been glossed in colonial ethnography as Islamic “fatalism,” a term so ambiguous as to have minimal explanatory utility. Much of French colonial ethnography eagerly represented Moroccan society as frozen in time and incapable of meaningful internal change (e.g., Levi-Provencal 1922:11). The equation of “God’s will” with “fatalism” fit the colonizer’s vision of the native better than it did the Moroccan’s assumptions about “the way things are.”

For Boujadi-s and other Moroccans, the notion of God’s will implies quite the contrary of popular French colonial ethnography: men are free to take the world as it is and to determine action on the basis of their empirical observations. The actual state of affairs is an expression of God’s will. Being inevitable it cannot be questioned.

God’s will legitimates the present—and ephemeral—distribution of social honor as the God-given state of affairs. The ranking of individuals in relation to one another is never taken for granted but is constantly empirically tested. Provisionality is the very essence of the cosmos. Consequently, attention is focused upon assessing exact differentials of wealth, success, power, and social honor among particular men as a prelude to effective, specific social action, not upon speculation over the general order of the world. God reveals his will through what happens in the world, and men of reason constantly modify their own courses of action to accommodate this will.

Far from providing cosmological ballast to an ossified status quo and discouraging the planning of future action, the concept of God’s will attenuates speculation on why particular projects succeed or fail and blocks metaphysical reflection on the fate of man in this world. The wide-awake man is thus much more concerned with adjusting to circumstances as they come along than with considering how things might have been or should be. An elderly, salaried Qur’an- reader, who formerly collected offerings at the shrine of Sidi Mham- med Sherqi, explained the concept in the following manner:

God created the world. He decides and knows everything. You have a car and I don’t. That’s God’s will [qodret Allah] . One day it might be taken away from you. That’s also God’s will. If you are a shopkeeper, how you treat people doesn’t always affect your business. There are bad- tempered traders like M who are still rich and suc

cessful. God decides whose affairs prosper.[60]

A Boujadi shoemaker articulated the same concept in explaining what he would do if someone told him his sons had been seen drinking:

If [my sons] had heads they would realize what other people were saying and leave off their conduct. As a father I would tell them to stop. If they didn’t, then they would show no respect for their father. That is written [mqay- yed]. If they continued, that also would be written. Similarly, I tell my sons to study and beat them. The younger boy is always playing in the streets, but he is better at school. Should I ask him why he is playing [i.e., get him to stop] ? He knows his lessons. The older boy always reads his lessons aloud

in front of me but he is worse in school. How can I judge who is the better of the two? That is God’s affair.

He applied the same concept to explain the ethos of competitive settlement among merchants and craftsmen:

If there are five ironsmiths next to each other and a tribesman comes wanting his plough fixed, no one calls out for the client to come to him. That would be improper [hshu-md]. You say nothing and the person will come [[../../../hshu-][to who]]mever God has chosen. Of course if you know the way things are done [qa‘ida] and deal fairly and politely with people they may do the same with you. But whether they actually do so is also God’s affair.

In Morocco, the concept of God’s will also emphasizes the limits of responsibility of one man for the moral and economic fate of others. Their fate is God’s; and each man looks after himself (ydebber rasu).

God created differences among people. And of many who are young [he referred to some nephews in their twenties] , they still have time; they will learn. Let people do as they want. God distinguishes between them. A Muslim’s duty is just to show people the path to those who wish to be with God, and that is that. Either they take it or leave it. The Prophets allow them the choice. There is paradise and there is hell, and God will select who goes to each. (A Makhzen official)

Men are bound together by multiple social obligations, but these tend to be particularistic. There are abstract, normative obligations incumbent upon each member of the Muslim community (umma) to aid other Muslims, but these obligations tend to be stylized. Thus, almsgiving (sadaqa) , an obligatory precept of Islam, tends to be performed on such occasions as the day of ‘Ashura, a feast day in the Muslim lunar calendar on which a tithe is given to the poor, on market days when beggars make the rounds of merchants, and frequently when one is about to undertake a long and arduous journey. The limit of men’s responsibility toward one another is illustrated by the fact that many rich merchants and notaries in Boujad, all considered pious Muslims, made fortunes in the famine of 1945 by purchasing land from tribesmen and houses from townsmen for a few measures of grain, turning tribesmen into sharecroppers and townsmen into tenants. Since the allocation of men’s fate is God’s affair, no Boujadi-s suggested that this sort of action was ruthless or morally objectionable.

At least on occasion, many Boujadi-s recognize incongruities between what they perceive as fundamental Muslim ideals and “the way things are” (qa‘ida), but this perception does not lead to any significant tension between ideal and real. Even in the interior of the mosque, where informants insist on the absence of inequalities of Muslims before God, men of prestige tend to have their customary places of prayer, which men of lesser prestige avoid. In small quarter mosques, the presence of a man of stature during evening prayers often causes the mosque to be avoided by men of lesser stature. On one such occasion, I asked a Boujadi I knew well why he abruptly turned away from a small quarter mosque he regularly attended without saying his evening prayers. He simply denied that the incident could have taken place, since normatively it should not have. Emphatically, however, the incongruity between norm and conduct constituted no dilemma

for my informant.

There are several ways in which incongruities between “the way things are” and Islamic ideals are made reasonable. One is to say that the world at present is defective or corrupt (khayba’):

These times are rotten [had l-weqt mkhasser^. No one wants religion now. Everyone wants the path of money. Once a notary [‘adel] was a learned man; now he is just anyone with connections and money to buy the post. It is a game. (A Makhzen official)

Everyone wants to show his influence [kelma]. The Minister [wazir^\ has a sofa as high as your knee; so the qaid wants one as high as your chest. This has been the state of the world since Adam. (A broommaker)

Such complaints reverberate throughout the writings of centuries of Moroccan historiographers, indicating that they are not peculiar to the last few decades (Levi-Provencal 1922).

A complementary explanation of incongruities is to claim that some professed Muslims are ignorant of what Islam “really” entails. Islam literally means “submission,” and an “ignorant” person (jahel) is one who is uncontrolled and unsubmissive, a slave to his passions.[61] Sometimes individuals are so characterized, but just as often the term is applied to entire categories of persons. The assertion that many do not abide by the Islamic code of conduct then makes comprehensible the present imperfect state of the world:

Those people in the countryside, those ignorant people, what do they know of Islam? They don’t pray or fast. They just live like animals: sleep, eat and work, and give grain and animals to any con man [gheddar] from the zawya or a brotherhood. (A merchant, once prominent in the Istiqlal [Independence] party)

Another educated informant made the following comment about the widespread belief in marabouts:

These stories of the marabouts bringing Islam to the Maghreb, they are all lies. People use them just to collect money from the ignorant. Islam came to the Maghreb with ‘Uqba ben Nafi.[62] People converted, but they did not remain Muslims. ‘Uqba was near Tangier when a soothsayer [kahen. “one who practices magic”] approached him and killed him. People did not stay Muslim until after the time of Mulay Driss.[63] But most men are still ignorant. They do not know what is and is not Islam and what their ancestors did and did not do. So they are happy for someone to tell them stories about marabouts.

Those who assert that they really “know” Islam feel under no obligation to dispel the ignorance of others. If others want to change their way of thinking and acting, that is God’s and their own concern. Each man looks after his own interests and takes the world as it is.

Islamic precepts are acknowledged as ideals but are peripheral to social action in this world because they are unattainable. A man's attention is directed away from an ideal normative state of affairs: "God has given that which is [had esh-shi Ui 'ta Allah, had esh-shi Ui kayri]."

*** Reason as a Social Concept

Since the pattern of events of any given moment is divinely ordained, the "reasonable" man sets about perceiving the multiple empirical ties between persons and adapting them to his interests as best he can. All formal roles—kinship, political, religious, and economic—are open to a wide range of negotiation as to their exact parameters and contents.

Reason (^qal) is the capacity to discern the meaning of social action and, on the basis of this perception, to engage in effective social action. It signifies adroitness or cleverness, without the pejorative English connotations of the latter word, more than a capacity for dealing with abstract rational phenomena. Its possession assumes an empirical knowledge of and capacity to manipulate the shared code of conduct called the qa'ida, "the way things are done."

Reason enables a man to perceive what will pass as acceptable and approved conduct in the management of his various social obligations to kinsmen, neighbors, merchants, and clients, men of influence and men without, and how to weigh these various commitments in relation to one another. The classical Arabic verb from which 'qal is derived can carry the meaning "to hobble a camel" and in other contexts can signify "confinement" or "control." These original meanings vividly parallel the contemporary Moroccan usage. Reason provides a man control over his nature (tbi'a) and passions (shehwat., sg., shehwa) within the precepts of Islam. Several informants explained this by citing a popularly known Qur'anic aphorism: "Man has reason. He distinguishes between that which harms him and that which doesn't."[64] Ordinarily the qa'ida provides a rough guide to "proper" behavior.

A majority of Boujadi-s ordinarily assume that the qa'ida is based upon, if not identical to, Islamic law (shra') in both its jural and its moral sense. In its jural sense, Islamic law is composed of those rules of conduct which in principle are enforced in a qadi's court: contracts and procedures related to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and certain property transactions. In its moral sense the Islamic law also prescribes the obligations of a Muslim: the five "pillars" of ritual prayer, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca, alms, and the confession of faith that there is no God but God and Muhammed is his Prophet. In scholarly texts there exists a complex set of prescriptions for conduct, many based upon the Prophet's life. Few Moroccans know these in any detail. In its more popular sense as a code of conduct, Islamic law as popularly understood glides imperceptibly into "the way things are done" (qdida). For Boujadi-s who distinguish between them, shra? usually refers to specific, known precepts of Islam, while qa'ida refers to more generalized patterns of acceptable conduct: styles of greeting, bargaining, and other expected forms of deference and civility in the conduct of social relations. Most Boujadi-s, however, tacitly assume that Islam is what Muslims do, or should be expected to do, and thus merge the two concepts.

The shra' and qa'ida as popularly understood together provide

“recipe” prescriptions for acceptable social action. The shra’ is considered ideologically to be immutable, and many Boujadi-s will make similar claims of the qa’ida. Since the latter is unwritten and the former is inaccessible in written form to virtually all Boujadi-s, there are, however, no effective criteria by which the claim of immutability can be demonstrated. Thus, from an analytical point of view the code of conduct is responsive to the shared, constantly renegotiated universe of meaning within which Moroccans live and is amenable to transformation.

Men acquire reason as they assume a greater autonomy in the social world. Thus, at birth a child has no reason at all and in this respect is indistinguishable from animals.

How could a child have [reason] ? When he is born he has absolutely nothing. How could he know the shra^ Islamic law doesn’t rule [ta-yhkem] over him; it doesn’t control his conduct. Reason grows in the child when he learns to distinguish, to weigh [his actions]. When he is small he will put his hand in the fire because he doesn’t know it will burn. When he grows older—by Islamic law when he is eighteen [szc]—he has reason. But God gives reason earlier to many children.

To have reason means that you must know the Islamic law. You must pray and fast. A good father will teach these things to his son beginning at the age of seven—take him to the mosque, encourage him to fast at least part of the day during Ramadan.

First you try to lead him by words, later with beatings if he doesn’t listen. If he disobeys you and doesn’t begin praying and fasting, then people will say of the father as well that he doesn’t have reason. (A shoemaker)

Reason is considered more likely to be fully developed in men than in women. This is not due to any innate masculine capacity, but to the fact that the activities of a woman are confined primarily to her household and quarter. Hence a woman’s reason, or ability to engage effectively in a wide range of social relations, is, like that of children, considered to be less than that of men. Some women are cited as exceptions, but the general rule is unquestioned. This is not to say that women lack power. Within their own sphere they are recognized as having formidable capacities for action. Women are often thought to be familiar with magical acts and other practices only dimly known by ordinary men. Being less restrained by reason, women are fully able to draw upon these resources in pursuit of their interests.

Men have reason and know how to get what they want. They are not quick to run to the Makhzen and to the street when their child gets a bloody nose. If a woman sees her child fighting in the street, she joins in without asking what has happened and is ready to fight another woman. They don’t have heads. (A Sherqawi grain merchant)

A man will think. He sees the quarrel leading to the Makhzen; he knows the other man has more “pull” [shoqa] with the Makhzen than he does. He knows how to deal with people bigger and weaker than he is. A woman is light-headed [khfifa]. She doesn’t know how to do these things. If she goes to the biru [French bureau, government offices], who pays attention to her? Better that she stay at home, where she can teach her daughters to cook and sew. They don’t know Islam like

men do; they even have tricks to avoid fasting. (A vegetable-seller)

You must keep a close watch on your women and children, because their reasoning is weak. If you don't want to see a man and you tell your wife and children to say you're not at home, they will say to the man that you are home but told them to say that you aren't. Or if you want them to keep quiet about a fight, they won't be able to. (A schoolteacher)

From the vantage point of townsmen, tribesmen are another category of persons deficient in reason. Since reason is judged by the ability of a person to demonstrate knowledge of "how things are done" in relevant social contexts, tribesmen often are somewhat handicapped in town settings. While most have multiple ties with kinsmen and others who have migrated to towns, these ties are usually less effective than those available to townsmen in facilitating commercial, legal, and administrative transactions.

Since most tribesmen are illiterate, it is easier to deceive them and to make them act in an "unreasonable" manner in urban settings. Especially bewildering are the mechanics of court procedure. Parts of the court sessions are in classical Arabic (as when the judge dictates to his clerk). Most townsmen also find classical Arabic hard to follow, but they can anticipate actions in court more successfully. In the Islamic law courts, plaintiffs and defendants must have depositions prepared on their behalf. Even the rare literate tribesman has difficulty in understanding these documents. Since notaries are paid for each document they prepare, they often knowingly allow tribesmen to commission and bring before the court documents that are without judicial merit. The entire process is seen as unpredictable by tribesmen, and tempers flare in the courtroom. One qadi said: "Most of the cases in my court are from the country, because country people have less 'qal than townsmen. They don't know how to deal with each other; so they fight openly and end up in court."

Another sign of men who lack reason is a futile public display of anger. In court, for instance, tribesmen often challenge the judge to throw them in prison after they have been ordered to support a divorced wife. After one such outburst a qadi said: "What do I care if he goes to prison or not? If he had reason he wouldn't say that." The implication is that a man with reason would recognize the futility of his loss of self-control.

Reason concerns the "inner" state of a man only in so far as he has the ability to exercise control over his impulses. Proper conduct is linked principally to efficacious performance in the social order, not to one's inner state or to abstract moral or ethical principles. Emphasis is placed on the ability of a man to control whatever "natural" impulses he might have and to present a "wide-awake" alertness toward social obligations and social action. The conduct of a reasonable man shows "balance" (mizan) the ability to calculate a course of social action in relation to its consequences for a total network of social relations.

For example, by Islamic law certain individuals have fixed rights in inheritance from certain relatives. One Boujadi, in a client relation to an elder brother much more prosperous than he, described how he acted at the division of his father's estate:

I did not demand my share of the inheritance and choose which of his possessions I wanted.

So that we would remain on good terms [bqa‘qalu], I told my brother to leave my share in a corner, and I would come and pick it up later. If I fought or tried to have influence [kelma], I might get a larger share, but my brother would no longer help me.

Ideally, the reasonable man is taciturn and not prone to listen to gossip or allow “everything in the market” to enter his head. Nevertheless he keeps close tabs on the actions of others while giving the impression of a man who keeps his own counsel and weighs the consequences of his actions. Again, he is in full control of himself and never acts impulsively:

If a reasonable man is in a group of ten or twelve people he will say only a few words, but each of these words will be weighed. You talk of high things. You do not say that Fulan [the Moroccan equivalent of “Jones”] was here and Fulan was there and he said this and that. You speak, but within the code for conduct [qa‘idd]. A green-headed person [kheddar][65] who runs from one shop to another carrying stories of what people are doing is without value. After all, how do you know whether that person is saying what he has heard or not? What is his objective ^gharadJ] ? If you act on what he says and later find out that he lied, he will deny his words. It is another matter if you always deal [te-tsaref] with another person, and drink tea with him. Then a man is more likely to tell you something reasonable. Which is better, something you buy for ten ryal-s, or for fifteen? People are like that too. (A graintrader)

If you say everything you know to a man who is your friend, that is fine as long as he remains your friend. But you might quarrel tomorrow, and then he will harm you with his knowledge. Do you know the story of the dove? She had her babies in a nest high in a tree. She cooed and a snake heard her, climbed the tree, and ate the children. (A carpenter)

A shoemaker described a situation in which a local government clerk paid less than the generally understood price (qa‘ida) for some repairs:

I did not tell him directly that he owed me more. If I did he would have been embarrassed [Zd-yhsherri). He would have paid, but the next time I went to the Makhzen to ask for something, he would have remembered. I might have had to wait for days to get his attention. Instead when he next came to me I said I had no leather. Then from another shoemaker he learned the price and realized why I said I had no leather. Then he paid my due. So he was not embarrassed, I got my price, and there is nothing [i.e., no friction] between us. He knows me as a reasonable man.

Since open disagreement or the direct refusal to comply with someone’s request both have the effect of challenging his status, the reasonable man attempts such a challenge only after careful calculation:

If you want me to go to the other side of town I will agree when you ask me, but will then go and sit in the house or at the market where I always sit. The next day you will ask me why I didn’t go. I will tell you that my brother came, my legs hurt, or some other such thing. You know that my brother did not come and that my legs are good, but you will understand that I had some reason for not going. I want you to be well-disposed to me and

was embarrassed to say “no” to your face. I say “yes” to avoid friction \le-mhakka), and thus your “reason” is not “broken.” (Owner of a public oven)

Reasonable men do not stand on absolute rights or wrongs. They accommodate themselves to social realities. They make themselves aware of ongoing changes in the shared cognitive map of the social universe and realize that the “rules of the game” call for constant, active negotiation over the content and contours of that map. This understanding of the world should by no means be taken for the amoral opportunism by which Edward C. Banfield characterizes the world view of Sicilians (1967). Moroccans place a great value upon maintaining the proprieties of the social order. Thus, to “break” the reason of another person, as in the above quote, is to challenge the assumptions of social ranking implicit in his conduct. Even when such challenges are deliberate, the reasonable course is to proceed whenever possible by indirection, leaving room for face-saving maneuvers on the part of those who stand to lose. As social positions are changed, the attempt is made to do this with minimal overt confrontation.

Since social honor is ephemeral, one’s situation is easily liable to reversal.

The most significant expression of reason and its relation to the Islamic code of conduct is in the complex symbolism associated with the month of fasting, Ramadan. Ramadan and the rituals associated with it are thought to sum up much of what it means to be a Muslim. For most Moroccans, it is the period in which Islam is most consciously brought to play in daily routines.

Some neo-orthodox modernists (Salafi-s) erroneously claim that Ramadan separates those who deal with marabouts from those who “know [formal] Islam.” This is empirically false. For the majority of tribesmen and many older townsmen, dealing with marabouts and participating in formal Islamic rituals present them with no intellectual or moral contradiction. Moreover, fasting is as widespread in the countryside as in the towns. Equally misleading are the interpretations of the nationalist press, which carries articles, curiously taken mainly from the writings of an earlier generation of European orientalists, which view Ramadan foremost as a diacritical mark distinguishing between Muslims and Christians, or justify the fast by its supposed medical virtues. Neither of these interpretations, however, is particularly widespread.

For most Moroccans, the celebration of Ramadan distinguishes men with reason.[66] Throughout the year there is, of course, an elaborate Islamic ritual cycle which includes five daily prayers, communal prayers on Friday, a feast marking the end of Ramadan (Td es-Sghir or Td le-Ftur), and the Great Feast (Td le-Kbir, the Feast of Abraham), among others. In principle, the Muslim community as a whole participates in these various rituals, although in practice they are primarily activities of adult, urban males and some members of the rural elite. In contrast, the rituals associated with Ramadan are performed by the entire Muslim community, except children, pregnant women, and others excused for reasons of health.

To Boujadi-s, the fast implicitly symbolizes the capacity of man to regulate his nature and live by the rules of society which God has revealed through his Prophet. During Ramadan, as at other times, there is no denial of man’s passions or appetites. Between sunset and early morning, life is carried on much as usual, except that those who ordinarily drink

alcoholic beverages cease to do so for the entire month.[67] Those who smoke will abstain during the day. Fasting during the day dramatically symbolizes man's ability to discipline his desires in accordance with the arbitrary code of conduct laid down by God. Men's capacity to follow the divine model reaffirms that they are not bound by their passions to live in a totally anarchic world. Daily prayers also symbolize the divine template for conduct, but Ramadan is recognized as a more intensive, sustained discipline of human nature. Although work habits are modified to alleviate the physiological tensions which accompany fasting, tempers often run short. Most people will, however, try to show their reason, and hence their capacity to follow the Islamic code of conduct, by avoiding situations in which they lose their self-control.

*** Deference and Propriety

Reason grows in a person with his ability to perceive the social order and to discipline himself to act effectively within it. Proper social comportment within this framework is symbolized by the concept of theshsham, or hshumiya. These terms approximate the English concept of propriety (which is the translation I give to the terms when used in the abstract), although they are also used in contexts where the English terms deference, respect, circumspection, and occasionally embarrassment would be fitting.

The locus of propriety is not so much the inner moral consciousness of a person as his public comportment with respect to those with whom he has regular face-to-face relations. A person is said to lack propriety when he is caught outside the image which he is expected to project of himself before "significant others." Maintenance of "proper" comportment reflects one's possession of reason.

Like reason, propriety is a quality which persons acquire as they mature. It is inculcated by parents, especially the father, and to a certain extent by other relatives and outsiders. This is achieved both by suggestion and, on occasion, by the use of physical force. As a son acquires reason, he is expected increasingly to show deference toward his father in the household and in public.

Before boys are taken to the mosque and initiated in the fast, fathers as well as mothers play with their sons and show affection and tenderness (Jianana) toward them.[68] As a boy matures, only the women of the household, especially his mother, continue manifestly to display affection toward him. Mothers and sons develop strong, expressed ties of affection: widowed or divorced mothers frequently live with their sons and look to them for moral and economic support. It is believed that if a father were to continue to be affectionate with his son as he matured, the son "would become soft like a woman, allowing others to dominate him [st'amaru]. Thus the father increasingly assumes a greater formality with his son and becomes hard [qaseh] with him.

As a boy matures, he increasingly strives to avoid situations in which his father or other persons can exercise domination over him. This often entails tacit public avoidance of the father, even when the son continues to live in the same household. This avoidance continues after a son becomes economically autonomous and establishes his own household. It does not indicate active hostility so much as a desire to avoid situations in which the son, himself the head of a household, is placed in a position in which his own

“word” must be circumscribed. On the marriage of a son, the father avoids those aspects of the celebration which would bring him into direct contact with his son. He generally sits with his friends in a separate room, away from the female dancers (shikha-s’) and musicians usually called in for the celebration. Direct contact between father and son on such an occasion is thought to be highly improper.

Propriety is similarly related to subordination and restraint outside of the household. Among examples of impropriety are acts of adultery, homosexuality, or other illicit sexual exploits, at least if they become publicly known; fighting in the street; being caught in the act of stealing; and various forms of deceit and exploitation. These are considered less as “immoral” than as “improper” acts. It is their public knowledge which is the subject of greatest concern, since, as one Boujadi said, only God knows the true motivation of a person’s actions.

In women, modesty [le-hya] obedience to her husband, and the avoidance of any behavior which would publicly imply that she is not subordinate to her husband are principal elements of proper conduct. Sexuality in this case is, of course, heavily symbolic of patterns of deference.

As indicated in the above account of father-son relations, impropriety often arises when the will of one person is openly challenged or blocked by that of another, or when a person assumes a social role which others are not willing to accord him. Thus it is embarrassing to ask for something from a relative, associate, or stranger and to have the request refused. Considerable intellectual energy, especially involving the use of intermediaries, is spent constructing situations so as to avoid such overt confrontations.

As an illustration of the attention paid to such tactics, one informant explained why he never entered the house of a higher-ranking neighbor on his own initiative:

I was embarrassed [kont te-nehshem) [to do so]. He’s a big man in the Mak[[../../../kont][hzen.]]He might insult a less influential man or push him around if he doesn’t restrain his conduct in front of him. If you call at his house without being asked to come, he gets a bad idea of you and says that you’re no good or “uppity” \Jik sentiha]. Then he will push you around. That’s how big men [le-kobbar^ are, especially if they don’t know you. You must be respectful [heshman] with them.[69]

The nuances of propriety are elaborated in numerous ways. These include spatial hierarchies—from sitting at a distance from social superiors and avoiding unnecessary encounters with them, to being at an intimate distance to men of prestige. The seating patterns of guests at a meal and the order in which they are served give subtle nuances of hierarchy. The most precisely calibrated patterns of deference emerge in styles of greetings. Most informants are uncomfortable about explicitly discussing their implications, particularly those which reflect the most pronounced inequality. Ignoring a deferential greeting or unceremoniously rebuffing one underlines extreme social distance. Kissing the feet, or the hem or sleeve of another’s jellaba (a type of North African robe with a hood), similarly expresses extreme social difference. Sons kiss the hands of their father, uncles, and guests as an act of deference. The same greeting is also offered to certain officials. Some informants justify this by saying that officials are

representatives of the king and emphasize the latter’s role as God’s deputy (Jdialifet Allah fel-l-ard). Submission, they claim, is to the office, not the individual. Actual practice, however, goes far beyond deference to persons in their official capacities. It is extended to anyone to whom it is felt that deference is necessary or useful. To use an appropriate American colloquialism, you kiss the hand you can’t cut off. As relations of equality are approximated, reciprocal handshakes and embraces become common. Public acknowledgment of one’s place in the social order and proper conduct toward significant others implies primarily a circumspection and cleverness designed to avoid censure and heighten one’s chances of success in the social order.

To summarize the argument so far, the concept of God’s will directs attention to what actually happens in social relations and away from abstract considerations of why things are the way they are. Reason is the capacity to discern realistically existing, if ephemeral, patterns of dominance and deference in the social order and to act appropriately. Propriety entails the circumspection necessary to act within the shared code of conduct. The next concept that I will describe, obligation, indicates more clearly how these preceding concepts articulate with the social order.

*** Obligation

The particularistic social ties which constitute the fabric of the social order are contracted and maintained by the exchange of obligations (haqq-s). Men cannot control God’s allocation of success, but they can render the actions of other men, including marabouts, more predictable by contracting and maintaining ties of obligation. The nature of these obligations and the persons with whom they are held provide an index of social honor, although since the totality of anyone’s ties is rarely known, these indices must always be approximate. Haqq is a polysemic term which, according to context in colloquial Arabic, can mean “share,” “privilege,” or “obligation.”[70] One speaks of having an obligation “over” or “in” someone else (fih l-haqq^ ‘lik l-haqq). Some obligations are minimally prescribed by Islamic law and “the way things are done” (qa‘idd), such as certain obligations toward kinsmen and communal religious ties. Even these obligations can be fulfilled within a wide latitude of acceptable conduct.

A number of actions can initiate a relationship of obligation: an invitation to a meal, performance as a go-between, or any other service or assistance. An obligation contracted by one means, such as service as an intermediary, need not necessarily be reciprocated in the same form. Obligations can also be contracted by omission: a missed appointment (at least between individuals of nearly equal social honor) creates an obligation on the part of the person who failed to keep the appointment. The mere offer of a service or support imposes obligations as effectively as an action actually performed. Even exchanges of greetings, by their complex code of gestures and manners, impose obligations, since they publicly assert what one person would like the other, and observers, to think regarding their relations.

Obligations are not directly convertible into cash. In the context of a regular, multifaceted social relationship, such an insinuation would be considered base and vile (duni). However, if there is no viable bond with the person being approached, a “sweetener” (Jilawa) or bribe (reshwa) is part of accepted, even if not condoned, social practice. The term reshwa, for example, also designates the nonreturnable gift, which, apart from the bridewealth (sdaq), is given by the groom to his bride’s father in order to expedite consent for the marriage. In

themselves, such cash transactions are not considered immoral. Theoretically they can be considered to be the limit case of haqq relationships in that they imply a one-time reciprocity. Baseness is generally attributed to such transactions only when the price exacted is considered abusive in light of the resources of the person making a request or when that person is capable of performing a reciprocal service of value at some later time. In the latter case, it would be considered both brash and lacking in reason to demand cash. There is a moral component here, but most informants emphasized the propriety, not the morality, of such situations. Another form of one-time exchange is the immediate reciprocation of an obligation, such as an invitation to a meal, with one of equal value. Such action often signals a desire not to enter into an ongoing relationship. An overt display of this intention is regarded as improper.

A category of transaction that falls outside the sphere of obligations is called fabor, which literally signifies a gratuitous act. The term fabor probably derives from Mediterranean port sabir, or lingua franca, rather than directly from the Spanish favor (see Lanly 1970). Its foreignness suggests that it is peripheral to the conduct of social relations in Morocco. The term fabor is often used in requesting alms from foreigners or in demanding services which the supplicant cannot reciprocate. Ideologically, the giving and receiving of alms (sadaqa) between Moroccans are also outside of the calculation of obligation. Nonetheless, an implicitly triangular reciprocity is involved. Beggars ask God or a marabout to repay the donor on their behalf. The same sort of triangular relationship is initiated in making a request to a person of much greater prestige.

Similarly, a man to whom God has allocated prosperity is supposed to be generous (krim), taking what God has given him and willingly distributing it to others. Such generosity (karama) manifests itself in largesse to guests, in such pious works (ihsari) as the construction and maintenance of mosques or orphanages, or—to indicate the flexibility of the concept—in provision for the salary of a trainer for the local soccer team. Such acts directly contribute to a man’s social honor by legitimating his wealth but are not considered to entail specific reciprocal obligations on the part of those who benefit by them. “There is no bill for karama in this world,” as informants say, but karama, while not explicitly considered by Moroccans as an obligation, follows the same principles. To accept the generosity of someone without being able to reciprocate is to confirm the superior status of the donor.

The complex web of personally contracted bonds of obligation by which society is knit together is always asymmetrical. All relationships impose obligations of calculable intensity. The dominant partner in such a tie is said to have “word” (kelma) over the other. The relation is that of patron-client if it is fairly regular and marked by such pronounced inequality that the client cannot reciprocate with services of equal magnitude. “Word” exists even when the relationship is much more finely tuned. There is a carefully nuanced vocabulary and repertoire of gestures for the discussion of these gradations, which depend on a wide range of such factors as education, wealth, kinship ties, and networks of obligations held or thought to be held with others.

The reason why dominance is so coveted in this system is that it allows a man to be autonomous, to assert his claim to be a full social person. In so far as a person is obliged to defer to the wishes of others, his autonomy and social honor are diminished. All members of the society utilize the skills and resources available to them to compete for dominance. Thus, the head of a household wants formally to assert his dominance over its other members. The comportment of wives, sons, daughters, kinsmen, and servants associated

with his household affects to a certain extent his own social honor. The comportment of these individuals is expected to be orchestrated as far as possible with his own interests or at least (especially in the case of adult married

sons in his household or already living apart) not publicly discordant with them.

There is a specific avoidance whenever possible of relationships which entail a sharing of authority or of responsibility with other persons, such as partnerships in a business enterprise or the sharing between certain relatives of a household. The popular proverb “A thousand debts before I become anyone’s partner [alf medyanin u-la meshruk]” is to a large extent borne out in social reality.[71] The reason for this avoidance of partnerships is that, in relations of near equality, the “word” (kelma) of a person is more easily called into question. Since each person strives to have “word” in social relations and at the same time tries to minimize situations in which he is obligated to others, the near-egalitarian relations of obligation contain a continual, inherent tension. Necessity often demands that a person enter into definite relations of deference to others, although in some circumstances such a tie (as when a person is known as factotum for someone of much higher prestige) can be a means of advancing social honor.

In general, the reasonable individual strives for flexibility in relations in which he is under obligation to others, while at the same time fixing as firmly as possible relations in which he holds obligations “over” other individuals. Since by God’s will “the way things are” is constantly in flux, an individual strives to be as free as possible to change the weight of obligations within his personal network, yet to remain within the bounds of propriety.

The vocabulary used in speaking of relationships of obligation implies this ledger concept of exchange. One term frequently used to indicate a contractual relationship of obligation literally means “to exchange” (tsaref, n., msarfa). Persons who “exchange” with each other are called “companions” or “associates” (shaty sg., sahety., a term which in itself carries no connotation of affective relations. It simply describes persons who regularly deal with each other. This is not to argue that affective relations are nonexistent or unimportant in Moroccan society. They are, however, decidedly subordinate to relations of obligation. A person who jeopardizes his own interests in steadfastly supporting another is often considered “unreasonable” or, in other words, defective in his cognitive map of the realities of the social world.

Below is a typical example of how obligations are contracted, slightly edited, from my field notes. It is so commonplace, undrama tic, and “trivial” to Moroccans that none of the actions described needs explanation to be intelligible. It is remarkable, however, in that one of the participants in the events, here called Hmed, was aware of my work and willing to interpret what he understood of his own role in the incident and those of the other actors.

In [a town adjoining Boujad] I was in the large American car of a wealthy local official, Hajj Saleh, who made his fortune by buying land during the famine of 1945. With us was a recently arrived official, Hajj Hmed, who in the Makhzen was the immediate superior of the car-owner, but inferior in wealth and—at least for the moment—local influence. Also in the car was Bu ‘Azza, a moderately prosperous tribesman who had come to seek the advice of Hajj Hmed. Near the market, we passed a man with a few chickens. Hmed asked Saleh to

stop the car so that Bu ʻAzza could run out and buy him a chicken. “These [name of tribe] really know how to buy chickens,” Hmed said as he watched the transaction from the car. When Bu ʻAzza returned, a scruffy-looking individual followed him, put his head in the window, and said to no one in particular that Bu ʻAzza owed him 80 ryal-s. Bu ʻAzza said nothing. Saleh, ignoring the intruder, told his driver to proceed. The driver sounded the car’s deafening bus horn to clear the road of carts and pedestrians and began to move. No one in the car made any overt sign of being aware that the man’s head was still in the window in an effort to keep the car from moving and settle the transaction. Then Hmed asked Saleh to stop the car, said to Bu ʻAzza’s alleged creditor: “Here’s 20 ryal-s of the debt,” and diffidently threw the money out the window. Again the car started, but this time Bu ʻAzza asked for a halt so that he could pay his creditor the other 60 ryal-s.

According to Hmed, Bu ʻAzza, the tribesman, was sent to bargain for the chicken, because at the time he was in a relation of obligation to Hmed. Since Bu ʻAzza did not know whether Hmed would pay, he could be trusted to argue for the lowest price possible. (Hmed repaid Bu ʻAzza for the chicken shortly afterward.)

In paying Bu ʻAzza’s debt, Hmed did not know anything of its nature or whether a debt existed at all. The individual to whom the money was given was in his eyes a beggar, one unable to reciprocate. The money given to him was thus karama, that is, the passing on of God’s bounty with no anticipation of repayment. Such an act gives a man a claim to high social honor in the eyes of other Muslims.

Later my informant, Hmed, spoke of his relations with his subordinate official, Saleh. There was no question that Saleh could manipulate officials to his advantage both locally and in Rabat. Hmed, as Saleh’s bureaucratic superior, faced the delicate problem of having to treat Saleh as a person of the same level of prestige. Hmed’s tone and gestures never became peremptory with Saleh, as they did with other subordinates. No direct assertion of “word” was possible; informally Saleh, while not as well educated or as smooth in his etiquette, dress, or speech, was decidedly more influential. The fact that Hmed was riding in Saleh’s car rather than his own reflected this. Significantly, however, he performed an act of karama in front of Saleh and other witnesses, while Saleh attempted no such gesture. Hmed, by performing an act which Saleh showed no sign of undertaking, tacitly asserted a higher social honor.

The action reported above had another meaning in relation to Bu ʻAzza. For him, the payment on his behalf put him in a further relation of obligation (haqq) to Hmed. By asking something of Hmed and later having a part of a debt paid on his behalf, he became Hmed’s client, under obligation to perform a service for him in the indefinite future. At the time of the incident, Hmed had no such clients locally and needed them to ensure the flow of information necessary to perform his functions.

The modalities of initiating ties of obligation are particularly clear in the case of encounters between individuals from different parts of Morocco, where mutual knowledge of social networks and individual abilities is incomplete or only circumstantial. A local Makhzen official spoke of how, when he first arrived in Bouj ad, some Sherqawa tried to put him in a relation of obligation.

They invited me to a meal. I could not refuse. They, and others later, would kill one sheep, sometimes two. A few days later they came to me and asked that some documents be changed. Another time they brought an entire tribal council [jmda] and grain and sheep for me. I didn't even know for certain how much "word" they had. They tried to embarrass me [t-hashemni] into helping them get whatever they wanted.

Persons are expected to reaffirm continually those ties which they want to maintain. Some key occasions when such reaffirmations are expected include marriages, births, and deaths; the graduation of a son or daughter from school; completion of a child's studies at the mosque; departure for and return from the pilgrimage to Mecca; and religious feast days. Neighbors, associates, relatives, and anyone with whom there is an ongoing social tie are expected to acknowledge such occasions by congratulations, a gift, or attendance at the celebration. Receptions for such occasions invoved nuanced indications of the guest's prestige: whether a meal is offered or simply tea, seating arrangements, the order of eating (often there are several sittings), and marks of attention from the host. Merchants and others also stay at or near their shops for part of the day in order to exchange greetings on the street with persons more distant to them.

All occasions except death are accompanied by the giving of gifts (hdiyya-s). Depending on the prestige claimed by the household, the gifts are paraded through the streets on trays on the heads of women, on carts, or on an open truck. Women, children, and, for wealthier households, musicians join the procession. In the case of marriage, the formal justification for this display is that the gifts indicate the standing of the households involved. Prestige is reflected in several ways—the size of the gifts, the identity of the donors, and where the procession is allowed to circulate. On the marriage of his son, a powerful landowner arranged for a procession which passed through all the town's main streets and lasted for hours.[72] Less distinguished processions are generally confined to one or two adjoining quarters. A wider circulation for modest processions is considered improper (hshuma). It would suggest the lack of reason on the part of the head of the household, who would be subject to ridicule for such pretension.

In the contracting of obligations, men take care to avoid situations which might call into question or limit their claims to prestige. A direct, open refusal to a request characteristically signals an indifference to or open challenge of the tie of obligation which links two persons. Hence a premium is placed on the use of intermediaries (wasita-s) in order to avoid such situations.

The selection of intermediaries depends on the issues to be negotiated and the stature of the parties involved. For instance, matters publicly supposed to be beneath one's attention, such as delayed rent payments by a tenant, minor disputes over prices, or negotiations for which the outcome is uncertain, are managed by entrusting them to a servant or client. Should there be a refusal or lack of direct compliance for any reason, both parties (depending on their relative standing) can deny their original messages and produce more suitable ones.

Some examples can indicate the range of choice involved. In dealings with the Makhzen, there is often a grey area in practice (as opposed to law, in which there is a strict separation of powers) between local officials of the Ministry of Justice and those of the Ministry of the Interior. Interior officials are present at each rural market, while qadi-s and civil judges are located only in the larger towns. Many tribesmen fail to distinguish between the formal authority of the two ministries, since in the

protectorate qaid-s also had the authority of civil judges. In addition, court cases often involve considerable travel and expense, since they take place only in town. Hence tribesmen frequently submit judicial disputes to agents of the Ministry of the Interior, who deliberately set their fees lower than the cost of formally presenting cases to the courts. Such decisions are legally unenforceable, and the Interior officials often err in interpretation of the law. Particularly when they fear that disgruntled litigants might later bring their case before a court, Interior officials who administer such informal justice send go-betweens of no formal standing to the judges with “hypothetical” cases to determine the law. This avoids direct friction (mahakka) between the officials involved and direct challenges to their authority. Judges usually refuse to cooperate, but, if a go-between is carefully chosen, they sometimes feel compelled to give advice.

Negotiations over marriage similarly require careful selection of intermediaries. Occasionally, when only kinsmen are involved, the suitor asks the father of a girl directly. However, women are most frequently used as intermediaries in such negotiations, since any messages they communicate can be conveniently denied by both parties involved.

Failure as an intermediary in such an enterprise constitutes an obligation that must be repaid. When a local school official wanted to marry the daughter of a prosperous local merchant, a friend offered to secure the consent of the girl’s father and assured the school official that he would not he refused. He later was refused. When other townsmen learned of this, the school official was severely embarrassed. Because of the public knowledge of his failure, the intermediary owed a major obligation to the official. He settled it by offering his own daughter and settling for a token bridewealth. Not to have settled the debt would have led to a break in relations between the two men.

*** Compulsion

A serious breach in relations of obligation, such as described above, or the need to oblige a person to come to one’s aid or serious threats to social honor can lead to placing a “compulsion” (’*ar*) upon the person responsible for creating the situation or capable of restoring satisfactory relations. Metaphorically, compulsion is thought of as a weight which can be “thrown” on a person or group. Once “thrown,” this weight can be “lifted” only by performance of the action requested.

Westermarck in Ritual and Belief in Morocco defines ‘ar as a “conditional curse” with supernatural sanctions (1926:1, 518). Supernat- urally inspired disasters are thought to occur to persons or individuals who do not respond appropriately to a request placed in the form of ’*ar*. Because of the serious consequences thought to follow its use, the ‘ar is not lightly invoked. Proverbs justify the use of indirection so as to avoid such situations: “Deceit is better than the ‘ar \l-hila hsen men I-ar]” and “Cleverness conquers the lion [l-hila ta-teghleb s-sbe‘]” ’ ’

There are two types of compulsion, the “great compulsion” (‘ar kbir) and the “lesser compulsion” (‘arsghir). The ‘ar kbir^ which virtually disappeared upon the establishment of French control, involved the mediation by marabouts or their descendants of disputes between tribes, tribal sections, or local communities. The prestige of the marabout called upon was commensurate with the gravity

of the dispute involved. At least ideally, marabouts even interposed themselves between contesting groups to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Alternatively, the flag from a "dead" marabout's sanctuary or the cloth shroud (ghota) of his tomb, carried by one of his descendants, could be used to compel a truce or settlement. The 'ar kbir was also invoked if a caravan escorted by a Sherqawi was attacked.

"Lesser" 'ar, the only form which presently exists, involves individuals placing each other in situations of compulsion. Compulsion invoked by a descendant of the Prophet or a marabout is considered especially serious, but other persons can use it as well. It is often used to bring an end to disputes involving divorce, court actions, and major threats to social honor. Serious cases of compulsion may involve the public sacrifice of a sheep at the door of the person being compelled or the placing of one's daughter in his protection. Less dramatic but nevertheless effective forms of compulsion include public gifts of large amounts of sugar or a public request on the supplicant's behalf by a respected descendant of a marabout or the Prophet.[73] The same principle of compulsion is implied in the carefully constructed phrases of deference and flattery (zsri'ar)[74] employed in the opening lines of written letters and requests. The intent of such phrases is to compel an individual to respond favorably to whatever the supplicant requests by reminding him of his social honor and implicitly suggesting that a refusal would be beneath the station of the one being so compelled. This practice also has its face-to-face equivalent.

'Ar can be construed as an extreme form of obligation (haqq') which is employed only after other forms of obligation fail. 'Ar merely compels the restoration of relations or the performance of a requested action; its imposition implies no judgment on the rights and wrongs of the situation which led to its use in the first place.

Like obligations, 'ar can be invoked only for situations which fall within the limits of propriety. It cannot be "thrown" for trivial reasons or for goals not sanctioned by "the way things are done." Within these limits, it is considered against reason and improper to resist a request made by 'ar. A Boujadi informant raised in a nearby town gave an example of 'ar which occurred in the late 1920's:

My father [a pious notary] was regarded by the neighboring tribes as a marabout, although he was not. Because of his reputation the French got my elder brother [also a notary at the time] to help them establish the rural tax [tertib] in the region. The tribes brought it to our house, thinking it was the tithe ['s/zzzr].[75]

Then the French appointed [an in-law of Pasha Hajj Thami 1-Glawi, pasha of Marrakesh] as qaid of the region.

He was a rough, ignorant man. One day at the market, the qaid slapped my father on the face before everyone, when my father refused to listen to his words. Later a friend of the qaid told him of my father's reputation and warned him that the tribes might rise up against him.

At the next market the qaid brought his daughter. Before everyone he went to my elder brother and said, "She is yours. Take [i.e., marry] her. She will never return to my house."

That was ‘ar. The qaid asked for no bridewealth, although later my brother paid something so that there would be a marriage by Islamic law.

An essential component of using compulsion is that it must be done publicly, as in the above case. The person initiating compulsion must be fairly certain of approbation for his activities. Refusal of such a request indicates a heedlessness toward potential disaster and a serious breach of the social order.

The following example of the use of ‘ezr, taken from my field notes, is more mundane but exhibits in fuller detail the circumstances leading to its use.

Two teen-age girls got into a fight on the street and began hitting one another. A third girl from a neighboring house intervened, trying to break up the quarrel. The young brother of one of the girls came by and immediately rushed to the aid of his sister. He entered the house of the girl who had tried to break up the quarrel and struck her in the stomach. Then he dragged his sister home, slapping her for getting involved in a street fight in the first place. Meanwhile, the girl whom he had struck had fainted.

Neighboring women came to sit with her and brought small gifts. When her father returned, his first act was to take his daughter to the doctor to get a certificate confirming that she had been injured. Since there were no injuries, he was unsuccessful. Further, the gendarmes refused to intervene without such proof of physical harm.

The morning after the fight, the father gathered witnesses to make depositions with the qaid. This was the first step in bringing the matter before the civil court. The charges deposed were assault and siba,[76] which in this case meant entering another man’s house without his permission, a very serious matter, since it affects his honor and that of his women. Some of the witnesses, all women, dropped out on pressure from their men, who feared being caught in the middle of a protracted conflict between neighbors.

Weeks passed, with the father of the struck girl trying to line up everyone who could potentially intervene on his side (the judge was one of his distant kinsmen) .[77] The other girl in the original fight, the servant of an important household, was beaten for getting involved in the first place. Her master, of much higher social rank than the father of the girl struck by the boy, refused to lend his support on the ground that the quarrel was none of his affair and that, since it was a woman’s quarrel, no one could tell what really were the issues. (He would also have lost prestige in lending support to the minor quarrel of a client household.)

After the case was finally docketed, the father of the boy then came to the door of the girl’s father at sunup, together with some of his friends and a gift of several cones of sugar. He asked for a suspension of hostilities [*sulh*]. Without opening his door to confront his opponent face-to- face, the girl’s father refused settlement on the grounds that the court date was already set. The first attempt at ’*ar* was unsuccessful.

Several days later an old, influential Sherqawi, a distant relation of the girl's father, came, together with some friends of the boy's father, on behalf of the latter (who was a commoner). The Sherqawi intermediary kissed the girl's father on both shoulders. He again offered the gift of sugar, asking that the matter be dropped. This time it was. The girl's father later told me it would have been improper \hshuma] for him not to have done so. The intermediary was carefully chosen by the supplicant as being in the social network of the girl's father and higher in "word." A refusal by the girl's father to drop the dispute would have asserted that the intermediary who came to him was insignificant and thus would have created a formal, open challenge to this other individual as well.

*** Common Sense and Religious Sense

The common-sense perspective toward "the way things are" is the overall one through which social experience is shaped and interpreted. As I have already indicated, some of the key concepts which make up the core of this perspective are explicitly thought to be Islamic and thus serve further to legitimate it. Despite the incorporation of some religious symbols into the common-sense perspective, religious beliefs can by no means be seen as just a symbolic expression of the social order. But the two perspectives are interdependent. It is doubtful whether a religious understanding of the world could exist in a given society if it were totally alien to the prevailing everyday orientation toward social reality. As Clifford Geertz has written, "religious symbols formulate a basic congruence between a particular style of life and a specific (if, most often, implicit) metaphysic, and in so doing sustain each with the borrowed authority of the other" (1966:4). Thus at least part of the religious perspective moves beyond the realities of everyday life.

It is important, I think, to recognize degrees of separation of the religious and common-sense perspectives, a point that is further discussed in the next chapter. I suggest that implicit ideologies show a much greater congruence with the everyday perspective than those which are consciously articulated. In a civilization-wide religion, such as Islam, many permutations of explicit and implicit ideologies are copresent and affect each other. Maraboutism, of course, is essentially an implicit ideology. Nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury sources almost unanimously attest to the significance of marabouts. Lacking the concept of world view or other devices to explore implicit ideological patterns, ethnographers of this period were unable to account for why marabouts were so highly regarded in any but such broad formulae as Bel's assertion of the "traditional" reverence for "human fetishes." Contemporary maraboutism is a pale reflection of an ideology which once was given a much fuller expression and which was a template for a much more significant range of activities than is presently the case. Still, it gives an idea of the earlier ideological bases of marabouts.

My intention in the following chapters is not simply to detail the partial congruence between maraboutism and everyday assumptions about the social world. Studies documenting such a relationship have been an ethnographic staple for several decades, even if not for the Muslim world. It is important to see just how this seeming convergence is accomplished, but it is even more significant to examine where it fails.

** 6. The Ideology of Maraboutism

Max Weber began his study on the sociology of religion by proposing to examine “the conditions and effects of a particular type of social action” (1968:399); he explicitly avoided a definition of religion for two reasons. In the first place, he saw no analytical utility in formulating a definition so broad as to encompass the wide diversity of behavior labeled as religious by actors in various societies. Second, he did not want to assume a priori that the religious was in all cases set apart from everyday purposive conduct or that behavior could be meaningfully classified into such analytic categories as religion and magic on the basis of our own notions of causality.

As suggested earlier, whatever else religion might entail, it is a set of beliefs, more often implicit than explicit, that are understood by members of a society against the background of tacit, shared assumptions about the nature and conduct of everyday life. Religious ideologies may not be entirely derivative from these common-sense assumptions, especially in the case of such “universal” religions as Islam and Christianity, but they are necessarily understood in their context.

Weber’s caution about defining religion is rarely reflected in later, protracted debates among anthropologists and sociologists over whether religion should be defined in terms of the nature of beliefs as labeled (e.g., Durkheim’s distinction between “sacred” and “profane”) or their content (e.g., Tylor’s “spiritual beings”). As the neo- Weberian W. G. Runciman has recently argued, neither of these basic approaches (or subsequent refinements of them) has been entirely satisfactory (1970:59–62). His own contribution to the debate has been to reiterate Weber’s implicit point of over half a century earlier that any attempt to distinguish “religious” from other forms of belief presumes that it is already known “what exactly people do believe” (Runciman 1970:61). Only once beliefs have been identified in the categories of the actors themselves is it possible to ask which are religious. He argues that sociologists and anthropologists generally use the term religion

in the sense where “ideology” would do almost as well— that is, in denoting those distinctive combinations of factual with ethical beliefs which constitute the “religion” of the Nuer, Dinka, Tokugawa Japanese, Homeric Greeks, Roman Catholics ... and all the rest. In other words, if there is a general distinction to be retained between “nonreligious” and “religious” beliefs, it is merely a distinction between what may be loosely called “matter-of-fact” beliefs on one side and beliefs about the conduct of life on the other. The latter may stand in many different sorts of relation to the matter-of-fact beliefs about the cosmos which the people in question also hold. But they are a universal and unambiguous category —all cultures have some [such] beliefs. (Runciman 1970:75–76)

Much recent work on the concept of religion tacitly adopts a similar position. The “definition” of religion offered by Clifford Geertz in “Religion as a Cultural System” (1966:4) is to him less a definition than a five-point paradigm for the exploration of the systems of meanings embodied in certain types of symbols. The paradigm recognizes the futility of rigorously setting apart a religious component from other systems of meaning in all societies.

To be sure, in some contexts the term religion can be employed clearly and unambiguously, as where it delineates nothing more than declared membership in a formally organized religion (e.g., Lenski 1963). But such uses clearly take for granted the

more interesting issues of definition. Most uses of the term religion are much more complex. For example, Wilfred Cantwell Smith's The Meaning and End of Religion subtly interrelates religion with sociohistorical context in documenting the historical trend toward reification of the concept of religion in both the Christian and the Islamic traditions. He sees increasing use of the term in both traditions as symptomatic of an increasing fragmentation of man's social and personal life, so that the religious, instead of being central to a coherent, generally implicit, vision of the world, emerges as merely one facet of a person's life alongside many others (1963:124). Clearly what is considered religious in these traditions cannot be encapsulated in a definition devoid of social or temporal context.

The identification of the "properly religious" is facilitated when one of its elements is an articulated, bounded ideology, as opposed to a merely implicit system of belief. However, the presence of such ideologies in the "universal" religions, such as Islam, does not automatically indicate the roles they play in the local contexts in which they are received and understood. Of course, within these major traditions there are a wide range of explicitness of belief and significant variations in patterns of belief (cf. Weber 1968:388–401). Thus the reformist and modernist movements in North Africa, of which more will be said later, possess fairly coherent doctrines based on clearly stated, universalistic grounds. Despite the significance of these movements over the last half century in North Africa, their ideologies are far from being popularly accepted, especially in Morocco. In general, their largest impact has been among an educated urban minority. The traditional maraboutic belief system, on the other hand, is almost entirely particularistic and, as I shall indicate, ordinarily an unquestioned, taken-for-granted part of the social order. Reformist doctrines are radical in the sense that they seek to alter established patterns of belief (cf. Harris 1971:208–214). They call into question the taken-for-granted assumptions about the cosmos and the social order and thus must necessarily be explicit. To a limited extent their adoption by many of the urban bourgeoisie has compelled an explicit, but generally ineffective, articulation of maraboutism. Nonetheless, one of the strengths of maraboutism is that even at the present it does not have to be consciously articulated or explicitly defended in order to be maintained by the vast majority of Morocco's rural population. While aware of the disrepute into which maraboutism has fallen in the eyes of most of the urban bourgeoisie, the rural majority and some townsmen continue to act as if they accept its fundamental tenets.

*** The Clients' View

How do the clients conceive of marabouts? The assumptions implicit in maraboutism are not systematically articulated by them. Nor, for that matter, are they by the Sherqawa, whose identification with maraboutism is discussed in the next chapter. Ties with marabouts and what they indicate of the social and political alignments of those who hold them are so integral a part of their world that no explanation of them is considered necessary. But the assumptions behind these ties can be discerned in how persons act and in how they describe their relations with marabouts. The meanings implicit in statements and ritual acts are systematically patterned into a social logic, even if it is only fleetingly perceived, if at all, by their carriers. As in any social group, some people are naive or even cynical about its ideology, although most manage to take it for granted (cf. Bendix 1963:341–343). Skepticism is generally confined to the assessment of individual marabouts, not to the underlying conception of how the supernatural intervenes in the affairs of this world.

The key to understanding the ideology implicit in maraboutism is in the cultural conception

of bar aka as a form of causality and the means by which it can be appropriated to sustain one's own activities. Baraka in Morocco and, for that matter, throughout the Muslim world is considered "a mysterious wonder-working force which is looked upon as a blessing from God" (Westermarck 1926:1,35). How this is elaborated depends upon social context, but in Morocco baraka is often invoked as an explanation for uncanny events, extraordinary political sagacity, and a range of mundane situations indicating well-being, abundance, or merely sufficiency of any quality or material. Westermarck's extensive, if itemistic, listing of instances of baraka half a century ago still largely holds for rural Morocco (1926:1,35–251). It is associated with a multitude of gestures and acts in daily life, words, places, animals, plants, foods, writing, descent from the Prophet or from Sidi 'Umar, times of the year, events in personal life cycles, and, of course, marabouts. Thus, for most Moroccans, baraka is as much a part of the everyday world as is witchcraft among the Azande. It is a concrete manifestation of God's will and is invoked as an explanation of why some things happen while others do not. Marabouts are conceived by their clients as having the ability to transmit this baraka and thus are concrete symbols within the social system of the pervasiveness of the supernatural in mundane affairs.

One way of understanding the significance of such a concept is in relation to the dominant patterns of the social structure, as Mary Douglas has suggested (1966:107, 111). The fact that Sherqawi marabouts and certain other powerful maraboutic descent groups have maintained a pre-eminence throughout four centuries of major political realignments indicates that baraka does not operate in a freely competitive system in Morocco, although marabouts and their descendants frequently represent the concept in this way. Maraboutic ideology as held by marabouts and their descendants, to be discussed in the following chapter, differs significantly in emphasis from that of their clients. Both ideological variants are influenced by a second factor that Douglas fails to consider, or assumes not to exist, in order to highlight her argument on the relation of ideology to social structure. This is the influence of competing patterns of belief. Perhaps in "simpler" societies one can assume that ordinarily such a factor need not be taken into account. At least many social anthropological monographs, including those written after decades of colonial domination of the society under study, make such a presumption. But Morocco, even preprotectorate Morocco, including the tribes of the Middle and High Atlas mountains, is no more a "simple" society than were the tribes of ancient Palestine, whose ideological fermentation has been so ably described by William Robertson Smith (1919). Both marabouts and their clients are, and have been in the past, aware of nonmara- boutic conceptions of Islam, and this awareness has had an impact on their own ideological tenets and ritual behavior. I shall discuss the consequences of this awareness later at greater length but think it important to emphasize for the present discussion as well.

Moroccans place maraboutism in the following context. Some townsmen explain that all Muslims believe in the existence of saints (wali-s), since the Qur'an specifically mentions them. A ivali, in classical Arabic, is simply an individual who is close to God. Strictly speaking, as educated Muslims do, only God knows who is a saint, just as only he knows those who are sincerely devoted to him, "the pious ones" (salihin^ sg., saleh). In ordinary usage both wali and saleh refer to anyone popularly considered to have "a certain rank with God" (sh-daraja I- end Allah). This conception implies, of course, a hierarchy among Muslims before God, a notion emphatically denied by reformist Muslims and even by many clients of marabouts, but still at the base of popular Sufism.

The concept of marabout (jnrabet) overlaps with that of saint. Essentially a marabout is "one who is tied to God." The word comes from a root meaning

“to bind, to tie, to fasten,” as one would a camel to a stake. What clients of marabouts and many other Moroccans assume, and what is not textually justified by the Qur’an as now interpreted by most educated, urban Muslims, is that marabouts are endowed with a special relation toward God which makes them particularly well placed to serve as intermediaries to him. Marabouts are regarded as “close” (qrib) to God. The meaning of “closeness” here is modeled upon, and to some extent constitutes a pattern for, relations among men.

Those who believe in marabouts further assume that marabouts can be “tied” to men. The creation and maintenance of such ties are regarded as essential or, in some contemporary contexts, simply advantageous, because nothing ever just happens. All events are the result of the active intervention of God’s will, even if by maraboutic proxy. The problem for individual believers is how to ensure the flow of grace to sustain their particular concerns. This ideology is concretely symbolized in many ways. One is for client tribesmen to bring some of their seeds for fall planting to Sherqawi marabouts or their descendants, asking for an invocation (da[i]wa’) to be said over them. These are later mixed with other seeds. When asked for an explanation of their action, tribesmen reply that “grain does not grow by itself.” In the past, when Sherqawa are said to have provided all the seeds necessary for planting, the representation of this underlying belief was considerably more explicit. Baraka in such contexts is often referred to as a physical substance (e.g., “a little bread” \sh-khbiza)) which can be gleaned by physical contact with a marabout or his shrine, and even taken away from clients again if they reveal their acquisition of bar aka to others. This is one of the reasons why tribesmen are often reluctant to speak openly of their dealings with marabouts and their descendants. Knowledge of these ties by hostile third parties (including other marabouts) can threaten their efficacy.

Thus the core of belief in maraboutism is quite simple. It postulates that relations between men and the supernatural operate in nearly the same way as do relations between men only.[78] For those who believe in marabouts, the dyadic, personally contracted bonds of inferiority and superiority which are thought to structure the Moroccan social order hold equally for relations toward the supernatural. The major difference is that the supernatural is thought to be consistently stronger than men and much more difficult to predict. All such ties are maintained by ongoing exchanges of obligations (haqq-s). In so far as possible, men contract and maintain ties with those persons they consider capable of sustaining or enhancing their interests and reassess these ties as economic and political circumstances shift. Depite the formal ideological claim that only God knows those who are “close” to him, clients of marabouts seek this-worldly signs which indicate who such persons might be.

As I stated in the introduction, this conception of man’s relation to the supernatural is incongruent with the formalist notion of Islam without any intermediaries, but the two are not mutually exclusive. The opposition of these conceptions is logical, not sociological. Those Muslims who tacitly accept the concept of maraboutism, or who act as though they do, also claim to accept the tenets of formal Islam, which are generally known to them at least in broad outline. They often say the daily prayers, attend Friday mosques, fast, and accept in principle all formal obligations incumbent upon Muslims. However, they implicitly act as though these formal tenets of Islam, the way relations with God are supposed to work, are peripheral to a “way of thinking and feeling about reality in general” (Bellah 1970: 146) which is directly linked to their immediate social world. At least for some Moroccans, the reality of belief in marabouts is confirmed by the nature of the social world, “the way things are,” even if other Moroccans regard the extension of the patterns of conduct that pervade the social order to encompass the supernatural as erroneous.

The coexistence of the ideology of maraboutism with variations of formal, explicit Islam is clear from the following statement, in which a townsman contrasted what “everyone else” believed and what he claimed was his own position, which he claimed was identical to that of the lectures on Islam broadcast on the radio (radyo shra‘):

Of course the radio says that everything comes directly from God. But just as the king has his ministers, God has his [marabouts]. If you need a paper from the government office, which is better? Do you go straight to the official and ask for it? You might wait a long time and never receive it. Or do you go to someone who knows you and also knows the official? Of course, you go to the friend, who presents the case to the official. Same thing with baraka. If you want something from God, you go to [the marabout]. He is just like us. The only difference is that he works with God [khdem m’a Allah] and has a high rank [daraja kbira] with him. If the marabout is too great [to directly approach], you go to his children. (A barber)

Although marabouts are thought to have a “high rank” with God, their clients are not assured that their requests will be granted. A woman who serves as custodian at one of the shrines in Boujad explained why: “The marabout is close _qrib] to God, but only has his turn to make his requests [itlob l-haq[[../../../_qrib~][q]. Have]] you seen how we stand in line in front of the butcher’s and the hospital and take turns? Even the marabout is like that with God.” The principal concern of clients of marabouts is not the implicit criticism of maraboutism by those opposed to it, but the ability to secure ties with the most capable marabouts disposed to act on their behalf.

The abilities attributed to marabouts vary greatly. Only a few, such as the principal Sherqawi marabouts, have an extensive clientele and a reputation for efficacy over a wide range of activities. These have a regular clientele of tribal groups and attract individual pilgrims from most of the regions of Morocco. In contrast, a much larger number of marabouts have developed a reputation for specified ranges of action, such as the ability to cure throat ailments (Sidi Shegdal of Bni ‘Amir) or skin diseases and syphilis (Sid et-Tunsi of Shawya). The clientele of such specialist marabouts tends to consist entirely of individual pilgrims seeking cures for these specific maladies. Finally, there are the minor marabouts connected with specific dawwar-s, mentioned in Chapter 4. These may not be regarded as particularly efficacious in any field. On occasion their aid will be sought, without much hope of success. For that matter, tribesmen do not offer them much to show faith in them. Some of these enshrined country marabouts are even approached, as are some of the less reputable country fqih-s, with requests for magic—to further an amorous adventure or bring disaster upon a personal enemy. Most persons dread approaching major marabouts or intercessors to them with such requests.

The reputations of these marginal marabouts often are quickly forgotten. In contrast, prominent marabouts like those of the Sherqawa are legitimated by attributes which in principle reflect the permanency and continuity of baraka and the ability to communicate it. These include the claim to mystical insight, transmitted along an unbroken chain (silsila) of powerful marabouts ultimately linked to the Prophet Muhammed, and patrilineal descent from the Prophet Muhammed or his second caliph, ‘Umar ben 1-Khattab (d. 644). The Sherqawa, collectively known as the “children of the shaykh” (wlad esh-shaykh) are thought to possess these enduring characteristics. Those Sherqawa who effectively control the resources of the

zawya are considered to be marabouts, particularly as this is symbolized by their apparent wealth, their ability to secure the support of other Sherqawa, and the size, strength, and faith (niya) of their client groups as measured by offerings and sacrifices. Only two living Sherqawa presently enjoy such a reputation. The power of enshrined marabouts is manifested in a similar fashion—the lavishness of their shrines, the respect accorded them by living Sherqawa, and the strength and intensity of their clientele. Such enshrined marabouts are almost exclusively those who in the past were lords of the zawya or sons of the founding marabout.

Not all of the internal differentiation among the Sherqawa is lost on their clients, but there is a tendency to impute to all of the descendants of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi the attributes of the best known. Thus the Sherqawa are collectively considered to be better off and more prosperous than the non-Sherqawa of Boujad. The implicit assumption is that the shaykh's descendants prosper because of their "closeness" to their maraboutic ancestor. Many of the Sherqawa had the advantage of education in the colonial past, when access to it was much more restricted than is presently the case. They also held until recently all significant local administrative posts and continue to hold several. Regionally and nationally prominent Sherqawa also are seen from the viewpoint of clients of marabouts as deriving power and social honor from the baraka of their maraboutic ancestors.

*** Marabouts and Clients: The Symbolism of "Closeness"

The reputation and prestige of a marabout are only part of the concern of his clients. As with other social ties, those sustained over a period of time and in multiple diffuse ways are considered to be the most efficacious. Thus, most of the tribal groups of the Tadla Plain and neighboring regions claim covenants (^ahd-s; bay'a-s) with the Sherqawa which were sealed in "early times" (bekri). Bekri is that range of time which forms a backdrop to the ordinary social horizon. The ordinary social horizon is composed of those events impinging upon the lives of tribesmen which can be placed in their full social context. Events which happened in "early times" are also thought to have a significant effect upon the present, but their context is not fully known or is thought to differ from that of the present. Myths are thought to portray "early" events. As in myths elsewhere, some of the events and transformations portrayed in them do not occur in other contexts; the myths also refer dramatically to origins and transformations (Cohen 1969:337). In so far as they affect the present, the covenants portrayed in myths are regarded as "true" events and constitute a part of the universe taken for granted by tribesmen of the Tadla. Such covenants, maintained and regularly renewed, are considered to be the strongest tie that can exist between marabouts and their clientele. Even individual pilgrims often try to claim "closeness" with the Sherqawa through membership in one of the many groups mentioned in the myths current on the Tadla and elsewhere in Morocco.

Such myths serve as "charters" through which individuals and groups of individuals legitimate their ties with the Sherqawa. This Malinowskian facet of maraboutic myths does not exhaust their rich and complex symbolism, but it is the only aspect of the myths that imposes itself upon the consciousness of the clients of marabouts and thus is an aspect closely related to the social context of maraboutism.[79] Because orientalists and ethnographers have long presumed that such myths do not exist in the Muslim world, at least outside the corpus of formal Islamic rituals, they have been almost entirely neglected by scholars interested in the Muslim world. As an example, I present one of them below. It is a short "origin" myth, depicting how Sidi Mhammed Sherqi came to Boujad and called upon the tribes to settle in the region.[80] Like most of the others, this myth is known to all

tribesmen of the region and most townsmen. This particular version is taken from a caretaker at one of the Sherqawi shrines. Such Sherqawa know the most elaborate versions of such myths and recite them regularly to pilgrims.

Why did Sidi Mhammed Sherqi settle there? It was because of that boy, Sid 1-Hajj 1-Meknasi.[81] He used to go on pilgrimages to Mecca. He made seven pilgrimages and on the seventh he died atop Mount ʻArafa.[82] That camel which carried him living [to Mecca], by Sidi Mhammed Sherqi's covenant with it, returned him dead.

When the camel returned his son dead, Shaykh Sidi Mhammed Sherqi went into his wife's room and said to her, "O Khelfiya!" She replied, "Yes?" He asked her, "Wasn't there something of value given to us? Today shall we give it back or not?"[83] She answered, "By God, Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, we'll return it in the same condition it was given to us." He said to her, "Whoever is like me can find strength in destiny. Death is hot, acrid. She gave me a cup of bitterness. Go on, 0 Hajj 1-Meknasi, 0 my son, we meet in the next world."[84]

His wife didn't restrain herself, fell to the ground, and rolled in convulsions in front of Shaykh Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. He asked her, "Why don't you forbear over [the loss of Sid 1-Hajj 1-Meknasi],[85] who belongs to God? Look at what we have done because of that loss. What will happen when the next comes?[86] Go on!" Khelfiya will never again bear one who gave her joy like Sid 1-Hajj 1-Meknasi.[87]

When Shaykh Sidi Mhammed Sherqi's wife did not contain her grief at that place where they were [living], he said to her, "I'm not going to stay in this land which disturbs my praising of God. I'm going to settle in that place which is free [of the thought] of Sid 1-Hajj 1-Meknasi." Shaykh Sidi Mhammed Sherqi went down there, lived in that land, and began looking for water. He came to ʻAyn Shaykh.[88] He struck his walking stick against the spring, water gushed forth by the will of God, and he said, "There will be a settlement here."

When Shaykh Sidi Mhammed Sherqi settled, he needed people to fill the land with him. He called for seven from Bni Zemmur, seven from Bni Shegdal, and seven from Smaʻla. He said to them, "Who wants to sacrifice?" He picked up the knife, went into trance, and the knife dripped with blood. He said to the tribesmen, "Who wants to sacrifice?" They replied, "We will sacrifice." The marabout said, "Come! I'll take your sacrifices in turn: [first] a SenTli, [then] a Shegdali."[89] When he went out,[90] he called, "Bring your necks for the sacrifice." The SenTli came forward, but the Shegdali fell back, until all seven [of the Smaʻla] had sacrificed. [When the marabout came out of trance] he asked, "Who entered and who remained [outside]?" Someone replied, "0 Sidi, the Smaʻla went in and the Bni Shegdal remained outside." [Then] the marabout said, "The Smaʻla will be watered[91] [with bar aka], but Bni Shegdal will remain without."

The ʻUmariya[92] whom Shaykh Sidi Mhammed Sherqi had married said to him, "Here is my neck, O Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, on behalf of Bni Shegdal."[93] Then Shaykh Sidi Mhammed Sherqi said to the Bni Shegdal, "Since the woman offered her neck on your behalf, you are now milk brothers of the Smaʻla." She gave her two breasts: that for the Smaʻla overflowed with milk; that for the Bni Shegdal overflowed with water. The marabout said to them, "Go, O Smaʻla! Whatever I break, you can mend; but that which you break, no one can mend."

Those are the people who filled the land with Shaykh Sidi Mhammed Sherqi and who remain in it to this day.

This myth forms part of a cluster of some sixty that I have collected on the Tadla Plain concerning the Sherqawa and other marabouts. I use the term cluster, rather than cycle, to describe these myths collectively because, like the social groups from which they emanate, they do not form closed, bounded entities. Those collected in Boujad and its region link Sidi Mhammed Sherqi and his sons (but not later descendants, about whom there are only miracle stories, karama-s, not myths) with client groups and marabouts throughout Morocco. Conversely, myths from the shrines of other marabouts on the Tadla Plain and adjacent regions articulate with the maraboutic myths of the Sherqawa. For instance, a myth of the Hmadsha religious order near Meknes has their founder, Sidi ʻAli ben Hamdush, receiving his baraka from Sidi Mhammed Sherqi (Crapanzano 1973:30–56).[94] The Sherqawa are not aware of this myth, although they believe that Sidi ʻAli obtained his baraka from Sid 1-Hafyan, possibly a grandson of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, whose shrine is in Boujad and is visited regularly by Hmadsha pilgrims. Later Sherqawi marabouts are also said to have had complex ties with their contemporaries (some of whom are known from written historical sources) or those currently thought to have been their contemporaries. Were such interconnections fully traced out, I think they could be shown to link all the major marabouts of Morocco and North Africa (cf. Gellner 1969: 275–278; Depont and Coppolani 1897; Rinn 1884). The clients of the Sherqawa, in any case, see themselves as tied through their marabouts to the wider society of Islam.

Tribesmen and Sherqawa are aware that at one level these myths concern the nature of obligations in social groups and between such groups and marabouts. Because of their concrete, compact imagery and particularistic references, the symbolism of these myths can be comprehended only with difficulty by those unfamiliar with the social milieu in which they are known. Several implications of the myth presented above are obvious. In the first place, the marabout, Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, makes the land fertile so that its settlement becomes possible. This sequence of events presumes bar aka, as described earlier, as a causal power transmitted through specifically contracted social ties. The second crucial aspect of the myth is its presentation of the contrasting forms of relation possible with the marabout, including the logical possibility of no relation (the Bni Zemmur) .[95] Links are established in the myth both by sacrifice of the seven animals and the offer, not the consummation, of a woman for sacrifice as the substitute for an animal.[96] Her offering in the myth explicitly establishes (for Bni Shegdal) a kinship relation with the marabout and with other social groups that are in a client relationship to him. These possibilities are depicted in the myth by combinations of ties of milk, blood, and water. Tribesmen do not comment upon these possibilities except to say, in response to the ethnographer’s queries, that some of the combinations—ties of blood and milk, milk alone, blood alone, and those not secured by either blood or milk (those of water?)—are replicated in actual social relations. Both the Sherqawa and their clients claim that the covenant represented in the myth fixes mutual obligations between them. These are depicted by the symbolism of sacrifices and marriages, which create irrevocable ties of blood and revocable ones of “closeness” between the parties.

Other myths known to the Sherqawa and all tribesmen of the region explore the same theme. In one, Sidi Mhammed Sherqi takes a woman from the Bni ʻAmir and has a son by her, Sid 1-Ghazwani. This marriage places the Bni ʻAmir in the relation of maternal uncles (khal-s) to Sid 1-Ghazwani and, by common metaphorical usage of the term, to all the Sherqawa. Later, when the Bni ʻAmir are oppressed by a ruthless sultan, Sidi

Mhammed Sherqi sends Sid 1-Ghazwani to their aid (see Eickelman and Draioui 1973). Among other themes, the myth stresses the obligation of the Sherqawa to aid the Bni ʻAmir because of their khal relationship. In another myth, concerning the Bni Wra (Shawya), Ghazwani changes the tribe from the form of birds into humans and makes them Muslim at the same time. A malevolent sultan had earlier cursed the tribe and changed them into birds. From the time of their retransformation, they regularly maintained their covenant with the Sherqawa.

Although tribesmen themselves suggest the partial replication of certain relations portrayed in the myths with actual social relations, it would be an error to assume a priori the role these texts play in tribesmen's conceptions of themselves and of their relation with marabouts. Although in part these myths are consciously construed by tribesmen to be a sort of Malinowskian social charter, they are not correlated in a one-to-one way with assumptions about social conduct in the everyday world any more than the ideological use of the concept of agnation among tribesmen directly reflects the sociological principles underlying actual conduct. These myths provide symbolic statements of the role of marabouts in tying men to given regions and to each other. Marabouts make possible order within society and thus metaphorically constitute concrete, localized manifestations of Islam, submission to God's will.

In regard to the distinction between maraboutism as a cultural idiom and as a pattern for actual social relations, it is crucial to note that the "level" at which the covenant is concluded in the myths, that of tribes, is not matched by ritual activities of those units acting as groups. Collective ties with the Sherqawa are maintained and reaffirmed at the "level" of tribal sections and local communities. Moreover, many collectivities have covenants with the Sherqawa which are not represented in myths, and tribes linked to the marabout may be in hostile relation with one another. Thus there is considerable leeway in how such covenants are realized. Contrary to the suggestion of some tribesmen that such covenants have "always" existed, they actually fall somewhere between Sir Henry Maine's categories of "status" and "contract." Tribesmen often refer to their relations with the Sherqawa as ascribed, but both the myths and relations in the actual social world indicate achieved, contractual relations on the part of the persons and groups involved.

*** Remaining Connected

Sherqawa and client tribesmen claim that the original covenants between Sidi Mhammed Sherqi and their ancestors have been renewed in an unbroken parallel chain of descendants on both sides which has kept them "connected" (jnettasliri). These links are maintained in three ways. One is through offerings to and communal meals with those living descendants of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi who claim special relationships with certain tribes, tribal sections, or local communities. These descendants are called "visitors" (zewwar-s) , because they visit the tribesmen at intervals throughout the year to collect the zyara, which in this context means the offering made to a marabout or his descendants. Another way is by annual sacrifices at the shrines of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi and certain of his descendants, in the presence of living Sherqawa. A few groups, such as the Sma'la until recently, maintain their links in both these ways. A much larger number of groups regularly maintain their covenant only through offerings and communal meals with nonmaraboutic Sherqawa, omitting the annual sacrifice at the main shrine. A third way to remain "connected" is through offerings and communal meals with living marabouts, but this practice is rapidly disappearing. It is presently much more difficult for living marabouts to maintain their reputations than for those who are enshrined. Only one of the two Sherqawa currently considered to be living

marabouts actively fosters this belief by entertaining pilgrims and accepting offerings from them individually and collectively. Links through Sherqawi “visitors” are consequently much more common. The majority of such visitors belong to the two Sherqawi descent groups that have dominated the affairs of the religious lodge over the last century, the ‘Arbawi and Zawya groups. Others are scattered throughout the remaining descent groups.

The relation of Sherqawi visitors to their clients is generally diffuse. Often, visitors are among the very few townsmen with whom tribesmen have regular contact. When they come to the weekly market, they often seek out their visitors to give them small offerings and to ask for personal invocations on their behalf. Clients also call upon other forms of expertise from their Sherqawi visitors, whose occupations include those of carpenter, tailor, shopkeeper, caravanserai operator, and notary. Beyond such particular skills, visitors can relay requests to other Sherqawa or townsmen. Even if such intervention is not efficacious, it is in the interest of visitors to allow their clients to think it is in order to enhance their own prestige. Each visitor is spoken of as “working” the local communities with which he is particularly regarded as an intermediary.[97] Most work five or six local communities, not necessarily in the same tribal sections. This “work” is generally passed from father to son or other close relations among the Sherqawa, including women on occasion. With the rapid spread of urban-based, formal Islam and diminished revenues and prestige from “visiting,” many younger Sherqawa decline to carry on the activity. Even tribesmen now consider many visitors to be beggars, emphasizing their need to use donations for their own subsistence, although still respecting their maraboutic descent.

Consequently these ties are rapidly being eroded, although there are still a large number of middle-aged visitors who derive enough income to want to continue the practice despite unfavorable comments from other townsmen. Moreover, the extent of attrition is difficult to determine because many Sherqawa and tribesmen prefer, for reasons previously mentioned, to dissimulate their links.

The major collective contacts between the Sherqawa active in the affairs of the lodge and their tribal clients occur on three annual occasions. On two of these, Sherqawi visitors go out to the local communities tied to them. The first visit is in early spring, generally in March, when pastoral contracts expire and the profits of the preceding year are traditionally divided. Some Sherqawa even buy horses for these rounds, which they then sell after the June harvests. Visitors again “work” their local communities immediately after the harvests in late May and early June. On both occasions, Sherqawa extract offerings in exchange for invocations to their ancestor to provide baraka for the supplicant group. This quid pro quo is often punctuated by heated, acrimonious protests. Although the tribesmen feel they need the invocations of the visitors for their well-being, many regard their demands as extortionate and openly say so. Arrangements for the collection of offerings on these occasions are usually made not by the visitor himself—only the poorest and least effective are reduced to that extreme—but by an “associate” (saheb) in each local community. This associate serves as the channel through which demands are made upon the group involved by the Sherqawi visitor and requests are made to him in turn. Generally such tribal associates are men of influence in their local community. Most are moderately wealthy, and many, in the hierarchy of oligarchy enhanced by the protectorate, served as government shaykh-s. In independent Morocco these same persons also generally play a prominent role in all representations of the tribal group with the outside world.

Living marabouts commonly made visits to their clientele until the 1930’s. They ceased this practice as the size of offerings diminished. It became clear to marabouts that they were

exposed on such occasions to open opposition from an emerging group of reformist Muslims and from tribesmen themselves. In such circumstances the marabout, not having full control over the conditions of his public exposure, risked substantial losses of prestige and hence of his reputation for bar aka. Baraka may have, as Mary Douglas claims, a “snowball” bias toward success (1966:109), but it can also work just as quickly in reverse.

The importance of the intermediary role of the Sherqawi visitors with their maraboutic ancestors and the wider Muslim community is still stressed by tribesmen, although the status of such visitors is often played down. The offerings which most visitors collect are now used for their personal benefit, although they are still known by the names of zakat and ‘ashur. The zakat is the tax incumbent upon all Muslims able to pay it and used for the benefit of the Muslim community. In the preprotectorate era, when most visitors seem to have served as messengers for and intermediaries toward their maraboutic kinsmen, there are indications that some of the revenues really were used in such a fashion, particularly in years of drought. ‘Ashur means “tithe,” but is not to be taken literally. It is a descriptive term which traditionally has signified taxes paid to the Makhzen or any other regular levy. Tribesmen designate offerings to marabouts or visitors as the “share of the shaykh” (l-haqq dyal esh-shaykh). Upon making them, tribesmen say to the visitor that they are given “in the face of God” and “for the sake of your ancestor” (7# khater jeddek). In the past, visitors were the key to seeking the intervention of the Sherqawa in a wide range of matters, including the mundane. Their role at the present is greatly attenuated in this respect, although, as recently as an election in the early 1960’s, a local candidate successfully consolidated his tribal support by persuading Sherqawa zewwar-s to work on his behalf.

The principal occasion for contact between the Sherqawa and their tribal clientele occurs during the fall festival (jnusern) of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Most groups renew their covenant with the Sherqawa during this period. As has been discussed, the timing of the festival varies with the specific ecological conditions of each client group. The predominantly transhumant Sma‘la, for instance, prefer coming during a full moon in order to diminish the possibility of theft of the animals which they leave behind. Another factor which influences the pilgrimage of specific groups is the desire of Sherqawi visitors to avoid the copresence in Boujad of mutually antagonistic groups. Each group informs their visitor when they want to make the pilgrimage. The visitors of principal groups then informally consult among themselves and set dates. This activity is virtually the only one in which visitors coordinate their activities.

The festival lasts an entire month but “peaks” in the ten-day period during which tribal sections from the Sma‘la are in Boujad. These and a few sections of the Bni Zemmur are the last to come on horseback and set up tents for the duration of their visit. The Sma‘la tents form a crescent along Boujad’s eastern side. Throughout the period of the Smada presence, “powder plays” (tehrak-s) occur daily between horsemen of rival local communities and tribal sections. As stated in Chapter 4, the patterns of participation in these, the arrangement of tents, and the patterns of contributions for collective offerings to Sherqawi marabouts and visitors all reflect the effective social units at that time. For groups that arrive by truck or bus, only the pattern of offerings to the Sherqawa indicates social alignments. Alignments of these groups are considerably more blurred than is the case with groups that arrive on horseback and muleback, because the occasions on which they are called upon to express group identity are fewer. Without horses, they cannot compete in “powder plays.” Their stay in Boujad tends to be shorter; and their lodgings are scattered throughout the town. Under these conditions open breaks with other groups or

within groups are less likely to be expressed. In fact, such groups often make joint contributions to the Sherqawa for reasons of economy and thus have even greater reason to attenuate any differences that exist among themselves.

Explicitly economic activities do not presently form a significant part of the festival, although they did in the past. The urban bourgeoisie, lacking substantial economic benefit from the festival, has become consequently more open in condemnation of it. Today, pilgrims buy in Boujad only those few supplies needed for their actual stay. Nevertheless, the government has in recent years associated an agricultural and livestock exposition to the festival in order to disseminate modern techniques to tribesmen. After a lapse of at least a decade, local government officials are also trying to use the festival to have tribesmen reaffirm their loyalty to the Makhzen. Such activity is hardly novel. Prior to the protectorate, sultans used a number of means to indicate their approval or disapproval of particular marabouts. Similarly, the French occasionally banned musem-s or restricted attendance in order to exert pressure upon particular tribal groups. The independent Moroccan government has also employed similar tactics in recent years.

The annual pilgrimage to Boujad is generally the one occasion which partially removes tribesmen from their ordinary cycle of agricultural and herding activities and weekly markets. Ritual activities accompanying the formal Islamic feasts and life-cycle occasions, such as births, circumcisions, weddings, and funerals, accomplish this to some extent but still are held in the social context of totally familiar social life. In contrast, the pilgrimage to Boujad is partially removed from these circumstances. Some contrasts with the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) help to discern what is characteristic about the pilgrimage (zyara) to the Sherqawi shrine in Boujad.[98] The pilgrimage to Mecca is obligatory for those Muslims economically and physically able to undertake it but is an act performed by individuals. The pilgrimage to Mecca and its associated rituals remove most Muslims to the periphery of the web of normative, local social structure. In Mecca itself, pilgrims from different parts of the Muslim world tend to unite in a spirit of what Victor Turner has called communitas. An ethos of the equality of pilgrims toward one another permeates their activities.

Many of these features are largely absent from the pilgrimage to Boujad. There is no free commingling of pilgrims from different social groups, although, as in traditional markets, there is a suspension of overt hostilities. Each group present has a dyadic tie to the Sherqawa, but this bond does not necessarily create horizontal ties among the groups themselves. The timing of the hajj to Mecca is determined by the Muslim lunar calendar, while the zyara to Boujad is tied to the agricultural and herding cycle. As with the hajj, the decision to go to Boujad is made by individuals on an annual basis, although in the latter case there usually is considerable group pressure to participate. Finally, the inequalities implicit in everyday social relations are preserved during the festival in Boujad.

The central feature of the fall festival is the renewal of the covenant with Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Its modalities vary considerably, for the renewal is not effected in the context of a formal, stylized liturgy.

All covenanting groups offer animals, generally sheep or bulls, which are either sacrificed or accepted by the Sherqawa in lieu of sacrifice and later sold on the open market. This latter practice is a rationalization of the covenant and an attempt by the Sherqawa to mitigate urban hostility, including that of many Sherqawa, to maraboutic activities. Some

tribesmen insist upon sacrifice, however, and for them there is a Sherqawi butcher at the main shrine who makes the sacrifice and then sells the meat to pilgrims at current market prices. The profits of this are then divided among the Sherqawa.

Collections for these sacrifices are made within each local community and tribal section by one of their number, generally the same person who acts as associate for the Sherqawi visitor. The share of contributing households is roughly scaled to their ability to pay. Considerable cajoling and public ridicule of recalcitrant donors often accompany these exactions up to moments before the sacrifice.

Most groups offer only sheep at the main shrine, but the tribal sections of the Sma‘la evince a considerably more intense relationship toward the Sherqawa. They offer sheep at each of the principal Sherqawi shrines in Boujad and, in addition, a bull at the main shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Until 1968, the latter was offered in what is known as a ^argiba sacrifice. This is a means used by tribes and tribal sections to secure and reaffirm major covenants or to impose a major supernatural compulsion (“ar). In the preprotectorate and early protectorate periods the t’argiba was often used to secure amnesty (amari) after rebellion from the Makhzen. Later it was used in the same fashion with the French. It last was used on the Tadla Plain in this way by the Sma‘la in August 1955, to bring a halt to the aerial bombardment and reprisals of the Foreign Legion for the earlier tribal attack on Wad Zem that same month.[99]

The t’argiba sacrifice at the main shrine generally took the following pattern. The tribal sections of the Sma‘la gathered at their tents on the outskirts of Boujad. Their Sherqawi visitors there said an invocation over the bull. Several barefooted tribesmen then led the bull, running, through the streets of Boujad to the shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Other tribesmen of the covenanting group accompanied the bull on horseback or barefoot, all shouting their allegiance to Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Some members of the procession beat drums, others went into trance (jedba) , particularly as the group approached the shrine. Other pilgrims and a few townsmen often joined the procession as it ran through town. Most townsmen, however, stayed at a distance because the Sma‘la had a reputation for being unrestrained during this procession, particularly if they saw the color red.[100] Finally, the bull was sacrificed in the interior courtyard of the shrine, in front of the room containing the marabout’s sepulcher. As the throat of the sacrifice was hacked open, some of those in trance struggled forward to drink the victim’s blood as it gushed out. Others, who were not in trance, smeared blood over their clothes or collected it in small vials. These were made into amulets to wear around their own necks and to give to their women and children. Tribesmen in trance were then led to the wooden grill work (garbus) which surrounds the marabout’s sepulcher, where they remained until they returned to their normal state. Sma‘la say that when their faith (niya) was strong, those in trance saw water gush forth from under the marabout’s tomb, and they then drank it.

Those who fall into trance are an exception to my claim above that the pilgrimage to Boujad largely constitutes a continuation of the ordinary social order. Such individuals claim no memory of events while in trance and thus are withdrawn from ordinary conventions. The consumption of fresh blood, for instance, is formally interdicted (haram) in Islam. Tribesmen are aware of this. It must be emphasized, however, that such behavior has been confined to a few of the Sma‘la. No other tribal groups act in this manner, nor did they do so in the past. Although none of the participants offers any explanation of this ritual, its form suggests that the covenant with the marabout

is symbolized by blood sacrifice, which by its nature is an irrevocable act. The sacrifice is reciprocated by the marabout's endowing the land with fertility, symbolized by the water said to gush forth from under his tomb. The total lack of exegesis and of complementary rituals which form neat, closed patterns makes the interpretation of this ritual tentative. But perhaps its looseness of form is itself significant, since this looseness is replicated by the nature of groups in the social order.

The covenant of the Smada was last reaffirmed in the above manner in 1968. One reason for discontinuance of the ritual was pressure from townsmen, including many Sherqawa, who are hostile to this ritual and the view of Islam implicitly represented by it. Although even the governor of the province in which Boujad is located has attended the festival in recent years and made major donations to the shrine, his attendance is simply due to the importance of the festival in the eyes of the tribesmen. Another reason for the ritual's disap-

pearance is that the Sherqawa, in the distribution of the revenues of the shrines (see next chapter), prefer that the animals be converted into cash for distribution among themselves. Sherqawa persuaded the tribesmen that the offer of a sacrifice was the same as its performance, and this argument was accepted.[101] Thus the Sherqawa perhaps unwittingly spurred the rationalization of the covenant with their clients. Tribesmen still run with the bull to the main shrine, and some Sma'la continue to enter into trance as an expression, they say, of their intense devotion to the Sherqawi shaykh. The tendency for offerings in cash to replace offerings and sacrifices in nature has, I suggest, the unintended consequence for the Sherqawa of emphasizing the instrumental aspect of their relation with tribesmen. It also induces a heightened awareness in their clients as to just what they are getting in return. Offerings in cash are more directly comparable to marketplace transactions than the traditional offerings in kind.

Tribal groups other than the Sma'la (and for that matter the Sma'la at all Sherqawi shrines except the main one) are markedly nonecstatic in renewing their covenant with the Sherqawa. There usually is a procession from wherever the group is staying to the main shrine, but it is at walking speed, wearing shoes, unaccompanied by drumbeats, chants, or other ecstatic behavior. The sacrifice of the sheep, when it occurs, is regarded nonchalantly. Attention of tribesmen is not particularly focused upon the act; so it is difficult for outside observers to detect it taking place at all.

Although tribesmen maintain that covenants have been made on behalf of their respective groups ever since the Sherqawa first came to the upper Tadla Plain, they are conscious of the latitude of the form in which their offerings are made and of the shifting composition of the groups involved. For instance, in recent years the Hwazem tribal section of the Sma'la offered grains and sheep to their Sherqawi visitors, in addition to sheep at each of the principal Sherqawi shrines and a bull at that of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. The Trosh and Wlad Fennan tribal sections made similar offerings to their visitors but none at the Sherqawi shrines in Boujad. After several years during which the harvest of the Hwazem was markedly superior to that of the other two tribal sections, tribesmen of the latter groups decided that their relative misfortune was due to the displeasure of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Consequently, since 1970, Trosh and Wlad Fennan have jointly offered a bull (not actually sacrificed) at his shrine. In earlier years these two sections never made joint offerings. The joint offering was made explicitly to reduce the expense, although tribesmen of both sections say that this economy does not reduce their expression of faith (niya) in the marabout. Similar reconsiderations of offerings occur among individuals. A tribesman of the Trosh section of Sma'la, a truck driver, recently stopped contributing to

the sacrifice. Shortly afterward, he had an accident for which he was held responsible. His misfortune was attributed to the anger of the shaykh. He has since renewed his contributions.

Sacrifices and other offerings at the main shrine are generally made at the level of tribal sections rather than local communities. Tribesmen pragmatically say this is in order to make more substantial offerings which will be acceptable to the marabouts. In contrast, each local community acts alone in slaughtering a sheep for a communal meal with their Sherqawi visitor during the festival. This meal generally takes place in the guest tent of the local community. In the past it often occurred at the house of the Sherqawi in town—at least when the visitor was wealthy enough to have a large one—but adamant pressure from the neighbors of visitors has discouraged what they consider "non-Islamic" rituals in their quarter. A few of the most prestigious tribesmen are invited to the house of their visitor at some time during the course of the festival, but never as a group.

The symbolism of the communal meal at the guest tent is quite explicit. In offering part of the meat of the sacrifice to their visitor, tribesmen say to him: "This sheep is for your ancestor. Eat! [Had el-hawli dyal jeddek, kulu,r\." His partaking of the meal reaffirms and strengthens the bond between the tribesmen and the marabout. At the end of the meal, a collection of money is made on behalf of the visitor. After it is handed to him, he responds with an invocation addressed to God and his ancestor Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Typical invocations mention the long association between the marabout and the local community in question, often referring in abbreviated form to the various myths known by the tribesmen. The visitor asks on behalf of his clients for good weather, the fertility of their crops and animals, and the resolution of any special problems which the group has experienced or anticipates. Problems facing individuals in the local community are also mentioned, such as a serious illness or the lack of male offspring. If a tribesman thinks that the visitor is skipping over any request too lightly or has forgotten something, he will simply interrupt and ask that the matter be dealt with. As with sacrifices, comportment at invocations is casual: ubiquitous transistor radios play in the background, conversations proceed only slightly subdued, and women and adolescents pay little attention, if any, to the proceedings. Despite the supernatural powers attributed to marabouts, the attitude toward them is generally not one of awe. The tone of invocations is that of reasonable men seeking to coax another into good conduct. The fact that at times tribesmen employ light sarcasm and taunting, not of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi but of his descendants, implies the pre-existence of close ties between the parties.

*** Marabouts and Obligations

Underlying all ties with marabouts is the concept of obligation (haqq). Requests to marabouts must be accompanied by offerings, sacrifices, or the promise (wd'da) of them.[102] Unlike the relations of Spanish villagers to saints, which run along a spectrum from relations of instrumentality to affective relations (Christian 1972), Moroccan relations with marabouts all tend to be construed in terms of obligation. One Sherqawi said, "You [must] bring something to 'open' a matter with God [Nta te-tjib shi-haja bash yefteh Allah l-amr bi ha)." The same principle applies equally to gifts intended to induce persons to grant requests made of them. A tacit corollary of this instrumental exchange is that the only effective marabouts are those who are able to receive offerings or who have descendants and other persons "close" to them capable of doing so on their behalf. The caretaker of one of the shrines in Boujad stated the point as follows: "If you give something [to a marabout], there must be someone to pick it up. If not, there's no point in giving anything." This applies equally to collective offerings and

individual supplications. Of course, descendants of marabouts are present only at the larger and more popular shrines to take offerings and to aid supplicants in making their invocations.

As with other transactions of obligation, there is no formal economic reckoning of the exchange between marabouts and their clients. Nevertheless, a mutual sorting-out takes place. The faith (niya) of clients is thought to be shown in the value of their offerings. This must be commensurate with their own prestige, that of the marabout or visitor, and the nature of the request being made. An offering considered meager in relation to the rank (daraja) of the client or that of a marabout or visitor is construed as a lack of faith. Visitors do not hesitate to inform their clients when they are not satisfied with meager offerings. Moreover, correspondence from the nineteenth century indicates that such bartering for invocations is not a recent development. If offerings are meager, a marabout or prestigious visitor is thought to refrain from acting effectively on behalf of his clients, even if an invocation is actually made. In particular, the prestige of living marabouts suffers if they are accessible to clients able to offer only a chicken or a few eggs. Boujad's living marabout receives pilgrims during the fall festival and also writes amulets and says invocations on behalf of individuals throughout the year. Writing an amulet for a diminutive offering would serve to diminish his "word," since he customarily performs such services in exchange for significant cash contributions, the gift of animals, or, as once occurred in 1969, the title to a used car.

This marabout has the same problem as his predecessors of preserving his baraka through a comportment which maintains a social distance from all but the most prestigious of his clientele. In the last century Sidi ben Dawd daily rode on his mule around Boujad, listening to requests from townsmen, and regularly visited his tribal clients. But the actual settlement of disputes and other political negotiations, in which there always was the risk of failure or indecision, was tacitly delegated to Sidi 'Umar, his son. Significantly, Sidi 'Umar did not succeed his father upon his death but continued as the political counselor for the next marabout. The present marabout who actively encourages belief in his maraboutic powers can be seen publicly around Boujad, but he has virtually no clients in the town itself. No one pays him particular attention. However, on market days and during the annual festival he confines himself to his house, access to which is controlled by retainers, generally poor relatives. These stand at the door of his house and decide which pilgrims to admit. A direct refusal to a supplicant unable to afford the going price of his invocations would be considered improper. Occasional intervention on behalf of the destitute is considered an act of charity, but too frequent action on their behalf would dilute the economic and status base necessary to maintain his maraboutic reputation for baraka. Persons seeking an invocation with little to offer often try to secure recommendations, sometimes in writing, from the marabout's more affluent clients to avoid being turned away.[103]

The ideology of clients' remaining "connected" with marabouts emphasizes stability. Nevertheless, now, as in the nineteenth century, alliances between marabouts and their clients are contracted and broken. Tribal groups can become disillusioned with the ability of their marabout or visitor to sustain them with baraka. The visitor himself may drop some groups in favor of those capable of demonstrating their faith with more substantial offerings. As the scope of baraka attributed to marabouts has contracted in recent years and its intensity diminished, many such connections are broken at the death of the visitors, who, as I have indicated, often no longer have other Sherqawa willing to replace them.

Such shifts in alignments are not done whimsically but once decided upon are fairly easy to accomplish, both for the Sherqawa and for their clientele. Sherqawa do not comment among themselves upon who, if anyone, has baraka or the ability to communicate it. Only God, they say, has that knowledge. Baraka among the Sherqawa thus resembles the ethos of competitive settlement among merchants, who wait for God to bring them business rather than openly solicit it, so as to avoid overt friction among themselves. This ideological tenet is also secure from direct attack from Islamic reformists, as no formal assertion is made of the "closeness" of the Sherqawa to God. During fieldwork, I initially thought that certain Sherqawa were being evasive when, in response to my asking whether a particular marabout, living or dead, had baraka, they replied that the Bni So-and-So made such a claim. Their commentary was quite accurate. The "proof" of baraka is the existence of clients who act as if a particular marabout has it. This comes very close to a pure example of Weber's concept of charisma (Weber 1968:401).

This populistic determination of baraka is particularly apparent in the careers of living marabouts but holds equally for the careers of visitors and enshrined marabouts. Shrines, at least such major ones as that of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, have a manifold symbolic appeal which partially insulates them from immediate political and economic vicissitudes. They also have an economic base not immediately dependent upon the offerings of pilgrims. The Sherqawa who manage the affairs of the main shrine have not distributed the accumulated offerings to the "children of the shaykh" in recent years. Instead, they have redirected this income into enlarging the shrine and building a hostel for pilgrims. Similar decisions have been made by the claimed descendants of enshrined marabouts elsewhere on the Tadla Plain. The effect is to upgrade the prestige of the shrine and to conceal the overall attrition of revenue.

As for living marabouts, at the turn of the century all client tribal groups were tied with either the lord of the 'Arbawi Sherqawa or the rival lord of the Zawya Sherqawa. As the ability of living marabouts to exercise their influence waned, so did their ties with client groups. Many groups have ceased maintaining ties with living marabouts, but continue them with visitors and make the annual pilgrimage. Groups that continue to renew their covenant with living marabouts (or in the case of the 'Arbawi Sherqawa, with a close relative of a person with such a reputation) generally have maintained allegiance with the same Sherqawi faction since prior to the protectorate. The longevity of these ties is largely due to the new social conditions introduced by the protectorate. The possibility of new marabouts emerging among the Sherqawa and asserting their identity was crippled by the French action in "freezing" the two rival lords and their successors into positions of prominence and fixing the lines of political identity for potential clients.

The situation of the one remaining Sherqawi marabout who actively seeks to maintain his reputation is especially precarious, since he depends directly upon revenue from pilgrims. Even as some groups sever ties with him and those who remain "connected" cut the size of their offerings, he is pressed to live up to his reputation for unrestrained generosity (karama) in entertaining them. During the fall festival, groups of several hundred pilgrims arrive in relays at his house. Each group stays for anywhere from one to three days and brings with it the animals and grain needed for its sustenance. To retain pilgrims, this marabout has in recent years added music and female dancers (shikha-s) for their entertainment, but their number is still declining steadily. A pending inheritance dispute may also bring about the division of the large house which is a manifestation of his baraka and in which he entertains guests. If the dispute goes against him, then he will lose most of the manifest symbols of his baraka. Unlike that of his predecessors, his own reputation for baraka is largely

demystified. Even through the 1930's, tribesmen popularly attributed to Sherqawa marabouts the capacity to change themselves into lions, among other miraculous deeds. The uncle of the present Zawya marabout (2–14) was reputed to have this capacity. The current marabout is not. Demystification means that living marabouts are now much more vulnerable to their immediate successes and failures.

The French tried to sustain the prestige of the Sherqawi marabouts by providing them with official sinecures, but their hold over other Sherqawa nonetheless became much less firm. This hold became even weaker with independence. Where once the Sherqawa were firmly identified with maraboutism, many Sherqawa now strive to separate the two identities as far as possible. I describe the cultural basis of Sherqawi identity and the process by which it became dissociated from maraboutism in the next chapter.

Table 5.

Principal Collective Visits to Living Sherqawi Marabouts^

September 1969

Lord of 'Arbawi Sherqawa	Lord of Zawya Sherqawa
Ait 'Attab	Bni 'Amir
Shawya	1. Several local communities of
1. WladBuZiri	Bni Brahim
2. Jrari	2. Wlad Ziyyan
3. 'Qawqa	3. Krifat
4. Wlad Sidi ben Dawd	4. Wlad 'Ali
Werdigha	5. Wlad 'Ali Dhirat (recently
1. Urada	split from Wlad 'Ali)
2. Thamna	6. Wlad Bu Herru
Bni Musa	7. Wlad'Ali Mulay 1-Wad
Several sections (traf-s')	8. Merbe'
Bni Meskin	9. Brawna
600 pilgrims, sections unknown	10. Wlad Sasi
Berbers from Walmas region	11. Bradiyya
Bni Zemmur	12. Wlad Messun
1. Hamrayn	13. Khalfiyya
2. Rwashed	Bni Musa
1. Mesghuna	
2. Ait LWali	

** 7. Sherqawi Identity

*** A Cultural Definition

A Sherqawi is defined by Moroccans as a patrilineal descendant of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Persons who claim descent from a common ancestor are normatively thought to constitute a descent group. When the claimed ancestor is a marabout, such persons are considered to be members of a maraboutic descent group. Sociologically viewed, however, they can best be described as what Harold W. Scheffler has called a “descent category.” In other words, the idiom of patrilineal descent “itself gives form only to categories of persons” of common patrilineal descent, and “these categories remain nondiscrete and only vaguely bounded” (Scheffler 1965:62). Membership in such a category does not imply an obligation to act in the common interest of that category. Rather, it is the presence of what are perceived as common interests, among which is the possibility of achieving or maintaining higher status, which encourages the formation of groups based on the claim to Sherqawi descent. Scheffler’s distinction between descent categories and descent groups is analytically quite useful. Some persons who are in the Sherqawi descent category are denied membership in Sherqawi descent groups. This largely comes about when the intensity and quality of their interaction with other persons recognized as Sherqawa falls below a certain level. Moreover, place of residence and propinquity to other Sherqawa, formally having nothing to do with the ideology of descent, are in practice crucial factors in shaping Sherqawi identity.

Predictably, those groups within the Sherqawa with significant interests to defend have their boundaries more sharply defined than the others. Recognition of Sherqawi identity follows the same principle of “closeness” that was introduced in Chapter 4. Thus the key question throughout this chapter is why and how identity as Sherqawa and as marabouts or their descendants is manipulated.

There are two separate aspects to Sherqawi identity. One is the formal genealogical ideology, which serves as a framework to conceptualize and legitimize a wide range of social relationships. The other is the question of how identity as a Sherqawi is pragmatically achieved and maintained. Signs of such identity include membership in a local group composed largely, but not exclusively, of persons appearing in a Sherqawi genealogy and residence in a Sherqawi quarter. They also include rights of inheritance as a Sherqawi through Islamic law, the conventions governing the distribution of offerings made at the various Sherqawi shrines, hypergamous marriage with commoners (i.e., the taking in marriage of commoner women but the giving of none in return), and explicit or tacit acceptance as a Sherqawi by recognized Sherqawa of high prestige.

As Scheffler has noted, the concept of descent group is itself inherently ambiguous: “A descent group is any group in relation to which a descent concept may be said to serve as one or more of the following: (1) a principle of recruitment (i.e., a criterion for membership); (2) a conceptualization of the unity of the group; (3) a statement of the actual or ‘proper’ composition of the group; and (4) a statement of the nature of the group’s relations with other such groups within the same set of groups (or society)” (1965:42). The

Sherqawi claim of shared patrilineal descent from a common ancestor shifts, often imperceptibly, between these various meanings. Sherqawiness, so to speak, is a condensed symbolization of several bases of social honor. The same is true of other assertions of “closeness” throughout Moroccan society. What distinguishes the Sherqawa in this respect is the intensity with which such identity is maintained and manipulated.

Ideologically, Sherqawi descent is characterized by claims to certain genealogical and mystical attributes. First, all Sherqawa are foqra (sg., fqif) , patrilineal descendants of ‘Umar ben 1-Khattab.[104] In some respects, foqra are treated like patrilineal descendants of the Prophet Muhammed (shorfa, sg., shrif). Like shorfa, the Sherqawa practice hypergamous marriage with commoners ^awam; sg., ‘ammi), that is, all those persons unable to claim descent from the Prophet or ‘Umar. Sherqawa and shorfa are, moreover, equal for the purpose of intermarriage. Thus, Sidi Mhammed Sherqi is said to have taken a wife from the Sa‘adi dynasty of shorfa (1555–1659). A more contemporary example of Sherqawi equality with shorfa is the current marriage of a prominent Sherqawi to the sister of the present king and royal consent to prefix Mulay to their son’s name, a prerogative normally reserved for shorfa.

As for mystical descent, Sidi Mhammed Sherqi is thought to possess mystical knowledge transmitted to him through a name-chain (silsila) of marabouts which ultimately reaches back to the Prophet. This knowledge has in turn been communicated by Sidi Mhammed Sherqi to other marabouts, primarily his own descendants but also some non-Sherqawa. As indicated in Chapter 1, the notions of the transmission of mystical knowledge and of patrilineal descent have popularly fused in Morocco, although, when the subject is explicitly discussed, educated Sherqawa distinguish between the two concepts. After all, it is known that bar aka is very unequally distributed among the descendants of marabouts. In principle, God determines the Sherqawi who has the most baraka at any given time, who then becomes lord (sid, mqaddem) of the zawya. But intense fights for succession in the past indicate that the signs of possession of such baraka have been highly contested by those who felt they could successfully stake a claim. Descent from or “closeness” to these maraboutic lords conveys substantial prestige to the rest of the Sherqawa. Some baraka is hereditary; “closeness” by descent from or kinship ties to a marabout in itself carries a presumed privileged access to their maraboutic relations. Even for those who presently deny that marabouts have the powers popularly attributed to them, Sherqawi prominence can be legitimated on other grounds: ancestors who have been distinguished both as religious scholars and as guarantors of social order in earlier, turbulent times, and the leading role of some Sherqawa in the contemporary Moroccan polity. But the possibility of separating genealogical from mystical descent is more apparent to the Sherqawa themselves than to their clients (or other commoners), who assume that all Sherqawa share in some degree the mystical powers of their ancestors.

The Sherqawa consider themselves at present to be divided into eight descent groups, each of which is associated with a residential quarter in Boujad. I specify “at present” because there are clear indications that the number of effective descent groups has historically shifted. Genealogies, after all, refer to the social situation of contemporary groups and persons, not to the dead. Six of these descent groups claim descent from six sons of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi—Sidi ‘Abd 1-Qader, Sid 1-Mursli, Sid 1-Ghazwani, Sid 1-Meknasi, Sidi ‘Abd es-Slam, and Sidi ‘Allal. The remaining two groups claim descent from maraboutic lords of the nineteenth century. (All Sherqawi lords claim descent from another of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi’s sons, Sidi ‘Abd 1-Khaleq [2–3]). ’

All prominent Sherqawa of the last two centuries have been from these latter two groups. Because they have had at their command the greatest material wealth and prestige, their members have had a competitive edge over other Sherqawa in controlling the resources of the religious lodge, access to both traditional and modern education, links with influential Moroccans elsewhere, appointment to government posts, and other strategic advantages. These are value-added, in the sense that prerogatives enjoyed in the past make it more likely that the same persons or those sponsored by them—generally members of their household, kinsmen, or clients—will enjoy similar advantages at later times.

The ideological core of Sherqawi identity and its internal differentiation is contained in genealogies and chains of "mystical" descent. These are regarded by the Sherqawa and others as symbolic encapsulations of Sherqawi histories. I use the plural because there are multiple ways in which the genealogies are constructed, understood, and related to each other. Each history is construed in terms of the social reality as seen by certain elements of society, even though the underlying pattern governing the generation of these histories is constant. At the same time, these conceptions of the past shape that reality both by internally relating the Sherqawa to each other and by linking them with the rest of society. In contrast to the genealogies of commoners (^awarn), the span of Sherqawi genealogies, that is, the number of contemporaries included in them, and their generational depth are significantly larger.

These qualities in themselves do not distinguish maraboutic from nonmaraboutic genealogies. Similar qualities are represented in the genealogies of "those who are distinguished" (nets khassa) on the basis of claims to prestige other than descent from Muhammed and 'Umar: families that claim a long tradition of Makhzen service, urban merchant families, families with a tradition of religious scholarship, and the like. As I indicated in my example of the formation of the Qsayra quarter (Ch. 4), social honor is legitimated whenever possible by the claim to a distinguished genealogy. For a commoner to assert similar genealogical knowledge would be considered presumptuous and improper. In contrast, the core genealogy of the Sherqawa is in the public domain. Not everyone, even among the Sherqawa, knows all of its key components, but everyone is aware of the centuries of maraboutic prestige of the Sherqawa, their numerous shrines in Boujad and throughout the Tadla Plain, and the reputations of some prominent contemporary Sherqawa (most of which are no longer based upon maraboutic activities). Claimed relations of kinship among the Sherqawa are also frequently much more complex than those that exist among commoners. For instance, the core of the 'Arbawi descent group claim kin relations through one of the fourteen sons and five daughters of Sid 1-Hajj PArbi (2–9). This lord had one legal wife and at least eight concubines. Many of these descendants, in turn, had large households, multiple marriages, and—for those who reached maturity in the years immediately preceding the protectorate—significant numbers of concubines. The Zawya Sherqawa show a similar complexity of internal relations. These descendants share complex rights to undivided inheritances through Islamic law, rights to the revenues of shrines, access as kinsmen to prominent Sherqawa, and such complex bonds of "closeness" based upon kin ties and other factors that multiple interlocking links can be made with other Sherqawa.

Few commoners elaborate their identity as a descent group in a similar fashion. Even among the Sherqawa, the importance attached to genealogical knowledge and to descent ideology varies considerably. The thinnest genealogical knowledge tends to be possessed by members of the six nonlordly descent groups. Each of these is associated with a shrine and a quarter in Boujad, although there are no formal activities associated with their particular shrines. The boundaries of inclusion in these groups are much more permeable

than those of the remaining two “main-line” descent groups, ‘Arbawi and Zawya. Long-term residents of the quarters associated with the non-main-line descent groups frequently claim Sherqawi descent and have this claim unchallenged in many contexts, even though they may not be able to claim a share (haqq) of the offerings of the principal shrine.

In principle, the Sherqawa maintain registers of descendants of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, just as registers of descendants of the Prophet are supposed to be kept. Nevertheless, such formal determination of descent-group membership is germane only for the distribution of offerings made at the main Sherqawi shrines. These registers are largely inaccessible, and many Sherqawa correctly maintain that they are incomplete and out-of-date. Much more important is being “known” (me‘ruf) as a Sherqawi in face-to-face, ongoing social relationships. In these terms, members of the non-main-line groups have only a truncated body of genealogical lore to establish their legitimacy. They know by name none of their intervening ancestors between the present and the sons of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi from whom they claim descent. Moreover, the span of known contemporary relationships is generally much narrower than that known by members of the main-line groups. Nor do these individuals have anything to gain in material interests by expanding the span of their relationships or by drawing attention to their genealogical claims.

In contrast, members of the main-line ‘ Arbawi and Zawya descent groups show a much greater awareness of the boundaries of their groups and can generally trace in detail their genealogical links to one of the nineteenth-century Sherqawi lords. Consequently they sharply delineate between members of their descent groups and mere inhabitants of their quarters who may claim “closeness” with them. These two groups have substantial common interests and have in general managed to defend them. Many of the estates of their prominent nineteenth-century Sherqawi ancestors have remained undivided, entitling many of them to substantial revenues through Islamic inheritance in addition to those from shares in the offerings at the main shrine, available in principle to all Sherqawa. In themselves, these two forms of rights are insufficient to provide members of the main-line groups with a livelihood, although they constitute an important addition to the income of many households. More so than members of other groups, main-line Sherqawa maintain houses in their respective quarters to substantiate their identity, rather than locate themselves wherever there is satisfactory housing, as members of other descent groups tend increasingly to do.

Even in these two descent groups, most Sherqawa do not know in detail the wealth of genealogical resources available to them, although all parts of the genealogy described below are known by them to exist and can be activated when there are reasons to stress or to forge specific links. Significantly, it is the most influential Sherqawa who possess the most elaborate knowledge of these genealogies and capacity to use them to further their interests. This social distribution of knowledge has already been described in the context of rural Morocco (Ch. 4). For all but certain highly educated Sherqawa, these genealogies are accepted in their entirety as being historically valid. They unquestionably are, in the sense that for many they constitute history as locally understood. Other Sherqawa discriminate between those sections of the genealogy which are corroborated by written historical accounts and are relatively fixed—such as the succession of Sherqawi lords (Fig. 2)[105]—and other elements of the genealogy, such as the links between Sidi ‘Umar in the seventh century and Sidi Mhammed Sherqi in the sixteenth or the links of descent from one of the nonmain-line sons of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. The act of writing and formally recording parts of the genealogy renders them immutable, while the other, unwritten claims are tacitly recognized by the Sherqawi elite as mutable.

The various sections of the genealogy presented below do not quite add up to a composite whole, since each of its components tends to be used as the ideology for certain types of social relations. Even over the last forty years, there have been considerable shifts in how they have been elaborated. For this reason I think it important to specify as carefully as possible the social contexts in which they are elaborated.

*** “Closeness” with ‘Umar: The Proto-Sherqawa

The claimed patrilineal link between Sidi Mhammed Sherqi and ‘Umar ben 1-Khattab is not known in any detail to the great majority of the Sherqawa and their clients. Nor is there any concern to know it, since there is no active contest of the claim and no current use to which this part of the genealogy is put. The fact that Sherqawa have for generations intermarried with descendants of the Prophet on the basis of such descent is considered sufficient evidence of such a link. Claims to descent from ‘Umar have been subject to skepticism by Moroccan religious scholars for centuries, an indication that the current skepticism of educated Moroccans about such claims is not novel.

In one elite account of the links of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi with

‘Umar (Fig. 10) there are twenty-two intervening ancestors. Alternate generation naming is a very common feature of Moroccan genealogies; so the repetition of names in this genealogy is to be expected. However, no biographical information is attached to any of the first fourteen descendants of ‘Umar, those who presumably remained in Arabia.

There are several uses which the Sherqawa make—or, more accurately, made—of the remainder of the genealogy, depicting Sidi Mhammed Sherqi’s ancestors who lived in Morocco. One is purportedly to document their association with Morocco’s reigning dynasties. The other is to relate the Sherqawa to some of their tribal clients. Thus, Sidi ‘Abdallah (10–1) is said to have left the port of Yanbu‘ in Arabia at an unspecified time for the Tafilalt region of southern Morocco. This region is important as the birthplace of the two major Moroccan dynasties that claim descent from the Prophet Muhammed, the Sa‘adi and the ‘Alawi. Since more concrete examples of such ties can be found at later periods and in the present, these earlier assertions of association with the shorfa dynasties are generally offered in a tentative fashion and are not pressed if skepticism is raised about them.

There is a third use for this part of the Sherqawi genealogy. As recently as forty years ago, a claim of descent from a proto-Sherqawi was a means of asserting a tie of “closeness” between Sherqawi marabouts and their clients without giving the clients the status of mara- boutic descent. Unfortunately, the lack of more detailed contextual information of how these claims to “closeness” were asserted makes it difficult to assess their significance with any precision. In the period of my fieldwork, several Sherqawa and some of the tribal elite still claimed a fqir status for their tribes without being able to specify the basis of this claim. In the 1930’s, in contrast, Claude Ecorcheville elicited an elaborate schema of such links from Sherqawi notables (Fig. 11). Since the number of Sherqawi clients has contracted in recent years and maraboutic ties have been significantly downgraded and divested of political implications, there is currently less interest attached to elaborating such links. In Ecorcheville’s tribal version, Sidi Mhammed Sherqi’s ancestors are part of the twelfth-century Bni Jabir of western Morocco.[106] I have heard no one

carry this claim to its logical conclusion and assert that all the tribes of western Morocco descended from ‘Umar are foqra like the Sherqawa. In particular, neither the Sherqawa nor the tribal elite suggest that the assertion of descent from ‘Umar enabled such tribes to take women homog- amously from Sherqawi foqra or from shorfa. This conceptual ambiguity in the use of the term foqra does not constitute any perplexity for informants. Clearly, the claim of fqir status has two components, patrilineal descent from ‘Umar and, as shall be described, mystical ties with Muhammed.

‘Umar ben 1-Khattab d. 644

Sidi ‘Abdallah

Sidi ‘Umar

Sidi Hilal

Sidi Mirdas

Sidi Muhammed

Sidi Hmed

Sidi Musa

Sidi ‘Umar I Sidi Fadel

Sidi Ya‘qub

Sid es-Sumayr . I .

Sid es-Sliman

Sidi Muhammed

. Sidi ‘Abd l-‘Aziz

Arrival in Morocco

1. Sidi ʻAbdallah

Sid es-Seʻid

2. Sidi Hmama

3. Sidi Muhammed 1-Mehdi

4. Sidi Hammu

5. Sidi ʻUmar

6. Sidi Muhammed Zaʻari

7. Sidi bel Gasem

2–1. Sidi Mhammed Sherqi d. 1601

Figure 10.

Descent from ʻUmar. (Based on Ecorcheville 1958.)

Sidi Hmama (10–2) (Wlad Hmama, Shawya)

Sidi Muhammed el-Mehdi (10–3)

Sidi Smayr Sidi Bhar

(Bni Smir, Werdigha) (Werdigha)

<right>

Sidi Smayn Sidi Bettah (Btahta, Tafilalt)

</right>

Sidi Hammu (10–4)

Wlad Bhar es-Sghir Wlad Bhar le-Kbir Sma‘la Bni ‘Amir Bni Zemmur Sidi Mhammed Sherqi (2–1)

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-18.png][Figure 11. Ancestors of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. (Based on Ecor chenille 1938.)]]

It is a mistake, I think, to assume that these genealogies are intended to be rigorously scrutinized. Each serves as a conceptual grid, parts of which can be utilized to construct or legitimate contemporarily significant social relationships. What is important is that there are available certain nodes on the genealogies through which certain relationships can be asserted. These are not random, of course, yet evidence a considerable flexibility. Many of the Sherqawa represented in the various genealogies have shrines or tombs on the upper Tadla Plain, although the exact identity of such marabouts is often ambiguous. For instance, informants are uncertain as to which represent ancestors or brothers of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. These ambiguities mean that Sherqawa and tribesmen can convincingly manipulate the genealogies to provide meaningful representations of contemporary social realities. The physical presence of shrines of certain Sherqawa (or proto-Sherqawa) who figure in these genealogies, even if only vaguely perceived by many tribesmen, anchors the Sherqawa securely in the geographical and social morphology of the region under their influence.

Thus, in Figures 10 and 11, Sidi Hmama (10–2) is claimed as the ancestor of the tribe in Shawya (located near the town of Ben Hmed) which bears his name. Sidi Muhammed el-Mehdi (10–3), whose tomb is in the midst of a public garden constructed by the French at Wad Zem, is not currently connected with any tribal group. In the 1930’s, however, individuals claiming descent from him attempted to initiate collective pilgrimages from the surrounding tribes (Ecorcheville 1938). Had this attempt been successful, then it is likely that elaborate genealogical schema would have been produced and accepted to link this marabout to his clients. The proof of “early” relations is the pattern of existing or potential social relations.

The biographical glosses associated with the sons of Sidi Muhammed el-Medhi confirm this suggestion. Sidi Bettah is said to have remained in Tafilalt, while Sidi Smayn was “childless.” In collecting contemporary kinship data, childlessness is attributed equally to persons without descendants and those whose descendants are unknown. In the latter case the term also implies that no one presently claims relationships through a particular person. Sidi Smayr and Sidi Bhar are eponymous ancestors for tribal groups that are Sherqawi clients located about forty kilometers to the northwest of Boujad. Finally, Sidi Hammu (10–4) and his grandson, Sidi Muhammed Za‘ari (10–6), have tombs in Boujad’s rural hinterland. The former is on the Wad Bu Gerrum (Tashelhit dialect, “Stream of the Marabouts”) ; the latter on Wad Tashraft (Tashelhit, “Stream of the Shorfa”). No known tombs represent the remaining persons who figure in this part of the Sherqawi

genealogy.

Claims of descent from one of the eight brothers of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi are used much in the same way as claims of descent from one of the proto-Sherqawa. These eight are Sidi ʻAli Filali, Sidi ʻAbd er-Rahman. Sidi 1-Werdi, Sidi ʻAbd en-Nebi, Sid et-Tunsi, Sid es-Seʻid, Sidi ʻAbd l-ʻAziz, and Sidi ʻAli (or Muhammed) Smuni. One of these, Sidi ʻAbd en-Nebi, has a shrine adjacent to that of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Another two, Sidi ʻAbd l-ʻAziz and Sidi ʻAbd er-Rahman, have shrines near Wad Zem. One, Sid es-Seʻid, has a shrine in Tetouan. Three of these brothers (Sidi ʻAbd l-ʻAziz, Sidi ʻAli Smuni, and Sidi ʻAbd en-Nebi, are claimed as eponymous ancestors of tribes in the Shawya that are clients of the Sherqawa. Not all informants agree on the number of brothers attributed to Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Some are considered by different informants to be merely “close” to him, his brothers, or possibly his ancestors. Informants often do not consider the exact relationship to be as important as the fact that a relationship exists. Like descent from an ancestor of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, the genealogical grid provided by the shaykh’s brothers has the potential for establishing new links between marabouts and clients. Thus in the 1930’s, when there was still considerable maraboutic activity, some tribesmen from Wlad Seʻid (Shawya) claimed descent from Sidi ʻAbd l-ʻAziz and unsuccessfully tried to establish his tomb near Wad Zem as a pilgrimage center (Ecorcheville 1938:36).[107] In the past, such descent was also frequently claimed by groups of inhabitants of Sherqawi estates (ʻazib-s) (Eickelman 1972–1973:52—53). There is no indication, however, of whether such a status provided individuals with prerogatives beyond those enjoyed by the other inhabitants of the estates.

Claimed descent from a brother of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi can also be used as a means of legitimating social honor. Currently a family of non-Sherqawi merchants who have supplied prominent local leaders of the nationalist movement claim descent from Sidi ʻAli Smuni. This reputed brother of the shaykh has no shrine in Boujad, although a quarter (6–20) founded in the 1930’s bears his name in addition to the now more common name Khaluqiyin. His claimed descendants maintain that Sidi ʻAli, in contrast to Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, was like themselves a “progressive,” thus making descent from him more significant (although they admit, less known) than descent from Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. For the benefit of outsiders, such as myself, they reasoned that, since they were descendants of ʻUmar and of a brother of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, they also were Sherqawa. Sherqawa point out that the family in question is of fairly recent tribal origin and that in any case no one else claims such descent. This latter argument is reminiscent of that used by al-Qadiri in the seventeenth century to question the Sherqawi claim of descent from ʻUmar. Seen sociologically, the claim of such descent has the advantage of avoiding a direct threat to the material rights of direct descendants of the shaykh.

*** The Mystical Heritage

Until the 1930’s, particularly in rural Morocco, a traditionally educated person was assumed to know something of the religious sciences (ʻulum^ sg., “Urn) and of the connections which historically existed among marabouts with mystical knowledge (al-asrar., lit., “the secrets”). Such knowledge legitimated their claims to high status in the eyes of others. At present, only the elderly know such ties with any detail. Since the ascendancy of the reformist and nationalist movements in the 1930’s, specific awareness of this body of knowledge has ceased to be part of the intellectual baggage of the younger elite.

The particular name-chains (silsila-s) through which mystical knowledge is acquired once were of vital political significance, as in the sixteenth-century struggles between marabouts supporting the Ottomans in Algeria (see Ch. 1). Knowledge of such chains continued to be significant through the 1930's, at least as a means of social legitimation of mystical insight.

Most Sherqawa and tribesmen know these chains of legitimation only through the myths and legends associated with the maraboutic tombs and shrines that dot the landscape. For instance, Sidi Mhammed Sherqi is linked in popular myths with the marabout Sidi Hmed bel Gasem, whose shrine and descendants are in Bni Mellal. In the popular conception of "closeness," this physical propinquity assumes more weight than the written record, known only to a few, which states that the two marabouts studied together (Qadiri 1913: 129). But this interlocking of written sources, known to exist even by tribesmen, with more popular accounts of these marabouts serves to reinforce the popular acceptance of the latter.

These mystical ties, like all others in society, are represented as dyadic relationships. Some of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi's mystic links with the Prophet are through his father, Sidi bel Gasem (10–7). His shrine is not far from Qasba Tadla, on the southern bank of the Umm er-Rbi' River. On the opposite bank is the shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi's mother, Laila Rahma.[108] Sidi bel Gasem is said to have studied religious sciences and mysticism with 'Abd l-'Aziz et-Tebba (d. 1508), one of the fountainheads of the pro-Moroccan mystic tradition mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2.

Most of the major marabouts of western Morocco are popularly considered to follow the teachings of Shaykh et-Tebba. Their shrines form a line along the piedmont between the Atlas Mountains and the western plains. Besides Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, these disciples include Sidi 'Abdallah ben Dawd esh-Shawi, whose shrine is at Ksiba (originally said to be from Wlad Bu Ziri in Shawya); Sidi 'Ali u Brahim and his disciples, whose shrines and clientele are in the Bzu region, near Sraghna; and Sidi Rehhal, who founded a religious lodge east of Marrakesh which bears his name. All of these marabouts are mentioned in traditional historical accounts and figure in popular myths and legends as mutually confirming and acquiring each other's baraka. One myth, for instance, describes Laila Rahma as childless until, unaided by her husband, she took a bull as an offering to 'Ali u Brahim. Subsequently she gave birth to Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Later, when she again encountered 'Ali u Brahim, the infant Sidi Mhammed Sherqi sucked nine of the ten toes of Sidi 'Ali while he was asleep and thus acquired much of his baraka.

One distinct facet of the heroic age of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi as popularly represented is the tendency of mystic insight to flow freely among those who sought it, regardless of their other bonds. Later, such insight is seen to be preferentially (but never exclusively) transmitted along the lines of patrilineal descent. The term secret of the ancestors (sirr l-aslaf) applies mostly to the transmission of baraka after this heroic age, not before. (Traditional educated opinion does not make the synthesis of transmission of knowledge through mystical ties and through genealogical descent.) Sidi Mhammed 1-Ma'ti (2–4), the third lordly successor of the founding marabout, is buried just outside Marrakesh in the same shrine as one of his Sufi masters, Brahim Tamili (Ecorcheville 1938:38). Such physical propinquity is often taken as evidence of the transmission of baraka between two marabouts.

*** Descendants of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi

The Sherqawa proper are those who claim direct descent from Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Because such claims involve substantial material rights and social honor, they are more sharply defined and contested than those previously discussed. Still there is considerable variation among the Sherqawa proper as to how their identity is conceived. Even among the Sherqawa there is a shifting of claimed ancestors similar to the pattern described earlier for the residents of the Qsayra quarter. This is particularly apparent in the changing relationship between descent groups and enshrined marabouts. As mentioned above, there are presently eight Sherqawi descent groups in Boujad, but a larger number of Sherqawi ancestors are available to serve as points of differentiation. Several other descent groups are vaguely recognized or thought to exist elsewhere. Thus, there were no recognized descendants of Sid et-Tanje, a son of Boujad's founding marabout who has a tomb in Boujad, until a group of roughly one hundred persons living in Fes claimed a proportionate share of offerings to the Sherqawa in the late 1920's. According to one Sherqawi notary, this claim was supported by the sultan, perhaps to irritate certain Sherqawa.[109] The annual share of these claimants was in principle forwarded to Fes by the qaid of Boujad until independence in 1956. With independence it became impolitic to press such claims, which seem to have disappeared with the transfer of power. Older Sherqawa are aware of the earlier existence of this group; younger Sherqawa are not. Similarly, the Sherqawa in Boujad recognized the existence of descendants of Sid ed-Deqqaq and Sid 1-Harti in the Shawya (Ecorcheville 1938) and of Sid 1-Malki among the Bni Hasan in the Gharb (Gouvion and Gouvion 1939). Of these three marabouts, only Sid 1-Harti has a tomb in Boujad, although all three are mentioned in myths. Currently, even older Sherqawa are unaware of any descendants of these three marabouts. No major community of Sherqawa is currently known to exist outside of Boujad, although there were many such groups in the late nineteenth century.

Principal Locations of Claimed Descendants

| — Sidi 'Abd 1-Qader (2–2) | Qadiriyin quarter (6–8) |

| — Sid 1-Mursli | Mursiliyin quarter (see Ch. 4, n. 2) |

| — Sid 1-Ghazwani | Ghazawna quarter (6–6); Shawya |

| — Sid 1-Meknasi | Mkansa quarter (6–3); Shawya |

| — Sidi 'Abd es-Slam | Old Sellamiyin quarter (6–4) |

| — Sidi 'Allal | 'Allaliyin quarter (6–7) |

| Sidi 'Abd 1-Khaleq (2–3) | Zawya (6–2) and 'Arbawi (6–1) quarters |

| Sidi Mhammed Sherqi | ---------- |

| — Sid 1-Harti | Shawya |

| — Sid et-Tanje | Fes |

| — Sid ed-Deqqaq | Shawya |

| — Sid et-Tunsi | — |

| — Sid 1-Malki | — |

| —Laila Hniyya | — |

| Laila Mina | _ |

Figure 12.

Sons and daughters of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi.

Each major descent group within the Sherqawa has shrines of its key ancestors associated with it, although the correlation is not exact. Two of the shaykh's twelve sons, Sid 1-Mursli and Sidi ʻAbd 1-Qader, have shrines in the same compound which houses that of their father. Five others, Sidi ʻAbd es-Slam, Sid 1-Ghazwani, Sid 1-Meknasi, Sid 1-Harti, and Sid et-Tanje, are grouped on a promontory just outside Boujad.[110] Only the ʻArbawi and Zawya quarters currently have shrines within them.

The principal ʻArbawi shrines are those of leading Sherqawi lords: Sidi Mhammed 1-Maʻti (2–4), Sidi Saleh (2–5), Sid 1-Maʻti (2–6), and Sid l-ʻArbi (2–7). All of these are elaborate, ornate structures dating from the preprotectorate era. Two of them also have adjoining mosques. These shrines receive steady flows of donations, although not so large as those offered at the shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Several also receive the collective visits of tribal groups during the fall festival, although covenants with the Sherqawa are renewed only at the main shrine.

The most significant of these shrines is that of Sid 1-Maʻti (d. 1766) (2–6). This marabout is the only Sherqawi to have founded a religious brotherhood (tariqa) that acquired as adherents a number of townsmen. Members of the brotherhood and subsidiary lodges are found in Bni Mellal, Qasba Tadla, Wad Zem, Fqih ben Saleh, Rabat, and Casablanca. One also was located at Khnifra, in the Middle Atlas Mountains, according to Francois Berger (1929:47).[111] However, no Sherqawa are presently aware of the existence of this lodge or of when it disappeared. In the past, tribesmen also swore alliances between groups over Sid 1-Maʻti's sepulcher (see Ch. 4). As with the other shrines in the ʻArbawi quarter, no sacrifices are permitted, although each shrine has a box (senduq) in which offerings are placed. These go entirely for the upkeep of the shrines and are not distributed to descendants.

The shrines located in the Zawya quarter all date from the protectorate: those of Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed (2–10), Sid 1-Hajj ʻAbd 1-Qader (2–14), and Sidi ben Dawd (2–15). In contrast with those of the ʻArbawi quarter, these are all modest structures which are locked most of the time and receive only rare visits from pilgrims.

Although common descent from these marabouts gives their descendants certain rights and prerogatives, it would be wrong to conclude that even with respect to their shared rights they act collectively. The critical factor is how individual members of these descent groups view such rights in relation to their overall interests.

Sherqawa claim there are two activities that represent their collective identity: (a) formal visits paid by representatives of each descent group to Boujad's prayer-leader (imam), presently a non- Sherqawi, on major feast days and (b) shares (hdqq-s) in the offerings made at the shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi.

Each Sherqawi descent group has a flag, which is usually draped over the tomb of the group's ancestor or kept in custody by a group member. On feast days each group has a representative who carries the flag of their common ancestor to the house of the imam. There they breakfast prior to the public prayer and then accompany the imam to the prayer-ground or mosque. Similar emblems are kept by each of the "respectable" religious brotherhoods present in Boujad, the Kittaniya, Tijaniya, Qadiriya, and Nasiriya. Their representatives also accompany the imam^ so participation in this ceremony does not in itself distinguish the Sherqawa from other groups, although only the Sherqawa participated in it prior to the protectorate.

In the past, however, this ceremony was more distinctive, for the lord of the Sherqawa was also the imam. This meant that he was the symbolic leader both of the Sherqawa and of the Muslim community as locally represented. In principle, there is only one prayer-leader in each town for the major Islamic feasts. He offers a sacrifice of a sheep at the mosque or prayer-ground (jnsalla) before the assembled community. After the communal sacrifice, others are made in individual households. Since the Sherqawa had in effect two lords (sids) after the split of the zawya in 1901, both served as imams on feast days and sacrificed on behalf of the assembled community for at least part of the period of the protectorate—at least until the late 1930's. The "masters of the flags" (mwalin l-allama) of the Sherqawi descent groups and religious brotherhoods paid visits to both. Eventually reformist pressure and a changing ideological climate among Boujad's bourgeoisie brought a halt to this de facto dual zmzzm-ship. Informants are now reluctant to speak of this practice because it is in such open contradiction to current understandings of Islamic conduct.

At first sight, the present system by which the shares (haqqs) of the revenues of the main shrine are allocated appears to offer the sharpest delineation of Sherqawa from non-Sherqawa. Each patrilineal descendant of the shaykh, male or female, is supposed to receive an equal share. This system of distribution is in contrast to the rules of Islamic inheritance, which provide differential shares for men and women for varying degrees of relation. There is a register of all those entitled to a share of the shrine offerings. In 1969, it listed 5,582 shareholders, clearly not all of the living descendants of the founding marabout, especially given the multiple wives and concubines of his key descendants. In formal terms, each of the eight major Sherqawi descent groups has a spokesman (mqadderri). He looks after the shares of those in his groups, keeps track of who is entitled to them, and participates in the administration of the shrine. [112] These spokesmen form a council (jma'a) , which is supposed to decide on the distribution of the offerings after deducting expenses for the maintenance of the shrine and salaries for certain of its employees, not all of whom are Sherqawa. One of the major decisions of this council in recent years has been to construct a hostel for pilgrims adjoining the shrine. They also offered a lavish reception for the king when he visited Boujad in the mid-1960's. In practice, this council is joined by prominent Sherqawa, who often have a decisive influence on the proceedings and who occasionally overshadow its formal members. Under the protectorate, the council was effectively controlled by the Sherqawi qaid, but it presently acts with more autonomy.

The utility of rights to the offerings as a means of identifying Sherqawa dissolves upon closer examination. The present formal system of allocations was the result of administrative intervention early in the protectorate. Prior to 1912, no formal council managed these offerings. Their distribution was made daily on an informal basis to descendants of the marabout and anyone else who happened to be present. Since such offerings were considered alms, wealthier Sherqawa made no claim upon them. In practice, only the nonlordly descent groups laid claim to them. Decisions relative to the upkeep of the shrine were made by the lords. Since they received substantial offerings directly from their regular clients and other pilgrims, the cost of maintaining the shrine constituted no major burden upon them.

Shortly after the French set up an administrative post in Boujad in 1913, this arrangement broke down. One of the first acts of the French was to allot tax and corvee obligations by quarters. For these purposes, spokesmen for the two rival main-line descent groups, each with their separate quarter, claimed to the French that they really were one quarter.

The other six Sherqawi descent groups, which more than today clustered in separate quarters, protested this decision. They were led by a Sherqawi of the Mkansa descent group/quarter, who later became one of the first government shaykh-s for Boujad, in part because he came to the attention of the French during this dispute. The leaders of the two lordly descent groups—the qaid, Sid 1-Hajj ʻAbd 1-Qader (2–14), and the qadi. Sidi ʻAbdallah ben l-ʻArbi (2–13) — made a counterproposal. They would acquiesce to the demand that their quarters be considered separate for the purposes of corvee and taxation, on condition that henceforth each member of their descent groups would receive his proportionate share of the offerings at the main shrine. This significantly reduced the allocations to members of the other descent groups.

The dispute was quickly carried to Rabat, where two crucial decisions were made. First, it was decided that offerings to a mara- boutic shrine were not governed by Islamic law and instead should be divided in equal shares among all living patrilineal descendants of the marabout. Second, to determine who these were and to distribute the offerings, a spokesman (mqaddem) was designated for each descent group. Offerings were to be distributed annually after deducting the upkeep of the shrine.[113]

An unintended consequence of this formalization of descent-group rights and obligations has been to render apparent to the Sherqawa discrepancies between their formal ideology, according to which they include all living descendants of the marabout, and the reality, which is that they are limited to a considerably smaller number who actually claim this descent, primarily members of local descent groups in Boujad itself. Moreover, no Sherqawa entitled to share in the distribution of the offerings are under the illusion that the formal spokesmen act in their collective interest. “In the end,” one of them said to me, “each of us is his own spokesman” (koll wahed mqaddem da rasu). Consequently the formal overseers are complemented by “shadows” who meet with them whenever matters of shrine upkeep or revenues are discussed. Among these “shadows” are several notaries as well as other Sherqawa who claim to represent by proxy a certain number of shares. Many solicit the shares of Sherqawa who, because of antimaraboutic scruples or personal wealth, allow less affluent kinsmen to collect in their name.

In sum, the right to a share of the offerings at the principal shrine, like all other

prerogatives claimed by the Sherqawa, exists in so far as it is defined and defended in social action. Rights held in common do not necessarily imply corporate activities any more than holding a formal office in itself legitimates authority in a given sphere of activity. Legitimacy is not sharply defined in traditional Moroccan society. Thus, in some circumstances the exercise of one's formal right to a share of the offerings at Sidi Mhammed Sherqi's shrine, or even the implicit assignation of it by proxy to another Sherqawi, can result in a diminution of social honor. Now as in the past, the distinction is blurred between rights or privileges abstractly held and their actual exercise.

*** Marriage Patterns

Another marker of Sherqawi identity is the maintenance of a pattern of hypergamous marriage with commoners and homogamy between themselves and descendants of the Prophet.[114] Boujadi-s and other Moroccans say that descendants of the Prophet (shorfa) and of 'Umar (faqra) constitute one "field" (badiya) for marriage. Commoners constitute another. This conception is accepted by all elements of society. One commoner (a tailor) said: "How can I marry a descendant of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi or the Prophet? If I get mad at my wife, I want to beat her. Can I beat a descendant of the Prophet or Sidi Mhammed Sherqi? Do I want their curse upon me?"

It is also popularly believed that the children of such marriages (i.e., of male commoners with female descendants of the Prophet or 'Umar) die soon after birth. Regardless of their other qualities, descendants of the Prophet and 'Umar possess a substance which makes them stand apart from those who do not possess it.

When expressing their ideas about marriage, neither Sherqawa nor commoners emphasize the hypergamous pattern described above. Instead, they explain their preference for marriage to those who are "close to us" (qrib Una). "Closeness," as I have emphasized throughout this study, has multiple dimensions, only one of which involves kinship. Frequently, Sherqawa claim that they are distinguished from commoners by their preference for marriage among themselves, but this is not borne out in practice (see Table 6). For instance, Sherqawi genealogies indicate that the most prominent household units have the highest rate of marriage to non-Sherqawa. This is not surprising, since marriage is one means of cementing political relations between individuals and groups. As Table 6 indicates, the rates of marriage to claimed kinsmen are roughly equal for both Sherqawa (48 percent) and rural commoners (50 percent).[115] This table should not be assumed to be an indication of the "actual" relations existing between marriage partners. As I have indicated in earlier contexts, criteria for kinship vary greatly.

The first column of Table 6 indicates the proportion of bent 'amm marriages—marriages between a man and his father's brother's daughter (or other woman so designated)—for each group specified. This type of marriage is often claimed to be a preferential one in Arab society, although informants cite as many proverbs and justifications against it as for it. My table represents informants' claims for such marriages, whether or not they could demonstrate with precision that the marriage was between paternal cousins. The actual relation of the wife to the husband often is that of father's father's brother's daughter, a matrilateral link, or one in which the genealogical tie is tenuous or undemonstrable.

How asserted genealogical links are manipulated depends on the total context of social relations between contracting parties, not just a narrow range of kinship considerations. One advantage of claiming a bent ‘amm relation is that the groom’s household can offer a smaller bridewealth than otherwise would be possible. The offering of a smaller bridewealth due to claims of a bent ‘amm relation is particularly widespread among tribesmen and among rural immigrants to Boujad, among whom written marriage contracts are less often concluded because of the notarial fee levied on written agreements registered with the Islamic court and the reluctance of tribesmen to reveal their financial resources to notaries, whom they mistrust, often with justification.[116] The “closeness” of a bent ‘amm relation generally is claimed between neighbors in the same or adjacent ddwwar-s. In town, such “closeness” often emerges from (or fuses with) relations of residential propinquity, a shared craft or trade by the two heads of households, or similar ties.

Table 6.

Marriage patterns of Sherqawa and commoners

| Bent ‘Amm Marriages (N) (%) | Marriages to Other Claimed Kinsmen | Marriages to Non-Kin |

| (N) | (%) | (N) | (%) |

| Sherqawa (N = 303) | 92 30 | 55 | 18 | 156 | 51 |

| Town-born commoners |

| (N = 124) | 17 14 | ^a | ^a | ^a | ^a |

| Rural commoners |

| (N = 234) | 51 22 | 65 | 28 | 118 | 50 |

Note-. Because of rounding off of decimals, percentages do not always total 100%.

^a A break-down for town-born commoners is not available. There were 107 town-born commoners who had non-bent ‘amm marriages (86% of all town-born commoners).

The second column of Table 6 indicates marriages designated by informants as between relatives, but for which the genealogical link was not always clearly specified. Among the Sherqawa of Boujad, this generally meant marriage to a Sherqawi outside one’s own immediate quarter or descent group, as when an ‘Arbawi Sherqawi married a person who resided in Ghazawna quarter (6–6) and claimed descent from Sid 1-Ghazwani. Since the ‘Arbawi is the more prestigious descent group of the two, the span and (to a certain extent) the depth of exact genealogical knowledge of a person from that descent group are usually much greater than those of one from Ghazawna. The latter’s identity as a Sherqawi depends more upon being “known” as one to other Sherqawa than upon exact genealogical reckoning. Neither Sherqawi would be able to demonstrate specific genealogical links with

the other. Thus, even among the Sherqawa of Boujad, there is room for ambiguity in identifying who are descendants of the founding marabout.

Hence the only significant difference which remains between commoners and Sherqawa is that of hypergamous marriage. Of the 303 Sherqawi marriages analyzed, there were only 25 exceptions to the pattern of Sherqawi women not marrying commoners. Twenty- one of these cases were of women no longer living in Boujad who did not maintain close ties with kinsmen in the town. Outside of Boujad, they had more latitude of personal identity. Significantly, many of these cases involved second marriages, the first having been with Sherqawa. Of the remaining 4 cases in Boujad itself, the activities of two of the husbands made them more or less the equals of Sherqawa. One was a Qur'anic teacher; the other had for many years collected offerings at the main Sherqawi shrine. The other 2 marriages both involved women of the non-main-line descent groups.

*** The Dynamics of Social Identity

The analysis of Sherqawi identity is important not only for an understanding of maraboutism but also for what it reveals of the dynamics of Moroccan social structure. The problem of discerning the constituent units of North African society has already been discussed in earlier chapters. Maraboutic descent groups show the same flexible patterns of boundary and identity as do urban quarters and rural social organization, the two examples that were earlier discussed at length. It is not the actual personal or group identities existing at any given moment that are the key to understanding Moroccan social structure, but the forces at work in any given situation. These include both a shared consciousness of the nature of social reality and the actual shape which social action takes. Under the impact of new conditions, the concepts through which Moroccans understand the social order, like those of other societies, themselves undergo transformations. Ordinarily, Moroccans are not aware of these transformations in how they perceive social action. Here the "native" conception of the social order and the anthropologist's analysis of it necessarily diverge.

Sherqawi identity is a concrete manifestation of Moroccan symbolizations of the kinds of connections that can exist between persons and the ways in which these connections can be manipulated. It would be misleading to imply that Sherqawi identity is open to anyone who simply strives to acquire it. A combination of attributes, including residence, descent, marriage patterns, political and economic alliances, and other aspects of comportment make one "known" as a Sherqawi. Most Sherqawa are known to each other through face-to-face relationships, so that acquiring prominence on the basis of an assumed Sherqawi identity (i.e., one that has not previously been maintained) is quite difficult. But asserting a marginal identity as a Sherqawi, even in a "company town," such as Boujad, is not uncommon. Some persons are motivated to do so for the social honor that such a claim implies, at least to other non-Sherqawa. Others pose as Sherqawi "visitors" during the fall festival for financial gain. Only in certain contexts do at least certain Sherqawa make public issue of the boundaries of their identity.

Since Sherqawi identity is merely a specialized case of the more general issue of the nature of social identity in Morocco, I think it useful to present graphically my conception of how the cultural basis of Moroccan identity contrasts with alternative sociological notions. Figure 13 is a standard, downward-branching model of social relations and hence requires only a brief explanation. The irregular but firmly-bounded shapes at the bottom of the diagram represent actually existing groups. According to this model of society, these

groups see their relations almost entirely through the various levels of patrilineal ancestors represented by the lines above the local groups.

Figure 14 is, I think, a closer approximation of how the Sherqawa conceive of their own social identity.[117] The key points in the diagram are the four lower triangles, representing living or deceased men of prominence to whom clusters of persons claim ties through patrilineal descent, matrilateral or affinal ties, friendship, clientship, and residential propinquity. It is from claimed ties with such prominent persons that Moroccans usually begin to depict the individuals to whom they are “close” (H. Geertz 1974:45–47). The boundaries of these clusters are not sharply defined, signifying the ability of at least some persons to shift the components of their identity. The four lines of ascending

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-2.png][Figure 13. A segmentary model of social relations.]]

triangles indicate immediately preceding generations. These lines, A-D, are not connected on the diagram. To indicate the “closeness” of present-day clusters, Moroccans consider such ancestors to be brothers or construct some other plausible ties between them. When combined in use with the name-chains that I have discussed in this chapter, I think this model reasonably portrays how relations are conceived among the various Sherqawi descent groups (or, sociologically speaking, descent categories) in Boujad. The same basic model presented in Figure 14 can also be used to portray ideas of “closeness” in other Moroccan contexts (see H. Geertz 1974).

As I indicated in my discussion of “closeness” in rural and urban settings in Chapter 4, the key factor from a Moroccan point of view is to consider the gains of elaborating certain sets of ties instead of others. How these appraisals shift over time can be seen by returning to a specific consideration of the Sherqawa.

The latitude that Sherqawa have in asserting their own identity has enlarged as their firm identification with maraboutism has begun to crack. That separation has recently been willed by at least some of them. A century ago, the Sherqawa actively maintained their identity as a maraboutic descent group. Much more than today, the life-chances of individual Sherqawa and their clients depended on claims of “closeness” to a living Sherqawi lord. Both clients and other Sherqawa contracted ties of obligation (haqq) to marabouts and valued these ties much more than at present. Being a marabout was a desirable quality. Whatever their differences and rivalries, Sherqawa able to do so sought to achieve maraboutic reputations. Clients of marabouts valued association with such persons. Under present conditions, the political and economic significance of marabouts is decidedly more limited; active attempts to maintain a maraboutic reputation carry a highly negative value among educated Moroccans. The remaining clients of marabouts, still a majority of rural Moroccans, have downgraded their ties with them. Ties of obligation with marabouts, like all other social ties, are continuously revalorized in the light of current social realities.

A B C D

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-moroccan-islam-1.png][Figure 14. A Moroccan conception of

“closeness ”]]

“Sherqawiness,” what the Sherqawa assert their identity to be, has consequently undergone modifications. Sherqawi identity is still primarily associated with persons of prominence in the two main-line descent groups. Many Sherqawa now play down their identity with maraboutic ideology or assert that maraboutism constitutes only a residual component of their identity, maintained only by those ignorant of the “true” Islam. Popularly, especially among tribesmen, the identity of the Sherqawa with maraboutism still holds, so that material prosperity and largesse to pilgrims are direct measures of God’s grace. As one tribesman said, “You get greasy doughnuts from the Ghazawna [Sherqawa] but cous-cous from the ‘Arbawa. Of course the ‘Arbawa have more baraka\” In towns, the maraboutic basis for Sherqawi prominence no longer holds, although no sharp break has occurred with the past. The “religious” component of Sherqawi prestige is simply being redefined. For example, a wealthy merchant of the Ghazawna Sherqawa, now in his fifties, is one of the few Sherqawa to live outside of the medina in Boujad. He is opposed to maraboutism and has relinquished his right to a share in the offerings at the main shrine. To indicate his “progressive” orientation, he invites the men of his quarter to gather at his house each Friday afternoon, after mosque, to read with him the Qur’an and pious recitations (hizb-s) written by his ancestor, Sid 1-Ma‘ti (2–6). He emphasizes in his conduct what he considers to be the “proper” Sherqawi tradition, that of serving for centuries as exemplars of Muslim conduct and guardians of a scripturalist Islam. Despite this reformist orientation, many neighbors interpret his conduct in terms of his maraboutic antecedents. For this reason, not for the recitation of pious texts for their own sake, they regard the Friday meetings with him as particularly beneficial. Many other Sherqawa have made similar reinterpretations of their tradition. Even those who continue to engage actively in maraboutic activities often refer to them apologetically, at least to ethnographers, as a “trade” just like any other.

The contracting social bases of marabouts have had an impact on the ideology of maraboutism. Even the clients of marabouts are no longer able to take belief in them largely for granted. They are aware much more sharply than in the past that there are other conceptions of Islam in which there is no room for marabouts. This fragmentation of religious ideology and its confinement to a clearly defined sphere are by no means unique to Morocco. The fact that such a shift has occurred is less interesting sociologically than an analysis of how it took place. My concluding chapter is intended less as a microhistory of this transformation than as an attempt to discern temporal patterns in social and cultural change. The last three chapters have emphasized the symbolism of the social order as perceived by Moroccans. To a certain extent, Moroccan conceptions of the social order and the anthropologist’s analysis of it necessarily overlap. This convergence, however, can never be complete. The symbolic categories employed by Moroccans define the nature of the social order and serve as guides to the exigencies of social comportment. As I have indicated, Moroccans are not ordinarily conscious of the temporal shifts in these categories or in the elements of social reality which they define. Nor are Moroccans ordinarily concerned with comparing their own symbolic categories with those which exist in other societies or in comparing their understanding of Islam with that of Muslims elsewhere. The anthropologist is interested in such comparative, analytical activities, or at least in describing conceptions of the social order and comportment in it in such a way that such comparison is implicit.

** 8. From Center to Periphery: The Fragmentation of Maraboutism

At the risk of shocking sociologists, I should be inclined to say that it is their job to render social or historical content more intelligible than it was in the experience of those who lived it. All sociology is reconstruction that aspires to confer intelligibility on human existences which, like all human existences, are confused and obscure. (Aron 1970: 245)

*** Social Change: Periodization and Lived Experience

Ideally, historical periods are characterized by differences in the fundamental patterns of events which occur in them. Clearly, what constitutes a period depends largely upon the subject of inquiry. Periodization is necessarily an imposition of form upon the past, an attempt to comprehend and interpret meaning. It is important to keep this arbitrariness in mind, particularly in the study of processes of change. For one thing, periodization tends to emphasize the "core" characteristics of each period, so that successive ones are contrasted, with minimal reference to the transitions between them. Rather than emphasize the mechanisms of change, such an approach can lead to an overly abstract exercise in comparative statics in which only the fact that some form of change has taken place is salient. Another danger is an excessive zeal in locating temporal boundaries. Thus, the official French protectorate over Morocco began in 1912. Yet, as I have indicated, at least in western Morocco this event was merely a formalization of de facto control that had been exercised since 1907. From a retrospective viewpoint, the beginning of formal French control is unquestionably an important "marker" event and undoubtedly appeared so at the time to a few Moroccans directly connected with the central Makhzen. But in a hinterland region, such as Boujad, no such marker event stood out, especially since it took several months for the French to extend even the skeleton of administrative control to the upper Tadla Plain. Men perceived the emerging pattern of events in different ways. Some persons more than others had the talent to delineate these patterns and alter their conduct to take advantage of them. Some were simply in the right place at the right time. Others saw the wrong patterns and failed to adapt to events. The shading of periods into one another and the shifts of emphasis that occur within them are crucial to an understanding of how persons in a given society themselves perceive their social order, react to significant events, and ultimately, usually in a process imperceptible to themselves, alter or bring into question their cognitive maps of the cosmos and the social order.

To see how these shifts occur, I want, first, to sketch the main periods in the social history of Boujad and its hinterland over the last century. The last century has without question been one of accelerated social change, in the sense of significant patterns of events and opportunities succeeding one another more rapidly than at any prior time. This makes the processes of social and cultural change more visible than would otherwise be the case.

By employing a periodization keyed primarily to Boujad and its hinterland, I am not implying that it is possible to present a social history that is hermetically sealed off from "external" events, as was presumed by colonial ethnographers of earlier epochs. Still, the social history of Boujad was once much more contained than is presently the case. This remained true until the early 1930's. Among other reasons, the protectorate "froze" local notables into positions of authority as a means of securing its own legitimacy. For Boujad, this meant the Sherqawa. Morocco unquestionably had a national identity that permeated all elements of society. Nonetheless, the French were remarkably successful in maintaining and encouraging attention to local issues in most of rural Morocco through the 1930's. Beginning in that decade, though, Boujad's history ceases to be locally oriented. The town is increasingly swept into the vortex of national and even international events. Even for the

last few decades, however, there is an advantage in focusing on the effects of major political and economic shifts in a local setting. Moroccans, like members of any other society, interpret events and maintain their understanding of the social order primarily through interaction with significant others with whom they have ongoing, face-to-face relationships. Events elsewhere—wars, political decisions, economic opportunities—are interpreted in terms of their local consequences. A local study, such as this one, thus can place many events in a perspective more indicative of how Moroccans themselves experienced certain events than can more generalized accounts that focus only upon the activities of Morocco's national elite.

The periodization that I suggest here is meant to throw into relief transformations in popular religious beliefs. For this purpose, there are three significant periods into which Boujad's social history for the last century can be divided. The first is that of maraboutic hegemony, which characterized the preprotectorate period and lasted into the early years of the protectorate. In it, living marabouts continued to exercise a wide range of political, economic, and social roles. Sherqawa avidly competed to become marabouts and thought of their social honor primarily in terms of their alliances with maraboutic kinsmen. Because of the far-reaching political and supernatural consequences of clientship to marabouts, tribesmen placed a high value upon ties with them. The central Makhzen and, later, protectorate authorities recognized the importance attached to such ties and acted accordingly.

The second major period, which I have termed the Pax Gallica, lasted roughly from the inception of the protectorate (for this region of Morocco) through the Second World War. Throughout this period the French policy of maintaining existing notables in positions of authority was generally successful. Sherqawi marabouts were frozen into positions of prestige as local officials, but they no longer exercised political and economic functions as a consequence of being marabouts. Men in their maturity could remember when living marabouts had exercised a much wider range of functions but were aware, as were the marabouts themselves, that they no longer could do so. Younger persons, both Sherqawa and their clients, no longer had the personal experience of seeing marabouts exercise such roles. They could only be told about what marabouts had done. Moreover, after the establishment of the Pax Gallica, non-Sherqawi artisans and merchants no longer were dependent upon the Sherqawa for their well-being. These formed the core of adherents to forms of religious expression not directly associated with the Sherqawa and also constituted, together with younger, educated Sherqawa, the membership of the nascent nationalist movement from the 1930's onward.

The final period is that of the Second World War and its aftermath, during which France's hold over Morocco and its other colonies became increasingly fragile. More significant than this were the concomitant social and economic dislocations and opportunities generated by the war and the postwar economic boom. Sharp-eyed men able to grasp the realities of the new climate made fortunes in commercial enterprises and real estate. This shift was felt even by tribesmen, who were increasingly attracted by or pushed toward the alternatives of emigration to the coastal cities and military service. All of these transformations weakened the traditional social order which the French aspired to preserve in order to maintain their hegemony. Notables exercising formal governmental functions were somewhat handicapped in fully exploiting these opportunities, at least on the western plains, but urban merchants without such direct ties to the government were not. Also in this period, Moroccans who had been educated by the French came to maturity and, together with an older generation of traditionally educated scripturalists, openly began demanding independence for Morocco. Despite their continuing importance to rural tribesmen, marabouts no longer were capable of any significant political or religious

initiatives. Beginning in the 1930's, scripturalist nationalists began major attacks on maraboutism, attacking it much more, in fact, than they did the French. After the Second World War, maraboutism was no longer a significant issue. Nationalists had appropriated the powerful symbol of the monarchy, with its coalescence of Islamic and national identity, to legitimate their own movement.

Seen from a peripheral center, such as Boujad, independence in 1956 was less the start of a new era than the consolidation and legitimation of earlier de facto shifts of economic and political power. Local merchants quickly took over the enterprises of departing Europeans and Jews, and Moroccans assumed control of the country's administrative apparatus. From the vantage of a decade or so from now, the impact of the expansion of educational opportunities that accompanied independence will be more fully realized. Then, retrospectively, independence and the chain of events it set in motion may appear to be more of a sharp break with the past than now seems to be the case.

In each of the periods that I have described, certain categories of persons acquired prominence: marabouts; notables (including marabouts) recognized and sustained by the French; and an educated bourgeoisie adhering to a scripturalist nationalism. What was a meaningful assessment of the alignments of power and opportunity in one of these periods did not hold for the next, nor did a comportment successful in one period ensure a continuing prestige and adjustment to "the way things are" in the next.

Moroccans did not respond uniformly to the pattern of events characteristic of each of these periods; nor was there general agreement as to what constituted either dominant or emerging patterns. These events were differently evaluated, not only according to what Weber called the "class" situation of men and their location with respect to economic and political power, whether or not they were aware of it, but also with respect to how generations of men were temporally located in relation to one another. A generation of tribesmen with no personal experience of marabouts who exercised significant social and political roles responded to marabouts quite differently from tribesmen with such experience. However clear such shifts appear in retrospect, it is important to try to grasp these events as they were initially perceived by Moroccans who lived through them.

Karl Mannheim's 1928 essay, "The Problem of Generations"[118] (translated and reprinted 1952:276–320), remains one of the most comprehensive attempts to consider the effects of time on social institutions and cultural categories. I want to present some key aspects of his argument in order to use it to analyze the process by which maraboutism was relegated to a peripheral status in Morocco. Mannheim saw two earlier trends in efforts to view generations sociologically. One, which he associated primarily with Auguste Comte, was the "arithmetical mysticism" of positivists, who sought to develop "laws" of historical development based upon the biological life span of men and the fact that old and new generations continually overlap. Proponents of such "laws" asserted that, when properly developed, they would constitute universal, "natural" formulae of social and cultural change. A second tradition, associated primarily with Wilhelm Dilthey, saw generations primarily in relation to qualitative, "interior" senses of time not directly related (as with Comte) to quantitative considerations. Mannheim points out that this approach was less a fully articulated one than a reaction to the mathematical, unilinear concepts of development espoused by Comte and his followers (Mannheim 1952:281). Dilthey and others argued that generations develop not merely because of the chronological coexistence of persons, but also because they experience the same significant events in markedly similar ways. Thus time is not a pointlike event but one with multiple dimensions, always experienced by several generations at different stages of development (Mannheim

1952: 283).

To introduce the concept of the generation, Mannheim places it in the more general category of “social location,” the most familiar dimension being class. Individuals can be said to be located in a certain economic class or related in a certain way to the power structure of a given society regardless of whether they are conscious of it. A given class situation cuts individuals off from certain types of experience and exposes them to others. This holds equally, writes Mannheim, for membership in a generation. Those persons belonging to the same generation and similarly located in the social and historical process are thereby limited “to a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action” (1952:291).

Generation location “is determined by the way in which certain patterns of experience and thought tend to be brought into existence by the natural data of the transition from one generation to another” (Mannheim 1952:292). This transition comes about through the continuous emergence of new participants in the sociohistorical process and the withdrawal of others, making for a continuous “fresh contact” with cultural traditions. Each generation has its own consciousness of these traditions. Their acquisition is composed of two elements. The first is that which is consciously or, more often, unconsciously appropriated from other persons. The second is tradition acquired by direct personal experience. The conscious and unconscious models on which men base their conception of the world and evaluate their actions are condensed out of their appropriated and personally acquired experience. The continual fresh contact with these traditions means that the cultural heritage is continually reinterpreted so as to maintain its meaning within the emerging realities of a given time and place. The changes brought about by this process are not necessarily apparent to participants in it. This is especially so for concepts basic to the social order, such as God’s will and obligations, and implicit patterns of religious belief, such as maraboutism.

As mentioned, time is not uniformly experienced by generations. Thus, one is “old” in so far as one “comes to live within a specific, individually acquired framework of usable past experience, so that every new experience has its form and its place largely marked out for it in advance” (Mannheim 1952:296). In youth, in contrast, such formative forces are just coming into being, so that basic attitudes are still being formed by the molding power of new situations. Significantly, these two groups influence each other, directly to some extent, but through intermediate generations as well. Contrary to the unilineal direction of change described by Comte, often the oldest generation is more capable than younger ones of flexibility in the face of new events and of realizing the potential of new perspectives engendered by the young.

Mannheim emphasizes that generation creates a similar “social location” (which he terms an “actual generation”) only to the extent that individuals “participate in the characteristic social and intellectual currents of their society and period, and in so far as they have an active or passive experience of the interactions of forces which [make] up the new situation” (1952:304). To adapt his argument to Morocco, it cannot always be assumed that tribesmen and townsmen of the same age belong to the same “actual” generation. In collecting genealogical data, for instance, I used Morocco’s independence in 1956 as a marker of calendrical time. For townspeople, this was a significant event, although it was often reinterpreted, especially by women, as “the commotion”—referring to the riots, demonstrations, house-burnings, and ensuing reprisals which had occurred in the late summer of the preceding year. For Sma‘la tribesmen, involved in an uprising against the

French in this period, independence was also a significant event. In contrast, independence as an event simply did not significantly impinge upon the personal experience of Bni Zemmur tribesmen, most of whom took no part in the events immediately preceding it. Hence for them, independence cannot be used as a temporal marker against which to plot other, more local experiences and events. The beginning of the protectorate constituted such a marker for them (“when the Christians came”), but its end did not.

Mannheim further divides actual generations into what he calls “generation-units.” These are “groups within the same actual generation which work up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways” (1952:304). Membership in a generationunit means acceptance of its characteristic values and, more importantly, “the ability to see things from its particular ‘aspect,’ to endow concepts with its particular shade of meaning.” It also entails absorbing certain “formative and interpretive principles” that enable individuals “to deal with new impressions and events in a fashion broadly pre-determined by the group” (1952:306). Such generationunits are not limited to concrete groups, although concrete groups in face-to-face relationships often form their nucleus (1952:307). Just as an ideology can spread beyond the confines of the class to which it initially appealed, so can formative principles peculiar to certain generations (1952:308). This is not to say that every generation evolves “its own, distinctive pattern of interpreting and influencing the world” (1952:310). Experiences which act as crystallizing agents to form distinct generation-units do not always occur. Also inherent in Mannheim’s approach is the idea that the “mentalities” unique to society at a given period do not entirely pervade it. Generation-units can put their intellectual stamp on coexisting groups without either destroying or absorbing them (1952:313). The clearest Moroccan example of this is the Islamic reformism of some of the urban bourgeoisie from the 1930’s onward. In relation to the total population, the carriers of this ideology represented a tightly knit but restricted minority of the urban population, but they can be seen retrospectively as “characteristic” of their period and exerting an influence well beyond their numbers. Although reformist Muslims were deeply antagonistic to it, maraboutism continued to survive as a significant force among Morocco’s rural majority, coexisting with reformist ideology.

*** The Pax Gallica and the Sherqaiva

I think it worthwhile to present the events immediately following the formal installation of the protectorate in greater detail than subsequent events. It was in the confusion of the early years of the protectorate that the Sherqawa, like the Moroccans elsewhere in Morocco, were compelled to make decisions that were to affect their fortunes for several decades.

The signing of the protectorate treaty of 30 March 1912 brought no immediate formal shift in the status of the Sherqawi zawya. Less than two weeks after the signing of the treaty, violent anti-French riots broke out in Fes and elsewhere. Their military suppression was the immediate concern of the French, so that for a few months the upper Tadla Plain was left to itself. Immediately after the protectorate treaty was signed, Sultan Mulay Hafed abdicated and was succeeded by his brother Mulay Yusef. News of this shift spread quickly throughout Morocco. But with no immediate pressure from the French to legitimate the new sultan and an aversion to making precipitate declarations of loyalty, neither the Sherqawa nor any of the tribes of the upper Tadla offered an oath of fealty (bay’d) to the new sultan.

Only by late summer of 1912 were the mechanisms of Makhzen legitimacy engaged on the

Tadla Plain, although in a somewhat confused fashion. In mid-August, Sultan Mulay Yusef sent a proclamation to the Zawya lord, Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed (2–10), notifying the “notables and qaid-s of the Bni Zemmur” of his enthronement and requesting their oath of fealty (E, 17 August 1912 / 4 Ramadan 1330). Shortly afterward, Hajj Muhammed’s sixteen-year-old son, ‘Abd 1-Qader (2–14), was sent to court bearing the oaths of the Tadla tribes and of the population of Boujad. Three weeks later, his visit was acknowledged in separate letters by the Grand Wezir, Muhammed 1-Moqri, and by H. Lyautey, who by this time had become resident-general of Morocco (both letters in E). The central Makhzen and presumably the French clearly were confused by the situation on the Tadla Plain. A few weeks after the proclamation sent to Hajj Muhammed, an identical one was sent to the rival ‘Arbawi lord, Sidi ‘Abdallah ben l-‘Arbi (2–13) (E, 5 September 1912 / 23 Ramadan 1330). The latter, of course, had been the “exclusive” lord of the Sherqawa in the eyes of the sultan’s immediate predecessor, but such niceties of legitimacy seem to have been quickly forgotten at the time.

By the autumn of 1912, the French had established Boujad as their first military outpost on the upper Tadla Plain. There was limited initial resistance from some of the tribes of the region, notably the Sma‘la, but in general military action was directed only to the south of the Umm er-Rbi‘ River. With the Sherqawi leaders and other notables, Lyautey was punctilious in his reassurances of all they had to gain by supporting France. Just as declarations of fealty were being extracted from the Tadla notables in late August, Lyautey wrote Hajj Muhammed to say that he was aware of the prestige of the Sherqawa and of their active role in aiding the French in the Shawya.

Lyautey defined his role to the marabout as one of collaborating with the Makhzen to bring order and peace to Morocco. Initially, Hajj Muhammed was frequently consulted on the selection of qaid-s^ as he had been in the past, and was often used as an intermediary to arrange for the submission of dissident groups. In turn, the French frequently intervened to “chastise” tribal groups (e.g., Bni Khiran) who menaced Sherqawi holdings in their territories. (Sherqawi estates outside of the Shawya were allowed at first to maintain their traditional prerogatives.)

By November, the French began to organize the formal administration of the Tadla. General Franchet d’Esperey came to Boujad on 12 November for this purpose.[119] He attended receptions given by both Sherqawi lords. Sidi ‘Abdallah ben l-‘Arbi and Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed. He claimed in the course of the day to have “reconciled” the two opposing factions so that henceforth only Hajj Muhammed was recognized as lord of the Sherqawa (Ecorcheville 1938:112–113; Cimetiere 1913:289; interviews with informants). The next morning, as “proof” of their settlement, both marabouts accompanied the general to Wad Zem, where he established a new military post. In actuality, both Sherqawi leaders recognized the danger of openly opposing French intentions or of allowing the French to interpret their internal rivalries as weakness.

The practical modalities of this “reconciliation” are not spelled out in detail, but one component was a division of influence between the rival Sherqawi factions. Hajj Muhammed advised on the selection of qaid-s over tribes in a client relation to him as marabout, including the Wlad Yunes (a subdivision of the Bni Smir), Wlad Bhar es-Sghir, and Gnadiz. He was also appointed qaid of Boujad. His brother, Hajj Hmed, became qaid over Bni Zemmur. Hajj Hmed was adamantly anti-French, refused to receive French officers at his house, and ignored French “suggestions” concerning his activities. Moreover, the tribesmen were hostile to having a Sherqawi as qaid. After a few months the French removed him from office.

Sidi ‘Abdallah ben l-‘Arbi of the ‘Arbawa was allowed to designate qaid-s for the Wlad Bhar le-Kbir, Mwalin Dendun, and Sma‘la, all groups that recognized him as marabout. A few years later he also became qadi of Boujad. This was considered at the time by both the French and the Sherqawa to be a much less important post than qaid. Within two decades this evaluation was to be reversed.

These first administrative arrangements were unsatisfactory to

Lyautey. He removed many of the Tadla qaid-s from office in April 1913, including the Sherqawi Hajj Hmed. In relation to the difficulties with the latter. Lyautey reminded his subordinate, Col. Emile Mangin, then responsible for the Tadla Plain, not to make formal appointments (or more exactly, not to arrange for the sultan to make appointments from among three nominees selected by the French) until an appointee had indicated his capacity to govern during a trial period of several months. Lyautey also insisted that each qaid should be chosen from the tribe over which he was placed. Moreover, the rural qaid-s of the upper Tadla Plain were deliberately selected for their independence from the Sherqawa.[120] Those of the Boujad region, as throughout Morocco, rapidly acquired personal fortunes through the formal and informal advantages attached to their positions. Throughout the periodic administrative reorganizations of the protectorate, essentially the same qaid-s, their brothers, and their sons retained hold over their offices. Later in the protectorate, some of these qaid-s had consolidated their positions to the point that they supported open attacks on the influence of leading Sherqawa. The French were not adverse to encouraging such local rivalries.

As for Boujad and the Sherqawa, Lyautey knew that Hajj Muhammed was dying (he died on 17 May 1913) and emphasized to Mangin the political importance of choosing an appropriate successor to “the bar aka.” Lyautey delegated Lt. Col. Emile Simon of Military Intelligence to discuss the situation with Mulay Yusef (Lyautey 1953:73, 83, 88–92). At this point, of course, French understandings of baraka began to be as important as those of Moroccans in determining maraboutic succession, since the French were in a position to impose their understandings of Moroccan society upon the social order and thus mold Moroccan social reality to fit their conceptions of it.

Hajj Muhammed was replaced by his son ‘Abd 1-Qader, regarded by both French and Boujadi-s as not particularly bright or skilled but, like his father, a “friend” of France.[121] As qaid, ‘Abd 1-Qader (he became a hajj in 1917) appointed primarily his Zawya kinsmen to subordinate posts. The nature of his office was such that he had many more patronage positions to offer than his ‘Arbawi rival, Qadi ‘Abdallah ben l-‘Arbi. Moreover, the posts over which the qaid had control rarely required literacy and so were open to a number of his supporters. Fewer subordinate positions were attached to the qadis court, and most of these required a high degree of literacy. Since only an estimated 1 or 2 percent of the population of the country was literate at the time, there was much less direct patronage that he could offer his relatives and clients. But Qadi ‘Abdallah and several other ‘Arbawi Sherqawa placed a high value upon traditional letters and, beginning in the mid-1920’s, upon French education, as it became locally available for younger Moroccans. Some ‘Arbawi Sherqawa sought out higher education elsewhere in Morocco. The Zawya Sherqawa primarily confined themselves to the immediate rewards of local posts. Until the last years of the protectorate, few of the Zawya Sherqawa were educated beyond primary school, which was locally available.

The French were aware of the continuing importance of mara- boutic activities to the Sherqawa but began actively to return the zawya to its “original” and “proper” concern with “spiritual” matters. In effect, this meant a quite untraditional separation of the “religious” from the secular activities of the marabouts. “Religious” activities were for the first time sharply set off from “nonreligious” ones. Of course, the two leading Sherqawi marabouts, as the qadi and qaid of Boujad, exercised the functions of these offices. But these, at least in principle, were limited to territorially circumscribed and formally defined administrative and judicial functions. Even the tribal clientele of these two marabouts soon sharply distinguished their maraboutic from their political and judicial authority.

The split of religious from political authority became more pronounced for the first few years of the protectorate, at least at the local level. The sultan, of course, continued to embody both spiritual and secular authority. In the first years, the French still used the Sherqawa as intermediaries to unsubmitted groups, but their role as intermediaries had been significantly transformed. No longer could the Sherqawa negotiate compromises. They could only indicate what were the terms of submission acceptable to the French. The standard French tactic for dealing with “dissident” groups was to strangle them economically by denying them access to their agricultural lands and their customary markets. As a result of this tactic, most tribesmen of the upper Tadla Plain, often on the basis of individual local communities, submitted to the French in late 1912 and 1913. The only exception to this monotonous pattern was a coordinated attack in early June 1913 by the Berber leaders Mha u Hammu ez-Zayyani and Mha u Se‘id on French positions in the Tadla. Mha u Hammu led an attack against the French post at Wad Zem, while Mha u

Seed’s tribesmen took up a position just south of Boujad. Colonel Mangin led the relief column for the French and was accompanied by the ‘Arbawi lord, Sidi ‘Abdallah, with whom most of the Sma‘la were in a client relation. Always punctilious in acknowledging services rendered, Lyautey later wrote to thank Sidi ‘Abdallah. One consequence of Mha u Hammu’s raid was that the trade route between Boujad and Khnifra was cut, although in July of that year Mha u Hammu sent his son to Boujad to negotiate its reopening. This was the last major incident in which the Sherqawa served as intermediaries.

After the above incident, the Sherqawi marabouts were effectively excluded from the scope of action considered by the French to be political. Thus the contingent supernatural curse (‘ar kbir) which marabouts had once been able to invoke to compel disputing tribes to cease hostilities could no longer be implemented, nor could the marabouts even collect offerings outside of Boujad without French consent; and, since both marabouts held official Makhzen posts, such permission was simply not granted. French policy was to discourage local officials from exercising influence beyond those territories for which they were specifically charged. There also was an intent, at least on the local level as opposed to the sultanate, to separate secular functions from those considered religious. Secular disputes were now the domain of the French, and they insisted on being informed of any outbreaks of violence. The French military negotiated settlements or imposed them by force. Tribesmen were aware that the French had pre-empted the Sherqawi marabouts (as well as marabouts elsewhere in rural Morocco) in the settlement of disputes. For a while, Sherqawi visitors were sought to mediate low-level quarrels, such as land disputes between tents or households. But, as antagonists realized that settlements could be appealed either to their qaid-s or to the French, even this contracted field of activity largely disappeared.

The Pax Gallica stimulated a political and economic differentiation that ostensibly maintained the “traditional” prestige of the Sherqawa but made it impossible for them to undertake the range of action upon which, in large part, they based their livelihood. Besides a developing oligarchy of autonomous rural qaid-s. a second important category of persons who became largely independent of the Sherqawa were Boujad’s merchants and craftsmen. After the effective imposition of French control, Sherqawi marabouts were no longer required to facilitate the safe passage of commerce in rural Morocco. It is also significant that, after 1912, most leading Sherqawa held local Makhzen sinecures. As a consequence of French policy, they were banned from simultaneous active participation in commerce and, on the double count of being marabouts and members of the Makhzen administration, were no longer able to secure patents of protection from foreign governments. Such patents, which exempted their holders from direct Makhzen (and after 1912, French) control, were invaluable for securing vital commercial networks in the Moroccan interior. The French and the Makhzen could act against patent holders only by registering a complaint with the European power that had granted the patent. Altogether eight key merchants in Boujad—six non-Sherqawi Muslims and two Jews—acquired such patents as local agents for major foreign trading firms.[122] Thus the protectorate gave non-Sherqawa (and by the 1920’s a few Sherqawa who had dissociated themselves from the activities of the zawya) a valuable competitive edge in commercial undertakings.

Changes in patterns of belief gradually followed the confinement of Sherqawi marabouts to narrower social roles and the growing economic and social differentiation of society. Prior to the protectorate, Sherqawi hegemony was such that any threat to Sherqawi interests on the upper Tadla Plain, and especially in Boujad, was not tolerated. Soon after the end of the European hostilities in 1918, one significant development throughout western Morocco was the rapid growth of urban religious brotherhoods (tariqa-s), especially the Kittaniya, Derqawa, Tijaniya, and Qadiriya. Each of these quickly established subsidiary lodges in Boujad and in the other, newer settlements that had appeared in the region. Outside of Boujad, the lodges connected with the eighteenth-century Sherqawi lord, Sid 1-Ma‘ti (2–6), also expanded rapidly, but in Boujad itself they acquired no significant membership. At first, however, most Boujadi-s maintained ties with the Sherqawa. As elderly townsmen explain, this was done out of a mixture of material interest and fear of the supernatural sanctions at the disposal of the Sherqawa. But the economic hegemony of the Sherqawa was curtailed with the protectorate; at the same time, the burgeoning of non-Sherqawi, urban-based brotherhoods provided alternative access to the supernatural.

The sudden growth of these urban brotherhoods can be seen as an expression of autonomy from Sherqawi marabouts. Adherents to these brotherhoods tended to make the same implicit assumptions about the desirability of using intermediaries to relate to the supernatural as were made by clients of the Sherqawa, but access to the supernatural was now more effectively differentiated. An increasing number of persons, primarily townsmen and elements of the rural elite, no longer felt themselves dependent on the Sherqawa or any other marabouts to ensure their well-being. The growth of these brotherhoods engendered no immediate ideological conflict with the Sherqawa, although the leaders of some of them fostered attempts to drive a wedge between the Sherqawa, who controlled the apparatus of the local government, and the French. The local mqaddem of the Tijaniya order repeatedly sent letters to the French accusing various Sherqawa of improper official conduct, and some of the charges were acted upon by the French. The French also suspected the leaders of two other brotherhoods of making anonymous denunciations of the Sherqawi qaid, qadi, and some of their kinsmen (B.31.BO, confidential, 23 November 1932; B.2261, 30 December 1934).

The principal adherents to these brotherhoods were non-Sherqawi town dwellers, primarily merchants and craftsmen, who had not belonged to such orders prior to the protectorate. The brotherhoods appealed to a relatively homogeneous bourgeoisie. The core membership of each tended to consist of the members of certain crafts or trades. None of the orders appears to have had any evangelical fervor in recruiting membership. When the national leader of a brotherhood, such as ʻAbd 1-Hayy Kittani of the Kittaniya order, came to Boujad, crowds of thousands, including tribesmen, flocked to the town. But few tribesmen subsequently joined his or any other order. It is significant that by this time Sherqawi marabouts no longer attempted to draw crowds in such a fashion.

Exact figures on local membership are not available in all instances, but by the late 1920's the Qadiriya brotherhood, not considered to be the largest in Boujad, had six hundred adherents in a population of eight thousand (B.10/BC, 23 February 1928). From the 1930's until just after the Second World War, their leader (mqaddem) was a merchant who had begun his trading activities prior to the protectorate but who had made his fortune by seizing the opportunities made by the French "pacification" of the region. Until the middle of the 1920's, he offered sacrifices at the conclusion of each weekly market at the shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi in Boujad. Other merchants then began pressuring him to make contributions instead to the Qadiriya lodge, which he soon joined, to local mosques, and to other religious institutions not connected with Sherqawi marabouts.

The shifts in religious affiliations of the urban bourgeoisie affected only minimally the overall numerical support of the Sherqawa. Only a few tribesmen were attracted to these brotherhoods. These generally were clustered in certain local communities, and such adhesions were miniscule in relation to the overall rural population.[123] Still, the presence of an alternative to being a client of the Sherqawa meant that even tribesmen in Boujad's immediate hinterland no longer simply took for granted their ties with the Sherqawa. In the past, dissatisfaction with certain Sherqawa resulted in a shift of allegiance to other Sherqawi marabouts. Henceforth, a shift of allegiance away from the Sherqawa was a further, although rarely exercised, possibility. Yet the fact that such an alternative was consciously known to be available was in itself significant. In any case, by the 1920's, the Sherqawa were effectively stripped of their nonrural, nontribal clientele. Some townsmen made occasional offerings in times of personal crisis, but not the regular offerings characteristic of an earlier period. Moreover, those who made irregular personal offerings tended to be older rural immigrants who had all along maintained ties with Sherqawi marabouts. Younger rural immigrants tended more to drop these ties.

For the most part, tribesmen assiduously maintained ties with the Sherqawi marabouts[124] but were aware of their contracted utility. This was reflected in the offerings and sacrifices to the Sherqawa, which no longer flowed as freely as they once had. Diminished revenues meant that fewer Sherqawa were able to sustain themselves from the activities of the zawya. As offerings diminished, so did the services that marabouts performed for their clientele. At the same time, the formal and informal resources available to the two leading marabouts of the Sherqawa, the qaid and the qadi, effectively blocked the emergence of rivals.

The ideology and membership of urban religious brotherhoods, on the whole, constituted no overt ideological challenge to maraboutism. But the contracting of ties of obligation with shaykh-s of urban religious lodges was not simply a substitute for equivalent ties with the Sherqawa. The shaykh-s of urban lodges were more distant; their hegemony over the affairs of the Tadla Plain was not so multifaceted as that of the Sherqawa. However, a more pronounced revalorization of maraboutism emerged locally by

the 1920's and by the mid-1930's had acquired considerable momentum. This challenge came primarily from the Salafiyya, or Islamic reform movement, proponents of which I have often labeled as "scripturalists" in this study. Like their counterparts who emerged in the eastern Arab world in the late nineteenth century, Salafi Muslims argued that the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet were the only true bases of Islam, thus sharply distinguishing what they considered "true" Islam from the popular Sufism of urban religious brotherhoods and of maraboutism. Most of these reformists were traditionally educated urban bourgeoisie and were primarily situated in Morocco's largest cities, notably Fes and Marrakesh. Although their numbers were quite limited, their influence was considerable in such centers of Islamic learning as the Qarawiyin Mosque-University in Fes (where the Moroccan nationalist Allal al-Fasi was then an instructor) and its counterpart institution in Marrakesh, the Madrasa ben Yusef. From these institutions, the reformers had a considerable impact upon the urban bourgeoisie throughout Morocco and upon significant numbers of the urban proletariat in the larger cities.

The first Boujadi-s to be attracted to the reformist movement were several merchants in their mid-twenties who had attended one or the other of these centers of traditional religious learning. Boujad also was the forced residence from 1924 to 1934 of the Tunisian 'Amer ben Nefti ben Hajj Mansur bel Ghayb, who had a wealthy in-law in Boujad, also a Tunisian, who was a grain merchant. Ben Nefti was locally active in propagating his ideas and, although Boujadi-s today claim that his ideas did not strike a responsive chord among them, was expelled by the French on the omnibus protectorate charges of "doubtful morals" and "nationalist tendencies." Several other Moroccans in forced residence during the late 1920's and early 1930's also seem to have contributed to making elements of Boujad's bourgeoisie aware of alternative ideologies. The main activities of this loosely knit body of individuals in Boujad was to set up a series of ephemeral, ad hoc committees that, like similar groups elsewhere outside of Morocco's larger cities, confined themselves to negotiating with the local protectorate administration on the development of schools and other issues. In Boujad there were less than a hundred such persons, but these were very influential with other merchants and craftsmen of their generation. Membership in these committees tended to overlap considerably. In addition to negotiating with the French administration locally, these same committees in Boujad eventually established a "free school" in 1947, independent of the educational apparatus provided by the French. Elsewhere in Morocco, such schools began to appear in the 1920's (Damis 1973). Other activities included the establishment of an orphanage. The links set up by activists on these committees in the 1930's eventually formed the local nucleus for the nascent nationalist movement.

In Boujad, this movement initially attracted younger bourgeois merchants and craftsmen, many of whom had never, or only marginally, been involved in the urban religious brotherhoods that attracted an earlier generation of urban bourgeoisie. Nor had most of them ever been clients of Sherqawi marabouts. As I have mentioned, the membership of urban religious brotherhoods in the rural centers of the western plains consisted primarily of non-Sherqawa who had reached maturity when the Sherqawa as marabouts were still politically and economically influential. Recruitment into the brotherhoods flourished from the beginning of the protectorate until the late 1920's and then abruptly declined.

Later generations of the urban bourgeoisie, those who in Boujad joined or sympathized with the protonationalist movement, matured in significantly altered social and economic circumstances. Most had no personal experience of preprotectorate maraboutic hegemony. In larger cities, such as Fes and Sale, there existed a young, more militant French-educated intelligentsia (see Brown 1973), but such individuals were almost totally absent in Boujad,

where the nationalist movement remained dominated by men with a more traditional, scripturalist orientation. Especially after the Berber daher of 1930, there was a growing popular urban support for this protonationalist movement, primarily because of its emphasis on the purification of Islamic life and institutions and its resistance to what was popularly considered to be a French threat to Islam. As the movement became more politicized in the larger towns, there was a growing split between the politicized militants, concerned primarily with presenting demands to the protectorate administration, and the more traditional Muslim reformists, concerned more strictly with religious issues, such as mar- aboutism and, to a limited extent, the threat which the colonial regime posed to Islam. In Boujad, such a clear split never developed. In part this was due to the small number of such protonationalists and the limited range of action they could take. Negotiations undertaken with local French authorities were generally amicable;[125] attempts to discourage maraboutism almost never took the form of direct confrontation. After all, the merchants who formed the core of the protonationalist movement lived in daily contact with the Sherqawa. In the coastal cities, the nationalist concerns of the elite quickly spread to the growing urban proletariat, but in small interior towns, such as Boujad, they remained the concern of a limited cadre of educated bourgeoisie until the last years of the protectorate (Rezette 1955; Halstead 1967). Similarly, in larger urban settings it is necessary to provide finer distinctions among types of Islamic modernism and nationalism, such as are provided by Laroui (1974). In smaller centers, such as Boujad, such distinctions were jejune for all but a few educated persons until after the Second World War.[126]

Oblique attacks on the Sherqawa in the 1930's took the form of denunciations to the French controleur civile especially of official abuses of power, and the quiet persuasion of fellow townsmen to allow their support of maraboutism to lapse. In these actions the reformists were largely successful. No public meetings were involved, but reformist merchants employed subtle pressures within their personal networks of acquaintances, kinsmen, and clients. Significantly, these same neoorthodox reformists did little to carry their convictions to tribesmen associated with them. Many rationalized this neglect by saying that sustained attempts to disseminate reformist doctrines would have incurred the wrath of rural qaid-s and that tribesmen, in any case, were too "ignorant" to understand the significance of reformist doctrines. These rationalizations mask the inability of the reform-minded bourgeoisie to propagate their ideology in other milieus and their lack of interest in doing so. The various protean organizations which made up the nationalist movement did not, on the whole, begin active recruitment until the late 1940's.

Until the Second World War, the protectorate was fairly successful in cutting rural Morocco into a grid of impermeable sealed compartments, each with "its own life" and local identities (Montagne 1941:19). In each compartment, the French nurtured a local elite whose interests were articulated with those of the French. In the first few decades of the protectorate this policy worked remarkably well. In the Rousseauistic phrase of one early administrator, the "natural leaders" (Berriau 1918:4–5), that is, the existing local elite, were given positions in the local Makhzen administration or were designated as "notables" by local officers of the French administration. For a time such designation carried with it considerable advantages, including access to French education for the children of these individuals and a certain favored treatment in dealing with the administration. During this period the competition for influence and prestige among members of the rural elite was primarily focused upon the administrative zones established by the French. Most quarrels found their way into the office of the local controleur civil or Native Affairs officer. Local French officers often became arbiters as well as monitors of these disputes. In contrast to later periods of the protectorate, they were actively invited to play such roles. The monthly political reports for the early 1930's almost exclusively concern such local conflicts. Nationalist activities among the elite begin being reported for Boujad only in the

late 1940’s.

A valuable index of the patterns of influence which built up during this period is the official protectorate newspaper in Arabic, es-Sa ‘ada, to which all Moroccans considered notables by the French received free subscriptions. This newspaper meticulously recorded weddings and similar celebrations for all of the rural elite. Thus the wedding of one influential Boujadi in the late 1920’s was given front-page coverage in two successive issues, including a list of all notables who attended and the number of animals slaughtered for the feast. Such reporting is, of course, entirely absent from contemporary newspapers, which rarely go beyond a chronicle of movements of officials of the central government and sports events. This shift in emphasis accurately mirrors the shift in the loci of political power. The pattern of power prevailing during the protectorate contrasted sharply to that which existed prior to the protectorate, when Sherqawi lords intervened in a wide range of issues. In preprotectorate days local issues often were closely articulated with those of national importance. Likewise, the sultan and his entourage in those days closely followed the vicissitudes of tribal disputes and other matters which under the protectorate were considered to be of only local import. During the protectorate, there was formally no direct contact between local Moroccan officials and the central Makhzen. Such contacts as there were had to be made through the hierarchy of the protectorate administration.

*** Postwar Transformations and the Sherqawa

The position of local elites in Boujad was not entirely frozen, as was indicated by the patterns of growth of New Boujad from the 1930’s onward. Significant cracks in the hermetically sealed blocks into which the French had divided rural Morocco began to appear with the rise of the nationalist movement. This movement rapidly gained momentum with the economic and political opportunities and dislocations of the Second World War and the period immediately following. Fortunes were consolidated and broken, creating a significant gap between those who held formal positions of prestige and authority (local officials appointed by the French) and those who increasingly held real economic and political power.

The postwar years also saw a sudden resurgence of the sultan (by then popularly, if not officially, known under the more modern title of king) as an authority independent of the protectorate administration. Muhammed V used the Feast of the Throne (20 August) and other occasions to establish direct, personal contact with his qaid-s^ pasha-s, and other, nonofficial Moroccans of prominence. At the same time the palace took a somewhat more active part in the campaign against maraboutism. For the first time since the misadventurous antimaraboutic campaign of Sultan Mulay Sliman in the early nineteenth century, a reigning sultan was involved in a deliberate fight against saints and religious brotherhoods. As a symbolic gesture, the sultan ordered destroyed the shrines of marabouts in the vicinity of Ifrane, his summer residence in the Middle Atlas Mountains (Montagne 1953:217). No similar action was attempted elsewhere in Morocco, and there is no indication that the sultan’s move was meant to precipitate any widespread attacks on physical representations of maraboutism. The general attitude seems to have been one of encouraging a benign neglect of maraboutic ties, coupled with a rekindled strength in the religious and political symbolism of the monarchy.

Networks of nationalists in all parts of the country grew rapidly in the postwar period. At first, these were confined primarily to the urban bourgeoisie, but they were greatly

enlarged after the French deposition and exile of Muhammed V in 1953. Contrary to the claims of Boujadi nationalist leaders and the French (e.g., Montagne 1953), there is no indication that the “cells” of the nationalist movement were organized into well-defined, centrally directed hierarchies. The pattern that emerges both from interviews with local nationalists and from French reports of the interrogation of suspected nationalists suggests a more protean organization of personal ties.[127] Local leaders had clusters of supporters, with more casual clients at their periphery. In turn, local leaders had informal ties with leaders elsewhere in Morocco.[128] These were adept at using local antagonisms and quarrels to gain further support for the nationalist movement. Among tribesmen, nationalists stirred up resentment against Francophile qaid-s and promised the successful resolution of land quarrels and other disputes in exchange for political support (B, untitled document [a draft?] summarizing interrogations from 2 March to 31 July 1953) .[129]

In many ways the structure of these networks at the local level resembled that of ties to the Sherqawi zawya. The major difference was that efficacious political and economic power no longer was in the hands of the Sherqawi lodge or of those most associated with its activities. Marabouts continued to be regarded as significant by a majority of the population but were popularly recognized as peripheral to new patterns of economic and political action. By the early 1950’s some Sherqawa, especially those of the Zawya faction, which held the q aid-ship of Bouj ad and associated posts, found themselves locked in increasingly untenable positions, despite efforts to avoid action regarded as inimical by either the French or the nationalists (B: confidential report on qaid^ 21 January 1952). In the latter years of the protectorate, this descent group lost heavily in prestige. Just prior to the French deposition of Muhammed V in 1953, the aging marabout Qaid Sidi ben Dawd (2–15), went to Rabat and asked the sultan what stand he should take in the growing conflict between the French and the nationalists. “Go on as you have,” the sultan enigmatically replied. A close relative of the marabout present at the interview interpreted these remarks as justifying Sidi ben Dawd’s continuing as qaid^ which he did until his death in 1956.[130] The sultan’s words could also be interpreted as implying that nothing which Sidi ben Dawd could do either as qaid or as lord of the zawya would be of significance in the light of the contemporary political situation.

Another indication of the decline of the Zawya Sherqawa is the shifting pattern of marriage alliances of the leading households. Prior to the protectorate, central Makhzen officials, qaid-s of the western plains, wealthy merchants, and others sought such alliances. This pattern was sustained on a reduced scale in the first decades of the protectorate. By the 1940’s, such ties were no longer sought.

Predictably, the fortunes of the ‘Arbawi Sherqawa were just the reverse. Their position was progressively enhanced in the later years of the protectorate and after independence. Qadi-s, notaries, and other personnel attached to Islamic courts were relatively independent of direct French control. To be sure, the French had a decisive influence over appointments and had effected subtle but decisive modifications in the system of Islamic justice. But by and large the Islamic courts were autonomous, so that with independence in 1956 very few of the court personnel were removed from office. In the early part of the protectorate, most of the leading ‘Arbawi Sherqawa were associated with the courts and, as I mentioned, placed a much higher value on both traditional and French educations than did the Zawya Sherqawa. By the 1930’s and 1940’s, various ‘Arbawi Sherqawa were engaged in a range of activities. Some remained with the Islamic courts. Others left the sinecure provided by the French and engaged in commerce. One ‘Arbawi, for instance, began his career as a notary but spent most of his time judiciously

investing in agricultural estates in regions that the French began opening up to irrigation in the 1930's. After making a fortune in black-market operations during the Second World War, he plowed his profits into urban real estate in Casablanca, which quickly skyrocketed in value. Other 'Arbawi Sherqawa became active in nationalist politics and from the postwar years to the present have been strong supporters of the revitalized monarchy. Their traditional maraboutic prestige and its accompanying control of wealth and property have been successfully parlayed into other forms of activity that in the colonial and postcolonial setting have led to greater power, wealth, and social honor. For the more successful 'Arbawa, maraboutism is a thing of the past, appropriate to an earlier era but no longer cause for sustained Sherqawi prominence.

*** Conclusion

Patterns of social structure and the prevailing systems of meaning through which religious beliefs are expressed are not always isomorphic. Peter Berger has remarked that, seen historically, the relationship is often one of irony (1969:107). An ideology introduced because of a certain intrinsic logic for one social situation or status group often assumes, when adopted or reformulated in a new setting, implications far removed from those that were originally, consciously intended. A particularly dramatic instance of such a transformation seems to have occurred during the Maraboutic Crisis, as the carriers of popular Sufism found themselves regarded in a very different light and performing for the first time a wide range of critical political, social, and economic roles. The religious knowledge possessed by marabouts soon became popularly regarded as "secrets" transmitted in the patterns of "closeness" that I earlier described. North African maraboutism, like popular Sufism elsewhere in the Muslim world, sustained an implicit hierarchy between those to whom this knowledge was attributed and the remainder of society.

Sources for this earlier period are sufficient to indicate the broad dimensions of these transformations but provide little concrete evidence of the processes by which the contours of popular belief were modified. These are in much bolder relief for the last century. In the late nineteenth century, as today, a marabout had the reputation of being a particularly efficacious intermediary with the supernatural. There was no clear boundary between "spiritual" and "mundane" powers, so that marabouts had a wide range of action. Since God's will was, and is, thought to be revealed through this-worldly patterns of action, success in their multiple endeavors sustained the reputations of Sher- qawi marabouts and effectively handicapped the ascendancy of rivals. To secure the benefits of access to the supernatural, the clients of marabouts contracted ties of obligation to them that were sustained by the same underlying principles that governed all other ties in society and were evaluated just like these other ties.

The transformations in the ideology of maraboutism and of the social role of marabouts have been discussed at some length. What sort of orderly patterns can be found in these changes? Maraboutism, like any other belief, constantly affects and is affected by the political and economic realities in which men find themselves. It is important to keep in mind that belief systems are not free-floating Platonic entities. They are, as Peter Berger writes, "socially constructed and socially maintained. Their continuing reality ... depends on specific social processes" (1969:45). Such ideologies as maraboutism are neither captives to local social structures nor by-products to be mechanistically deduced from them. For at least four centuries, maraboutism represented a meaningful formulation of Islam for tribal and urban Moroccans. It has remained a significant component of social reality for some. But the ideology of maraboutism has been far from static. As a primarily

implicit, multivocal ideology, maraboutism owed its vitality to its flexibility in adapting to a number of varying situations. But the social conditions created by the protectorate, in Morocco at least, reduced the specific social processes which had maintained maraboutism throughout earlier centuries. This was especially the case in urban settings, where the transformations engendered by the protectorate were more pronounced than in rural areas and where alternative patterns of Islamic belief were ascendant and appeared to offer a superior formulation of "the way things are" in relations with the supernatural. Even among rural clientele, from the 1940's onward the spread of cash instead of animals and cereals as the principal medium in which offerings were made accelerated the conscious instrumental re-evaluation of the worth of these ties.

For most Moroccans, God continues to be the cause of everything and responsible for every turn of fate. But with the contracted sphere of influence of marabouts, there are now clear de facto boundaries on the intervention of the supernatural in the specific affairs of this world. With the disappearance of living marabouts, there is no concrete instrumental medium through which God's assistance can be invoked for specific situations.

The restriction of the roles that marabouts could play in Moroccan society was one component of a growing social differentiation made possible by the protectorate. There developed locally in the Boujad region a greater range of bases on which social honor could be established and power acquired. Nonmaraboutic elites developed that acquired considerable influence and prestige from commercial and political undertakings. These persons increasingly adopted and acted upon nonmaraboutic conceptions of Islam, locally an impracticable option in the preprotectorate era.

A Weberian sensitivity to the differentiation of interests and beliefs within a society is a more useful perspective in the study of the shifts in belief than are theoretical perspectives which emphasize (as do most Durkheimian studies of religious belief and practice) only those beliefs held in common by all elements of society. Thus, over the last century, the assumption that access to God is patterned on the relations which exist among men has appeared increasingly unrealistic to many Moroccans. Even many Sherqawa now play down the idea that their ancestors and certain of their living relations had a special relation with God. Instead, following the conventions of traditional Muslim historiography regarding marabouts, they maintain that the leading Sherqawa of the past were men like any others; the only difference was that they were distinguished for their piety, scholarship, and prestigious descent from 'Umar.

I have tried to show that this overall shift in meaning and social identity followed patterns discernible through time. An ahistorical study focusing upon contemporary patterns of belief without regard to their historical development would misrepresent the relationships of maraboutism with specific social categories. An equal distortion resuits from considering historical shifts only in superimposed synchronic slices. Although useful for some analytic purposes, periodization tends to blur the ongoing process of the reinterpretation of cultural traditions, particularly the interaction of different generation- units, to use Mannheim's term. Reinterpretations of Islam, or of other religions, do not follow as knee-jerk utilitarian reactions to changed economic and political situations, although such changes provide a heightened awareness of ideological commitment and thus provide a favorable climate for such re-evaluations.

The onset of the colonial period, particularly in urban settings, gave rise to a loss of orientation among many Moroccans and an effervescence of explicit ideological activity.

Much of this took the form of an increased receptivity to ideological currents in the Arab east, where Muslims had an earlier and in some cases protracted experience with the problems of foreign domination that now faced Morocco. The explicit ideological positions adopted by Moroccans were by no means unique to them (Laroui 1967). Nor was the contracted base of mara- boutism. Although still far from moribund, it lost much of its capacity to respond to new situations. In particular, maraboutism has not inevitably been replaced by reformist ideology, as accounts of these movements sometimes imply. Maraboutism continues to hold its ground among the majority of the population. The power attributed to individual marabouts has markedly declined, but maraboutism remains for many what Weber called the “religion of everyday life” (1968:416). Marabouts relate to the concrete life situations of their supporters in a way that the formal, egalitarian tenets of Islam cannot. Maraboutism implies a conception of the supernatural that is immediately present. It implicitly offers a degree of control over the unknown and the supernatural. Men contract and sustain dyadic bonds with marabouts by the same conventions that govern all other social interaction. The pervasiveness of this concept is apparent in the ties that many men, including some who formally denounce maraboutism, continue to sustain with marabouts. It also is apparent in popular interpretations of the symbolism that surrounds the Moroccan monarchy, in which the king is popularly seen as the vehicle for sustaining the country with baraka. In this light, the centralization of authority and de-emphasis upon primordial and regional loyalties that began during the protectorate and continued after independence have their counterpart in the popular religious symbolism of the monarchy. Its homology with the assumptions that govern the social universe is also, as I have sought to emphasize, the fatal weakness of maraboutism as an ideology.

A relatively small group of educated, generally well-to-do Boujadi-s (like similar Moroccans elsewhere) are activated by and committed to the explicit ideology of Islamic reformism. They interpret this reformist ideology as demanding the rejection of marabouts and of mar- aboutic ideology. Many more now say they subscribe to reformist tenets but continue quietly to act as if they believe in the efficacy of marabouts. The transcendent image of the divinity provided by Islamic reformism is in itself too alien from their experience of the realities of this world and the common-sense assumptions that guide their actions in it to carry conviction. This is so despite the fact that both in towns and in the countryside there is a resurgence of participation in formal Islamic rituals and observances. Awareness of this “official” Islam is undoubtedly stronger today than in the past.

In any major religious tradition, beliefs are responsive to social actualities. The two alternative conceptions in Islam of relations between man and God that I have illustrated here have allowed Moroccans, at least until now, to contain the impact of social change within the boundaries of the Islamic tradition. Thus a continuity of religious identity is sustained in the midst of altered social situations. The hierarchical conception of man-God relations represented by maraboutism is now in eclipse, but there is no reason to suppose that it will necessarily remain so. Islamic reformism, now ascendant, is selfconsciously less compromised by the social order. But Islam, like other major world religions, constantly must face anew cycles of compromise and noncompromise with the social order.

** Appendix: The Wheel of Fortune: The Last Maraboutic Intrigues

There are several compelling reasons to present in detail the struggle for the lordship of

the Sherqawi zawya that began in the mid-1890's. It was the last such major struggle to occur in a "traditional" setting. With the protectorate, the groups supporting aspirant marabouts contracted rapidly in size. A detailed account also checks the tendency to describe individuals in nascent factions as consciously striving to establish autonomous groups. The account presented here suggests, rather, that the process is one of heightened identity, in which the possibility of establishing an independent group emerges only gradually among the participants in such struggles.[131]

A mere enumeration of the sons of the major Sherqawi marabout of the nineteenth century, Sidi ben Dawd (2–8), suggests the problems inherent in maraboutic succession. At his death in 1889, he had twenty-one living sons. Whether their mothers were legal wives or concubines, technically all were equals in Islamic law. But in Sidi ben Dawd's and other major households, this legal precept failed to form a model for actual practice. The long lordship of Sidi ben Dawd meant that he was in a position to choose his successor. He was the last Sherqawi marabout for whom this was unequivocally true. The confusion

of events from his death to the beginning of the protectorate allowed none of his successors to establish a similar position.

In 1889, Sultan Mulay Hasan I confirmed Sid 1-Hajj l-'Arbi (2–9), the eldest of Sidi ben Dawd's sons, to succeed him. Sid l-'Arbi, then sixty-seven, had earlier spent many years in the sultan's entourage. Sidi 'Umar, his brother, continued to exert considerable influence as the "grey eminence" of the zawya. As mentioned earlier, 'Umar's son, Driss (d. 1915), had settled in Casablanca, where he operated as factotum with the Makhzen and merchants, arranging for the passage of caravans through Boujad and the Tadla Plain, and frequently provided detailed advice to his father on the position to take in negotiations with the sultan.[132] After 1904 he had become in addition an employee of the French consulate. In this capacity he advised the Sher- qawa, or those Sherqawa whose interests he represented, on how best to deal with the French. He performed much the same services for the French.

The Sherqawa wielded considerable influence in the 1890's. This is evidenced by Sid 1-Hajj l-'Arbi's assistance in getting the sultan's expedition (mehalla) safely from Dar weld Ziduh to 1-Bruj when Mulay Hasan I, accompanying the expedition, died in 1894. His death occurred in hostile territory. Had it been known to his entourage, they would have panicked and made likely a major crisis of succession, although the sultan had designated one of his sons, Mulay 'Abd l-'Aziz, as his successor. By keeping his death a secret for two days, until the return of the expedition to more secure territory, the sultan's chamberlain (hajeb) Ba Hmed was able to retain his power and secure the confirmation of Mulay 'Abd l-'Aziz (who reigned from 1894 to 1908), still a minor at the time. A proclamation reconfirming Sid 1-Hajj l-'Arbi as lord of the Sherqawa zawya was soon issued in the name of the new sultan (E, 26 August 1894 / 23 Safar 1312), but Ba Hmed, the Grand Wezir, Mehdi 1-Mnebhi, and others in the sultan's entourage had already begun seeking ways to undermine the strength of the Sherqawa (Ecorcheville 1938:89–90).[133]

From the beginning, Mulay 'Abd l-'Aziz's reign was marked by growing foreign threats and tribal uprisings. The Sherqawa were frequently called upon to negotiate with tribes on behalf of the Makhzen. Thus, when the Bhamna tribe rebelled upon the death of Mulay Hasan, they cut off Marrakesh from the rest of Morocco. Sid 1-Hajj l-'Arbi was sent to negotiate with them. A later royal decree (E, 27 July 1895 / 4 Safar 1313) congratulates the

lord upon his success and agrees to the terms for an amnesty which he negotiated. These included a t'argiba sacrifice, the traditional sign of submission, and the delivery to the Makhzen of the leader of the rebellion. In a face-saving compromise, the sultan acknowledged that, since the rebel leader had escaped, he was satisfied with the burning of the tents of the rebel and his followers and confiscation of their property, reported by the Sherqawi lord. Later, in 1898, the sultan camped near present Wad Zem for four months in an expedition intended to bring dissident tribal groups within the pale of the Makhzen.[134] Fifty-five heads were collected during this raid for display at Marrakesh. Again the Sherqawi lord served as the sultan's principal emissary. Despite their association with Makhzen interests, the Sherqawa preserved a measure of autonomy that some of the sultan's entourage found intolerable. Qaid-s fleeing the wrath of the Makhzen often successfully sought sanctuary in Boujad until favorable settlements could be negotiated. During this period there were also increased signs of tension between local qaid-s in Shawya and the Sherqawa.

From at least 1895 onward, the Makhzen directly subsidized a few descendants of Sidi ben Dawd who were not formally recognized by the Makhzen as being in control of the zawya. This act in itself signaled to ambitious Sherqawa the possibilities for intrigue among themselves. Subsidies were paid on feast days to the leader of this nascent faction, Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed (2–10), through the overseer (amiri) of customs in Casablanca. Hajj Muhammed wrote the sultan on each festive occasion, saying that he had invoked divine blessings on his behalf. He also specified to the sultan what he needed as a subsidy.

The core of the subsidized dissenters, who eventually became known as the Zawya Sherqawa, appear to have only gradually asserted a separate identity and acquired the resources to make this possible. Three months after the death of Sid 1-Hajj PArbi (2–9) (23 October 1898), one of his sons, Sid 1-Hajj 1-Hasan (2–11) was given "the direction of the zawya, to the exclusion of all other individuals, as was the case with your deceased father" (E, Sultan 'Abd l-'Aziz to Hajj 1-Hasan, 25 January 1899 / 13 Ramadan 1316). A second decree reaffirmed his leadership two years later, although its very issuance was indicative of the growing challenges to the new lord's position.

The split of the Zawya Sherqawa from the 'Arbawa formally culminated in 1901. The sultan ordered Hajj Muhammed (2–10) of the Zawya Sherqawa and his nephew, Sid 1-Hajj 1-Hasan (2–11) to his court at Marrakesh. There he announced that the zawya and all of its holdings were to be divided equally between them. They were henceforth to be known as its "co-lords."

The difficulties in dividing the Sherqawi holdings have already been discussed in Chapter 2. In general, Hajj 1-Hasan got control of the estates ^azib-s) to the south of Boujad and in regions peripheral to Makhzen control. Hajj Muhammed of the opposing Zawya group got the estates of Shawya and Tadla, regions at that time under relatively firm Makhzen control. To facilitate Hajj Muhammed's gaining control of his half of the lodge, Sid 1-Hajj 1-Hasan was detained for several months in Marrakesh. There he is reported to have said that the sultan should not be suspicious of his actions because he did not intend to remain lord of a zawya controlled by the Grand Wezir and the qaid-s of Shawya (Ecorcheville 1938:95).

The sultan's division of these estates only roughly coincided with the loyalties of tribal groups toward the two rival lords (see Table 7). Hajj 1-Hasan still was the more prestigious

of the two, despite the intention of the Makhzen to equalize their followings. When Hajj 1-Hasan finally was allowed to leave the sultan’s entourage (he did so from Rabat), he returned by way of the territories of several tribes which, at least a few years later, were clients of the rival Zawya lord: Zyadiya, Mdakra, Mzab, and Werdigha.

Table 7.

Tribal clients on the Tadla Plain, ca. 1905

‘Arbawa

Sma‘la

Bni Zemmur (Ait Saleh)

Bni Khiran (except Bni Mansur)

Bni Musa

Wlad Brahim (about half)

Bni Khlef (sections)

Wlad ‘Abdun (sections)

Bni Smir (sections)

Wlad Bu ‘Ali

Bni Ma‘dan

Bni ‘Amir

Zawya

Ghraba

Bni Zemmur (except Ait Saleh)

Bni Khiran (Bni Mansur)

Gettaya

Wlad Brahim (about half)

Bni Khlef (sections)

Wlad ‘Abdun (sections)

Bni Smir (sections)

Wlad Ye‘ish

Wlad ‘Azzuz

Mfassis

Mwalin bel Ghorraf

Gfaf (sections)

Source-. Ecorcheville 1938:96.

Neither Sherqawi lord took tribal alignments for granted. They were to fluctuate markedly, especially during the struggle for the sultanate which broke out in 1907. The agents of both lords actively canvassed tribesmen and Makhzen officials in the Shawya for their support.

These intrigues often flared into violence. In a decree dated 25 January 1903 / 25 Shawwal 1320 (E), Mulay ʻAbd l-ʻAziz ordered the qaid-s of Werdigha, Bni Zemmur, Ait Rbuʻ (near Qasba Tadla), Bni ʻAmir, and Bni Khiran to "respect" Sherqawa of the ʻArbawi descent group.

In general, Mulay ʻAbd l-ʻAziz endeavored to strengthen the position of Hajj Muhammed and his descent group, which never appears to have gained the stature of the ʻArbawi group. To dampen potential rivalries within his descent group, Hajj Muhammed secured a decree designating the elder of his two sons (2–14) as his deputy (E, 27 June 1903 / 1 Rbiʻa II1321). Since both sons were children, he relied primarily upon his brothers as emissaries to the Makhzen.

Correspondence for this period indicates that Hajj Muhammed was treated virtually as a servant of the Makhzen. As the French later became aware, much of his influence was based on his ability to secure Makhzen appointments for clients in exchange for whatever price the market would bear. For this privilege, the Makhzen held him responsible for nominating persons who could satisfactorily assert Makhzen interests. Essentially this meant the collection of taxes and settlement of all disputes inimical to Makhzen control. Hajj Muhammed was held responsible for the conduct of the qaid-s whom he nominated. Thus, when the Bni Musa refused to obey their qaid, appointed on the recommendation of Hajj Muhammed, the sultan wrote him: "You have informed us ... that the Bni Musa ask to have as their qaid the son of their old qaid in place of the present quid, Maʻti ben Ziduh. Maʻti ben Ziduh came with a letter from you and was named their qaid by your recommendation, while the son of the old qaid was named as his deputy" (E, 22 October 1904 / 12 Shaʻban 1322).

Despite its support of the Zawya Sherqawa, the Makhzen was aware of the strength of the ʻArbawi rivals and did not unnecessarily alienate them. When Sid 1-Hajj 1-Hasan of this faction died in 1903, the sultan named as his successor co-lord and as overseer of pious endowments his brother, Sidi Muhammed ben Sid l-ʻArbi ("Weld Zohra") (2–12) ,[135] bypassing his nineteen sons. When Weld Zohra complained about unfairness over the division of water rights of a subsidiary zawya which he jointly held with his rival, Hajj Muhammed (2–10), at the edge of the Berber highland near Bni Mellal, the sultan gave a courteous response and delegated the Berber qaid of the region, Mha u Seʻid, to look into the matter (E, 29 September 1905 / 29 Rejeb 1323). In general, neither faction appears to have gained a definite advantage over the other. This stalemate presumably was what the Makhzen intended. Until 1907, the policy was relatively successful.

By 1907, Mulay ʻAbd l-ʻAziz had become, in the eyes of many Moroccans, the creature of European, and especially French, interests. In an attempt to meet the threat of European intervention, the sultan undertook a series of well-intentioned but ill-conceived fiscal reforms which further weakened his position. Tribesmen believed that the sultan was losing his bar aka because of close contact with Europeans. In contrast, his brother Mulay Hafed owed his initial popularity to his being a symbol of resistance to European penetration. His supporters ranged from Fassi intellectuals, who saw an opportunity to undertake the same style of reforms as those desired by the "young Turks" for the Ottoman Empire, to tribesmen of such regions as the Shawya, who, for economic reasons (among which were new taxes considered to be non-Islamic), as well as religious and nationalistic ones, were increasingly disenchanted with the reign of Mulay ʻAbd l-ʻAziz.

Open conflict for the sultanate broke out when Mulay Hafed was proclaimed sultan by the ‘ulama of Marrakesh on 16 August 1907. The French used the occasion as a pretext to land troops in Casablanca later that month. Ostensibly this landing was to protect their interests in Casablanca and Shawya, but it was also intended to support Mulay ‘Abd l-‘Aziz. Nevertheless, Mulay Hafed steadily gained support, first from the tribes of the Marrakesh region and by December from the “ulama of Fes, led by Mulay le-Kbir le-Kittani of the powerful Kittaniya religious order. The Fassi support was conditional upon the insurgent sultan’s enacting certain reforms and undertaking to eliminate European influence over Morocco. Soon two leading Middle Atlas Berbers. Mha u Hammu ez-Zayyani and Mha u Se‘id, also joined the insurgent movement.

In the growing conflict it was difficult to maintain equivocal positions. From the point of view of the ‘Arbawi Sherqawa, in any case, nothing was to be gained by equivocation. For almost a decade the ‘Arbawa had been systematically undermined by Mulay ‘Abd l-‘Aziz and his entourage. Shortly after Mulay Hafed was declared sultan in Marrakesh, the lord of the ‘Arbawa, Weld Zohra, pledged allegiance to him. When in December 1907 a delegation of Fassi-s went to Marrakesh to see Mulay Hafed, they traveled with a Berber escort across the Middle Atlas Mountains; then across the Tadla and Sraghna plains they were personally escorted by the ‘Arbawi lord for part of the way (Ecorcheville 1938:100) .[136]

The Zawya Sherqawa were decidedly at a disadvantage because of their close ties with Mulay ‘Abd l-‘Aziz. Nevertheless, Sid 1-Hajj Muhammed (2–10) wrote to Mulay Hafed, imputing to him long-standing ties with the Sherqawa. Mulay Hafed replied to this attempt at alliance-hedging, thanking the Zawya lord for his sentiments but not revealing his intentions toward him (E, 26 December 1907 / 21 Qa‘ada 1325).

‘Arbawi support for Mulay Hafed was rewarded in 1908. Mulay Hafed issued a decree naming Muhammed “Weld Zohra” as the “sole” lord of the zawya and authorizing him to secure all prior royal decrees concerning Sherqawi matters from his relatives (E, 6 April 1908 / 4 Rbi‘a 11326). The wording of the decree suggests its entrepreneurial nature, since Mulay Hafed and his advisors do not seem to have had a clear idea of just what were the Sherqawi prerogatives. Shortly afterward Mulay Hafed ordered Hajj Muhammed (2–10), along with the “qaid-s, notables, and council” of the Bni Musa and Bni ‘Amir, to his court (E, two identical proclamations sent to the two tribes, dated 23 April 1908 / 21 Rbi‘a 11326). Both tribes were already supporters of Mulay Hafed. Predictably, although the sultan assured Hajj Muhammed that he had “absolutely nothing to fear,” the latter never left Boujad.

Mulay ‘Abd l-‘Aziz rapidly lost support on the Tadla Plain. In April 1908 he asked the Bni Khiran to furnish him with horsemen for an expedition. A few days later he made a similar request to the Wer- digha that indicated the weakness of his position: “We are aware that you followed Mulay Hafed against your will. You did not have the necessary strength to resist him. For this reason we accord you complete pardon” (E, 1 May 1908 / 29 Rbi‘a 11326). There no longer were the customary menaces of retribution.

From their arrival in Casablanca, the French military carefully monitored the local political situation of the Shawya and, ostensibly only to protect the Shawya, the neighboring regions. Since Driss ben ‘Umar of the Zawya Sherqawa worked for them, the French tended for years to underestimate the importance of the rival ‘Arbawi faction. Moreover,

the French presumed a notion of marabou tic legitimacy in which only one person could be recognized as lord of the zawya at any given moment, so that rivals were dismissed by them as “malcontents.” Even after the French established a forward intelligence post at Ben Hmed in the Shawya in late April 1908, to provide them with better intelligence on the Tadla Plain, they did not alter their assessment.

Mulay Hafed passed through the Tadla Plain in May 1908 to consolidate support there.[137] Throughout this visit he was accompanied by Hajj Qaddur, a brother of the lord of the ʻArbawa. By the early summer, most of the tribesmen of Werdigha and Bni Khiran had shifted their support to Mulay Hafed. Moreover, Weld Zohra of the ʻArbawa gained the reputation of being Mulay Hafed’s political agent for the Tadla Plain. Anyone who wanted access to Mulay Hafed (or his powerful ally, Qaid l-ʻAyyadi of Rhamna) first had to speak with the lord of the ʻArbawa.

Two parallel administrative structures developed in this period, each supported by one of the Sherqawi lords and his clients. Hajj Muhammed of the Zawya Sherqawa counted on the support of tribal qaid-s who owed their posts to him. The lord of the ʻArbawa arranged for rival qaid-s to be appointed by Mulay Hafed. Thus in Bni Brahim (Bni Musa), an unpopular qaid had been appointed on the advice of Hajj Muhammed. The ʻArbawi lord arranged for appointment of a rival Hafedist qaid, more acceptable to the tribesmen. Similar tactics were employed on a section-to-section basis.

Despite the weakened position of the supporters of Mulay ʻAbd l-ʻAziz and consequently of the Zawya Sherqawa, Hajj Muhammed was still considered by the French to be the “legitimate” Sherqawi marabout. When the French undertook a major reorganization of the qaid system in Shawya, they at least formally sought Hajj Muhammed’s advice. The French were informed (by Driss?) that the Sherqawa were “traditionally” consulted in such appointments. The French were aware, however, that in consulting the Sherqawi lord, they served only to augment his prestige. On these grounds Lieutenant Colonel Fretay of Military Intelligence advised in late July against the appointment of Hajj Muhammed’s nominee for qaid over the Mzab and ʻAshash tribes, especially since the appointment would not strengthen Mulay ʻAbd l-ʻAziz or the French (JP, 29 July 1908).

Fretay was also concerned with the “ambiguous” attitude of Hajj Muhammed toward French interests.

In November 1908 Paul Marty, then an officer in Military Intelligence,[138] was sent to Boujad to report firsthand on the political situation. The timing of his visit and substance of his report suggest that his main purpose was to sound out the Sherqawa on the consequences of the imminent shift of French support to Mulay Hafed. Marty, although aware of dissent, remained convinced of Hajj Muhammed’s dominant position: “Everywhere the natives show signs of the highest veneration for him, listening to his advice and following his orders. Nevertheless, he has enemies. At the moment, the malcontents and ambitious of each tribe gather around his nephew, “Weld Zohra” Ismaʻil. The Smaʻla have always been troublesome to him” (Marty in JP, 1908). While in Boujad, Marty stayed at the house of Hajj Muhammed. A day after his arrival, what he termed an “anti-French” demonstration occurred in front of Hajj Muhammed’s house, intended to show the “lack of authority” of the Zawya lord. Hajj Muhammed’s response was to order the notables of each quarter to call on Marty and express their lack of hostility toward

France. Marty conceived of the Sherqawi position as follows: “[The ʻArbawi] faction [parti] relies on Berbers from outside [the region]: the Zayyani, Mha u Hammu and the Wirrani, Mha u Seʻid. Some statements of the Zayyani have particularly instilled a certain fear in [Hajj Muhammed] . [Mha u Hammu] said that after the harvests he was going to destroy Boujad ... [Hajj Muhammed] asks that the French come to his aid in such a case.... I made a dilatory reply and promised to relay his request” (Marty in JP, November 1908). Hajj Muhammed seemed most concerned with securing from the French their guarantee that his interests would remain secure whatever the outcome of Makhzen politics:

The Sid has marked sentiments for ʻAbd l-ʻAziz. He concluded by telling me that whichever Sultan France might recognize in Morocco, he avidly hopes that [a guarantee of his status] will be included in the conditions imposed on the new Sultan so that he will be maintained with all the advantages of his situation.... He is against all Makhzen intervention in the affairs of Boujad as well as in the estates [fermes] which he possesses in the exterior:

Shawya, Dukkala, etc. This question is very important to him and I believe that he will soon come personally ... to Casablanca [to discuss it]. (Marty in JP, November 1908)

Shortly after Marty’s visit, the French issued a patent of protection to Hajj Muhammed which exempted him from direct Makhzen administration.

Mulay ʻAbd 1-Aziz’s position rapidly crumbled. Not long after Marty’s visit, Hajj Muhammed wrote General d’Amade, commander of French forces in Casablanca, asking what position to take. The general replied on 8 December, announcing that Mulay ʻAbd 1-Aziz had abdicated and had been replaced by Mulay Hafed. He advised the Sherqawi lord that his animals, clients, and other interests would be protected. “Do not worry about news from the outside. If anyone tells you to rebel, do nothing.” He was further assured that “mutual friends” had intervened to make the new sultan “forget” Hajj Muhammed’s support of ʻAbd l-ʻAziz (Ecorcheville 1938:105).

The sudden abdication of Mulay ʻAbd l-ʻAziz and reversal of the French position did not bring an end to internal conflict. Moreover, many Moroccan clients of the French were caught in an untenable position. The Journal Politique of May 1909 acknowledges that when the French were “led” to the support of Mulay Hafed, they advised qaid-s and others “in contact with them” to shift their support to Mulay Hafed. The French recognized, however, that there was little they could do to ease the precarious situation of those who, at French insistence, had earlier supported ʻAbd l-ʻAziz. Hajj Muhammed was commended for his “Francophile sentiments” (writers of other reports assessed his sentiments less favorably) but was recognized as one such loser (JP, Sicard, May 1909).

Clashes between the supporters of the two sultans did not cease. From the summer of 1909 onward, “anarchy” and “banditry,” to use the terms of the French reports, were on the rise. Significantly, the reported upsurge of “anarchy” coincided with a growing desire of the French military to intervene directly in the affairs of the Tadla Plain. Throughout this period, Hajj Muhammed continued to be useful in quelling tribal disputes. At the end of 1909, Hajj Muhammed combined a visit to the French outpost at Ben Hmed with a

collection of offerings from various Shawya tribes. In the course of these rounds, he arranged for a truce (sulh) between the ʻAzizist and Hafedist factions of the important Bni Smir tribe by collecting fines from both groups. Two weeks later, on 12 January 1910, he returned to the French outpost accompanied by his brother, Sidi Muhammed Sultan, who was at that time qaid of Werdigha. Muhammed Sultan requested the French to exempt both the Sherqawa and their clients from corvee labor. The French were aware that his intention, although clothed in the argument of "tradition," was to increase the strength of his own clientele by offering significant material advantages to his supporters. The French replied that they had done all they could to maintain or enhance the marabout's interests. Such demands, together with French awareness that the marabout was still influential but less than fully committed, or essential, to them, made at least one officer suggest that it would be in the French interest to confine marabouts to strictly "religious" affairs. The ensuing de facto separation of social roles initiated a chain of events which encouraged a similar differentiation in the realm of ideas, as I have argued. Ironically, the disturbances caused by the French occupation of the western plains and the struggle for the sultanate left virtually nothing of what the French considered the "spiritual" aspect of the zawya. The school (madrasa) of the zawya was irremediably crippled by the disturbances leading up to the protectorate. The Sherqawi marabouts, sensing no doubt the changed social circumstances, no longer showed any overt concern over its fate (Cimetiere 1913).

By 1910 the French had consolidated their hold over the Shawya. The urban and rural elites of Morocco began clearly to realize that the French were significantly altering the rules of the game of political entrepreneurship in Morocco. Local centers of influence and prestige could still be maintained, but only through alliance with the French. An early French innovation was the requirement that marabouts, including the Sherqawa, obtain French authorization to make the rounds of tribesmen to collect their "rights," or offerings. Thus in 1910 Hajj Muhammed was allowed to visit Wlad Seʻid, Mzamza, Gdana, and Wlad Bu Ziri client tribes located in the French-controlled Shawya. The French were not entirely pleased with his ensuing conduct. The Journal Politique (January-February 1910) reports that he spread "alarmist rumors," among which were that the French had renounced the idea of further extension of their influence and that yet another change of regime was to be expected. However, the French were aware that Hajj Muhammed was still influential among the tribes. In any case, he remained a significant conduit of intelligence regarding tribal politics on the Tadla Plain.

Another indication of changed circumstances was the constant stream of letters between Driss ben ʻUmar and Hajj Muhammed, arranging frequent visits of the Zawya lord with the French "ambassador" (bashador\ consul, and military officers. The principal concern of the Sherqawa in these visits was to maintain or extend their privileges in the Shawya. In a letter written early in April 1910,[139] Driss asked one of his brothers in Boujad to gather all royal decrees held by the descendants of Sidi ben Dawd (2–8)—in other words, those held by both the Zawya and the ʻArbawi Sherqawa. Driss mentions those individuals most likely to possess them, an indication of how little communication there was between the two factions, and promises their timely return. What was at issue, he wrote his brother, was the status of all Sherqawi ʻazib-s in the Shawya, but he asked that this be concealed from other Sherqawa. On 9 April, Hajj Muhammed was summoned to Ben Hmed to discuss the matter with the French. A second meeting took place a week later at Qasba 1-Mzab. On both occasions the Sherqawi lord unsuccessfully attempted to convince the French of "traditional" Sherqawi prerogatives. Sherqawi ʻazib-s were stripped of their special status. Their inhabitants, Sherqawa and non-Sherqawa alike, became subject to taxes, corvee labor, and direct Makhzen administration. Late in 1910, another major administrative reorganization was

made in the Shawya. In it, the French reduced substantially the number of qaid-s and shaykh-s and stipulated that henceforth such officials would be drawn exclusively from the groups over which they had authority. The Sherqawa were no longer to be consulted over the nomination of officials in Shawya, although their advice was still sought for the upper Tadla Plain as late as 1913. Alarmed by the exclusion of Sherqawa from Shawya affairs, Driss ben ‘Umar wrote Hajj Muhammed (S, January 1911 / Mu- harrem 1329), suggesting that he oppose the French move. Driss also asked to be sent a list of Hajj Muhammed’s nominees for the qaid- ships, together with their tribal origin and any information useful in maintaining Sherqawi influence. His efforts were unsuccessful.

Ostensible concern for the security of the Shawya led the French military to extend their activities to the Tadla Plain, although their instructions from Paris expressly forbade such action. The military’s justification for the ensuing expeditions was that the marabout Ma l-‘Aynin, who had effectively organized resistance against the French in Morocco’s far south, had come to the Tadla Plain for the same purpose. His presence seems to have been conjured by the military, since intelligence reports for the period, usually precise in their documentation, provide no specific accounts of the marabout’s activities. There were, however, other “agitators.” The advantage to the French military of asserting Ma l-‘Aynin’s presence was that he was recognized as a formidable threat in ministerial and parliamentary circles in Paris, whereas the other “agitators” were not. Nonetheless, the raids organized by these “agitators” into regions nominally protected by the French suggested to many tribesmen that the French hold was tenuous. For this reason the military was anxious to stop them.

The French launched what was meant to have been, at least to the metropolitan authorities and the parliament, a secret punitive expedition. One column, composed largely of Senegalese troops under Commandant Aubert (the French often practiced the economy of using colonial troops to maintain their empire), left from Ben Hmed in the north and proceeded through Boujad, Qasba Tadla, and the “dissident” regions of Bni Musa and Bni ‘Amir. A second column proceeded from the south of the Shawya. When Aubert reached Boujad, Hajj Muhammed was asked to accompany the column in order to minimize resistance. Aubert clearly was under the assumption that a marabout had “authority” over his tribal clients. The Sherqawa had probably encouraged, or at least had not corrected, this assumption during their earlier attempts to maintain a voice in the political affairs of the Shawya. The assumption was now put to an empirical test.

Fearing stiff resistance to the French, Hajj Muhammed pleaded illness and instead substituted a kinsman “with no prestige or authority” (JP, D.14, June 1910). When tribesmen in the Qasba Tadla region later offered only token resistance, Hajj Muhammed quickly joined the column in an effort to take credit for this. But he refused to accompany the column to the Bni ‘Amir. At this point, Hajj Muhammed told Aubert that he had absolutely no prestige among that tribe and asked that the ‘Arbawi lord, Muhammed “Weld Zohra” (2–12), be asked instead. Aubert attributed Hajj Muhammed’s refusal not to the structural position of the marabout, which did not include the exercise of formal, political authority, but to a lack of character: “Without attaching more importance than deserved to the charges of his enemies, who portray him as playing a double game, one is led rapidly to the belief that this religious figure wavers above all through impotence and that his pusillanimity renders him incapable not only of leading a popular movement, but even of forseeing it” (JP, D.14, June 1910). The French possessed earlier accounts that the “malcontent” ‘Arbawi lord had a sizable following, but only one report (JP, D.20, Sicard, May 1909) correctly perceived that there were actually two “legitimate” marabouts in the eyes of the Moroccans. Weld Zohra was summoned from Boujad and quickly joined Aubert’s

column. There was an element of surprise in his acceptance, for the French had been led to assume by the Zawya Sherqawa that Weld Zohra was implacably anti-French. Aubert wrote that, as the column progressed. Weld Zohra successfully “reduced fanaticism.” However, a fatally hostile assembly of tribesmen was waiting for the column among the Wlad ʻAyyad of Bni Musa. Among the tribesmen there were reportedly some Ait ʻAtta from the High Atlas Mountains. The marabout tried to “reduce the fanaticism of the crowd, some of whom accused the Sherqawa of having sold Shawya to the French and of trying to do the same with Bni ʻAmir and Bni Musa!” A shot was fired, which killed the marabout.[140] Regard for his maraboutic baraka was restored immediately upon his death. Tribesmen fought over his remains in order to bury him, or part of him, on their own lands, but the lord’s retainers managed to regain possession of the corpse and return it to Boujad. Weld Zohra was posthumously awarded the French Legion of Honor for his services (JP, Aubert, June 1910).

None of these events mitigated the hostility between the ʻArbawi and Zawya Sherqawa. When he learned of Weld Zohra’s death, Driss ben ʻUmar, in Casablanca, felt compelled to write to his uncle Hajj Muhammed that it would be “reasonable” (^aqil) for him to present condolences to prominent ʻArbawa. That such a letter was even sent indicates the prevalent antagonism. Driss presumably was motivated not only by propriety but also out of concern for the image of the Zawya leaders in the eyes of the French.

Mulay Hafed waited for over ten months before appointing a successor to Weld Zohra. Finally, on 30 April 1911 / 1 Jumada I 1328, he issued three proclamations naming Sidi ʻAbdallah ben l-ʻArbi (2–13) as the “exclusive” lord of the Sherqawa and assigning all Sherqawi estates to him (E). Despite Weld Zohra’s sacrifice for France and the Makhzen’s appointment of an ʻArbawi as lord, the French continued to assume that Hajj Muhammed was the only “legitimate” Sherqawi lord. By now, however, the French were in a position to impose their definition of realities upon Moroccans, and their disregard for the action of the Makhzen was evidently not successfully contested.

Rather than mitigate hostile raids, the indecisive French action served only to exacerbate them. For one thing, marabouts and what the French called “war chiefs” were able to rally many tribesmen in a holy war (jihad) in the defense of Islam. The internal organization of these raiding parties has been discussed in Chapter 4. Unfortunately, the French reports give only terse, inconclusive comments on their ideological component. Another motivation to join antiFrench raids was the fear of falling under Makhzen authority. The French were aware that anti-French resistance in Dukkala, for instance, was tenacious because of the heavy-handed rapacity of Qaid l-ʻAyyadi of the Rhamna, one of the “grand qaid-s” on whom the French were soon to rely for control of the south (JP, Col. Brauliere, September 1910). They were also aware, however, that the leaders of some raids seemed motivated only to demonstrate their importance to the French. Thus, a marabout from the zawya of Taneghmelt (Ntifa), Sidi Hmed ben ʻAbbas, acquired a significant following on the southern Tadla and began raiding tribes that had submitted to the French. Through the intermediary of a qaid in Sraghna “friendly” to the French, he suggested that his neutrality could be purchased (JP, December 1910).

These raids continued throughout the summer and fall of 1910 and the following year. The Sherqawa used them as an opportunity to demonstrate to the French their ability to monitor and settle the tribal disputes of the Tadla Plain. At French request, the lord of the Zawya Sherqawa regularly undertook the settlement of disputes (e.g., S, Driss ben ʻUmar to Hajj Muhammed, 8 July 1910 / 29 Jumada II 1328). The ʻArbawi Sherqawa also tried to

gain French attention in this manner. Thus in November 1910 Sidi Sherqi ben l-‘Arbi Sherqawi, later to become overseer of pious endowments for the Tadla and Bni ‘Amir plains under the protectorate, wrote General Monier and described the great expense he had incurred in arranging for the disbanding of the raiding party of Shaykh Mha l-‘Attawi.[141] The French recompensed him, although they were skeptical of his influence in halting Shaykh Mha’s activities. Sidi Sherqi was unsuccessful in attracting a following in the winter of 1911. At least some of the French were aware of the cyclical patterns of raids, which diminished rapidly with fall planting and did not resume again until after the harvests. In the fall of 1910 the French received numerous tribal delegations seeking protection from these raiders (and presumably also from the French). Some French interpreted these delegations as a sign of their growing influence, although others were aware of the vulnerability of tribesmen to French threats during fall planting.

In general, the French were unimpressed with the ephemeral truces arranged by marabouts. For instance, Hajj Muhammed was often unsuccessful in arranging lasting settlements. He also reported to the French that a deputation of tribesmen from Werdigha, Bni Khiran, Sma‘la, and Bni Zemmur had asked him what attitude to take with Shaykh Mha and another anti-French “agitator.” The anonymous writer in the Journal Politique remarks that the marabout “prudently” advised them not to attack the French (JP, April- May 1911). Earlier, the Journal complained of the “shady” (louche) attitude of the marabouts of Boujad and of another zawya in Dukkala, because maraboutic loyalties shifted with their perception of the strength of the antagonists. The writer was particularly concerned with the Dukkali marabout, Sidi Ahmed Tunsi, who maintained a contingent of horsemen with orders to join the winning side of any dispute in order to carry away a share of the booty (JP, December 1910).

After the summer of 1911, the French report only minor conflicts on the Tadla Plain. The reporting for this period, however, is also rather thin, reflecting the transfer of French attention to the Fes region where, by the end of the year, five thousand troops were camped outside the walls of the palace. Having eliminated the last international obstacles to their protectorate in November, the French began in earnest to prepare for colonial rule. Henceforth, the Sherqawa were to play only a minor role in their calculations.

** Glossary

‘alem (pl., ‘ulama): religious scholar.

annexe. See melhaqa.

‘ar. conditional supernatural curse or compulsion.

‘Arbawi Sherqawa: one of the two most prominent descent groups of the Sherqawa.

‘ashur-. tithe; in preprotectorate Morocco the term also signified a

government tax or, with the consent of the sultan, a payment made to a designated marabout in lieu of a tax.

‘azib\ estate granted to marabouts by the preprotectorate Makhzen that was exempt from direct government taxes and controls.

baccalaureat’. degree granted upon the successful completion of six years of secondary studies in France and Morocco.

baraka-. supernatural blessing; abundance.

bay’a: oath or covenant of allegiance to a king or marabout.

Boujadi: person from Boujad.

cercle. See da’ira.

college’, school providing the first three years of the six-year cycle of secondary education in France and Morocco.

controleur civil’. French official in charge of a cercle (da’ira); the lowest rank in the French Native Affairs administration in protectorate Morocco.

daher: royal decree or proclamation.

da’ira (Fr. cercle): ordinarily the smallest unit in Moroccan administration, over which a qaid is placed.

dawwar: rural local community (lit., “circle”).

derb: an urban quarter, in western Morocco (in Fes the term merely signifies an alleyway or impasse).

fabor: gratuitous act thought to require no reciprocation.

Fassi: person from Fes.

foqra. See fqir.

fqih: a person who knows Islamic law; a Qur’anic teacher; a marabout, usually a minor one.

fqir (pl., faqra): a patrilineal descendant of ‘Umar ben 1-Khattab; a mystic; a poor person.

funduq: hostel for travelers or the urban poor containing small sleeping rooms and stables.

hajj: the pilgrimage to Mecca; also used as a title by those who have made the pilgrimage.

haqq: obligation; share or right; truth.

hshuma: impropriety; impertinence; shame.

hshumiya (theshshem): propriety; deference.

“Um (pl., “ulurn): religious knowledge; religious scholarship.

imam: prayer-leader.

jinn: a form of supernatural being.

jma‘a: council or gathering.

Ka‘ba: the sacred house at Mecca around which the circumambula- tion is performed.

karama: miracle story; sign of God’s bounty; generosity.

kelma: “word” or authority.

khayma: tent; residential unit.

madrasa: school; in this study, one of traditional Islamic higher learning.

Maghreb: North Africa; also the Arabic term for Morocco.

Makhzen: colloquial term for the Moroccan government; “the place where treasure is stored.”

marabout: a person, living or dead, thought to have a special relation toward God which enables him to ask for God’s grace on behalf of his clients and to communicate it to them.

Marrakshi: person from Marrakesh.

medina: city; in North Africa this term often specifically designates the traditional, precolonial part of a city.

mektub: “that which is written”; God’s will.

melhaqa (Fr. annexe): a subdivision of a cercle (da’ira) with a qaid appointed over it (an administrative anomaly in Morocco, of which Boujad is virtually the sole example).

mellah: a quarter inhabited by Jews and containing a synagogue; also loosely designates any quarter with a heavy concentration of Jews.

mokhazni: soldier; guard attached to the office of a qaid.

mqaddem: spokesman; one who represents another (used in a variety of contexts).

msarfa: a general term for social exchange; dealing.

Mulay (title): honorific title prefixing the name of a patrilineal descendant of the Prophet Muhammed.

musem: a periodic festival in honor of a marabout.

niya: faith or intent.

pasha: Moroccan official responsible for a town or city.

qadi: a religious judge.

qaid: tribal chief appointed over a tribe or small town during the protectorate; now a Ministry of the Interior official responsible for a rural or urban da’ira.

qa’ida: code for conduct; “the way things are done.”

‘qal: reason.

qodret Allah: God’s will.

qrab. Sttqrib.

qrib (pl., qrab): a person with whom one has close agnatic ties; a person with whom one has sustained bonds of obligation developed out of friendship, clientship, alliance, residential propinquity, etc.

Residence: the office of the French Resident General in protectorate Morocco; the administrative center of the protectorate.

ryal: a unit of Moroccan currency. In 1970 a ryal was roughly the equivalent of one American cent.

saheb (pl., ashab, shab): companion or associate; a person with whom regular transactions are made.

Salafi: a reformist Muslim.

saleh: a pious or devout person; a saint; in some contexts, a marabout. shaykh: religious teacher or head of a mystic order; government official.

Sherqawi (pl., Sherqawa): a person claiming descent from the marabout Sidi Mhammed Sherqi.

shorfa. See shrif.

shra‘-. Islamic law.

shrif (pL, shorfa): patrilineal descendant of the Prophet Muhammed through his daughter, Fatima.

Sid, Sidi\ honorific title of address used for marabouts and claimed descendants of ‘Umar ben 1-Khattab.

Sufi, Sufism: Islamic mystic; Islamic mysticism.

t‘argiba: the sacrifice of a bull to conclude or renew an oath of allegiance or to seek a truce; involves the imposition of compulsion (‘ar).

tariqa: Sufi brotherhood or mystic “way.”

tasawwuf ’. the practice of Sufism.

tata\ contractual ritual alliances (preprotectorate).

theshshem. See hshumiya.

‘ulama. See ‘alem.

‘ulum. See “Um.

wali\ saint.

wefh’. “face”; prestige.

zakat, alms tax.

zawya\ religious lodge or residence of a prominent marabout.

Zawya Sherqawa: one of the two leading Sherqawi descent groups, formed in the late nineteenth century.

zewwar-. “visitor,” a maraboutic descendant who acts as intermediary between clients and his maraboutic ancestor.

zyara: local pilgrimage to a maraboutic shrine; an offering to a marabout.

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[1] Parsons’s judgment is curious, since he characterizes his own work as no more than a paradigm (1964:485). It would appear that Weber asserts no more for his own work (1964:109).

[2] Dead, that is, from an observer’s point of view. For those who believe in marabouts, “dead” ones are alive and well in their shrines, ready to influence the turn of events in this world.

[3] Here I should point out that I use the term maraboutism in a broader sense than is usually found in the French literature. Many French writers, including Berque (1957:14), distinguish between maraboutisme, conf r er is me and other forms of religious organization. Yet these all share the underlying notion of a hierarchical relation between man and God. Although useful in some respects, Berque’s categorization is misleading for such maraboutic groups as the Sherqawa, which exhibit characteristics of various forms of organization that Berque sees as necessarily competing. To my knowledge, only Ali Merad uses mara- boutisme in the broader sense that I do. One other caution is here in order. I have decided to reserve for a later study, which will deal with traditional Moroccan intellectuals, the exploration of varieties of what I here call “formal” Islam, such as modernism, reformism, neofundamentalism, and so on. From the vantage point of Boujad and other parts of rural Morocco, the distinction between these various intellectual currents tends to blur.

[4] After the protectorate was established in Morocco, it would appear that the French regarded only the nonindigenous elements of society as inherently “progressive.” For a detailed account of the formation of colonial stereotypes toward Moroccans, see Burke 1973:175–199.

[5] Such assumptions became powerful ideological weapons in the hands of political advisors to the French Residence. For instance, they were used to justify the separation of native from European populations in the cities on the basis of a Muslim “preference” to be so isolated. They also justified such French policies as the famous Berber Proclamation (daher) of 1930, which removed Berber-speaking regions of Morocco from the jurisdiction of Islamic law. The goal was to foster a separate Berber (i.e., non-Arab and to a certain extent non-Muslim) identity. Jacques Berque has sarcastically referred to these policies as an attempt to create a Berber ethnographic reserve or “national park” (1967).

[6] The translation is by the author, as are subsequent translations unless otherwise indicated.

[7] Bel originally intended to complement his study with two other volumes. One was to have dealt primarily with mara- boutism and religious brotherhoods. The other was to have dealt with “pagan survivals” in Islam. Neither was ever published, although his approach to both themes is readily apparent in his first, published volume.

[8] The term tariqa also signifies a religious order to which affiliation is in principle individual and voluntary.

[9] Along with other writers, Bel assumes that there is a conscious deception involved on the part of many who claim to be marabouts. Foreign travelers and diplomats in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries provided some supporting evidence for this notion. Ali Bey (Domingo Badia y Leblich) met a marabout, “a better sort of man,” who admitted that he was a cheat. “He repeated often his favourite saying, that fools are made for the amusement of men of ability.” The attitude of religious scholars toward marabouts which Ali Bey reports is remarkably similar to present-day attitudes: “The Fakih and the Taleb pass over these tricks in silence, and leave the people in their folly, though they themselves know very well what to think of it, and conversed very frankly with me upon the subject” (1816:48–49).

Chenier (1788:179–191) presents a similar view of marabouts, although he differentiates types of marabouts more clearly than Ali Bey. Chenier describes “sainthood” as a lucrative profession or trade, passed from father to son or sometimes from master to servant. He also claims that among his friends was a well-known saint who admitted to him that he was an impostor.

[10] The formal conception of educated Moroccans (and that of the current Moroccan constitution) is that the king is only the “commander of the faithful” (amir l-mu’minin). Nevertheless, for all practical purposes the doctrines of the sultanate (temporal authority) and the caliphate (spiritual authority) are popularly fused. Elsewhere in the Muslim world the distinction between these two conceptions is often highly significant.

[11] This was the stillborn “Projet de constitution marocaine” drafted by a “young Turk” coterie which surrounded Sultan Mulay ‘Abd 1-Hafed (reigned 1908–1912). This was one of the last-minute efforts to reform Morocco to enable it to cope with the growing European influence over its affairs. Article 7 of this document reads: “Tout sujet du Royaume doit obeissance a ITmam cherifien et respect a sa personne parce qu’il est 1’heritier de la Baraka [All subjects of the kingdom owe obedience to the Shrifian Imam and respect to his person because he is the inheritor of the Baraka]” (cited in Robert 1963:311).

[12] Most of the royal decrees mentioned are from translations into French made under the direction of Claude Ecorcheville while he was controleur civil of Boujad in 1938. These are indicated by E in the text. (On the accuracy of these translations, see my note in the bibliography.) Material taken directly from the unpublished correspondence of Sherqawi families in Boujad is indicated by S’. Dates are given in both Muslim and Christian Eras.

[13] One exception is Da’ud’s encyclopedic local history of Tetouan, which is still in progress (1959-). Although not explicitly a social history, it includes numerous references to marabouts and suggests the wealth of documentation available, at least in some regions, for local history. Mukhtar es- Susi has written a similar local history for the Sus.

[14] The account of ed-Dila which follows is based primarily on Drague (1951:137–139), although Hajji (1964) has also been consulted.

[15] Similar ties were earlier maintained with the declining Sa‘adi dynasty. Sultan Mulay Zidan (reigned 1613–1627) is reputed to have built the shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi’s mother, Laila Rahma. It is located along the Umm er- Rbi‘ River, to the east of Qasba Tadla. The sultan probably constructed the shrine as an attempt to gain favor both with the Sherqawa and with their tribal clients.

[16] Al-Ifrani obliquely refers to a “great misfortune” which befell him. Evidently he fell out of favor at the court of Mulay Ismahl and sought refuge at Boujad for several years (Levi-Proven^al 1922:115, 119–120).

[17] Myths and oral traditions concerning him that are current on the Tadla Plain will be presented and analyzed in chapters 6 and 7.

[18] Examination of the tension between the sultanate and marabouts for a later period, the eighteenth century, is provided by Morsy’s excellent essay on the Ahansal (1972). The presence of a European witness provided the key text for her examination of the otherwise reticent “official” historiographies and elements of local legends.

[19] The maraboutic successors to Sidi Mhammed Sherqi are called “lords” (sid-s). Names in the text which also appear in accompanying figures are given numbers to facilitate identification. The number before the hyphen refers to the figure in which an individual first appears. The same number is also used in later figures.

[20] Mhammed ben Naser also had ties with the zawya at ed-Dila. Likewise Sidi Mhammed 1-Ma‘ti was lord of the Sherqawi zawya during ed-Dila’s apogee, but the texts again give no clue as to the substance of these ties. Drague is incorrect in describing the Sherqawi lodge as “subsidiary” to the Nasiriya order, although his informants at Tamgrut in the 1930’s may have made such a claim. Drague may also have simply repeated the error of Cimetiere’s earlier account (1913:287). The affiliation of individual Sherqawa had no effect on their descendants, according to contemporary Sherqawa.

[21] This individual is a grandson of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Hmadsha legends make Sidi ‘Ali a disciple of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, a chronological impossibility (Crapanzano 1973:30–37).

[22] I am grateful to Muhammed Sherqawi for this information ,which he bases upon manuscript sources which I have not yet been able to verify personally. I have, however, seen a deed (resin) authenticating the sultan’s ownership of a house in Boujad.

[23] For a detailed description of such arrangements in the Moroccan southeast, see Dunn 1971.

[24] A more extensive analysis of these holdings and subsidiary zawya-s, with the documentation available for each of them, has been presented in Eickelman 1972–1973. To the list given there should be added Sidi Mekki Sherqawi, patron marabout of the town of Azemmur. A group of his claimed descendants lived about twenty kilometers from the town. Until the 1920's, a living descendant of Sidi Mekki lived in the town itself and accepted offerings (Le Coeur 1969:120).

[25] The Makhzen itself seemed unclear as to the status of these estates. In 1901 Sultan Mulay 'Abd l-'Aziz ordered the properties of the Sherqawi zawya to be divided equally between two rival lords (E, 20 October 1901 / 7 Rejeb (1319). A marabout from the zawya at Wezzan was sent to supervise the division. According to Sherqawi informants, he discovered that, unlike the situation in Wezzan, where 'azib-s were considered the collective property of the zawya^ most of the Sherqawi 'azib-s were owned by individuals and could be divided only by the laws of Islamic inheritance. Consequently he reported to the sultan that the Sherqawa were fighting for property which in any case could not be divided (Eickelman 19721973:45, Ecorcheville 1938:72). However, Jacques Berque has kindly informed me that there were also private 'azib-s at Wezzan. This suggests that other factors came into play in the decision attributed to the Wezzani marabout.

[26] In a posthumously published document, Foucauld quotes the following Sherqawi comment on relations with Mulay Hasan I: "We don't fear him and he doesn't fear us. He can't harm us and we can't harm him" (1939:135).

[27] The qadi from 1894 until the early years of the protectorate was Mhammed ben Saleh, of the Qadiriyin descent group of the Sherqawa. Shortly after the death of Sultan Mulay Hasan I in 1894, one prominent Sherqawi sent Mhammed ben Saleh a note concerning an inheritance dispute in which he was an interested party. It stated his intent to pursue the dispute as soon as the authority (sulta) of the Makhzen was restored (E, Mhammed ben Saleh to 'Umar ben Sidi ben Dawd, 17 March 1894 / 10 Ramadan 1311).

[28] If slaves were maltreated, they often ran away and sought refuge with marabouts or other intermediaries until given assurances by their masters that their condition would improve.

[29] At the end of his stay in Boujad, Driss gave Foucauld a letter offering his services to the minister of France in Tangiers and asked whether he would be made a qaid upon the arrival of the French (Foucauld 1939:135). In 1907 Driss sought Foucauld's intervention to obtain his post with the French consulate in Casablanca (Gorree 1939:62–72).

[30] Evidence of 'Umar's role is primarily oral, although it is supported by the fact that correspondence relative to Mha, as well as copies of the correspondence which passed between the sultan and Mha, was found among 'Umar's papers (S. 24 November 1882 / 13 Muharrem 1300; 20 July 1883 / 15 Ramadan 1300; 3 December 1883 / 2 Safar 1301). These letters were addressed to Sidi ben Dawd.

[31] The substance of the complaint was that ‘Umar had appropriated for himself revenues derived from allowing individuals to be buried on the grounds of a Sherqawi zawya in Meknes.

[32] This distinction eluded Drague (1951), among others.

[33] The inhabitants of the region consider the Tadla Plain as stretching roughly from Bni Mellal to Khuribga. This is the usage which I follow. Recent geographical studies (Martin et al. 1967; Noin 1970) delimit the part of this plain surrounding Khuribga as the Phosphates Plateau. This delimitation is based on the criteria of geomorphology and modern economic activities but is peripheral to accepted popular usage.

[34] Jacques Berque, originally a controleur civil during the protectorate, has suggested a connection between the appropriations which did take place in this region in the late 1920’s and the Wad Zem massacre of 23 August 1955 (1967:35). On the morning of that day, the Sma[4]la cut the telephone lines to the town and invaded it, killing eighty-seven Frenchmen out of a population of eight hundred within a few hours. In reprisal at least five hundred tribesmen were killed by French ground and air forces in subsequent days; houses were destroyed and animals slaughtered. The uprising was considered the most significant rural resistance to the French in the waning years of the protectorate.

[35] In 1963, 35 percent of Boujad’s adult (over age 21) residents had been born in the surrounding rural area. Eleven percent came from other regions of Morocco. The remaining 54 percent had been born in Boujad itself. (These figures are calculated from the municipal electoral lists, 1963). The assumption of an increased rate of immigration is based primarily upon the qualitative appraisal of Boujadi-s and upon more general demographic studies (e.g., Noin 1970: II). Statistics comparable to those of 1963 are not available for earlier periods.

[36] Zyara is also the term used for visits to Mecca outside of the pilgrimage season.

[37] In the dialect of the Tadla Plain, derb is synonymous with huma, although the latter term is rarely employed. This usage can be confusing, since, in the dialect of Fes, huma means “quarter,” while derb signifies an alleyway or impasse. Thus, in Fes, a hurra contains a number of derb-s. I point out this variation in order to avoid possible misunderstanding.

[38] For a detailed, broadly analogous description of the internal changes of a market in northern Morocco and its postprotectorate transformation, see Fogg 1938.

[39] Seventy-five percent of the animals brought to the market are sheep. Goats comprise another 12 percent, cattle 7 percent, and other animals—camels, donkeys, and horses—the remaining 6 percent (Raynal and Andre 1955).

[40] In the late 1960's the rural holdings were taken over by the Ministry of the Interior and in principle exchanged for equivalent urban holdings in the interests of agrarian reform.

[41] Two of the non-Sherqawi shrines are dilapidated, virtually unvisited shrines in an old, abandoned cemetery to the north of Boujad. One shrine belongs to 'Ali ben S'id; the other is supposed to be the shrine of a marabout of the neighboring Sma'la tribe. Both these marabouts are regarded as having lost their religious powers because of the empirical fact that their shrines are untended. They are also falling into obscurity. The third non-Sherqawi shrine is that of Rabbi Lewi, located in the midst of the Jewish cemetery. Jews of Boujad origin who now live in Casablanca still return on occasion to visit it and see to its maintenance.

[42] There were fewer visitors in the remaining two weeks of the festival period. A very rough estimate is an additional ten thousand.

[43] The term "shadow qaid" I owe to Clifford Geertz. He uses it primarily to refer to the common administrative pattern in which the "stranger" who is qaid in one region informally consults a native of the region who is qaid elsewhere. The latter person is the "shadow qaid." I use the term more broadly because in my experience in western Morocco, such "shadows" are commonly locals who hold no formal administrative posts.

[44] Since 1970 Boujad has had no regular qadi. The Ministry of Justice decided there was not a sufficient case load to warrant a full-time religious judge. One is supplied from a neighboring town on each market day.

[45] This formulation of social structure owes much to discussions with Lawrence Rosen, Clifford and Hildred Geertz, and Lloyd A. Fallers. For Rosen's development of the concept, see his account of Arab-Berber relations (1973) and Arab-Jewish relations (1972). In addition, many of us interested in Morocco have been aided greatly by Fallers's earlier work on Buganda (1959: esp. 23). For a discussion of similar problems in Iran, see Bill 1973.

[46] An example of this dissociation in a Sherqawi quarter is the one which claimed as eponymic ancestor Sid 1-Mursli, one of the sons of the founding marabout. It was located next to the shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Presently it is remembered by only the oldest Boujadi-s, although descendants of this marabout are still in Boujad and entitled to a share in the offerings of the main shrine. The buildings which constituted the quarter still exist. Many elderly Sherqawa still live there. It is simply not regarded as a quarter anymore. Some of the households are now tacitly assimilated into neighboring Sherqawi quarters. Jewish residential areas followed a similar pattern. As I mentioned earlier, Boujad never had a mellah in the strict sense of the term, although the quarter in which the synagogue was located was called the mellah. When all but one Jewish household departed in 1963 and the synagogue was deconsecrated, its quarter quickly became known as part of Qadiriyin, the Sherqawi quarter which encompassed it. A more dramatic indication of these shifts is the difficulty which local officials have in using an administrative map of quarters prepared by the French in the 1930's, which is still supposed to be employed for governmental purposes. Many of the boundaries have shifted,

and several names are unidentifiable. Although they are supposed to use the labels provided by the official map for such things as election registration, officials admit that they are unable to do so and instead use the nomenclature “which everyone knows.”

[47] In recounting this episode, informants regarded this turn of good fortune as a sign of God’s favor to Bu Bakr and attached no adverse connotations to his behavior.

[48] A brother of Mali’s (7–6), actively seeking a government post at the time of field research, indicated how the same calculations of “closeness” operate in other contexts. He told me that his weld ‘amm (father’s brother’s son), a government clerk m Rabat (7–2), was helping him in the matter. In this case, the “actual” link (i.e., in terms of Islamic law) was known. The person claimed as weld ‘amm by Islamic law was actually his sister’s husband’s mother’s sister’s son (weld khut umm raj el khuti) or—since both one of his brothers and his sister had married into the same household—his brother’s wife’s mother’s sister’s son. Again the justification offered for using the term weld ‘amm was the quality of “closeness” claimed to exist between the two persons.

[49] Bni Zemmur is an administrative creation of the protectorate. The colonial government, like the precolonial Makhzen, often created “tribes” for administrative purposes. Tribesmen recognize the term Bni Zemmur as a vague clustering of their “actual” tribes but not as a unit of effective social action, except in so far as the government treats the “Bni Zemmur” as a reality. Tribesmen regard their “actual” tribes—i.e., those with which they identify in nongovernmental contexts—as Rwashed, Shegran, Bni Battu, Bni Zrantel, and Wlad Yusef. These are officially considered to be sections of the Bni Zemmur.

[50] It has sometimes been asserted that all tribes in North Africa can be described in terms of segmentation. Elsewhere, I plan to deal at length with the issue of segmentation theory and its relation to rural social structure in North Africa. Attempts to apply segmentation theory to North Africa are interesting for some of the epistemological considerations they raise but are peripheral to the main concern of this book. Besides, many anthropologists and social historians interested in North Africa since the mid-1960’s are only now preparing monograph-length studies. A discussion of broader epistemological issues will become more meaningful when these are available so that they can be contrasted with the earlier contributions of colonial ethnographers. For the nonce, the most thorough, and devastating, critique of the concept of segmentation as sociological theory can be found in Peters’s (1967) account of the Bedouin of Cyre- naica, earlier described as segmentary by Evans-Pritchard (1949) (although with none of the thoroughness of his studies,of the Nuer). Summaries of recent empirical research indicating that the concept is no more accurate as a sociological description of the tribal organization of preprotectorate Morocco can be found in the contributions of Seddon and Vinogradov, explicitly, and Dunn, implicitly, to Gellner and Micaud, eds., Arabs and Berbers (1973). An earlier but highly thoughtful French discussion of the problems of social identity inherent in defining tribe can be found in Berque (1953).

[51] No ties are claimed with the component groups of the Bni Zemmur of the Boujad region, although in practice the two groups have had multiple ties through the Sherqawa, shared pasture lands, and factional alliances prior to the protectorate. In calling these groups “tribes,” I am following local usage. Several French administrative reports term the Sma‘la and Bni Zemmur “confederations,” although this usage is not consistent.

[52] Since independence the Moroccan government has officially abandoned the division of rural Morocco into tribes. These have been replaced with rural “communes” (jma‘a-$\ each of which generally carries the name of the tribe residing in it. In principle, each commune has popularly elected officials who form its council. This group, under the tutelage of its qaid, administers a small budget for public works. The principle behind the reform was to replace primordial loyalties, encouraged during most of the protectorate, with broader, national ones. Despite sincere efforts on the part of many administrators, the impact of the communal system remains politically and socially marginal.

[53] Townsmen frequently claim that tribesmen are ignorant of Islam and thus pay no heed to these formal religious activities. Such claims are hardly new. There is preprotectorate evidence for the existence of such rural mosques for the neighboring Shawya region, along with denials of their existence by townsmen (Mission Scientifique du Maroc 1915:1, 121).

[54] Informants claim a similar flexibility prior to the protectorate despite the much greater occurrence of intergroup hostility. The preprotectorate manuscript correspondence which pertains to the nature of “traditional” tribal organization mentions only the relations of tribes and tribal sections. This is to be expected, since most of the correspondence concerns Makhzen intervention in tribal affairs (S, ‘Ali Mesfyuwi to Sidi ‘Umar Sherqawi, 17 December 1881 / 25 Muhar- rem 1299; S, Driss ben ‘Umar to Sid l-‘Arbi, February 1894 / Sha‘ban 1311; E, Mulay ‘Abd l-‘Aziz to Sid 1-Hajj 1-Hasan, 25 January 1903 / 25 Shawwal 1320).

[55] Milk brotherhood is created when two children are nursed by the same woman. In Islamic law, persons thus linked are treated as full siblings for purposes of marriage, although they gain no rights of inheritance. It should be noted that, although the terminology reported here is current throughout western Morocco and the Middle Atlas Mountains, variations exist elsewhere. I quote in full a personal communication from Ross Dunn (1974): “Alliance through the milk exchange was called tafargant among the Ait ‘Atta (particularly referring to their alliance with the Bni Mhammed). It is clear that the ‘Atta made a clear distinction between tafargant (which included a marriage taboo) and tata. That is, the ‘Atta do not seem to have regarded tafargant as a type of tata, but as something quite distinct.”

[56] There are two ways to account for this apparent anomaly of the mixing of “levels” of tribal organization. One is to suggest that, in the sixty years which have elapsed since this alliance was contracted, one group or the other has been either “raised” or “lowered” from local community to tribal section or vice versa as the result of the internal realignment of tribal organization. Alternatively, it is equally plausible that such an arrangement simply made sense in terms of tribal geopolitics and the demographic size of the two groups involved. Informants from the two groups saw no anomaly; only tribal strong-men who deal regularly with the administration speak of clearly demarcated “levels.”

[57] Informants were unable to tell me whether in these cases tata also involved marriage prohibitions between the contracting groups. See note 12 above.

[58] His name suggests that his tribe of origin was the Ait ‘Atta, a powerful Berber group situated in the High Atlas Mountains to the south of Bni Mellal. Neither David M. Hart (personal communication, ca. 1971) nor Ernest Gellner (personal communication, 1969), both of whom have written extensively on this tribe, can identify him.

[59] The French, misunderstanding the Moroccan concept of baraka^ or perhaps understanding it all too well, recognized and supported only one of the two rival Sherqawi lords of this period as a marabout.

[60] For an excellent discussion of the same concept in a biography of a Casablanca merchant, see Waterbury (1972: esp. 155156).

[61] For a fuller elaboration of this term in its classical context, dissimilar but not unrelated to contemporary Moroccan usages, see Izutsu 1964:203–219 and the discussion in the text of reason as a social concept.

[62] A Muslim general, d. 681.

[63] D. 792.

[64] “L-bashar ‘andhom l-‘qal. Ta-ymiyzu bin 1-haja Hi ddorhom we-l-haja Hi ma ddorhom-sh.”

[65] The implicit metaphor is that thoughts, like vegetables, must ripen and mature before being offered for consumption.

[66] For all practical purposes in terms of Islam as popularly understood in Morocco, Christians, generally called the rumi-s (Romans), fall outside the sphere of ordinary social action. The problem of how Christians demonstrate reason is one which does not immediately present itself to Boujadi-s, few of whom have had regular contact with foreigners.

[67] Abstinence from drinking usually begins a month prior to Ramadan.

[68] This account is consciously meant to trace the inculcation of these concepts in men only. The socialization of females is similar with respect to propriety but differs considerably in other aspects crucial to male-female roles. For one thing, daughters traditionally remained in the care of their mothers, while boys were expected to move beyond the women of the household circle at an early age. The spread of education for girls, especially in towns, undoubtedly will rapidly result in changing conceptions of propriety in relation to public space. Unfortunately this topic has only begun to be investigated, and the best discussion to date (H. Geertz 1974) is still in mimeographed form.

[69] My informant’s wife called regularly at the house of the official. These visits were never reciprocated, since the wife of the high-ranking man was never allowed to leave her house. The visiting pattern indicated the ranking of the households in relation to each other.

[70] In classical Arabic, haqq is frequently used in the sense of “truth” or “that which can be verified.” It is used in this sense in records of court proceedings, which, of course, are conducted in classical Arabic. In colloquial use, ‘andek l-haqq can in some contexts also be translated as “you’re right.”

[71] Of a nearly complete sample of 838, only 61 (7.3 percent) of Bou- jad’s merchants and craftsmen had acquired capital from other individuals for their enterprises in 1970. Of these 61, 37 (60.7 per cent) had borrowed from kinsmen. In a few such cases, the owner of the capital would effectively assert dominance over the activities of the borrower. A very few cases of real partnerships existed, almost always between kinsmen, in which both worked in the same shop. Such partnerships, even between brothers, tended to have very short lives. The only exceptions to this overall pattern are Boujad’s itinerant rural cloth-sellers. As mentioned in Chapter 3, these individuals were originally Qur’anic teachers (fqih-s) who took over the business of Jewish merchants shortly after independence. These traders act collectively in their purchases, share storage space in Boujad, and in other ways regularly act in one another’s interests. Bou- jadi-s consider this cooperation exceptional and attribute it to the fact that, as former Qur’anic teachers, the clothsellers are really trying to live according to the principles of Islamic brotherhood.

[72] Men claim no formal knowledge of these processions but, since they involve activities in public space, quietly plan to the last detail the hire of carts and musicians and the route the public display will take in order to avoid possible embarrassment to the household. Male servants often accompany such processions to maintain order. No women and children of higher prestige participate in the public processions. Hence such processions tend to consist primarily of clients and lower-ranking neighbors, at least in the case of more distinguished households.

[73] For an extensive presentation of examples of situations involving the “greater” and “lesser” ‘ar and the means for their invocation, see Westermarck 1926:1, 518–564.

[74] The word is derived from “ar on the istif”al pattern of formal Arabic. This pattern is used to make up words which include in their meanings the action of asking for or requesting.

[75] The term “shur is also sometimes used for offerings to marabouts.

[76] This term is also used to denote a refusal to accept the political authority of the Makhzen, as in tribal rebellions.

[77] The judge later counseled the father to drop the case. He tried— in his words—to make him “see reason and avoid “arT

[78] Only one tribal informant ever directly applied the analogy of manman and man-God relations and spoke of “dealing” (jrtsarfa) with God and his associates (ashab, sg.^saheb). Since the Qur’an explicitly states that God has no associates, other informants, including those maintaining ties with marabouts, spoke of the above statement as coming from someone ignorant of Islam (jahel).

[79] I plan to devote a later, separate study to the analysis of the content and rhetorical form of these myths. Although such covenants are to my knowledge represented only in the form of myths in western Morocco, written covenants exist elsewhere. Berque (1955:278) reports one that dates from 1840 for a Berber-speaking group of the High Atlas Mountains.

[80] For the Arabic version of this myth and bilingual presentations of two others, see Eickelman and Draioui 1973.

[81] Meknasi is one of the eleven children attributed to Sidi Mhammed Sherqi.

[82] Ascent to the top of Mount ‘Arafa is forbidden to pious Muslims.

See the article on “Mount ‘Arafa” in Gibb and Kramers, eds. 1961.

[83] The underlying concept here is that life is a gift of God which can be taken back at his will.

[84] This quotation is in saj’ verse, a sort of limerick rhyme often indicative of supernatural inspiration. See the article “Kur’an” in Gibb and Kramers, eds. 1961 for a more complete description. Note the implicit contradiction in the words of the marabout. He claims that those like him can forbear but then expresses his grief over the loss of his son.

[85] Literally, l-amana dyal l-haqq, “the trust which belongs to God.”

[86] I.e., “If this is our reaction to the loss of this son, what will we do at the death of another?”

[87] It is unclear whether Sidi Mhammed Sherqi says this sentence as if his wife were not present or whether it is spoken by the narrator. I am assuming the latter to be the case.

[88] A spring located in Boujad.

[89] Sem‘li is the singular of Sma‘la. Note that at this point the Bni Zemmur cease to be mentioned in the myth.

[90] The implication is that the marabout was in a shrine.

[91] T esq aw. lit., “to irrigate” or “to nourish.”

[92] Khelfiya, Sidi Mhammed Sherqi’s wife, is, like the marabout himself, considered to be a descendant of ‘Umar ben 1-Khattab.

[93] Human sacrifices are, of course, prohibited in Islam. Note that, for the second time in the myth, the marabout is compelled to take a particular action as a result of the interference of his wife. The first time was when her uncontrolled grief compelled him to settle elsewhere.

[94] Sidi ‘Ali died in either 1718/1719or 1722/1723, over a century after the death of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi (Crapan- zano 1973:23). Such historical precision is, of course, irrelevant to the social relations which are thought to have existed between the two.

[95] In social actuality, the component groups of the Bni Zemmur maintain ties with the Sherqawa but are regarded as lacking faith (niya) by the Sherqawa and surrounding tribes. This lack of faith, indicated by merely nominal offerings to the Sherqawa, is said by many tribesmen to account for the poverty of the Bni Zemmur in relation to other groups.

[96] A similar equivalency occurs in actual social relations. An isolated example occurred as recently as 1969. A tribal group in Dukkala wanted a Sherqawi whom they considered prominent to live among them. They built him a house and provided a tribeswoman as wife. The tribesmen themselves paid the entire bridewealth (sdaq) to the girl’s father. The Sherqawi did not participate even symbolically in raising the bridewealth. This is the only such exchange that I know of to have occurred in recent years, but once they appear to have been more common. Le Coeur (1969:120), who studied the town of Azemmur between 1930 and 1933, reports that, until a few years before his arrival, there was a living marabout who claimed descent from Sidi Mekki Sherqawi, patron marabout of the town and its region. Offerings were regularly made to him, including young girls selected by lottery. Unfortunately Le Coeur gives no further details. Le Coeur was also told that this marabout passed his time smoking kif (hemp), drinking rum and tea, and openly avoiding prayers and the fast. Such activities evidently were taken as a sign of his special insights.

[97] Some Sherqawa, usually from the same descent grouping, have competing claims to the right to “work” certain tribal groups. In this circumstance some agree to work in teams, others to divide the proceeds of such visits.

[98] Some of these contrasts have been suggested by Turner (1973).

[99] Significantly, each bull offered at that time represented a separate tribal section. As

with sacrifices at the shrine of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, the bulls were offered simultaneously, but not on behalf of any supersectional collectivity.

[100] On the significance of this color and other points, neither the Sherqawa nor the Sma‘la offer any explanation.

[101] More distant groups from Shawya often simply offer cash.

[102] Conditional offerings are called, literally, “that which the marabout picks up” (l-merfuda dyal esh-shaykh). These frequently are offered in the case of illness by individual clients. The father of a sick infant, for instance, will choose an animal of his herd, which ideally is the age of his child, and whisper in the animal’s ear that it will belong to the marabout if the child recovers. The sacrifice is actually made only if there is a successful recovery.

[103] The need to maintain baraka by controlling access to its possessors is a major reason why women are often discouraged by the Sherqawa from seeking access to marabouts and prominent visitors. One visitor explained to me that women can rarely make significant offerings of their own. They often offer small coins at the major shrine and occasionally will sleep overnight next to the sepulcher of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. Only men can make or offer to make sacrifices, so that husbands and wives generally go together to shrines for major invocations or to deliver sacrifices which have been promised to a marabout for services rendered. Many activities associated with women are strictly forbidden by custodians at the major shrines. At unattended shrines, women often smear henna on the portal or leave locks of their hair and small strips of cloth torn from their garments as reminders of the request they have made to the marabout. Such conduct is forbidden at major shrines, although it is often attempted.

[104] Fqir has this sense primarily on the western plains of Morocco: Shawya, Tadla, and Dukkala (see Westermarck 1926:1, 35–36). David M. Hart (personal communication, ca. 1972) reports a similar use in the Rif. In addition to Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, two other major marabouts on the western plains also base their legitimacy on ‘Umari descent: Sidi Shegdal ben Ghilan (Bni Shegdal) and Sidi ‘Ali u Brahim (Aid Bu Zid, Wad Nfis). In classical Arabic, fqir signifies a religious ascetic (Bel 1938:352), as mentioned in Chapter 1. In current speech the term is also a polite way of referring to an impoverished individual. Among many young, urban Moroccans, the distinction between joqra and shorja is currently often blurred or nonexistent.

[105] Of course, even Figure 2 telescopes past events by omitting reference to any but recent contests for the lordship. Many Sherqawa, in reciting Sherqawi lords, omit one or the other of the variant lordship lines for this century.

[106] A slightly different version of the ties of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi with some of the tribes of western Morocco is offered in al-Qadiri’s seventeenth-century biography of the marabout (1913:127–129). He writes that the Sherqawi lord was originally from the Werdigha tribe (near present-day Khuribga), which in turn was from the Bni Jabir. Although many Sherqawa knew of the existence of this account, they saw no need to reconcile the two versions. After all, they reasoned, the ties of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi with these groups

are “known,” and they are all descendants of ‘Umar.

[107] Sultan Mulay ‘Abd 1-Aziz (reigned 1894–1908) was named after this marabout because he was born near the marabout’s tomb while his father was on a military expedition.

[108] These facing shrines are tended by a small group of descendants of Sidi bel Gasem (including one Sherqawi from Boujad), each of whom has specified days on which he collects offerings. There is also a small festival held each fall at the shrine of Sidi bel Gasem, attended primarily by Berberspeaking groups. Since knowledge of the clients of marabouts is highly concentric, few of the Boujad Sherqawa have any specific knowledge of the activities associated with this shrine.

Laila Rahma is said to have been from the Drissi dynasty, the first descendants of the Prophet to rule in Morocco. In the 1930’s, this claim was legitimated by an elaborate genealogy of twenty-four individuals, some of whom have tombs on the Tadla Plain (Ecorcheville 1938). No one to whom 1 spoke during my fieldwork could refer me to anyone able to recite this genealogy.

[109] Partial evidence for this is a directive from the Grand Wezir to Qaid ‘Abd 1-Qader of Boujad (E, 7 February 1927 / 4

Sha‘ban 1345) ordering the payment to be made. Other directives from the Grand Wezir to the qaid from this period (E: 14 February 1927 / Il Sha‘ban 1345; 20 May 1927 / 18 Qa‘ada 1345) indicate several other disputes over revenues from Sherqawi shrines. There is no evidence of any such official intervention in maraboutic affairs after 1929, a fact which indirectly confirms Marty’s assertion to that effect (1929:575–600).

[110] There are also tombs for two daughters of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi, both of which are visited only by women. Neither tomb has custodians. One is that of Laila Mina, next to that of Sidi Mhammed Sherqi. She is said to have had the baraka to weave a jellaba for him in a day, an activity that normally takes weeks or months. The other tomb, of fairly recent origin, is that of Laila Hniyya, supposedly efficacious at reconciling quarreling couples. Women leave strips of their clothing stuck with henna to its door. So far as I could gather, both tombs were maintained by the municipal budget. The only explanation I received for this was that both tombs were next to a main road, so that it would be unseemly to allow them to fall into disrepair.

[111] Boujadi-s and merchants from Demnat were affiliated with it (F. Berger 1929:47). There were at least three other zawya-s in Khnifra, each of which had as members merchants from a particular city or region. Fassi-s affiliated with the Tijaniya; Marrakshi-s with the Qadiriya, and so on. Each “alien” community also had its own quarter and tended to be occupationally specialized (F. Berger 1929:44–45). Unfortunately, Berger does not indicate patterns of affiliation to these lodges, if any, for the Middle Atlas Berbers.

[112] In 1969 the formal mqaddem-s included a zewwar who was also a weaver, a retail grocer, a bicycle repairman, a government shaykh and prayer-leader in a mosque, the custodian of a major Sherqawi shrine, a primary schoolteacher, and a notary.

[113] This account is primarily from a Sherqawi notary (‘adel) actively interested in the affairs of the shrine. The exact nature of the administrative or judicial tribunal which handled this dispute is unclear. Similar mechanisms for division exist among groups of shorfa., so it is possible that the French imposed the same pattern upon the Sherqawa by analogy.

Division of the offerings has not occurred in recent years because of charges of embezzlement raised in the late 1960’s against several of the overseers. Some Sherqawa unsuccessfully attempted to bring the dispute before various local government agencies. These echoed an old protectorate stand that “religious” matters were not a governmental concern. Others claimed that the dispute was a “family” affair which had to be worked out among the Sherqawa themselves. Meanwhile the mqaddem-s keep the offerings for shrine expenses.

[114] A tenet of Islamic law is that a woman can be married only to a man who is at least her “equal” (see Schacht 1966:162). What constitutes equality (kafa’a) in a legal context— wealth, social honor, education, descent from the Prophet or ‘Umar—would make a fascinating study, especially if historical shifts in its definition were taken into account.

[115] Unfortunately it is not possible to calculate the rate of such marriages for town-born commoners from my sample. My guess is that it would not differ greatly from the two known rates.

[116] The notarial fee in 1970 was 1.5 percent of the bridewealth (sdaq). Rural bridewealth is called ‘orram (lit., “heap”). Rural marriages are almost always concluded before the number of witnesses required by Islamic law. If it is ever necessary to go before an Islamic law court, it is thus possible to prepare a formal contract at a later date, based on the declarations of these witnesses. (Courts do not recognize marriages for which there is no valid written contract. This is important in legal cases involving inheritance and support.)

[117] In conceiving of Figure 14,1 have benefited from discussions with Hildred Geertz and from her study on Moroccan kinship (1974).

[118] Contemporary sociological usage prefers the more precise term cohort to generation. A cohort is defined as “an aggregate of individual elements, each of which experienced a significant event in its life history during the same chronological interval” (Ryder 1968:546). In the discussion in the text, I follow Mannheim’s older usage, which, in the context of his writing, is not open to the charge of ambiguity.

[119] J. Cimetiere, the first Native Affairs officer assigned to Boujad, incorrectly states that the visit occurred in October (1913: 289).

[120] There was only one exception to this policy throughout the protectorate. In the early 1930’s a brother of ‘Abd 1-Qader Sher- qawi, then the qaid of Boujad, was appointed as qaid of Fqih ben Saleh. But this individual had totally dissociated

himself from the affairs of the zawya and had served for some time as an officer in the French army.

[121] This assessment of him was contained in the draft of a French intelligence report of the 1930's. The French administration required monthly intelligence reports from its local officers, a section of which were devoted to assessments of the various notables. In addition, special reports were prepared on an annual basis. I have seen some of those written in the 1930's and early 1950's, in the form of carbons and drafts which the French overlooked in removing their confidential records from Boujad. These were mixed with less sensitive documents in a storeroom of the qaid's office in Boujad, to which I was given access by the local administration. Because of the disorder of the "archives" left behind by the French, they have evidently not been consulted since independence. Many of the documents, especially the drafts, lack the filing numbers that identify final copies. France has a fifty-year law concerning its archives but, for technical reasons, it is claimed, no post- 1912 records concerning Morocco are available for scholarly research. The Boujad archives are identified in references as B.

[122] For example, one merchant held an English patent as agent for an English-owned Shanghai firm with a branch in Tangiers which imported tea and sugar (B, Steeg to Commandant of Meknes region, 25/D, 23 March 1924). With the dispensation of the resident-general himself, a later patent was granted to the brother of the local leader of a religious order that was highly antagonistic to the Sherqawa (B. 10/BC, 23 February 1928).

[123] There were just under one thousand such rural adherents to non- Sherqawi brotherhoods in Boujad's tribal hinterland in 1952. The source for this estimate is the draft of a local intelligence report, which lists membership in the four major brotherhoods and breaks it down by local community. In no case are two brotherhoods found in the same local community, a fact that suggests the limitations upon personal maneuvers in the tribal setting. One order was limited in another way. The mqaddem for the Tijaniya brotherhood in Boujad told me that his order attracted only literate tribesmen, including some rural shopkeepers. The 1952 report partially confirms this, since only thirty-nine rural Tijani-s are claimed, never in the relatively larger concentrations indicated for the other religious orders.

Although the general trends indicated by these figures are corrobated by interviews, they must be treated with extreme caution. These figures were gathered during an upsurge of anti-French feeling in tribal regions, one significant index of which was the inability of the French to collect rural taxes effectively. The French were extremely suspicious of organizations of any form in the tribal hinterland, so that the informants were undoubtedly under pressure to minimize the importance of the brotherhoods.

[124] How tenaciously these ties were maintained can be seen in the fact that sixty-four tribesmen of the Boujad region fighting for the French in Indo-China in 1949 sent the marabout — qaid Sidi ben Dawd (2–15) a large sum of money to say invocations on their behalf (B.37/cl, 24 January 1949). Such offerings were also sent regularly from servicemen and workers in France, although not through official channels as were the offerings from Indo-China.

[125] The cordiality of these encounters was stressed to me by both the Boujadi-s and the French involved in these negotiations. Local archives confirm that the controleur of Boujad supported various educational improvements suggested

by local non-Sherqawi notables (B.1170 B / I, 6 June 1936; B.1181, 24 August 1938). To the credit of the local French officials, this was often done over the opposition of local qaid-s who, perhaps correctly, saw all expansion of educational facilities as a potential threat to their positions.

[126] For this reason, I am dealing with the topic of this small cadre of intellectuals in a separate study, now in preparation.

[127] Rezette characterizes the entire nationalist movement, even at the level of its national leadership, in similar terms. He calls this the “personalization” of power (1955:245–246, 282–285, 287).

[128] One local nationalist suggested that the French unwittingly contributed significantly to the nationalist movement by repeatedly imprisoning its suspected members. His own time in prison enabled him to meet at length and solidify ties of confidence with nationalists elsewhere in Morocco. What the experience of schooling had done for cementing ties between many nationalist leaders in Morocco’s larger cities, prison accomplished for those of smaller towns.

[129] To maintain the morale of servicemen in their overseas forces, the French had for decades employed a similar strategy. Special officers were assigned to France’s native Moroccan troops to aid in formulating and transmitting complaints of the troops about land disputes and other matters in Morocco. Such complaints seem to have been treated with more consideration than many of those locally originated, since written reports had to be prepared and retaliation was impossible (e.g., B.1344, 27 October 1952; B, Capt. Jeanlet, 2 December 1949; B.906, 11 July 1952). Overseas servicemen also complained regularly to the special officers about the excesses of qaid-s and certain Sherqawi notables. Such accusations are notably absent in court proceedings and other inquiries held in Boujad itself.

[130] This qaid increasingly yielded to pressure from the nationalists. Thus, after the bloody demonstrations in Boujad and Wad Zem in 1955, Boujad’s controleur sent the qaid a list of fifteen “responsible” local nationalists, ordering their arrest. The qaid’s signature was needed for form’s sake. Fearing reprisals, the qaid hurriedly consulted with one of the men on the list, who told the qaid to write down all the names of those killed during the day and to sign that list. He did, so that the French issued arrest warrants for those already dead. The local controleur was, of course, aware of the substitution, but in the waning days of the protectorate he was undoubtedly also aware of the futility and personal danger of challenging this maneuver.

[131] I have briefly indicated the sources for this account in the first section of Chapter 2. Arabic correspondence comes from the collections designated as E and S. There are several French accounts for this period. The earliest are contained in the archives designated as JP. The best of these accounts are J. Sicard’s “Note sur la situation religieuse des tribus traversees par la mehalla du Caid Layadi,” JP, Serie D, carton 20, May 1909, and Capt. Verlet-Hanus, “Notice comparative sur 1’etat politique des tribus traversees, rapport d’ensemble,” JP, March-May 1909. The fullest account is Ecorcheville 1938:89–114. Ecorcheville has told me (interview, 1970) his method of

preparing the account. As controleur civil of Boujad, he “invited” the two leading Sherqawi notables of the 1930’s, Qaid Hajj ‘Abd 1-Qader and Qadi ‘Abdallah, to provide him with any correspondence in their possession relating to the Sherqawa. These he supplemented with the files of his own archives. Ecorche- ville’s translator prepared translations from the Arabic of necessary documents. As he prepared his account, Ecorcheville frequently asked the two notables, particularly Qadi ‘Abdallah, to clarify points of detail for him and to explain when necessary the relations among the protagonists. Since Qadi ‘Abdallah had participated in some of these events and other Boujadi-s were also alive who had firsthand knowledge of them, I have used Ecorcheville’s account extensively. During my initial fieldwork in Boujad I was unaware of Ecorcheville’s study and constructed my own narrative of events based upon the Sherqawi correspondence (S) and the accounts of informants. The account in this appendix fully incorporates Ecorcheville’s study.

[132] For example, under the pseudonym Hajj al-Bashir (“the pilgrim bearing good news”), Driss wrote his father in February 1894/Sha‘ban 1311: “If you should speak with His Majesty soon concerning the Werdigha [tribe], tell him the following: Bni Khiran is being led away from the Makhzen by the Werdigha. Second, have the sultan order the Sma‘la to refrain from contact with Bni Khiran” (S). Much of the private correspondence which I have examined lacks signatures or in other ways seeks to obscure meanings, to prevent its use by hostile third parties. The identity of writers, however, is generally clear from their handwriting.

[133] Ecorcheville’s source was Sidi ‘Abdallah ben l-‘Arbi (2–13). As a youth he was with Mulay Hasan’s expedition or royal progress when the sultan died in 1894.

[134] Qaid-s were appointed, or reappointed, over most of the tribes of Tadla at this time.

[135] His laqab, or nickname, means “son of Zohra,” his mother. It is used because his personal name, Muhammed, could easily be confused with that of the leader of the rival faction.

It is difficult to assess the significance of his being named overseer of pious endowments. There are virtually no significant pious endowments in the immediate Boujad region, athough there are many to the south, in the region of Bni Mellal. It is unclear whether he was responsible for these, although the jurisdiction of the Sherqawi overseer of pious endowments appointed at French initiative after the protectorate included the entire region.

[136] The delegation, which included Mha u Hammu, was met by Mulay Hafed at Meshra Shayr, on the Umm er-Rb? River. They returned by way of the Sma‘la. Their movements indicate a relatively widespread support for Mulay Hafed at that time on the upper Tadla Plain.

[137] The following account is based primarily on an intelligence report by Captain Verlet-Hanus which appeared in the Journal Politique for May 1909.

[138] He later was to become one of the principal architects of the Berber policy of the

protectorate, which culminated with the Berber Proclamation of 1930 (Ageron 1972:144). An ardent Catholic, Marty allegedly passed out copies of the Bible in Arabic to Muslim visitors to his office.

[139] The letter (in S) carries no date, but its context indicates when it was written.

[140] A Berber from another region was reported to have fired the shot. The Sherqawa probably preferred such an account, although in the circumstances impossible to verify, since an attack by a Sherqawi client might be taken by the French as evidence of a complete loss of Sherqawi "authority."

[141] The letter was anonymous, and the French account of the incident mentions no names (letter, S, November 1910 / Qa'ada 1328; French account is in JP). The identification of Sidi Sherqi rests on the fact that a copy of the request, in his distinctive calligraphy, was found in Boujad. The calligraphy was identified for me by a retired official of the Ministry of Justice.

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*** Preface

This book is intended as an anthropological introduction to the Middle East. This goal is inseparable from a second, complementary one, that of indicating the contribution which the study of the Middle East is making to the main currents of anthropology, especially those which relate to the analysis of complex societies. As anthropological scholarship on the major civilizational areas of the world has reached a critical intensity, certain themes have been more emphasized than others. In research on Black Africa in the 1940s and early 1950s, the nature of political order to be found in “stateless” societies was a predominant question. Much of the anthropological study of India has focused on the cultural and social aspects of inequality, and this literature has profoundly influenced the consideration of stratification and social class elsewhere.

Research on the Middle East is beginning to reach a similar critical intensity and several interrelated themes prevail. One group of problems is suggested by the study of Islam and the means by which a world religion is to be understood simultaneously as a universal ideological force and in its rich local manifestations. How does a world religion such as Islam maintain its vitality in rapidly evolving economic and political contexts, and how do local understandings of Islam affect the wider currents of Islamic civilization?

Another set of problems deals with ideas which people hold of their cultural identity. In a region as complex as the Middle East, with interlocking linguistic, ethnic, religious, kin, and class distinctions, the problems of how personal and collective identities are asserted and what they mean in differing historical and political contexts are especially crucial. Such distinctions are much more plastic than earlier stereotypes concerning their cultural bases have allowed.

A third emerging research focus concerns economic activities—the production and consumption of goods and services. At a general level, shared with other disciplines, this focus involves analyzing the social and cultural impact of developments such as massive labor emigration from poorer countries, the influx of oil and mineral wealth to others, urbanization and land reform, and the shifting circumstances of international politics. A specifically anthropological contribution to these issues concerns the analysis of the cultural values and systems of social relationships associated with forms of economic activity ranging from the Middle Eastern bazaar to “modern” forms of industrial and commercial activities and what happens to values and social relationships in the context of rapid economic and social change.

A fourth research focus concerns changing interpretations of Middle Eastern societies and cultures by Westerners and by Middle Easterners themselves. This problem, once regarded as an historiographic one related only indirectly to “real” anthropological inquiry, is now regarded as implicit in any problem in the human sciences. Ideas concerning what constitutes valid description and interpretation of any culture and society have changed dramatically over the last two centuries, especially as social science has ceased to be primarily a Western or European enterprise.

This book is intended both as a textbook and as an interpretative essay. It is a textbook insofar as it is intended as a self-contained book to introduce students and colleagues to the basic ethnographic themes of the Middle East and the theoretical questions that have been and are being developed by specialists in the region. Although this book is in part necessarily a synthesis of major research, I seek to develop a particular style of anthropological inquiry and show its contribution to the study of a region of complex civilization rather than provide an exhaustive review of the literature. Many textbooks are derivative and unconvincing in that they rarely convey the sense of discovery which leaps from the pages of the more extensive monographs which constitute the central substance of anthropological inquiry. I hope that this book contains enough of the sense of discovery that I have felt in creating it so that readers will be prompted to read'it in conjunction with some of the monographs and articles indicated in the footnotes. The footnotes to each section and chapter are designed to be a guide to further readings on particular topics, and for this reason no separate list of further readings is included. To enhance the value of this book as a guide to contemporary anthropological research, I have indicated the best available sources, even when they are in foreign languages. This is deliberately contrary to some of the established conventions of textbook writing. My purpose is to indicate the cutting edge of anthropological and related research for those who wish to pursue given topics.

The outline of this book first took form when I was asked to prepare a series on Middle Eastern anthropology for CBS-TV's "Sunrise Semester." As the title of the general series implies, these programs did not exactly reach a prime time audience, but writing them brought me directly in contact with the evasive "general" audience so often evoked but never clearly delineated by academics. I wrote for the series as I would for graduate and undergraduate students (in my own experience the distinction between writing and teaching for these two categories of students is often exaggerated because the critical talents of undergraduates are often not fully appreciated) and for anyone interested in the region and civilizations of the Middle East. From correspondence and conversations it gradually emerged that the decision not to seek to popularize by softening the edges of difficult problems was enthusiastically received by an audience wider than one interested simply in the Middle East or in how anthropology as a discipline can contribute to the study of complex societies. I have tried to use the same approach in this book.

In writing this essay, I have benefited substantially from the critical comments and advice of a number of colleagues and friends. Hildred Geertz of Princeton University read the entire manuscript with a critical intensity which enabled me to strengthen and clarify key points of the essay, especially the sections concerning kinship and cultural identity. Paul J. Sanfapon of the American Museum of Natural History also commented with insight upon the manuscript and coordinated key editorial tasks at a time when my absence from the country might have delayed the appearance of the book. My colleague Karen I. Blu at New York University provided timely and detailed suggestions on most of the manuscript. Jon Anderson, Richard T. Antoun, T. O. Beidelman, Vincent Crapanzano, Bouzekri Draiouiy, Christine Eickeiman, Clifford Geertz, Abdellah Hammoudi, Nicholas S. Hopkins, Michael Marcus, Kenneth Sandbank, David M. Schneider, and Delores Walters have also offered useful advice. Except where otherwise noted in the text, the maps have been prepared by Danny Comyetz. Numerous colleagues have generously ' allowed me to use photographs and other materials, and such assistance is acknowl

edged at appropriate places in the text. This book is dedicated to the late Abdul Hamid M. el-Zein, a friend who in his own work sought to make anthropology a self-renewing form of philosophical and social inquiry which could transcend the intellectual traditions of "East" and "West," an aspiration which I fully share.

Dale F. Eickeiman

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*** Note on transliteration

One of the first books which I read on the Middle East was Carleton Coon’s Caravan. [1] As a beginning student of Arabic, I appreciated his careful transcription. It facilitated my identification of unfamiliar terms, and for languages that I did not speak it gave me a general idea of how words were spoken. In a time of publishing economies, the willingness of Prentice-Hall to allow the full transcription of terms from Middle Eastern languages, particularly Arabic, reflects a concern for editorial quality that can no longer be taken for granted. I have in general followed the conventions of the International Journal of Middle East Studies, although in deciding on how to transliterate colloquial terms I have attempted to follow the pronunciation of the area being discussed. For Arabic, the stroke over a vowel indicates it is lengthened: aas in ma, 7as in bean, and u as in noon; ay as in pay is a diphthong. The emphatic consonants (d, s, t, z, h) are indicated by dots under them; kh is pronounced as in Bach; gh as the r of Parisian French. The ^cayn has been rendered with a small, raised ^c, and the hamza, a glottal stop as in the Brooklynese “bottle,” with an apostrophe f). Often in spoken language, even in educated speech, the hamza is dropped; but I have included it in transliteration in those instances where it seemed necessary to do so. Except where otherwise noted, only the singular form of Arabic words is indicated, with -s added for plurals. Adjectival forms of many Arabic place names and words are indicated with an i at the end of the word, as in Arabic. Words and place names with common English forms appear as they do in English and are not fully transliterated. Thus Mecca, not Makka; Fez, not Fas; Quran, not Qur’an; Allah, not Allah; Islam, not Islam; and sultan, not sultan. Richard Bulliet of Columbia University has kindly checked the accuracy of transliterated Persian and Turkish words.

* Part I: Introduction

** 1. Anthropology and the Middle East

*** The Middle East Defined

The term “Middle East” appears clear when it is employed in general commonsense contexts, especially those which imply a contrast with other regions of the world. Yet scholars interested in the region are usually ambivalent about the term. The late Marshall Hodgson reluctantly conceded that of all the terms used to describe the area it was probably the best, but nonetheless proceeded to banish it from his majestic Venture of Islam in favor of a private terminology which he considered to be free of all traces of

Western ethnocentrism.[2] Another historian recently expressed dissatisfaction with the term in an article entitled “Is There a Middle East?” but concluded, after a useful excursus on the characteristics which unite and divide the region, that it remains the best term available.[3]

The specialist’s reluctance to speak of a “Middle East” without providing an extensive gloss on the term is due to the circumstances surrounding its origins. Just like older, more geographically limited labels such as “the Near East” and “the Levant” that remain in use, the term “Middle East” was not coined by inhabitants of the region. It originated with nineteenth-century European military strategists and thus is unabashedly Euro-centered. In the geopolitics of the English military, for example, the “Middle East” meant the command responsible for the region from the Nile to the Oxus; the lands to the east of the Oxus belonged to their Indian command.[4] In terms of civilizational boundaries such a division made little sense since it cut the historically united (or at least interacting) Iranian plateau in two, but after all the term was not coined with scholars in mind.

In contrast, the terms most commonly used to describe North Africa are more sharply defined, although once again this is largely due to the maimer in which the region was divided by European colonial powers. In the first place, the term “North Africa” should not be taken literally. It is almost never used by area specialists to include Egypt. It is generally taken to mean Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. For Arab-speakers this region is generally known as the “Maghrib,” a term which literally means the West and, more poetically, the land where the sun sets. This usage clearly indicates the geopolitics of an earlier epoch, that of the first waves, of Muslim invaders in the seventh and eighth centuries. The term “Maghrib” is popularly used in French as well, largely because the region, less Libya and a narrow mountainous zone in northern Morocco ceded by the French to Spain, was under French colonial domination until recent times. Even in this more compact region, the imposition of colonial boundaries created distinctions which are still significant even though the period of European colonial domination is over. The country known today as the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was considered by Arab geographers as part of the Maghrib and toward the beginning of the twentieth century also came under effective French rule. Yet because it was attached to French West Africa and administered from Dakar it is often considered not to be part of the Middle East, despite the fact that the majority of its population is Muslim and Arabic-speaking, and the country is a member of the Arab League. The Sudan, despite its large non-Muslim, non-Arabic-speaking minority, has no such difficulty in being considered part of the Middle East, but again this is largely due to the accident of spheres of colonial rule—it fell under Egyptian rule about 1830, and by the end of the nineteenth century was ruled by what was formerly an Anglo- Egyptian condominium.

In contemporary usage the “Middle East” is taken to encompass the region stretching from Rabat to Tehran, a distance of roughly 3,400 miles. This is equal to the distance from New York City to Fairbanks, Alaska. To give another indication of its vastness the Middle East includes territory on the three continents of Africa, Asia, and Europe (the European section of Turkey). When certain features of the linguistic, religious, political, and historical complexities of the region are emphasized, it is often extended to encompass Afghanistan,

Pakistan, and, at least in the recent historical past, the states of Soviet Central Asia that are heavily influenced by Islam.

TURKEY

In this broader sense the Middle East has often been characterized as a “mosaic.” Despite the popularity of this metaphor, it has significant drawbacks for the purposes of modern social anthropology, for it does little more than indicate the fact of significant internal regional differentiation. One of the basic arguments of this book is that the juxtaposition of a range of cultural and noncultural features in the Middle East does not in itself make the region unique. Such a “mosaic” characterization can be equally applied to the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, the Balkans, and the Soviet Union, among other locales. Rather, it is the presence throughout the area of key cultural symbols and their variants and through shared historical circumstances that this region can justifiably be considered as a single sociocultural area.

In historical terms the area designated by this broader, contemporary usage of the term “Middle East” coincides roughly with the first wave of Arab invasions and with the three largest Muslim empires at their greatest extent—the Umayyad (661- 750), the early Abbasid (750-ca.-800), and the Ottoman as it was from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. Geographically the region also shares common characteristics. As a whole, it is semiarid and characterized by the prevalence of irrigation agriculture and pastoral nomadism. However, it is not fully delineated by natural frontiers. Although the region is partially cut off from sub- Saharan Africa and from the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent by mountains and deserts, its present northern boundaries with the Soviet Muslim territories, for example, are more political than natural.

FIGURE 1-2 Muslims in the world today. Shaded areas: majority population; areas with tranverse lines: minority population. (Adapted from Aramco Handbook, rev. ed. [Dhahran: Arabian American Oil Company, 1968], p. 230.)

Seen in terms of social and cultural features, the boundaries of the Middle j East are more elusive. The region is closely identified with Islam and is where Islam

' won its first adherents, but thinking of it as a heartland of Islam can lead to a

distorted view' of Islamic civilization. Muslims today are situated in a wide band ; which ranges from Indonesia and the Philippines through the Indo-Pakistani sub- i continent, Soviet Central Asia, Iran, and Turkey to the Arabic-speaking regions of

the Middle East and North Africa and Black Africa. The epicenter of the total Muslim population lies between Iran and Pakistan, on the eastern edge of the area with which this book is concerned.

Similarly, Arabic is often thought of as the language principally identified with Islam and the Middle East, yet unless qualified this assumption also engenders : serious distortions, one of which is to diminish the role attributed to Persian culture

| in Islamic civilization. Although Arabic today is the principal language of the largest

part of the Middle East, this was not always the case. For a considerable period after the initial Islamic conquests of the seventh century, Arabic had still not become the principal language of either commoners or the indigenous elite of many of the conquered regions. Likewise, during the period of the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries, Ottoman Turkish tended to be the principal lingua franca of the elite in much of the region. Persian was also commonly employed in a similar role in regions beyond those s where it is spoken today.

The majority of the region’s inhabitants are Muslim, but only occasionally has this fact provided a base of common sentiment and identity. Currently an ethnic irredentism based upon common language is on the upsurge in the Middle East as elsewhere in the world, but this was not always the case. Thus for over half a century the elite of Turkey have stressed their ties with Europe more than those with their Muslim neighbors. Egyptian elites prior to the 1950s, and again in this decade in certain contexts, stressed the Mediterranean identity of their country as much as its Arab or Middle Eastern identity. The same is true for the various countries of North Africa. Historians such as Fernand Braudel have persuasively j argued the case for considering the countries on both sides of the Mediterranean as a single society for extended historical periods.[4]

To sum up, despite its drawbacks, the term “Middle East” continues to be the most acceptable of available terms, provided that it is not taken unreflectively to indicate a homogeneity which the region does not possess, much as is suggested by i the misleading concept of the “Arab mind” which has recently resurfaced in some

i popular literature. Alternatives are occasionally introduced, such as the acronym

SWANA (South West Asia and North Africa), and justified on the ground that they ‘ are completely devoid of all historical, political, and religious assumptions. Yet all

such terms suffer equally from unfamiliarity. Furthermore, it is precisely the shifting cultural and historical realities that must be taken into account in any meaningful study of the region, whatever initial difficulties such complexities may offer. In any case, whatever the origin of the term “Middle East,” it is now employed in a fairly neutral, descriptive sense by Middle Easterners themselves and is used in the same way in this book.

[4] Femand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

*** Anthropology: Some Practical Assumptions

Anthropology as an academic discipline is notoriously difficult to define, yet a brief sketch of its nature is essential to indicate its unique contribution to the study of a region such as the Middle East. Many of the anthropological studies referred to in this book use specialized terms in different and occasionally incompatible ways. By indicating some of the broader theoretical issues which are implicit in such usages, these differences can be seen for what they are—references to broader intellectual concerns rather than being inconsistencies of writing or thought.

In an earlier, theoretically less reflective era, social anthropology was commonly—although imprecisely—defined as that branch of sociology most concerned with the study of small-scale, technologically simple, nonliterate societies. Now that sociologists, political scientists, economists, and historians rub elbows with anthropologists in the study of both complex and “simple” societies, such a casual division of labor—always a questionable one—is now fully inadequate. Hence two questions must be raised. The first concerns the nature of an anthropological study of a complex or simple society and the extent to which such a study can be differentiated from those of history and the other disciplines of the social sciences. A second issue, introduced here and implicitly answered by the structure of this book, is the means by which anthropological techniques developed largely in the context of the study of small-scale societies and small groups can contribute to the study of major civilizational areas. By specifying some of the central concerns of anthropological inquiry or, to be more precise, the style of anthropological inquiry developed in this book, I suggest a view of anthropology less heroic than a literal reading of our discipline’s name—the science of man—implies, but which at the same time more accurately represents its unique contribution to the human sciences.

The difficulty in defining anthropology reflects less a confusion on the part of its practitioners than the nature of anthropological inquiry itself. The discipline does not exhibit the features of what Thomas Kuhn calls a “normal” science. There is no clear agreement among its leading practitioners upon a central paradigm for research or upon the nature of the questions to be asked.[5] For this reason the discipline is intractable to ordinary textbook treatment. Indeed, it is one of the few major disciplines for which even the Educational Testing Service appears to have despaired, at least for the time being, of determining a body of orthodox knowledge for which competence can be measured by objective testing. To adapt Kuhn’s concepts to my immediate argument, anthropology is an anormal science.[6] In an anormal field of inquiry, competence in the discipline is acquired by joining its central debates at any given moment.

In England and the United States, anthropology has existed as a formal academic discipline only since the turn of the century but had been a clearly demarcated field of inquiry for several decades before then. Since that time, like the other human sciences, its central concerns have shifted. In the late nineteenth century, anthropology was closely linked with Darwinian concepts of human evolution, so that the techniques and data of what are today separate subdisciplines— social and cultural anthropology (then less grandly known as ethnography), linguistics, archaeology, and physical anthropology—were all loosely united. New frames of reference and methodologies have tended to draw these subdisciplines apart for many purposes although the departmental structure of most American universities still reflects the nineteenth century organization of the discipline.

The lack of a common central paradigm in anthropology makes it difficult to convey the concerns of the anthropologists, especially a sociocultural anthropologist, to nonspecialists. In 1950 Edward Evans-Pritchard, a leading British anthropologist, sought to depict the nature of social anthropology to the English public in a series of radio lectures. He began by admitting that for most persons, anthropology still conjures up hazy connotations of apes and skulls, primitive rites, and curious superstitions.[7] This image of anthropology is of course far from reality; although, given the lack of theoretical orthodoxy, hard and fast characterizations are difficult to make. Thus, the account of the discipline that follows should be considered as a set of working guidelines rather than dogma.

A cultural or social anthropologist studies contemporary or historically well- known societies and is concerned with describing, analyzing, and comparing patterns of order in them. Cultural anthropologists have tended to be concerned with the key symbols through which persons in a given society make sense of the world about them and proceed to act in it. Until the last two decades, this emphasis upon the study of patterns of meaning has been the dominant American contribution to anthropology. Social anthropologists have traditionally been more concerned with the study of regularities in observed social organization and in the ideas held by a society about such organization—how the domestic and public activities of social groups are organized and the consequences of this organization. A concern with such issues has been until recently a dominant

characteristic of British anthropology. It is true that the monographs of most anthropologists emphasize one concern or the other, but in practice the distinction that used to be made between social and cultural anthropology has become increasingly blurred in recent years as the practitioners of the discipline have begun to converge in their key theoretical assumptions. For all practical purposes, the labels of social and cultural anthropology are now interchangeable and are used to encompass more recent theoretical developments as well. My own preference is to use the term social anthropology to encompass what others now designate by the compromise term of sociocultural anthropology. I spell out these flexible usages to avoid unnecessary terminological confusion.

As an enthusiast of my discipline, I recognize that I am passing over several lively theoretical debates of the moment. I am doing this so as not to get bogged down in a technical discussion of the merits of Levi-Straussian structuralism, the nearly cryptological study of symbols favored by others, the reemergence of a somewhat musty evolutionary perspective to the study of society, or other sets of concerns. Instead, I briefly sketch the nature of the discipline as it specifically relates to the study of the Middle East, although throughout the text I refer to other approaches.

In the first place, anthropology, or at least a major tradition within it, is a human science—and as such shares many common features with history, the other major discipline through which the study of major civilizational areas is undertaken. Some anthropologists seek legitimacy for their enterprise by claiming that their goal is to develop universal “laws” of social organization or of cultural order which are somehow independent of specific societies or historical realities. Despite occasional programmatic essays proclaiming this goal, the enduring core of the discipline is contained in detailed, monographic studies of specific societies and cultures. Admittedly, one leading anthropologist, Edmund Leach, has written that he finds the details of ethnography dull, especially the details of other persons’ ethnographies. Yet he is also the first to admit that such details, and the means by which they are interconnected, are the essence of anthropological inquiry.[8]

Comparative studies of societies and cultures are possible on the basis of such ethnographic studies, but the order thus discerned is not of the sort discerned by the natural scientist. In some sciences, such as physics, chemistry, and geology, the patterns of order which are described and analyzed are the products of communication among fellow specialists. There is no question of their speaking with the objects of their study. In anthropology and the other human sciences, like history, the notion of objectivity acquires a special meaning, since the anthropologist must discern the meaning behind a social act in order to comprehend it. Briefly stated, humans are cultural animals. They communicate with others and comprehend the world through ordered, shared systems of symbols. Anthropologists are usually much more concerned with making explicit the underlying logic of these shared patterns of meaning and codes of conduct than are historians, but such patterns must be presumed to exist in the work of both disciplines.

The problem of making explicit such shared meanings has been called the “translation of cultures.” This problem is most vivid in working with the small- scale, relatively isolated groups which have traditionally been the concern of anthropologists, for in such societies such basic concepts as time, space, and person, along with other aspects of the nature of the social order, are likely to be substantially removed from our own concepts. At the same time, such notions are often so taken-for-granted that they usually are not fully expressed by those who share a given cultural tradition. Yet the explanation of such implicit concepts is central to making sense of other societies and cultures. Such problems of translation are just as real for anthropologists studying the rich, complex civilizations of the Middle East; although at first sight there is much more that is at least superficially known about shared patterns of meaning and social action in such societies. The same problem equally exists for a contemporary historian studying, for example, early nineteenth-century sectarian movements in upstate New York when he or she seeks to determine exactly what was the significance to audiences in that period of the frenzied descriptions of the terrors of hell contained in surviving written copies of sermons. In the New York case, the problem of translation initially appears less obvious, as the historian can “get by,” although imperfectly, through a substitution of contemporary attitudes. My point is that some set of hypotheses as to the underlying patterns of the social order must be made in order to render such evidence intelligible. Thus, the historian will seek systematically to state, what is known or knowable about the beliefs and the social order of the earlier period, just as the anthropologist does in the study of any contemporary society, including his own.

So far I have concentrated on the similarities between history and social anthropology. Both entail abstractions from social reality and the comprehension of the shared social meanings which constitute such reality. History differs from social anthropology in the type of abstraction which is made from this reality, although this is more a difference of degree than of kind. A common-sense way of conceiving history has been to consider it as simply a record of what happened in the past along with the discipline concerned in eliciting this record. Yet a moment’s reflection (as Malinowski was fond of saying) makes it clear that any coherent narrative concerning the past requires abstractions from reality. Sartre has aphoristically defined history as “the deliberate resumption of the past by the present” and thus captures at least part of the enterprise involved.[9] Whether the historian is concerned with the Battle of Algiers or the 1933 World Series, no account would be duller or less meaningful than one which naively attempted to gather all relevant documents while imposing no order upon them. The historian must sift through what is known of events and then abstract from them, discarding data that fail to contribute to a “story.” The historian’s primary goal is to elicit the circumstances that are unique to a given event or to a sequence of events. The resulting explanations only partially entail the determination of fact: The more difficult issue, as the French sociologist Raymond Aron has emphasized, is in deciding the best way of arranging the facts to make them intelligible. Unlike scientific explanations, which can be tested and confirmed through success with parallel cases, historical explanations cannot be tested in the same way. Instead, the best historical explanation is the one which is “most consistent, plausible, and in accordance with all the evidence.”[10]

The historian may seek primarily to explain specific events but must still rely upon sociological (or social anthropological) abstractions about the nature of religious beliefs, political relations, and the like in a given society in order to proceed with his narrative. The goal of the social anthropologist is complementary to that of the historian in that the social anthropologist is primarily interested in attempts to elicit and to confirm recurrent regularities in a society—such as the relation of certain systems of belief to social action, the nature of symbol systems, and the relation of types of political authority to various ideas of social inequality. Such explanations are closely intertwined with the understanding of specific historical events. Raymond Aron has gone so far as to say that the job of the sociologist—and sociology as he uses the term encompasses social anthropology as well—is "to render social or historical content more intelligible than it was in the experience of those who lived it."[11]

The relation between history and social anthropology has often been obscured by theorists who presume that because historical and sociological explanations are separable as ideal types, the actual work of historians and sociologists is equally separable.[12] Even a casual comparison of key monographs in social anthropology and in history indicates that the two forms of explanation are necessarily complementary. Marc Bloch's Feudal Society contains long sections on the ideas of fealty and kinship and notions of equality and hierarchy in the social order of Europe over a specific historical period that are as sociological in character as similar passages in Edmund Leach's Political Systems of Highland Burma.[13] At the risk of shocking my anthropological colleagues, I think that Bloch's study can even be considered the superior of the two studies because the nature of his documentation is more carefully described and integrated into his principal conceptual argument, while the argument in Political Systems, for all its iconoclastic brilliance, is more crudely drawn.

Some forms of anthropological explanation at first appear to fall outside the general framework sketched above, such as the seminal example of "pure" symbolic analysis provided by David Schneider's American Kinship: A Cultural Account.[14] [] For the sake of clarity, Schneider deliberately set aside questions of historical development in order to concentrate upon the logical interrelations among the key cultural symbols of kinship. Such an approach does not deny the importance of historical context. Moreover, as Schneider emphasizes, the style of analysis which he used to delineate relations among the key symbols which define ideas of kinship in American culture can be applied to other cultures as well—many such studies now have been carried out—but the direct comparisons of symbols and clusters of symbols about kinship in two or more societies does not lead to any meaningful generalizations which can be applied to cultures in general. A comparison of American cultural ideas of kinship with those held, for instance, by Moroccans facilitates an understanding of what is unique and distinctive about ideas of person and of relationships among them in each case. Such implicit and explicit comparisons are, of course, also used by historians in making sense of their data.

So far I have discussed the nature of historical and sociological explanation in general, but I have not indicated what is distinctly “anthropological” about anthropological research. In terms of the theoretical base upon which anthropologists draw, there is little that is unique to our discipline or to any of the other social sciences. All draw equally upon the works of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and their successors. As I indicated earlier, the study of distinctively “primitive” societies is no longer the hallmark of the discipline, nor is the intensive research technique called “fieldwork” exclusive to us. Yet, because anthropologists emphasize fieldwork as a principal technique, a description of anthropology in terms of what anthropologists do may facilitate distinguishing it from neighboring disciplines.

To prepare for fieldwork, in addition to immersion in anthropological monographs and sociological theory, an anthropologist characteristically, or at least ideally, spends several years learning the language and history of a region. Fieldwork itself generally lasts for a year or two and concentrates upon a particular small-scale group or groups. Evans-Pritchard’s definition of anthropology as that branch of sociology concerned with small-scale societies is now dated, although it reflects the primary concern of the discipline until the early 1950s. The reason for this emphasis on small-scale, “primitive” societies was that in them most significant social relations were assumed to be face-to-face and geographically self-contained. Under these circumstances it was easier for the anthropologist to see the links between institutions—family and kinship relations, friendship and patron-client ties, land tenure, inheritance rules and practices, religious rituals, beliefs, politics, and, most importantly, the shared symbolic conceptions of the world that underlie these various forms of behavior.[15] On the basis of the intensive study of such societies (or, increasingly today, of small groups within larger societies), the anthropologist then proceeds to the hardest job, that of creating out of the record of research a coherent representation of a society and the general principles of order within it. More self-consciously than most historians, the anthropologist relates this task to general theoretical issues.

Now that anthropologists are, or try to be, as much at home in cities, towns, villages, and regions encapsulated within modern and complex societies, as in the rapidly disappearing isolated and small-scale societies, the question of how the microsociological technique of fieldwork—the intensive, totalistic study of social forms—contributes to understanding larger units of society becomes more pressing than when they could claim the study of certain types of society for their own. How can the microsociological study of an anthropologist contribute to the understanding of larger entities such as nation-states? As Clifford Geertz has asked with characteristic irony: “Are the petty squabbles of barnyard notables really what we mean by politics? Are mud huts and goat-skin tents really where the action is?”[16] Is there not the danger of getting lost in “mindless descriptlvism” in the study of a pilgrimage center in Morocco or a tribe in the Yemen, or at least of learning more about these entities than one really wants to know?

A constant theme of this book is to demonstrate that anthropologists, or most anthropologists anyway, study specific places not for themselves or for the love of minute description of routine events in exotic places, but in order to learn something beyond them. We do intensive analyses of political, economic, symbolic, and historical processes on a

small scale. Like all other disciplines in the social sciences, we use our data as a means of making hypotheses about larger wholes. As Geertz emphasizes, the question is not whether we generalize—any science generalizes—but how we generalize. And that is important. In the human sciences, the microsociological technique of anthropology offers an alternative to the tendency to speak of tribe and peasants, of rulers and ruled, as if they were stock characters in a sociological morality play.[17]

Anthropologists are particularly concerned with eliciting the taken-for- granted, shared meanings that underlie conduct in given societies and are so familiar

a part of routine that they are taken to be “natural.” It is against such undramatic backgrounds that citizens participate in nation-states or have contact with the governments of such entities, or even form a part of such governments. The petty squabbles of barnyard notables, as Geertz says, may not in themselves be of compelling interest, but they frequently offer a more advantageous means of determining the components of a political style than do the more formal and generally less accessible deliberations of parliaments and cabinet meetings. The link between the unit of the anthropologist’s study and the larger whole is not that of microcosm to macrocosm—as an earlier generation of community studies often naively assumed— but merely that of an arena the study of which permits the elaboration of hypotheses about • certain social and cultural processes. Through the study of such mundane events as patterns of naming, seeking a husband or wife, the ways in which sickness is cured, the selling of a sheep, local elections, and religious ceremonies, anthropologists seek to grasp what is distinctly Moroccan about Moroccan markets, Lebanese about Lebanese political factionalism, Alevi about Alevi conceptions of Islam, Omani about Omani notions of honor, or Egyptian about Egyptian styles of etiquette and deference. Even the citizens of nation-states find themselves living most of their lives in the sets of microcosms that make up such larger entities. The microsociological perspective of the anthropologist can often provide valuable i insights into just how participation in such larger entities is experienced.

j To sum up the argument so far, social anthropologists and historians pursue

styles of explanation that are complementary and interchangeable in many respects. Just as in history the search for universal laws devoid of specific content leads only to trivial or false generalizations, similarly the search for laws in social anthropological research is unfruitful. Yet, through comparison of different societies and cultures and through careful attention to technique and theoretical assumptions, anthropologists seek an understanding of what is distinctive about general processes operating in specific historical and culture settings. Some anthropologists conduct research within less comprehensive but nonetheless useful theoretical frameworks. Cultural ecologists, for instance, are primarily interested in the relations between individuals and their environment in societies that generally are technologically simple and for such a purpose do not require a broader theoretical base. This book makes reference to such approaches in appropriate contexts.

Having briefly stated what is characteristic of the anthropological approach to the study of society, we now consider the ways in which this approach contributes to an understanding of the Middle East and the particular anthropological themes most fully developed in the study of the region.

*** First Approximations

Not long after the French Protectorate over Morocco began in 1912, a popular scholarly literature on Islam and on Arabs in that country began to flourish in the French language. By the 1920s the production of popular books on Islam and Morocco had become a minor industry, so that Georges Hardy, a prominent colonial administrator of the period, was able to publish a synthesis of the vast literature. Hardy's chapter on Moroccan "character" gives some indication of the approach which was used to grasp the "mysteries" of the Orient of which Morocco was considered a part. Hardy juxtaposed a series of contrasts: Moroccans were said to be both individualistic and gregarious, anarchic and despotic, intellectually lethargic and avidly pragmatic, serene and impulsive, reliable and fickle, artistic and uncreative, Muslims and animists, morally scrupulous and evasive.[18] An equivalent juxtaposition of opposites was used to describe such mundane things as climate and geography.

A consideration of these earlier colonial images of Morocco is important because of their influence on later attempts to characterize the Middle East as a whole. Carleton Coon, who wrote the first general anthropological survey of the region, lived and worked for extended periods in Morocco in the 1930s. When he came to write the first edition of Caravan in the late 1940s, he used the image of the mosaic, implicit in earlier writing on Morocco, as his guiding metaphor in order to highlight the geographic, linguistic, religious, and ethnic complexities of the region in general.[19] In a descriptive sense the mosaic metaphor is useful, although its major shortcomings are discussed in Chapter 3.

The object of the rest of this chapter is to indicate some of the general characteristics of the Middle East, beginning with certain geographic factors. This is because, at least traditionally, geographic factors have formed broad constraints within which the societies of the Middle East have developed.

As a whole, the Middle East can be characterized by three basic geographical features: It is semiarid (although there are local exceptions to this condition); it is a region which since antiquity has been one of agriculture (since at least 8000 b.c.) and empire; and, as mentioned earlier, it lacks sharply defined natural boundaries, so that it has always been accessible to conquest by land and sea, and it has long served as a crossroads of long-distance trade. Of course, the same is true of most other major sociocultural regions of the world. These characteristics thus do not serve to distinguish the Middle East from other

major sociocultural areas, but they do constitute major factors of relevance to historical developments and the kinds of lives lived in the region.

As Figure 1-3 indicates, few places in the Middle East receive the forty to fifty inches of rainfall which is characteristic of the eastern United States and the richer agricultural regions of Europe. Some coastal and mountain areas receive up to twenty inches annually, but many other regions receive as little as four to eight inches annually (Saudi Arabia) or less than one inch a year (southern Egypt). Rainfall-fed, or nonirrigated, farming is possible only in relatively narrow belts of Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, Jordan, and the countries of the Maghrib. Even in these cases, the amount of rain varies substantially from year to year and radical annual shifts in rainfall and climatic conditions are the rule. Where there is heavy rainfall, as in the Rif mountains of northern Morocco, the soils are often too poor to permit regular, adequate agricultural yields.

FIGURE 1-3 Rainfall in the Middle East.

FIGURE 1-4 Population density of the Middle East, c. 1970.

Nonetheless, agriculture is important throughout the region. By 1970 figures, over 95 percent of the Middle East’s rural population is sedentary and lives from agriculture, although only 14 percent of the total land surface is arable.[20] Thus the popular image of the Middle East as nomads traveling between oases on the desert is misleading. To a large extent, however, agriculture is dependent upon irrigation. A glance at the population map of the Middle East indicates how dramatically many of the centers of population cluster around sources of water for agriculture. Thus for Egypt, cultivation is confined to a few miles on either side of the Nile, although on the Nile Delta and in Iraq between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, there are intricate webs of irrigation channels that support relatively dense populations. Elsewhere throughout the Middle East there are other sorts of irrigation systems, both traditional and modern, adapted to local circumstances. Wells often are a source of water, although in Iran and in regions of Morocco such as Marrakesh, there are elaborate underground canals (called ghattara in Morocco, qariat in Iran, and aflaf in Oman) that carry water from underground streams in nearby mountain regions to the rich oases of the plains. Modem technology has greatly expanded the regions that have been brought under cultivation.

Because it is semiarid, large parts of the Middle East traditionally have been given over to a mode of livelihood that combines the extensive seasonal cultivation of crops such as wheat and barley with semitranshumant pastoralism, especially of sheep and goats. Pastoral nomadism as the sole or predominant activity of certain groups to the full exclusion of cultivation is today relatively rare; although when considered together with transhumant pastoralists, nomads still form a significant (although rapidly declining) minority in such countries as Saudi Arabia (probably between 11 and 20 percent), Iran (10 percent), Afghanistan (16 percent or more), and less than 5 percent of the population of the countries of North Africa, with the exception of Libya and Mauritania. Only in Somalia have nomads until recently constituted a majority of the population (about 75 percent in the early 1970s). [21]

The significance of transhumant pastoralists and nomads has often been exaggerated as a factor in Middle Eastern history. Nonetheless, such groups have traditionally constituted political and military threats to effective central government in many regions, including Morocco and Iran. From at least 1S00 to 1917 the Iranian polity was to some extent limited by the power of pastoral tribal groups. In the case of Morocco it was not so much the strength of pastoral groups as the strength of tribally organized societies, not necessarily pastoral, that limited the control of the central government until the effective imposition of the Protectorate.

Most Middle Eastern countries also possess mountainous regions—Kuwait and certain other Gulf states are some of the few exceptions. From premodern times to the present these regions have served as zones of refuge from central government control. Thus the Kurds of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey have been able to preserve a degree of autonomy, and Berber-speaking tribal groups in Algeria’s Kabylia mountains and Morocco’s Rif and Atlas mountain chains have managed to do so until the relatively recent past.

Traditionally, the Middle East may have been a region of irrigation agriculture and pastoralism, but for many of the countries of the region a significant mineral wealth, especially in oil, has created the potential for significant economic growth. Revenues from such resources have dramatically increased in recent years and have made possible substantial alterations in the social and material life of some of the region’s inhabitants, especially in the cities.

The Middle East is a region of intense urban and commercial life, with ancient cities as Damascus, Cairo, and Istanbul, as well as those of much more recent origin, such as Riyadh and Casablanca. Over 40 percent of the region’s inhabitants were urban dwellers in 1970, as opposed to roughly 10 percent in 1900.[22] The transformations occurring in these cities are not unique to the Middle East. The rapid rate of urbanization, for instance, is occurring throughout the Third World. In the chapters of this book concerned with the nature of cities these more general trends are considered, but the emphasis is upon the extent to which certain features of urban life continue to make these cities distinctly Turkish, Egyptian,

Muslim, or Middle Eastern and how these culturally unique attributes influence and are affected by more general processes such as population growth and world economic currents.

In terms of religion, the Middle East as a whole is predominantly Muslim. One of the major issues that must be faced is how a world religion such as Islam has remained a vital force for over a millennium in such a wide range of cultural and social contexts. Islam has retained its significance because of its capacity to be reinterpreted in a variety of ways in different cultural contexts and in different strata of society. The mosaic metaphor sufficiently indicates some of these major contrasts in belief and ritual; although by and large this has not led to a more analytic consideration of their implications.

The Middle Eastern mosaic also contains significant Christian and Jewish minorities, with the obvious exception of the state of Israel in which Jews constitute a majority of the population. To consider Christians first, roughly 8 percent of Egypt's population is Christian (mostly Coptic), 20 percent of Syria and Iraq, and perhaps 40 percent of Lebanon. Exact statistics on the size of this minority are hard to obtain, especially in the case of Lebanon, where no census has been conducted since 1932 in an effort (which largely succeeded until 1975) to preserve a delicate political balance between various ethnic and religious groups: Maronite Christian, Armenian Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Sunni Muslim, Shi^cT Muslim, Palestinian Christians and Muslims, Druze, and other smaller groups. A significant question in this book is to determine precisely how such complex ethnic and religious identities are socially maintained in various situations.

Most bf the countries of the Middle East have also possessed significant Jewish minorities, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and the states of the Persian/ Arab Gulf (which, however, have Hindu minorities). Jewish communities contracted in size after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and (more significantly in terms of sheer numbers) with the collapse of the colonial regimes of North Africa in the 1950s and 1960s and, in the east, the Iraqi revolution of 1958. Sizeable Jewish minorities remain, however, in Iran, Turkey, Tunisia, and Morocco. Another significant minority in many of the countries of North Africa were colonial settlers, who were predominantly, although not exclusively, of French, Spanish, and Italian origin. Elsewhere in the Middle East there have traditionally been thriving Greek and Armenian communities, especially in Egypt and Turkey, although since the beginning of this century their numbers have considerably diminished.

The major language groups of the Middle East have already been mentioned, but in many areas a number of languages and dialects of more limited scope also exist. In a small town of 12,000 inhabitants in northwestern Turkey recently studied by an anthropologist, virtually the entire population spoke mutually intelligible dialects of Turkish, but the older generation in the town continued to speak Circassian and Georgian.[23] Kurdish is widely spoken elsewhere in Turkey, which also has an Arabic-speaking minority. In northern Iraq, there is a bewildering array of ethnolinguistic communities: Kurdish-speaking gypsies, Kurds, Arabic-speaking pastoralists, and a range of groups with finely distinguished religious, ethnic, and

linguistic identities. Similarly, in many border areas of the Middle East, such as between Iraq and- Iran, most of the population is bilingual—Arabic and Persian in the case of the southerly portions of that particular border and trilingual (Arabic, Persian, and Kurdish) along its northernmost sections.

Similarly, there are large Berber-speaking populations in North Africa, although most of these are becoming increasingly bilingual in Arabic. In other regions, such as Egyptian and Sudanese Nubia, most of the male population is bilingual in Arabic and a Nubian dialect, although use of the Nubian dialects is rapidly becoming limited to domestic contexts.[24]

FIGURE 1-5 Middle Eastern languages.

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European languages, especially those of the former colonial powers in certain regions, continue to be important in large parts of the Middle East. Arabic is the national language in all the countries of France’s former North African colonies, but the urban educated population is predominantly bilingual in French and in Arabic. Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco all have adopted official policies of Arabization; yet, after over two decades of independence in Morocco and Tunisia and a slightly lesser period for Algeria, many sections of the government bureaucracy continue to be run primarily in French. The French language remains significant in the schools as well, although Arabization at the elementary and secondary levels is progressing. A network of French educational institutions formally intended for the children of the remaining French still exists, although a number of children from elite North African families also attend these institutions. In the government-run schools French also continues to be important as a secondary language.

To sum up this section, I have tried to indicate enough of the dimensions of complexity in the Middle East to make it clear why expansive generalizations about the region are not always possible. General themes in social anthropology, such as inequality and the interconnection between religious belief and social forms, can be explored in the various societies of the region, but for reasons already discussed, no one part of the region can be taken as a direct

microcosm of the others. In what way, then, can this book be said to encompass the Middle East as a whole?

The approach of this book is not encyclopedic, and I shall not attempt to cover equally all the countries of the Middle East. For reasons of historical accident and rapidly shifting political climates for research, American, European, Iranian, Arab, and Turkish anthropologists have been better able to conduct field studies in some areas than in others, just as the historical development of some countries has focused attention on specific issues. Thus many of the anthropological studies of Turkey by both indigenous and foreign researchers have concentrated upon the themes of modernization and nation-building, while those of North Africa have been intensely concerned with various aspects of the continuing impact of the colonial experience. Even if the various countries of the Middle East were equally known through anthropological studies, there would be little point in attempting a direct synthesis of these materials, any more than such an effort for Africa or Latin America would be intellectually rewarding. In general, my procedure will be to develop specific topics on the basis of the best available documentation for a particular country or region and then to sketch as far as possible how such patterns of kinship, political comportment, and the like compare with similar patterns elsewhere in the Middle East. For example, Chapter 4 discusses nomadism, especially through an examination of the Basseri of southern Iran and the Al Murra Bedouin of Saudi Arabia. They are chosen not because they represent a “lowest common denominator” typicality for all nomads of the Middle East, but merely because they have recently been the subject of anthropological studies which are sufficiently detailed to form a base for understanding pastoral activities elsewhere and for a discussion of the role of nomads and of tribal societies in the premodem, preindustrial past.

My purpose throughout this book is not simply to convey information, but to convey a manner of thought. The language of social anthropology is not quite so laden with technical jargon as is the language of the other social sciences. This has the handicap in some circles of making our style of inquiry initially appear like a codification of the obvious, but it is often the “obvious” assumptions about cultural conduct and social forms which appear so familiar that they become almost impermeable to analysis. I seek to indicate how the specifically anthropological approach to the study of the Middle East has contributed both to an understanding of the region and to the principal intellectual currents of the discipline.

** 2. Intellectual Predecessors: The Rediscovery of the Middle East

Academic chairs in anthropology were created in England and the United States only at the turn of this century. Yet from the beginning of the nineteenth century several styles of inquiry converged which emphasized issues that later became central to our discipline. Standard accounts of the proto-anthropology of the last century correctly emphasize its

association with Darwinian theories of evolution and curiosity about primitive peoples, but admittedly these concerns were only marginally pursued in Middle Eastern contexts. Still, the Middle East and a rather diffuse concept of “Oriental” society had a significant impact upon some of the main theses developed by leading sociologists, including Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim.

The purpose of this chapter is not to hunt for distinguished ancestors who fit contemporary notions of anthropological thought. Instead, through the use of key examples I Will indicate some of the principal intellectual currents and geopolitical circumstances that gave impetus to sociologically oriented accounts of the Middle East in the last century. The scholars whose work I discuss share, in varying degrees, three common features with modern social anthropologists: (1) They considered the study of the contemporary social order significant to their research, even when their primary goal was the comprehension of remote or “classical” historical periods; (2) they considered it important to describe and comprehend the ordinary activities and taken-for-granted conventions of daily life and sought to do so through direct and prolonged contact; and (3) they consciously made systematic observations (especially in the latter half of the century) and sought to make explicit the principles on which their inquiries were based. A significant number of studies of the Middle East in the nineteenth century do not conform to the passionately argued yet curiously ahistorical attempt to portray earlier scholarship provided by Edward Said’s Orientalism,[1] and it is these studies which this chapter seeks to evaluate.

There were three main reasons for the growing European interest in the Middle East in the nineteenth century. First was a general curiosity about the customs of peoples elsewhere, but particularly those of the Muslim Orient. From the late seventeenth century, the Muslim Orient had been used as a screen against which European fantasies about the primitive or the alien “other” were projected against an often imaginary geography. This is in part reflected in the vast scope of the emerging field of “orientalism,” which included everything from Islamic society to the civilizations of India, China, and Japan. This interest was popularly reflected in a number of ways. Moors, Turks, and Persians characteristically appear in operas of the period; artists such as Delacroix romantically depicted what they considered to be the private life of Islam. Successful, if inaccurate, books such as Washington Irving’s Mahomet and His Successors[2] or more imposing artifacts of intellect such as Ernest Renan’s “Islamism and Science” offered a general theory of the “decay” of Muslim civilization in contrast to the vitality of the West.[3] By the mid-nineteenth century, travel to the Middle East, at least to the major cities, was no longer considered hazardous. Novelists such as Thackeray visited the region, and the reading public insatiably followed accounts of such travels.[4] Later in the century this fascination with the Muslim world merged, at least among the British, with the romantic notion of the pure Bedouin nomad as a primitive contemporary with the virtues of a Victorian gentleman. Anachronistically, this strand of attraction to the Middle East might be called the “T. E. Lawrence syndrome.”

Such romantic assumptions toward the Islamic Orient were undeniably important in sustaining a scholarly and popular interest in the area, and some travel

'See Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) (best and more accurate on the period prior to the nineteenth century); also Bernard Lewis, “The Study of Islam,” Encounter, 38, no. 1 (January 1972), 31-41. For a more general essay on the European image of non-Europeans in this period, see Henri Baudet, Paradise on Earth (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 42-53. Finally, for a convincing essay which breaks with scholarly convention and looks at Islamic civilization as an integral part of the past of the West, see F. E. Peters, “Islam as a Western Civilization,” The Arab World, 18, no. 3 (May- June 1972), 13-19.

[2] Washington Irving (1783-1859), Mahomet and His Successors (New York: Putnam’s, 1868). Equally indicative of the kitsch literature concerning the Muslim Orient is Washington Irving’s Legends of the Alhambra (Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1909).

[3] Renan’s essay can be found in his The Poetry of the Celtic Races and Other Studies, trans. William G. Hutchinson (London: W. Scott, Ltd., 1896). An essay on the life of Muhammad can be found in Renan’s Essays in Religious History and Criticism, trans. O. B. Fro- thingham (New York: Carleton, 1864), pp. 226-84.

[4] William Makepeace Thackeray (pseud. M. A. Titmarsh), Notes of a Journey from Comhill to Grand Cairo (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1846).

accounts, such as Charles Doughty’s Travels in ArabiaDeserta (1888),[25] presented valuable and precise ethnographic data, although they were not intended as ethnographies. In the hands of latter-day anthropologists, such accounts have been invaluable in reconstructing the social organization of nomadic tribal societies prior to the ; effective imposition of modern state controls.

j A second reason for attention to the Middle East in this period was a

heightened imperial interest in the region. It was considered as both a fertile ground

; for the enterprises of European financiers and ripe for direct political control,

t Bonaparte’s expedition to Egypt (1798-1801) brought Egypt under French rule for

f a brief period. Completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 began a period of rapidly growing European interest in the country, which culminated with English occupation in 1882,-and the addition of the Sudan (technically an Anglo-Egyptian condominium) shortly thereafter. As for North Africa, Algeria was occupied by France in 1830 and ultimately was legally considered to be an integral part of the metropole; Tunisia was made a protectorate in 1881; Morocco in 1912. If indirect forms of domination are included, such as the presence of British political advisers to the Trucial States of the Arab/Persian Gulf from the early nineteenth century onward to protect imperial lines of communication to India, then the magnitude of European political interest in the region is emphasized even more. In the years following the First World War, direct European control (or control by mandate) over the countries of the Middle East expanded to encompass Libya (Italy), Syria and Lebanon (France), and Palestine and Iraq (England).

Finally, an interest in the Middle East converged with important trends in European scholarship , particularly in the so-called “higher criticism” of the Bible which was then emerging in Germany and later prevailed in other scholarly circles. As Bernard Lewis has written, one reason for this was a Jewish sympathy with Islam. As religious anti-Judaism gave way to a racially expressed anti-Semitism, some Jewish scholars looked to other Semites for comfort. This affinity, Lewis says, was largely imaginary but accounted for part of the interest in Islam.[26] In addition, several prominent scholars trained in ancient and modern Semitic languages became explorers and ethnographers because they saw such research as necessary for the understanding of society in the time of the Old Testament patriarchs.

*** Bonaparte’s Expedition to Egypt, 1798-1801

Bonaparte’s expedition is often used by historians to symbolize the point at which the Muslim Orient, forced to recognize growing Western hegemony, was compelled to acquire Western technology, especially military, and ultimately was to be profoundly shaken by contact with all aspects of European civilization. Here I am concerned with the inverse process, the European scholarly rediscovery of the Islamic East. (I specify “rediscovery” because at least until the final collapse of Islamic rule in Spain in the fifteenth century, Europeans had recognized the intellectual supremacy of the Muslim world in many fields.) Scattered throughout the ships in Bonaparte’s fleet were 150 scientists and Orientalists, scholars whose task was to make as systematic an inventory of Egypt as possible—its geology, rivers, minerals, antiquities, and, of most concern in the present context, the “manners and customs” of its inhabitants. The motivation for the latter was the hope that insight into contemporary society, especially that of the peasants, might provide clues as to the social order of Pharaonic times. The implicit assumption was that peasant society was profoundly conservative and resistant to change. (Parenthetically, the notion that the study of the present is primarily valuable as an indication of the past dies very hard. For example, it still dominates the popular understanding of what anthropologists do.) In any case, the findings of the scholars accompanying Bonaparte were collected in the massive, meticulous, twenty-four volume Description de I’Egypte (1820).[7] Even if its ethnographic section was not always as accurate as the sections on geology and natural history, its authors aspired to the same high standards. In the later French colonial conquests in North

Africa, an initial byproduct of conquest was the compilation of similar inventories of the new domains. The strength of the surveys of Algeria and Tunisia rests more on an inventory of the physical characteristics of the two territories than in an understanding of their populations. Nevertheless, they indicate in a perfunctory manner the nature of indigenous political activities and institutions.[8] In contrast, the monographs written on Morocco just prior to and in the early years of the protectorate constitute one of the best collections of colonial ethnography to be found anywhere. One reason for the quality of this research in contrast to most of that conducted in Algeria was the conscious decision on the part of the French, at least in principle, to preserve and enhance indigenous institutions. Another clear impetus was the notion that rational, systematic ethnographic inquiry would facilitate the "scientific" implantation of colonial rule. This tendency to regard the exercise of colonial rule as a science was already present at the time of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt.

Another significant aspect of Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt was the attempt to legitimize the colonial enterprise in the eyes of the conquered population—a theme to be developed at greater length in a later chapter. On one of the expedition's ships was an Arabic printing press looted from the Vatican. This was used to print a proclamation, translated into Arabic by an Orientalist, announcing that Bonaparte had come in the name of Islam and would govern in a more Islamic fashion than had the preceding corrupt Mamluk regime. The invading troops were ordered to be scrupulously respectful of mosques. Bonaparte even dressed as a . Muslim and prayed in mosques for a time, until the ridicule of his troops forced him to abandon the practice.[27] What is crucial about such actions is that they prefigure later, more systematic, attempts of colonial regimes to legitimate their presence in the eyes of the ruled and whenever possible to win over key elements in indigenous society. Ethnographic investigation was seen as an important contribution to this aspect of the colonial enterprise.

[7] Description de l'Egypte (Paris: Editions d'Art Albert Guillot, 1966).

[8] Interest in ethnographic inquiry during the colonial era in Algeria was directly linked to political conditions. For example, in periods of sustained local resistance to French rule, there was an increase in ethnographic investigation of political and religious topics. This interest waned when French rule was thought to be secure. For a useful account of changing styles in the ethnography of Algeria, the one country for which a detailed ethnography of ethnographic styles has been made, together with representative texts, see Philippe Lucas and Jean-Claude Vatin, L'Algerie des Anthropologues (The Anthropologists' Algeria) (Paris: Maspero, 1975). Despite this book's occasionally simplistic tendency to correlate styles of inquiry directly with socioeconomic "interests," its basic argument remains plausible.

*** Explorers and Scholars

There was a special class of explorers whose works are particularly useful in tracing the rediscovery of the Middle East—those who could -speak the languages of the region and who, through long residence in it, could describe its society with reasonable accuracy. One of the best known was the polyglot Sir Richard Burton (1821 - 1890), who began his career in the Indian Army. After seven years he was forced to resign because of a firsthand report he had made in confidence to a superior regarding the organization and use of male brothels in Karachi. This report created a scandal when one of his rivals caused it to be made public, and the incident forced his resignation. Subsequently he traveled to and wrote extensively on South America, Utah, Central Africa, East Africa, and the Arab world, the last of which ! specifically concerns this study.

Perhaps the best of Burton’s books is his account of a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1853. Like most travelers of the period, he adopted oriental dress, in his case i Persian costume and the name of Mirza ^cAbdallah, an identity he had previously

f assumed with success in India to conceal his European origin. Although Europeans

in the Middle East commonly adopted oriental costume, not all felt compelled to conceal their identity as Europeans. But, then, Burton’s attitudes toward “orientals” generally displayed an arrogance and hostility which exceeded even the prevalent Victorian notions of English superiority over other races and nations. Burton’s writings emphasize the safety of travel in Egypt, yet he refers to Egyptian society as being somewhere between “barbarism” and “civilization.”[28] He offered the following advice on the orient: “The more haughty and offensive [the traveller] is to the people, the more they respect him; a decided advantage to the traveller of

FIGURE 2-1 Sir Richard Burton (1821-1890) dressed as Mirza °Abdallah. (From Richard F. Burton, Persona! Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Ai- Madinah &Meccah [London: Tylstonand Edwards, 1893], frontispiece, vol. 2.)

choleric temperament.”[11] Elsewhere he rails against what he calls “Asiatic” governments—those that can be dealt with only “by bribe, by bullying, or by bothering them with a dogged perseverance into attending to you and your concerns.”[12] Given his attitude toward his fellow travelers on the pilgrimage, it is not surprising that his hostility was often reciprocated.

As fascinating as it is to read Burton’s account of his pilgrimage, the book reveals more of the author than of the nature of Islam or of the Muslim countries through which he traveled,

despite its literary array of erudite footnotes, digressions, and incidental geographical and ethnological observations. To his credit, Burton was conscious of this aspect of his narrative style: “I make no apology for the egotistical semblance of the narrative. Those who felt the want of some ‘silent friend’ to aid them with advice, when it must not be asked, will appreciate what may appear to the uninterested critic mere outpourings of a mind full of self.”[29] The very title, A Personal Narrative, specifies the nature of the text.

[11] *Ibid*., p. 15.

[12] Ibid., p. 20. The theme of the inherent corruption and decay of “oriental” governments is a common theme in the literature of the period, although such claims should not be taken at face value. It runs throughout Alexander Kinglake’sEothen (London: Icon Books, 1963 [orig. 1844]), an excellently written account describing the author’s travels through the Ottoman domains of eastern Europe to Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and return, in a period when the plague ravaged the entire region. Although Kinglake spoke virtually no Arabic, he wrote that Damascus was safer than Oxford and that he could even use the public baths with impunity without concealing his identity. Kinglake took for granted that as an Englishman he was obliged to confirm his rank by dealing with local officials through bullying and threats (p. 133).

For the purposes of ethnographic (or more precisely protoethnographic) description, there are two nineteenth-century explorers and travelers who are considerably more significant, if less flamboyant, than Sir Richard Burton: John Lewis [f] Burckhardt (1784-1817) and Edward Lane (1801-1876).

Burckhardt was born of a well-to-do Swiss family and became attracted very early in his life to the “discovery” of the Middle East.[30] As a young man he traveled to England to study the Arabic language for two and one-half years at Cambridge. During this time, he prepared himself for what he conceived as the rigors of life in the East by walking barefoot through the English countryside, while living only on vegetables for long periods. In 1809 at the age of twenty-five he left > for the Middle East and never returned, for he died there of malaria eight years later.

J Burckhardt’s books reveal him to be an engaging, if compulsive, scholar who

J can be relied upon for accuracy. He lived upon a minute stipend sent him by an English group calling itself the Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa.

Throughout his stay in the Middle East, Burckhardt dressed in Turkish fashion, as did the urban elite of the period throughout much of the Middle East. He adopted the name of

Shaykh Ibrahim more out of convenience than in an attempt to conceal his true identity. Burckhardt’s Arabic was so excellent—both his classical Arabic and several contemporary dialects—that while in Damascus he translated Robinson Crusoe. Although recognized as a Christian, he was even accepted as an authority on Islamic law. Among his works are a collection of Arabic proverbs, an account of his travels in Nubia, and his detailed but elegant Notes on the Bedouins and the Wahdbys, his most ambitious work. [31]

Notes on the Bedouins is evenly divided between an ethnographic description of Bedouin society in Arabia and a detailed history of the Wahhabi movement, a form of Islamic puritanism which originated in the mid-eighteenth century in Arabia and rapidly acquired a political base, reaching its greatest territorial extent during Burckhardt’s stay in the Middle East. _;

The ethnographic section of the Notes compares favorably in some respects to recent anthropological studies of pastoral nomads in the Middle East. He describes Bedouin society in a coherent, organized fashion: There are sections on the layout of tents, the segregation of the sexes, dress, etiquette, domestic life and economy, religious practices, tribal organization, marriage, feuds, and warfare. No explicit sociological themes are explored, although an implicit concern with the nature of Bedouin “independence” runs throughout the account. Burckhardt was fascinated by the independence of the Bedouin, their “uncorrupted manners,” and their code of honor. His efforts to describe precisely the nature of social life in the desert carry more conviction than Burton’s ambiguous but constant reiteration that the Islamic world was beyond the pale of civilization. Admittedly, his point of departure is naturalistic description. He classifies the parts of the tent and the “parts” of tribal organization in virtually the same way a botanist would classify plants. One reason he appears to consider the Bedouin as “uncorrupted” and in contrast to the “debauchery” of townsmen is that stylistically he portrays them as timeless and unchanging. Even towns and the Ka^cba are described primarily by their physical form; many of the “ancient customs” which he describes are also virtually made into part of the physical landscape. In general, Burckhardt makes it clear that the observer is the contemplator and that the Bedouin, for all their initial charm, live a monotonous and unreflective life. Still, his work is not as fully anchored in the “orientalist” assumptions of his period as are other accounts and represents a genuine attempt to portray Bedouin society.

After describing the rules of hospitality , blood revenge, and the autonomy of most Bedouin tribes from the authority of central governments, Burckhardt asks the more general question: How it is possible to have an ordered society such as that of the Bedouin, with a code of law and conventions of conduct but yet have no written codes of law and no formal “legislation”? The form of Burckhardt’s question sounds awkward today, but it was one that interested many European political philosophers of the period.[16] Burckhardt’s contribution to its discussion was to perceive the relevance of his direct experience with such a society. Segmentation theory in social anthropology (see Chapter 5), which enjoyed considerable popularity from the publication of Evans-Pritchard’s The Nuer (1940) until the mid-1950s, can in many ways be considered to be a more systematic response to this same

question, since societies described as segmentary were said to exist without any formal leaders or governmental apparatus, all conflict within them being regulated by organized violence (feuds) among the groups involved.[17] On the basis of Burckhardt’s observations, later social anthropologists have been able to

[16] Burckhardt, Notes, pp. 378-82.

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Burckhardt described in detail the institution of the feud as the Bedouin themselves conceived it. A segmentary diagram even appeared in his account (Vol. 1, pp. 150-51). construct more theoretically oriented arguments on the nature of political organization in pre-oil Arabia.[32]

The second section of the Notes concerns the Wahhabi movement. The ideological goal of this movement was the reform of Islam as it was then practiced. It was especially antagonistic to the popular custom of venerating the shrines of Muslim saints. In their drive to reassert the Quranic doctrine of the equality of all men before God, the Wahhabi movement succeeded even in destroying the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad. Because the movement politically united the tribes of Arabia, it was considered a threat to the Ottoman Empire and particularly to the Mamluk regime of Egypt. After repeated attempts to crush the movement, it was finally defeated in 1818 by an army of Muhammad ^cA1I, the ruler of Egypt. This occurred shortly after Burckhardt wrote his account. Burckhardt gathered reports of the Wafihabl-s and their doctrines from their representatives and other eyewitnesses. He carefully assesses the implications of the Wahhabi insistence upon settling nomadic groups in order better to control them, their leadership, the exact nature of their doctrines plus the reaction to them by Muslims outside the Arabian peninsula. Like latter-day anthropological descriptions of religious movements, Burckhardt’s account of the Wahhabl-s alternates between social history and providing the background material on religious ideologies and social forms necessary to follow his description of specific events.

Edward Lane’s Manners and Customs of the Modem Egyptians (1836)[33] provides a detailed account of urban Muslim society and thus complements Burckhardt’s Notes. Lane originally intended to enter the ministry and in this context acquired an enthusiasm for Oriental studies. Later he became an engraver but abandoned the work when it proved too taxing on his health. In 1825, at the age of twenty-four, he set out for Cairo and lived there more or less constantly until 1849. He adopted native clothes—the Turkish dress of Cairo’s elite—but never concealed his identity as an Englishman and a Christian. He delicately reminded his Muslim friends that Christ was also seen as a prophet in the Quran. Lane mixed freely with Egyptians and was held in confidence by many of them. Fluency in Arabic, such as he possessed, may not be absolutely necessary for certain types

of ethnographic inquiry (such as cultural ecology or certain forms of economic anthropology), but for any account of a society's beliefs, rituals, and social conventions it becomes essential. Anything less than fluency, or at least the anthropologist's ability to convince informants that he is fluent, generally handicaps the gathering of such data.

Lane does not appear to have considered his Manners and Customs as his principal work, although it is so considered today. He intended it as a popular book to complement an account of the manners and customs of the ancient Egyptians (those of Pharaonic times) that was then in circulation. His other studies included a translation of A Thousand and One Nights in a manner more accurate, if less sensational, than that provided by Burton and a massive Arabic-English lexicon which he never lived to complete.

Lane, modestly wrote that his intention in Manners and Customs was simply to make some of his countrymen "better acquainted with the domiciliated classes of one of the most interesting nations of the world, by drawing a detailed picture of the inhabitants of the largest Arab city." He regarded his book as an accessory to the reading of translations of Arabic literature which was then in vogue.[20]

His descriptions of urban life are elegant in their economy and clarity. They include dress, child rearing, ceremonies associated with birth, marriage, and death, domestic life, the marketplace, government, Islam, and above all the nuances of etiquette and the taken-for-granted conventions of society. As with the writings of Burckhardt, there is no explicit theoretical orientation to Lane's writing, and there is a tendency to view Cairene society as an object to be contemplated and classified. Theoretical concerns become important only in subsequent scholarship such as the work of Robertson Smith.

*** William Robertson Smith (1846-1894)

FIGURE 2-3 Bridal procession in Cairo, 1835. (From Lane, Manners and Customs, p. 164.)

The brilliant, tenaciously cosmopolitan William Robertson Smith is the first of the scholars considered in this chapter to have a specific, conscious theoretical orientation toward the study of Arab society. As Thomas O. Beidelman has written in a recent appraisal of Smith's work, whatever Smith's shortcomings by today's theoretical perspectives, he "sought to define the essential nature of religious behavior and approached the analysis of social institutions through comparative and historical studies."[34] This explicit goal, and Smith's

means of achieving it, remains one of the central concerns of contemporary social anthropology.

Smith’s interests are difficult to'summarize. He began his scholarly career by acquiring a dazzling reputation as a mathematician but quickly turned to Biblical studies. In 1875 at the age of twenty-nine he was given the extraordinary distinction for a person of his youth of being named to a committee to produce an authorized English translation of the Bible. He also assumed editorship of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, where his wide-ranging interests and responsibilities “led him to a personal acquaintance with nearly every important intellectual in Britain and a large number on the Continent... men as different as Swinburne and Darwin, Huxley and Kelvin, Spencer and Burne-Jones.”[35] So compulsively thorough was he in his editorship that he is said to have personally read every one of the articles submitted.

One of Smith’s strongest personal interests was in the “historical” criticism of the Bible. This approach to Biblical study, already prevalent on the Continent, asserted that the texts of the Bible should be treated as any other historical document and analyzed accordingly for authorship and historical authenticity. Like other scholars of his time, Smith found this approach easier to apply to the Quran than to the Bible because of strong opposition from conservative Christians. By all accounts, however, Smith was strong-willed, independent-minded, and had more than a touch of arrogance. His determination to express his views in an uncompromising manner eventually led to dismissal from his professorship at Aberdeen by the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland.

Like most Biblical scholars, Smith was fluent in Arabic and other Semitic languages, as well as the principal European languages. To improve his Arabic— he is said to have spoken it better than Burton—he made several voyages to Egypt and North Africa between 1878 and 1890. In 1878-1879 he spent about a year in Cairo, divided between two visits. On one of these visits he managed to make camelback tours of the Arabian peninsula, Palestine, and Syria.[36]

As Beidelman writes, Smith seems to have deeply enjoyed these visits. Like Burton, he traveled in native garb and adopted an oriental name, in this case the Arab one of ^cAbdallah Effendi. On one brief excursion from Cairo, in fact, he was accompanied by Burton. Smith, with his swarthy looks and dark beard, often managed to pass as an Arab.

FIGURE 2-4 W. Robertson Smith as ^cAbdatlah Effendi. (From J. S. Black and G. Chrystal, The Life of William Robertson Smith [London: A. 8t C. Black, Publishers, 19021.

Courtesy Adam & Charles Black, Publishers.)

Like most Victorians, Smith was profoundly pleased with his Britishness and sometimes shared the excesses and prejudices of his time in thinking about alien peoples. For instance, he wrote:

It would be a mistake to suppose that genuine religious feeling is at the bottom of everything that justifies itself by taking a religious shape. The prejudices of the Arab have their roots in a conservatism which lies deeper than his belief in Islam. It is, indeed, a great fault of the religion of the Prophet that it lends itself so readily to the prejudices of the race among whom it was first promulgated, and that it has taken under its protection so many barbarous and obsolete ideas, which even Mohammed must have seen to have no religious worth, but which he carried over into his system in order to facilitate the propagation of his reformed doctrines.[37]

Despite these lapses into the conventional stereotyped wisdom of his age, Smith considered the systematic study of contemporary Arab society—at least what he habitually referred to as that of the “pure” Bedouin—as crucial in his attempt to comprehend how men’s experiences in society relate to their religious and ethical conceptions.

Smith’s two principal books, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (1889) and Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia (1885) are both readily obtainable in paperback reprint editions, so I concentrate here on the principal assumptions contained in them about the study of human society.[38]

First, like many of his contemporaries, Robertson Smith accepted the concept of the evolutionary progress of human society. As T. 0. Beidelman stresses, this “evolutionary” perspective was encouraged by the basic Judeo-Christian belief in the ethical and intellectual development of a chosen people that, for Christians, culminated in the message of Christ. Thus societies could be arranged on a sort of ladder, with Victorian England predictably on the highest rung. Smith’s studies of Arab—which for him meant Bedouin—kinship were considered in this context to be a key to understanding ancient Semitic society.

Second, Smith saw a close relationship between the stage of development of a social group and the nature of its intellectual, religious, and moral life. He assumed that our perception of nature and the universe is modeled on our experience in society. This idea is adequately developed in his Lectures but is even more sharply delineated in a separate study of prophecy in ancient Palestine.[39] Smith argued that each prophet could speak only for his own time and thus had to convey his message in terms that could be understood by members of his own society. The ideas of prophets could be ahead of those prevalent in their own society but not too far. Thus, Smith conceived of the problems of the alienation of people from society and the means by which their ideas could affect social transformations. For example, for a scholar to grasp, the message of Ezekiel, the social organization of that prophet's time had to be delineated, together with the cosmology and modes of thought and expression contemporary with it. If Ezekiel's prophetic message was then found to differ from that of Samuel, Smith argued, it is not because of any contradiction in the Bible but because Samuel addressed himself to different groups and situations.

Given Smith's assumption of stages of social development, and their specific relationship to ideologies, his scholarly interest in the Bedouin becomes more apparent. Smith saw Bedouin society as a holdover relatively unchanged from the time of the Old Testament. Through studying the present-day Bedouin and what was known of Bedouin society just prior to and immediately after the time of the Prophet Muhammad, Smith sought through analogy and comparison to "reconstruct" the state of society as it was in the time of the Patriarchs. Such an ahistorical assumption is no longer acceptable in contemporary social anthropology, but it is important to recognize that it led Smith to evaluate carefully the ideas about kinship and political organization of Arabs both at the time of Muhammad, on which, extensive information was available through traditional Islamic scholarship,' and in the nineteenth century.

Finally, Smith used ethnographic and historical data to support explicitly formulated theoretical assumptions about the nature of Arab social organization and its evolution. Part of his argument concerning the evolution of Arab society is simply wrong. In the second part of Kinship and Marriage, for example, he presumes the existence of an earlier, matrilineal system of descent reckoning among the Arabs on the basis of what is today regarded as insufficient evidence. Yet the first section of the book is one of the enduring classics of social anthropology, for it presents the first systematic account of the social structure of the feud and the basic principles of kinship and political organization among the Arab Bedouin. Smith essentially sets forth the fundamental features of what later were to become known as segmentary societies. His argument was a direct inspiration for Evans-Pritchard's later (1940) study of segmentation among the Nuer of the southern Sudan.[40] Similarly, Smith's conviction that symbolic behavior was related to the nature of social groups was the basis upon which Emile Durkheim derived inspiration for his own sociology of knowledge and of symbolic forms.[41]

Smith was also the first to recognize that the genealogies used by the Bedouin to describe their sociopolitical order were not descriptions of concrete, actual relations among themselves but ideological charters for the construction of social groups. Smith realized that

ecological necessity and changing political conditions could result in shifts in the composition of groups. To gain political strength, for instance, ambitious chiefs would be anxious to include as wide a net as possible of assumed kinsmen and clients in their following, and Smith was well aware of the means by which weaker groups and individuals could manipulate genealogies so as to establish claims to kinship with more powerful groups.[42]

In Chapter 5, Smith's influence upon the ideas of more recent anthropological concern with segmentation and related concepts, especially in the work of E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Emrys Peters, and Ernest Gellner will be discussed more fully. The critical point to recognize for the present is that studies such as those of Robertson Smith reached a wide audience and provided considerable impetus to the understanding of the Middle East, the Arab world, and Islam. Even when Smith constructed theoretical arguments that are considered faulty in retrospect, he touched upon many of the basic issues of social anthropological inquiry, including the social base of symbolic behavior, the nature of the feud, and the ideological basis of conceptions of kinship. As with Durkheim, many of his insights remain fresh today. In particular, his theoretical arguments and documentation of them through ethnographic and historical sources were much more boldly conceived than many of the "functionalist" studies that were later to predominate in the study of the Middle East.

*** Scholarly Inquiry and Imperial Interests

Like the other human sciences, anthropology has become a critically reflexive discipline. By this I mean that its leading practitioners regard an awareness of their implicit theoretical assumptions and how these assumptions are indirectly, yet pervasively, influenced by the intellectual and political setting in which scholarly inquiry is carried out as an integral part of any research. A similar consciousness of implicit scholarly assumptions can be seen to pervade Islamic studies, although without the single-minded focus upon political considerations that pervades much of the anthropological work of this genre.[43] Nineteenth-century scholars were aware of many of the assumptions that pervaded their work, but even when directly concerned with the nature of non-Western political institutions, they remained remarkably silent on the exact consequences of imperial conquest and of European colonial rule.[44] Scholarly investigations by Europeans of "oriental" societies were carried out in the context of impending imperial domination or, in some cases, of actual colonial rule, and this fact;must be taken into account, since the direction of scholarly inquiry often merged with the interests of the colonial power. It would be wrong, however, to interpret such a fusion of interests anachronistically by contemporary standards and to regard all such research as politically sinister, as proponents of more simplistic versions of neo-Marxism often argue. Some anthropologists argue that ethnographic inquiry in this century and the last was carried out in the context of European bourgeois society expanding its political, economic, and intellectual domination. This is certainly the case, but the specific consequences of such domination for patterns of inquiry still must be demonstrated. In any case, such an assumption in itself hardly invalidates anthropological inquiry. Many ethnographers who participated in colonial rule were quite aware of the context in which their work was carried out. A salient example is the French sociologist

Jacques Berque, whose father was for many years Director of Native Affairs for the French government in Algeria. Berque himself was raised in Algeria and had a distinguished career in the Moroccan colonial service. Even in the 1930s Berque's writings indicate a subtle awareness of the nature of the colonial situation which he experienced—a theme which in recently years has become much more developed in his work. Of course. Berque, like other scholars, was profoundly affected by the milieu in which his research was conducted, but this fact hardly denies the possibility of competent sociological inquiry.

More plausible than direct correlations between political context and scholarship is the sort of argument put forward by the literary critic Edward Said, among others, that imperial domination and studies of the Islamic "Orient" bear a subtle and abstract relation to each other. They shared in common a general drive to impose "order" upon the non-European world. In one case this order was political and military; in the other it was the attempt to classify, arrange, and codify knowledge of an alien civilization.[45] The two sorts of order and control were often closely related, but they could also operate independently of each other, as has been shown by the radical transformations in the disciplines concerned with Middle Eastern and Islamic studies over the past century and a half.

The nature of traditional Muslim polities and the consequences of colonial rule are important issues and will be dealt with in detail in later chapters. In the present context it is sufficient to demonstrate that the situation of impending or actual colonial rule did much to encourage sociological investigations into the nature of Muslim and Middle Eastern society.

Here I present examples of two styles of research stimulated by imperial interests. The first is the independent scholar who later contributed his skills to solving the problems of colonial administration. This is the Dutch Orientalist Christian Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936). The other style is exemplified by team research directly tied to colonial control from its inception. This is the French Mission Scientifique au Maroc (Scientific Mission to Morocco).

Snouck Hurgronje's lifelong interest was in the study of Islam and he is best known for his intensive studies of Islam and politics in Indonesia, when it was under Dutch colonial rule.[46] Earlier in his career, however, he spent a considerable period of time in the Middle East. As a young student in Holland, he was interested in theology and Old Testament studies but soon shifted his focus to the study of Islam. His thesis topic in 1880 was the origin of the Islamic pilgrimage. In 1881 he obtained an academic post in Leiden at the Institute for Training Administrators for the Dutch Indies, a post he held until 1887. At the same time he devoted himself to the study of the Arabic language. He resolved to travel to Mecca, and in August of 1884 he arrived at Jidda, the principal port of Muslim pilgrims, where he appears to have been courteously received by its religious scholars ([Q] ulama').

Although Snouck Hurgronje dressed as a Muslim during his travels in Arabia and adopted a Muslim name, ^cAbd al-Ghaffar, it appears that he did not conceal his identity

as a European to the Muslim scholars and officials with whom he was in contact. He received permission from the Ottoman administration and local Arab notables to continue to Mecca, where he arrived in February of 1885. Unlike most European travelers such as Burton, who visited Mecca only for the brief period of the annual pilgrimage and in disguise, Snouck Hurgronje managed to stay for six months. He had to leave before the pilgrimage itself, which took place on the 17th of September in 1885, because of the indiscretions of a French vice-consul in Damascus that threatened to create a minor scandal for the local officials through whom Snouck Hurgronje had made his arrangements. Nonetheless, it is significant that Snouck Hurgronje was later extended an official invitation to return, although he never did.

In Mecca, both the Turkish officials and the descendants of the Prophet (Ar. pl. shurafa’) who were the hereditary rulers there were aware of Snouck’s identity. As a sign of the support he obtained from the elite, he managed to take a number of photographs, among which are the first ever obtained of the Ka^cba, as well as

FIGURE 2-5 The Ka^cba, 1884. (From C. Snouck Hurgronje, Bilder-Atlas zu Mekka [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 18881.1

FIGURE 2-6 A Meccan bride, 1884. (From Snouck

Hurgronje, Bifder-Atlas.)

others of pilgrims, local notables, and even unveiled brides and the women of several of the most distinguished households of the city.[47]

As a result of his stay, Snouck Hurgronje was able to write a detailed account of everyday life in Mecca, with chapters on everything from children’s games and rituals surrounding life crises to kinship, trade, religious brotherhoods, political organization, scholarly activities and intellectual life, proverbs, and domestic arrangements.[48] His account of the intellectual activities associated with the princi-

FIGURE 2-7 Meccan notable with servant, 1880s, (From Snouck Hurgronje,Bilder-Atlas.)

pal mosques of Mecca is pne of the few treatments of traditional Muslim scholarship which appreciates it for the vigor that such scholarship has managed to maintain until comparatively recent times.

Snouck Hurgronje placed considerable importance upon his ethnographic studies of Mecca. This was in direct contrast to the emerging disciplines of the history of religions and oriental studies, which tended to place greater weight on the evaluation of textual evidence as the basis for comprehending religious traditions. For Snouck Hurgronje, to understand the social reality of any religion, whether in the historical past or in the present, one had to have a thorough understanding of the social context in which that religion was experienced by its believers. This underlying assumption is of course shared by contemporary social anthropologists.

As indicated earlier in this chapter, ethnographic inquiry in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was often regarded in colonial contexts as an adjunct to political and military control, especially during periods of “native” unrest. This trend is especially prevalent in the ethnography of North Africa. In Algeria, as I have indicated, the social institutions and beliefs of native Algerians were generally ignored during periods of unquestioned French domination, only to become the subject of .intensive analysis during periods of resistance to French rule. The movement against the French led by Amir ^cAbd al-Qadir in the 1830s and 1840s was one such occasion; the stiff resistance met by the French in Berber-speaking Kabylia, the last region of Algeria to succumb to French domination in the 1850s, was another. During and shortly after conquest of the region, studies of Kabylia were abundant and created stereotypes about Berbers that were to persist for generations afterward.[36] In the Algerian case similar ethnographic interest was not to be rekindled until the 1950s, in the final, violent years of colonial rule.

It was in Morocco that organized ethnographic inquiry reached its fullest development. The incorporation of Morocco as a protectorate within the pax gallica dates only from 1912, but from the late nineteenth century French colonial interests began seriously to contemplate extending their “civilizing mission” to Morocco. The quality of the administrators and scholars first attracted to Morocco is in many ways comparable to the quality of scholars and officials attracted to India within the British Empire. What is certain is that in regions of English influence in the Middle East there is no body of ethnographic study comparable to that which exists for Morocco. French Moroccanists were frequently of high intellectual caliber and heavily influenced by the main sociological currents of their day. Admittedly they were not unaffected by the romantic vision of France as the first imperial power since the Romans to be capable of uniting most of North Africa under one rule. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several individual scholars, usually backed by colonial interests or the French government, had begun systematically to describe Morocco. [49]

The collective investigation of the nature of Moroccan society began in 1904 with the founding in Tangier of the Mission Scientifique au Maroc. This brought together a group of talented scholars and scholarly diplomats who spoke Arabic and frequently Berber and who were well grounded in current sociology. This group produced extensive monographs on Moroccan history, the workings of the traditional Moroccan legal system and administrative apparatus, the organization of traditional crafts and commerce, Muslim education, religious beliefs and rituals, linguistic texts through which local dialects could be rapidly learned by administrators, tribal divisions, and translations of key legal, religious, and historical

[36] So thorough was the ethnography of the region that Emile Durkheim referred to it frequently in his classic The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1966 [orig. 1893]).

documents.[50] The plan of studies undertaken was conceived in a primarily utilitarian vein. This is clear from the fact that shortly after the beginning of the protectorate, the Mission Scientifique formally was attached to the protectorate administration. Later, in the 1920s, it became a part of the Institut des Hautes Etudes Marocaines (Institute for Higher Moroccan Studies), an organization whose principal task was to train colonial administrators.

One of the most distinguished members of the original team of scholars was Edouard Michaux-Bellaire, who became director of the Mission Scientifique in 1907. After the Mission had been in existence for nearly two decades, Michaux-Bellaire described its initial purpose as the sociological “reconstitution” of Morocco’s social life not only through the study of books and manuscripts but through the collection of tribal traditions and the study of religious brotherhoods, economic life, and families.

It was a question of creating ... so to speak, the catalogue of Morocco, its tribes, its towns, its religious orders, to rediscover through them origins, ramifications, struggles, and alliances, and to follow them in history through different dynasties, to study institutions and customs, in a word, to reconnoiter, so far as possible, the land in which we might be called to act one day, so as to permit us to act in full awareness of the consequences of our actions.[51]

To sum up, this chapter has indicated the convergence of interests which led to the ethnographic discovery of the Middle East in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If at the beginning of this period the Islamic “Orient” served as a projective screen upon which European fantasies about the exotic and unknown could be projected, this was to be replaced by more systematic observations under the impetus of growing colonial and imperial interests and the centrality which the ethnographic study of the region had to key intellectual topics of the period. In later chapters that deal with contemporary

anthropological research, some of the themes introduced here will be taken up again in more detail.

** 3. The Functionalist Era: Village and Community Studies

*** Functionalism as Theory and Practice

This chapter continues the discussion of the intellectual technology by means of which knowledge of Middle Eastern societies has been organized. As a movement dominating social anthropology, functionalism can be traced from its origins in the second decade of the twentieth century through its apogee in the 1930s and eventual decline, but not disappearance, as a theoretical doctrine in the late 1950s. Although it was a dominant trend in English and American anthropology, it never acquired the same, firm hold upon German ethnology or the work of French anthropologists and sociologists interested in the non-European world. There also were pockets of anthropologists in the English-speaking world who ignored the functionalist movement, although for the most part such individuals were of an older generation that followed earlier paradigms for scholarly investigation.[1]

The French sociological tradition remained largely uninfluenced by the functionalist movement, although the English and American functionalists often considered Emile Durkheim as providing a theoretical base for their own position. Durkheim’s collaborators and successors made extensive use of ethnographic materials and courageously tackled such broad issues as the character of entire civilizations. Marcel Granet’s study of China (1922)[52] is the best known of these, although no equivalent study was made for the Islamic world despite Durkheim’s own use of Algerian ethnographic data and his interest in complex societies. Likewise, French human geographers took advantage of France’s Middle Eastern colonial domain to undertake a number of detailed studies of traditional ecological adaptations, primarily of pastoralists, throughout the region.[53] With the exception of studies of this nature, functionalism pervasively influenced the character of anthropological research in the Middle East as elsewhere in the world.

[J] One urominent example is the Finnish anthropologist Edward Westermarck (1862- 1939) who taught at the University of London for most of his career (1904-1930). Beginning at the’ turn of the century, he lived intermittently in Tangier over a period of roughly two decades and produced a number of monographs concerning various aspects of Moroccan rural society. Among his principal publications were Ritual and Belief in Morocco (New Hyde . University Books, 1968 [orig. 1926]); Wit and Wisdom of Morocco .(New York. Horace Liveright, Inc., 1931), ani Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco (London: Macmillan, 1914).

A by-product of functionalism, however, was the turning of anthropological interest away from the Middle East. The few studies which continued to be undertaken were primarily those which treated villages and tribes as closed social worlds, even when large numbers of villagers regularly sought work in the cities of their countries or overseas and depended upon income from such temporary or permanent migration for their sustenance.

Because functionalism so clearly illustrates how theoretical preconceptions shape what an anthropologist or sociologist “sees” in fieldwork, and is far from being a moribund framework for research, it is particularly interesting to examine its dominant conceptions in detail. As a theory, functionalism emphasizes the explanation of social phenomena on the basis of their interrelation with coexisting events or social forms, rather than in terms of how any of these came to be.

Such an extreme theoretical doctrine requires that societies be treated as closed entities. Hence it appeared to account much better for relatively simple, small-scale societies than for the larger-scale, historically known societies which anthropologists typically encountered in the Middle East. Only by the device of treating Middle Eastern villages and tribes as if they were small-scale, relatively isolated societies was it possible to make sense of them in terms of functionalist theory.

The best way of considering functionalism is as a variety of related theoretical perspectives instead of a unified theoretical viewpoint. Yet these perspectives share essential features. One of these is the idea that societies can be considered self- contained organisms, even if they are sometimes so complicated that it is hard to determine just what are their component parts—persons, social roles, or institutions—and the precise “functions” of these parts.

The convenient analogy of the human body to society was occasionally employed by functionalists to illustrate their ideas. In the case of the human body, the component parts are dissimilar, but by each performing its complementary task, the organism as a whole is able to survive: The heart pumps blood, the stomach digests food, and the legs transport the body from one place to another. Functionalists argued that societies had similar parts.

The anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown was an early popularizer of functionalist theory. His own analogy for the study of society was the horse. The articulation of the various parts of a horse, he argued, cannot be explained by study of the origins of the horse and its evolution, but only by the functions performed by each part in the present. In an accurate and biting critique of this approach, E. E. Evans-Pritchard commented that Radcliffe-Brown might be correct in writing of horses, but societies cannot be compared to them.[54] The notion of society is only an observer’s abstraction, so that the “parts” do not always fit together. In essence, the anthropological study of social and cultural form necessarily involves the study

of these forms in their historical context. Sociological forms are necessarily abstracted from events and situations that to a certain extent are always unique.

In an important sense, all anthropologists are functionalists in that they seek to interrelate various aspects of social action and systems of meaning, or culture. What distinguishes functionalism as an explicit theoretical framework is its emphasis upon describing societies as if they were in equilibrium. Only the more extreme of the functionalists completely ignored the data of historical change, but many chose to work in preliterate societies in which accounts of past events independent of immediate social context were unavailable or difficult to obtain. Most functionalists took historical facts into consideration when they could obtain them, but such data fitted only awkwardly into the main theoretical framework. Since functionalist theory has the built-in bias of treating societies as if they were closed systems existing at one historical moment, there was a tendency not to consider the factors that led to the “transition” of a society from one state to another. Historical transformations were instead thought of in layer-cake images, with each slice of time merely superimposed. The limitation of this strategy is that it serves more to contrast the end points of certain processes rather than to focus on the nature of the changes taking place. This is because the “synchronic slices” approach encourages a conception of historical change in terms of discrete, episodic units, rather than as a continuous process. Emphasis was placed upon the description of societies in periods when it was presumed there was little significant change rather than at periods of conflict, revolution, or major transition.[55] An alternate version of the same basic argument regarded social forms as cyclical, in which a tendency to social inequality, for instance, would begin to develop and then be replaced by a movement toward egalitarianism.[56]

Even in the small-scale, relatively isolated societies where the notions of functionalism appeared to work best, there were clear indications of the artificial conventions that functional theory imposed. Such small-scale societies were generally studied in a colonial context but described as they supposedly had existed in the precolonial past, with only passing references being made to the consequences of European conquest and administration. The effects of European incursion upon the central institutions of political authority, kinship, religion, and economics were generally ignored. It was also usually assumed that such societies had been essentially unchanging in form in the period prior to colonial conquest or to sustained contact with the West. In the heyday of functionalism, American anthropologists frequently used the term base-line to describe such societies prior to “outside” contact. This term clearly reveals the careless sort of assumption often made about the historical past.

*** Functionalism in the Study of the Middle East

The limitations of the concept of functionalism became particularly clear when the j notion was applied to complex, historically known societies. By the 1950s, minor qualifications were being added to the basic arguments of functionalism so that the “functional” description of a

society was frequently complemented by historical description. Evans-Pritchard’s The Sanusi of Cyrenaicaf is a classic monograph by an anthropologist which embodies the resulting contradiction. Evans-Pritchard’s criticisms of extreme forms of functional theory have already been mentioned. My commentary here is based upon the implicit argument of The Sanusi.

The goal of the monograph is to describe how an Islamic religious order, the Sariusiya, became in the nineteenth century the predominant religious order to which the transhumant Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica (Libya) were affiliated. He argues that the Sanusiya was the only order to adapt effectively to the acephalous segmentary social organization of the tribes, in which each individual was presumably an equal of every other and no one occupied a position of full-time leadership, so that in the twentieth century, Italian conquest and colonization provided the sustained pressure which was necessary to transform the acephalous segmentary . tribal society into a state organization under the leadership of the head of the Sanusi religious order, who subsequently became Libya’s first monarch. But a closer examination of this study indicates that the section in which the social structure of Bedouin tribes is described is abstract and totally separated from the much longer straightforward historical account describing the growth of the Sanusi religious brotherhood and the Italian conquest of Libya. Only in two crucial paragraphs (pp. 104-5) does Evans-Pritchard discuss how Bedouin tribal society was presumably transformed from an acephalous segmentary society into a state organization. He speculates that prolonged external pressure forces “segmentary” societies into such transformations but of course provides no detailed description of this process. His historical account is fully intelligible without reference to the abstract description of the segmentary structure of Bedouin society as it presumably was in the precolonial historical past (pp. 29-61). As social history the book is eminently successful, but the ahistorical description of Bedouin social organization is marginal to that success.

Perhaps the most broad-gauged attempt to apply functionalist theory to the Middle East was provided by the physical anthropologist Carleton Coon in Caravan: The Story of the Middle East, first published in 1951 and revised several times over the following decade. This book was the first general anthropological introduction to the area and for a time enjoyed a sustained popularity. Yet Caravan also glaringly portrays the drawbacks of functionalism. The book’s unity is sustained by the metaphor of the mosaic, a device which is useful for conveying some of the bare geographical and ethnographic facts concerning the Middle East and North Africa— modes of livelihood, physical characteristics of the population, religious and linguistic groupings, and political organization. Unfortunately, it is less adequate in explaining the interrelations among these elements or their known historical transformations. In fact, a principal negative virtue of Caravan is its clear exemplification of the weakness of functionalist theories in providing meaningful accounts of historically known societies. Thus in his first chapter, “The Picture and Its Pieces,” Coon writes that the mosaic pattern of the region becomes clear if the “little pieces of plastic and broken glass” are removed. By plastic and broken glass he means essentially everything that is “modem” or in transition in the Middle East. Coon writes that “a culture in transition is hard to describe and harder to understand; we must find some period in history when the culture was, relatively speaking, at rest.”[58]

This assertion means that Coon's method is, for instance,to describe Egyptian society as it presumably was prior to Bonaparte's invasion, Morocco as it existed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Turkey as it was in the nineteenth century and then to assume that these descriptions essentially hold in all key

respects for much longer periods of time. These are "base times" for Coon, and he assumes that for hundreds of years-from at least the fifteenth to the nineteenth century in most parts of the Middle East—societies were "frozen" in form. Recent historical research has underlined what was already known before the publication of Coon's book: Ahistorical assumptions concerning Middle Eastern societies are profoundly inappropriate. The extraordinary assumption of centuries of cultural "rest" creates a highly artificial and misleading way of looking at any society or civilization and is empirically inapplicable to the civilizational area which he describes. Throughout the period of cultural "rest" that Coon assumes, highly significant transformations were occurring throughout the Middle East. To name only one, in the nineteenth century the Middle East was increasingly being drawn into the world capitalist economy. This was one of the principal factors leading to the instability of central governments in many regions such as Morocco after the 1860s. The resulting instability provided a convenient excuse for European colonial intervention in some instances and the control of vital governmental services such as customs revenues in others. Nor were all transformations of the society related to external factors alone. Much of the impetus for change came from developments "internal" to Middle Eastern societies themselves.

Elsewhere, Coon describes Islam as the "right" religion for the Middle East because it survived as the dominant religion in the area for such an extended period of time. Hence he argues that Islam must be in "equilibrium" with the environment. Here again the "horse" analogy is lurking in the background. A similar argument underlies his explanation of the prohibition upon wine in the Islamic world. Coon suggests that with so much of the area a desert and the Arabs so hospitable, it would be too cumbersome and expensive to carry goatskins of wine through the region.[9] Or consider his more general statement: "The keynote to the Islamic way of life is that it provided a maximum goodness of fit for a swarm of human beings, living in the environment of the Middle East, to a progressively deteriorating landscape."[10] Again, this statement constitutes a massive tautology. It could just as well be adapted to Christianity in Europe or, in the New World, to Aztec human sacrifices. All that needs to be argued is that such practices exist because they fulfill a function.

To return to the specific consideration of the Middle East, Coon's assertion of a "fit" between Islam and the Middle East ignores the fact that the center of gravity of the Muslim population in the world falls somewhere between Pakistan and Iran; in fact, the majority of the world's Muslims live on the Indian subcontinent and in Southeast Asia. Admittedly, Coon's argument also can be adapted to the environmental circumstances of these regions,

although again the argument asserts no more than the fact that if things were not the way they are, then they would be different.

The serious theoretical shortcomings of Coon’s book did not prevent it from being a practical and popular introduction to the area, especially at a time when there was no other general text available. Yet there are alternatives to functionalism in the social sciences. General propositions about social organization and culture can be made without turning them into universal “laws.” Such universal laws simply do not exist except in a most trivial or acultural sense in human societies.

[9] Ibid., p. 347.

[10] Ibid., p. 346.

Coon was exceptional in writing of a civilizational area, for as I have previously indicated, the professional work of anthropologists is primarily upon a much more minute scale. At this reduced scale, whatever the shortcomings of functionalism as sociological theory, it has the decisive practical advantage of providing an organizing guide for anthropological fieldwork. It encourages anthropologists to conceive of societies in their totality—or, to be more modest about the scope of anthropology as actually practiced, it encourages fieldworkers to collect information on kinship, myths, politics, economics, and other aspects of social life and to seek out interrelations between these various activities even when the linkages are not immediately apparent. As a consequence, a substantial number of ethnographies now exist that provide resource materials for purposes other than those for which they were originally intended. It can be argued that the notion of gathering documentation on the “total” social world of individuals, whether they be office workers in an industrial society or villagers who spend a large part of their lives in relation with significant others from the same immediate locale, constitutes a distinctively anthropological technique of viewing culture and society. As a theory, functionalism has limitations which are obvious once they are made explicit, but its organizing concepts have proved to be an enduring ad hoc stratagem for effective field research.

Three examples are presented here to indicate the strategies involved in the functionalist study of societies. I have deliberately chosen examples of research toward the end of the functionalist era, the 1950s and early 1960s, and of researchers who have since acknowledged the limitations of their earlier theoretical assumptions. The first two examples concern societies in which irrigation is a main economic feature; the third example involves an agricultural village in southern Lebanon.

There were several converging reasons for the interest in irrigation societies in the 1950s. One was the impact of Karl Wittfogel’s Oriental Despotism,[59] which argued

that irrigation systems, or at least certain forms of them, necessitated the development of hierarchical forms of sociopolitical organization. The thesis attracted the attention of a wide range of archaeologists and social anthropologists, for it provided what was considered to be a testable framework in which the relation between modes of production and social organization could be explored. Another reason was that studies of irrigation societies fit in nicely with the conventions of functional explanation. After all, in a region such as the Middle East, irrigation systems and the scarce resource of water which they distribute are vital to agricultural production and social life. Social institutions are sharply constrained by ecological considerations. It would be a poor use of metaphor, but nonetheless accurate, to point out that functionalist theory itself is a hydraulic theory of the integration of society; A shift in any component invariably brings about shifts in the others.

The first example concerns the Fadiji Nubians of Upper (southern) Egypt as they were studied in 1961 by the late Abdul Hamid el-Zein, then an ardent functionalist and later a leading proponent of the structural study of ritual and symbolism.[60]

The people Zein studied were relocated elsewhere in Egypt in 1963 when the construction of the new Aswan dam resulted in the flooding of their old village sites, so that Zein’s description is necessarily in the past tense. Prior to the flooding, settlements and fertile land were located in a narrow belt along the Nile, with the settlements framed on both sides of the river by rocky, barren mountains. The region received only one inch of rainfall annually, so that agriculture was entirely dependent upon irrigation. Prior to relocation in 1963, there were earlier pressures upon the availability of land induced by technological change. The first Aswan dam built in 1902 raised the water level in the winter of each year and thus reduced the land locally available for cultivation; the same effect followed later heightenings of the dam in 1912 and 1933. In the low water season of August and September, this low-level land was briefly available for cultivation in addition to the land located at higher elevations. Wheat and beans were the principal crops, although many villagers also owned palm trees and harvested their dates.

In three hundred pages Zein works out the implications of the water wheel for the social life of the Fadija. In the course of his argument, it becomes clear that the Fadija never were self-subsistent agriculturally. In the nineteenth century their village was important as a way station in the slave trade between Cairo and the Sudan, while more recently it was important in the lucrative smuggling between Egypt and the Sudan. In addition, Nubians have for long emigrated to other parts of Egypt—a phenomenon that was already important in the nineteenth century. The remittances these emigrants sent home were necessary for the subsistence of their relatives and families. Significant in this respect, the principal crops of the Fadtjz were insufficient for their subsistence, so that many villagers played active roles in the market as merchants and traders as a necessary part of their livelihood.

But, as Zein specifies, the Fadtja nonetheless claimed that their status in the community was linked directly to the ownership of land and water rights.

Zein cites a Nubian proverb to reinforce his theme of the water wheel as a central element in Fadiji society: “The water wheel is like a mosque, and those who serve it are like those who serve the mosque.” Zein treats membership in the village, status in the local community, and central rituals as if they were all part of a closed system. Thus he emphasizes the land shortage and the ecological constraints that made it impossible for men to build up wealth in animals. He sees education, emigration, and market activities as partial solutions to the chronic land shortage, thus conceiving them as a sort of safety valve so that the system of the village was able to work.

In describing the ownership and operation of the water wheel, Zein emphasizes the functional justification of certain traditional arrangements. Thus the base of a water wheel is hard to site—few locations are suitable for it—and difficult to repair. It must be owned by one man, writes Zein, because it is so crucial. The upper parts of the water wheel, including the buckets, are individually owned or rented. In the case of a serious quarrel certain of these upper parts (unlike the base) may be removed and replaced by those belonging to someone else without seriously disrupting the wheel’s operation. Through case studies of disputes, Zein indicates how Fadifi social institutions prevent conflicts from interfering with their livelihood. Similarly he indicates how patterns of marriage alliances are linked to the ownership of water rights. Co-owners of water rights seek intermarriage between their households in order to solidify their alliances and lessen the problems connected with inheritance. The roles played in rituals are also closely associated with such rights. The water wheel thus is a concrete artifact whose study reveals the components and functioning of the supposedly closed social system of the village.

FIGURE 3-1 Water wheel, Egyptian Nubia. The wheel is partially covered by branches to retard evaporation. (Courtesy Abdul Hamid WI.el-Zein.)

Although Zein’s densely packed monograph does not provide a “total” explanation of village life, as functionalist arguments often promise, it manages to provide an intricate description of what he asserts to be a key institutional complex within Nubian life. The ethnographic description of the water wheel, its maintenance and its relation to other aspects of village life provided by Zein constitute what is undoubtedly the best descriptive account of the social organization of irrigation practices available for the Middle East. Less convincing is his overall conceptual framework, in which the components of society at a given moment are considered to be in a closed equilibrium with each other. In the classical functionalist tradition, Zein considers the water wheel and ownership of water rights to be in direct relation to the cultural value of community maintained by the Fadija (“moral”

community in Durkheim’s terms) and to the acquisition of social honor within the community. Yet Zein is such an exceptionally able ethnographer that his own data suggest that the system of status honor that he described was more complex and less holistic than he claimed. For instance, villagers who could command cash from remittances or from trading activities fail to fit into the nicely established equilibrium of status honor tied to land and water rights which Zein asserts. When returning emigrants invested their money in land, Zein was able to provide an account of their role in the status system. But when the funds were invested in education or new economic activities, his account is more ambiguous and simply treats such forms of status as if they were alien to the local community.

Zein explicitly states that while individuals entered and left the social system and while individual ownership of land and water rights was constantly shifting, the water wheel and the system of allocating rights connected with it persisted. Yet within the monograph Zein acknowledges that the “enduring” system of the allocation of rights which he describes came into its present form only at the turn of the century. As a descriptive convention, Zein’s assumption that the water wheel and the social obligations connected with it were a central cohesive force works well so long as his account concerns only those activities directly related to the water wheel. Leaks in the “closed” system show up as soon as other activities of the villagers are considered.

Robert Femea’s Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority among the El Shabana of Southern Iraq[13] is another primarily functionalist monograph on an irrigation society, inspired by the explicit theoretical problem of changing patterns of political authority. At the time of Fernea’s fieldwork (1956-1958) in a small town of 3,000 persons 150 miles to the south of Baghdad, Fernea was primarily, if indirectly, interested in the Wittfogel thesis of the relation of irrigation with political authority. Essentially Femea’s approach is to provide a general ecological and social historical description of southern Iraq, with an emphasis upon the Al Shabana tribe. This is followed by an excellent general account of tribal organization. Although the Al Shabana tribal structure is characterized as “segmentary” by Fernea, he is a careful ethnographer and realizes that the lineage system by which tribesmen characterize their organization and obligations simply does not correspond to actual groupings.[61] The remainder of the study examines the changing patterns of authority of the tribal leadership under Ottoman rule, the succeeding period of the British mandate, and finally under the independent Iraqi regime. The authority of tribal leaders (shaykh-s) was most autonomous under' Ottoman rule and in fact was enhanced in the late nineteenth century by the system of land registration implemented by the Ottomans as part of wide-ranging tax reforms. These reforms enabled tribal leaders to register traditionally collective or “tribal” lands in their personal names, thus becoming major landowners and in many cases turning their fellow tribesmen into tenants and sharecroppers. Their authority was more restricted under British rule and, in more recent times, has been even more circumscribed in favor of irrigation engineers and other representatives of the central government. Nonetheless, tribal leaders have managed to maintain considerable- political influence as intermediaries between tribesmen and representatives of the central government.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

A principal contribution of Femea's monograph is its clear exposition of present-day tribal organization.[62] Femea adopts the conventions of functional analysis but, like Zein, does not allow his ethnographic account to be trapped entirely within his theoretical formulations. Fernea clearly depicts the significance of "outside" political forces for comprehending local authority structures, although he is less successful in indicating how individual shaykhs and their followers themselves viewed the successive political transformations which he describes and the way in which perceptions of change affected the action which they took. Attention to such a theme would have avoided at least some of the pitfalls of the layer-cake conception of history, in which social and cultural institutions are seen as unchanging over long, indefinite periods (that is, "premodern," "traditional"). Suchahistor- ical notions are encouraged by the conventions of functional analysis, an approach that Fernea in fact has abandoned in his more recent writing.[63]

Perhaps the most incisive account of the limitations of the functionalist approach was developed by the British anthropologist Emrys Peters. Peters has worked in two regions in the Middle East. As a student of E. E. Evans-Pritchard, he worked with the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, Libya, shortly after the Second World War. The principal results of that research have been a series of articles exploring the concept of segmentation and the feud (see Chapter 5). His most direct inquiry into the more general issue of functional theory is contained in two articles he wrote on a Shi^cf Muslim village in south Lebanon, where he worked for a year in 1952 and again in 1956. The first analysis was published in 1963, although it had been presented informally at scholarly conferences prior to his return to Lebanon in 1956. A thorough "recantation" of his 1963 article then appeared in 1972.[64]

His earlier analysis is of more than historical interest, for it indicates in detail the social and economic organization of the village. In his first account, published in 1963, Peters used the "equilibrium" assumption to which I earlier referred. Of course, such a notion does not imply that individuals are frozen in place. Peters perceived that at least some individuals were highly mobile but that the structure of the society—that is, the orderly arrangement of roles and statuses within it—remained the same. Revolutions against the social order did not bring about the collapse of the social order; rather, they provided opportunities for powerful persons or groups of persons to replace others whose power and influence had diminished.

As Peters writes, there were many characteristics of the village he studied that led him to believe that an equilibrium model of its social structure was appropriate in 1952 and for at least three generations prior to that time. In the first place, the village was territorially discrete, located on a high promontory with a cliff on one side and sharply delineated

borders on the others, so that it was set off sharply from the other villages in the region. Its population of eleven hundred people appeared prosperous and largely self-sub sistent. There was an abundant rainfall of fifty to sixty inches from November through March, though irrigation was needed for the rest of the year. The luxurious array of crops included tomatoes, eggplant, peppers, beans, peas, carrots, cabbage, apples, oranges, quince, radishes, lettuce, cucumbers, plums, figs, pomegranates, sugar cane, olives, and grapes. Many villagers also had small herds of sheep and goats, although most of the meat consumed in the village was purchased elsewhere.

Another reason that Peters conceived the village to be self-contained was the emphasis which the villagers themselves placed upon landownership as a criterion of social identity. Villagers asserted a special identity with their land and spoke of themselves as being its “sons.”

In his 1963 article, Peters accepted the villagers’ self-categorization into distinct groups as an adequate model of the actual social structure. Essentially, this division was composed of the “Learned Families,” the commercial traders, and a peasant proletariat. The village was predominantly Shl^cf Muslim, although a few Christians were also present. Since nearly all of Peters’s analysis concerns the Muslim population, I will concentrate upon it as well. Membership in the three Muslim cate-

FIGURE 3-2 A village in southern Lebanon, 1950s. (From Emrys L; Peters, "Aspects of Rank and Status among Muslims in a Lebanese Village," in Mediterranean Countrymen, ed. Julian Pitt-Rivers [Paris and The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963], p. 168. Courtesy Emrys L. Peters and Mouton & Co., Publishers.)

gories was primarily related to landownership and use and was reflected in patterns of dress, seating arrangements on social occasions, and other readily visible signs of comportment.

The first group as seen by the villagers, the Learned Families, was composed in part of the descendants of the Prophet’s great-grandson ^cA1L These were called sayyid-s. The remainder of this group were known as shaykh-s. They claimed descent from an ancestor who fought alongside the Prophet’s grandson at the seventh-century Battle of Karbala, an incident which is crucial to Shi^cI history. These families were called “Learned” not because they necessarily were educated but because they claimed a superior social and religious status based on descent. Some members of the Learned Families had been to traditional Shf^cf centers of learning in Iraq. This aristocracy constituted about 20 percent of the population of the village. They intermarried among themselves and with families of similar status in neighboring villages and managed to control local political offices. The Learned Families tended to live in better houses than other villagers, performed no manual labor on their land

as another indication of their status, and were said by the villagers to own the majority of the land.

Although the Learned Families claimed a common identity based upon descent, it was possible for persons from the other categories to assimilate to them through persistent effort and the expenditure of wealth in ways approved by the leaders of the Learned Families. Peters provides several specific examples of individuals in the other categories who had become wealthy and powerful and who, through demonstrating proper deference and a willingness to become publicly known as clients of the Learned Families, could put forward a claim to Learned Family status themselves, at least in certain contexts. In his 1972 account, Peters acknowledges that he did not see such social mobility as a force in the realignment of sets of social relationships, but only as a movement of persons within a fixed social system. [65]

The second important group were the commercial traders. These were not so clearly defined as a category, although they cultivated small gardens, tended to wear European clothing, and belonged primarily to two patronymic groups. Together, they constituted another 20 percent of the Muslim population.

The third and largest group was the peasant proletariat, the remainder of the population with the exception of a few Christian households. Peasants worked their own land and served as laborers for the lands of the Learned Families. In his 1963 account of the village, in which he saw status as part of a single, overriding system related to the land, Peters regarded the high rate of migration among the peasant proletariat merely as an indication of pressures upon the land. If persons of peasant origin migrated in large numbers to North and South America, Great Britain, and West Africa, it was simply because of the lack of locally available land, and not because of any other factor. In his later study Peters acknowledged that earlier he had largely neglected the improved access to schools of many of these emigrants, the substantial remittances they sent back to the village, and, especially in the case of those who remained in Lebanon, the active influence they maintained in village affairs. Because the villagers insisted to Peters that ownership of land was the key to understanding stratification, he had directed his research strategies primarily toward this topic and assumed that the social structure he so construed was stable over time.

Peters confirmed his earlier conception of a stable social structure through the analysis of two behavioral indices. One was the performance of the annual mourning (ta^cziya) plays commemorating the martyrdom of the slaying of Husayn, the Prophet’s grandson, by Sunni Muslims in the year 680. Throughout the regions in which Shi^cf Islam predominates, such reenactments were until recently performed during the first ten days of the Muslim lunar month of Muharram, in some circumstances by professional actors and sometimes by the villagers themselves. In the village studied by Peters, the roles of the Shf^ca, supporters of ^cAli (the Prophet’s son-in-law) and descendants of the Prophet, who of course

lost the battle and suffered martyrdom, were performed by the Learned Families. The roles of the victorious but treacherous Sunni Muslims were performed by the peasants, thus dramatically symbolizing what Peters took to be fixed elements of the status of and a symbolic “warning” to the peasants of the anarchy that would prevail if descendants of the Prophet were not allowed their rightful place in the social world.

Peters also considered the fact that despite some signs of discontent, almost everyone in the village exhibited some form of deference to the Learned Families, and that in elections for various local offices, the candidates supported by the Learned Families invariably won. Because the Learned Families were a minority, their own votes were insufficient to win an election, but through the manipulation of other village factions, they always managed to win.

Soon after his initial period of fieldwork, Peters saw the architecture of what he had assumed to be a stable system of social structure disintegrate. In 1953, there were municipal elections throughout Lebanon. One of the peculiarities of elections in the Lebanon of this period was that persons could choose to vote where they wished, although most franchised persons chose to vote in their natal villages. This fact in itself renders suspect any account of local politics which considered only the presence of persons in the immediate geographic locale of an electoral region. No village in Lebanon is more than half a day by bus from any other village, so that persons not regularly resident in the village but who had ties with it could easily participate in its elections. In the 1953 elections the candidate supported by the Learned Families was soundly defeated and, moreover, the Learned Families were unable to exert significant political influence from that time on. The winner in the 1953 election was still in office fifteen years later and had been instrumental in bringing a new school to the village, a medical clinic, a paved road, and education for women, among other significant transformations.

The value of the 1972 study by Peters lies in his meticulous account of why his early analysis and implicit theoretical assumptions were invalid. As Peters writes, his principal difficulty was his acceptance of the global social categories used by the

villagers themselves. This directed his attention away from certain major economic and status transformations which were then occurring. These were not perceived as patterned regularities by the villagers themselves, but, Peters argues, an understanding of them was essential for an adequate social anthropological account of village structure. The villagers asserted a central unitary value in the ownership of land, said that the Learned Families were the major landowners, and accused the Learned Families of coveting the land of the other groups. This obscured for Peters the fact that a large number of Learned Families were poor and, moreover, were handicapped in that their status obliged them not to work their own land. Being]

hard pressed for funds, they found themselves selling their land to an emerging group of commoners whom Peters calls the “Professionals” in his 1972 article.)

These were the children of commoners who had attended American missionary schools in the region and who were thus often enabled to acquire further technical and university training. For reasons of their status, the Learned Families were compelled to send their children only to Shi^ci religious schools, a restriction that the commoners could easily ignore. Hence a number of commoner children became 1 prominent doctors, lawyers, merchants, bureaucrats, and managers in Lebanon and | abroad. Likewise, the commercial skills acquired by peasant emigrants familiarized 5 them with modern administrative techniques. These persons had considerable 1 money for investment and put at least part of it in village lands. Yet, while the Learned Families maintained their land in nonmarket crops, the Professional and trader classes were more aware of the possibilities for export crops and invested in such things as apples. By the time the Learned Families became aware of the income to be derived from such crops, the market value had diminished so that much of the initial advantage of investing in them was lost. Nor did the Profes- 'i

sionals choose to make the heavy investment necessary to acquire merit in the eyes of the Learned Families.

In many ways, Peters wrote in his 1972 reanalysis, there was a disadvantage 'j, to the high rank of the Learned Families. Only a few of them were actually large ’> landowners. Poor sayyid-s and shaykh-s had to live on loans because it was beneath their dignity to work their own lands. Similarly, though as a group the Learned Families exhibited a high degree of literacy, this was almost exclusively acquired in traditional religious education. This limited their perception of and ability to benefit from modern economic and political opportunities.'

Moreover, the social networks and ties of patronage and clientship of the Learned Families showed sharp contrasts to those of the other two groups. The Learned Families tended to marry only among themselves or with persons of i

similar rank in neighboring villages. The peasant Professionals had weblike connections through marriage arid patronage with persons of many different walks of life J in Beirut and elsewhere—bankers, politicians, doctors, educators, emigrants, and 1 entrepreneurs—and used these ties to advantage in the acquisition of political j influence. The Learned Families were caught up in a narrow web of relations and ’

were pursuing what had become a defunct economic policy of investing their 5 wealth only in land, although the locus of significant economic activities had shifted elsewhere. The Professionals had acquired the training, the connections, and the resources which enabled

them to replace the Learned Families as the dominant social group. Furthermore, they were capable of enhancing the welfare of the community as a whole through the effective manipulation of these ties.

The error of Peters's first analysis, as he saw it, had been the attempt to fit all the facts of village life into a single pattern. In his reanalysis, he concluded that the "system" the anthropologist looks for is necessarily open-ended and must be explained at least in part by looking for historical transformations. The key components of status present in any situation must be looked at comparatively in order to be comprehended, both in different social settings and at different historical periods. The system thus described is open-ended, and its components become apparent by the historical analysis of shifts in power. Patterned regularities exist in such open-ended systems, but they are not the elusive and misleading single system presumed by the functionalists. As Peters wrote, the perplexing (for him) results of the 1953 election jolted him into a reconsideration of what he had thought to be a basic, enduring social structure. Through his reanalysis, he perceived that rank as perceived by the villagers operated differentially—that is, to the detriment of some members of the Learned Families and to the advantage of some persons in the other categories and that ownership of land was not of equal significance to all the villagers.

In fairness to Peters, few anthropologists in the 1950s and 1960s realized the full importance of the cultural and social impact of immigration and emigration, education, and exposure to the West and the ensuing feedback upon the political and cultural fate of the region. Even earlier in the century, to take only the countries of North Africans an example, the presence of large numbers of North African laborers in France led to the development of organized labor movements in the colonies and the coalescence of a nationalist movement. The same was true for the large number of North Africans who fought in France's armies, and a smaller but influential number of North African students who studied in France. More recently, in the 1950s and 1960s, political issues in countries such as Brazil, France, and West Germany related to problems of bicultural education can be traced directly to Middle Eastern immigrant populations. When such workers return to their country of origin, they bring with them changed notions of housing, marriage, family, and society. Their changing tastes in clothing, housing, and other commodities have contributed to the precipitate decline of many traditional crafts such as weaving, rug making, and the like. Whether their experience with the West is one of bitterness and disillusionment or one of partial liberation from some of the constraints of their own society, their lives are profoundly altered. Emigration is significant enough a phenomenon in countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria to affect the lives of virtually every town and village. Immigration into oil-rich countries such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states (where immigrants sometimes outnumber local residents) has had a similarly profound impact. Additionally, it has only been in the last two decades that substantial numbers of school-age women have had improved access to higher education in many Middle Eastern countries. The consequences of such change are often delayed, which may be one of the reasons that Peters underestimated its importance in his earlier study, but as he realized in his reanalysis, its cumulative and long-range impact can often be profound. [19]

There are other aspects of Peters’s analysis that are explored in later chapters, but for the moment it is critical for its brief indication of certain features of village ! life in one part of the Middle East and for its unusually straightforward evaluation of the shortcomings of functional analysis and assumptions which imply that villagers, pastoralists, and townsmen live now or lived in the past in closed social worlds. In the ensuing chapters more satisfactory alternatives to such concepts are presented.

** 4. The Contexts of Pastoral Nomadism

As of 1970, pastoral nomads constituted only slightly more than 1 percent of the population of the Middle East, yet such nomadic societies have been more extensively studied by anthropologists than those in village or urban settings. There are major anthropological studies in English of pastoral nomads in Iran, Turkey, Somalia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, and Libya, as well as an extensive literature in professional journals.[1] Until recently, in contrast, the Middle East has been the only world region for which no equivalent range of studies has been available concerning its major populations, the peasants or settled “tribal” communities.[2]

A partial explanation for the disproportionate emphasis upon pastoral nomadism continues to be the romantic attraction to some anthropologists of nomadic life and virtues. There are also some more important theoretical and practical reasons. First of all, pastoral nomadism offers the appropriate conditions for social groups which conceive their identity primarily in terms of segmentary lineage organization, a subject which raises basic questions on the comparative study of society in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world.[3] A second reason is an anthropological concern with human ecology. Studies of pastoral societies contribute to an understanding of human adaptation to difficult environments,and to the constraints which ecological and economic conditions place upon social organization. A third reason is a practical one: Middle Eastern governments have been anxious to settle their pastoral populations for a mixture of political, economic, and humanitarian motives and consequently have often encouraged the work of foreign and indigenous anthropologists with pastoral groups.

Patterns of pastoral nomadism vary widely, even if considered in a strictly ecological dimension. Geographers interested primarily in land use, for instance, frequently make a distinction between horizontal and vertical nomadism. Horizontal nomadism refers to pastoral movements in search of water and pasture that occur throughout the year in roughly similar ecological regions, such as is the case with the camel-herding “noble” tribes of the Arabian peninsula and the Kababish Arabs of the northern Sudan, who have mixed herds of camels, sheep, and goats.

Vertical nomadism involves seasonal movement between complementary ecological zones, such as lowland plains for part of the year and mountainous regions for another. This form of pastoralism principally involves the herding of sheep and goats and is frequently combined with agriculture and the use of permanent settlements for part of the year. Among other regions, it is the most common form of pastoralism in Iran, Iraq, and Morocco.

in Sociology and Social Anthropology, 13 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972); The Desert and the Sown: Nomads in Wider Society, ed. Cynthia Nelson, Research Series, 21 (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973), and the Equipe Ecologie et Anthropologic des Societes Pastorales, Pastoral Production and Society (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978). Finally, Douglas L. Johnson, The Nature of Nomadism, Research Paper 118 (Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1969), is a useful geographical study which also contains a thorough bibliography on Middle Eastern pastoralism. The most original and provocative book to appear in recent years on pastoral nomadism and its relation to states and empires, and on the relation between political forms and Bedouin oral literature, is Michael E. Meeker, Literature and Violence in North Arabia, Cambridge Studies in Cultural Systems, 3 (New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[2] Clifford Geertz, “Studies in Peasant Life: Community and Society,” in Biennial Review of Anthropology, 1961, ed. Bernard J. Siegal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 17.

[3] On the significance of studying lineage organization in the context of pastoral societies as opposed to those of towns or villages, see Emrys Peters, “Aspects of Affinity in a Lebanese Maronite Village,” in Mediterranean Family Structures, ed. J. G. Peristiany, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, 13 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 30-32.

For most anthropological purposes, classifications of pastoral nomadic groups based purely upon ecological considerations or type of seasonal movement are insufficient. Both in recent decades and in earlier historical periods, the political and social relations of pastoral groups with the peasant settlements, towns, and states that are on the periphery of zones of intense pastoral activity have been as important for their livelihood as pastoralism itself. Pastoral nomadism depends upon regular access to settlements for a variety of agricultural products and other goods that can be obtained through trade (or pillage) or, on occasion in the past, by force. Pastoral, agricultural, and trade activities are part of a single economic system articulated by various forms of social and political domination. These forms are complex and the participants do not fall readily into classificatory niches such as nomads, villagers, and townsmen. Both now and in the past, many tribes commonly have had both nomadic and settled components, and political leadership and movements

frequently have encompassed groups pursuing combinations of these forms of economic activity.[67]

*** Pastoral Nomadism: The Past and the Present

Some accounts of pastoral nomadism give the impression that only the political and economic transformations since the eighteenth century have significantly reduced it in scope. Actually, it has probably been the case that nomadic pastoralism has always been part of a larger system including agricultural, settled peasants, and trading urban centers. For no historical period is it possible to think of nomadic pastoralists as an autonomous society. The reasons for the seemingly irreversible decline beginning in the eighteenth century are multiple and vary considerably with region, but among them are the steady expansion of cultivated land to the detriment of lands available for grazing, the declining attractiveness of herds as a capital investment to merchants and other nonpastoralists, the disappearance of significant caravan traffic as alternative investments have become available, and the increasing ineffectiveness of nomads as a military force. Census figures for Iraq indicate the scope of this decline—in 1867 nomads constituted about 35 percent of the population as compared with only 2.8 percent, or 300,000, in 1970.[68] The beginning of the pronounced decline of nomadism varies from country to country, but in almost all cases the rate of decline brought about by large-scale economic and political shifts has been rapid.

The major factors involved in the decline of pastoralism are suggested by the case of Egypt, which in the early nineteenth century became the first country in the Middle East to experience a rapid expansion of agricultural production due to increasing involvement in the world capitalist economy and a consolidation of its central government under the reign of Muhammad ^cAH (1769-1848).[69] To increase agricultural production and tax revenues, Muhammad ^cA1I sought to settle the Bedouin tribes, and to this end he used a combination of tactics which met with varying success. One was to give land grants to Bedouin tribal leaders (shaykh-s) and to tax this land at a low rate. The drawback to this policy was that many shaykhs preferred to lease their land to peasants rather than induce their own followers to settle. Another technique was to appoint Bedouin leaders to government offices, keeping members of their families as hostages in Cairo to ensure their loyalty. In order to carry out their tasks and to enjoy the wealth which usually was associated with such offices, many of these leaders settled in towns and often built palaces for themselves as an indication of their new status. At the same time, they maintained a firm hold upon fellow tribesmen as their formal representative with the government and persuaded many of them to settle, exacting from them tax revenues and other obligations.

An associated tactic to encourage settlement was to allow Bedouin shaykhs to register uncultivated land in their own names, leaving them to induce their fellow tribesmen by whatever means available to settle and cultivate this land. The process of land registration was confusing enough to illiterate tribesmen (who often thought it to be a prelude to military

conscription) so that even when tracts of land were intended for tribes as a whole, tribal leaders found it easy to acquire personal title to such land and progressively to convert their fellow tribesmen into peasants and sharecroppers. A similar process occurred elsewhere in the Middle East, including the former Ottoman provinces of Iraq, Syria, and Palestine.[70]

Although the decline of pastoralism is a long-term phenomenon, many anthropologists recognize a qualitative difference in the sociopolitical context of nomadic groups prior to and after the imposition of sustained and effective central government control. William Irons's study of the Yomut Turkmen of northern Persia is typical of many studies in that he sharply distinguishes between land use patterns and sociopolitical organization before and after the effective imposition of such control in the mid-1930s.[71] Other anthropologistshave based their analyses entirely upon earlier sources. Notable among these is Henry Rosenfeld's account of the military and political role of pastoral nomads in northern Arabia in the nineteenth century and prior to the First World War.[72]

Rosenfeld's account is worth considering in detail, for it sharply delineates the inherent tension between the "tribal" social organization and loyalties of pastoral nomadic groups and the principles of leadership and authority associated with state organizations in the premodem period. "Premodem," like "traditional," is a difficult term to define. Here I use the term, as does Rosenfeld, to signify the period prior to significant Western military and economic penetration and its accompanying decisive impact upon political, educational, and other institutions. The terms "premodem" and "traditional" are often useful provided that it is kept in mind that what is "premodem" for a country such as Saudi Arabia (or even a region within a country) occurs historically at a very different time from what is "premodern" .for Egypt, the first country in the region to be subject to sustained European intervention.

The specific details of Rosenfeld's argument relate to pastoral groups in northern Arabiaj but his main theme is also useful as a starting point for considering the premodern political role of pastoralists in other regions of the Middle East. Rosenfeld argues that the scope of economic and political domination which any social group can exercise is limited by its form of social organization, especially of its military force, and that pastoral nomads are limited militarily because of their "kin-based" social organization. A corollary argument is that pastoral nomadic life contains fewer possibilities for the relatively permanent differentiation by wealth than is possible in settled milieus where, of course, "kin-based" or "tribal" social organization is also found. In the case of pastoral groups, consequently, there is more of a tendency for relationships among individuals to be egalitarian both in ideology and in practice than is the case in oases, villages, and towns. Parenthetically, it is misleading to equate "kin-based" with "tribal" social organization, as do Rosenfeld and many others concerned with pastoral nomads, for reasons which will become clear later in this chapter. For the moment, Rosenfeld's argument is at a level of generality for which a more precise use of terms is not crucial. Essentially, Rosenfeld discusses the different patterns of leadership and social organization among pastoral nomadic groups and the transformations from one form to another which occurred in the political context of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

One possibility was for a Bedouin shaykh to possess only a limited form of domination over his fellow tribesmen, relying primarily upon informal persuasion. Ideologically, Bedouin shaykhs were (and still are) considered to be only the first among equals, although in practice they possess a greater control over resources than their followers which enables them to entertain lavishly and to have a web of relations with nontribesmen. To cite Burckhardt's aphorism: "A shaykh's orders are never obeyed but his example is generally followed."[73] Another practical limitation of the control of Bedouin shaykhs over tribesmen was that ecological exigencies required nomadic groups to break up into small units for large parts of the year and to move quickly to take advantage of available rainfall and vegetation. Pastoral groups coalesced into intertribal raiding parties, especially during the winter months when the search for water and pastures was less demanding than in other seasons, but most raids were carried out by small groups which had neither permanent members nor leaders.[74]

Nonetheless, pastoral groups in some circumstances had an advantage over the militia of settlements in certain irregular encounters, in escaping taxation, in disrupting caravan traffic, and in carrying out sporadic raids against outlying oases or agricultural settlements. Often the mere threat of a raid was sufficient to persuade a village, oasis, or weaker pastoral group to pay for protection in cash or kind. Often such payments were known euphemistically as "brotherhood" (khuwa) obligations.[75] Even the Ottoman government found it expedient to pay regular subsidies to nomadic leaders to ensure the safe passage of caravans (including those associated with the annual pilgrimage to Mecca) and to ensure the safety of the Damascus-Medina railroad. The railroad was completed in 1908 and destroyed by T. E. Lawrence during the First World War. The extent of such tribute depended upon the rapidly fluctuating strength of particular nomadic groups.

Given the dependence of pastoralists upon the produce and merchandise of settled communities and oases, the dominance of settled communities over nomads was a more common occurrence than was the reverse situation.[76] The possibilities were numerous, but usually pastoral leadership was fragmented or weak. Oases often control access to the only perennial source of water, needed by nomadic groups for the summer months. The leaders of oasis communities commonly sought to create rivalry among nomadic groups through subsidies and other tactics in order

FIGURE 4-1 Ja^cda camel driver. Hadramawt. South Arabia. Roads and trucks have profoundly transformed the life of nomadic pastoralists. (From Freya Stark, Seen in the Hadhramaut [London: John Murray, Publishers, Ltd., 1939], p. 3. Courtesy of the author and publisher.)

to keep them in a state of dependence. Also common, however, was a situation of uneasy peace between oasis dwellers and nomads, in which pastoral groups exchanged their animals and animal products (and services as transporters of goods and persons) for dates, grains, coffee, salt, cloth, guns, and ammunition and established ties with cultivators that allowed them to forage their animals on harvested fields. Some pastoralists owned date trees and land in these settlements or had settled kinsmen on whom they depended to facilitate their economic transactions.

In some circumstances, as Rosenfeld explains, ambitious Bedouin leaders sought opportunities to acquire firmer control over trade and oases than was possible through their influence as “first among equals” with their fellow tribesmen. Initially, the ruler of an emerging tribute state acquired control of oases and settlements with the support of a kin-based militia of fellow tribesmen but gradually replaced these with mercenaries and slaves, whose livelihood depended directly upon their obedience to and support of the ruler. Such a shift in type of authority usually was marked by the settlement of a Bedouin leader in a key town or oasis and a growing identity of his interests with those of leading merchants and a Bedouin elite, as opposed to the interests of the majority of his fellow tribesmen who remained nomadic pastoralists. Nomadic groups and settlements peripheral to such a tribute state received no direct benefit from submission to it and hence sought to break away whenever possible. The militia of the ruler sought regularly through raids or the threat of raids to force such nomadic groups and settlements to accept their protection.

Finally, Rosenfeld describes the features of a rudimentary state organization which he calls episodic or expanding. In this form of state, kin-based nomadic groups are incorporated but only so long as their interests coincide with those of the ruler of the state and his associates. This occurred when tribal levies were engaged in raiding and military activities directed against external objectives. As soon as such a state ceased to incorporate new settlements or tribes, these levies were not needed and kin-based nomadic groups again sought whenever possible to break away. One example is the Wahhabi, or “Unitarian” religious movement in Arabia, associated with Saudi Arabia’s ruling dynasty.[77] Wahhabi expansion began in the mid-eighteenth century with a raid which involved only seven men and camels, although the movement grew until it encompassed most of the Arabian peninsula by the end of the century. With each successful expedition, more tribesmen and others adhered to the Wahhabi state. Participants in successful expeditions were allowed to distribute four-fifths of the booty among themselves, with the remaining fifth going to the central treasury. This division was legitimated by the fact that it was the same practice followed by the Prophet Muhammad in the early stages of the Islamic movement in seventh-century Arabia. Both in the early phase of the Wahhabi movement and after its revival in the late nineteenth century, there were repeated difficulties in securing the loyalty of pastoral nomadic groups. After 1912, for instance, the Saudi dynasty sought with mixed success to settle nomads in about two hundred military and agricultural encampments. These encampments also served as points from which punitive raids could be undertaken against recalcitrant groups.

The basic tension described by Rosenfeld between authority in “tribal” societies and that exercised by the ruler of a state and his entourage continues to prevail to some extent in other contexts. In some of the states of the Arab/Persian Gulf, for instance, a common pattern prior to the 1950s was to have coastal rulers whose interests were closely tied to maritime commerce and who had only a nominal rule over tribal leaders of the interior, both pastoral and settled. The tacitly contractual loyalties of these leaders were maintained through subsidies, political intermarriages, and associated strategies. These tactics continue to be significant in the region, and tribal loyalties are far from being artifacts of the past.[78] The case is the same in Somalia, where nationalist politics prior to independence in 1960 and political activities since then under both democratic and military governments are significantly associated with lineage and clan loyalties, albeit in modified forms,[79]

The decline in pastoral nomadism has rapidly accelerated with the economic and political transformations that have occurred since the end of the Second World War and the influx of oil wealth into several Middle Eastern countries. For example, roughly 40 percent of Saudi Arabia’s population was nomadic in the 1950s, as compared with 11 percent in 1970. These figures do not reveal an even more significant shift of many nomadic groups from camel-herding to the raising of sheep and goats and a motorized nomadism in which trucks are used to facilitate seasonal migrations.[80] In Libya, 25 percent of the population was nomadic in 1962 as compared with 3,5 percent in 1970.[81] In some regions, notably those adjoining the Sahara and the Hom of Africa, this trend has been accelerated by the drought and famine which occurred in the early 1970s. Prior to the drought, 75 percent of Somalia’s population was nomadic; subsequently, most pastoralists had to be relocated in refugee camps as conditions worsened. The Somali government, like many other governments in the affected zones, responded to the crisis by taking steps to settle the pastoralists permanently and to seek to replace their clan and tribal identities with wider notions of ethnicity and nation.

The range of anthropological studies of contemporary pastoralists indicates that the process of settlement has a variety of consequences for social organization. The Yoruk of southeastern Turkey, who began large-scale settlement only after the Second World War, regard sedentarization merely as one of a number of economic strategies. As the economic rewards of pastoralism became increasingly marginal, households and groups shifted to settled life whenever possible, basing the decision to settle primarily upon economic considerations. This shift implied significant changes in the distribution of wealth (fixed inequalities of wealth are generally not as pronounced among full nomadic groups), but it did not result in any “massive change in formal institutions or social rules.”[82] A similar conclusion was reached by a study of the impact of a government project initiated in the early 1960s to settle the Bedouin of Egypt’s western desert, one aspect of which was to encourage participation in an agricultural cooperative movement in order to weaken traditional lineage loyalties. The socialist cooperatives quickly became popular but not for the reasons envisaged by government planners. Nomads regarded the cooperatives as offering an economically advantageous alternative to traditional herding practices, which

also permitted the strengthening of traditional lineage loyalties and leadership.[83]

In other cases, settlement is resisted even when there are economic advantages to abandoning traditional pastoral activities. This is reported to be the case for some of the camel-herding “noble” tribes of Saudi Arabia, who have opposed settlement because it often involved their mixture with nontribal groups considered their inferiors in the system of social stratification prevalent in the region until recently. Likewise, there was an initial reluctance to shift to the herding of sheep and goats because this was an activity traditionally carried out only by “weaker” (that is, inferior) tribal groups. But because the economic advantages to be gained from such a shift have enabled some of these weaker groups to raise their status, the reluctance of “noble” tribes to adapt themselves to the commercial raising of sheep and goats is rapidly diminishing, only to be replaced by the major ecological problems of lack of water and overgrazing of available pastures.[84]

*** Saudi Arabian Pastoralists: The Al Murra

So far in this chapter I have provided a general view of the historical, economic, and political contexts in which pastoral nomadism has occurred in the Middle East. The remainder of this chapter involves thicker ethnographic description, primarily of one group of pastoralists, the Al Murra Bedouin of the eastern deserts of Saudi Arabia. The Al Murra, numbering around fifteen thousand in 1970, are described in Donald Cole’s Nomads of the Nomads, which is based upon field research conducted from 1968 to 1970. Cole’s monograph is the only modem study of a pastoral group on the Arabian peninsula and for this reason is significant. Cole’s study has a further advantage for the purpose of using it as an illustrative case. It accepts most of the conventional anthropological assumptions concerning the social identity and social organization of pastoral nomads and other tribal groups, yet is thorough enough as an ethnography to indicate the shortcomings of these assumptions.

In 1970 there were still 400,000 to 1,000,000 pastoral nomads in Saudi Arabia—the ambiguity of this estimate in itself indicates one of the problems facing development planners even in the richer countries of the Middle East. The Al Murra have been one of the most “traditional” groups, in part due to the ecological circumstance that part of the grazing lands with which they are traditionally associated is unsuitable for a major shift to the herding of sheep and goats as has been undertaken on. a larger scale by other tribes. Likewise, only a few of the Al Murra had settled permanently as of 1970.[85]

The Al Murra groups that Cole describes in detail are primarily engaged in subsistence camel-herding, so that their activities are closely tied to ecological conditions. In the course of a year, Cole reports, the Al Murra range over some 200,000 square miles of Saudi Arabia, occasionally crossing its boundaries to go with

FIGURE 4-2 Al Murra migrations, early 1970s. (After Donald P. Coie, Nomads of the

Nomads [Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1975] ,p. 29. Used by permission.)

their herds into Kuwait, Iraq, and South Yemen. If only their major moves are considered, most tribesmen travel some 1,200 miles yearly with their herds; together with more limited moves from temporary encampments they travel a total of up to 3,000 miles annually in search of pastures and water for their herds.[86] These movements and the rhythm of social life vary considerably with the seasons.

Because of ecological conditions, migratory patterns also differ from year to year. Cole describes the following movements for a year of relatively abundant rainfall. In the fall, which usually lasts from mid-September through December or January,[87] the Al Murra move some 200 miles to the southwest of their summer camps to the “Empty Quarter,” a region particularly associated with the Al Murra and devoid of permanent settlements. Temperatures are relatively moderate in this season—95°F at noon as compared with up to 120°F in the summer. Tents, the basic household and herding units, are widely dispersed during this season. The 40 tents of the lineage with which Cole lived in 1968, for example, were spread out over 4,000 square miles, with a distance of roughly 15 miles between tents. Every few days, each of these tents was moved in order to take advantage of the sparse vegetation.[88]

During the last days of the fall, the Al Muna carefully follow reports of where rain has fallen. Annual rainfall varies from 10-100 mm (1/3-4 inches) and occurs in highly irregular patterns. Reports on rainfall are frequently imprecise or conflicting, so such news is carefully sifted and discussed. Now that pickup trucks are used to reconnoiter for water and occasionally to obtain it, the danger of herd loss through lack of water is somewhat reduced, although wrong moves still have serious consequences.

The winter pastures of the Al Murra are 400 to 600 miles to the north of the general are£ of their fall encampments. Once rains are reliably reported in the north, the Al Murra move rapidly, frequently as much as 15-40 miles daily, so that the entire move is accomplished in under two weeks. These moves usually involve a more intense cooperation among tents than occurs during the earlier months. Moves are not formally coordinated, but clusters of tents, called dar-s,[89] are formed whose members are often related to each other through affinal ties, or ties through marriage. The Bedouin explain that when such ties of kinship exist among women, visiting and cooperation among them is facilitated because their fathers and brothers are in the other tents, which otherwise they would be unable to visit. According to Cole, the component households of a dar do not share

herding responsibilities, but the men commonly gather for the one cooked meal of the day. These camping units also frequently share the expenses of hiring a truck to transport their women and household goods during the move to winter pastures.[90]

Rainfall is relatively abundant in the winter and water can often be collected from the ponds that form in the desert. The water requirements of camels are considerably less in this season than at other periods of the year. Depending on climate, camels can go from four to six weeks without drinking in winter, as opposed to only four days in the summer.[91] Grazing land is also relatively abundant, with access to land being on a first-come, first-served basis, unlike the carefully regulated seasonal rights to land and migratory routes reported for the nomads of south Persia.[92] Because the Al Murra and neighboring tribes are physically more concentrated during this season than at other times, social life is more intense, with frequent visiting and feasting among the Al Murra and neighboring tribes. Al Murra princes (who do not migrate with the tribe) and non-Bedouin dignitaries also visit during this period. Traditionally, winter was also the season of intense, and now banned, intertribal raiding. Pastoralists carefully regulate the breeding of their animals in this period, so that calving takes place when grazing is abundant in the late fall and early winter.

The end of winter is marked by gradually increasing temperatures and the withering of winter vegetation. Since seasons are determined by the climate and not by abstract calendrical notions, spring is not an annual occurrence in the climate of Saudi Arabia. The Bedouin consider spring to occur only in those years when there are fresh pastures for a few weeks in January or February.[93]

From March to June, the Al Murra return to the area of their summer pastures. Lineages usually camp together during this period around wells which are jointly owned or controlled, although rights to use these wells and the grazing around them are often granted to household groups that do not form a part of that lineage. Camp composition varies from year to year, depending upon ecological conditions and the quality of relations prevailing among specific household units. Grazing land is scarce during this season, herds lose the fat which they may have accumulated in the winter, and the problem of securing adequate water supplies becomes more difficult with the passing months.[94] _

So much for an account of the migratory cycle of the Al Murra. As with other pastoralists, the activities of the Al Murra and their social organization are closely tied to and constrained by the circumstances of ecology and climate; although, as indicated previously, wider economic and political considerations have been_of equal or greater significance both now and in the past. Thus for many of the Al Murra, the work associated with herding constitutes only part of the economic activities in which they are engaged. In addition to the complex patterns of exchange with towns and villages in which some Al Muna participate as middlemen, many households also receive income from occasional wage labor in towns and oil fields and monthly stipends from participation in the Saudi Reserve National Guard. Politically, of

course, the relations of the Al Murra with other tribes, settlements, and the government significantly affect the availability of pastures, water, and migratory routes.

How do the Al Murra themselves conceive of their social organization and what constitutes an adequate anthropological description of this organization and the values upon which it is based? Cole's account centers upon the way in which the Al Murra explain their social identity to themselves and to outsiders. As with many other anthropologists who have studied pastoral groups, Cole does not distinguish clearly between the ideology of the social order maintained by the Al Murra themselves, which emphasizes the equality of all tribesmen and the lack of permanent leadership, and the social anthropological descriptive accounts and analyses of that order. The importance of distinguishing between these two modes of explanation will progressively emerge in this chapter and the next. In any case, the locally held ideology of the social order constitutes an important element of any explanation. As will also emerge, the Al Murra ideology of their social order has many elements in common with those held by other "tribal" groups in the Middle East; for Cole, the Al Murra provide an example of segmentary lineage organization.

Cole's account of Al Murra social organization centers upon five distinct units: the tent, or household (bayt); the camping cluster (dar), mentioned earlier; the lineage (fakhd, which literally means "thigh"); the clan; and the tribe as a whole. These last two levels of society are both called gdbila in Saudi Arabic.

On an abstract level, the Al Murra consider _themselves related through patrilineal descent from a common ancestor. For the Al Murra, all the basic units of society except the camping cluster (dar), which is ideally built around affinal ties, depend in principle upon the relation of persons to each other through a grid determined through common patrilineal descent. These relations can be conceived in terms of a downward-branching diagram like Figure 4-3. At the top of the diagram is an ancestor common to the entire tribe. The Al Murra consider this ancestor to be a quasi-mythical "personage who is said to have lived before the beginning of Islam."[32] Clans, of which the Al Murra presently have seven (not all of which are shown here), also have common patrilineal ancestors who unite all their members. The same thing occurs at the level of lineages, although in this case the common ancestor often is a historical person who was known to elder tribesmen. Of course, such an ideological representation of tribal social organization is not necessarily based upon actual historical persons and is used primarily to explain contemporary

[i2] Ibid., p. 93. Fig. 4-3 is a simplification of the more complex diagram which appears on p. 92 of Cole's book.

Murra

’all

Ghayathin

Shabib

Jaraba

Ghurfran

Sa ’id

Jabir

bishr

Buhah

fahdif

’Athba

Fuhayda

FIGURE 4-3. Al Murra clans. Only the capitalized names are actual clans. The other names serve as connecting links. (After Donald P. Cole, Nomads. Courtesy of the author.)

social relationships. Ancestors not needed to provide links between actual groups are quickly “forgotten,” just as other linking forebears are “remembered” when realignments in present-day groups require the existence of a common ancestor to give form and legitimacy to their cooperation. The social obligations that the Al Murra feel are attached to identity (in principle) within this genealogical grid are explained below. _

The tent, or household, is the basic social and economic unit among the Al Murra. There is a range of variation in the composition of tents. A common pattern, for instance, is for an economically viable tent to include an older man and his wife—polygyny, though legally permitted, is relatively rare in practice—their sons and the sons' wives if the sons are married, and their children. The exigencies of herding and domestic life make it difficult for a tent to consist only of a conjugal pair and their children. A moderately prosperous tent often possesses fifty to seventy-five milk camels which must be herded near the tent, twenty to twenty-five pack camels used for carrying the goods of the household and which can graze at greater distances, plus a number of riding camels, giving a total of over one hundred camels. When a household does not have sufficient personnel for herding and the associated tasks, it must hire personnel from other tents or pastoral groups or else entrust some of its animals to other tents.[95] An inability to do so for economic or other reasons jeopardizes the viability of a tent. Another consideration is that the men and women of a tent individually own its animals, although the animals are jointly herded, with the adult males coming to common agreement on pastoral movements. When such agreement cannot be reached, the tents split up. Similarly, if a tent loses large numbers of animals through disease, drought, or other natural disaster and has no adequate supplementary sources of income, it loses its viability as an economic unit and must choose either settlement and agricultural labor or working as subordinates for other pastoralists.

The lineage, the next level of integration of Al Murra society, is a more abstract unit. Cole defines it as "all the people who are descended [patrilineally] from an ancestor who stands about five generations removed from the present adult generations."[96] However, the composition of lineages is more complicated than Cole's definition suggests.

First, let me specify in what ways the lineage is a more abstract social unit than that of the tent. In practical terms, lineages ordinarily camp together only in the summer, usually around wells to which they claim customary rights. Lineages also possess common camel brands, although as stated, ownership of animals is vested in individuals. Such summer encampments are not necessarily exclusive. Tents from other lineages frequently are allowed, just as tents of a lineage may seek to obtain water rights with another group (for example, one with which they have affinal ties) when it is to their advantage.[97]

There are no specially appointed leaders or councils within the lineage, although on occasion it may be represented informally by a mutually agreed-upon spokesman. Most decisions, such as how to defend water rights, are made through an informal consensus.[98] Cole reports that marriages generally occur within lineages, although he provides no clear account of how marriage strategies may vary with status and wealth. In some cases, a marriage contracted with a person of another lineage can give access to needed water and pastures; in other cases, it may cement a useful political alliance. These are important points to consider, for they indicate the inadequacy of assuming that alliances and political obligations are determined primarily by the ideology of patrilineal descent. For instance, the Al Murra told Cole that members of a lineage are jointly responsible for the actions

FIGURE 4-4 Al Murra herder and younger brother. (From Donald P. Cole, Nomads. Courtesy of the author.)

of its members and must seek revenge for an attack upon any of them. Yet in discussing the camping cluster (dar), whose membership is not determined by agnatic (patrilineal) ties, Cole states that each member of a day has an obligation to defend another "against the attack of even his closest male relative."[37] Such inconsistencies indicate the insufficiency of anthropological analyses which are confined to presenting the ideological claims of members of a given society, although such statements are, of course, important in themselves. For the moment I simply call attention to this problem, for it is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

How an essentially ideological claim of this sort can come to resemble the actual norms for action that are followed—that is, how people can come to accept the social obligations associated with such claims—is complex. One crucial requirement lies in the possibility that membership in a lineage can be acquired by means other than birth and subsequently accepted as of "the same" sort of membership as that acquired by birth. There are several reasons why individuals from other Al Murra lineages and from outside the Al Murra entirely often seek assimilation. Occasionally an individual breaks with his own lineage because of a serious dispute and seeks to identify with a different lineage. At other times, a man from a lineage, poor in camels, seeks to marry a woman from a wealthier lineage. Particularly if the wealthier lineage is short of manpower, such an alliance will often be encouraged, provided that the man agrees to live with his wife's lineage instead of his own. Eventually such a man identifies himself primarily with the lineage of his affines rather than his own, although only his grandchildren may "really" be considered

p. 63. part of the lineage. Similarly, a man from a weak lineage may seek to join a more powerful one.[38]

Such shifts in social identity also occur at the level of entire lineages, again indicating the flexibility of claims to patrilineal descent to accommodate contemporary and emerging social realignments. For instance, the lineage with which Cole spent most of his time between 1968 and 1970 was divided into two major groups. One consisted of thirty-five tents whose members were camel pastoralists. The other group was composed of sixteen tents of sheep and goat pastoralists who spent the entire year in northern Arabia. The latter had little to do with the camel pastoralists, and other lineages considered the two groups to be genealogically separate. Shifts of identity are also linked to economic activities and political influence. As has already been indicated, the Al Murra claim that all lineages and members of the tribe are "equals" does not stand close examination. "Weak" lineages are considered to be genealogically separate from "stronger" ones, although as the economic condition of such groups improves in relation to that of other lineages, over several

generations genealogical explanations for their “inferiority” are progressively abandoned by the members of other lineages.[39]

The next two levels of Al Murra social organization, the clan and the tribe, are both known as gabila. This entails no confusion, as the Al Murra rarely think of these “levels” in abstract terms; rather, they refer to the names of specific groups. Thus each of the seven Al Murra clans contains between four and six lineages. Some clans have princes (amir-s) associated with them; the others must depend upon the amir of another clan for assistance in dealing with the government and settling disputes. The clan plays no direct role in the organization of pastoral nomadic activities, but the Al Murra state that clan identity plays an important role in political disputes. No specific examples are provided by Cole, but the Al Murra claim that individuals and lineages of a clan “automatically” lend their political support to others in the clan in disputes with outsiders. Clans, in turn, are said to form coalitions with other Al Murra clans, although these coalitions do not follow the lines suggested by segmentary lineage theory, in which closely related clans should unite against any provocation from a member of a genealogically more distant group.[40]

Finally, the Al Murra tribe as a whole is a significant political and social unit, The tribe has its own myths, legends, and traditions; marriages are virtually all within it; the tribe has customary (although not formal) identification with certain pasture areas; and, most importantly, no individual in the tribe considers approaching the government on any major matter without the “permission and collaborative support of his tribal leaders.”[41]

[3S] Ibid., p. 88.

[39] fbid., pp. 89, 90, 93. Cf. p. 102, where Cole contradicts this recognition of the inequality of wealth of lineages by saying that they are all “roughly equal in power and wealth.”

[w] Ibid„ pp. 91-93,103.

[41] Ibid., p. 94.

*** The Ideology of Equality: Further Considerations

The role of the tribal leaders (amirs) emphasizes the difficulty of regarding the Al Murra as an “egalitarian” society in the past or in contemporary circumstances without exploring the meanings of “egalitarian” in specific contexts. By tribal ideology, Al Murra amirs are only “first among equals,” “slightly differentiated” from other tribesmen.[99] Yet there is

substantial evidence of a pronounced inequality, despite the ideological claim to the contrary. A major role of the Al Murra amirs is to arbitrate disputes among the tribesmen and to serve as intermediaries on all matters, of importance with the government. They possess no formal authority in these roles, but their domination over fellow tribesmen is generally unquestioned. To perform these tasks effectively, the amirs and their households do not engage directly in pastoral nomadism or migrate with ordinary tribesmen. They live in tents or houses near the main towns and close to paved roads so that they can maintain effective contact with their tribal clientele and townsmen alike.

The amirs are wealthier than ordinary tribesmen, but a more significant difference is their ability to control or to have access to a wide range of resources that ordinary tribesmen can obtain only with their assistance. Although most amirs are illiterate, their sons and those of their close relatives have attended school. One amir, the paramount leader of the Al Murra, is also commander of the local unit of the Saudi Reserve National Guard, whose members meet for a few days each month. For this service, each guardsman receives the relatively significant sum of $100 per month. The largest number of guardsmen are selected from the paramount leader’s own clan, which again suggests that some Al Murra are more equal than others.

Another, significant indication that the amirs are more than “first among equals” is that the paramount leadership of the Al Murra has remained within the same lineage since the nineteenth century and has survived a number of major political changes. This ability to maintain political dominance over generations again suggests how misleading it is to regard the Al Murra ideology of equality and their claim that tribal leadership is achieved through personal effort as practical guides to their social and political organization. To maintain their_position, Al Murra amirs cement close ties with powerful outsiders. Unlike other Al Murra, the amirs and their close relations contract a significant number of marriages with outsiders and use the relationships established through such marriage? for political purposes.

Informally, the tribal leaders are referred to by other Al Murra as their “eyes” (dual, ^caynayri), a revealing term which stresses the role of the amirs as intermediaries with the government and with outsiders, for in Arabic the term also carries the connotation of “spy” or “informer.” Although the Arabic word is not as decidedly pejorative as these English glosses may suggest, it does emphasize that tribal leaders owe their positions in part to “outside” interests.[100]

To conclude this chapter, let me more sharply delineate the drawbacks to using the shared ideology of equality among tribesmen as a guide to the relationships which actually prevail by briefly describing the Lur-s, a sheep- and goatherding tribe in western Iran.[101]

Like the Al Murra of Saudi Arabia and many other tribal groups, pastoral and nonpastoral, throughout the Middle East, the Lur-s consider themselves to be political equals. They maintain ideologically that success as a herder is determined by personal qualities and luck. Yet, as their ethnographer indicates, the probabilities are high that the wealthiest 10 percent of the population will be able to maintain or increase their wealth, while the remaining 90 percent will have difficulty in maintaining economic viability. In the sense that the Lur-s possess “no acknowledged leaders, no officers, and no named ranks,” they are equal.[102] However, the majority of the population requires economic patrons from the upper strata of society. The upper strata of society control larger herds, require labor for their herds, and can provide work and salaries for those of the lower strata. Lower strata members have fewer animals, must work for others to make up for their lack of sufficient capital in animals, and are usually obliged to offer the labor of their sons to larger herd owners, so that control over their sons is weakened.[103] Animal mortality figures provide an index to the consistent and marked difference in control of economic and political resources between the upper and lower strata of Luri society. The mortality rate for animals owned by the lower 90 percent of the population is 50 percent higher than that for the upper 10 percent.[104]

Luri tribesmen claim that as equals they are free to opt out of dependent contractual relationships, as Black points out, but doing so essentially means that they must find another patron, which is not always easy to do. The situation of inequality described by Black may be more extreme than others elsewhere in the Middle East, but it calls into question the adequacy of accounts of tribal society which present the locally maintained ideologies of equality as substitutes for social anthropological description. The inequalities of wealth among the Al Murra as described by Cole do not appear as great, but the same practical inequality exists: There are dominant individuals in a few lineages who control access to the government over important matters and effectively allocate jobs and other economic benefits. Other tribesmen consistently lack such resources.

This chapter’has indicated some of the reasons why there has been a pronounced emphasis by anthropologists on pastoral nomads in their study of the Middle East. I have emphasized shortcomings to considering Bedouin society as essentially “closed” and stressed the need to recognize and study the sustained and necessary ties between pastoralists and nonpastoralists, both in historical and present-day contexts. Ecological conditions place significant constraints upon pastoral nomadic groups and their social and political affairs, but I have indicated reasons why the wjder political and social contexts in which pastoral groups exist are of equal if not greater significance.

By providing an extended example of the social organization of a single pastoral group, I have emphasized that ethnographic description necessarily implies a set of theoretical assumptions and have indicated the problems associated with certain types of anthropological explanation. The next chapter examines these issues in more detail and relates them to the more general issue of the cultural nature of social identity.

* Part II: Meaning and Society

** 5. What is a Tribe?

*** Ideologies

In current popular usage, the term ideology often acquires the connotation of a system of illusory “unreal” beliefs concerning the nature of the social (or economic or political) world. The notion that ideologies are illusory is unfortunate and contrary to how the term is used by most sociologists and social anthropologists, who regard ideologies as significant and irreducible components of any cultural order. Ideologies inform social practice and provide it with meaning. The problem is to specify more precisely what is meant by ideology and its relation to society. The authors of such a classical discussion as The German Ideology insisted that ideologies shape and in turn are shaped by the particular social, economic, and historical formations in which they occur.[1] Regardless of the attitude of social theorists today toward contemporary versions of Marxism, the central problem posed by Marx of the relationship between ideology and society continues to inform contemporary social thought. The primary theoretical issue is how the relation between

*Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, ed. C. J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1970 [orig. 1846]), esp. pp. 46-47. This general principle holds not only for what might be termed social knowledge but also for the underlying assumptions of scientific thought as well, despite the popular notion that “science” is somehow immune from social vicissitudes. See Barry Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977).

RF ideologies and social forms should be described and elaborated, not whether such a relationship exists.

In the past, many sociologists of knowledge have been concerned principally with those ideologies or beliefs that are consciously elaborated and maintained. Such ideologies, especially in the political domain, are of undeniable importance and merit intensive analysis. Yet the term ideology encompasses a wider set of notions than formal ideologies alone. Anthropologists and many other social theorists are additionally concerned with what might be called practical ideologies, sets of beliefs constituted by largely implicit shared assumptions concerning such basic aspects of the social order as notions of tribe, kinship, family, person, sexuality, nation, religion, and world-view.[105] Most

of these notions overlap in various ways and some are more encompassing than others. World-view, for instance, is one of the broader concepts and is used by anthropologists to designate shared cultural assumptions concerning the overall nature of the social order. Many of the practical ideologies remain incompletely systematized by those who maintain them, although forms of conduct such as patterns of naming, marriage, residence, and ritual can be used to document them. The fact that many of these ideologies are so “natural” and taken for granted means that in ordinary circumstances they are not consciously or fully articulated. Thus Americans, in looking at their own beliefs and social forms, are jj not ordinarily prepared to elaborate their shared assumptions concerning family, sexuality, and the like. Or more precisely, to make the anthropologist’s task more intriguing, when some “natives” express formal beliefs concerning family, religion, and economic conduct, these beliefs may only obliquely account for the actual, implicit principles which form the basis of their practical ideology. The same is of course true of Middle Eastern and other societies. In dramatic instances, such as the officially Marxist Somali Democratic Republic, tribalism and lineage loyalties have been declared illegal and no longer to exist, yet through mundane but critical 5 indices such as patterns of livestock investments and the lineage composition of . J governments since the 1969 “revolution,” it can readily be demonstrated that lineage loyalties are thriving, although it is illegal to say so publicly in Somalia? 5

How formal and practical ideologies overlap and influence each other is one of the principal themes raised in the discussion of the idea of “tribe” in later chapters of > this section.

There are genuinely puzzling problems of analytical strategy and substance which concern the basic problem of the relation of ideologies to society. Notions of tribe, kinship, ethnicity, sexuality, and religion all constitute shared cultural J meanings, ways of making sense of the social world and "of informing action within it. All patterns of cultural meaning are generated, maintained, and often transformed through social use. If patterns of meaning are generated through social action, why do so many of them (such as notions of family) appear to remain relatively stable over long periods of time, in spite of the massive economic, political, and social transformations of many parts of the Middle East over the last half century? Or is it just that some patterns of meaning appear more stable, perhaps those practical ideologies so taken for granted that they are not fully articulated (and thus not subject to conscious manipulation). A related issue concerns the limits of ambiguity and multiple interpretations of symbolic statements and how such ambiguity often facilitates the accommodation of major social and cultural changes. In the last half century in countries such as Morocco, Iraq, and the Sudan, and only in the last decade or two in countries such as the Yemen and Oman, there have been massive changes in how people make a living, where they live, how they are educated, and what they expect from each other and from the state. The theme of change is pursued in historical as well as contemporary contexts because the scope of some changes in the past has often posed similar problems of the relation . of cultural meanings to social forms. Such issues are not only of major interest to social theorists, but they provide persons who live in rapidly changing societies with a means of assessing the significance of their own lived experience.

*** The Concept of Tribe

“Tribal” identities at first appear more exotic to Westerners than those based upon kinship, ethnicity, or religion and therefore serve as an apt introduction to a discussion of how ideologies relate to the social order. In part, tribal identities have appeared exotic due to the way in which some anthropologists have chosen to depict such social forms. That is why it is useful to discuss ideas of the “tribe” in writing about the Middle East before considering other bases of social identity. Of course, “tribal’’- identities do not occur in all Middle Eastern contexts, although there are significant nomadic and settled populations that are tribally organized throughout the entire region, from Morocco to Afghanistan.

The first thing to emphasize is that tribal identity, like other bases of social identity including kinship relationships and even citizenship, is something which natives (and sometimes ethnographers) make. People do things with such social forms; these forms do not exist merely as objects that can be torn from social and cultural contexts by anthropologists to be recorded and classified into typologies.[107] Such patterns of meaning change with historical situations. It makes a great deal of difference whether they occur in the context of strong or weak state organizations or a colonial society.

There are four principal forms in which people “make” tribal identity in the Middle East. These are: (1) the elaboration and use of explicit “native” ethnopolitical ideologies by the people themselves to explain their sociopolitical organization; (2) concepts used by state authorities for administrative purposes; (3) implicit practical notions held by people which are not elaborated into formal ideologies, and (4) anthropological concepts? These various notions of tribe are not entirely parallel. All but the last are actor’s notions in the sense that they are implicitly or explicitly held by participants in a society and used as a practical guide to some form of social action. The anthropologist’s notion of tribe is primarily for analytical rather than practical purposes, although the sociological “observer,” whether native or foreign, also participates in the “observed” society in a special sense and is engaged in the “practice” of theoretical discourse. It should be emphasized that •

although these various notions of tribe are separable for analytical purposes, in practice they are by no means mutually exclusive and frequently overlap each <

other. After briefly explaining these notions in more detail, I present two practical examples of them, drawn from Morocco and Libya.

Native, or locally held, ethnopolitical ideologies of tribal identity vary some- ;

what throughout the Middle East, but they are generally based upon a concept of :

political identity formed through common patrilineal descent. A major exception is the Tuareg of the Sahara, where “tribal” identity is based instead upon matrilineal descent. Political action in such tribes has generally been explained by anthropologists in terms of segmentary lineage theory. People in such tribes sincerely believe that the principles of segmentary ideology explain the essence of their political activity, although as Emanuel Marx points out, this is simply not the case? As I shall indicate in discussing the Moroccan notion of qbila (“tribe”), such §

ideologies are differentially elaborated by tribesmen, depending upon their social position. Individuals who are socially and politically dominant often elaborate such ideologies in complex ways and use them to solidify political alliances with members of other tribal groups and to enhance their own position vis-a-vis state authorities. Ethnographers working in tribal societies have frequently based their accounts of kinship relations and tribal organization on information provided by such socially and politically dominant individuals, although the notions of tribal identity maintained by ordinary tribesmen often differ significantly from such formal ideologies of the dominant.

[s] The following discussion is based upon Bourdieu, Outline; Talal Asad, “Political Inequality in the Kababish Tribe,” in Essays in Sudan Ethnography, eds. Ian Cunnison and Wendy James (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1972), pp. 126-48; and Dale F. Eickelman, Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center, Modern Middle East Series, 1 (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1976), pp. 105-21.

[6] Emanuel Marx, “The Tribe as a Unit of Subsistence: Nomadic Pastoralism in the Middle East,” American Anthropologist, 79, no. 2 (June 1977), 356; Philip Carl Salzman, “Tribal Organization and Subsistence: A Response to Emanuel Marx,” and Emanuel Marx, “Back to the Problem of Tribe," American Anthropologist, 81, no. 1 (March 1979), 121-25.

The second notion of tribe is based on its use as -an administrative device in contexts as varied as the Ottoman empire, Morocco, and other countries prior to and during the period of colonial rule, and a number of independent Middle Eastern countries. Administrative assumptions concerning the nature of tribes are generally based in some degree upon locally maintained conceptions, but modified for political purposes. Thus administrative concepts of tribe frequently assume a corporate identity and fixed territorial boundaries that many “tribes” do not possess and give privileges and authority to tribal leaders that are dependent upon the existence of a state organization and not derived from concepts of leadership as understood by the tribesmen themselves. In cases such as Morocco and the Sudan, the colonial powers formerly promoted “tribal” identities and developed tribal administration to a fine art in an attempt to retard nationalistic movements. In reaction, the postindependence governments of these and other countries have signaled an ideological

break with the colonial past by formally abolishing tribes as an administrative device, although such identities continue to be highly significant at the level of practical local administration.

Practical notions of tribe, the third analytical category considered here, are those implicitly held by tribesmen as a guide to everyday conduct in their relations between larger social groups. The term practical emphasizes that these concepts of identity emerge primarily through social action and not through abstract reflection upon the social order. Such notions are often difficult for anthropologists to elicit, for they are not always formally articulated by tribesmen in ordinary situations and because social alignments based upon these notions frequently shift. Practical notions of tribe and related concepts of social identity implicitly govern crucial areas of activity, including factional alignments over land rights, pastures and other political claims, marriage strategies (themselves a form of political activity), and many aspects of patronage. These notions are explained in detail in the examples which follow later in this chapter.

Finally there are the analytical conceptions of tribe held by anthropologists. A preliminary caution regarding these notions—I emphasize the plural—is in order. In both popular and anthropological usage, the concept of tribe figures in a variety ■of sociological, evolutionary, and ecological typologies. In some contexts “tribe” is even partially synonymous with “primitive,” a usage decidedly out of place in the Middle East.[108] This variety of meanings indicates that careful attention must be paid to the specific way in which the term is used.

The anthropological conceptions are primarily intended to make sociological sense of “tribal” social relations. Like the “native” conceptions outlined above— and “natives,” of course, also can be anthropologists—anthropological notions also exist for a purpose, usually that of acquiring a theoretical understanding of the cultural bases of social identity, but they parallel the uses of,native ideologies.

Anthropological notions of tribe are not more real than “native” conceptions or superior to them; instead they are intended as a more explicit form of knowledge of social relations.

There is a drawback to providing a general, abstract definition which ignores all of these various overlapping notions of tribe. What an ethnographer “sees" of social forms in any given cultural context depends upon such factors as whether informants attribute the ethnographer with an official capacity, whether the ethnographer is regarded as friendly or hostile or as possessing a greater or lesser degree of understanding of a society. As Pierre Bourdieu points out, ethnographers, whether “native” or from another cultural tradition, are almost inevitably perceived as “learned,” so that their questions nearly always elicit the most “learned” representations of society from informants themselves,, in accordance with their own conception of learning and of conscious literary tradition. In tribal societies such

learned representations generally entail the elaborate use of written or oral traditional (memorized) genealogies. While such ideological representations are important in themselves, they do not take into account the implicit practical cultural understandings of society which are so basic that (to paraphrase Bourdieu) they find expression only in silence.[8] The anthropologist’s problem is not simply to balance out these various conceptions of tribe in order to arrive at one which is more “real.” It is to achieve as adequate an understanding as possible of how persons in a given society conceive of social forms and use this knowledge as a basis for social action.

*** A Moroccan Example: The Bni Batdw

The Bni Bataw is a semitranshaumant, Arabic-speaking tribe of roughly ten thousand persons (as of 1960) located on the plains of western Morocco near the foothills of the Middle Atlas mountains.[9] Their livelihood derives from a combination of pastoralism with seasonal agriculture. Each fall they sow fields of wheat and barley on the plains; then they take their herds of sheep and goats to the forested foothills of the mountains where there is sufficient forage for the winter; although there are running disputes with the government’s forest guards over the use of these lands. In the past, the Bni Bataw often moved their herds far into the Berber-speak- ing highlands, but French colonial restrictions, and now the restrictions of the independent government, substantially limit the timing and extent of these annual moves. In the spring during March or April, depending upon ecological conditions, the Bnl Bataw return with their herds to the plains. Today most of the Bni Bataw

^Outline, p. 18.

[9] Eickelman, Moroccan Islam, pp. 105-21; see also my “Time in a Complex Society: A Moroccan Example,” Ethnology, 16, no. 1 (January 1977), 39-55.

<right>

FIGURE 5-1 Tants at harvest time among tha Bn" Bataw. (Courtesy of the author.)

</right>

live in dwellings made of stone and dried mud on the plains and use their tents only in the winter transhumant months. After their fields are harvested in June, the herds are allowed to graze on the stubble in the fields. Water and forage become scarcer as the summer progresses. Eventually they are compelled to move with their herds toward their- winter pastures.

How do Bnf Bataw tribesmen conceive of their identity? Bm is an Arabic word literally meaning “sons of.” Bataw is simply a Berber word meaning “fragment.” Bni Bataw leaders and the government officially consider the tribe to be part of larger tribal “confederations,” but those larger groupings exist primarily as administrative 'entities and as ideological frameworks in which wider political alliances were concluded in the past. There is no historical evidence to indicate that these wider entities ever acted as a collectivity. Within the BnT Bataw itself, tribesmen speak of their identity in terms of agnation, a concept introduced earlier in the discussion of the Al Murra of Saudi Arabia. But how can tribesmen be “sons of a fragment” or the “sons of” the place names that are used to designate certain subgroupings of the BnT Bataw? The ideological nature of social identity becomes clear in the answer to this question.

Tribesmen explain their relation to each other and to outsiders such as anthropologists in terms of metaphors. Sometimes the metaphor is based on the parts of a tree—twigs, branches, and the trunk; at other times such parts of the human body as veins and arteries are used.

Ordinarily these metaphors are applied only in a general sense to the three “levels” of the Bnf Bataw. These are known abstractly as the rural local community (dawwar), the section (fdkhda), and the tribe (qblla). Members of such groups claim common descent or, more specifically, “closeness” to each other. Briefly described, the smallest unit of these levels is the dawwar. Literally the word means circle. Until

Tribe

Section Local Community

—Mzaglr

— Bnl'lsa---------- Wlad Ayyub

— Za'ama

L—Flalha

Bnl Bataw

'Ababsa

—Wlad Yahya

—Wlad Brahim

—W'ad David

—Wlad Khallu----

—Fkama

—Dyab

FIGURE 5-2 BnT Bataw divisions, early 1970s. (From Dale F. Eickelman, Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society In a Pilgrimage Center [Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976], p. 116. Courtesy of the author and the publisher.)

the 1930s, tribesmen lived in tents throughout the year. Especially when they moved their herds into the highlands controlled by Berber-speaking groups, tribesmen pitched their tents in a circle, herding their animals into the center at night for security. Few groups camp like this any more, since the French effectively managed to limit most intertribal hostilities and raiding. Today tents are more widely spaced during the winter months, just as the permanent dwellings of the Bm Bataw are located on their agricultural lands, which are individually owned. These dwellings are not clustered into villages. Each local community is composed of 50 to 100 “tents” (khayma-s), also frequently called “households” (dar-s).

The next level is the section, which is composed usually of three or four local communities. The Bni Bataw use a number of terms to designate sections, one of which is thigh (fakhda), a term also used by the Al Murra (fakhd is the exact term used in the Saudi dialect of Arabic). The Bnl Bataw presently are divided into five such sections.

To understand how tribesmen themselves comprehend their society, the first important thing to notice is that they do not consistently emphasize their relations with each other through patrilineal descent, although this notion is associated with the metaphors Of social organization provided by the imagery of blood and the parts of a tree. As one tribesman put it, “We are like the branches of a tree, but each branch is on its own,” emphasizing the fact that the claim of common descent does not necessarily determine the lines of faction and political alliance. Actually, in explaining how the metaphors of the parts of trees and the human body relate to their social structure, tribesmen rely heavily on the concept of “closeness” (qaraba). Qaraba does not necessarily imply real or assumed kinship, even for tribesmen. Closeness flows along a number of lines besides “blood.” It can develop through cooperation with nearby households, mutual herding arrangements, kinship and patronage relations, and other bonds of mutual interest. The notion of “closeness” is an important one and is discussed at length in the following two chapters. On a practical level, moreover, the enumerations of groups and their divisions at any moment never exactly tally. Although all tribesmen conceive of the relations between individuals and groups within the same framework (that is, the metaphor of the tree or of blood), there are regular variations in how these organizing concepts are applied to actual groups.

These variations are particularly clear at the “level” of the rural local community, the most important “level” in terms of everyday activities. Every tent belongs to such a local community. They are not set apart from each other by formal boundaries, only by the tribesmen’s shifting understandings of the identity of groups and their composition.

Tribesmen in a rural local community (and most of their wives) claim patrilateral relation to each other (among other ties), but no one can specifically demonstrate how all members of a group are mutually related. When pressed to indicate exact ties, tribesmen generally say that only “older” persons know or that such ties derive from “early” (bakri) times, an unspecified ahistorical past which is used to legitimize present-day social alignments,[109] Tribesmen do not ask each other for exact demonstrations of such ties. What counts is who acts together in a sustained way on various ritual and political occasions. This flexibility is seen in the council (jma[Q] a) which each local community has. This is not a formal body but is constituted simply by adult male heads of tents who informally consult on such issues of mutual concern as transhumant movements, quarrels over water and pasture rights, the hiring and payment of a Quranic teacher to reside with them and teach their children the rudiments of the Quran, maintenance of the whitewashed building which serves as a.tomb for their marabout, or saint (every local community is identified with one), and similar collective obligations.

Individual tents and groups of tents dissatisfied with belonging to a particular rural local community may seek to break away to join another rural local community or to form their own whenever circumstances permit. Marriage ties, land inherited by a wife, or even the purchase of land from an individual from another rural local community can serve as the basis for such a realignment. Such realignments frequently entail no physical relocation of households since for practical purposes only nearby rural local communities are ordinarily involved. Because of these shifts of identity, “official” administrative designations of rural

local communities are almost always inaccurate and are considered by tribesmen as a separate category of identity used only in formal contact with local officials.

Since rural local communities are constantly re-forming, one way of determining links is to see the camping arrangements at the annual festival (musim) of the major marabout of the region, Sfdi Mhammad Sharqi. His shrine and living descendants are located in the nearby town of Boujad'.This festival occurs each fall, just before the move to winter pastures. Groups are distinguished both by the placement of tents on these occasions and by the competitive displays of horsemanship and shooting (tahrik-s), sometimes called powder-plays (la^cb al-barud), in which they engage. The idea of these competitions is for groups to ride in a gallop in a straight line and to fire their guns simultaneously. Heavy betting accompanies these occasions. Participation in these competitions reflects new social alignments, and some realignments are due to disputes over the competitions themselves. Since the marabout's festival is also the one time in the year that tribesmen gather from a large area, such powder-plays in effect constitute public announcements of new social arrangements. As the conception of patrilineal descent is a relative one which changes with actual social arrangements, the groups involved legitimize their new relations to each other by shifting the way in which they represent their ancestors and links with particular marabouts.

The identity of sections among the Bni Bataw is somewhat more stable over time, although these also shift in composition and identity. One reason for their greater stability is their administrative reality. The precolonial, colonial, and independent governments have invested the rights to collective pastures in sections and still allocate many taxes through the administrative apparatus associated with

FIGURE 5-3 Competitive riding at a musim, Morocco, 1968. (Courtesy of Maurice Grosser.)

sections. Prior to the colonial period, sections also performed significant functions. Each section, for instance, constructed fortified compounds made of mud and stone which were used for collective defense in times of intertribal raiding. Sections also made collective arrangements for grazing rights to pastures controlled by neighboring groups, but there were many other "levels" at which such arrangements could also be made. Individuals from different tribal groups, for instance, could make arrangements among themselves, if they had confidence in each other.

More formal arrangements between relatively stable groups also were common. A common sort were "ritual alliances" (tata) made between rural local communities and sections of the same and different tribes. In such alliances, groups agreed to refrain from fighting and raiding each other and, at least in principle, to aid each other in the event of threats from third parties. Such alliances generally involved the exchange of herding rights

as well. The patterns of such alliances occasionally coincided with “closeness” as reckoned by the formal ideology of patrilineal descent, but such ideology was by no means the primary factor in their formation.

Such ties worked in the following manner. For instance, the Flalha (see Fig. 5-2) local community of the Bni ^cIsa section of the Bnl Bataw concluded an alliance with the ^cAbabsa section of the tribe—the fact that the two groups were considered to be at different “levels” of organization was not considered significant by the Brn Bataw themselves. They met at the shrine of one of the marabouts in Boujad and swore an alliance.

Each collectivity had multiple alliances of this sort. The Wlad Khallu section had three such alliances with other sections just before the colonial era. One section was part of an Arabic-speaking tribe with adjacent agricultural lands; another involved an Arabic-speaking tribe at some distance from their own; a third alliance was with a Berber-speaking neighboring group, the Alt Bu Haddu.

These alliances were concluded by different ritual means. In one case the groups involved had a communal meal, at the end of which all the men present removed one of their slippers and placed them in a pile, one pile for each of the two groups. Slippers from the two piles were then matched at random. The men whose slippers were paired became companions with a special relation to each other. Whenever one needed permission for pasture rights or other matters, he approached his companion in the other group. In another case, the lactating women of the two contracting groups nursed the children of the opposite group after the mtn’s communal meal, thus creating bonds. In the third case, the councils of the two groups had a communal meal in which the milk from lactating women of the two groups had been mixed in one of the plates, thus creating an enduring tie of milk brotherhood. Once such an alliance was concluded, any violation was considered to invite supernatural (as well as human) retribution.

I have said little of the level of the “tribe” so far, for the simple reason that from the historically known precolonial period, it appears to have existed more as a set of vague “tribal” names which provided a range of potential identities for various groups at different times than as a base for sustained collective action, although coalitions of various sections and rural local communities within the “tribes” frequently occurred. When these coalitions did occur they did not come together along strict lines of closeness of lineal descent. This is demonstrated by the patterns of resistance in which persons from various “sections” and “tribes” associated themselves against the French. Precolonial accounts of disputes in western Morocco also suggest that alliances followed much more flexible lines.

The imposition of colonial government in 1912 had a number of important consequences for tribal organization, especially when the colonial regime had become firmly implanted by the

1920s and 1930s. For one thing, the average size of herds was reduced from what it had been in the precolonial era. Part of the reason was that many townsmen had made substantial investments in livestock, making arrangements with the individual tribesmen in most cases. As alternative investments opened up and became more lucrative, such local investments declined. In addition, the colonial government imposed restrictions upon pastoral movements, reducing the flexibility which was possible in the precolonial era.

An interesting aspect of the French colonial understanding of tribal structure is that it depended more upon the ideology of agnatic relationships than did the Moroccan tribesmen themselves. Segmentary ideology was administratively convenient as an “official” representation of local social structure. How were these administrative understandings translated into practice? Each winter, as I indicated earlier, the BnT Bataw moved with their herds to the Berber highlands. Yet, for the French, the Berber highlands were under military rule while the lowland plains were under the civil native affairs administration. In the precolonial period, pasture rights could be arranged even between individuals or several tents of different tribal groups when peaceful conditions prevailed. In some circumstances, the host person or group charged a price for such rights; in other cases, only reciprocity at a later date was expected. Of course, disputes occurred frequently, but these only served to emphasize the wide range which such pastoral arrangements could take. The French found this flexibility confusing for administrative purposes, especially when tribesmen crossed administrative boundaries.

Colonial archives for the 1930s indicate that some administrators went so far as to propose a ban on pastoral movements which crossed administrative boundaries, unaware that such radical restrictions would have the consequence of drastically reducing the size of herds and making the survival of the BnT Bataw precarious. In the end, a compromise was adopted in which movements of herds were authorized but only on a reduced scale and only involving entire sections. The French argued (in line with popular sociological assumptions of the period) that only collective arrangements were “traditional.”

French administrative divisions, however, worked more along the lines of a quasi-genealogical framework than Moroccan tribes. For example, let us say that a pastoral dispute broke out between the Brii Bataw and a group of Berber tribesmen while the Bni Bataw were with their herds in the Middle Atlas mountains. The French civil official in the town of Boujad who was responsible for the Brii Bataw was not allowed to communicate directly with his military counterpart twenty miles away who was responsible for the neighboring Berber group. Instead, he was obliged to communicate with his immediate superior in a neighboring town, who in turn communicated with his civilian superior. This administrator, in turn, contacted the ranking military officer responsible for the Middle Atlas region, who in turn communicated with his subordinates. These rigid administrative hierarchies simply had no counterpart in Moroccan tribal organization, although the genealogical grid used by the French to indicate relations among various groups naturally had important consequences since pasture rights and taxes were determined by them, and local strong men had their privileges reinforced by the support they received from the French by appointment as unsalaried officials.

Now what is important about these complex patterns of association and identity? To say that some rural Moroccans are “tribesmen” tells us very little now or in the past about how they conceive of their social identity and comport themselves politically in relation to other groups. Lines of political cleavage follow no preordained pattern but depend upon complex factors of residence, kinship, herding, and land arrangements, among other considerations. Those interests that are most significant often are legitimized by being thought of in the idiom of genealogical grids determined by concepts of patrilineal descent. “Tribal” man, at least in the context just considered, does not respond in a semiautomatic way to the affairs of the various social collectivities to which he belongs. The notion of “closeness” outlined earlier is a more comprehensive one which allows for considerable variation in the forms which social action can take in Morocco.

Of course, the social organization of a Moroccan tribe cannot in itself be taken as “representative” of all Middle Eastern tribes, as I indicated earlier. But the type of analysis which I have sketched can serve as a guide to understanding tribes in other contexts. Such analysis involves an account of how persons in a given society explicitly and implicitly conceive of the social order and proceed to act on these assumptions. It also involves seeing how these assumptions are modified by and in different historical contexts. Although Middle Eastern countries and'regions within them share numerous economic, social, and cultural similarities, they differ in just as many ways. Comparisons of “tribal” societies in these countries based solely upon a single point of resemblance, such as the ways in which ideologies of patrilineal descent are used and manipulated, can be highly misleading because such ideologies in themselves are simply Inadequate to describe the political organization of Middle Eastern tribal groups.[110]

*** Segmentation Ideology or Segmentary Theory: The Bedouin of Cyrenaica

One reason for the fascination with segmentary lineage theory as it has been applied to tribal peoples in the Middle East, Black Africa, and elsewhere is the extent to which it assumes that the explicit native ideology of the social order (usually one based on patrilineal descent) and the anthropologist’s analytical model of that order were thought to coincide. As I have already indicated, segmentary lineage theory does not account for many crucial features of tribal social and political organization and for this reason is a mistaken way of explaining the working of tribal societies in the Middle East. Yet such theory has played an important role in the social anthropology of the Middle East and elsewhere. When ethnographic accounts developing its assumptions began to be published in the 1940s and 1950s, segmentary lineage theory appeared to provide a framework within which anthropologists could undertake meaningful comparative research.[12]

Figure 5-4 shows the essentials of the idea of segmentation. I am using letters rather than the names of actual groups and numbers to refer to various “levels” of segmentary society so that its abstract features are more discernible. There are three assumptions necessary for

segmentary theory to be valid: (1) A society must conceive of its political relationships primarily or exclusively according to a tree of lineal descent (either patrilineal or matrilineal); (2) groups at each “level” of society must be balanced by another group of roughly equal strength; and (3) individuals within such a society must be considered equals.

Political obligations and relationships in such a society become particularly

FIGURE 5-4 The concept of segmentation. (After Dale F. Eickelman, Moroccan Islam, p. 207. Courtesy of the author and the publisher.)

[12] See, for instance, M. G. Smith’s early review of the use of the concept in ‘‘Segmentary Lineage Systems," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 86 (1956), 78.

on evident in the case of a feud resulting in homicide. Suppose, for instance, that a dispute occurs between a person from group A and another from group E at level 1. Both disputants presume that they can rely for support upon their fellow group members. If such a dispute involves a person of group A and another of group F, a higher level of escalation occurs. In this case, groups A and E are expected to support the person from group A; groups C and F are expected to support the person from group F. Thus, groups coalesce at level 2. In a dispute involving groups A and H, groups E, C, and F are expected to rally to the support of group A, while B, G, and D are expected to rally to the support of H. Such a conflict involves opposing groups at the more inclusive level 3. Finally, a challenge to the tribe from outside involves the participation of all groups claiming descent from a common ancestor-the tribe as a whole (level 4), This schema of relationships can be expanded, indefinitely, although in practice more than four levels are rarely involved. Real names for groups and their levels can, of course, be substituted, such as tent, lineage, clan, and tribe among the Al Murra of Saudi Arabia and tent, rural local community, section, and tribe among the Bnl Bataw.

The various “higher” levels of segmentation are called contingent social forms by anthropologists because they come into being only when a group or individual is threatened. The groups themselves are acephalous, or leaderless, since in principle all members of segmentary societies are considered to be equals, although temporary leaders may emerge at times. Such a society of equals results in what Evans- Pritchard has referred to as “ordered anarchy.”[13]

I have already indicated the fascination that this concept of the social order held for anthropologists. It raised a basic question of European social philosophy- how was it possible for individuals to cooperate in society? The seventeenthcentury English philosopher Thomas Hobbes had posed the question in the following manner: How could the various wills, passions, and desires of individuals be coordinated so that there would not be a war of all

against all? Given his particular image of man and society, his answer was that while all men sought to satisfy their desires to the full, no one could do so in a state of total anarchy. Hence, men possessed a “spark of reason” which enabled them to agree to at least a minimal “sovereign” control over themselves in order to pursue their self-interest. In segmentary societies, the minimum of such control is certainly reached as no permanent “governmental” authority exists, only the contingent social forms of cooperating individuals organized in groups determined by the metaphor of blood relations. The principle of segmentation thus provides the minimal conditions for a society to exist, in which violence and self-help provide the ultimate sanctions. Segmentation theory had the added attraction of providing a key notion by which a wide range of social forms in certain types of societies could be explained.

Interest in the concept of segmentation, although not labeled exactly as such, is evident in such influential sociological Studies as The Division of Labor in Society (1893), where Durkheim writes of “mechanical” or “segmental” societies in which

^TheNuer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 6.

individuals and groups tend to resemble each other to the point that he compares their forms to the rings of an earthworm.[111] Even if cut up, each part is capable of existing on its own. One of his primary examples of such a society was the Kabyle of Algeria,[112] although anthropologists later developed the notion of segmentation in Black Africa as opposed to the regions north of the Sahara.

The most thorough ethnographic application of segmentary lineage theory occurred in the context of Evans-Pritchard’s books on the Nuer, the first of which appeared in 1940. As indicated in Chapter 2, it appears likely that Robertson Smith’s analysis of Arab kinship had a profound influence on Evans-Pritchard. In conversation he has even indicated that the full potential of segmentary lineage theory first occurred to him after a series of visits he made to the Bedouin of Egypt’s western desert in the 1930s.[113]

There is no question that segmentary ideologies provide a “native model of tribal society, but the question remains regarding the extent to which it. is an accurate analytical model of the social order of societies so characterized. If the major work of developing the concept of segmentation occurred in the context '

of Black Africa, the realization of its limitations became most readily apparent in <

later work in Middle Eastern and other contexts.

Discussions of segmentary ideology in the Middle Eastern context are numer- j ous. The concept is often used in very misleading ways, so that one scholar discussing Iran has written that the notion “somewhat” describes the political comportment of the Iranian elite over long periods of time and another applies the notion loosely to account for political factions among the Moroccan elite, when all that is meant is that political rulers have sought to “divide and rule” in order to maintain their own hegemony. Here I am concerned with the more accurate use of the concept in a tribal setting, and specifically with an important 1967 article by Emrys Peters on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, which contains a comprehensive critique of segmentation theory.[114]

Peters’s account is based upon fieldwork carried out between 1948 and 1950, during which time the tribal groups involved still were camel-herding pastoralists. In the first part of the article, Peters explains the social organization of the Bedouin as they themselves see it. Thus, the basic unit of social organization is the camp— that is, groups that herd together. Over 80 percent of the males in these camps, each of which has a population of 200-700, are agnatically related. Acceptance of a common name in such a group implies full political responsibility. Such “tertiary” groups (as they are designated by Peters) are corporate for most purposes. Moreover, each camp has its own wells, ploughland (these groups also cultivate), and pasture. In Fig. 5-4 such groups are represented as level 1, where the irregularly drawn spheres associated with them are meant to indicate the territory possessed by each descent group. The ultimate test of membership in such a tertiary group is conduct during feuds and the payment of blood money. If someone does not participate aS expected in such matters, he risks splitting from the group. Bedouin say that homicide within a tertiary group is unthinkable since the group is supposed to respond to the injury of any of its number as “one body.” Such homicides occur nonetheless, but Peters points out that the Bedouin do not think of them in terms of murders requiring revenge. The most common result is the voluntary exile of a slayer or his expulsion from the group.

As for homicide between tertiary sections, such as A and E on Fig. 54, the payment of blood money or a vengeance slaying is the most probable result. Peters indicates that such collateral tertiary groups are usually neighbors. Although each has a different tract of territory and different wells, social relations between them are fairly intense. A prolonged feud would seriously disrupt such relations, so neighboring groups usually find it expedient to find some way to remain on friendly terms rather than engage in long-term feuds. In most cases, settlement is arranged through an agreement to pay “blood money” (diya). The amount agreed to is rarely paid in full, for, as Peters says, debt, like the feud itself, is a form of social relationship (although the feud is a negative one). As long as the debt is not fully paid, the social relationship endures.

At the next level of segmentary integration (level 2 on Fig. 5-4 and “secondary sections” in Peters’s article), homicide characteristically results in a feud. Most such sections occupy different ecological regions. If a feud develops between them, there is no urgent necessity to make peace, unlike the case for neighboring groups on level 1 of the figure. However, feuds

which occur between groups at the level of what Peters calls secondary sections also have their etiquette. For instance, feuds were not carried on at the market, although in the case of hostilities, rival groups usually arranged to be present at tribal markets at different times. [115]

At level 3 of Fig. 5-4 (“primary” sections for Peters), men of collateral sections often are complete strangers to each other and meet only irregularly. When a homicide occurs, it is unlikely that negotiations will even be undertaken. In this case, reciprocal raiding occurs, often for prolonged periods, but large-scale killing is avoided. Challenges from outside the tribe itself involve the entire tribe, but such hostilities result in wars instead of feuds in which (at least in the nineteenth century) major losses of life occurred. In wars, unlike feuds, there were no conventional restraints upon attacks, at least in principle.

Peters’s article elaborates in considerable detail how the Bedouin themselves make use of segmentary ideology to explain their social relationships. In this he makes a valuable contribution, for many accounts of segmentary ideology are highly schematic and present virtually no specific examples of how this ideology is applied by its adherents to specific, historically known situations.[116]

There are a number of ways in which segmentary ideology fails as an analytical model of social action. As Peters indicates, if all secondary sections were engaged in feuding, for instance, pastoral movements would become impossible. Such contradictions present no direct challenge to segmentary ideology for the Bedouin; a number of contingencies are invoked to explain why segmentary ideology does not apply directly to particular situations. Unfortunately, segmentary lineage theorists have similarly tended to invoke contingencies rather than question its viability as a sociological model.

Peters goes into the weakness of segmentary lineage theory in some detail to document his contention that the lineage model is not a sociological one. He sees such theory as possessing four major weaknesses. First, segmentary groups simply do not occur in a balanced opposition to each other. What Peters calls tertiary groups (rural local communities in the context of my Moroccan example) are not balanced against each other. Resources of land and herds are unevenly distributed, as is the population of various groups. There is a great variation in the number of groups which occur at this level of differentiation.

Secondly, when groups combine, they do not do so in terms of the combinations anticipated through an application of segmentary lineage theory. Similarly, segmentary lineage theory assumes that power is distributed equally throughout the entire tribal political system and doesnot acknowledge the existence of leaders. As Peters indicates, such leaders exist, although lineage theory has effectively blocked the analysis of patterns of tribal leadership. Moreover, such leadership does not occur along the lines of groups as determined by segmentation theory.

Third, there is considerable disparity in the political resources enjoyed by various groups, as opposed to the rough equality of people and resources presumed by segmentary lineage theory. Groups may appear “equal” as descendants of a pair of brothers from a common father, but such equality in a genealogical sense masks a considerable disparity of political strength and of the actions that a group is willing to take. This point applies equally to the Al Murra, the example discussed at length in the last chapter.

The fourth objection to segmentary lineage theory is that it says little about ties of kinship created through women. By Bedouin ideology, women and the ties created through them belong to the nonpolitical realm of domestic relations. Yet there are important political and economic links created through marriage ties and other ties through women.[117] The Bedouin (and anthropologists working within segmentation theory) seek to account for such ties through “secondary” rules that do not involve the principles of segmentation. Yet there are important areas of conduct that cannot be explained by such assumptions. As Peters indicates, killing a relative through marriage is as repugnant to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as killing a close agnate, and there are numerous marriages that occur between neighboring groups. In many circumstances, one’s mother’s brother may be the only person to whom one can turn to in situations such as access to water rights in years of drought. Similarly, in the payment of blood money, it is not unusual for a mother’s brother to contribute even when there is no obligation to do so in terms of segmentation theory.

The Bedouin also have an explanation for such contradictions in terms of segmentation theory. They claim that they marry whenever possible within their own group so as to avoid conflicts of interest between opposing segmentary groups.[118] As Peters indicates, this is simply not the case. By studying the total marriage patterns of Bedouin groups, a different pattern emerges. Bedouin create a significant number of strategic alliances with other groups through highly selective political marriages which taken together give groups access to a range of ecological resources and other aid. Such ties are of more than secondary importance. As Peters writes, throughout his stay in Cyrenaica he never saw groups assembling along the lines expected by segmentary lineage theory. When disputes occurred over wells or ploughlands, agnatically close groups were often absent while genealogically more “distant” groups often were present. A number of men who took sides in such disputes were not even kinsmen but were related in other nonkin ways to the main protagonists in such disputes.

These are some of the principal objections to segmentary lineage theory. As an ideology of social relations among many tribal groups in the Middle East, the notion of segmentation has considerable importance. As a sociological model, it is inadequate. I have dealt with it at length only because it has mistakenly led many anthropologists to explain virtually every problem in tribal social relationships in terms of the lineage system.

The issue of whether segmentary lineage theory can usefully explain the workings of tribal society has been important only because such theory has been used uncritically to account for common social elements in the entire region. It also has blocked the development of alternative and more satisfactory ways of accounting for social structure. Some anthropologists have gone so far as to construct elaborate theories accounting for how presumably acephalous and egalitarian tribes in the' Middle East coexisted with the inegalitarian social order of the cities and states of the region, at least in the “traditional” past. Unfortunately no clear evidence exists to support such an assumption.[119] Thus Ernest Gellner, one of the main defenders of this point of view, has presumed that the High Atlas region of Morocco on which he based his account of tribal society had “traditional [segmentary] institutions” which until the 1930s “had survived untouched ... in a kind of sociological ice-box” until his own work in the region in the mid-1950s.[120] Yet significantly, Gellner can provide no specific examples of political action by High Atlas Berbers for the pre-1930s period, and the evidence that he provides for later periods is irrelevant or contradictory to his contention that segmentary theory is valid.[121]

It is possible to make general 'statements concerning common elements of religious belief, political organization, economic activity , and other fields of activity in the Middle East, but such statements should take the form more of “family resemblances,” partial similarities that can meaningfully be compared and contrasted, rather than exact identities asserted by simpler,but less accurate theoretical i assumptions. This is emphatically the case with Middle Eastern tribes and with the] subject of Chapter 6, ideas of kinship and family in the Middle East.

** 6. Personal and Family Relationships

*** Kinship Today

Anthropologists today recognize that kinship and family relationships, and cultural ideas concerning them, must be studied in the context of complementary, locally held notions such as patronage, neighborliness, and friendship. This assumption has not always guided ethnographic inquiry and analysis in the past. For instance, a major body of anthropological theory once held that kinship in all societies was concerned with what were essentially biogenetic relationships which could hence be compared cross-culturally. Kinship in such a theoretical perspective is then defined primarily in terms of genealogical criteria instead of other possible bases of interpersonal relationships.

As I see it, there are several rather straightforward arguments that should be made in understanding kinship and family relationships cross-culturally. First, whatever the actual

groupings are of people who feel obliged to one another through “family” relationships, these groupings act in cultural terms which have a biogenetic reference. Nonetheless, how people behave toward one another as “kin”: and “family” cannot be accounted for entirely in terms of norms of obligation defined in biogenetic terms. Hence anthropologists must elicit what are the shared cultural notions of family and relationship prevalent in any given society rather than presume their coptent (for example, shared biogenetic substance) in advance. [1]

[1] Among recent studies which take such an approach are David M. Schneider, American Kinship: A Cultural Account, Anthropology of Modern Societies Series (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968) and his more recent “What Is Kinship AU About?” in Kinship

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Second, in the past, many American and European anthropologists have implicitly and inappropriately imported their own cultural stress on biogenetic “natural” ties when interviewing people in the Middle East and in analyzing their notions of kinship and family. The result has been to overstress genealogical kin- drip ideologies, which have their main and clearest form for Muslims in the Quranic inheritance code and for all Middle Easterners in the kinship terminological system? Because there are some similarities between the Arabic formulations and American notions, some anthropologists have wittingly or unwittingly extrapolated their own cultural notions much too far into the Middle Eastern data. This has been particularly the case in limiting family ties to blood ties and in assuming that the notions of “clan” and “tribe” have overriding significance in the ordering of behavior and in the determining of choices in moral situations? Such misleading assumptions have in part contributed to the popularity of notions such as segmentary lineage theory, as discussed in Chapter 5. Two related issues are involved here. One concerns how coercive are kinship norms in themselves. The other concerns the independence of kinship norms from other kinds of social obligations.

Studies in the Morgan Centennial Year, ed. Priscilla Reining (Washington, D.C.: Anthropological Society of Washington, 1972), pp. 32-63. See also Rodney Needham, “Polythetic Classification: Convergence and Consequences,” Man (N.S.), 10, no. 3 (September 1975), 349-69;and Hildred Geertz and Clifford Geertz, Kinship in Bali (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

[2] The form which kinship terminology takes throughout the Middle East is remarkably consistent and can be indicated briefly. The principal kinship; terms for family of origin in

formal Arabic are as follows: father (ab), mother (umm), father’s brother {^camm), father’s sister pamrna), mother’s brother (khil), mother’s sister (khSla), brother (akhj, sister (ukhtj, son (ibn), and daughter (bint}. The principal terms indicating affinal links, or ties through marriage, include husband (zawj), wife (zawja), and father-in-law (nastb}; ansibfi', the plural of naitb, designates in-laws in general. There are a few other terms, such as grandson and granddaughter (hafid and hafTda), and grandfather and grandmother ((add and jadda). The plural of these terms, ajdad, is used to designate one’s ancestors in general. Terminology such as the above is called denotative by anthropologists, because its emphasis is upon specific relatives rather than classes of them. Relatives other than those specified above are generally designated by combinations of these terms. For instance, a father’s brother’s son is ibn ^camm, and a wife’s father is abu zawja. There are other combinations of terms to designate half-siblings, co-wives, and other types of relationships. The exact terminology in colloquial usage varies throughout the Middle East but tends to follow the general pattern described above. For Morocco, see Hildred Geertz, “The Meanings of Family Ties,” in Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society, Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and Lawrence Rosen, Cambridge Studies in Cultural Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 356-63; for Egypt, see Hani Fakhouri,Kafr el-Elow: An Egyptian Village in Transition, Case Studies in Cultural Anthropology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972), pp. 57-61; for South Yemen see R. B. Serjeant, “Kinship Terms in Wadi Hadramaut,” Der Orient in der Forschung (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1967), pp. 626-733. Kinship terminology in Turkish and Persian, the two other major languages of the region, follows a similar pattern. See Paul Stirling, Turkish Village, The Nature of Human Society (New York: John Wiley &. Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 151-55; Fredrik Barth,Nomads of South Persia (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), p. 31.

[3] For an elaboration of this argument in an Algerian context, see Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology 16 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 30-71; for a Moroccan example which jndi-

Third, the anthropologist or any other person 'interested in understanding . Middle Eastern life should try to follow “native” constructs and logic as thoroughly as possible. Knowledge of the full context in which ideas of family and personal relationships are held is perhaps especially important for an understanding of Middle Eastern societies because kinship forms and the personalization of social relationships permeates even bureaucratic and industrial settings, perhaps in an effort to make such relationships more reliable. It is not unusual to find the key offices of governments of the region constituted in large part by close relations, presumably because kinship ties in some contexts are assumed to be a guarantee of loyalty. This is the case not only in the monarchies of the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Morocco, but in other regimes as contrasting as Ayatullah Khomeini’s (and the significant

roles of his son and son-in-law) If an, Syad Barre’s Somali Democratic Republic, and Anwar el-Sadat’s Egypt. Nor are such actions always regarded as an abuse of political authority.

The study of notions of kinship in the Middle East, like the study of tribes, has been a task often regarded as a distinctly anthropological preserve, although this has not prevented scholars in other fields from making generalizations about the nature of family and group identity without adequate empirical investigation or confirmation. Indeed, such assumptions can intentionally or unintentionally become highly politicized. For instance, Edward Said has taken a distinguished sociologist to task for writing that “co-operation in the Near East is still largely a family affair and little of it is found outside the blood group [sic] or village,” on the grounds that it suggests a diminished capacity of Middle Easterners to organize “institutionally, politically [and] culturally.”[122] [123] Yet because a large number of personal relationships are cast in the language of family relationships, and such ties pervade government offices, the secret police of some countries, and other key organizations, understanding the elastic uses to which the term family is put is especially important in the case of Middle Eastern societies.

As with conceptions of “tribe” in the Middle East, there are no single notions of kinship and family which hold from one end of the region to the other, nor can variations between the kinship systems of the region be used to classify them taxonomically. Cultural notions of personal and kin relationships vary considerably from Rabat to Kabul, from rural to urban settings, and among different educational and socioeconomic categories of society.

*** Cultural Forms

The best way of recognizing why our own notion of kinship should be used comparatively only as a first-order approximation is to look at concepts drawn from different parts of the Middle East which could be glossed as “kin”: These are the notion of qawm (Afghanistan), hamula (Arabs in Israel), and qaraba (Morocco). In Afghanistan, qawm refers to a socially united and territorially contiguous group of people who speak of themselves as if they are also linked by agnatic kinship, although such a group actually includes affines, some neighbors, and others. Significantly, the term does not apply to persons or households who fail effectively to cooperate with other members of the qawm, in spite of close agnatic or affinal ties. A qawm is ideally “a territorially and socially integrated group, joined together through ties of kinship, political action, and religious belief and ritual.”[124] Although qawm can also refer to persons sharing common agnatic descent, it would be incorrect to regard such a usage as primary and its reference to “a territorially and socially integrated group” as secondary. The central feature of the Afghani concept of qawm is the active maintenance by its members of a shared notion of relationship. It is this ideological form which is. primary, not a “native” recognition of “blood” ties, even if such assumptions are metaphorically important.

The same general point holds for some of the shared notions of identity among Arab villagers in Israel. In a study conducted in 1958-1959, Abner Cohen found that most (but significantly not all) households were identified with a number of patronymic associations called hamula-s. The shared identity of the hamula was expressed in the idiom of patriliny, although villagers themselves were aware that not all the claimed patrilineal links were historically valid.[125] To emphasize the fact that he was not writing of lineal descent, Cohen used the term patronymic group in his book to stress that the shared element othamula identity was the name of a claimed agnatic ancestor. To my knowledge Cohen was the first ethnographer to break with the more conventional assumptions of lineage theory in a Middle Eastern context. In a later publication he referred to the hamula by the more appropriate term of patronymic association rather than group in order to emphasize better the flexibility inherent in the cultural principle of hamula and its frequent lack of sharp principles of exclusion in social practice.[126]

For certain specific purposes such as inheritance, a calculation of agnatic relations and affines was made in principle in terms of the tenets of the Quran. However, everyday domestic arrangements and the political alignments of the hamula were governed by principles of social identity that were not based soley upon ties created through “blood” and marriage, as Cohen’s case studies meticulously demonstrate. In practice, hamula identity was based upon a complex web of patrilineal, affinal, and matrilateral ties, neighborliness (most hamula households were located in the same section of the village), and sustained cooperation in political, economic, and ceremonial activities. As political alignments and interests altered, some households even shifted their hamula identity, although such realignments generally occurred only among households not clearly identified with the hamula’s core. Nonetheless, when asked to define a hamula, villagers did so in terms of common descent, although they privately stated to the ethnographer that such claims could not always be demonstrated. As with other forms of social identity, hamula affiliation in itself did not determine the lines of cooperation and political action, despite the fact of such identity being couched in the idiom of patrilineal descent. Cohen provides numerous examples of cross-hamula ties of friendship, patronage, and common economic and political interests which served equally as bases for unity and cooperation. Ties created through marriage were similarly used. Cohen points out that intra-Aamu/a marriages were relatively common, but that marriages outside the hamula could equally serve as the base for close economic and political cooperation.[127]

A third example, from the “far West” of the Middle East, is the Moroccan concept of “closeness” (qaraba), briefly introduced in its rural/tribal context in Chapter 5.[128] As used by urban and rural Moroccans, “closeness” carries contextual meanings which range imperceptibly from asserted and recognized ties of kinship to participation in factional alliances, ties of patronage and clientship, and common bonds developed through neighborliness. Closeness is constituted by compelling ties of obligations. Often closeness is expressed as a “blood” tie, even when no demonstrable linear ties exist, because however such ties are valued in practice, they are considered permanent and cannot be broken. Yet in

contexts other than those governed by inheritance law, closeness based upon family ties is generally not sharply differentiated from closeness based upon other grounds. Most frequently, persons seek to make the various bases for closeness overlap.

There is evidence, that the concept of closeness as used in present-day Morocco is not an accommodation to recent developments. In many respects it resembles the concept of “group feeling” (^casabtya) explained centuries earlier by the North African philosopher Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406). Ibn Khaldun indicates the multiple bases upon which group feeling can be asserted among both townsmen and tribesmen but ultimately opts for the ideological position that the “naturalness” of “blood” ties makes them superior to all other modalities as a basis for group feeling.[129] Nonetheless he makes it clear that the underlying cultural construct of ^casabTya is not based exclusively or primarily upon socially recognized notions of lineal descent.

*** Practical Kinship: Morocco

The significance of the shift from talking about kinship to exploring notions such as qawm in Afghanistan, hamula among Arabs in Israel, and qaraba among Moroccans can be stated as follows: Kinship can be,considered an experience-distant concept. It is one formulated for the purposes of the analytically inclined participant to comprehend a phenomenon or to compare it with others, either typologically or through “family resemblances.” On the other hand, experience-near concepts are those which individuals use “naturally and effortlessly” to define what they see, feel, think, and imagine and which they “readily understand when similarly applied by others.”[130] “Closeness” is such a concept in Morocco.

An illustration of how the notion serves as a guide to practical social relationships is provided by the prominent maraboutic (or “saintly”) patronymic association in the Moroccan town of Boujad, which had a population of approximately twenty thousand persons in 1973. The town is a local pilgrimage center located on Morocco’s western plains, next to the foothills of the Middle Atlas mountains. Roughly a third of Boujad’s population claim descent from the marabout Sidi Mhammad Sharql (d. 1601). Collectively these descendants are known as the Sharqawa-Shaiqaw being the plural for Sharqi in Arabic. The town has twenty-six maraboutic shrines of varying importance; twenty-three of which are Sharqawi shrines. Despite the decline in recent years of popular belief in the efficacy of marabouts as intercessors with the supernatural, the town remains an important regional pilgrimage center and is also' the administrative and market center for its rural hinterland.

Because of the advantages of wealth, prestige, and education which derived from the reputation as marabouts of some Sharqawa in the past, many have managed to maintain prominence in Morocco today as merchants, entrepreneurs, officials, and politicians.

Although today SharqawT prominence is justified principally on other grounds than maraboutic descent, some Sharqawa still derive considerable material and status benefits from the gifts they receive from their largebj rural clientele.

What exactly does the claim to SharqawT descent mean in Boujad today? The Sharqawa do not act collectively as a group and never did so consistently in the, past. Descent was only one of a number of identities which they shared. In Boujad, itself, there are currently eight SharqawT patronymic associations. All of these claim , descent from sons of SIdi Mhammad SharqT, although none are able to trace their , exact genealogical links with him. Nonetheless, this information is said to repose in books and records. Of the eight SharqawT patronymic associations represented in Boujad, the members of two of them additionally claim descent from prominent nineteenth-century Sharqawi marabouts. Each of these patronymic associations is associated with a residential quarter in Boujad. In addition, there are persons who claim SharqawT descent elsewhere in Morocco.

One of the two most prominent SharqawT patronymic associations in Boujad is that of the ^cArbawa. Identification with a patronymic association in itself does not imply an obligation to act in common with other individuals who belong to it, as recent experiences in local electoral politics and disputes over various local issues amply demonstrate. Still, ^cArbawT quarter is one of the most tightly knit in Boujad. Approximately 86 percent of its three hundred or so residents (as of 1970) were born in the town itself, as opposed to an average of 54 percent for the town as a whole. A majority of the households in this quarter claim bonds of kinship with each other. In fact, many of them have shared inheritance rights from agricultural estates and other holdings. More importantly, among the descendants of the leading SharqawT marabout of the nineteenth century, after whom this quarter is named, are prominent administrators, merchants, politicians, a brother-in-law of the King of Morocco, and even a leading sociologist. There are advantages of prestige in claiming identification with this particular patronymic association.

Ideally the households of a quarter are considered to be bound together by multiple personal ties and by common interests. In fact, a “traditional” residential quarter in Morocco can be defined as the extension of “closeness” (qaraba) in physical space. Component households should be able to assume a certain moral unity so that in some respects social space in their quarter can be regarded as an extension of thejr own households.

Ties of closeness in a patronymic association such as the ^cArbawa, especially when many of its component households live near each other, are elaborated and reaffirmed in "numerous ways: the exchange of visits, assistance and participation in the ritual activities associated with the births, circumcisions, weddings, and deaths of its members. For closeness to be said to exist in a patronymic association, as in a residential quarter and in a traditional urban setting such as Boujad—the two significantly overlap—the quarter must be capable of collective social action in at least some significant contexts, This usually

means that there are one or several men of standing (kubbar) with “word” or decisive influence in the patronymic association or quarter who are able to act as spokesmen for the comm'”’ [;] -[J]

FIGURE 6-1 Tetouan, Morocco. Neighbors In traditional quarters such as this often claim "closeness." (Courtesy of the author.)

critical occasions and to mobilize the heads of households of the collectivity. Ideally, the notions of patronymic association and residential quarter converge. When this overlapping occurs in practice, as in the case of the ^cArbawT patronymic association/residential quarter, then mobilization of the collectivity forms a regular part of the fabric of social life.

In many “traditional” spatial settings, neighbors who cooperate effectively with each other will seek to claim to outsiders that they have common descent as a means of enhancing their prestige. Thus the inhabitants of another residential quarter in Boujad, not far from ^cArbawi quarter, claim common origin from a nearby tribal group and assert kinship with one another. Although certain households of the quarter are related by ties of kinship and marriage, others are linked solely by occupation, neighborliness, and by other common attributes not related to the attribute of descent. Again, the one feature common to all the quarter’s households was their ability on occasions to act successfully as a collectivity.

The quarter in question, Qsayra (“The Little Fortress”), is so named because it adjoins a fortified, high-walled SharqawT quarter and, in fact, looks like a scaled- down version of it. How closeness is demonstrated by residents of the quarter will serve to indicate how notions of “family” and “kinship” must be understood in their Moroccan context. Most residents of the quarter claim that they or their ancestors came from Ait Salih, a tribal grouping to the immediate west of Boujad. Without denying their Ait Salih origin, others prefer to stress their,relations with one Hajj Bu Bakr, himself reputedly of Ait Salih, who founded the quarter at the turn of the century and whose household serves as the core with which other households claim affinity.

Bu Bakr was a tannery owner and grain merchant when the French arrived in 1913. Not long after this event, he made a fortune through his commercial activities. Soon he converted his fortune into social honor, first by making the pilgrimage to Mecca and thereby acquiring the title of Hajj (“Pilgrim”), then by constructing an imposing house for himself, and later by marrying a second wife. As his sons matured and married, he built adjacent houses for them, in the manner of other men of prestige. He also constructed a small mosque for the quarter

and made the major contribution toward hiring a Quranic teacher (fqih) to teach in it. He died shortly after the Second World War, but his sons and widows continue to reside in the quarter.

The means vary by which residents of Q^ayra quarter claim “closeness” with Hajj Bu Bakr. Most claim closeness by descent and marriage, although in most cases no exact genealogical links can be demonstrated. There are only some thirty dwellings in the quarter, but when I asked residents to enumerate them for me, several were invariably excluded. These turned out to be living units which somehow did not qualify as households—men sleeping in shops; the dwellings of several poor and often childless couples; and all those people excluded from the circle of closeness for some assumed moral defect. These nonhouseholds did not share the visiting patterns of the counted households of the quarter or engage in their multiple reciprocal exchanges.

It is useful to examine the asserted ties of one informant in detail, since they illustrate virtually the entire range of means by which closeness can be claimed. Ma^ctf (I)[131] , a local shopkeeper, at first claimed that Bu Bakr was of his “blood” (min dammi). This, he elaborated by claiming that the relation was through his “father’s brother” (3), who had married a woman of Hajj Bu Bakr’s household. In itself this notion is interesting for such a tie would not be considered “blood” in our own concepts.

In another context I had earlier asked Ma^cti to tell me whom he considered his kinsmen. I was preparing a “formal” kinship chart, as do many anthropologists, diagramming in an abstract manner his claimed relatives. When I reminded him that previously he had said that his father had no brothers, he replied that, since he was “close” (qrib) to Hajj Bu Bakr, then it must be through a half-brother of his grandfather (5). In other words, the knowledge of closeness came first, then its justifi-

Asserted kinship link

FIGURE 6-2 Kinship ties of Ma^ct~, Qsayra quarter. (From Dale F. Eickelman, Moroccan Islam: Tradition andSociety in a Pilgrimage Center [Austin: University of Texas Press, 19761, p. 101. Courtesy of the author and the publisher.^

cation. He continued that there “probably” was a second link through the marriage of his mother’s sister (4), who also lived in the same quarter. Again, this tie could not be demonstrated. Finally, Ma^ctf said that Bu Bakr’s people act os if (h-hal) they are related (flrlb')' so they must be; and he cited at length the informal visiting patterns which prevailed between their households. No one can remember such genealogical ties clearly, he said; and although—in perfectly comprehensible Catch-22 reasoning—no one can verify them in any exact way, they must exist.

He went on to link himself in a similar manner with a minor, but locally significant, government official (2) also of the quarter founded by Bu Bakr and related to Ma^cti through the marriage ties of his brother and sister. The tracing of significant kinship ties through affines and the bilateral reckoning of kin in practical social contexts is a very common feature of Moroccan notions of kinship, the formal emphasis upon the ideology of patrilineal descent notwithstanding.[132]

In the “Little Fortress” quarter, as in the ^cArbawi quarter, both “kinship” and involvement in local exchange networks are invoked to justify assertions of closeness. Given the role of the maraboutic Sharqawa in Boujad’s past, one way in which the residents of Qsayra sought locally to enhance their prestige was to build a tomb for one of their claimed ancestors next to some of the Sharqawi" tombs on the outskirts of town. The effort ultimately met stiff opposition from the Sharqawi and failed, but its near success nonetheless managed to raise the prestige of the quarter’s inhabitants in the eyes of most other Boujadis because they successfully managed to act together as a collectivity.[133] Significantly, this process of merging social ties based upon asserted kinship and residential proximity is also characteristic of older residential quarters elsewhere in North Africa and in the shantytowns which have grown up around many of the region’s towns and cities.[134]

The overlapping of kinship identities with other forms of identity, including those of residential proximity, is found throughout the Middle East. Fuad Khuri, for instance, has studied the growth of two contrasting suburbs of Beirut, one settled primarily by Maronite Christians, the other by Shl^ci Muslims from southern Lebanon. In both communities, Khuri emphasizes that ties among households were commonly expressed through the idiom of shared patrilineal genealogies, the image of the large extended family (even where particular links were not known with precision), and shared notions concerning a history of common migration and settlement. He further stresses that the use of joint genealogies often shifted with patterns of prestige and influence. Thus when certain individuals and households emerged as prominent, the neighborhood’s conception of shared lineages tended also to shift so that the ideology of social relationships tallied with social realities. Moreover, hotV linkages between persons and groups were expressed remained quite fluid and varied considerably with political and economic circumstances. A prestigious house, with prestige derived from the control of wealth and people, was called a “known” house (bayt maFruf), and “lineages” tended to be built up . around such houses.[135]

Khuri also found that how asserted kinship ties were elaborated and utilized varied significantly with the religious affiliations of the two communities. In both the Maronite and Shi^cI communities, many extended families were organized into family associations, legal entities which served the collective interests of their members in a variety of ways and which depended upon the entrepreneurial abilities of their organizers. Associations founded by Shl^cT extended families exceeded those founded by Maronites at a ratio of 19 to 2. Khuri attributes this significant difference to the fact that the Maronite church has an effective organizational structure which provides a number of community services, while among the Shl^ca, who lack the equivalent of a

“church” structure, such community structure depends more exclusively upon family associations.[136]

*** Practical Kinship: Some Analytical Considerations

So far in this chapter I have emphasized the flexibility with which notions of family and interpersonal relationships are conceived and utilized. Because of the many variations in cultural concepts of social identity which occur throughout the Middle East, it is especially important to understand how anthropologists seek to explain and to document these notions. For this purpose, the best available account in my judgment is Hildred Geertz’s “The Meanings of Family Ties,” based upon extensive field research in the town of Sefrou, Morocco, in the 1960s. Essentially what she does is to describe (1) prior anthropological approaches to the study of Middle Eastern kinship; (2) the living arrangements—the use of space and the “webs” of relationship in which cultural notions, of kinship are used to inform and to interpret social action; (3) cultural understandings or “constructs” concerning family; and (4) how marital choices are made and their significance in the study of kinship. Geertz’s account has the crucial advantage of thoroughly stating her theoretical assumptions, unlike other outstanding but more specialized studies in which such assumptions and issues of methodology remain largely implicit. The sections in which Geertz describes why she became increasingly uneasy with the earlier anthropological assumptions concerning kinship make her analysis particularly worthwhile.[137]

After a brief review of prior studies of Middle Eastern kinship, with their emphasis upon lineage theory and the so-called “preference rule” for father’s brother’s daughter (bint ^cnmm) marriage, Geertz situates the study of kinship concepts and ties in the wider context of the complementary notions of friendship and patronage because the lines between these various forms of relationships are not sharply drawn in the Moroccan context. To document the practical contexts in which notions of personal and family relationships are elaborated, Geertz describes in detail the kinship ties and living arrangements of one of the wealthier and more conservative extended families of high status in Sefrou. This extended family is admittedly not typical, but, as Geertz argues, the fact that it is tightly organized and possesses other unique characteristics makes it easier to discern in it “the underlying patterns which inform familial relationships.”

The houses of the ^cAdlun extended family tend to be clustered in a neighbor-

hood or quarter (darb) which bears their name. Geertz proceeds to describe in detail how space is used in this quarter and more particularly in one of the oldest, largest, and most distinguished of the ^cAdlun houses, called Dar Bu ^cAli (“the house of Bu ^cAE”). As she points out, many of the larger houses in the older sections of North African cities now tend to be subdivided and tenanted by unrelated poorer families, but in the case of Dar Bu ^cAli, eleven related adults, including

several married couples (and in the past, their servants), share the same house, j Twenty-five other adults living elsewhere are also associated with the household. [As Geertz emphasizes, the notion of “house” deserves particular attention.

The house is known by the name of the dominant adult male (or ancestor) associated with it. Such a person is known as the “owner” or “master” of the house □ (mul ad-dar). In this case, Bu. ^cAU was the paternal grandfather of the older residents of the house. The inhabitants of the house, including its women, are collectively known as the “masters” of the house (mwalin ad-dar). But there is no sharp dividing line between members of the household and other relations. Bu ^c All’s claimed descendants are sometimes referred to as “Bu ^cAJFs people” (rias Bu ^cAli); ! “Adlun refers to the entire extended family, but there is no sharp division made

! between rias ^cAldun and nas Bu ^cAfi. The connotations of both these terms and of

I family (^ca ’Ha) are multiple and refer to a number of overlapping categories of kins- I men. Bu ^c All’s people (rias) are not just a neatly delineated subdivision of the ^cAdlun people. The two terms have a variety of connotations, none of which is necessarily primary. The categories cannot be accommodated by lineage theory.

In the past, a number of material circumstances encouraged the daily interaction of quarter residents, especially the women. To a more limited extent this remains the case today. In the past, when there was no piped water-many of the poorer households are still without it—the women of the household had to use a public fountain. The shared fountain, a public bath in the quarter constructed by the ^cAdlun family, inheritance laws which tend to subdivide the ownership of houses among relatives who thus share common economic interests, and the use of space such as rooftops (from which Women from different houses often can talk with each other as they do their chores) all continue to facilitate interaction among neighbors and kinsmen and frequently to blur the distinction between the two categories.

Geertz’s discussion of the web of actual social relationships has a special interest for the anthropological study of kinship because she poses a series of related questions which form comprehensive guides to the study of practical kinship in a number of contexts. As she explicitly acknowledges, her own study is □ based primarily upon the study of a single high-status urban extended family, an example appropriate for her own particular argument because of its complexity. The issues she poses, however, can be used to make sense of practical kinship in a number of other situations, as I shall suggest by indicating how they

can be elaborated and clarified by studies of kinship and domestic organization carried out elsewhere in the Middle East.

Geertz's first issue concerns the size and scope of the daily interacting group of relatives and neighbors, especially women. In the residential quarter described by Geertz, the clustering of houses, the shared water resources, the communal expenses such as the maintenance of a small mosque, and the large number of kinsmen living with each other mean that many relatives have intense daily contact. Of course "relations" means not only persons patrilineally related, but also those related through marriage and matrilaterally. Often through generations of marriage, kinship ties become extremely dense so that people are related to one another in all three ways. Muslims are permitted to marry their first cousins and when such marriages occur the result is to strengthen the multiple ties among relatives. As Geertz explains, "one's cousin is also one's brother-in-law, one's ex-husband has married a woman next door, one's uncle is one's father-in-law, one's husband is a former playmate, and one's child seemingly is shared by everyone."[138] Additionally the feelings and activities of neighbors and relatives in such close physical proximity mean that their behavior is "entirely a matter of open argument

FIGURE 6-3 Returning from market In town, Morocco. Lack of vailing often indicates rural origin or lower social status In North Africa. (Courtesy Paul J. Sanfaqon.)

and explicit social pressure."[139] This constant pressure of "publicity," to use Geertz's appropriate term, is an integral part of Moroccan family life and makes privacy and concealment often difficult to obtain.

Of course, residential patterns do not always place relatives in such close physical proximity, but such a pattern is frequent. Khuri's study of two suburbs of Beirut, already discussed, provides an example in historical depth of a pattern

FIGURE 6-4 Woman spinning, southern Iraq. (Courtesy Robert A. Fernea.)

broadly analogous to that described by Geertz. as does Antoun's study of a Jordanian village. [140]

Geertz's second point draws attention to the boundary between informal ("private") and formal ("public") spheres of social action. In the "conservative" setting that she describes, the higher the status of women, the less they are seen in public, although there is considerable variation between generations and according to whether women are young or old and unmarried or married. Age, social status, education and many other complex factors

enter into how and when a veil and other covering garments are worn. How these clothes are worn symbolizes the division between the public and the private spheres of action.

In rural settings in North Africa, for instance, women often go unveiled, although they will conceal themselves and act with socially appropriate modesty when strangers are present. In urban settings, women commonly are unveiled before marriage but assume the veil after marriage. The use of the veil can often serve as an indicator of higher social status, although once again there is considerable flexibility as to when and where it will be used. Younger educated women, for instance, are socially freer not to use the veil and to find other means of indicating propriety and status. In comments on the use of veiling in Iran, Michael Fischer suggests that it , serves as a “complex moral device” which operates in the domains of modesty where “proper” comportment varies with social space and behavior, status manipulation, and religious-political identity and serves as a marker of the religious group—Muslim, Jew, Bahai, or Zoroastrian. The veil is also at times a powerful political symbol. Fischer’s analysis of. the component of status manipulation in the use of the veil indicates just how complex this dimension (and the others) can be ,.

Not only are veils rough markers of stratification, from villages (in the past and still today often headcloths without chadors) to lower-class urban (veils tied around the waist to allow free use of hands when working) to traditional upper class (full veiling whenever in public); but veils are also markers of intimacy from sons, brothers, husbands (no veils) to close friends and near kin (loose veiling) to the stranger (veiling to the point of covering all but one eye). Modern status, today, is marked by being without veil or with a pastelcolored or transparent veil, or by wearing the veil halfway back on the head so as not to cover all the hair.[142]

Based on their work in western Turkey, Lloyd and Margaret Fallers point out that one of the consequences of the traditional separation of the worlds of men and women outside the domestic realm is that Turkish women have been at least psychologically more independent than their American counterparts. As they participate increasingly in the academic, business, and professional worlds, Margaret

FIGURE 6-5 Vailing and head covering can communicate a variety of statuses and attitudes. Group of women wearing the traditional San^cS' cloak (sitara). (Photograph by Dr. Ronald Lewcock, from City of San^ca', ed. James Kirkman [London: World of Islam Festival Publishing Company Ltd., 19761. Courtesy Middle East Centre, Cambridge.)

Fallers claims that women in Turkey appear to have fewer obstacles to professional advancement than has been the case until recently for American women, although as economic and social circumstances increasingly favor the emergence of singlefamily households, women somewhat paradoxically again become more dependent upon men.[23]

The third issue in the analysis of practical kinship is the prevalent patterns of hospitality and visiting that prevail among relatives and nonrelatives. In the Moroccan context, there is continuous visiting among relatives and neighbors, and when relatives are neighbors, these patterns of activity are particularly intense. There is also considerable visiting among relatives and close friends at greater distances. AsHildred Geertz indicates, men are considerably more mobile than women, but even their travel patterns are “to a striking degree determined by the location of family connections.”[24] These patterns vary considerably according to whether members of the family are urban or rural, wealthy or poor, concentrated in one particular locality, or widely dispersed. Even with the impact of the modern

[23] Lloyd A. and Margaret C. Fallers, “Sex Roles in Edremit,” in Mediterranean Family Structures, pp. 243-60. The Fallers’ study is particularly useful because it presents sketches of a variety of Turkish men and women, thus indicating the nuances of how the division between the public and private spheres shifts according to circumstances of wealth, education, region, generation, and other considerations.

[24] In H. Geertz, “Family Ties,” p. 334.

economy and its pressures, at least among the educated middle classes, who occupy modern housing in which it is difficult for relatives to be immediate neighbors (as was traditionally the case), Geertz finds a persistence of strong familial ties expressed in patterns of visiting, a trend largely confirmed by studies conducted elsewhere in the Middle East,
[143]

A fourth issue in the analysis of practical kinship is the relative importance of the conjugal family in Middle Eastern settings. In the residential quarter described by Geertz, the conjugal bond is only one of many cross-cutting ties of kinship and affinity, so that household units are not built primarily around the conjugal bond. In an older pattern of polygamous marriages (by Islamic law men are permitted up to four legal wives) which is rapidly diminishing in incidence, affinal links through women were used by wealthier individuals to secure complex political and economic alliances. Still, the overall trend throughout the Middle East is toward separate housing for each nuclear family and the strengthening of the conjugal bond, with the consequences of shifts in the tenor of relationships among members of the family. Mubeccel Kiray argues that a wife’s sfttus rises when she lives alone with her husband and children rather than under the same roof with her husband’s relatives, although the woman also becomes more dependent on her husband. She shares more in the decision making of the household and in many of the activities of her husband. Extended families remain very important even when such relatives are not living in the same house or immediate neighborhood. Kiray argues that the changes which have occurred with large-scale labor erhigration to Eutope-a trend now diminishing in importance-and other economic and political shifts have brought about fundamental reinterpretations of family and kinship

roles. At the same time, she sees a continued importance in the role of the extended family and in the bonds of obligation and trust which unite family members, facilitate their movement from one region of the country to another, and secure employment.[144]

The complexity of housing patterns and variations in them must be noted. In a study of 140 households in Isfahan, John and Margaret Gulick report that fifty- five compounds, or housing units, were composed of a single nuclear family, but eighteen of these also had other patrilineal and matrilineal relatives present. The rest of the compounds consisted of multiple households in which two or more married couples resided. A particular value of the Gulick study is that it provides almost case-by-case descriptions as to why persons have chosen or were compelled to accept particular residence patterns. Studies conducted elsewhere, including the

Egyptian Delta region, similarly emphasize the considerable variations' in household composition, many of which are not related directly to issues of tradition or modernity but to changes in the domestic cycle as persons marry, raise children, age, and establish some degree of autonomy by setting up independent households when economically feasible?[7]

A final consideration is the linkage between kinship and patterns of social status, influence, and authority. Hildred Geertz suggests that economic and political achievement in Morocco is “almost entirely an individual matter. An ambitious man may use the help of kinsmen in his climb, and in return may help them, but these exchanges are personally arranged and by no means obligatory.”[18] Significant, ranges of wealth can be found within a single extended family, and Geertz provides numerous case studies indicating this variation. At the same time, it remains true that the presence of powerful and influential individuals within a single extended family substantially increases the likelihood of the next generation of that family possessing a competitive advantage in retaining their social status. Studies of rural leadership in Morocco suggest that despite the changes from the precolonial regime to colonial domination and later to independence, economic and political advantage has often remained within the same extended families, although not without substantial challenges?[9] The same phenomenon holds for local and national leadership in Saudi Arabia, as the earlier discussion of Cole’s study indicated, and elsewhere in the Middle East.

Similarly, how family ties are articulated depends substantially upon the economic situation of the families involved. Maher, in her study of a small town in Morocco’s Middle Atlas region, suggests that marriages are much more stable among the urban middle classes than among the less economically affluent in rural areas. When the main inheritance is land, men and women are likely to retain important shared property rights and service obligations with their own kin, and such ties tend to be incompatible with a primary allegiance to the spouse. Marriages in such circumstances are arranged less with a view to conjugal happiness than to serve the temporary interests of those who arrange them, the parents of the spouses and the

[27] John Gulick and Margaret E. Gulick, “Varieties of Domestic Social Organization in the Iranian City of Isfahan,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 220 (March 1974), 441-69; Lucie Wood Saunders, “Aspects of Family Organization in an Egyptian Delta Village,” Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, Series II, 30, no. 5 (March 1968), 714-21; Emrys Peters, “Aspects of the Family among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica,” Comparative Family Systems, ed. M. F. Nimkoff (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 121-46.On the continuing importance of the extended family in changing economic circumstances, see especially Henry Rosenfeld, “Social and Economic Factors in Explanation of the Increased Rate of Patrilineal Endogamy in the Arab Village in Israel,” in Mediterranean Family Structures, pp. 115-36, and Vanessa Maher, “The Extended Family and Lineage Groups in the Maghreb (Morocco),” in Kinship and Modernization in Mediterranean Society, ed. J. G. Peristiany (Rome: The Center for MediterraneanjStudies and The American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976), pp. 47-60.

[18] H. Geertz, “Family Ties,” pp. 339-40.

[29] Remy Leveau, “The Rural Elite as an Element in the Social Stratification of Morocco,” in Commoners, Climbers and Notables, ed. C. A. 0. van Nieuwenhujjze (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), pp. 268-78; Eickelman, Moroccan Islam, pp. 211-37.

intermediaries.[145] Maher estimates that for 70 percent of the population of the town she studied, marriages served to maintain the economic and social status quo of the couple. For another 20 percent it meant cultural assimilation to the Arabized and politically dominant group (she studied in a Berber-speaking region); for the remaining 10 percent, the urban elite, women possessed movable capital as opposed to land rights. Marriage with such women was regarded principally as alliances with long-term economic and integrative significance between extended families and hence marriages tended to be more stable. For groups lacking such capital, divorce entailed no significant loss of capital as there was none to lose. This was decidedly not the case for the urban elite.[146] Clearly any study of kinship which neglects the practical domain of economic relationships, as many studies have tended to do in the past, must b,e treated with some caution.

*** Marriage

“Arranging marriages is a highly serious matter, like waging war or making big business deals.”[147]

As the above statement suggests, marriage in most Middle Eastern contexts involves not only the personal wishes of the man and woman concerned but the responsibility of many of their respective relatives. In the past, at least among wealthier families, marriages could be said to have been almost entirely the ultimate responsibility of the father or guardian of a

boy and girl, although under contemporary circumstances this is no longer the case. Actual marriage practices vary significantly throughout the region, so that studies of particular locales must be consulted for appropriate ethnographic detail. In general, however, the fact remains that marriage choices usually are made by a group of people from the extended families of the conjugal pair, whether the marriage is among Muslims; Christians, or Jews and that marriage notions like those of ideas of family can serve as another indicator of shared assumptions concerning the nature of the social order.[148]

Since some of the principal examples stressing notions of kinship have come from Morocco, where many of the critical reappraisals of notions of kinship have been conducted, let me provide a further example from that country. Much depends upon the social status and educational background of the couple to be married. Half a century ago in upper-class families, in general the persons to be married had litfle say in the choices imposed upon them; today, of course, this is no longer the case. In the case of a young man with a living father, his father is expected to take a significant role in the negotiations, and the same is true for a young woman. Now men, if questioned, will aver that marriage negotiations are their concern alone, since they claim to have an understanding of the social obligations involved superior to that of women. Women will take a very different view of the process involved and will in fact take quite an active role in the suggestion of marriage partners and in preliminary negotiations.[149]

In the first stages of such discussions, informal go-betweens are often used. These are chosen from among kinsmen and friends thought to be trusted by both parties. For example, a young man might use a trusted school friend to sound out the other family - or his own sister or mother. Who is selected to explore such possibilities depends upon the social ties between the parties involved and cannot be predicted from abstract considerations of kinship roles alone. Women’s baths and social gatherings involving women exclusively are one place where exploratory talks can take place. After all, as one Moroccan woman explained to me, since. Moroccan men presume that women tend to have less “reason” (fqal) than men, with reason being defined as the ability to act effectively in a wide range of social situations,[150] women are especially useful in such exploratory discussions since anything said by women can be denied by men as not accurately representing their views. Although formally the initiative is supposed to come from the groom’s family, the bride’s family often takes the initiative, especially if there have been previous marriages between the two extended families or if the marriage is within the extended family itself, as is the case for father’s brother's daughter, or “parallel cousin” marriages, which are permitted in Islamic law.

If the suggestion of a marriage is accepted, then discussions follow concerning the probable date of the wedding and the conditions to be included in the marriage contract (a woman can, for instance, specify that her husband may not take a second wife without granting her a divorce). The subject of the most protracted negotiations is the size of the bridewealth (sdaq), or the sum which the groom’s family must pay over to the bride’s family, part of which goes for the provision of certain furnishings which remain the personal property of the wife. The bridewealth payment is not usually paid in full but is used as a

device to discourage a husband’s seeking divorce since in such an event the wife or her family can demand the balance of the agreed sum.

The amounts involved in bridewealth payments have escalated significantly in recent years, and a discussion of how much is involved will indicate why negotiations are taken very seriously. Rosen reports that in the late 1950s the amount involved for a well-to-do family was only a few hundred dollars but had reached as much as $ 1,000 by 1970.[151] Yet the bridewealth is only a part of the costs involved. Because the ceremonies involved in marriage importantly indicate to the wider public the social standing of the couple, the expenses for gifts and entertainment are often excessive. A 1975 study conducted in Fez estimated that the cost of marriage for a young junior civil servant, including all gifts and the multiple entertainments of guests, came to approximately $14,000. Of this, the groom’s family contributed $5,000 and the bride’s family the rest. The overall cost was approximately that of the income of the married couple for a period of four years. For the more modest wedding of an ordinary worker, costs were estimated at $1,900, with $1,314 paid by the groom’s family and the rest by the bride’s. The overall expense equaled the man’s estimated income for the first twenty-two months of his marriage. With the cost of marriage so high, many couples prolong their engagement for several years In order to acquire the resources they need in order to afford marriage.[153]

Once the negotiations of financial arrangements are satisfactorily concluded, the fathers of the bride and groom or the relatives acting as their guardians sign a formal agreement before a notary, although there still are marriages in rural areas where the older tradition prevails, at least among families with very modest resources, of simply concluding agreements in front of reliable witnesses so that the matter, if contested, can later be brought before a court. Either procedure is regarded as legally binding and closely precedes or follows the khatba, the public formal request for the woman’s hand during a ceremonial dinner at her home.

The engagement, or khatba, usually is preceded by a large gift of sugar, publicly delivered, to the woman’s household. If the families involved are well-off, this will be delivered with musicians and a number of women from neighboring households joining in. In general, the more socially prominent the families involved, the more public is the delivery of the gift. Families of lesser social prominence and wealth will tend to be more circumspect in the announcement of an engagement. If their gift is not declined, then the engagement feast takes place the following day.

As stated earlier, the actual wedding may be delayed considerably after the formal legal agreement. Not only are financial considerations involved, but in many Middle Eastern cities there is an acute housing shortage, so that many couples postpone living together and having children until suitable accommodations can be found and until they can afford to live together.

Shortly before the actual wedding, the bride's family delivers to the groom's house the various goods purchased with the bridewealth—mattresses, blankets, trays and silverware, cups, clothing, cooking utensils, and so on. For modest families, the procession may be very short and circulate only in the immediate residential quarter. For the weddings of more substantial families, goods are carried on flat-bed trucks and are circulated throughout the town; accompanied by musicians drumming and playing woodwind instruments and clapping and dancing by at least some of the women of the households involved and their neighbors. These occasions are clearly ones of considerable status competition, for they are the means of publicly announcing the social standing of the couple and the prestige of their respective extended families.

On the day of the wedding, a farewell celebration is held at the bride's house. At the groom's house, in the meantime, there is a long evening of feasting and talking. Later, some of the groom's relatives, but not the groom himself, set out to take the bride from her home. There is much weeping and crying as the bride is taken away from her family.

Upon arrival at the groom's house, the bride is ceremonially dressed in wedding clothes—heavy layers of fine brocades and jewels, often rented. The groom finally leaves his guests, lifts his bride's veil, and drinks milk with her and offers her dates. Depending on the region of the country, close relatives and kinsmen may visit the new couple briefly at this stage, or not at all. Wedding gifts are presented at this time, with each gift publicly announced and displayed. The wedding party continues throughout the night, culminating, so to speak, when proof is brought in to the guests of the bride's virginity. In country weddings, this is done by having a hired female dancer place a tray of fruit on her head, over which is placed a handkerchief spotted with the bride's virginal blood. As more Moroccans become exposed to western and urban sensibilities, the practice ofinsistingupon such direct confirmation of virginity is gradually disappearing. Several days of feasting often follow, during which the bride is expected to feign exhaustion and remain immobile, visited only by her close female friends. Perhaps in part to accustom the bride to her new surroundings—when indeed the bride and groom are not previously related—and to accommodate her to new patterns of domestic authority, the bride will not see her father, brothers, and other male relatives for at least three months.

Moroccans, as well as other Middle Easterners, stress the multiple forces involved in marriage arrangements, of which the feeling of the man and woman for each other is only one factor. The total social networks of the two are more or less directly involved and enter into calculations as to what is a good marriage. Statistics on marriage and divorce are hard to come by because most experts acknowledge that divorces which do not involve property settlements go largely unreported in most Middle Eastern countries. In one village setting in Morocco studied by Vanessa Maher, 49 percent of all marriages ended in divorce and this figure appeared to be relatively constant for those born between 1895 and 1915 and in later generations. Maher's study brought out significant contrasts between marriage stability in the rural setting and in the neighboring town which served as a regional administrative center. Divorce rates were highest in the village—52 percent—as against an average of 38 percent in the town.[154] Maher states that the crucial factor in determining the rate of

divorce was the economic and social situation of women. If inheritance was in land instead of liquid assets, if minimal bridewealth was paid, if the bride was young (80 percent of marriages of women under the age of fourteen ended up in divorce), and if each marriage partner retained stronger links with their natal family than that of their spouse-all factors more prevalent in the village as opposed to the town—the divorce was more likely. Another factor is whether a couple has children, Until a woman has children, it is often the case that her primary source of moral—and sometimes financial—support remains her own kin. She can always go back to them if the need arises, and this option is often exercised and remains open even after the couple has children.

*** The Importance of Kin and Family

Marriage strategies and patterns of kinship obligations reveal underlying notions of personal identity and conceptions of the social self. There has been a tendency in earlier writing on the Middle East to treat kinship rights, practices, and obligations as self-contained objects that can be reduced to fixed rules or normative structures which generate the various practices analyzed by anthropologists. As a consequence, much of the literature on Middle Eastern kinship has for a long time been dominated by an emphasis placed upon the importance of father’s brother’s daughter marriages and upon the significance of genealogies as a means of determining social and political obligations in a wide range of contexts. The prior attraction of these two topics is worth considering in detail.

Father’s brother’s daughter (bint ^camm) marriages are permissible in Islam, as stated earlier, and at least in some social contexts Middle Easterners assert that such unions are preferred, to the point of saying that if a woman and her family choose not to marry a father’s brother’s son, his consent and that of his family must first be obtained.[39] Proverbs are sometimes cited as evidence for this preference, but proverbs stating contrary opinions toward such unions are equally prevalent. Thus the Moroccan proverb in favor of bint ^camm marriage, “He who marries the daughter of his father’s brother is like him who celebrates his feast with a sheep from his own flock“ (that is, one who shows wealth and prestige by having sufficient resources within the family on which to draw) has its contrary in “Keep away from your blood before it defiles you” (in quarrels between the relatives of the spouses).'[10] Some anthropologists have sought to document the statistical rate of actual occurrence of such marriages, although, as has been indicated in earlier contexts, how certain relatives are designated in social practice is not so straightforward but depends upon the tenor of existing social relations. Other authors have confined themselves to assuming that such marriages are normative and preferred. For those interested in the statistical incidence of bint ^camm marriages, they appear to vary from 43 percent in tribal Kurdistan to 2 percent in Lebanon.

[39] For example, Antoun, Arab Village, p. 74. Donald Powell Cole, Nomads of the Nomads: The Al,Murrah Bedouinof the Empty Quarter (Chicago:

Aldine Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 71-72, states that the Al Murra “prefer” bint ^camm marriages but explicitly states in practice this means that marriages within lineages or with persons of equal status are preferred. Because the topic has held such fascination for anthropologists concerned with the Middle East, it is useful to present a brief listing of the standard articles dealing with the subject. These are as follows: Fredrik Barth, “Father’s Brother’s Daughter Marriage in Kurdistan," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 10 (1954), 164-71; Millicent Ayoub, “Parallel Cousin Marriage and Endogamy: A Study in Sociometry,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 15 (1959), 266- 75; Robert Murphy and Leonard Kasdan, “The -Structure of Parallel Cousin Marriage,” Arneri: can Anthropologist, 61 (1959), 17-29; Raphael Patai, “The Structure of Endogamous Unilineal Descent Groups',” Southwestern Journal ofAnthropology, 21 (1965), 325-50; John Gilbert and Eugene Hammel,< “Computer Simulation and Analysis of Problems in Kinship and Social Structure,” American Anthropologist, 68, no. 1 (February 1966), 71-93; Robert Murphy and Leonard Kasdan, “Agnation and Endogamy: Some Further Considerations,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 23 (1967), 1-13; Harvey Goldberg, “FBD Marriage and Demography among Tripolitanian Jews in Israel,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 23 (1967), 177-91; Fuad I. Khurl, “Parallel Cousin Marriage Reconsidered: A Middle Eastern Practice That Nullifies the Effects of Marriage on the Intensity of Family Relationships,” Man (N.S.), 5, no. 4 (December 1970), 597-618; Jamil Hilal, “Father’s Brother’s Daughter Marriage in Arab Communities: A Problem for Sociological Explanation,” Mid East Forum, 46, no. 4 (1972), 73-84; James M. B. Keyser, “The Middle Eastern Case: Is There a Marriage Rule?,” Ethnology, 13, no. 3 (July 1974), 293-309; and~an article which like Keyser’s has a broader perspective-Michael E. Meeker, “Meaning and Society in the Near East: Examples from the Black Sea Turks and the Levantine Arabs,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 7, no. 2 (April 1976), 243-70, and no. 3 (July 1976), 383-422. Peters, in “Aspects of Affinity,” p. 61, refers to the analysis of “explanations” of. bint ^camm marriage provided by one author as “a veritable thesaurus of errors.” By far 'the best account of the whole issue, despite the author’s difficult style of presentation, is contained in Bourdieu’s Outline, pp. 30-71, which includes a historiographic discussion of why anthropologists got interested in this issue to the exclusion of other issues in the first place.

[40] Cited in Edward Westermarck, Wit and Wisdom of Morocco (New York: Horace Liveright, Inc., 1931), p. 72.

In most communities, Richard Antoun estimates that its incidence is approximately 10 to 15 percent of all marriages, although such estimates often are made from incompatible assumptions and should be treated with caution.[155]

The enormous literature on the subject must be consulted to savor fully the nature of the bint ^camm debate, but examples of several of the issues involved are appropriate here. Keyser, following Patai, indicates that there are four principal reasons advanced by Middle Easterners for the bint ‘own preference:

1. It preserves the patrimony within the agnatic unit.

2. It strengthens the defensive unit.

3. It confers stability on the household unit,

4. 4. It insures that the status of the partners is equal.[156]

As he summarizes them, the grounds against such propositions are the following. In regard to the first one, women do not inherit equally with male children in Islamic law and in practice often do not inherit at all. Moreover, although such marriages may appear endogamous to Western eyes because in our own system of kinship reckoning such marriages are prohibited, this is not the case in the Islamic Middle East. Bint ^camm marriages do not fall within an economically defined corporate group. There may be economic gain in such unions, but there may be economic gain in a number of alternative unions as well.[157]

The second argument is related to the notion of kin-vengeance groups, examined in some detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Keyser points out that the proponents of such arguments, notably Barth, have failed to provide specific examples and to indicate that persons who contract such marriages are better off economically and politically than those who do not. As.for its conferring greater stability on household units, again evidence is lacking. Maher’s evidence on marriage stability indicates that a number of other factors enter into consideration as to whether marriages and households are stable or not.[158] Keyser rather nicely states: “If it is possible for people to like each other only if they know each other, it is also possible for people to hate each other only if they know each other, and marrying within one’s own household could be as disruptive and traumatic as not.”[159] The final argument concerns the “equal” status of the marriage partners. Equality (kafa’a) is a principle enshrined in Islamic law, but whether this principle is defined in economic, social, or other terms is a contested matter. For bint ^camm marriage to insure equality of status, however the notion is defined, it is necessary to make the further assumption that brothers are always equal, which is decidedly not the case.

The explanations for bint^camm marriage preferences, as Keyser points out, often take curious turns, as when a discussion of parallel cousin marriage for the

entire Middle East is supported by evidence solely from the Bedouin of the Syrian desert or when kinship ideology is confused with the biology of descent. Keyser's own argument, based upon plausible documentation from field research in Turkey, is that the "preference" for bint ^camm marriage can best be interpreted as a metaphorical statement which expresses what respective relatives through marriage should ideally be.[45] In reference to the particular issue of bint ^camrrt marriage, this is the most plausible argument put forward, for it focuses attention upon the cultural values of family and kin relationships instead of a single, exotic (for nonMuslims) marriage strategy.

The emphasis placed upon genealogies, especially patrilineal genealogies, can be dealt with more summarily as it already has figured significantly in Chapters 4 and 5. Some anthropologists' emphasis upon bint ^camm marriage has unduly highlighted only certain of the "most remarkable" marriage strategies rather than the entire range of available marriage strategies. Similarly, many anthropologists have taken the importance of genealogies for granted and have analyzed them as static ethnographic artifacts, ignoring how they are used. In my own ethnographic experience, people's use of complex genealogies tends to be correlated closely to wealth and social class. Individuals who have something to gain by imposing their interpretation of genealogies upon the social order tend to do so. It would be considered inappropriate in both tribal and nontribal settings for persons without claims to high social status, as such status is variously defined, to make elaborate claims of descent. Although the anthropological literature is filled with downward-branching diagrams such as Figure 5-4, a number of anthropologists have found that such charts can often be constructions based on the anthropologist's ideas rather than on a meaningful representation of how kinship relationships are conceived by Middle Easterners themselves. Hildred Geertz describes with some amusement her frustration at trying to show informants how to construct logically ordered kinship diagrams. Her findings are better approximated by Figure 6-6, in which informants first thought of a prominent ancestor or living person, then of clusters of indi-

FIGURE 6-6 A Moroccan conception of ''closeness." {From Dale F. Eickelman, Moroccan Islam, p. 208. Courtesy of the author and the publisher.)

viduals related to each of them.[161] The relationships among the various prominent ancestors were not clearly defined but were spoken of as being of "one family." Such a means of representing notions of kinship may not work everywhere in the Middle East, but it is useful to present an alternative to the earlier analytical frameworks which are proving increasingly unsatisfactory.

In discussing the significance of genealogies, Bourdieu argues that anthropologists have in the past tended to neglect the role of genealogists and the significance of the occasions when a genealogical representation of relationships (as opposed to other representations) is invoked. In drawing up genealogies for analysis, he argues that anthropologists easily forget that genealogies are the product of multiple strategies and thus treat the meaning of kinship relations genealogically defined as a resolved question.[162] Instead, anthropologists should seek to specify the types of situations in which the use of genealogies and relationships defined by them are particularly dominant. Although emphasis is placed upon patrilineal relationships, matrilateral relations can be shown to have equal importance in many social situations, although they have tended to be neglected as they are not “official” genealogical representations of the social order.[163] As Bourdieu illustrates through detailed examples drawn from the Kabyle of Algeria, marriages which are genealogically identical may have different, even opposite, meanings and may be the outcome of very different strategies involving a wide range of symbolic and material interests such as fertility, filiation, residence, inheritance, marriage, and the values of honor and prestige.[164]

A brief practical example from the Morocco of sixty years ago might prove useful. Just after the French gained effective control of one of the southern regions of the country, a new, rather brutal Moroccan qa’id, or tribal administrator, was put in charge of a region which included a large village in which one of the most respected notables was a pious, aged notary who was regarded almost as a saint by surrounding tribesmen. The qd’id soon had a falling-out with the notary and slapped him on the face in public during one of the weekly markets. Soon after, the qa td was told by one of his confidants that a tribal rebellion was in the making because of the slap. So at the next weekly market, the official brought one of his daughters and publicly threw her at the feet of the notary’s eldest son (then in his twenties), saying: “She’s yours. If you don’t take her, she can go kill herself.” Confronted with such an act, the notary’s son was. compelled for the sake of Ms honor to marry the girl. Essentially, her father publicly declared that he repudiated all responsibility for her honor and transferred it to the notary’s son; marriage was the only legitimate sort of relation he could have with the girl. (The formalities for a valid Islamic marriage were subsequently resolved.) The offer of his daughter effectively neutralized the offense of the slap.

The marriage turned out to be a success in both personal and political terms. A few years later, a younger son of the notary married his older brother’s wife’s sister, further strengthening the bonds between the two families. The initial act was a boldly successful political move. The second marriage had a political element, but there were other considerations, including relations between the two brothers, who were at the time living in the same household. Most marriage decisions show a subtle combination of various strategies which cannot be derived from rules or prescriptions, and the anthropologist’s principal task is to see the underlying assumptions toward the social order which these strategies reveal, not to reduce their complexity to a single, simplistic “rule,” such as bint ^camm marriage.

A good way to conclude this chapter and to place the legacy of earlier anthropological studies on kinship in the Middle East in perspective is to cite a recent essay by Constance Cronin on kinship among the Iranian elite. Cronin's earlier work concerned Italian immigrants in Australia, so when she began to work in Iran, she did not share the presuppositions that many scholars working principally in the Middle East took for granted concerning what Middle Eastern kinship was all about.[165]

Cronin writes that most of the work on Iranian kinship was a poor carbon copy of the prevalent assumptions concerning Arab kinship, placing undue stress upon the importance of patrilineal genealogies, extended families as corporate units, and rigid marriage rules concerning parallel cousin unions. In speaking both of the "traditional" (Cronin is decidedly uneasy with the term) family and contemporary ones, she says there is no marked discontinuity between past and present. Data which she collected from older informants suggested that they had a bilateral kinship system, despite the fact that patrilineal genealogies were verbally displayed for limited purposes such as responding to questions put by anthropologists. Whenever economically possible, nuclear families lived apart, and close- knit families (in the sense of taking collective actions) were the exception rather than the rule. There were few jointly held investments; important decisions were made household by household without necessarily consulting others in the extended family; patterns of obligations toward relatives were highly flexible and often indistinguishable from those of close friends.

Richard Antoun has written that any scholarly approach which concentrates almost exclusively upon one type of kinship tie or social relationship and the "problems" derived from it constitutes a "museum" approach which creates artifacts of kinship exotica.[166] Although it can be argued that his comment unjustly characterizes current trends in museology, I concur with the intention of his comment. Kinship relationships should be treated as something which people make and with which they accomplish things. Such a notion is not exactly startling in its novelty, although meticulous descriptions of how social identities are elaborated and manipulated and which do not treat them as fixed ethnographic objects are still fairly rare. Kinship studies have often been considered to be an arcane anthropological preserve, except when more general writers choose to make sweeping generalizations concerning the importance of family ties in the Middle East. This chapter has suggested a less arcane way of looking at Middle Eastern notions of social identity and how they work.

** 7. Change in Practical Ideologies: Self, Sexuality, and Ethnicity

The paradox of studying cultural meanings, and the practical contexts in which they are generated, maintained, and transformed, is that the relationship between the two is not always direct or predictable. For one thing, patterns of meaning concerning such concepts as kin, family, person, community, and sect do not occur in isolation but are interconnected with each other in complex ways so that change in any one domain is often irregularly

accelerated or impeded. Second, rapid and massive economic and political change affects such notions, but again the influence is often uneven and not fully predictable. In periods of crisis or rapid transformation, new ideologies concerning ideas of lineage, tribe, kinship, sect, religion, and nation are often formulated. As indicated earlier, the mere reference to lineage identities is illegal in Somalia, although such identities can be shown to have a continuing, decisive influence on public and private life; Morocco has abolished tribes as political units and replaced them with “communes,” although most communes follow tribal boundaries; other countries have legislated changes in the personal status of men and women which often contrast dramatically with popularly understood rights and expectations. This chapter looks at three of the most sensitive contexts of cultural projections of persons and cultural self: naming, a practice which, because usually not consciously systematized, is a good index of implicit notions of persons and change; sex roles and sexuality, which also are in part regarded as firmly private, immutable, and implicit; and ethnic identities, which have posed special theoretical challenges (discussed later in this chapter) concerning the role of ethnic identities in modern economies.

*** Naming

Patterns of naming provide privileged insight into the assumptions concerning cultural ideas of the person, as S. D. Goitein indicates in his ingenious analysis of female names in the Geniza documents. These documents depict the social life of the Jewish (and Muslim) communities of the southern Mediterranean in the tenth through the thirteenth centuries. Goitein’s analysis has produced a description of the social life and values of the period which is more thorough than that provided by many contemporary ethnographies. In the Geniza documents, women rarely speak for themselves; many were illiterate and even if not were frequently constrained to speak through male guardians. From Inheritance papers, correspondence, and other fragmentary evidence, Goitein nonetheless managed to elicit the implications of naming patterns and what they reveal of attitudes toward self. Names were “living words,” the meanings of which were well known to,those who bestowed them. Moreover, women were primarily responsible for the names which they gave their daughters, so that the meaning of a name and the frequency of its occurrence are therefore good indicators of what a woman wished for her daughter and, by implication, for herself. [167] The wide variety of names given to women possessed a number of common characteristics. In contrast to the names of men, which often contained references to God or to religious concepts, women’s names almost consistently emphasized secular themes. The exceptions were principally confined to upper-class families. Goitein takes the sexual dichotomy in naming patterns to imply a “chasm” between the worldwide Hebrew book culture of the men and the local popular subculture of the women. Additionally, many female names—over 70 percent encountered by Goitein, and an equivalent proportion among Muslim names—suggest ideas of “ruling, overcoming, and victory,” such as Siti al-Kull (“She who Rules over Everyone”), Sitt al-Nds (“Mistress over Mankind”), Sitt al-Fakhr (“Mistress of Glory”), and Labwa (“Lioness”). As he argues, such names suggest a self-image of women other than that of frailty, domesticity, or dependence upon men. Indeed, names implying chastity or fertility, attributes regarded by men as praiseworthy, were almost entirely absent, perhaps because such attributes were so taken for granted. Other names implied noble lineage, or a mere

welcoming of the newborn, such as Muna (“Wishes Fulfilled”), Ghunya (“Gain”), Yumn (“Good Luck”), Sakada (“Long Life”), and Baqa (“Substitute”— for a child who died). Because such names were fairly common, Goitein suspects that they were a protest against the male preference for boys.

In Goitein’s studies and in those of other scholars, changing fashions in naming can also be used as documentary indices of shifting religious and national consciousness, another crucial dimension of ideas of self.[168] One such study is.

Richard Bulliet’s discussion of trends in Turkish naming patterns from the early nineteenth century to the 1950s.[169] For instance, the Turkish names of Mehmet, Ahmet, and Ali are all derived from Arabic and have religious connotations. These names were highly popular prior to the secularizing Ottoman reforms (called the Tanzimat) which were enacted from the 1840s onward. There was a sharp plunge in their popularity until they reached a low in 1885-1889, when the reforming spirit was most intense. Afterward, religious names slowly recovered in popularity, only to reach a new low in 1905-1909, when the Young Turk movement was strong. Later there was a gradual but steady recovery of the incidence of religious names through 1920-1924, after which they maintained a fairly stable level of incidence.

Concurrently, the political circumstances from the rise of the Young Turks in the final years of the Ottoman Empire through the declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923 were correlated with the replacement of names of Arabic origin with those that were Turkish and secular, reflecting a distinctly Turkish national identity. Such names comprised only 8 percent of the total of the sample in 1910- 1914, rose to 65 percent in the decade of 1930-1941, and have declined only slightly in the years since then. Yet, as Bulliet emphasizes, the new trend in the popularity of Turkish secularized names was not at the expense of names with a religious base, suggesting that despite the militantly secularist ideology of the Turkish state promulgated by Ataturk and his successors, a significant component of the population retained its distinctly religious identity. The recent resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Muslim world, including Turkey, reaffirms the continuing importance of religious identity.

Another important dimension of naming as a key to the idea of the person in the Middle East is the fact that there is considerably more flexibility as to how persons can be referred to and addressed in Middle Eastern contexts than in our own. In the early years of French rule in Morocco, for instance, when letters of safe conduct and a system of land registration which required the precise legal identity of persons was being put into effect, it was not uncommon for the French to issue papers which referred to individuals by numerous alternative (and equally appropriate) names.[170] For example, a man called Ahmad could also be known as:

Ahmad wuld Driss al-Baqqal

Ahmad wuld Driss wuld Mustafa

Ahmad “wuld ^cMsh”

Ahmad al-TadilT

Ahmad, son of Driss, the Grocer

Ahmad, son of Driss, son of Mustafa

Ahmad, “son, of the man with poor eyesight” (a nickname)

Ahmad from Tadla

al-Tadili

Wuld Driss

or Ahmad wuld Driss ash-SharqawT

the one from Tadla

son of Dnss

Ahmad, son of Dnss, of the Sharqawi (patronymic association)

Only with the spread of the legal registry of births and the necessity, principally for administrative reasons, of identifying persons unambiguously by a single name, has the variety of naming choices been lessened somewhat. Moroccan naming patterns suggest how flexible are the ways in which persons can identify themselves, although there are variations in how these different components are emphasized through the Middle East. Moroccan names can be composed of the following elements: (1) personal names, such as Muhammad, Ahmad, and Buzkri; (2) nicknames (laqab-s), generally relating to some predominant personal identifying feature, such as “the one-eyed,” “the colorful,” or “the fast one”; (3) names derived from occupation and origin (nisba); (4) patrifiliative names; and (5) “family” names (kunya-s), made obligatory by the government in the 1950s but earlier maintained by wealthy government officials, merchants, marabouts, and descendants of the Prophet (pl. shurfa).[171]

Personal, or “first” names, can be drawn from a range of religious and secular sources. By themselves these names are not always distinctive. In one set of census material, Hildred Geertz found that out of 982 male names, 156 were called Muhammad.[172] . Quite a few names reflect little more than the time of year a child was born. An infant born near the Feast-day of the Prophet (^cId al-MHud) often is given the name MiludT. Similarly one born near the Feast of Abraham (^cId al-Kabir) will often be known as al-KabTr. If an earlier child has died, the later child may be given the same name or a name indicating that he or she is a replacement. A child may also be named after an admired person among his immediate relatives who has recently died. Naming a child after a living person is considered an ill omen for the child in Morocco and is therefore not done. There are fashions in naming, and names often acquire a political significance. In earlier generations almost all male names were religiously based (in a pattern reminiscent of that described by Goitein, many female names were not). A name once given is not ordinarily changed, although in some regions such as the Sultanate of Oman a man or woman may change his or her personal name at marriage if the name is thought to be incompatible with that of the proposed spouse. In such contexts, each letter of the alphabet is thought to be correlated with certain values (such as fire and water), some of which are incompatible with others. If the names of a couple intending marriage lack the proper correspondence, then the name of one of the two is changed,[173]

Nicknames can be acquired for a number of reasons. Usually they refer to a distinctive personal characteristic, or an incident in a person’s life which stands out. A Moroccan in one small town was named “Bin Shaqrun,” after a prominent Casablanca merchant of the 1890s, because he used to sell things as a child to other children in his quarter. In a Jordanian village, one man is called al-Hamshan, a Turkish word meaning countryman, because his father served in the Ottoman army in the First World War. Upon returning to his village he greeted the first man he saw with: “How are you, hamshart'l” using the Turkish term. Another man known for his piety was called al-Shihadi (“Testifier” of faith in God), because a male child was born to him at the end of his life.[174] Nicknames easily fall into two categories. Those of persons

and groups that convey either neutral or positive images tend to be public and used in the face of the persons involved. Names conveying less desirable invidious personal characteristics, such as dagger (“busybody”), can be used as effective means of social control in the contexts of everyday use.[175] There is an inherent ambiguity in many such terms which permits them to be used either pejoratively or simply as signs of intimacy. One Moroccan secondary student is called al-muqayhir (“the down-and-out”) because, unlike his classmates, he ostentatiously dresses in his oldest clothing. The same nickname might be applied of course to a student who really was in desperate financial circumstances.

Names derived from occupation, origin, and affiliation (for. instance with a religious brotherhood) are called nisba-s, “ a combination morphological, grammatical, and semantic process which consists of transforming a noun into what we would call a relative adjective, but what for Arabs becomes just another sort of noun.”[176] Thus the location with which people are identified Can become part of their name: al-MarrakshT for a man and al-Marrakshiya for a woman who comes from Marrakesh. Depending on context, the same people can be referred to by the name of a quarter in Marrakesh, or by the name of a tribe in the region or subgroup of it, or by the name of a larger geographical or social entity. For example, in Cairo, Hasan al-MarrakshT might be known as Hasan the Maghribi (“the Moroccan”); in Morocco itself such a nisba would be hardly distinctive, nor would be al-Marrakshi’ln Marrakesh. Nisba-s also can be derived from occupations, such as al-Khayyafi (“the tailor”) and al-Baqqafi (“the grocer”); from affiliation with a religious brotherhood, for example, an-Nasiri for a member of the Na$iriya brotherhood; and from the name of a maraboutic descent group such as ash- Sharqawi (of the Sharqawl patronymic association); or ^cAlawl from the son-in-law of the Prophet (and thus indicating prophetic descent). The characterization of a person by nisba is highly flexible: “Calling a man a Sefroui is like calling him a San Franciscan; it classifies him but it doesn’t type him; it places him without portraying him.”[177] Combined with other types of naming and situating persons in social contexts, it provides one more means by which notions of self can be specified and expressed.

Patrifiliative names, such as Abu Bakr bin Fu’ad (Abu Bakr, son of Fu’ad), situates persons in the social context of their familial predecessors and elder contemporaries. In ordinary usage, the name of only one ascending generation is indicated, although for clarity or to emphasize particular features of one’s genealogy, a string of claimed predecessors may be added, as in Abu Bakr bin Fu’ad bin Driss, in which the grandfather’s name is also added, Occasionally, a mother’s name is added ,as a sort of nickname, especially in the case of plural marriages. Occasionally a matriflliative link is also indicated, as in Fafimabint Zahra (Fatima, daughter of Zahra). Children and young adults are commonly referred to only as someone’s child, as in Bint Hasan (Hasan’s daughter), until with maturity their own social identity becomes distinct.

Teknonyms, in which people are known after the name of their children, are also common: Abu Nasir (Nadir’s father), Abu ^cUmar, and Umm Muhammad (Muhammad’s mother) are examples of this usage. There are variations within and between regions in the

use of such names, with their use being more prevalent in the Levant and the Arabian peninsula, for example, than in North Africa. Among some nomadic tribes in Oman, for instance, a man can be given a teknonym based on his daughter’s name, although among the settled population of the coast and in the Jabal Akhdar region, a teknonym is based inevitably upon the name of a son.

One of the principal ideological features of patrifiliative name-chains is that while ideally they can be extended infinitely into the past, in reality they rarely extend further back than two generations. When someone asserts that such a namechain can be traced over many generations, it usually indicates the assertion of high social status, “noble” antecedents, or descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Middle Easterners sometimes claim that even elaborate genealogies are “real,” which in a certain sense they of course are, although the social base of such claims becomes apparent when it is noted that the most assiduously elaborated genealogical claims are associated with political, religious, and social leadership. [178]

Until fairly recent times, the use of family names, or kunya-s, was largely confined to members of the elite in many Middle Eastern countries. In Morocco such names became obligatory only in the 1950s and are still known in rural areas and small towns as “government” names. Sometimes family names were chosen for individuals from printed lists of available names, if the person did not suggest one. Some illiterates in fact have to ask other persons to read their “government” names for them, so little are these names a part of ordinary social contexts. Often names that can be thought of as nisba-s, such as SharqawT, are adopted as family names, and names connoting place of origin and of occupation imperceptibly merge with those of family.

As a basis of social identity, names primarily signify the actual person carrying the name, not abstract groups or genealogical “lines” with an extended temporal reality. The very structure of possible ways of naming a person ensures that the temporal depth is markedly attenuated, as is the notion of the person having a . fixed social location. Naming patterns and how they are used thus indicate that there is a considerable flexibility in how persons are identified and can choose to identify themselves. In American and European contexts there is also a certain flexibility: The terms of address used with persons, such as the use of the first name without titles or honorifics, can suggest intimacy or disrespect, according to context and the speaker. The same is true of course in Middle Eastern situations, but the fact remains that the variety of means by which a person can be identified is considerably greater.

*** Women, Men, and Sexuality

Some of the recent writings on women and sex roles in the Middle East assert that these subjects were neglected in earlier studies. Yet Roxann Van Dusen, the author of a

comprehensive review of Middle Eastern women's studies, has pointed out that it is not so much that women have been neglected in earlier studies, it is rather that portrayals of them have been unidimensional. For instance, analyses of marriage and domestic life have concentrated principally upon formal roles and procedures. In community studies, women were generally described as "a world apart," or as inhabitants of a "private" sphere of limited "social" significance. In a number of studies, even those concerning family planning and population patterns, there is similarly a significant but incidental coverage of women. Recent literature concentrates explicitly upon such topics as women's economic roles, patterns of friendship and visiting, and the role of women in rituals and in mediating disputes.[179] After criticizing the noncumulative nature of much of the recent research on women and women's roles, Van Dusen suggests that more substantial analytical work can be achieved through intraregional comparisons and, even more importantly, comparisons among social strata. Her specific suggestions are to concentrate upon differences of age and generation, patterns of residence (urban and rural), length of time in various locales, and education and its relation to family background. She also suggests the need to conduct comparisons over time and to develop a more critical attitude toward some of the more common themes which run through the past literature on Middle Eastern women: the significance of the public/private dichotomy, male distrust of female sexuality and its implications, women's selfimages and patterns of socialization, family interactions, economic roles, and political roles.[180]

Since the appearance of Van Dusen's review, two major collections of essays have appeared which substantially answer these questions and indicate the contribution that the study of women and sex roles can make to the central concerns of social theory.[181] I emphasize the potential contribution of such studies rather than what has been realized to date for the reason that most of the research discussed here has appeared very recently and with few exceptions has been in the form of articles rather than full monographs. For this reason it has been difficult for scholars concerned with such topics as sexuality and the role of women to take substantial account of one another's work. The following discussion is thus necessarily confined to assessing the resources upon which more comprehensive discussions can be elaborated and made to contribute to the main currents of social thought.

Anthropological knowledge has a way of calling into question the most fundamental assumptions concerning "human nature" and the assumption that there are two gender roles is no exception. Based on research in Suhar, a town in the northern coastal region of the Sultanate of Oman, Unni Wikan asserts that in the case of this particular region of Oman there are three and not two genders: man, woman, and khanith. A khanith in Oman is a male transsexual prostitute. Wikan argues that such prostitutes are defined by "a socially acknowledged role pattern whereby a person acts and is classified as if he/she were a person of the opposite sex for a number of crucial purposes."[182] Such a statement in itself suggests a variety of role patterns, but not the existence of three genders. In the article, j however, Wikan argues that whereas women are always women on the basis of their

: anatomical features, for men it is their role in the sexual act and not possession of

the appropriate sexual organs that is constitutive of gender.[17] She claims that the

; existence of this “third sex” in the Omani context is a means of protecting the vir- tue of women, for the “third sex” can act as a safety valve for men’s sexual drives.[18] Moreover, Wikan states that members of the Omani “third sex” can | redefine their identity simply by marrying and acting as men and can shift back 1 and forth in how they represent their gender in public because each individual in

[Oman “is his own master”; the world is recognized as imperfect, so that men

i! strive to criticize the actions of others as little as possible unless it directly affects I their interests. As several critics of Wikan’s argument have pointed out, her discussion rests upon a confusion of cultural definitions of gender and of sex roles. These critics offered alternative explanations which do not invoke claims to the existence of a third gender but instead examine the social roles of male transsexual prostitutes. Wikan’s discussion is clearly argued, but many of its key assumptions are flawed. Thus in logically eliminating all possibilities of men’s seeking sexual “release” in forms other than male prostitutes, she argues that masturbation is discouraged in part because of the “Islamic fear” of polluting the right hand.[19] (Surely use of the left hand could overcome such a “fear”?) And the implicit Quranic injunction against homosexuality contained in the story of Lot (Sura 26, verse 165) surely can also be considered “Islamic” and be used to neutralize the normative base on which this element of Wikan’s argument rests. Despite the faulty construction of Wikan’s discussion, its presentation and subsequent discussion have served to clarify numerous issues concerning sexuality. The article remains one of the relatively few extensive discussions of the values underlying prostitution in the Middle East'(as opposed to its mere incidence) and their relation to notions of person and sexuality.[20]

Apart from Wikan’s discussion, most studies concerning sex roles in the Middle East point to the markedly different patterns of socialization of the two sexes. As already indicated, the different types of names which tend to be given to boys and to girls strongly suggest the different attitudes toward the two sexes and their roles in society. Ammar’s discussion of childhood socialization in an Egyptian . village remains one of the best available accounts and is a significant point of

'’’ibid, 309.

[18] Ibid., 314. For one of the few studies of prostitution in the Middle East (although not one to call gender roles into, question), see Samir Khalaf, Prostitution in a Changing Society: A Sociological Survey of Legal Prostitution in Beirut (Beirut: Khayats, 1965).

[19] Wikan, “Man Becomes Woman," 315.

[20] The following letters concerning Wikan’s argument have been published: Gill Shepherd, “Transsexualism in Oman,” Man (N.S.), 13, no. 1 (March 1978), 133-34; Robert Brain, “Transsexualism in Oman?” Man (N.S.), 13, no. 2 (June 1978), 322-23; Gill Shepherd, G. Feuerstein, and S'. al-Marzooq, with a reply by Unni Wikan, "The Omani Xanith," Man (N.S.), 13, no. 4 (December 1978), 662-71; and Unni Wikan, “The Omani Xanith-. A Third Gender Role,”Man (N.S.), 13, no. 3 (September 1978), 473-76. departure. Boys, he writes, tend to be regarded as a capital investment in peasant settings and a greater contribution to the social prestige of the family. A man with a number of sons is thought to be able to speak with more authority as the sons mature. Consequently, midwives are given more substantial presents on the birth of a boy than that of a girl. Ammar indicates the lesser enthusiasm which greets the birth of a girl, yet points out that normatively It is reprehensible (makruh) formally to evince dissatisfaction at their birth. Villagers are frequently reminded of the pre-Islamic custom of burying female infants alive and of Islam’s superiority in this regard as the Quran forbade the practice. Nonetheless, villagers say they regard girls as burdensome and a potential source of shame to the family,, so that girls must be carefully protected until their marriage. [21] Ammar lists what villagers consider to be some of the positive attributes of women, such as greater compassion than men are supposed to possess, yet the structure of his account clearly indicates the greater reserve that tends to accompany the birth of women. A practical index of attitudes toward the two sexes might be the infant mortality rates of female as opposed to male infants. The claim is made for Iran that the female infant mortality rate is higher than that for boys.[22] Although Ammar provides detailed statistics concerning overall infant mortality rates—but without regard for sex differences— and such detailed data as the relation between divorce and the number of surviving children, he says only that the family treatment of infants is more protective and more attentive compared with the later period of childhood.[23]

In the village studied by Ammar, girls are shown comparative indulgence in infancy but are expected to reach “sociological adulthood” more rapidly than boys. They soon form separate play groups and are differentially treated throughout their childhood and young adulthood. Perhaps' the most striking experience that the two sexes undergo is circumcision, which is practiced on both sexes in the Aswan region of Egypt. For boys, this occurs between the ages of three and six and is accompanied by a public communal celebration involving both adult male relatives and friends and a separate meal for women. Girls are circumcised (that is, the internal labia are cut off) at the age of seven or eight, ostensibly “to prevent any suspicion on the bridegroom’s part that the bride is not a virgin.” While the occasion of male circumcision is regarded as a religious occasion, that of female circumcision is confined to women, and men are not even supposed to evince an interest in it.[24] On reading Ammar’s account, it is easy to concur with Paul Vieille’s

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Ammar, Growing Up, pp. 94-96.

[22] Paul Vieille, “Iranian Women in Family Alliance and Sexual Politics,” in Beck and Keddie, Women, p. 452.

Ammar, Growing Up, p. 113.

[2i] Ibld., pp. 116-18. Despite legislation prohibiting female circumcision in Egypt enacted in 1959, the practice continues in some areas. See Nikki R. Keddie, “Problems in the Study of Middle Eastern Women,” International Journal of Middle East. Studies, 10, no. 2 (May 1979), 240. An even more radical practice—infibulation—occurs despite legislation forbidding it in the Sudan and certain other Middle Eastern countries. Inflbulation involves the deliberate mutilation of the female genitalia so as to close off the vaginal opening almost completely. It is an statement concerning the status of women in Iran that the “progressive devaluation” of women is apparent despite the value placed upon their fertility and their importance as counters of exchange in “good” marriages.[183] When a girl is married at the average age of twelve or thirteen, despite the legal requirement that she be sixteen, as reported by Ammar, or on the average between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, as the Gulicks report for Isfahan, Iran, clearly she has only a minimal say in her fate.[185]

As with, other topics of key concern in a region so vast as the Middle East, it is important to consider how such practices fit in with other key social assumptions. Singling out a single attribute of local custom, such as the practice of veiling (in any case not a specifically Islamic practice despite popular assumptions to the contrary), often turns out to be relatively unimportant in comparison to overall patterns of sexual ideology and practice.[186]

The need to examine comprehensively the obligations, rights, and division of labor of both sexes is a main theme of Emrys Peters, who undertook a comparison of women in four different Middle Eastern settings.[187] Among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, he states that there is little separation of the sexes until girls are nubile; there then follows a pattern of strict control and arranged marriages. After marriage, the formality of male-female interaction decreases somewhat, with men managing the “external” affairs of the household and women managing the domestic side. Women generally agree to renounce their inheritance rights at marriage, but at’ the same time after marriage acquire a certain amount of political status. Wives do not own tents, as is the case with other Bedouin societies including

the Al Murra of Saudi Arabia, but their bridewealth includes a number of furnishings for the tent for which women possess full rights of inheritance.

In the ShT^cT peasant village of south Lebanon studied by Peters, he found that women of higher status (the “Learned Families” discussed in Chapter 3) were veiled their entire lives and confined in their practical activities. In contrast, peasant women wore only head scarves and could move about with relative freedom. Among higher-status families, marriages were carefully arranged within their own circles; among peasants, there was a freer range of choice, and many marriages were love matches. Women inherited, and for peasants the world of men and women often was interchangeable. In contrast to women in Bedouin society, however, peasant women in Lebanon tended to have a low political status.

The two remaining comparisons that Peters makes are with recently settled Bedouin who replaced the Italians as olive farmers in Libya and Maronite Christian women in Lebanon. In the Libyan case, Peters argues that the ethos of sexual segregation was transferred to settled life. But whereas women in the semidesert had freedom of movement within camps, in the settled situation this freedom shrank to the house itself, isolating women and diminishing their status “to the point of degradation.”[59] In the case of the Maronites, the impact of male emigration was an Important consideration, as women often could assume significant political roles if left to manage households on their own for long periods of time; as with Muslim peasant women in Lebanon, personal and familial compatibility is a serious consideration in marriage and there is a latitude of individual choice.

Peters’s observation that the status of the two sexes is strongly correlated with the division of labor is echoed in many writings on the implications of sex roles in the Middle East. For this reason a number of studies have concentrated on the impact of greater educational opportunities for women, legislative reforms, and the effect of changing economic and political conditions upon women’s roles and the image of women in society. In countries such as Egypt and Turkey, some women of the middle and upper classes participate in organized movements for the explicit purpose of ameliorating the status of women, and such associations exist today with varying degrees of influence in most of the countries of the Middle East.[188] A notable exception is Saudi Arabia, where among other restrictions women are not allowed to drive, are not allowed to attend university classes with men, and are allowed access to library facilities only at specified and highly limited hours when no men are present.

Legal reforms which have benefited women to varying degrees have been enacted in most Middle Eastern settings, with substantial improvements in the status of women in countries such as Tunisia, Iran, and Turkey.[190] There are notable omissions in such reforms. Only Turkey, Israel, Tunisia, and the Soviet Union have, for instance, prohibited polygamy altogether, although in other countries, including Iraq and Pakistan, specific legal permission

must be obtained for marriages subsequent to the first marriage. In Morocco and Lebanon, women can insert restrictions into marriage contracts against husbands taking second wives.[191] Minimum ages for marriage are in effect in most Middle Eastern countries, and reforms limiting a husband’s unrestricted ability to divorce have been enacted in most countries. Laws related to inheritance, on the other hand, have met with greater resistance because of the existence of specific Quranic prescriptions. Of course, legal reforms in themselves do not necessarily change social practice, although they may reflect the changing values of legislators or rulers. In Turkey, which introduced fully secular civil and criminal codes in 1926, marriages in rural areas are often never officially validated by civil courts, and inheritance disputes tend to be settled independently of the formal judicial system.[192] Nonetheless, a recent study indicates a gradually increasing assertiveness by women over the last two decades in using the court system when they are involved in disputes with men. The consequences of legal reforms affecting women have emerged only gradually, but their social impact is now becoming apparent and is tied to the current higher educational level and greater political sophistication of women.[193]

The status of women in revolutionary situations is more difficult to determine. Women in the regions of heavy Muslim population in the Soviet Union appear to be the only ones to enjoy equal legal rights and educational opportunities. Revolutionary countries such as the People’s Democratic Republic of South Yemen and liberation movements throughout the Arab world often proclaim the full equality of women with men, but actual practice is virtually impossible to assess.[33] No clear pattern has yet emerged from the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979, but the participation of Iranian women in political life, educational opportunities, and the exercise of legal rights enacted on their behalf by the regime of the last Shah are now being held up to question. During Algeria’s struggle for independence, some women participated fully in the revolutionary movement. Because the French rarely searched them, women often were used for carrying bombs and as couriers. Since independence, however, women have continued to be treated as minors, have had lesser de facto access to education, and have been discouraged by public policy from competing with men in the labor market.[36]

Access to education is a prerequisite in many ways for a change in women’s status throughout the region. In the Middle East as a whole during the 1960s the average percentage of adult women (fifteen and over) who were literate was only 13 percent, ranging from a low of 4 percent for Algeria, Libya, and Morocco to a high of 30 percent for Turkey.[37] Of course, the higher proportion of school-age girls in primary schools as of the early 1970s as opposed to earlier decades indicates the capability and commitment of particular countries to provide for women’s education, yet popular resistance to the inclusion of women in mass literacy

FIGURE 7-1 Education is a major force in changing women's status. Saudi student, Beirut. (Courtesy Aramco World Magazins, March-April 1971.)

[36] See the eloquent and scathing account of the status of Algerian women by the Algerian journalist Fadela M’rabet, excerpted from her Les Algeriennes and translated in Fernea and Bezirgan, Women Speak, pp. 319-58.

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Nadia H. Youssef, “The Status and Fertility Patterns of Muslim Women,” in Beck and Keddie, Women, p. 88.

campaigns (as in Afghanistan) suggests an unwillingness to reconsider the traditional forms of male domination. Enrollment rates vary from 83 percent of school-age girls in primary schools in Tunisia, constituting 55 percent of total enrollment, to the respective figures of 36 percent and 33 percent for Morocco, 50 percent and 29 percent for Iraq, 61 percent and 41 percent for Turkey, 85 percent and 43 percent for Jordan, to less enviable records of 18 percent and 28 percent for oil-rich Saudi Arabia, 21 percent and 33 percent for the Sudan, and 1 percent and 2 percent for the Yemen Arab. Republic.[195] In every case there are significant regional disparities, with the percentage of rural women having access to education markedly lower than urban women in every instance and the proportion of women remaining in school after the age of fifteen dropping very rapidly as compared to the proportion of men .

Most studies suggest that the higher the direct involvement of women in nondomestic economic activities, the more open the social roles they can perform. At the same time, recent intensive studies of the economic role of women have documented a greater traditional and nontraditional range of roles that women can occupy than has often previously been reported. Davis reports a total of twenty- two different income-earning activities engaged in by rural Moroccan women. Some of these can result in increased social status; others, such as field labor and prostitution, result in a decrease.[196] Adopting a more global perspective, Maher presents a complex picture of categories of women in Moroccan society and how recent economic transformations have affected their status. These include women of “high bourgeois” origin who have been able to use their status and access to higher education to win a considerable measure of political and social autonomy; “new women,” educated women of the “petty bourgeoisie,” who have assumed professional roles as teachers, nurses, and secretaries; dependent wives of upwardly mobile petty administrators and teachers, for whom a rise in social status usually means a strict seclusion from men and the organization of activities in time and space so that the social worlds of men and women rarely coincide; “free” women— professional dancers, some divorced women, some wives of migrant workers, and prostitutes—often of rural origin, who trade off their ambiguous status for autonomy from the male tutelage;[197] and women who because of their precarious economic situation—widowed, divorced, kinless, or with husbands unable to work—' are forced into factory work and other work considered as socially marginal.[198] Fatima Mernissi’s interviews with women working in various craft industries such as weaving textiles and rugs indicate how dependent women are upon men as intermediaries, a

situation that only increases their precarious economic position. She concludes that the increasing capitalist penetration of such industries has had the consequence of further degrading women's status.[199] As Maher points out, the progressive impoverishment of the Moroccan countryside with recent economic transformations has had "particularly devasting" consequences for women and children, as a result of their subordination to men and their exclusion from the labor market.[200]

Similar conclusions have been drawn elsewhere in the Middle East: Whether it is the replacement of camels by trucks in nomadic encampments, or more complex economic processes, the most dramatic changes in women's status appear linked to economic transformations.[201] Michael Fischer's analysis of the changing situation of women in Iran might be taken as a general guide for most of the region. He writes that in Iran there has been a conservative ideology which allocates women a subordinate status to men. Until recently this ideology had its base in "small- scale peasant and merchant communities."[202] As this economic-political base has undergone radical transformations, the conservative ideology concerning malefemale roles has increasingly been eroded. Changes in state ideology favoring women's suffrage, the admission of women to all levels of education, legal enfranchisement, and access to public employment all have, served further to call into question traditional assumptions concerning women's roles.

How the erosion of this conservative ideology will be resolved is a matter open to debate. Economic "modernization" has just as often brought a worsening of women's practical status as an improvement in it. Nonetheless, economic transformations have in almost every instance brought the traditional ideologies concerning male-female relations into question. Even when changes in the status of women appear to move at a glacial pace, women in remote rural areas are increasingly aware of the opportunities available to them and are beginning to question the roles assigned to them in the past or by prevailing conventional ideological assumptions. As one colleague has suggested, the general lack of participation of Muslim women in public life in the past means that when they assume modern professional roles, they experience fewer obstacles to their careers than has been the case until recently for women in the United States.[203] While this observation certainly holds in the case of professionals in countries such as Egypt, no one has demonstrated a "trickle effect" upon the status of women with less extraordinary qualifications or upon their ability to participate in public life in government and commerce.

Change in the status and roles available to women is not a process confined to recent times or to major social upheavals such as the advent of Islam in seventhcentury Arabia or nineteenth- and twentieth-century European domination of many parts of the Middle East. Additionally, the ideological conventions concerning women vary considerably in different Middle Eastern societies. To ignore these differences of time, place, and social condition in order to speak of a pervasive "Islamic attitude" concerning sex roles leads to serious distortion.[204] In the West, use of a term such as "the Christian woman" would immediately signal a partisan conception not clearly related to specific historical or social contexts. Yet precisely this sort of transhistorical abstraction is commonly used in writing about women and sex roles in the Middle East, both by outsiders to the region and by those living within it.

One cause for the contributing popularity of such ahistorical abstractions comes from the way that both those advocating maintenance of the status quo and those advocating a rethinking of sex roles, like other significant aspects of social identity and social policy, seek legitimacy for their views. Revolutionaries, modernists, and traditionalists all assert that their positions are identified with the “authentic” message of the Quran and of Islam. Thus, those who wish to emphasize the constraints which Islam places upon women in society emphasize Quranic verses such as the following:

Your women are a tillage for you; so come unto your tillage as you wish.

(Sura 2, verse 223)

Men are the managers of the affairs of women for that God has preferred in bounty one of them over another . ..

And those, you fear may be rebellious admonish; banish them to their couches, and beat them.

(Sura 4, verse 3S)[205]

Taken in a literal sense, as do many conservative Muslims, such verses can be used to legitimize the effective relegation of women to an inferior status in public life and in relations with men. However, it is equally possible to read these verses in a more liberal sense by emphasizing the contexts in which these verses occur: legal prescriptions which specified the rights of women and frequently improved upon existing customs at the time they were revealed in seventh-century Arabia. The verse following the second of the above quotations, for instance, recommends that if a husband and wife should quarrel, arbiters should be appointed from the kin of each to seek a resolution of the conflict. Moreover, through various judicial and customary interpretations of Islamic doctrine, considerable modifications of doctrine and practice can occur despite the fact that the authors of such changes legitimate them by claiming that no change is involved other than a “return” to pure Islamic principles. Unfortunately, the ideological claim that no change occurs has blocked some analysts from perceiving variations which are often dramatic.

One of the earlier approaches to the study of sex roles in Islamic society was to signal the disparity between what was considered to be the “Great Tradition”—a distillation of what was taken to be Islamic law and Quranic ethics—and locally elaborated practices and traditions as studied by anthropologists throughout the Islamic world. When the study of sex

roles and ethics is conceived of in terms of transcultural norms and local comportment, the anthropologist then sees various village practices as “accommodations” of what is taken to be the normative tradition of Islam to the exigencies of village and urban life. The first studies of this kind to appear, notably Antoun’s essential 1968 article concerning the “modesty” of Arab village women, performed the valuable service of assembling relevant Quranic citations and aspects of Islamic tradition, of culling appropriate ethnographic sources, and of reporting on his own meticulous Jordanian research.[206] The principal drawback to this approach is the somewhat artificial normative tradition against which local practices are assessed. Muslim intellectuals ranging from Saudi fundamentalists to liberal modernists each construe a particular Islamic tradition and measure contemporary practices and expectations against it. Antoun’s attention to translocal norms (as locally understood) and locally accepted practices is useful. Yet by asserting that there is an identifiable Islamic normative “tradition” somehow independent of particular situations and carriers, anthropologists who study the “problem” of accommodation tend to ignore the continuing debate among Muslims as to just what is normative and arbitrarily select one normative construct against which actual practice can be measured.

Another major approach to the study of women in society is what can be called the structuralist approach, perhaps best exemplified by the writings of Pierre Bourdieu on the Kabyle Berbers of Algeria. Bourdieu situates his discussion of women in the broader context of issues of honor and a wide range of social relations. As he writes, honor “is the basis of the moral code of an individual who sees himself always through the eyes of others, who has need of others for his existence, because the image he has of himself is indistinguishable from that presented to him by other people.”[50] Hence the dynamics of honor necessarily involve those of social exchange in general. When speaking of dishonor in Kabyle society, the formulas employed generally refer to how certain problems appear before others. Social honor in general, he argues, is maintained through a series of challenges and ripostes. Kabyles distinguish between two complementary forms of honor: nif (a term which literally means “nose”) and hurma (“all that is prohibited under the penalty of committing sin, or is sacred”).[51] Bourdieu translates hurma as “honor” and nif as “point of honor.” Hurma implies both that which is sacred and that which is respectable. The integrity of honor requires a “punctilious and active vigilance” of the point of honor (mf). At times, matters of points of honor can be manipulated as in a game of two parties seeking to outbid the other, but any challenge to honor deals with the “most fundamental divisions” of Kabyle culture, “those which control the whole mythico-ritual system.”[52] Bourdieu proceeds to identify hurma with all that concerns femininity, the “sacred of the left hand,” sexuality, food, magic, and privacy, while he identifies nif with the sacred of the right hand, masculinity, all which concerns social and political exchanges, religion, and public life.[53] The propriety of women and the privacy of the family is thus for Bourdieu a crucial component of the broader discussion of the implications of the role of women and sex roles. Indeed, in a complementary essay he links the architecture of the traditional Kabyle house, the practical functions associated with each of its sections and its cultural connotations with a series of dualistic categories (male/female; house/fields and market; day/night; upper/lower; right/left) which make the house a microcosm of “the same oppositions which govern all the universe.”[54] Women and sex roles in this view are components of a more

comprehensive set of cultural assumptions concerning the world that are shared by persons in a given society.

A broadly analogous approach is the intensive analysis of specific rituals as a means of eliciting attitudes toward sexual differentiation. This type of study is perhaps best exemplified by John Mason's analysis of wedding rituals in a Libyan oasis community. His analysis suggests the confluence of three opposing forces, a principal one being the generalized assumption of female inferiority, in which male honor and the "kinship group requirement of protecting female virtue (via the modesty code)" are opposed to women's assumed "ethical incapability of controlling [their] animalistic sexual appetite [s]."[207] As with Bourdieu's structuralist approach to the study of honor, Mason refers to the changes taking place in Libyan society and their impact upon sex roles, but these observations do not figure into his structural analysis as such.

[50] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society," in Honour and. Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society, ed. J. G. Peristiany, The Nature of Human Society Series (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 211.

[51] Ibid., p. 216.

[S2] Ibid., pp. 216-17.

[53] See chart, Ibid., p. 222.

[54] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Berber House or the World Reversed," in his Algeria 1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 133-53 [original French, 1970].

A more comprehensive approach to the study of sexuality and sex roles is exemplified by the work of Lawrence Rosen. For Rosen, members of a single society may share "a broad set of cultural assumptions [yet] may nevertheless possess diverse interpretations of reality."[208] One such set of assumptions concerns the nature of sexuality and sex roles; although, as he argues, the possession of such common assumptions does not necessarily imply that both sexes will elaborate their shared assumptions in quite the same way. After reviewing the essential features of male and female roles in Morocco—the markedly separate patterns of socialization for boys and girls, the expectation that women are predominantly confined to domestic roles, a differential access to resources in which women in general are economically more insecure—Rosen graphically depicts some of the assumptions which Moroccans make concerning how men and women differ as persons.

The essential contrast which Rosen draws is between the complementary concepts of nafs (“passion, appetite”) and ^cqdl (“reason”).[209] Nafs is possessed by all living creatures—angels, men, animals, and jnun (sing.,/mn-s). It is composed of all the passions and lusts; unchecked it can lead men to do bad and shameful things. ^cQal is “reason, rationality, the ability to use our heads in order to keep our passions from getting hold of us and controlling us.”[210] Through following God’s word as it is known from the Quran and the teachings of Islam, man can avoid being a slave to his passions, can distinguish right from wrong, and can live as God intended man to live. Through discipline and learning, a child learns gradually to control his passions. Women also possess reason but cannot develop it as fully as men have the ability to do. “It’s just in their nature. Women have very great sexual desires and that’s why a man is always necessary to control them, to keep them from creating all sorts of disorder. ... ‘A woman by herself is like a Turkish bath without water,’ because she is always hot and without a man she has no way to slake the fire.”[211]

As Rosen points out, the notion that women are subordinate to men is an ideological assumption shared by both sexes, but in practice it is elaborated in different ways by men and women. Men tend to emphasize the supposedly natural differences between the two sexes when they seek to “comprehend their actual ties with women” and how they ought to handle concrete situations regarding them. Women, for their part, tend more to emphasize the social relations of the two sexes and “ways in which men can be ignored, outflanked, or outwitted by the arrangement of various social pressures within the household or family.”[212] In short, their actions suggest that they regard their subordination as more social than natural. Rosen proceeds then to document how the definition of what is “reality” is negotiated in crucial situations such as marriage negotiations.

The advantage of the analytical approach exemplified by Rosen is that no implicit assumption is made that the “nature” of social reality is fixed and derived from rules. Both the cultural assumptions concerning reality and their articulation in practical social circumstances are regarded as subject to redefinition through changing political and economic circumstances.

Michael Fischer employs a similar approach in the study of Persian women, although he places greater emphasis on the circumstances engendering social and cultural change than does Rosen.[213] Paul Vieille, also concerned with Iran, seeks to depict attitudes concerning sexuality in peasant society and does so by tracing the interrelationships among virginity as a female “capital,” fecundity, and the comple- . mentarity of the sexes (with women considered to be “incomplete,” submissive, and inferior). He writes that in peasant society, “sex is ... a constant subject of dreaming, of preoccupation, of conversation” and goes so far as to say that Iranian peasant society is “a society centered on sexuality.” Yet he proceeds to depict sexual practice as remarkably contrary to-the ideal. He writes that the only contact in

the course of the sexual act is between the genital organs; caresses are virtually unknown (despite there being no specific religious or cultural prohibitions); there is no communication between spouses regarding the sexual act; and the “avowal of pleasure is inconceivable from woman to man and also from man to woman.” Even in married life the woman must refrain from showing her desire; deficiencies such as sterility are almost always attributed to the woman. In sum, and perhaps with hyperbole, Vieille writes: “Comradeship or friendship among men and women is inconceivable and cannot exist; all verbal communication and all physical approaches take on sexual content and are suspect.” A woman is “a sexual good at the disposition of a man,” yet as Vieille implies, assumptions concerning sexuality suggest a “contradiction” between the level of institutional values, where sex is overrated, and that of actual sexual practice.[214]

Although Vieille’s essay makes an attempt to treat sexuality comprehensively by speaking of male-female relations and other forms of sexual gratification, he is not entirely successful. He writes that the laments of popular songs and “the frequency of other forms of sexuality such as masturbation, homosexuality, and bestiality” all suggest a masculine dissatisfaction with heterosexual relations despite the lack of “direct indexes” of what men think.[215] Here Vieille reiterates what might be labeled the underlying “hydraulic” theory of sexuality, in which any impediment to heterosexual relations is thought to result directly in the practice of other forms of sexual gratification.

When explicitly stated as above, the deficiencies of “hydraulic” theories of sexuality can easily be recognized. The liberalism of some European countries and parts of the United States has not demonstrably resulted in any shift between homosexual and heterosexual orientations and, if anything, has resulted in a more tolerant attitude toward what Vieille would call “other” forms of sexual gratification. As suggested thus far in this chapter, ideologies of sexuality involve complex dimensions, including notions of domination, authority, intimacy, friendship, economic hegemony, and other essential definitions of, and practical control over, self and social honor.

Nonetheless, or possibly because sexuality in the Middle East as elsewhere is such a crucial component of notions of self, it is difficult to elaborate a more comprehensive discussion of the issue because of the lack of a solid base on which to build. So little reliable discussion has taken place to date in the scholarly literature on the Middle East that Burton’s “Terminal Essay” to his translation of 1001 Nights—an encyclopedic inventory of hearsay and what he considered to be the sexual wonders and extravagances of the “Sotadic Zone” (a region which for him stretched from Tokyo to Tangier, his “Orient”)—is astonishingly referred to even today as authoritative in some general books on the region.[216] Most discussions of sexual conduct make cursory references to male and female homosexuality and other forms of sex, as when Snouck Hurgronje wrote of nineteenth-century Mecca that there were many men “who gave themselves up, to the vice called after Lot” and their female counterparts as well.[217] The “Orient” writ large was used as a screen against which Western images of its supposed excesses could be projected. Pilgrimages such as that made by Andre Gide in 1893 to Algeria in search of the “golden fleece” of moral and sexual

liberation only served to reinforce the Western notion of the “Orient” as different and exotic, in sexuality as in other spheres.[218]

Such images persist in the travel literature of the present, as when Gavin Maxwell suggests that the marsh Arabs of southern Iraq “are not very selective in their direction of sexual outlet; all is, so to speak, grist to their mill.”[219] With sexuality treated superficially as the exotic, it is not surprising that even nineteenth-century ethnographers such as Snouck Hurgronje noted that Middle Easterners, especially educated ones, spoke with circumspection concerning sexual attitudes and beliefs. As ethnography, isolated comments such as those I have cited above only underscore how little is known of sexuality in theory or conduct.[220]

A sketch of what a comprehensive study of sexuality should be and an indication at least of the documentary sources on which it could be built is provided by the Tunisian sociologist, Abdelwahab Bouhdiba. His La Sexualitken Islam (Sexuality in Islam) analyzes attitudes toward sexuality in the medieval Islamic world and in the contemporary period both through texts and (by reference to a few relevant colonial and contemporary studies of Tunisia alone) sociological accounts. He insists that although the Islamic community considers itself rightly as a unity, Islam is fundamentally “plastic” in its essence, so that nothing of the ambiguities of existence or of life are “sacrificed,” including the serious and playful, collective and individual components of sexuality. For Bouhdiba, one can speak of a Malay Islam, an Arab Islam, and Iranian Islam, a Tunisian Islam, and other Islams, each of which suggests essential comportments and attitudes which cannot be reduced to “folklore.”[221] His text is resplendent with suggestions of how the sexual dimension of identity has been elaborated in the context of various expressions of Islamic belief and practice and a multiplicity of social structures.

*** Ethnicity and Cultural Identity

Ethnicity is no less complex a notion than the other aspects of personal and cultural identity so far considered. In a provocative essay written in the late 1960s, Fredrick Barth briefly reviews the drawbacks to defining ethnicity in terms of shared biological features and, as he understands the term, cultural identities and suggests instead that analytically the crucial elements of any definition of ethnic group are those characteristics “presumptively” determined by origin and background, which actors use “to categorize themselves and others for purposes of interaction.”[222]

When Barth’s discussion of ethnicity first appeared, it provided a useful corrective to those discussions which either took ethnicity to be a fixed and unchanging element of personal identity or which regarded the notion of culture as composed of set, prescriptive “traits” or rules. However, most modern anthropological notions of culture emphasize how cultural meanings are socially employed, produced, and maintained in social action and interaction.

The social production of meaning is a component of such an approach to the study of culture.[223] Barth sought to consider the “socially effective” to the exclusion of all considerations of cultural meaning, except insofar as notions of ethnic group identity produced or maintained perceptions of boundaries of groups, as opposed to what he called “cultural stuff,” which he saw as merely content filling in social form.[224] As this essay has reiterated in various contexts, the notion of culture as “stuff’ is not analytically useful.

FIGURE 7-2 Shabak men, northern Iraq. (Courtesy Amal Rassam.)

As logically elegant as Barth’s essay is in some respects, it is limited in theoretical value because it lacks an adequate notion of how social processes are related to the production of cultural conceptions with which people distinguish themselves from “other” ethnic categories and with which they account for, evaluate, and weigh the importance of those distinctions. Instead, Barth focuses upon the organizational forms of social groups whose principle of unity is presumed rather than demonstrated to be that of ethnicity rather than alternate or complementary attributes which could form the base of organizational cohesiveness. For example, the essay concerning Fur cultivators and Baggara pastoralists in the Sudan explicitly avoids consideration of the historical process of personal shifts of ethnic identity between the two groups. It is explicitly assumed that when persons change the means by which they utilize certain resources, their ethnic identities change as well. Even were this to be the case, little attention is paid to precisely what ethnicity means in the setting of the Fur and the Baggara and, indeed, only Fur views of social identity are provided in any detail.[225]

An analytic framework which presented the principles of ethnic stereotyping (notions concerning the motivations of the members of “other” ethnic groups and what can be expected of them) of both groups and how these notions were maintained in changing historical contexts would have been much more useful.[226] In his own case study in the volume, Barth is concerned with elaborating the economic and productive contexts in which it is useful for Pathans to stress their identities as Pathans and when it is not. By confining his discussion to “traditional” Pathans, and to social groups distinguished by their exploitation of particular ecological “niches,” some of the most significant tests of the precise ramifications of ethnicity in contemporary and complex settings are ignored.[227]

The identity of the Shabak of northern Iraq as studied by Amal Rassam (Vinogradov) gives some notion of just how complex ethnic identities can become and why it is misleading to study them as if such identities were part of a fixed ethnic “mosaic.”[228] The Shabak are a Muslim Shi[0] ! sect of about fifteen thousand persons located in some thirty-five villages to the east of Mosul. The area in which they live is fairly delimited, they speak a Kurdish dialect (with most men today bilingual in Arabic), and until recently they worked as sharecroppers on land owned by a group of wealthy Arab families who live in Mosul and who claim descent from the Prophet. In recent land reforms the Shabak have become landowners themselves. They largely marry only among themselves and tend to be secretive toward outsiders with

respect to their religious beliefs. In the immediate vicinity of the Shabak are a variety of ethnolinguistic communities: ShI^cT Turkoman tribes in villages along the Tigris, ShI^cT Kurds, Sunni Muslim Arabs in Mosul, Christian villagers (Monophysites, Assyrians, and Nestorians), Jews in both Mosul and in agricultural communities (until 1958), Kurdish-speaking gypsies, and tribally organized Sunni Arabic-speaking Bedouin.[77]

Rassam writes that “the Shabak are completely ignorant of their history and cultural affiliations” yet states that an analysis of what is known of them historically is essential to consider their self-identity and how it is changing. The Shabak claim that their name derives from an Arabic term, shabaka, which means “to interweave” or “to tie together,” and thus alludes to the fact that they are an amalgam of peoples.[78] Unlike other groups in the Mosul region, the Shabak “claim no common descent and keep no genealogies; neither do they have lineages which provide political leadership.” Their social integration is provided almost exclusively by their religious beliefs and practices. As Rassam writes, the very weakness bf the Shabak protected them. They made no claims to social honor on the basis of corporate strength, which indeed they did not possess, and they carried no weapons. “Thus, they avoided any involvement in the kaleidoscope of political alliances and feuds that raged around them.”[79]

At the same time, the Shabak were in a patron-client relation with their landlords (the soda), a relation that continues today despite the fact that the patrons are now their former landlords, as the land has been expropriated and distributed to the tenants. Similarly, there was nothing inevitable about the sada, as the descendants of the Prophet are collectively known, acquiring their favored position. The Ottoman administration in the nineteenth century settled five families of sada in the Mosul region in order to use their religious prestige and influence to buttress their authority. In return for their cooperation as representatives of the state and

Society: Religious Alignments in the Hindu Kush. Anthropological Papers, 50 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Museum of Anthropology, 1973). A later series of short papers on the same theme is contained in Ethnic Processes and Intergroup Relations in Contemporary Afghanistan, eds. Jon W. Anderson and Richard F. Strand, Afghanistan Council, Occasional Paper 15 (New York: Asia Society, 1978). Anderson’s “Introduction and Overview,” pp. 1-8, is particularly useful in suggesting the limitations of using the notion of ethnicity in non- Westem contexts.

[77] Rassam (Vinogradov), “Ethnicity,” 208-9; Rassam (Vinogradov), “Power,” p. 157. Data on the Jewish and Christian groups are derived from Rassam, personal communication, 1976.

[78] Rassam (Vinogradov), “Ethnicity,” 210.

^Ibid., 210.

Change in Practical Ideologies: Self, Sexuality, and Ethnicity 161 as intermediaries charged with keeping the population of the region peaceful and politically inactive, the Ottoman government gave the sada families large tracts of land. As landlords of the Shabak, the sada gave their peasants a place to stay when they came into Mosul to sell their produce and buy provisions, and “acted throughout as advisors, creditors, and protectors” on their behalf.[80]

Under the conditions of relative insecurity that prevailed under the Ottoman administration, the Shabak had few alternatives to being sharecroppers; a few individuals managed to acquire funds (for example, by working for the British army in Iraq in the 1920s) to buy lands themselves and to become upwardly mobile, one sign of which was to speak Arabic exclusively and to adopt urban life styles. Some even claimed sada status for themselves, and all sought to downplay their former identity as Shabak. In post-1958 Iraq, with the consequences of land reform and rural education having a major impact on social and cultural identity, Shabak can emigrate to other regions of Iraq or leave their villages to work in nearby factories.[81] As Rassam insists, it is not sufficient to define the Shabak in the context of locally existing ethnic groups and to locate them in time and space: “Equally important is to discover the basis of their differential access to resources, religious, social or economic, and the patterns of their articulation ... an historical analysis becomes crucial for the proper assessment of the factors involved in the formation of these groups.”[82] A sociological comprehension of ethnicity necessitates a historical understanding of how ethnic identities articulate and are manipulated.

The situation depicted for northern Iraq is not dissimilar to the ethnic complexity of neighboring countries, notably Turkey and Iran, both of which contain minority populations which differentiate themselves according to ethnic, religious, and linguistic criteria. Perhaps the most complex country of the region in terms of such identities is Lebanon. The country was on the verge of civil war several times in the 1950s and 1960s prior to the tragic conflagration which began in 1975. Often the fighting is simplistically reported in the foreign press as between “rightists” and “leftists” or between Christians and Muslims. Actually the situation is considerably more complex. By 1975, Lebanon, a country roughly the size of Connecticut but only thirty-five miles wide, had an estimated population of three million, with seventeen officially recognized religious sects. Because Lebanese electoral politics were linked to the strength of the various sects as recorded in the official census, there had been no official census since 1932. Nonetheless, most accounts assume that 30 percent of the population was Maronite Christian, 20 percent Sunni Muslim, 18 percent ShI^cT Muslim, 10 percent Greek Orthodox Christian, 6 percent Greek Catholic, 6 percent Druze, 5 percent Armenian Orthodox (many of whom arrived as refugees from Turkey in the early part

of this century), with the remaining 5 percent of the population divided among Armenian Catholics, Protes-

[S0] Ibid., 211-13; Rassam (Vinogradov), “Power,” p. 160.

[81] Rassam (Vinogradov), “Ethnicity,” 212-13, 216.

[82] Rassam (Vinogradov), “Power,” pp. 157-58.

tants, Jacobites, Syrian Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Nestorians, Latin Rite Catholics, Jews, and others. An estimated one-third of Lebanon’s inhabitants as of 1975 were noncitizens. These included 500,000 Syrians (both Christian and Muslim) and an estimated 300,000 Palestinians (again both Christian and Muslim). Although earlier immigrants to Lebanon, including Armenians and many of the Palestinian refugees who arrived in 1948 were accorded Lebanese citizenship, most of the later arrivals were not. Joseph estimates that 60 to 75 percent of Lebanon’s population lives in cities, with over 50 percent of the urban population being in the greater Beirut area.[229] As the fighting in Lebanon’s south continues, the refugee population of the capital has increased, further exacerbating the various potential cleavages in Lebanon’s society. Furthermore, distances in Lebanon are so short that incidents in one part of the country immediately affect other parts.

Although Lebanon’s civil war is characterized as sectarian, this notion must be carefully analyzed. Khuri’s enumeration of sectarian differences between a predominantly Maronite region of Beirut and a neighboring ShI^cT one indicate that there are considerable differences of education, occupation, marriage and household patterns, life styles, and other nonreligious identifying features between the various sectarian groups.[230] For example, Christians tended to have contact with European missionaries from the nineteenth century onward and have benefited from educational facilities superior to those available to most Shi^ca. Such educational differences explain in part the marked occupational differentiation between the two confessional groups, with the ShT^ca tending to be concentrated in professions which can be acquired by apprenticeship or which require no specialized training.[231] Although neighborhoods are not distinguishable by class, there has been a marked settlement by sect, but the geographical and social boundaries between Muslim and Christian communities (and various divisions within them) are not always sharp. In general, areas of concentration of one sect tend to serve as a magnet for other persons of the same sect. As Khuri writes—in a study completed prior to the 1975 civil war—“interaction between confessional groups is, by and large, limited to business transactions and to formal occasions: festivals, weddings, and funerals. To interact openly and freely with other confessions requires both knowledge and

hypocrisy: knowledge of the etiquette, manners, and cultural sensitivities of the other group; hypocrisy in pretending to appreciate the ways of others while manipulating them."[232]

Joseph emphasizes in her writings on sectarianism in Lebanon that the boundary markers between various sects have varied historically and that the sects should not, even under present circumstances, be taken as fixed religious and political identities.[233] Her study of Burj Hammud, an independent municipality about 5 kilometers from downtown Beirut, clearly depicts the practical implications of sectarian identity.

Like other parts of Lebanon, population movements in and out of Burj Hammud reflect the political and economic currents affecting the entire country. In 1920, the municipality had a population of 2,000 persons, which increased to 20,000 in 1942 and to about 200,000 in 1973, with a high population turnover. Every one of Lebanon's 17 major confessional groups is represented in its population.[234] Less than 1 percent of its present-day population is composed of the original settlers of the town.

Joseph stresses the importance of the period when various waves of migrants settled in the community, a factor which Khuri also mentions. The first major wave of migrants were- the Armenians who came to Lebanon following the massacres in Turkey in 1920. Through the assistance of various Armenian organizations, they bought land in the region and encouraged other migrants to join them. Through the end of the Second World War the Armenians predominated numerically in the region, set up a number of small industries, and built schools, clinics, clubs, and churches. They likewise gained control of the municipal board and have retained that control to the present. Palestinians began arriving in the community after 1948, with the wealthier ones settling directly in the community and the more impoverished ones living in a nearby camp. Following political upheavals in Syria in the 1960s, a large number of Syrians, mostly Sunni Muslims but also of other Muslim and Christian confessional groups, arrived. Later refugees in the 1970s were largely Shl^ca from Lebanon's south. As a consequence, Joseph estimates that the present population distribution is roughly 40 percent Armenian Christians, 40 percent Shl^ca, and 20 percent Palestinian. Some of the municipality's neighborhoods are mixed in confessional orientation, but in most cases a single group predominates.

Several sorts of bonds emerge from daily interaction. Almost every street constitutes a neighborhood, with households of various confessional groups mixed together. Neighbors tended to share their various goods and to participate in each other's feast days and other special occasions. Women tended to form interconfessional friendship and visiting networks which often served as the basis for maintaining some semblance of security, social control, and unity in the street even in the face of deteriorating political conditions.[235] On the other hand, the sectarian identities and the armed militias maintained by the strongmen of

various groups have become increasingly part of the regular fabric of social life. Here the national (and international) repercussions of Lebanese “internal” politics become apparent. In Bug Hammud as elsewhere in the country, each confessional group can call upon its compatriots elsewhere. In fact, many of the Lebanese residents of Bug Hammud did not vote there when elections were held (one of the reasons that the Armenians maintained their local political strength) but in their villages of origin where they were indebted to particular strongmen (zzz^czm-s).

Similarly, groups that might be strong locally but weak nationally coalesce with others. Thus the right-wing Kata’ib party, whose principal base of support is the Maronite Christian community, usually tends to be supported by the Armenians, just as the Palestinians (both Christism and Muslim) tend to be supported by the Shl^ca of Lebanon’s south or refugees from that region. When any one group is threatened, it can call upon compatriots elsewhere to support its conceived interests.[236] These various armed militias are organized almost entirely along confessional lines, as Khuri points out in his comments upon patterns of political leadership in Lebanon. In fact, he goes so far as to say that ideological political parties, such as the Ba^cthists and Communists, appear to appeal primarily to the young, semieducated, and unmarried, many of whom desert these parties after marriage when they have more responsibilities and material interests to protect. Some alliances cross confessional lines, but these usually are among particular leaders.[237] Hence sectarian affiliations and the importance of asserting confessional identity can be more flexible than may at first be apparent.

Several researchers recently have questioned whether the strength of organizational forms along confessional lines is real or apparent and have placed great stress upon the relation of economic realities to political structure and notions of authority. Virtually all accounts of organized violence and political leadership in Lebanon acknowledge that the followings of various strongmen are primarily along sectarian and factional lines. However, Michael Gilsenan, among others, has argued that although sectarian politics of the “Boss Tweed” variety and their associated patron-client relationships were important in an earlier era in Lebanon, fundamental economic transformations have profoundly altered the structure of Lebanese society. One consequence is that despite appearances, there has been a cementing of ties among favor givers (Lebanon’s zzz^czm-s) irrespective of sectarian affiliations to the exclusion of all other Lebanese (the favor seekers), in order to keep the favor seekers dependent and to ensure that they continue to think of Lebanon’s politics as a spoils system in which only ties to successful strongmen can bring any semblance of security. This “alliance and consolidation at the top” suggests to Gilsenan that class conflict has become the root of current Lebanese political unrest, not locally held ideologies concerning how that society is divided.[238]

j Amal Rassam’s conclusion regarding the ethnic and sectarian divisions of

j northern Iraq might equally be applied to the situation in Lebanon: “Ethnicity and its attendant patronage system represented an organizational solution through i which weak, special-interest groups managed to protect their identities and insure their survival.”[93] As this argument stands, it is somewhat circular for what the

' identity of ethnicity “solved” organizationally were problems of economic and

! political advantage-seeking. Such identities lost their importance once economic

and political circumstances were significantly transformed. The same observation concerning ethnic and sectarian identity and advantage-seeking has been put forward for Lebanon, stating that the major divisions of Lebanese society since the first major capitalist penetration in the nineteenth century have been economic and not religious ones and that such divisions are tied to specific historical circumstances and an intraclass struggle among political leaders.[94] To the extent that such organized factional violence is supported by international political forces, such an argument gains credence. Lebanese political leaders have managed to obtain arms and money from a variety of external political sources, thus prolonging their own tenuous command over their following.

Any consideration of ethnic and factional alliances must look beyond purely local ideological beliefs to understand the particular forms they take. The Kurds are a case in point, and their situation serves in some ways to indicate the difficulties involved in treating ethnic identities as either primordial givens along the lines of Carleton Coon or merely as locally held “apparent” ideologies of identity a la Barth.[95]

Kurdistan is a region which crosses several international boundaries. The majority of Kurds are located in Turkey (7 to 12 million), Iran (4 to 6 million) and Iraq (2 to 3 million), with smaller numbers in the USSR (600,000 to 1 million) and Syria (500,000 to 600,000), and perhaps 400,000 elsewhere.[96] The number of

Transaction and Meaning: Directions in the Anthropology of Exchange and Symbolic Behavior, ed. Bruce Kapferer, ASA Studies in Social Anthropology, 1 (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1976), pp. 191-219.

[93] Rassam (Vinogradov), “Ethnicity,” 216.

?[4] Laurel D. Mailloux, “Peasants and Social Protest: 1975-1976 Lebanese Gvil War,” in Joseph and Pillsbury,Muslim-Christian Conflicts, pp. 101-3.

[95] The Kurds are very poorly known from specifically anthropological studies, as most ethnographers have spent only brief periods of several weeks to two months in Kurdistan and were not familiar with Kurdish or the other languages of the region. With these reservations, the principal studies are E. R. Leach, Social and Economic Organisation of the Rowanduz Kurds, London School of Economics, Monographs on Social Anthropology, 3 (London: Percy Lund, Humphries and Co., Ltd., 1940); Fredrik Baith, Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan, Universtetes Ethnografiske Museum Bulletin, 7 (Odo: University of Oslo, 1953); and Henny Harald Hansen, The Kurdish Woman’s Life: Field Research in a Muslim Society, Iraq, Nationalmuseets Skrifter, Etnografisk Raekke, 7 (Copenhagen: National Museum, 1961).

[96] Figures derived from “Kurds on the Move,” The Middle East (London), no. 55 (May 1979), 47-52, which provides a useful summary, of the political situation of Kurds today. Similar political ambiguities plague the substantial disparity between the population claims of Egyptian Coptic spokesmen (7 million) and official estimates (2,600,000 as of 1976). See Makram Samaan and Soheir Sukkary, “The Copts and Muslims of Egypt,” in Joseph and Pillsbury, Muslim-Christian Conflicts, p. 130.

Kurds is itself a significant political issue, with the Kurds themselves suggesting the upper figures and those wishing to diminish their political importance advocating the lower estimates. In Turkey, a recent survey of Kurdish affairs indicates that there has never been official discrimination against Kurds, who have provided prime ministers, millionaires and members of parliament to the country. There is, however, a cultural discrimination: The teaching and writing of Kurdish is banned, and younger Kurds advocating autonomy and independence are carefully watched by the police. There is evidence that the Soviets have encouraged the autonomy of Kurdish Turks (although presumably not of Kurds within the boundaries of the Soviet Union). In Iraq there has been sustained guerrilla warfare against the Baghdad regime, with arms and money supplied in part until 1975 through the Iranian and U.S. governments. One component of the 1978-1979 Iranian revolution was an uprising against garrisoned troops in an effort to gain regional autonomy and official recognition of their cultural and linguistic heritage.[239] Thus, ethnic and sectarian identities are forged and maintained in historically specific economic and political circumstances. As with a range of other attributes of identity, these ideologies have profound practical significance and are actively manipulated, often with requisite cynicism, for reasons of political or economic advantage.

Since ethnic and religious considerations are rarely if ever the sole attribute shared by persons and groups in the Middle East, it is crucial to consider how such social distinctions figure in the overall context of social and personal identity and not to stop at a mosaiclike’enumeration of distinctions such as ethnic group, sect, and occupation which indicate their complexity but which provide no, clear indication of what they mean in practice. An excellent analysis of such identities in a Moroccan context is provided by two complementary articles by Lawrence Rosen, one concerning the significance of “ethnic” distinctions between Arabs and Berbers, the other concerning Muslims and Jews.[240] Both articles deal with politically volatile aspects of cultural notions of self and community. The essential background is as follows. French colonial administrators, first in Algeria in the nineteenth century and subsequently in Morocco, sought to nurture a notion that “Berber” identity was distinct from that of “Arab and Muslim.” It was politically useful for the French to emphasize real and imagined differences of “Berbers” (largely residing in mountainous regions and in Morocco’s south) from the “Arab” society of the towns and agricultural plains, but this turned out to be politically disastrous in some respects. In 1930 the French issued their famous “Berber proclamation” in Morocco which legally excluded regions designated as Berber from the jurisdiction of Islamic law courts. The proclamation set off violent protests in all of Morocco, but nonetheless the French continued to treat the “Berbers” and “Arabs” as antagonistic to the end of their rule, implemented a number of policies regarding military recruitment, local administration, education (“Berbers” were forbidden to learn Arabic in schools, although most students found the means to do so anyway), which were designed to cultivate a distinctly “Berber” elite. The issue continues in many ways to be a delicate one for the present Moroccan government, many of whose French-educated administrators from the urban milieu, even if skeptical of The ideological justifications of French colonial policy, assimilated its basic assumptions concerning the structural divisions of Moroccan society."

Another major identifying axis in Moroccan society, as with other Middle Eastern societies, is that of Muslim and Jew. The Jewish community in Morocco remains one of the largest in the Middle East outside Israel itself, although significant Jewish minorities remain in other Middle Eastern countries as well.[241] A number of recent studies have suggested major cultural similarities between Moroccan Muslims and Jews. As Rosen writes, the status of Jews in the Middle East has historically differed significantly from the status of Jews in Europe and has in some ways been superior. Through the advent of French colonial rule in Morocco, Jews were scattered throughout the country. Many were in larger towns, where they often, but not always, lived in separate quarters called mallah-s', in many of the smaller centers-, regions of Jewish residence were not so sharply set off from their Muslim neighbors.[243] Jews practiced a range of occupations—they were butchers; sellers of charcoal, shoemakers, artisans in gold and silver, money-changers, grain traders, cloth merchants, and itinerant traders in rural regions.[244] Various European Jewish organizations made contact with Jews in Middle Eastern countries in the 1880s, and eventually the Europeans set up Jewish schools and community services of various sorts.

As a consequence of these early efforts and the provision of separate schools for Jews with the establishment of the French protectorate in Morocco, the Jews had a competitive edge in commerce, often serving as the local representatives for European commercial interests and as minor functionaries in the protectorate administration. By the 1930s, primary education

of a European sort became almost universally available to the Jewish community, while in the same period fewer than 2 percent of Moroccan Muslims had access to such education. After 1948 large numbers of Jews began to emigrate, especially from the smaller communities of the interior. A larger wave of emigration, however, began with Morocco's independence in 1956, with wealthier, educated Jews tending to emigrate to North America (especially French-speaking Quebec) and France and those with fewer skills or connections to Israel.

Even during periods of serious crisis, such as during the Second World War when the Vichy regime sought to deport Morocco's Jewish population and that of Tunisia, North African Jews were protected. Morocco's Sultan reminded the French that formerly Morocco was a sovereign nation and that Moroccan Jews were his subjects and had his full protection. The consequence was that Jews of French citizenship were vulnerable and were subject to deportation but not Moroccan Jewish nationals. The same protection of Jews by the Muslim population occurred in Tunisia, and as late as the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, many Moroccan Muslims took steps to ensure the safety of Jewish households with which they had ties.[245]

Now what does the tenor of Muslim-Jewish relations in Morocco have in common with Arab-Berber relations? Rosen's answer is first to indicate ways by which persons in any society can categorize others, using Alfred Schutz's familiar categories of predecessors, successors, consociates ("persons .. . who actually confront one another in intimate face-to-face relations"), and contemporaries (who do not actually confront one another directly but who have a "structural" relationship through stereotyped and anonymous roles).[246] Various cultures emphasize different types of relationships, and Rosen sketches some of the contrasts of Moroccan society, where there is a tendency for persons to seek to turn what Schutz calls ties with contemporaries into ties with consociates—that is, into total social relationships in which relationships with others are rendered stable and more or less predictable through the creation of multiple bonds of obligation. Other patterns predominate in cultures elsewhere, as in Bali where there is a tendency to turn personal relations into those of stereotyped anonymous contemporaries.[247]

Rosen writes that in Moroccan society in general (for "Berbers" as well as "Arabs" and for "Jews" as well as "Muslims"), personal obligations are not prescribed by kinship roles or any other roles. There is a wide, permissible latitude in how bonds, even of kinship, are expressed and a considerable flexibility in how an individual can "actually choose, or contract, particular kinds of relationships with his kinsmen just as, in the absence of strong sanctions to the contrary, he can contract such ties with outsiders.... Like ties of kinship, occupation, residence, and so on, inherent ties to other members of a particular ethnic division contribute to but do not wholly typify a given individual."[248]

Within this general framework the meaning of Berber identity becomes more apparent. Berbers are chiefly distinguished from other Moroccans by the fact that they speak a Berber dialect, but even this feature in itself says little of personal identity. Rosen then.proceeds to

consider patterns of occupation, residence, marriage, urban and rural origin, and other factors to show that distinctions in these areas do not coincide with languages spoken, as well as the modalities of political conduct and ordinary commercial transactions. His analysis bears out his assertion that Berber ethnicity is “only one among a series of factors operative in various situations, and that it serves as only one among a set of social identifiers.”[249] It provides a minimalist, baseline identity when nothing else is known of an individual, but even in the mundane activities of buying and selling, Moroccans immediately proceed to seek to make the bonds of obligations with other individuals more multiplex. In hardly any context is identity as Berber or Arab “an all- pervasive typification in terms of which one views and relates to another person.”[250]

FIGURE 7-3 Berber men and women. High Atlas region, Morocco. (Courtesy Robert A. Fernea.)

Muslim and Jewish relations in Morocco must be considered from the same overall basis in which Moroccans culturally typify most interpersonal ties. As is the case in the distinction between Berbers and Arabs, it is not possible to differentiate Jews and Muslims in terms of the economic roles they play. The major distinctions are instead between urban merchants and Jews on the one hand, with the distinctive social roles they play, and persons of rural and Berber-speaking origin on the other, although even this distinction is not a sharp one. Nor are Jewish traders, artisans, and merchants treated differently in the marketplace than other participants.[251] There is, however, an element of differentiation. Rosen argues that Muslims as a group share a “sociological pool” of “prestige resources” in which there is an intense and open competition among persons which ranges from economic transactions to political and marital ties. Jews in Morocco are placed outside this sociological pool according to Rosen in the sense that few marital ties are possible and their participation in politics is indirect and restrained. Relations of Jews with the Muslim community, both Arab and Berber, were more purely those of financial transactions, without the open-ended competitive ramifications engendered by more diffuse relations among Muslims. As with most other social ties in Moroccan society, those between Muslims and Jews were highly personal; in addition, however, they were noncompetitive in all but the economic sense. Thus a traditional role of Jews was to act as economic intermediaries between townsmen and the rural, tribalized population in central Morocco. Rosen writes that Arabs and Berbers (and Jews) did not risk their social independence. Often the resulting ties could even be characterized as those of friendship. Even with the transformation of Muslim-Jewish relationships which occurred with rapid identification of part of the Jewish community with European ways and economic interests in the colonial period, Jews continued to be treated as face-to-face consociates rather than as “stereotyped contemporaries.”[252]

Rosen’s account of how the meaning of ethnicity should be evaluated and of

FIGURE 7-4 Interior of synagogue, Tunisia, 1972. (Courtesy

Nicholas S. Hopkins.)

the relationship of ethnicity to other forms of social identity applies specifically to the Moroccan context, as ethnic (and sectarian) identity makes sense only when more fundamental and general Moroccan notions of collective identity are taken into account. Yet the strength of such an approach to the study of ethnic identity is in many ways independently confirmed elsewhere in the Middle East, notably by anthropological studies of the social and cultural context of “Oriental” Jews in Israel.

Briefly, here are some essential features of Israeli society as related to the situation of “Oriental” Jews, a term which I use here to designate Jews of North African or Middle Eastern origin, who emigrated to Israel or whose parents did so. Roughly half of Israel’s Jewish population (about 15 percent of the population is Christian and Muslim) consists of Oriental Jews. Because the majority of such immigrants had little educational background and possessed traditional skills that were of minimal use in Israel, they usually were compelled to become manual laborers and agricultural workers. This reduced status and the strong secularizing influence of Israeli society put severe strains upon them. As an aggregate, such immigrants and their children have considerably less success than their counterparts of European origin; their unemployment rates are significantly higher, the number of cabinet members and members of the Knesset (Parliament) is significantly less than their numbers in Israeli society. The same holds true for the number of Oriental Jews in the upper ranks of the military and in the civil service.[253] Israelis are aware of the aggregate disparities between Oriental and European Jews, but it is clear that they are the result of deliberate discrimination. Yet the perception of these relations among Israeli Jews themselves indicates a significant intercommunal problem. In a public opinion poll taken just after the 1967 Six Day War, 84 percent of Israelis thought that intercommunal relations were good; this figure had dropped to 48 percent by 1971,[254]

What does this situation mean for the perception of ethnic identity among Oriental Jews, especially those of North African origin? As one Israeli anthropologist, Shlomo Deshen, reports, Israel’s official immigration policies have been founded upon the notion of the absorption of refugee immigrants and encouraging them to think of themselves principally as Jews.[255] A common pattern has been that immigrants from North Africa at first tend to shed their traditional practices which mark them off from other Jews, but as they face the realities of adjustment in Israel they gradually resume some aspects of their particular identities, such as the publication of folktales and scholastic writings peculiar to their own communities, the support of particular immigrant associations, the production of unleavened bread (matzot) in forms unique to each of their communities, political support

for candidates concerned principally with the problem of immigrants of North African origin, and maintenance of “local” religious practices such as pilgrimages to Jewish saints (in a manner analogous to the visits to marabputic shrines among some of North Africa’s Muslim population). At the same time, the identities which these immigrants seek to project are not simply reconstitutions of identities which they possessed prior to their arrival in Israel. In fact, many immigrants who previously thought of themselves principally as Moroccan, Yemeni, Iraqi, or southern Tunisian Jews now think of themselves in terms of a new category of ethnic identity, that of Orientals. Deshen concludes that the immigrants “are making a stand for certain elements of their culture which they have retained and want to nurture. They seek to identify themselves also in autonomous subethnic terms, but they want that identification to be within the bonds of their overarching identity as Israelis.”[256] These symbolic transformations of the meaning of ethnicity are comprehensive in terms of the specific historical circumstances in which they operate. Ethnic identities forged in other, earlier contexts in Tunisia, Morocco, and elsewhere are the base from which subsequent transformations of these systems of meaning occur: “The derivation is there, even if continuity is most tenuous and subtle; and often it is quite overt.”[257]

Several conclusions can be drawn from the various studies of ethnic and sectarian identities discussed so far. First, ethnic identities, like linguistic, sectarian, national, family, and other forms of social definition can be comprehended only in the context of more general cultural assumptions made in a given society concerning the nature of the social world and social relationships. Sex roles, ethnicity, kinship and the like are all simultaneous components of social identity and cannot meaningfully be analyzed independently of more general shared underlying assumptions. Second, such identities must be analyzed in the specific historical contexts in which they are maintained, transformed, and reproduced, and not as blocklike units in an ahistorical mosaic. The theoretical points of departure of contemporary studies of ethnicity vary widely: from an emphasis primarily upon ethnicity as embedded in a system of social meanings (Rosen and Deshen) to ethnicity and sectarianism as principally a product of global economic and political circumstances (most of the contributors to the Joseph and Pillsbury volume). Nonetheless, the majority of the current studies recognize that research into notions of identity entails attention to both cultural meanings and the practical contexts in which they are produced. Anthropologists like other scholars concerned with social theory are not in a position to produce comprehensive schema for indicating the precise interrelationships between economic and political transformations and the ideologies of society and social identity maintained in them. But they recognize that both of these dimensions must be carefully analyzed and that systems of meaning cannot be treated as if they were unchanging, as they have been treated in the past and have sometimes been presumed to be in “native” ideologies. A final observation might be treated as a corollary to the above. Ethnic distinctions, like those of region, sect, sex, language, and even tribe, are not necessarily being erased, as an earlier generation of analysts once facilely assumed, but provide the base from which newer social distinctions are forged and maintained.[258] Even when there is a popular consensus or a desire among intellectual and political leaders to facilitate the reshaping of identities and responsibilities, be these in muting the importance of ethnic or sectarian identities or transforming the roles of women and men in society, the point of departure from which such transformations are made must be considered in assessing their direction and tenor.[259] Some governments and political leaders often seek to ease possible tensions that arise from making such group definitions by denying their

existence, but it would appear more reasonable to recognize them for what they are and constructively seek to harness them. Shared notions of community by ethnic group or region often can provide the basis of trust and solidarity necessary for effective functioning of and participation in modern industrial society.[260]

** 8. The Cultural Order of Complex Societies

*** World View

Institutions such as kinship, community, tribe, responsibility, and trust are subjectively held ideas about social relations shared by members of a society and embodied in rules, customs, symbolic actions such as ritual, and most everyday actions. Such patterns of meaning have been analyzed by some anthropologists as parts of formal systems of classification and symbol systems. For some purposes a formalist approach which is not concerned with social action is entirely legitimate. A complementary approach, emphasized throughout this book, focuses upon how meanings emerge, from a social practice.[261] Patterns of meaning are generated in the everyday world of social experience, shape that experience, and in turn are modified by it. This emphasis upon the production of meaning through practice (praxis in the vocabulary of some theorists) sets apart most contemporary analyses of world view (shared cultural assumptions concerning the nature of the social world) from those earlier studies that were primarily concerned with the “logical fit” among the key symbols of a cultural tradition. Notions of world view overlap with and build upon more specific conceptions such as family, community, ethnicity, and sexuality discussed in Chapters 5 through 7, but differ in that they are more explicitly integrative and comprehensive.

The idea that cultural meanings are socially produced has been introduced in the last few chapters through the discussion of specific topics such as tribe, kinship, the use of genealogies, sex roles, and ethnicity. I have stressed that these specific topics can be comprehended analytically only through the matrix of social definitions of reality through which everyday life and actions become subjectively meaningful to Middle Easterners themselves. The elaboration of concepts of world view in the Middle East, as opposed to how world views (or cosmologies, as many English anthropologists use the term) are represented in “primitive” societies, is in the context of historically known societies. The concepts which comprise particular systems of meaning, by being considered Islamic or otherwise universal, are not contained by the frontiers of any particular country, tribal group, or other social division. These concepts change historically in relation to the political and economic circumstances in which they are elaborated; any accounting of them must take account of the patterns in such variations.

As with any sociological study, prior approaches to the understanding of world view or, as it has often been called in the past, “national character,” must also be taken into account. In the past, the national character of a particular region was sometimes considered to be virtually unchanging. The attitudes and practices of Egyptian peasants of the twentieth century were thought to be nearly directly similar to those of Pharaonic times.[262] Such portraits of changelessness could be used to justify colonial domination. French colonial ethnographers drew upon those elements of European social thought which emphasized the fixed “primitive mentalities” of certain populations as one means of legitimizing the colonial enterprise. Handbooks prepared for European teachers of Moroccan children emphasized the fixed values and traditions of Moroccans, disregarding the impact of European domination and economic penetration. Such guides advised that “respect” for religious and social beliefs and practices required European teachers to limit what they conveyed to their students, so that education could not be used as a means of transforming what was conceived to be the “traditional” social hierarchy, the status of women, or other sensitive topics.[263] France’s “civilizing mission,” to use the phrase of the epoch, had its clear limits. Comparable accounts of “Oriental” character were prepared for areas under English colonial domination. As Edward Said and others rightly insist, the “mosaic” representations of Middle Eastern societies that deliberately avoid discussion of the impact of political and economic changes lend themselves readily to such assumptions, as do vague assertions concerning the “Arab mind” or “Islamic thought.”[264]

Contemporary anthropological discussions of world view are at once more ambitious and more limited in scope. They are more limited in that they do not assume that such representations are shared in quite the same way by all members of a given society, let alone from one end of the Arab and Middle Eastern world to the other. They do not purport to represent all implicit shared understandings, but only those most related to the comprehension of particular patterns of social action—the bazaar economy, kinship, participation in maraboutic (“saintly”) cults, friendship, and lying, to mention only the specific examples that will be elaborated in this and later chapters.

The more ambitious aspect of contemporary analyses of world view is that they seek to articulate those taken-for-granted attitudes and values that make everyday social action possible; social conventions that are so deeply rooted that they flow almost automatically. As Lloyd Fallers has written, an anthropologist interested in analyzing such basic assumptions must learn to cultivate

especially the receptive side of communication—the ability to spend most of one’s time listening instead of speaking, watching instead of acting; he learns to remember and to record in great detail what he sees and hears. These are difficult disciplines requiring rigorous training for academic intellectuals, who usually would rather talk than listen and who find boring or repulsive what they see as the “trivia” of ordinary life, particularly in their own societies.[265]

Taken together, such “trivia” documents a set of “natural” assumptions concerning the social world. These assumptions, which are felt to be “natural" and not “conventional,” are constructed and transformed through social practice and made up of everyday, incompletely systematized common-sense understandings of how the world “really" is.[266] Under ordinary conditions these basic assumptions form the implicit background against which social action is planned and carried out and are so taken for granted that they are not fully articulated by members of a society. Special frames of reference, such as formal religious ideologies, specialized knowledge of commerce and crafts, medicine, political strategies, and the interpretation of dreams, are elaborated against the background of such understandings.

Anthropologists have had different, albeit largely complementary, concerns in the elaboration of systems of world view. Some scholars have been particularly concerned with the logico -meaningful relations among the cultural assumptions which comprise particular world views. Others, while not neglecting this task, have paid particular attention to analyzing how such basic assumptions toward the social world are related to changing economic and political conditions. Because such implicit understandings are not fully systematized they cannot be represented as neatly organized “cognitive maps”; there is a meaningful fit among the assumptions which comprise particular world views, but the fit is best represented as jagged and uneven. In any case, what we hypothesize about any particular world view is documented by the fragmentary and often inconsistent outward actions and statements of persons in a given society . The ultimate test of an adequate description of world view, therefore, consists of its ability to render intelligible wide varieties of behavior in a given society. Many recent studies have sought to depict such matrices of cultural meaning and to place them in the context of historical and sociopolitical change. An assessment of the basic approaches used in the study of world view serves to tie together the discussion of the preceding three chapters and forms an essential backdrop to the discussion in later chapters of religion, politics, and the economy.

*** Morocco: God’s Will, Reason, and Obligation

Several anthropologists have used their various ethnographic studies of Morocco in the 1960s and early 1970s as a basis for exploring complementary aspects of the notions of world view and culture. Most of the resulting publications have also addressed wider issues, so they form a useful point of departure for discussing the theoretical significance of ideas of world view and their importance to the study of the Middle East.

A brief analysis of the relevant sections of my Moroccan Islam suggests some of the decisions facing an anthropologist in any discussion of world view. In that study, I sought to indicate the implicit set of cultural assumptions through which Moroccans make sense of the local interpretations of Islam and of transformations in these interpretations, especially over the last century. I worked with the initial assumption, shared for the most part with the participants in the study of Sefrou and its region—Clifford Geertz, Hildred

Geertz, Lawrence Rosen, and Paul Rabinow —that Morocco's social structure was best conceived with persons as its fundamental units, rather than their attributes or status as members of groups.[267] Moreover, persons are not arranged in layerlike strata or classes but are linked in dyadic bonds of subordination and domination which are characteristically dissolved and re-formed. The relatively stable element in this type of social structure is not the patterns that actual social relations form but the culturally accepted means by which persons contract and maintain dyadic bonds and obligations with one another.[268]

How is such an implicit notion of the social order made to appear natural and taken-for-granted to Moroccans themselves?[269] In a chapter entitled "Impermanence and Inequality: The Common-Sense Understanding of the Social Order," I sought to delineate five of the key concepts through which Moroccans comprehend social experience. These five concepts were God's will (qudrat Allah), reason (^cqal), propriety (hshumiya), obligation (haqq), and compulsion (^car).[270] The emphasis given to these five concepts rather than others was admittedly arbitrary in the sense that any description of world view is largely shaped by the range of social action that it attempts to render meaningful. Had my study concerned notions of sexuality rather than religious ideologies, for example, then emphasis would have been placed on other sets of Moroccan concepts that in my account were treated only in a subordinate fashion.

There is a problem of boundaries to these concepts in two senses. In the first sense, I deliberately used the term Moroccan rather than the name of the particular locale in which I worked, for my experience in research elsewhere in Morocco (and in trying out my formulations on interested Moroccans) suggested that with regional nuances, the same ideas applied elsewhere and in all likelihood did not stop abruptly at the country's frontiers. Indeed, many of the basic Moroccan assumptions concerning the social world are expressed in the form of Islamic ideas that are hardly unique to Morocco or to North Africa.

In the second sense of boundary, the concepts which comprise a world view are not in a fixed relation to one another. They are maintained insofar as they are actualized by individuals and meaningfully explain and render coherent action in the social world. When they cease to do so, they shift in emphasis. This flexibility accounts for their ability to accommodate and accounts for major shifts in the loci of economic and political power. Notions such as God's will and reason, for instance, have rich historical layers of meaning and are used elsewhere in the Muslim world. Both of the terms occur in the Quran and have been the subject of an interesting study of the world view of seventh-century Arabs, as well as an account of changing perceptions of the world in northern Sumatra.[271] The occurrence of these terms in Morocco is not unique, but they appear in a different semantic field, although in ordinary contexts most Moroccans never consider the possibility that these notions could be understood in any way but their own. Indeed, the fact that these implicit notions are tacitly construed by Moroccans as Islamic, as well as human universals, makes the resulting vision of the world all the more reasonable and compelling to them.

Let me briefly sketch how these key notions articulate with each other. God's will is a basic notion for Moroccans. Any expression of future actions or events is almost inevitably prefaced by saying "if God wills" (in sha' Allah), which is also tied to the notion of "that which is written" (maktub). French colonial ethnography glossed this notion as "Islamic fatalism," suggesting a Moroccan passivity and resignation toward the events of this world. This interpretation was congruent with the colonizing power's image of Moroccans but is almost exactly opposite to the way in which Moroccans themselves implicitly use the term. Let us consider the notions of social structure described earlier. For Moroccans, the inequality of men in this world is so matter-of-fact as not to be a matter of speculation. The actual state of affairs in this world at any moment is a manifestation of God's will; being inevitable, it cannot be questioned. An understanding of one's present social situation in terms of God's will legitimizes the momentary—and ephemeral—distribution of social honor as the God-given state of affairs. Men are free to take the world as it Is and to determine action on the basis of their empirical observations. God's will attenuates speculation on why particular projects succeed or fail and blocks metaphysical speculation on the fate of the individual in this world. The wide-awake, common-sense person is much more concerned with adjusting to circumstances as they arise than with considering how things might have been or should be. Pro- visionality, the acceptance of God's will, thus focuses attention upon assessing exact differentials of wealth, success, power, and social honor among particular men as a prelude to effective, specific social action, not upon speculation over the general order of the world. A corollary to this notion is that the responsibility of persons for one another is limited. There are abstract, normative obligations incumbent upon each Muslim, but how the obligations which arise from particular ties are valued varies significantly. Here is how one educated Moroccan explained to me the limits of one person's responsibility toward another:

God created differences among people. . .. Let people do as they want. God distinguishes between them. A Muslim's duty is just to show people the path to those who wish to be with God, and that is that. Either they take it or they leave it. The Prophets allow them the choice. There is paradise and there is hell, and God will select who goes to each.[272]

Linked to the notion of God's will is that of reason, a notion already introduced in the discussion of sexuality in Chapter 7. In Morocco and elsewhere in the Muslim world, the concept of reason is more explicitly tied to social context than is our own use of the term. Reason in the Moroccan context is primarily the capacity to discern the meanings of the actions of other people and, on the basis of such perceptions, to engage in effective social action. Reason signifies adroitness or cleverness (without the pejorative English connotations of these terms) more than a capacity for dealing with abstract rational phenomena. Its possession assumes a capacity to perceive the empirical ties between persons and to adapt them to one's own interests as best as possible, within the shared code of conduct of society. Reason enables a person to perceive what will pass as acceptable and approved conduct in the management of social obligations to kinsmen, neighbors, merchants, Clients, men of influence, and men without.

The word for reason, ^cqal, comes from an Arabic root which also means “confinement” or “control.” It implies an ability of persons to dominate their passions and to act as Muslims. Children are said not to possess reason because they do not yet know the Islamic law and code of conduct. Although Moroccans are highly affectionate toward their children, they say that at birth children are like animals, because only gradually do they acquire the code of conduct and the ability to abide by it that distinguishes them from animals. As children begin to participate in the fast of Ramadan and to assume adult patterns of comportment, they are attributed with reason. Similarly, as was pointed out in Chapter 7, reason is popularly considered to be more fully developed in men than in women. This is not due entirely to any innate masculine capacity but to the fact that women’s activities are confined primarily to the household and its immediate milieu. Hence a woman’s ability to engage in a wide range of social relations and to have full control over expression of her passions is considered to be less than that of a man. Some women are attributed a full capacity for reason, usually when high social class, education, or other circumstances enable them to participate effectively in the wider social world. One Moroccan explained the general difference between the sexes as follows:

A man will think. He sees a quarrel leading to [court]; he knows that the other man has more “pull” with the [court] than he does. He knows how to deal with people bigger and weaker than he is. A woman is light-headed. She doesn’t know how to do these things. If she goes to the [government offices], who pays attention to her? Better that she stay at home, where she can teach her daughters to cook and sew. They don’t know Islam like men do; they even have tricks to avoid fasting.[273]

In the same way that women are collectively considered to be deficient in reason, townsmen often claim that tribesmen are deficient because of their relative lack of skill in dealing with the government and merchants.

The notion of reason is clearly linked to the Islamic code of conduct in the complex symbolism associated with Ramadan, the month of fasting. The ability of Muslims to follow the arbitrary pattern of the fast and to refrain (among other restrictions upon appetites) from food and drink from dawn to dusk for one month each year is taken as a key metaphor by which men can discipline their desires in accordance with the arbitrary code of conduct laid down by God. Men’s capacity to follow the divine model reaffirms that they are not bound by their passions to live in a totally anarchic world. The five ritual daily prayers also symbolize the divine template for conduct, but Ramadan is recognized as a more intensive, sustained discipline of human nature and as an opportunity for the collective exercise of selfcontrol that signals the possession of reason.

Obligation (haqq) fits into the same pattern of comprehension of the social world. Men cannot control God’s allocation of success and prestige, but they can render the actions of others more predictable by contracting and maintaining bonds of obligation. In the Moroccan context all exchanges, invitations to meals, services as intermediaries, and even

offers of rides in a car are seen as obligations which must be reciprocated. Some obligations are minimally prescribed by Islamic law and “the way things are done,” such as certain obligations toward kinsmen and communal religious ties. These obligations can be fulfilled within a wide latitude of acceptable conduct. Even exchanges of greetings, with their complex code of gestures and manners, impose obligations, since they publicly assert what one person would like the other, and observers, to think regarding their relations.

If a person repeatedly asks for a service to be rendered but is incapable of reciprocating, then he falls into a client relationship with the other person. The dominant partner in the relationship is said to hold an “obligation over” (haqq ^cla) or “word” (kalma) over the other. The complex web of personally contracted bonds of obligation are always asymmetrical, just as all relationships impose obligations of calculable intensity. Exchanges of obligations can be very finely tuned. There is a carefully nuanced vocabulary for the discussion of gradations in them which depends upon a wide range of such factors as education, wealth, kinship ties, and networks of obligations held or thought to be held over others.

In general, the reasonable individual strives for flexibility in relations in which he is under obligation to others, while at the same time fixing as firmly as possible relations in which he holds obligations “over” other individuals. Since by God’s will the social world is viewed as in constant flux, an individual strives to be as free as possible to change the weight of obligations within his personal network, yet to remain within the bounds' of| propriety (hshumiya) or acceptable social conduct.

Compulsion (^car), the fifth of the concepts which I sketched in my original presentation, is a special sort of impossible obligation which provides culturally accepted means of mending serious breaks in the web of obligations which bind men together. Essentially, it involves such a profound public effacement of the person or group seeking to oblige another to act in a certain way or to restore ordinary social relations so that refusal to accede risks divine punishment and severe social disapproval. (For examples, see pp. 132-33 and 185-86.)

Taken as a group, all of these five concepts are logically articulated with one another and form a major part of the backdrop against which social relationships are elaborated. There is nothing fixed about these assumptions; some people question them some of the time, but most of the time they are accepted as an adequate and necessary base for daily social conduct and the assessment of the actions of others. These interrelated notions as a group cannot be extended to cover other societies in the Middle East; although, as previously mentioned, some of the concepts figure elsewhere in modified form and in different conceptual contexts.

*** North Africans in Israel

A particularly useful approach toward understanding how basic shared assumptions concerning the social world are modified is through the reanalysis of monographs concerning North African Jewish immigrants in Israel, a topic raised in a different context in Chapter 7. Israeli immigration policy has in many cases sought to “transplant” entire communities of North African Jews, so that villages in North Africa have been reconstituted in Israel and have clearly had to undergo rapid social and environmental change there.

An outstanding example of this genre of study is Moshe Shokeid’s The Dual Heritage.[274] As opposed to some of Shokeid’s later work, in which he is explicitly concerned with changing cultural values, The Dual Heritage is concerned primarily with social change, so some background is necessary to adapt his study to the present discussion of world view. Shokeid uses the sociological notion of reference situation, a complex of values appropriate to a past (or different) situation which continues to be used to discern social order in a novel context. The reference situation for the residents of the Israeli immigrant community he studied was their former village of some 350 persons, located in Morocco’s High Atlas mountains to the east of Marrakesh. To specify the nature of what he terms the reference situation, Shokeid attempts to reconstruct the social organization of this community as it once existed.[275]

For an anthropologist who has studied contemporary Muslim communities in North Africa, the reanalysis of Shokeid’s monograph is fascinating for what it reveals of similarities in shared notions of society between North African Muslim and Jewish communities. The Jewish community studied by Shokeid possessed a myth of how they came to be settled where they were in the High Atlas. He speculates that a quarrel may have led to the splitting apart in the nineteenth century of an earlier village. The event is recalled by the villagers in mythical form: A leading rabbi informed their ancestors not to emigrate to the new location until a fountain was discovered under a tree near the site where they later constructed their synagogue. An analogous type of settlement myth is told by Muslims in various parts of Morocco to account for the location of their villages.[276]

This particular North African Jewish village was surrounded by villages of Berber-speaking Muslims, and the social structure of the Jewish community appears to have significantly resembled that of their Muslim neighbors. Shokeid acknowledges that the memories of the past of the villagers now in Israel are somewhat idealized, so that their recollection of “permanent insecurity” is probably not quite accurate. However, the region was unquestionably insecure at the time of French entry into the area and later, at the announcement in late 1955 of Morocco’s imminent independence, there was a threat of renewed disorder which contributed to the departure of most of the community for Israel in 1956.[277]

Shokeid’s account of the internal differentiation of the community indicates that in the High Atlas mountains and later in Israel it was divided into patronymic groupings or agnatic

clusters, each claiming descent from a common ancestor, a pattern also common to rural and urban Muslims in Morocco.[278] He states that in Morocco these groupings were stratified, with the one possessing the most influential political and economic contacts on the top, skilled itinerant craftsmen next, and the unskilled at the bottom.

On arriving in Israel, the settlers were first assigned to a settlement called Yashuv, organized by one of Israel's leading socialist parties. The first settlement did not succeed for a number of reasons. Representatives of several of Israel's religious parties told the Moroccan settlers that their sponsors were antireligious, would compel their daughters to serve in the army where they would lose their virtue, and would not allow their sons to study the Torah. Additionally there were scandals concerning the allocation of wage labor which resulted in demonstrations and some violence. In 1957 a large number of the settlers moved to Romema, another settlement in the Negev, the principal locus of Shokeid's field study.[279]

According to Shokeid's account, the villagers from the three principal patronymic groupings saw themselves as a single cooperating entity upon their arrival in the Negev. Yet their intention of communal cooperation collapsed when they began to dispute over the allocation of leadership positions. Shokeid argues that the traditional hierarchical stratification of the three patronymic groupings in Morocco broke down in the new situation of the Negev, which was more conducive to egalitarian relations. In fact, by 1958-1959, Israeli settlement officials thought of writing off Romema as a failure and again moving some of the villagers, but by then it was difficult to shift immigrants to new locations.

In reading Shokeid's intricate description of the political maneuvers for land allocations and political office in Romema, I was struck repeatedly by the similarity of his account to those of my own and others describing contemporary local politics in Morocco.[280] The principal alliances were not necessarily along the lines of patronymic groups but along the lines of any available kinship or other form of relationship which could be used as the basis for concerted action.[281] Shokeid acknowledges that kinship relationships in themselves did not necessarily induce cooperation. Only when there were other social links or economic factors or common economic interests did cooperation actually occur.

Perhaps the best indication of the villagers' notion of community is their conception of,the committee which was organized to run their agricultural colony (moshav). The immigrants' use of Hebrew was admittedly imperfect, but the errors they made appear to have accurately reflected their conceptions. Shokeid explains that the proper way in Hebrew to refer to a member of the moshav governing committee was to call him haveir va'ad, "a member of the committee." The committee itself was va'ad. But the villagers consistently referred to this committee as va'adim, "committees," and to each committee member as va'ad, "a committee." The implication of this linguistic fact and of other documentation introduced by Shokeid was that each committee member in himself

represented a committee. Shokeid's conclusion is that each committee member, instead of drawing his status from the fact that he belonged to the committee, contributed his status to the committee. He documents this interpretation through a detailed analysis of how the committee handled the allocation of water during a shortage.[282]

The situation in Romema which Shokeid describes is congruent with the Moroccan notion of social structure in which the basic components of social structure are persons rather than groups and in which the stable cultural element is the means by which persons secure bonds with each other. One of his key examples is an incident in which a member of a lower-status patronymic association kissed the cheek of a higher-status group member on Yom Kippur in a gesture implying "humility and observance of the Jewish moral code." The gesture deprived the higher-status person of the opportunity to demonstrate his superiority through a public display of generosity and forgiveness. In fact, the upper-status man commented that the other man, "who had been his employee in Morocco, was now trying to lord it over him."[283] The entire incident, as with other incidents documented in Shokeid's account, easily makes sense in terms of the notions of obligation (and the constant renegotiation of social status implied by the manipulation of obligations) and the notion of compulsion as they are comprehended in the context of Morocco. Other accounts of immigrant communities of Moroccan origin in Israel, although not intended as analyses of underlying cultural assumptions, also imply similar background values.[284]

Let me suggest what I regard to be an appropriate reinterpretation of Shokeid's analytic framework, made possible by the quality of his ethnographic documentation. Shokeid concentrates upon idealized patterns of social interaction and tends in The Dual Heritage not to analyze underlying cultural values. Significantly, although he occasionally refers to past conflict and strife, he gives no elaborate examples of them. By juxtaposing an idealized past to a present in which the lines of conflict do not follow normative statements concerning the unity of patronymic groups, he concludes that the immigrants suffered a "breakdown" of their prior community.[285] I would alternatively argue that Shokeid's account demonstrates a marked continuity of values and of assumptions concerning interpersonal obligations, an interpretation supported by his passing remark in the conclusion that most Romemites were "fairly modem" in their economic comportment (and adaptation to political life in Israel), despite the fact that "on the whole, their value system hardly changed" and that the "new" forms of behavior were legitimized "within the traditional set of norms."[286]

*** The Market as a Cultural Form

A particularly intensive discussion of the economic dimension of cultural values is contained in a recent study of the bazaar (suq in Arabic) economy of a Moroccan town by Clifford Geertz.[287] The strategy of discussing economic activities as opposed to religious or political ones as a means of furthering cultural analysis is particularly appropriate

because some economists still treat economic activity as if it were isolable from cultural considerations. Geertz's intention is to sketch the bazaar as a theoretical notion implying certain processes as general as those associated with the ideal type of "industrial" and "primitive" economies. He concurrently treats the bazaar as a concrete institution situated in a particular cultural and historical setting.[28]

As a cross-cultural type, the bazaar economy possesses a number of distinctive characteristics that set it apart from other economic forms. Among them is the prevalence of small-scale enterprises with an intense division of labor, the lack of standardization of products, weights and measures, the preference for partnership agreements over employer-employee ones, the importance of negotiating skills (which predominate over managerial or technical ones), weak or informal government controls, the lack of hierarchical coordination of enterprises, the exploration of economic possibilities in depth with a few selected trading partners rather than a diversity of them, and the personal contract as the main form of legal relationship.[29] The information needed to function effectively in the bazaar is "generally poor, scarce, maldistributed, inefficiently communicated, and intensely valued."[30] The search for information is so important a characteristic of the bazaar that "a great deal of the way in which the bazaar is organized and functions .. . can be interpreted as either an attempt to reduce such ignorance for someone, increase it for someone, or defend someone against it."[31] Consequently the principal prob-

FIGURE 8-1 Commercial street near market, Sefrou, Morocco. (Courtesy of the author.)

[28] Oifford Geertz, "Suq," p. 124.

[39] Ibid., Table 13, pp. 214-15.

[30] Ibid., p. 124.

[31] Ibid., p. 125.

lem for participants in the bazaar economy "is not balancing options but finding out what they are."[288] Thus ignorance is a known (or known about) characteristic of the bazaar, not just a matter of some participants lacking certain information, and buyers and sellers are aware of this fact. Geertz emphasizes that these various characteristics of the bazaar are not random occurrences but imply each other and together form a coherent system.

Bazaar economies are found in a number of different social historical and cultural settings—Iranian, Moroccan, Chinese, Indonesian, and Mexican, to suggest only a few. Despite their overall similarity in some respects, Geertz's major argument is that there are equally important differences which make it imperative to comprehend each bazaar economy in its particular cultural setting. In the Moroccan case, his argument is that the bazaar is enmeshed in at least three key institutional frameworks. These are detailed in Geertz's presentation, so here it is necessary merely to suggest their wide scope. First is the involvement of the bazaar economy with the "ethniclike" distinctions of nisba identity, discussed in Chapter 7, in which a person can be referred to by a number of overlapping attributes of origin, craft, membership in a religious brotherhood, or other characteristics.[289]

Second is the association of the bazaar economy with popular Islam. One aspect of this association is the system of pious endowments (habus). Many urban shops are habus properties, whose revenues are used for various religious activities. The Ministry supervising these endowments is one of the town's largest landowners.[290] A principal benefit of these habus holdings to the trading community is that the rents for these properties are kept well below market value, largely because of the wishes of the trading community itself. Another aspect of the tiesbetween bazaar and Islam is that the practice of many crafts and trades is associated with participation in certain religious orders, and the fortunes of both appear to have prospered in the period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the "region-focusing" bazaar economy in the town studied by Geertz began to crystallize and prosper.

A final consideration spelled out by Geertz was the role of the Jewish community in Sefrou in connecting the regional market of the town with local ones around it. Jews, many of whom were involved in commerce, constituted 40 percent of the Sefrou population toward the turn of the century. In the marketplace, as stated earlier, the activities of Jews were not distinguishable from those of Muslims. Yet there were two distinct roles played by Jewish participants in the trading community. One was to serve as intermediaries in the form of itinerant traders between Berber-speaking tribesmen of the Middle Atlas mountains and the Arab speakers of the plains. The other was for a few of the wealthier Jews both to control the marginal Jewish traders and to serve as sources of financing for the

FIGURE 8-2 Itinerant Jewish vendor of clothes and cloth goods (foreground) at market, Tunisia, 1972. (Courtesy Nicholas S. Hopkins.)

bazaar economy, 'before moving on to the economic opportunities later provided by association with "modern" European commerce in the period of the French protectorate. Geertz merely speculates on why Jews may have filled this intermediary role. He writes that part of the answer may have been their relative political impotence, meaning that their ambitions could be expected to be confined to the economic domain.[291] Geertz's

emphasis throughout is upon patterns of “fit” between institutional arrangements and their associated cultural values.

A final, and crucial, element of Geertz’s account involves study of the vocabulary used by Moroccans for speaking about and making sense of life in the bazaar. For Geertz, “the flow of words and the flow of values are not two things; they are two aspects of the same thing.”[292] Notions of “news,” “crowds,” “trust,” “friendship,” “validity,” “custom” and “convention,” “reason,” “understanding,” and other key terms are presented and analyzed as a means of invoking the “conceptual world” through which the activities of the bazaar are carried out.

In sketching the principal features of Geertz’s approach to the analysis of the Moroccan bazaar as cultural form, little has been said of the social historical context in which such activities take place. On the one hand, his ethnographic presentation documents historical transformations of the political and economic contexts in which the bazaar economy existed as meticulously as oral history and written sources allow. On the other hand, Geertz states that since 1900 “the cultural framework within which the homely business of buying and selling proceeds, the conceptual structure that gives it point and form, has altered but in detail.”[293]

FIGURE 8-3 "The flow of words and the flow of values are not two things; they are two aspects of the same thing." Market street, Mutrah, Sultanate of Oman. (Courtesy of the author.)

This may be so, but if indeed the “cultural framework” has remained so constant in the face of significant political and economic changes, then this is an important analytical insight of the nature of cultural values which deserves to be elaborated with the same intensity that Geertz applies to eliciting how the bazaar economy is comprehended and elaborated in the Moroccan context.[294] The silence of Geertz’s analysis concerning how systems of cultural ideas change notwithstanding, his study remains a major contribution to comprehending the web of cultural meanings through which trading and associated activities in Morocco are carried out and provides an important complement to his studies of other dimensions of the concept of culture.

*** Lying

The studies of world view considered so far in this chapter took the analysis of particular social institutions—Islam as popularly interpreted, community leadership, and the bazaar—as their point of departure. Gilsenan’s study of lying (kizb) in Lebanon takes a key cultural concept as his point of departure and indicates how it is tied to and produced by social interaction. He argues that lying is a fundamental element of specific situations and

individual actions which serves to restrict the social distribution of knowledge over time. Thus it is woven into the system of power and control present in any society. Its presence creates an uncertainty as to the precise degree of lying or truth present in a given situation.[295] The analogy with the “search for information” described by Geertz for Morocco’s bazaar economy and associated institutions is evident.

Gilsenan explains that kizb is an everyday word in Lebanon and that from childhood on persons invest a good deal of time in learning the sport of deceiving others. But the practice of kizb would be misconstrued if read merely as a negative value or as wordplay. A constant theme in Lebanese society is recognition of an essential tension between “appearance” and “reality.” Kizb possesses “its own aesthetic of baroque invention and is part of a style, of a wide range of variations on the cultural theme of appearance and reality, and is recognized at once [by Lebanese] for what it is.” Here Gilsenan’s approach indicates the anthropological rediscovery of how literature and the imagination are linked to cultural constructions of reality.[296]

Lebanese, writes Gilsenan, recognize that access to the true and real are through the Quran and the teachings of Islam, although men recognize that they spend much of their time ignoring it and actively lying. Echoing the phrase of Max Weber, he consequently sets out to document the “elective affinity” between the ideology of lying and social practice in northern Lebanon. He focuses upon the two domains of social honor and religious knowledge. In the domain of social honor, he first describes the social organization of Lebanese villages with the patterns of lords or strongmen (za^cim-s) and their followers. The normative code of social honor in Lebanon is public and uncompromising in its simplicity. In normative terms, the line between honor and dishonor is sharply drawn and prescribes direct, violent action in the case of offense. In practice, to preserve a reasonable balance of social order, Gilsenan argues that Lebanese invest considerable effort in creating ambiguities over how situations can be defined. The collective exercise of kizb manages to avoid confrontation by preserving the appearance that public honor is satisfied so that social life can go on. Those who persist in defining situations in terms of challenge and response threaten collective interests and consequently tend to be ignored or redefined as hotheads or “mad” so that their definition of events can be disregarded.[297] A parallel situation exists in the domain of religious knowledge, where the perception of who are real men of learning or miracle-producing shaykh-s depends upon the judgments and attributions made by relevant others as to who knows, or can discern the apparent from the true.[298]

Gilsenan’s discussion of lying, as with the other elaborations of Middle Eastern world views considered here, looks at complex social situations and the cultural values through which they are constructed. A particularly promising line of argument is his sustained attention to the practical elaboration of social meanings. In addition to evoking the “logical fit” between social action and meaning, he sets himself the ambitious task of at least pointing to the problem of what happens to meaning in circumstances of major political and economic change. He argues that the economic and political bases upon which traditional elaborations

of social honor were based have been undercut in recent years. As leaders have managed to purchase more and more land to consolidate their position and tie others to them, families have lost their autonomy, so that competition over honor reflects less and less the realities of power and social structure. “The cars, tractors, and harvesters that [younger men] drive and the guns that they carry belong to others, not to them.”[299] The ensuing notion of work becomes more a “false” consciousness which masks a situation that more and more persons consciously recognize. These matters are not just ones of style, Gilsenan concludes, for the “ultimate stake” is the definition of who you are, of self.[300]

*** Etiquette

In a practical sense, the best means of advancing discussion of the background conventions and assumptions that make possible the routines of daily life is through the analysis of concrete examples. It has been argued that each culture has at its core a set of common-sense assumptions about reality. These assumptions are usually not regarded as complete, but as sufficient to conduct the ordinary business of life. For this reason, turns of phrase, bodily movements, styles of dress, and patterns of etiquette are all valuable indicators of what these underlying assumptions are.

Within countries as complex as Lebanon, Iran, many of the Arab Gulf states, and Turkey, there is a recognizable diversity of personal and collective interests and beliefs, the commingling of which requires exercise of the virtues of civility, a collective self-restraint, and willingness to coexist with other persons and groups even if they do not share all basic assumptions about the conduct of daily affairs. Moreover, such basic assumptions are not fixed, and fortunately stereotyped metaphors such as “the Arab mind” and “the French mentality” are beginning to disappear from educated usage.

Still, it remains true that there are styles of social conduct indicating such background assumptions specific to particular cultural groups. Anyone who has conducted international negotiations realizes that one of their most difficult components is not what is formally said but the informal nuances of what is not said formally that figure significantly into the development of or lack of common trust necessary for satisfactory agreement. Gestures and complexes of beliefs form coherent rhetorical patterns. To take several obvious examples, for Americans (except New Yorkers?), normal conversational distance is about 3-4 feet apart, with closer distances corresponding to greater degrees of intimacy and greater ones suggesting more formality. Deans, business executives, ambassadors, and other high-status persons often have large desks not out of practical necessity but implicitly to modulate distance with visitors. Such functionaries usually also have couches and less formal seating arrangements (and hidden liquor cabinets) which can set an appropriate tone of lesser formality upon occasion and convey this informality by distance and setting. Among most Middle Easterners, by contrast, normal conversational distance is closer than 2-3 feet, a proximity at which many Americans begin to feel uncomfortable. Male friends or even relative strangers on good terms in the Middle East and Mediterranean will

frequently hold hands or touch during conversation, without such gestures conveying the sexual intimacy that they are often thought to convey in American contexts. Similarly, notions of time and how long a person can be kept waiting have cultural registers capable of subtle reading and orderly interpretation. Successful negotiators in international contexts tend to develop a flair for empirically comprehending such background assumptions; they may not possess the ability to articulate such assumptions, as is necessary for the anthropological analysis of them, but nonetheless acquire a practical mastery over them and over the delightfully complex problem of how these contrasting codes are practically intermingled.[301]

Older ethnographic accounts such as Lane’s Manners and Customs of the Modem Egyptians remain valuable for analyzing such assumptions. His discussions of greetings, for example, can be easily reinterpreted so that his model of a rigid social hierarchy determining the forms of Cairene society can be replaced by one which indicates more clearly the niceties of social rank and its public expression.[302]

A more recent study of the etiquette of guest houses (mudif-s) among the marsh dwellers of southern Iraq shows how rules for manners are closely related to social ranking and the Iraqi concept of person.[303] A few wealthy men have their own guest houses, but most are collective ones maintained by each lineage. These guest houses are the center for most male social life. Persons who attend the guest

FIGURE 8-4 Men of the "lower classes" (Lane's designation). (From Edward William Lane, An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians [London: John Murray, Publishers, Ltd., 1860],p. 33.)

house are expected to attend fully dressed, with their head rope and outer cloak. One defers speaking before persons of higher status, and jokes and unnecessary laughter must be avoided in their presence. Even in the case of anger and major quarrels, those present are expected to speak clearly and calmly. Salim, the Iraqi ethnographer who has described the etiquette of guest houses, recounts that one day a man who had two quarreling sons ran to the headman of his lineage in the guest house and asked him to intervene. The man had entered with such great haste that he forgot his head rope and'was unable to speak clearly. The headman listened to him, then criticized him for speaking in a confused way, adding insultingly, “I thought one of your old wives had run away with a lover.” The underlying assumption is that in almost all social situations a respectable man is expected to show reason and self-control.[48]

FIGURE 8-5 Tribal guest house (mudif), southern Iraq. (From S. Ml. Salim, Marsh Dwellers of the Euphrates Delta [London: Athlone Press, 19621, plate 5A. Used by permission of the London School of Economics, the publisher, and Dr. S. M. Salim.)

Guest house etiquette in Iraq also clearly reveals relative social ranking. Each person sits in the place which corresponds to his social rank. High-status persons, such as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, sit in places of honor, usually set off by carpets and pillows. The senior elder or owner of a guest house shows his respect to an esteemed visitor or stranger by personally leading him to his proper place or ordering tea to be prepared for him as well as the usual coffee. When a man enters a guest house, those assembled show their respect by rising to their feet for those of higher status and merely making the gesture of rising for those of lesser status. Then each person present greets the newcomer, who responds separately to each greeting, rising or making as if to rise as each case merits. Overestimating a person's social status makes a newcomer look ridiculous; underestimating it is tantamount to insult. The whole procedure can be quite complicated, and adult Iraqi males are expected to have mastered these complexities. The search for "information" as described by Clifford Geertz is hence an essential prerequisite for effective social comportment. Questions of rank are not explicitly discussed, but their accurate perception forms a necessary component of social life. If, because of long absence, a man is uncertain as to his relative rank, he will sit at a lower-ranking place and wait for someone to correct him.

FIGURE 8-6 Guest house etiquette is a key index of notions of person and value. Reception following opening of Quranic school near Nizwa, Sultanate of Oman, 1978. (Courtesy of the author.)

*** Iran: Ta^caruf

Iranian social forms and etiquette provide a final and highly complex indication of how ideology and social institutions fit together and shape social reality. Iran, like other key Middle Eastern countries, has had generations of observers seeking to discern its central values in all-encompassing categories. A recent study sketches a tension for most Iranians between the opposing concepts of zerangi, which can be glossed as cleverness, shrewdness, insincerity, cynicism, and a lack of social responsibility, and safayi batin, a term which implies integrity and an inner piety. The first characteristics are regarded ideologically as necessary to deal with an uncertain and treacherous world, in which social relationships outside of a narrow circle are unstable and subject to rapid flux. The second term implies an "inner" self, reserved only for a narrow circle of trusted intimates, which is more pure, constant, and which approaches spiritual ideals. In many of the studies of Iranian "national character" reviewed by Ali Banuazizi, such brief sketches of value tended to become psychological profiles with "universal applicability" to all Persians and as such were untenable.[304] Later studies have sought to indicate how such notions inform and shape specific patterns of social practice and as such eliminate the assumption of fixity of earlier approaches.

A promising approach to the study of world view in complex societies is to analyze intensively the relation between conventions of social etiquette and social structure. This approach is particularly appropriate for Iran, where the conventions of etiquette (ta^aruf) are pervasive. In English, etiquette connotes prescribed routine, an unwritten code of honor, and a set of conventions to avoid lowering the dignity of persons or professions. In Iran, according to Beeman, the notion entails a discipline of the inner self in the service of the public self.[305] Only in the most superficial manner can etiquette be “read” as insincerity or the use of empty forms. Indeed, in Iran, knowledge of and use of ta^caruf (and of when to disregard its forms as well) appears linked to concepts analogous to reason as described for Morocco, in the sense that the possession of the “human refinements” of ta^camf are said to separate men from animals in Iran and those lacking such conduct are thought to be “childlike” regardless of their age or not in possession of their senses.[306] Thus the accurate use of etiquette can also be related to the control over and search for information described by Geertz in the context of the market and. Gilsenan in the social implications of lying. The elaborate codes of hospitality found throughout the Arab peninsula, North Africa, and elsewhere in the Middle East can also in part be interpreted in the same maimer.

The meaning of etiquette for Beeman is tied to exact stylistic variations employed in different contexts. In almost every case it involves the concealment (or the ability to conceal) true (or “inner”) feelings or opinions. Such control is regarded as a highly positive public virtue. Beeman further argues that a careful analysis of the use of ta^caruf indicates the shared notion of Iranians that the social order is inegalitarian and without reference to fixed rank or stratification. He argues that in Iran status is relative to specific situations of social interaction and that the weight of social obligations constantly shifts. The control and formal reserve of ta^caruf enable persons to avoid overly committing themselves to one course of action or set of assumptions concerning social ranking that might prove difficult to maintain if the relative position of persons should shift at a later date.

James Bill has concisely described how such conventions are related to social forms.[307] He argues that despite the existence of some formal organizations in Iran, notably the state apparatus, the exercise of political power is played out primarily within networks of informal factions, cliques, coteries, and ad hoc collectivities of all sorts. These networks of personal coteries are called dawra-s. Each dawra—the word literally means “circle”—is an informal group of individuals who meet periodically, usually rotating the place of meeting among its members. These circles may be formed around any of a number of ties: professional, familial, religious, intellectual, political, or economic. This form of consociation has deep historical roots. Sufi mystics and darvishes, for instance, formed dawra-s with their disciples, and many of the groups regularly meet in coffee houses—Bill says there are perhaps 2,000 of them in Tehran alone. Among merchants and craftsmen in the bazaar, membership in dawra-s often partially overlaps with that of guild.

One reason for the pervasiveness of such informal organizations is the suppression of formal ones on the part of the prerevolutionary Iranian state and by all appearances the postrevolutionary one. Even when formal political parties exist, most Iranians assume that real access to authority is through informal channels. The existence of personal ties is considered more important than ideological preferences. Dawra-s tend to fragment and re-form as the interests of their members change, and most individuals belong to a number of these circles.

From the intimate circles around the Shah in the past and the informal coteries that surround Iran's present leaders to the level of informal village politics, the style of the dawra permeates Iranian political life. If a governor visits a village, villagers presume, and with reason, that a request to his driver, secretary, guard, or even his guests constitutes an effective intervention. Iranians expend a great deal of energy in determining how best to approach persons for a given request. Similarly, in the last days of the Shah, members of the foreign press corps were surprised to find announcements as to the Shah's intentions made by persons with no formal capacity but who, in retrospect, were the most reliable sources as to what was going on. The successive postrevolutionary governments have shown a similar lack of clear lines of organization.

The dawra makes sense in a setting where the cultural assumption is that "real" power does not flow from institution to institution, as suggested by the formal apparatus of government, but from person to person and groups of persons who effectively manage to impose their authority. The common force that unites the membership of dawra-s is a personal one; relationships that are not face-to-face and created out of multiple obligations are not as fully trusted. And as each person belongs to a multitude of dawra-s, information is rapidly passed among them.

The underlying conception of asymmetrical interpersonal relationship means that Iranians tend to assume that their survival and success depend upon their ability to cultivate the right personal contacts and to use those contacts to achieve their goals. That attitude in itself does not sharply distinguish Iranians from Americans. Informal "circles," "crowds," and "cliques" exist in every society and are always deeply involved in political ties and administrative functioning. The real difference rests in the degree to which such perceptions and social forms in societies such as Iran are formalized and taken to be normative. "Circles" are culturally recognized or even stressed in Iranian social situations and also given sense and legitimacy through connection to, and meaningful association with, fundamental ideas about "natural" social relationships. To draw a parallel between two Middle Eastern contexts, the Iranian term of nazdik, which means "nearness" and which implies reliable close acquaintances, kin, or friends, has much the same contextual meaning as the North African notion of closeness introduced earlier in this book.

Another point made by Bill is that the Iranian assumption of the instability of social hierarchies is easily borne out in practice. In Iran’s recent past, gardeners, water carriers, stableboys, and the children of drivers have all had excellent opportunities for advancement provided they perform their services close to men of power. There are just as many opportunities for decline, and the scramble for personal power takes these shifts into account. Bill recounts the anecdote of the prominent Iranian who clips obituaries from all the daily newspapers (which contain lists of who attends funerals) in order to fill in and change when necessary a huge chart to figure out the intricate links between the living. When he needs to get something done, he uses the chart to figure but the appropriate persons to contact.[308] Important families and persons at all levels of Iranian society try to spread their members over a number of key positions because of the assumption that all offices and ranks are unstable. Bill even goes so far as to say that Iranian basketball teams are handicapped by how players are selected—personal ties—and the lack of an adequate concept of teamwork, so that “teams” are thought of largely in terms of competing individuals.[309]

In such a social order, the seeming pleasantries of ta^caruf acquire more significance. TaSaruf is a means of avoiding direct, decisive encounters in a political and social world considered with justice to be unstable. Pleasantries, courtesies, politeness, and flattery abound at every level of social encounter just as do uncertainty and doubt. Etiquette buffers opposing views, loosens actual lines of tension, and enables individuals to keep their options open to protect themselves against sudden shifts in political currents. Such styles are not Immutable and of course have their limitations. Some forms of bureaucracy and industrial organization require high levels of technical competence and persons are selected on the basis of these professional skills alone, not just personal connections.[310]

*** Conclusion

Throughout this book and in the present chapter I have emphasized the necessity of considering the patterns of meaning and social practice as they are found in each Middle Eastern setting. Nonetheless, the analysis of ideology and social practice in situations as diverse as Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Israel discussed in this chapter suggests important points of “family” resemblance. It also suggests the importance of patterns of social order that would be given the approximate label of “informal” or even “nonstructured” in other contexts. Bill uses the term “plastic.” Out of context, such labels can be taken as pejorative. Each of the studies analyzed in this chapter makes sense of such flexible and pragmatic patterns of social action in the context of cultural assumptions concerning the nature of the social world which both informs these actions and serves as guides to them. Finally, an examination of recent accounts of world view and of social identity point to a renewed anthropological interest in how the relation between meaning and social practice changes historically. This is in marked contrast to an earlier generation of anthropological studies and one essential to making sense of events in the Middle East today.

* Part III: Islam and Religious Experience

** 9. Islam in Practice

*** Islam as a World Religion

All major world religions face the problem of how to keep their key traditions vital and meaningful over long historical periods and in diverse contexts. By definition, world religions are not confined to one society or cultural tradition. They transcend specific cultures, including their own culture of origin. The formative ideals and the expression of religious truths at the core of each great religious tradition are considered to be eternal and immutable. Yet for these ideals and truths to maintain their sense of reality in a sociological sense, they must be capable of reformulation and reinterpretation so that they enter meaningfully into local value systems and changing social realities. As with other great religious traditions, Islam is rich and varied in its creativity and expression, so much so that many Muslims, especially those who adhere to certain reformist principles, have difficulty in accounting for the diversity of Islam as it has been expressed over 1,400 years and in the context of varied cultural traditions. As a result, some Muslim and nonMuslim- scholars dismiss local practices which they think not to be in accord with “central” truths as non-Islamic or as incorrect understandings of Islam, even though persons who hold' such beliefs consider themselves fully to be Muslims. One Muslim intellectual, despite the general richness and sensitivity of his account of the Islamic tradition, has gone so far as to dismiss all “mystical” and popular understandings of Islam not in accord with his own notion of Islamic tradition as being perpetrated by charlatans and “spiritual delinquents” and accepted only by the ignorant? To account for these diversities, anthropologists in the 1940s introduced the notion of “Great” and “Little” traditions. When first applied, the Great Tradition/Little Tradition contrast had the effect of rekindling an interest in popular understandings of religion (among other social institutions) and placing these understandings in the wider context of complex societies; nonetheless, in many anthropological monographs this concept subsequently meant little beyond juxtaposing statements of Islamic principles as elaborated in standard Orientalist texts and by educated Muslims with inventories of local religious practices? The study of “trance” and “possession” states has also suffered from being relegated to the Little Tradition side of the Great/Little divide so that only recently has the study of such rites become more clearly related to comprehensive studies of concepts of the person and to religious understandings of the world?

Critical discussion of what is meant by Islam and Islamic tradition is needed both for analytical and practical reasons. Especially in recent years, a number of studies of Islam have appeared that combine attention to textual analyses, a venerable tradition in the study

of Islam, with analysis of the ethnographic and social historical contexts in which notions of Islam are developed, transmitted, and reproduced.[4] Earlier studies of Islam, based primarily upon either the study of key

[1] Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979 [orig. 1966, p. 185], p. 153.

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See, for example, Harold B. Barclay, Buurri al Larnaab: A Suburban Village in the Sudan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 136-210.

3 See especially Vincent Crapanzano, The Hamadsha: A Study in Moroccan Ethnopsychiatry (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973); and also his “Introduction,” in Case Histories in Spirit Possession, eds. Vincent Crapanzano and Vivian Garrison (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1976), pp. 140.

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Clifford Geertz,Islam Observed (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968); Ali Merad, Le Reformisme musulman en Algerie de 1925 a 1940, Recherches Mediterraneenes, Etudes, 7 (Paris and The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1967); Ernest Gellner, Saints of the Atlas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Abdallah Bujra, The Politics of Stratification: A Study of Political Change in a South Arabian Town (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); Michael Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi in Modem Egypt (Oxford: University Press, 1973); Abdul Hamid M. el-Zein, The Sacred Meadows: A Structural Analysis of Religious Symbolism in an East African Town (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974); Dale F. Eickelman, Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center, Modern Middle East Series, 1 (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1976), “Ideological Change and Regional Cults: Marabout- ism and Ties of ‘Closeness’ in Western Morocco,” in Regional Cults, ed. Richard P. Werbner, A.S.A. Monographs, 16 (New York and London: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 3-28, “The Art of Memory: Islamic Education and Its Social Reproduction,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 20, no. 4 (October 1978), 485-516; Emanuel Marx, “Communal and Individual Pilgrimage: The Region of Saints’ Tombs in South Sinai,” in Regional Cults, ed. Werbner, pp. 29- 51; and John P. Mason, Island of the Blest: Islam in a Libyan Oasis Community (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1977). Perhaps the best single study of the Islamic tradition to date is Marshall G. S. Hodgson’s three-volume The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1974). Hodgson’s text is difficult but essential. Two brief review essays

concerning his study are useful complementary readings. These are Marilyn Robinson Waldman’s review of Venture, which appeared in the Religious Studies Review, 2, no. 3 (July 1976), 22-35; and Edmund Burke, III, “Islamic History religious texts or of certain types of religious experience (formal ritual of mysticism, for example), tended to concentrate upon the search for an Islamic “essence.” This earlier analytic tradition, which is still vigorous, in part coincided with the ideological premise held by many Muslims that Islamic beliefs and practices are unaffected by historical change.

Recent ethnographic and social historical studies suggest a more complex notion of Islamic tradition than can be extracted primarily from religious texts. As a consequence, the notion of an Islamic “essence” has been difficult to sustain. Although in practice recent studies by anthropologists and social historians of Islam differ widely from each other in analytic assumptions, they suggest that in almost every studied locale there are opposing conceptions of Islam. These opposing (or complementary) conceptions of Islam are distinguished by greater (particularistic) and lesser (universalistic) degrees of compromise with the social order. These opposing conceptions are co-present and in dynamic tension with each other. Some of these ideologies, such as those characteristic of “reformist” Islam and the beliefs of many educated Muslims, tend to be universalistic in that they are explicit and more general in their implications. Others, including what can conveniently be labeled as maraboutism in North Africa (“saint cults,” to be explained shortly, is a misleading gloss), are particularistic in that they are largely implicit and tied to particular social contexts. The co-presence of these alternative universalistic and particularistic ideologies, some of which are not formally elaborated, means that the strength of one or another ideological form cannot be attributed solely to its relation to a specific social context.

In what is perhaps an extreme reaction to the earlier analytic tradition which largely accepted the ideological premise held by many Muslims of the immutability of “true” Islamic belief and practice, an Egyptian Muslim anthropologist has suggested replacing the term Islam by islams, in order to emphasize better the diversity and vibrancy of the religious tradition which he seeks to interpret and to signal an analytic distance both from the Orientalist seeking of “essence” and from the theological tenets of some Muslims.[311] The intent of this chapter is to incorporate social historical materials with a survey of Islam today, in order to indicate the richness and variety of the Islamic tradition and some of the key components that are constantly refashioned to maintain its vitality and to provide a necessary critical perspective for placing monographs dealing with particular aspects of the Islamic tradition in their appropriate contexts.

Recognizing the lack of a common core of dogma, a problem which Zein accommodates by writing of islams, Bryan S. Turner has suggested that in the Islamic case it is better to talk of orthopraxy, the “commonality of practice and ritual,” rather than of orthodoxy, the “commonality of belief.”[313] Even this formula has its limitations, despite the growing consensus among many educated Muslims on at least certain elements of practice and belief. Nonetheless, delineation of some basic features of

Islam and the five “pillars” of faith serves as a useful point of departure for considering Islam as locally received and understood.

*** The Five Pillars

Islam is the only one of the major world religions to have had a built-in name from its very beginning in seventh-century Arabia. Islam (Ar. Islam) means “submission,” submission to the will of God. Whoever submits is called a Muslim. These terms occur repeatedly in the Quran. The word qur’an itself means both “reading” and “recital.” It is the word of God revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by the angel Gabriel. Something is known of how these revelations first came to Muhammad from verses in the Quran itself. First Muhammad saw a glorious being stand erect high in the sky toward the horizon; then this being came closer and closer to him. At first Muhammad thought the being was God Himself, but later he recognized it as Gabriel. No one is sure which part of the Quran was first revealed to Muhammad. Many Muslims think it is this verse:

thou shrouded in thy mantle, arise, and warn!

Thy Lord magnify thy robes purify and defilement flee!

Give not, thinking to gain greater and be patient unto thy Lord.[314]

(Sura 74:1-7)

Every word of the Quran is held by Muslims to be the word of God. In fact, Muslims believe that God had earlier communicated His word through other prophets, those recognized by both Jews and Christians. Muslims believe that over time the messages of these earlier prophets became distorted. So Muhammad was made the “Seal of the Prophets,” or the last one, to warn men one final time of their wrong ways and again to provide them with God’s word “in clear Arabic.”

Any translation from one civilizational tradition to another is treacherous, but a comparison with Christianity is useful here. The Quran should not be seen as precisely the equivalent of the Bible. Christians, or anyway most Christians, see the Bible as a record of the prophets and of Christ, but not directly as God’s word, as Muslims see the Quran. This is why many Muslims, even those who do not speak Arabic, place such great emphasis upon comprehension of classical Arabic and regard translations of the Quran as mere guides to its meaning rather than substitutes for the original. For Christians (or again, most Christians) it

is the person of Christ, the Son of God, that personifies God because Christ is God. In contrast, the Quran insists that Muhammad is merely the messenger of God. Some Muslims, especially certain mystics, have admittedly considered the person of Muhammad to be a saintlike figure, but most Muslims go no further than to consider Muhammad to be the most perfect of men. In fact, the tomb of Muhammad was destroyed in the late eighteenth century by zealous Wahhabi Muslims intent upon avoiding a personal veneration of the Prophet or of any other figures in Islam.

Clearly the belief in the Quran and the eternal nature of its exact message are important components of the Islamic tradition, but the word of God as embodied in the Quran is made meaningful to Muslims in different ways according to time and place. Problems of revelation and the legitimation of political authority, to take only two major practical examples, are interpreted in various ways throughout the Muslim world.

A Moroccan qadi, or religious judge, had this to say to me concerning how the Quran should be interpreted:

How can ordinary men, no matter how much they study, understand by themselves the words of the Quran? Those are high words, the words of God. Instead, you must look at what the Prophet did, the sayings of the Prophet, and the conduct and decisions of the Muslim community in the past. These tell you what is the sliarFa (the law of Islam or the “straight path”).

He then drew two parallel lines on a sheet of paper and explained that conduct within the two lines was permitted by Islam and that all else was not.

Since the Quran cannot be a direct guide to man’s conduct, one must turn to what is traditionally done by Muslims. Such a belief is not prevalent everywhere in the Muslim world but is an example of one of the ways in which the ideological notion of the immutability of Islamic belief can be maintained yet adjusted to accommodate local traditions. Much of what is considered to be Islamic practice depends upon consensus (ijma^ca) of morally upright Muslims, especially those considered to be religious scholars, in any part of the Muslim world. The notion of consensus has precise legal connotations in Islam, but here I am primarily concerned with indicating popular conceptions of religious tradition.

Every Muslim considers himself to be part of the umma, the community of living Muslims everywhere who are committed to what Hodgson has called the “venture of Islam.” The sharFa, the straight path of the ritual observances required in principle of Muslims, is only the most visible component of that venture. Muslims differ as to

who legitimately succeeded Muhammad in the leadership of the Muslim world—Sunni Muslims accept in principle the notion that any Muslim

FIGURE 9-1 Moroccan qadT. (Courtesy of the author.)

could be Muhammad’s successor in all matters except prophecy, while the ShFa, principally located in Iran, East Africa, India, southern Iraq, Lebanon, and parts of the Arabian peninsula, feel that succession rightly belongs only to the descendants of Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and his son-in-law ^cA1I. There are many elaborations and intermediary positions of these principal themes. Despite these differences, Islam is thought of by Muslims as imparting a tone and style to all aspects of their lives—familial customs, sociability, learning, even for some Muslims styles of personal grooming. Shanna can be translated as “law,” but it is much more than the concept of law in English usage. Religiously speaking, the shari^ca governs all aspects of one’s conduct as a Muslim.

There are five “pillars” (pl. arkan) of Islamic faith incumbent upon most Muslims; I say most because some Muslims modify or deny the normative nature of even these pillars because of their own interpretations of Islam. These five pillars are the declaration of faith, the five daily ritual prayers, almsgiving, fasting, and the pilgrimage to Mecca.[8]

®There are a number of accounts of these obligations. One of the most concise is Gustave E. von Grunebaum, Muhammadan Festivals (New York: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1951). Another is contained in a handbook written for English-speaking Muslims, Muhammad Hamidullah, ed., Introduction to Islam, enlarged edition, Publications of the Centre Culturel Islamique, Paris, No. 1 (Hyderabad, India: Habib & Co., 1959). The account below of the pilgrimage, the fifth pillar, is based primarily upon von Grunebaum, Muhammadan Festivals, pp. 15-49; and the Aramco World Magazine, 26, no. 6 (November-December 1974).

The declaration of faith (shahada) is quite simply that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is His messenger (rasul). Like any living tradition, Islam in practice has varied enormously as it is constantly in the process of becoming. This simple declaration of faith has had the advantage of being so elemental that all Muslims can agree upon it, whatever other differences they may have had for thirteen and a half centuries.

The second pillar of Islam is the salat, or five daily ritual prayers. All Muslims are supposed to cleanse themselves ritually, face Mecca, and pray at dawn, noon, midaftemoon, sunset, and dusk. In towns, prayer-callers climb to the top of minarets, even when loudspeakers are prevalent today, and announce each of the prayers. Muslims may pray where they want; the use of mosques is not obligatory, although many believers congregate in mosques at least on Fridays for the midday prayers. The obligatory prayers are fixed in form and content, although personal invocations to God may be added to them upon their completion. The uniformity of these prayers is said by many to symbolize man's equality before God as well as the community's submission to His will.

Almsgiving (zakat) is the third pillar. In some countries at certain periods the zakat has been an obligatory tax upon all Muslims who can afford to pay it. The Quran enjoins the wealthier to set aside at least part of their wealth for the destitute of the Muslim community. Most almsgiving throughout the Middle East remains personal and direct; the donor has a more direct contact with his clients, unlike the anonymous pattern of giving which prevails in our own society.

The fourth pillar of Islam is fasting (sawtn), which occurs each lunar year during the month of Ramadan. All adult Muslims who are in good health are expected to fast, and despite the fact that many persons privately may choose not to do so, public fasting is observed almost everywhere. During Ramadan, Islam is more consciously brought into daily activities; religious lessons are given nightly on the radio and television and in mosques. It is the month of repentance and purification. Some Muslims, defensive against the West, rationalize the fast by praising its supposed medical virtues in cleansing the vital organs of the body. Yet, as indicated in Chapter 8, its more important meaning is the ability of Muslims to follow the code of conduct fixed by Islam and thus to demonstrate their self-discipline and control over self. The fast carries a variety of more elaborate interpretations, as the Fallerses indicate in their account of the fast in Turkey and Antoun in his account for rural Jordan, but the public manifestation of the community's ability to observe the fast is a key and universal aspect of belief and practice.[9] Eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual intercourse are prohibited between dawn and sunset and, more significantly, Muslims are expected to engage in spiritual self-renewal. At night, in contrast, sociability is in many ways increased; visiting among friends and relatives is intensified, and the practical meaning of what it is to be a Muslim is enhanced for the entire community.

[9] L. A. Fallers, assisted by M. C. Fallers, "Notes on an Advent Ramadan," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 42, no. 1 (March 1974), 35-52; Richard T. Antoun, "The Social Significance of Ramadan in an Arab Village," Muslim World 58 (1968), 36-42, 95-104.

The fifth pillar is the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca, obligatory once in a lifetime for every Muslim economically and physically able to do so. Even more than the month of fasting, the pilgrimage is an obligation that removes pilgrims from the constraints of

ordinary, particular obligations. From the moment pilgrims set out on the journey, they are removed from Ordinary society and become “liminal” in the sense of the term made popular by Victor Turner.[315] Pilgrims agree to dedicate their lives to Islam and must be in a state of ritual consecration to make a valid pilgrimage. Pilgrims may not uproot plants or shed blood —if they do so, they must atone for it by ritual means. Sexual intercourse is also forbidden. As a sign of their consecration, if they die while on pilgrimage, they are thought to enter paradise immediately.

During the pilgrimage, ordinary social relationships with kinsmen, neighbors, and others assume a diminished importance. One’s identity as a Muslim and brotherhood in Islam are of paramount significance. Every step of the way becomes highly symbolic of the pilgrim’s wider identification with Islam; the web of particularistic social relationships is supposed to be transcended. Ritually speaking, the Ka^cba is regarded as the symbolic center of the world, however peripheral it might be in terms of the ordinary social and political systems in which pilgrims are otherwise enmeshed.

In recent years, more than a million pilgrims annually have made the voyage. Its timing changes each year, for as with other key Islamic rituals, the time of the

FIGURE 9-2 Pilgrims often visit the shrines of local marabouts before departing for Mecca. Tunisia, 1973. (Courtesy Nicholas S. Hopkins.)

pilgrimage is set by the lunar calendar. Pilgrims from nearby countries arrive by bus and even by foot; those from more distant locales arrive by air, with only small numbers now arriving by sea.

In the past, as with equivalent rituals in Europe, the pilgrimage was a long and arduous journey from which many persons never returned. Every step of the way was fraught with danger, but this only enhanced its spiritual richness. A voyage of a year or longer was not uncommon for pilgrims coming from North Africa, so that before they left on the hajj, they set their affairs in order in case they should never return. Even in the mid-nineteenth century, when modern sea transport and relative peace and security made the pilgrimage easier, it still had its uncertainties.[316] For many, it was a voyage of'intellectual, and even commercial, discovery. Religious scholars at Mecca and along the way had contact with the major intellectual currents elsewhere. Merchants could use the pilgrimage as an occasion to establish bonds which were of use in the conduct of international trade.[317]

FIGURE 9-3 Principal traditional caravan routes to Mecca. (Aramco World Magazine, November-December 1974.)

There are many descriptions of both the transformation that the pilgrimage effects upon Muslims and its ritual significance. In most parts of the Muslim world it is a pious act for pilgrims to write an account of their journey for the guidance of others, although it is the unusual pilgrims whose accounts perhaps best reveal the intense meaning that the pilgrimage carries for the community of the faithful.

Malcolm X was one such unusual pilgrim. Given the bitterness of his own racial perceptions in America, his remarks are especially poignant. He remarked on the fact that the tens of thousands of pilgrims “were of all colours, from blue-eyed blondes to black-skinned Africans. But we were all participating in the same ritual, displaying a spirit of unity and brotherhood that my experiences in America had led me to believe could never exist.”[318] He went on to say that he observed color patterns in the crowds in the sense that like stayed with like but concluded that “true brotherhood” existed when these patterns existed with no complexes of superiority or inferiority.

For others, the pilgrimage assumed a mystical significance. Even Richard Burton, never a pilgrim to be moved by ordinary emotions, could not refrain from expressing his exaltation upon first arriving, disguised, in Mecca:

There at last it lay, the bourn of my long and weary Pilgrimage, realising the plans and hopes of many and many a year. The mirage medium of Fancy invested the huge catafalque and its gloomy pall with peculiar charms ... the view was strange, unique—and how few have looked upon the celebrated shrine! I may truly say that, of all the worshippers who clung weeping to the curtain, or who pressed their beating hearts to the stone, none felt for the moment a deeper emotion than did [I].

Resuming his characteristic orientalist distance, Burton continued:

It was as if the poetical legends of the Arab spoke truth, and that the waving wings of angels, not the sweet breeze of morning, were agitating and swelling the black covering of the shrine. But, to confess humbling truth, theirs was the high feeling of religious enthusiasm, mine was the ecstasy of gratified pride.[319]

There are nine ritual steps to the pilgrimage itself. Here my intent is not to present a structuralist explanation of the significance of these events but merely to suggest some aspects of their symbolic richness.[320] (1) First is the donning of the

FIGURE 9-4 Principal steps of the hajj. (Based upon an illustration in Aramco World Magazine, November-December 1974.)

ihram, a white seamless garment that for many Muslims symbolizes the pilgrims' search for purity and their separation from the ordinary world. This may be donned anywhere along the route but at the latest at fixed points signifying the confines of Mecca. No jewelry or other personal adornment may be worn, nor are pilgrims supposed to engage in disputes. Providing that the pilgrims have declared their intention (mya) of making the pilgrimage, they are ready to enter the haram, the sacred enclosure of Mecca itself, thought to have been established by Abraham and confirmed by Muhammad. Non-Muslims are not allowed within its confines. Then (2) on the eighth day of the lunar month of Dhu 1-Hijja, the month of the pilgrimage, pilgrims proceed to Mina, a small uninhabited village five miles east of Mecca. There they spend the night meditating and praying.

The next morning, the pilgrims move as a group to the plain of ^c Arafa for the central rite of the pilgrimage, the (3) "standing" before Mount ^c Arafa, the Mount of Mercy. They face Mecca, meditate, and pray. Many spend the entire time standing, from noon to sunset. Some climb almost to the summit of the two-hundred- foot mountain, at the foot of which the Prophet was supposed to have delivered his last sermon.

Just before sunset, a cannon sounds and the pilgrims proceed to (4) Muzdalifa, a few miles back toward Mina. There they worship and sleep under the stars after gathering a number of pebbles for use on the following day. The next morning, before daybreak, they return to Mina, where they throw the pebbles at three white-washed masonry pillars, especially the one thought to represent Satan, who three j times tried to persuade Abraham not to obey God's command to sacrifice his son. j The throwing of the pebbles symbolizes the repudiation of evil.

(5) For the Feast of the Sacrifice (^cId al-Kabir) all pilgrims who can afford to do so buy a sheep or other animal for sacrifice and give away part of it to the poor , although given the quantity of meat sacrificed, most of it is not consumed. This sacrifice has a range of meanings. It commemorates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son; it symbolizes the readiness to give up what is dearest to the pilgrim if commanded by God; it offers thanksgiving to God for having communicated with humans and reminds pilgrims to share their blessings with the less fortunate. Muslims throughout the world vicariously share in the elation of the pilgrims by performing their own sacrifices on the same day.

Once pilgrims have offered their sacrifices, they have completed a major part of the pilgrimage. Men shave their heads and women cut off a lock of their hair to symbolize their

deconsecration. Pilgrims now are free to bathe and to remove the ihram, although the prohibition on sexual intercourse remains.

The pilgrims next proceed directly to Mecca and perform (6) the tawaf, the circling. They circumambulate the Ka^cba seven times on foot, reciting a prayer on each circuit. This circling is said by some to symbolize the unity of God and man and of heaven with earth and reminds believers of the importance attached to the Ka^cba by the Patriarch Abraham, his son Ishmael, and Muhammad. During the j circling, many pilgrims try to touch the black stone which is embedded in one J comer of the Ka^cba.

‘FIGURE 9-5 Colonnades of the great mosque, Mecca, (Aramco World Magazine, November-December 1974.)

The key ceremonies of the pilgrimage are now completed, and pilgrims have the right to call themselves hajj-s. Most pilgrims, however, proceed to the “Place of Abraham,” where Abraham is supposed to have offered his devotions to God. There pilgrims reenact (7) the “running” (sa^cy), the search for water by Hagar, the wife of Abraham (and Sarah’s rival in the Bible). Hagar ran back and forth desperately searching for water for herself and her child until the angel Gabriel appeared, stamped the ground with his heel, and brought forth water from the well of Zamzam for them. Pilgrims drink from this well before starting the running; many return home with bottles of water from the well.

Pilgrims then customarily return for a third and last time (8) to Mina, where they cast their remaining pebbles at each of the three pillars—seven stones at each pillar for each day of the pilgrimage. This also is a time to visit with other pilgrims and to bid farewell to friends. Their final visit is to Mecca again, where pilgrims again circumambulate the Ka^cba (9) before returning home.

There is a rich tradition of myths associated with each of the steps of the pilgrimage, and these myths have been variously interpreted throughout the Islamic world. The rituals associated with the pilgrimage are interpreted in slightly different ways for Sunni and ShI^cI Muslims, at least on a popular level.

*** The Sh^cra

Unlike the case for Christianity, there is no' formal clergy in the Muslim world and no center of priests who can decide upon what is and is not orthodox. Hence it is misleading to speak of schisms in the Muslim community. There is ho formal religious center from which judgments of orthodoxy and heterodoxy can be made. Even with this consideration in mind,

Shl^ca are set apart from Sunni Muslims in terms both of how they interpret and elaborate the meaning of Islam and in the practical sense of self-differentiation from other Muslims. Nonetheless, the ShFa, like other Muslims, firmly believe in the universality of Islam and the integrity of the Muslim community.

The word Shi^ca itself means “party” or “sect.” This label in part reflects the origin of Shl^cism as a political movement in seventh-century Arabia. ^cA1I, the son- in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, was the fourth of his caliphs (khaHfa-s), or successors (656-661).[15 C] A1I was later assassinated by his opponents, as was Husayn (in 680), the grandson of the Prophet. Both men are considered by Slu^ca to be martyrs. After ^cAll’s assassination, the “party” of ^cAli in Kufa, in southern Iraq, demanded that succession be restored to ^cAll’s descendants alone. This legitimist claim continues to be a core belief of the Shl^ca. One contributing factor to Shl^cism

[16] See Marshall G. S. Hodgson, “How Did the Early Slu^a Become Sectarian?,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 75, no. 1 (January-March 1955), 1-13, for a subtle account of how what are now accepted as the “basic principles” of Sht^ctthought and practice emerged. His Venture of Islam is also an indispensable reference.

at least in its formative years was the tension between newly conquered non-Arabs and their Arab rulers. From the very beginning Shiism has been a movement of political opposition and of social discontent and has carried with it the notion that the Shl^ca are persecuted, although in recent years this component of ShI^cI doctrine has had less importance than in the past.

Most Islamic historians have stressed the doctrinal differences between Sunni and Shf^ca, an approach which is misleading from an anthropological and social historical perspective because Sunni Islam is no more a homogeneous entity than is Shi[0] ! Islam. A more promising approach to characterization of the distinctive features of Shi[0] ! Islam is taken in a seminal paper by Leonard Binder.[321] His approach concentrates upon the relation between the practical organization of Shl'T men of learning (called collectively ^culama’ as they are among Sunni Muslims) and certain aspects of ShI^cT doctrine that are both theologically propagated and popularly accepted. His overall points are that (1) for doctrinal reasons ShI^cT men of learning are accorded greater religious authority than their Sunni counterparts; (2) for historical reasons, ShI^cI men of learning have not been as seriously challenged in their authority as has been the case with Sunni religious scholars; (3) the ShI^cT religious “establishment” is more hierarchically organized and centralized; and (4) ShI^cI men of learning have been more effective in maintaining their autonomy from government control and in maintaining a strong popular base for their legitimacy, as the 1978-1979 revolution in Iran vividly demonstrates.[322]

In doctrinal terms, the Shl^ca hold that the only legitimate successors of Muhammad were his descendants through his son-in-law ^cA1I and his daughter Fatima. Most Shl^ca believe that there were twelve legitimate Imams, or leaders of the Islamic community, including ^cA1I. The twelfth Imam is said to have hidden himself from this world, to return at some later time. Since then, the Imams have been hidden, so that it is the responsibility of recognized men of learning to interpret Islamic doctrine and to guide the Muslim community as new situations arise. The Imams are thought to have the charismatic qualities of the Prophet, except the gift of prophecy itself. Leading men of learning partake to a certain extent of the charismatic qualities attributed to the Imams, a feature almost entirely lacking in at least the formal doctrines of Sunni Muslims. I stress formal, for at a popular level, neglected until recently by many Islamic historians, other beliefs such as that a mahda, or “rightly guided one,” will return the community of Muslims to its proper course, are often present. The takeover of the Great Mosque at Mecca in November 1979 by a band of armed militants who proclaimed that one of their number was the “hidden” Imam indicates the continuing political potential of such a belief.

Most Shl^ca stress the practice of taqiya, or “concealment.” In the face of persecution, Shi^ca are said to be able to dissimulate their real beliefs if the expression of them would result in grave physical danger or threat to the community. Thus ^cAH, whose caliphate was contested throughout his lifetime, is alleged to have “concealed” his firm belief in the right of his descendants to be Muhammad’s successors because of such a threat. One practical consequence of this doctrine has been to allow Shf^cism in practice to accommodate a range of complementary beliefs of other religious traditions in the region: Christianity, Manichaeism, and other doctrines.[323] In fact, the practical ties of groups such as the Shabak of northern Iraq to the wider ShI^cI community are virtually nonexistent; they have their own leadership and their need to develop formal doctrine is not as paramount as it is in the case of the predominant “twelver” Shl^ca of Iran and elsewhere in Iraq.[324] At a greater extreme, the rituals and formal beliefs of the Alevi (Ar. ^Alavn.) Muslims of Turkey, Iran, and Syria (where the current president is an ^cAlawi) are such that many of their Sunni and ShI^cI neighbors do not even accept them as Muslims.[325] Numerous Shi^cI groups exist elsewhere that accept a different number of Imams and in other ways maintain a separate leadership and sense of practical community.

Binder’s second point is that at least in Iran, ShI^cI men of learning had no living Imam to reduce their status. Ayatullah Khomeini’s popular support is indicative of the potential strength of such leaders. Elsewhere in the ShI^cT world, as with the Zaidis in Yemen, the IsmaPilis and the Fatimite caliphate of medieval Egypt, there were living Imams. During certain periods in Iran’s history, the role of Shl^ci men of learning was strengthened by the

government. Because of the lack of formal colonial domination in Iran, the presence of ShI^cT shrines and centers of learning in neighboring Iraq, notably Karbala and Najaf, which serve as places of refuge in times of political crisis, the lack of major religious opposition (such as could be provided by an effective modernist movement), and the lack until quite recently of a large body of intellectuals with Western-style educations has meant that Shi^cI men of learning have had no substantial challenge to their legitimacy other than that of the pre-1978 ruling circles.

Binder's third consideration, the institutional organization of Iran's ^culama', fits nicely with Bill's stress upon the significance of patterns of informal association (see Chapter 8). Strictly speaking, there are no formal patterns of institutional leadership among the ShT^ca of Iran, but the pervasive informal ones enable ShI^cI men of learning to mobilize their followers effectively. Perhaps because the patterns of leadership are informal, they are more difficult for hostile governments to control and suppress. There are mullahs, or village preachers, associated with each mosque and a number of other lesser religious figures. At the higher level are scholars called mujtahids, those who by study and personal piety are capable of making independent judgments and interpreting Islamic tradition. In contemporary Iran, mujtahids acquire recognition by publishing books outlining their methods and views for public comment. At a level above mujtahids are scholars called Ayatullahs, a term which literally means a "sign of God." At the very apex of the hierarchy is a scholar called the "supreme" Ayatullah, Ayatullah al-^cUzma, considered to be the most learned scholar of his age and whose piety is beyond question.[326] There is no formal "election" of such individuals. At all levels of the hierarchy, success depends in part upon the ability to attract a popular following and to obtain financial support from followers which can be used to support the education of religious students, the upkeep of ShI^cT shrines, and other religious activities. At higher levels, success depends additionally upon recognition by other men of learning. Binder suggests that recognition as Ayatullah al-[z] Uzma is in practice in the hands of a relatively small group of thirty or forty religious scholars residing at Qum, one of the holy cities of Iran. Many of these leaders are themselves descendants of famous religious scholars of the past, but the succession to leadership still depends largely upon a reputation for religious learning.[327]

Finally, Iran's ShT^cT religious leadership has managed to retain popular support despite the significant political and economic transformations undergone by at least part of Iran's population.[328] With the exception of the supporters of Iran's former regime, some Westernized intellectuals, and a few Muslims influenced by various reformist movements, traditional Shi^cI men of learning have managed to retain the support of the peasantry and most of the merchants and craftsmen participating in Iran's bazaar economy. Despite divergences among ShI^cT leaders, for the most part they have managed to retain the loyalty of "traditional" groups, and to win the support even of a number of students in the "modern" educational sector, as well as the support of what Binder calls somewhat ironically in terms of the 1978-1979 revolution the "uninfluential classes" of Iranian society.[329]

Especially at the popular level Shl^cism has certain key rituals that dramatically indicate the central elements of belief and practice. One of these is the annual mourning (tafziya) in commemoration of the death of Husayn, the Prophet's grandson, at Karbala, Iraq, in the lunar month of Muharram in a.d. 680. For the Shi^ca, Husayn is the third Imam. Muhammad and ^cA1I were the fest two. As the late Gustave von Grunebaum wrote: "It would be incorrect to say that Husain stands in the center of SH^ca dogma, but it is unquestionably true that contemplation of his personality and fate is the emotional mainspring of the believer's religious experience."[330] Shl^ca consider it to be particularly beneficial to be buried next to Husayn's grave in Karbala. For centuries caravans brought the dead to be interred there, and in more recent times an airline specialized in flying remains there has been established.

In the Shl^ci tradition Husayn's death is interpreted as a voluntary sacrifice so that through his suffering, Shl^ci faithful could enter paradise. The popular commemoration of Husayn's martyrdom has been described by Elizabeth Fernea, who was in Karbala in 1957, together with women from a nearby village where she was living.[331] At that time Karbala was a town of thirty thousand people, but with the pilgrims arriving during Muharram its population swelled to over a million, with black tents erected for the pilgrims. Similar ceremonies, although not of course attracting an equivalent influx of pilgrims, occur in various forms in ShI^cT communities in the entire region. From the first of the month, when the commemoration begins, mourning clothes are donned; people refrain from bathing and shaving and adopt a simple diet. Pulpits are placed in the street from which the story of Husayn's martyrdom is recited, often with many added details. Listeners commonly break out in tears. Also during this period, at least through the 1950s, groups of men seeking penance, with their half-naked bodies dyed black or red, toured the streets, pulling out' their hair, inflicting sword wounds upon themselves and dragging chains behind them. Not infrequently, fights with non-ShI^ca developed as well as fights between rival neighborhood factions. I use the past tense to describe these activities because both the Iranian and Iraqi governments have at least formally banned the more extreme of these activities, although many continue to be carried out in modified form, especially in more remote areas.

On the 10th of Muharram, a large procession designed as a funerary parade reenacts the last episodes of Husayn's life and his burial. A coffin, a few arms, and Husayn's banner are the only props necessary for the reenactment of the last days of his life.

A number of versions of these mourning plays exist, often keyed to local social and political circumstances.[332] The ta^czTya for Husayn consists of some forty

FIGURE 9-6 Carrying Husayn's corpse,
ta^cziya drama, southern Iraq, 1955. (From Sigrid Westphal-Hellbusch and Heinz Westphal, "Die Ma'dan; Kultur und Geschichte der Wlarschen-bewohner im Siid-lraq," Forschungen zur Ethnologie und Sozialpsychologie, Band 4 [Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1962], plate 60. Courtesy of the authors and the publisher.)

to fifty loosely connected episodes. Since the audience knows the play in advance, j the drama does not rely upon suspense but upon how the particular scenes are constructed. Anachronisms abound in many presentations; in some versions, European Christian ambassadors are made to betray Husayn rather than Sunni Muslims. Old Testament figures similarly are introduced. The performance is often highly realistic, so realistic in the nineteenth century that condemned criminals often were made to play the part of the slayers of Husayn in case the spectators i became so enraged that they attacked the actors themselves. The final scene involves a procession with the martyr’s coffin (or in some versions a severed head) to the court of the Sunni caliph. On the way, Christians, Jews, and Sunni Muslims j are portrayed as bowing before Husayn.

The symbolism of these commemorative plays for Shi^ca carries the clear i

message that the sacrificial death of Husayn is linked to their salvation. In one j version of the play, in fact, the angel Gabriel is made to announce to Muhammad that his grandchild will die, not because he is guilty of any wrongdoing, but so that his blood will be redeemed. [333]

The intensity of such public performances, coupled with the lack until recently of anthropological accounts of popular understandings of ShT^cism, have led to a misunderstanding of many aspects of Sh!^cI belief. For instance, the pilgrimage to Mecca is as important to Shi^ca as it is to other Muslims, but it is differently interpreted. Most pious ShT^ca consider the pilgrimage to Mecca significant at least in part because nearby Medina is the place of burial of the Prophet Muhammad, one of their recognized Imam-s. Pious Shi^ca also try to visit the shrines of the other Imams, located throughout Iran and Iraq, so that structurally the pilgrimage is not of the same importance for them as it is for many Sunni.

Because the ShT^ca tend to be located in regions where their orientation toward Islam is only one of many, and because the tendency of many Western writers has been to consider Sunni Islam as “orthodox,” distorted views of popular ShT^cism still prevail. A personal experience might indicate this attitude. In 1968 I spent a month in Iran. Shortly after my arrival, a Sunni colleague from a neighboring country warned me that I would most likely encounter ShI^cI hostility,

especially in the smaller centers. For example, I was cautioned that the ShT^ca would undoubtedly break any glasses or plates after I had used them. I do not speak Farsi, but at the time spoke a reasonably fluent Iraqi Arabic, a dialect known to many Iranians, especially religious scholars. I encountered no hostility and in fact left Tehran for Baghdad by a bus on which most of my fellow travelers were Shi[0] ! pilgrims on their way to visit the shrines in Iraq. The bus stopped regularly for collective prayers, the pilgrims sang together and shared their food with me. Later I mentioned to a mujtahid what I had been told about the breaking of dishes and glasses. He laughed and replied that such objects were too expensive to break each time a nonbeliever was offered hospitality. My direct contact with the Sh!^ca was brief but sufficient to suggest that in the case of the region of Iran and Iraq, as with the complex religious situation described by Canfield for Afghanistan, each religious group holds strong and often unfavorable sentiments regarding the presumed comportment of the others.[334]

*** An Ideological Frontier?: The Alevi

The ambiguous situation of the Alevi in eastern Turkey, Syria, and northern Iraq dramatically underscores the difficulty, at least from a sociological perspective, of defining Islam too strictly in terms of a supposed orthodoxy. The Alevis of eastern

Turkey have been the subject of study by Nur Yalman, a Turkish anthropologist]

who together with other Turkish intellectuals has evinced a renewed interest in the strength of religious traditions in Turkey.[335] From the 1920s until very recently, Turkey’s militantly secular leadership has sought in various ways to discourage religious observances. Yalman avers that “Social Darwinism” became the dominant ideology of the Turkish upper classes and a justification for “embracing” Western | culture.[336]

This attitude on the part of the elite met with significant popular resistance as many Western-educated Turks have begun to acknowledge in recent years. Some religious orders such as the BektasKya have had decisive political influence since at least the eighteenth century and were regarded warily by Ottoman officials and later by those of the Turkish state ,[337] Many religious orders (tariqa-i) appear to have been driven underground but still enjoy considerable popularity. The rediscovery by Turkey’s educated elite of the strength of religious organization and belief also points to the necessity for anthropologists to consider the articulation of divergent religious ideologies or attitudes toward religion within complex national traditions. ;

The region of Alevi settlement in eastern Turkey is part of a continuum of the shatter-zone of religious groupings described by Rassam for northern Iraq.[338] There are small Christian communities, including Armenians and Assyrians. Most of the population is Muslim, but they

are divided between the Sunni, which Yalman glosses as “orthodox,” and Alevi, Bektashi, and Nuseyri. To some extent these divisions coincide with linguistic ones: the Nuseyri speak Arabic, the Bektashi speak Turkish, and the Alevi speak both Turkish and Kurdish. The Sunni com- j munities are cross-cut by following various of the major legal schools in Islam and various brotherhoods. There is even a community of the Yazidis, popularly known as “devil worshippers,” in the region.[339]

Many Shl^ca (and Sunni) reject the Alevis as non-Muslims. Nonetheless, as the name Alevi implies, their beliefs and practices have much to do with the role of j ^cA1I in Islam. Yalman’s description mostly concerns a small, bleak peasant village of some sixty-seven houses. As Yalman points out, the first thing a stranger notices < about the village is the lack of any building showing a minaret: “There was no call to prayer and no mosque.”[340] Additionally, men tended to have mustaches which covered their upper Up in part to symbolize the secrecy of their creed as opposed to the more clipped mustaches of the other sectarian groups.

Alevi ritual practices contrasted markedly with those of the Sunni of the region. A brief contrast of ritual and belief in terms of the five pillars of Islam indicates the singular nature of their beliefs from a Sunni perspective. In terms of the declaration of faith, Alevis emphasize the role of ^cAE in addition to the oneness of God and the prophecy of Muhammad. Sunm Muslims of the prevalent Hanafi rite of the region pray five times daily, with a total of about forty bowings (rak^a-s) daily (according to Yalman there are about eight bowings in each of the five prayers). For the Alevis, two bowings annually in the presence of their prayer leader are sufficient. Sunnl-s fast the entire month of Ramadan; Alevi Musims consider this a fetish. They fast only twelve days of the year in memory of the twelve Imam-s. As for the pilgrimage to Mecca, they consider this to be “external pretense.” The real pilgrimage is internal and in one’s heart.[341] For the Sunni, or (to use Hodgson’s phrase) the shari^c<z-minded Muslims, such interpretations of the Islamic tradition are unacceptable. Yalman delineates other points of contention: Alevis are reputed not to perform ablutions correctly after sexual intercourse, and their secretive religious organization is regarded with suspicion by their non-Alevi neighbors. All but the most major disputes are resolved in the community itself and are not brought before the formal apparatus of the government. Within the Alevi community the rituals associated with the Feast of Abraham (Ar. ^cId al-Kabir) are known as Ayin-i Cem. Outside the community it is known as mum sondu (“candle blown out”), a term “associated with the myth of communal sexual intercourse and incest.”[342]

This ritual occurs once or twice yearly, when the Dede, or spiritual leader of the community, visits it from where he lives in a neighboring town. A key element of the ritual involves members of the community approaching the Dede in pairs, hand in hand, kneeling down and walking on all fours, like lambs, to kiss the hem of his coat. They then perform the only obligatory Alevi prayer. This is also the time at which the Dede attempts to settle outstanding disputes in the community, and the community sacrifices a ram.

Yalman’s article is primarily diagnostic in that it documents Alevi social organization and popular belief and the relations between Alevis and non-Alevis (it might be added that the village described by Yalman had a heavy incidence of labor emigration). He also acknowledges the breakdown of communications between villagers and the Turkish government, especially the ministry responsible for religious affairs, the resilience of religious faith despite all efforts by the earlier republican government to discourage religious practices, and the increasingly evident political significance of these popular attitudes toward religion.[343]

*** Sufism

I suggested earlier that “universal” religions such as Islam are prismatic in their richness and involve multiple levels of belief and experience. The pervasive notion of community, the “Five Pillars” of Islam, the respect and authority accorded men of learning, and the practical organization of the community of believers (as opposed to normative adherence to the universal community of Islam) vary considerably. This section elaborates the notion introduced earlier of the copresence of alternative, or complementary (depending upon circumstances), notions of Islam. One dimension of Islam is the universalistic one of formal belief and practice, designated by the late Marshall Hodgson as a shun^ca-minded Islam concerned principally with outward, public credos and behavior (such as normative adherence to the five pillars) and the elaborate body of Islamic scholarship and jurisprudence which has been constructed over the years. Another dimension of the Islamic experience has been glossed as “mysticism,” although the notion of mysticism is an elastic one and carries connotations throughout the Islamic world much wider than the intensely personal and often esoteric pursuit of religious truths most commonly associated with the term.[344] In North Africa a key aspect of what is regarded as “mysticism” is maraboutism. Marabouts are persons living or dead (dead, that is, only from an outside observer’s point of view) thought to have a special .relation toward God which makes them particularly well placed to serve as intermediaries with the supernatural and to communicate God’s grace (baraka) to their clients. Maraboutism is an ideology (usually implicit) and the ritual activities associated with such a belief. Often marabouts are thought to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, of ^cUmar, the second caliph in Islam (634-644), or of other religious leaders attributed with baraka. Tribes and urban neighborhoods often have special ties with particular marabouts or with maraboutic descent groups, such as the Sharqawa of western Morocco.[345] The shrines of such marabouts can be seen throughout North Africa, and the significance of such figures is formally acknowledged in a variety of ways. Throughout North Africa it is common for persons going on the pilgrimage to Mecca first to visit the shrines or sanctuaries of local marabouts and to do so again upon their return (see Fig. 9-2). Such ritual activities suggest an integrated vision among believers of “local” religious practices with those of the “central” rituals such as the pilgrimage. There is in addition an array of religious brotherhoods (tariqa-s) and lodges (Ar. zawiya; Per. khdnqah; Turk. tekke) inadequately glossed as associated with “mystic” practices.

Mysticism in Islam is known formally as to<zwvw/and in the West as Sufism. A mystic—the ambiguities of this term as signaled above must be kept in mind—is known as a Sufi. The word Sufi is sometimes said to originate from the Arabic word for wool, referring to the coarse wool garments that early Sufis wore to symbolize their lack of concern for the things of this world. Sufi is also thought by some to derive from a word meaning “to be pure.” If s/Mn^c<z-minded Islam was primarily concerned with outward, socially perceived behavior and the well-being of the Islamic body politic, then Sufism in the abstract represents more of a concern with the social and spiritual life of the individual (and, as shall be seen, of specific social groups).

In the first two centuries of Islam, from the seventh to the ninth centuries, Sufism appears to have remained a largely individual phenomenon, but gradually it developed a mass appeal. [346] The first Sufi gatherings were reputedly informal gatherings, especially among literati, for religious discussions. These gatherings sometimes were associated with the repetition of religious formulas, called dhikr-s, but these also could properly be recited in mosques. Hence Sufism was not considered to be a rival growth challenging the formal practices of sh®f^c<z-minded Islam. (A later development was the addition of elaborate rituals, music, and dancing accompanying the dhikr, and these practices were regarded by some Muslims as a threat to the integrity of Islam.)

At first, organized Sufism appears particularly to have gained ground among the intellectual elite, constrained by the exigencies of shari^ca-minded Islam. Despite its stated apolitical objectives, Sufism was regarded from the outset as politically suspect (because of its potential for charismatic leadership), with political authorities sometimes using Sufi organizations for their own purposes or regarding them (often with cause) as being so used by others. The Sufi doctrine of the “inner way,” or the “spiritual itinerary” toward greater religious experience, was especially regarded as suspect since by its very nature it claimed a privileged religious insight independent of the community. As a consequence, Sufis began to develop formal disciplines and standard ways of depiciting their experiences. Regular stages in spiritual development were articulated in the classical theories of mystical thought, each of which was called a tariqa, or “path.” The same term also designates Sufi orders or brotherhoods.

In some versions of “classical” Sufi doctrine, the Sufi way consists of seven- stages of ascending spiritual insight. Most members of religious orders remain at the lower rungs of these spiritual paths. The upper level is said to be reached when a mystic, in a state of exaltation (half comprehends the divine attributes. Such persons are considered walt-s, or saints, and often were popularly attributed with the ability to perform miracles.

By the eleventh century, particularly in the person of the great scholar and mystic al-Ghazzali (d. Ill 1), a synthesis of intellectualized Sufi doctrine and short ^czz-minded Islam was reached. At the level of an educated elite, a beautiful poetry and literature developed around the notions of mysticism, particularly in the principalities of Muslim Spain and in the Persian-speaking regions of the Islamic world.[347]

In many of the accounts of Sufism written by Muslims and by Western scholars concerned primarily with textual analysis there is an unfortunate tendency to consider Sufi doctrine as practiced and elaborated by the educated elite as “pure” Sufism and later, popular developments as a corruption of this purer vision. The result is a distorted view of religious development which led an earlier generation of historians to write of the “decline” of the Muslim world rather than to recognize the multiple levels of religious experience in which the “spiritual” aspects of Sufi practice as interpreted by an elite were balanced by its functions as a sociopolitical movement intimately tied to other aspects of society.[348] A proliferation of Sufi “paths” developed which were internally differentiated and which appealed to different groups and social classes.

In North Africa, for instance, the Tijaniya order had numerous government officials among its adherents.[349] In Turkey the Bektashi order, founded in the thirteenth century, became particularly associated with the Janissaries, a professional military group that played an important part in the maintenance of the Ottoman empire until the early nineteenth century. The influence of this order was such that an estimated 10 to 20 percent of Turkey’s adult male population belonged to it just before 1925, when religious brotherhoods were outlawed in Turkey. Other orders were associated with particular crafts or trades. Some of these orders were considered highly respectable; others, such as the Hamadsha and the Haddawa, were associated with the use of drugs, trances, and activities considered marginal to the urban bourgeoisie.[350] Until the 1920s, the strength of these orders was such that the majority of adult urban males and many villagers belonged to a brotherhood in most parts of the Middle East. A popular saying was: “He who does not have a Sufi master as his guide has Satan to guide him.”

The organizational backbone of these orders is important to consider. At its core was the relation of the Sufi master (Ar. shaykh; Per. pir) to his disciple (mund in both languages). In formal doctrine, the disciple was supposed to be under the total authority of the shaykh, like a dead body in the hands of its cleanser. Additionally, local religious lodges were organized in a loose hierarchy ordered by the prestige of their shaykhs. But the larger these organizations grew, the more difficulties they had in controlling their members. Nominally subsidiary lodges were constantly breaking away, with their leaders acting on their own. The dyadic, or two-person, chains of personal authority inherent in the organization of the brotherhoods thus had a built-in weakness. Despite this fact, colonial ethnographers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially in North Africa, conceived of the organization of these orders as monolithic “pan-Islamic” conspiracies which could be used by the Ottoman regime and rival colonial powers to weaken colonial rule.[351] In practice, it might be added, the authority of shaykhs over their followers was usually less than total, as is indicated among other things by the fact

that many individuals belonged to more than one order and that only a few orders required that their members join no other order.

The proliferation of Sufi “ways” and “saints” or marabouts cannot sufficiently be stressed. Bryan S. Turner has suggested the following contrasts with Christianity as a means of explaining the variety in scope and intensity of religious figures in Islam. In early Christianity, saintship at first was a local and spontaneous phenomenon, but saintship increasingly became tied to the institutional needs of a bureaucraticized church. By the medieval period, saints became officially recognized only after a lengthy process of canonization. There were three implications to this process. First, because of the length of canonization proceedings, persons became saints. only after they died. Second, since there were stringent tests of piety required. by ecclesiastical authorities, most saints were recruited from monasteries and nunneries. Finally, since trained theologians conducted canonization proceedings, theologians had a much better chance than illiterates for canonization.

In Islam, becoming a marabout stands in marked contrast to the Christian tradition, a principal reason why the term marabout is generally preferable to that of saint. First, with no formally recognized body of orthodoxy, the recognition of marabouts is invariably local, although some acquire widespread prominence. Secondly, while Christian saints tend to be orthodox, there is no orthodoxy to which marabouts can adhere. At best they can demonstrate orthopraxy and conform to an established ritual code. Finally, since there are no formal bodies for deciding who are marabouts, the process of labeling them varies widely. Sometimes a person is considered to be a marabout on the basis of descent from religious leaders, as on the basis of performing uncanny acts, outstanding feats of scholarship, or political success.

There is an “essential looseness,” to use Turner’s elusive phrase, about Islamic religious organization, which means that it is much more responsive to local social contexts than has often been the case in Christianity.[352] Religious orders and lodges accommodated the local beliefs and customs of their adherents, and this led to their sustained popularity in earlier historical periods. In fact, much of the spread of Islam throughout North Africa after the initial Islamic conquests was due to the actions of these orders and lodges. Some of the leaders of these orders and lodges based their legitimacy upon genealogies of spiritual authority which in form resembled the “teaching licenses” (ijaza-s) of men of learning. The source of their teachings could ideally be traced in these chains (silsila-s) of authority to the teachings of the Prophet himself. Other lodges claimed genealogical descent from the Prophet Muhammad. One such leader, the Sudanese Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad (1844-1885), went so far as to model the major activities of his life upon those of the Prophet Muhammad as a means of convincing followers of his legitimacy.[353]

FIGURE 9-7 Members of Rifa^Tya Order parading in Cairo, Muslim New Year, 1965. (From Michael Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: An

Essay in the Sociology of Religion [London: Oxford University Press, 1973]. Courtesy of the author.)

The reasons for the general decline of many of these orders by the earlier part of this century have been suggested by Michael Gilsenan. In 1964-1966 he studied one of the new Egyptian religious orders which continues to thrive, the Hamidiya Shadhiliya.[354] This order was established in the first decades of the twentieth century and formally recognized by the government in 1926. In the early 1960s, it had between twelve thousand and sixteen thousand members, concentrated for the most part in Cairo and in the larger towns of the Nile Delta;

Gilsenan's argument for the decline of the other Egyptian orders by the 1920s is the following. In earlier times, the orders provided an "organized associ- ational life" otherwise absent in many Islamic societies. As such, they served the function of being intermediaries between the highborn and the lowborn, rulers and ruled, as well as between persons at the same level of society.[51] As a result of basic changes in Egypt's political economy, the heads of the Sufi orders gradually lost their public and political influence. Professional politicians, landowners, lawyers, and journalists took over some of their functions, and various mutual aid societies were established to fulfill yet others. Additionally, the economic position of most of the orders was undermined as a result of government confiscation of some of the pious endowments (waqf-s), and the declining value of others on which they depended. This deprived the leaders of these orders of the resources with which to entertain their followers and to assist them when necessary. Moreover, Sufi teachings and ethics in their conventional form had become less and less responsive to the values of modern society. Many Sufi orders continue to be a major source of emotional gratification for their remaining adherents, but these adherents are now mostly peasants and manual laborers rather than the broader distribution of membership which they often had in the past, and younger Egyptians no longer seek to join most Sufi orders.

Gilsenan observes that the Hamidiya ShadhilTya order was an exception to this general decline. Significantly, its founder, Salama ibn Hasan Salama (1867- 1939), was a minor civil servant and as such was directly familiar with the demands of modern bureaucratic organization. He was largely self-taught but popularly respected for his religious learning and his claim to descent from the Prophet. Salama was a charismatic figure to his followers: A number of miracle stories circulated concerning him during his lifetime; he was reputed to be capable of confounding the religious scholars opposed to him, was known for his understanding of the "secrets" of Islamic mysticism, and was charitable and generous to his followers.

Organizationally, the Sufi order which Salama founded was set apart from the others. First, in contrast to the practice in other orders, the founder of the Hamidlya Shadhiliya thoroughly tested his early initiates, so that he had a hard core of subordinates who were thoroughly devoted to him. Salama demanded that his followers join no other brotherhood. Second, the order was successful in attracting a white-collar following as well as workers and peasants. Its doctrines and firm organization provide a sense of personal worth and security to “middle class” persons blocked in educational advancement (as are many educated Egyptians who hold clerical positions despite university degrees). Gilsenan characterizes most of its adherents as benefiting from, yet not wholly committed to, the new order of Egyptian society. Because of the lack of advancement opportunities, many individuals of humble origin who have had their occupational advancement blocked can find alternative satisfaction, he argues, in the order.[355] It offers the fraternal certitude and security which presumably were once provided by the “traditional” social order, yet is organizationally adapted to the exigencies of modern society.

A corollary organizational feature of the order is that each role in its hierarchy is carefully defined by written charter. Formal reports are required from its branches, and the members of the order are carefully controlled as to the nature of their public displays. While other groups exhibit ecstatic behavior in public, the Hamidlya Shadhiliya is carefully organized and disciplines its members in public and demands exemplary conduct from them. In return, even if a member is transferred from one town to another, the order keeps in touch with him and assists him in adjusting to his new environment. Gilsenan argues that adherence to the primary religious values of the order enables its followers to resolve implicitly the frustrations they find in other aspects of their lives in modern society. Moreover, new branches are authorized by the order’s hierarchy only after the order’s leaders are convinced that they will be successful. Publicly this increases their prestige. Such administrative efficacy is almost completely lacking in the other orders. The hierarchical control of the Hamidlya Shadhiliya order has enabled it effectively to overcome the problems of schisms and lack of control characteristic of the other orders.

*** Maraboutism: Town and Tribe

One factor in the proliferation of Sufi brotherhoods is the contrast between the requirements of formal, community-minded religion as opposed to a more personalized pattern of belief such as that provided by the religious orders. Other factors are the local conceptions of the social order and the popular understanding of religion. A key Quranic notion is that all persons are equal before God, despite the inequalities to be found in this world. Yet the activities of some religious brotherhoods and the often lavish offerings given to marabouts and their descendants in North Africa and similar figures elsewhere suggest that some Muslims implicitly act as if they accept a hierarchical conception of the relations between people and the supernatural.

How can the tenet of the equality before God be reconciled with the implicit notion of hierarchy? Analytically, an easy way out is to hold that any doctrine that suggests that all are not equal before God is a magical accretion to Islam. But from the viewpoint of tribesmen who make offerings and sacrifices to marabouts, such intermediaries with God are a part of Islam as they understand it. They regard themselves as Muslims, pure and simple, although they are aware of the disfavor in which such beliefs are held by Muslim scripturalists and reformists. Consequently, clients of marabouts often dissimulate their "local" beliefs in front of such persons, especially in contemporary contexts.

In essence, maraboutism involves the implicit assumption that whatever might be formally stated about Islam, human relations with the supernatural work in almost the same way as do relations among persons themselves. In the Moroccan case, for example, the implicit assumption concerning the social order is that people are related in personally contracted dyadic bonds of inferiority and superiority. In a nearly analogous fashion, marabouts are thought to have a "special" relation toward God and with particular persons or groups. For Moroccans and other North Africans who implicitly accept maraboutism, the main issue is not the existence of marabouts—that is taken for granted—but whether particular marabouts will choose to exercise their powers on one's behalf. They are more likely to do so if a client can claim "closeness" (qaraoa) to the marabouts or his descendants. Moroccans who hold this belief are aware that there is no place for it in "official" Islam, "the Islam of the radio," as one Moroccan put it.

Of course the radio says that everything comes directly from God. But just as the king has his ministers, God has his [marabouts]. If you need a paper from the government office, which is better? Do you go straight to the official and ask for it? You might wait a long time and never receive it. Or do you go to someone who knows you and also knows the official? Of course, you go to the friend, who presents the case to the official. Same thing ... if you want something from God.[356]

A range of offerings and sacrifices are made to marabouts and their descendants. Some, such as the sacrifice of bulls or sheep at the annual festival of a marabout are annual obligations which ensure that the social groups involved "remain connected" with the marabout and can count upon his blessings (baraka). Other gifts are given by individuals or groups in exchange for specific requests. These offerings often are contingent. For instance, it is common for women to go to certain shrines asking for the marabout's help in becoming pregnant. They may

FIGURE 9-8 "The radio says that everything comes directly from God. But just as the king has his ministers, God has his [marabouts]." Interior of Sidi Mhammad SharqT's shrine, Boujad, Morocco. (Courtesy of the author.)

tear a strip of cloth from their dress and attach it with henna to the door of a shrine as a “reminder” to the marabout. If the request is granted, then a sheep or other promised payment is made. At the larger shrines with attendants or descendants of the marabout acting as custodians, a hostel and even food may be provided for “visitors” (zawwar-€). The Arabic word for pilgrim (hajj) is not used to describe such visits; the pilgrimage to Mecca is considered conceptually to be a separate phenomenon. The modest offerings made by women on their own or their placing of “reminders” at such larger shrines is discouraged in favor of more substantial offerings in line with the “rank” of the marabout.

Such offerings are explicitly thought of in North Africa in terms of the ideology of “obligation” (haqq) which informs most other social relationships. As

FIGURE 9-9 Women often tear strips from their clothing to serve as "reminders" of requests to marabouts. Shrine near Boujad, Morocco. (Courtesy of the author.)

the descendant of one marabout explained: “You must bring a gift to ‘open’ a matter with God.” Offerings and sacrifices create a bond of obligation between the marabout and his client. Just as with other patterns of obligations, those between marabouts and their clients, even if sometimes discussed in terms of the ideology of “blood” relations, are subject to vicissitudes. The reputations of marabouts living and “dead” are as subject to revaluation on the part of the clients as are other concepts of social obligations.

Personal and collective ties with marabouts rest on a similar ideological base, but the collective ties merit particular attention because of the emphasis lavished upon them by anthropologists. Many tribal collectivities are specifically mentioned in popularly known myths, which serve to legitimate the ties between particular maraboutic descent groups and their clients. Such covenants are represented as being maintained through such means as annual sacrifices, the giving of women to prominent leaders of maraboutic patronymic associations, the claim of a common, distant ancestor between marabouts or their descendants and their clients, and the claim of mere physical propinquity in the distant past. [357]

FIGURE 9-10 Preparing amulets for sale at a mara- boutic shrine, Boujad, Morocco. (Courtesy of the author.)

So pervasive are the basic assumptions concerning the social order upon popular religious conceptions that notions parallel to maraboutism can be found in North African Judaism. Accounts of North African Jewish communities from the 1930s to the 1950s document saints' shrines, local festivals (called hillula instead of musim), and sacrifices. In fact, many of these communities continued maraboutic practices in modified form after emigration to Israel; in one case, members of the group averred that their saint/marabout had managed to emigrate with them.[358]

The understanding of Islam represented by maraboutic practice is rapidly becoming transformed by changing economic and political conditions. In the past, marabouts in North Africa exercised a wider range of economic, political, and social roles than is today the case. Marabouts and maraboutic descent groups previously served as mediators between tribes and the Sultan's court, secured the safe passage

FIGURE 9-11 Hillula of Rabbi Yahya, near Rabat, This rare photograph was taken in the early 1920s. (From J. Goulven, Les Mellahs de Rabat-Saie [Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1927], plate 21. Courtesy of the publisher.)

of commerce, and participated in many commercial ventures. At the same time, many marabouts were widely respected as religious scholars. Their popular reputations as miracle workers and politicians in no way diminished the respect that was accorded their religious learning. Marabouts frequently had extensive contact with religious scholars in the principal towns and elsewhere, and in some cases even tutored members of the royal family. Frequently there was a constant tension between royal and maraboutic authority, but the relationship was one of complementarity. Earlier social anthropological studies dealing with the role of marabouts prior to colonial intervention suggested that they placed an interstitial "balancing" role between segmentarily organized tribes in the absence of an effective centralized government. More recent research based upon a more detailed study of social historical documents suggests that this earlier view needs revision. The extent to which maraboutic centers were allied politically with royal authority had previously been underestimated. In addition, far from being in opposition to urbanbased religious scholars, many marabouts were respected by them and shared similar notions of Islam, even though popular understandings of their role were often at variance with "formal" Islamic precepts.[359] There was no sharp urban/rural dichotomy of belief and ritual practice but rather a continuum between the two.

The effect of the imposition of colonial rule and its consequent political and economic transformations was largely to circumscribe the scope of maraboutic powers. The political and economic roles of marabouts became almost negligible, although many individuals of prestigious maraboutic families were co-opted by the French into positions of local authority. Others, considered notables by the Protectorate administration, managed to use their position to acquire education, property, and the political influence necessary to maintain

their elite position. As the kinds of specific actions which marabouts or the descendants can successfully undertake have diminished, so has the importance given to maintaining links with them by various tribal collectivities. The size of offerings has diminished and so has the size of the clientele of particular maraboutic groups. Nonetheless, their importance as a component of Islam as locally received and understood is far from negligible even today. The festivals of major marabouts continue to attract tens of thousands of clients annually. Today's maraboutic clientele tend largely to be rural and tribal, but this circumstance in itself does not seriously reduce their numbers. Despite Morocco's rapid urbanization, over 60 percent of its population continues to be rural, with much of it often benefitting only marginally from participation in modem economic circuits.

Maraboutism is only one of a range of popular religious ideologies that defy firm classification but which form a component of popular religious understandings. In southern Morocco, for instance, resistance to the French as late as 1919 was led by a religious figure from a marginal social group claiming to be a mahdi, who continued to attack the French even after more established religious figures had sought accommodation with the colonial power. After the mahcfi died, the organization which he founded continued its resistance to the French until 1934.[360] The significance of such popular religious leaders has tended to be overlooked in part because of the reluctance of "establishment" religious scholars to recognize the strength of popular religious movements outside their control, the uneasiness of French military intelligence in comprehending such popular beliefs, and the fact that many foreign social anthropologists cannot readily assess the documentation on such leaders, most of which is in Arabic. As social anthropology increasingly becomes a "native" enterprise, significant modifications in how popular religious currents are depicted is certain to take place.

I have concentrated upon Morocco in discussing religious beliefs and "tribes" because in recent years anthropologists there have extensively debated the theoretical implications of how popular religious beliefs are related to the social order. However, earlier seminal studies exist for other regions. One of the first of these was Evans-Pritchard's The Sanusiya.[361] His main thesis is that the SanusTya managed to become the most significant religious influence over the tribes of Cyrenaica in Libya because the order's leaders effectively managed to adapt its structure to local tribal conditions, something which no other order managed to do. This may well be the case, but several cautions concerning Evans-Pritchard's elegant presentation, briefly introduced in Chapter 3, are necessary. First, he characterizes the tribes of the region as segmentarily organized yet provides no concrete examples of exactly how these segmentary principles worked or how the Sanuslya lodges were concretely articulated with the tribal structure. He provides a brilliant social history of Sanuslya resistance to the Italians, their relations with English military authorities, and how they ultimately became highly politicized The details of guerrilla activities against the Italians are fully comprehensible without recourse to his characterization of tribal social structure as segmentary. Surprisingly, Evans-Pritchard deals with the transition from the presumed segmentary structure of the tribes to their integration into a "political form ... on the model of the European state" in a mere two paragraphs.[5] ® Such a massive transformation of social form, if accurately depicted, merits more sustained consideration. Later studies of Islam in a tribal milieu, notably Lewis's account of the role of saintly lineages

in Somalia from precolonial times to independence, are significantly more successful in suggesting how Islam has adapted to specific political and historical circumstances.[362]

*** Men of Learning (^cUlama')

Some studies of Islam in rural and tribal milieus depict a single pattern of religious belief and practice. In the foregoing sections I have presented some of the reasons why it is more accurate to regard belief and practice as prismatic, generating and reflecting multiple influences, in both urban and rural contexts. This is why it is misleading to speak of firm divisions among various types of religious leaders— scholars, mystics, mahdi-s, and the like. In practice these analytic categories overlap. A scholar can become popularly regarded as a marabout for the quality of his learning and piety, and an unlearned person similarly can acquire a scholarly reputation at least in popular circles. One of the unifying elements in Islam as a religious tradition is the respect for those aspects of belief and ritual which are considered to be fixed and enduring. Thus in religious learning, there is a valued cognitive style, "a set of basic, deeply interiorized master-patterns of language and thought," which places great emphasis upon the accurate memorization and transmission of knowledge which is considered to be fixed.[364] The key exemplar of this cognitive style is memorization of the Quran. Respect for knowledge that is fixed and enduring pervades not only religious knowledge (^cilmj but the knowledge of secular subjects and skills (maSrifa). This attitude also produces a particular respect for the exact use of the spoken word and of stocks of set verses from the Quran, proverbs and poetry, and influences much of the popular music, rhetoric, art, and oral literature (both religious and secular) throughout the Muslim Middle East.[365] At least prior to Western economic and colonial penetration, a major source for the inculcation of this style was the mosque-universities at which advanced students learned the Islamic religious tradition and contributed to it. Schools such as the

Qarawiyih in Fez, the Yusufiya in Marrakesh, the ZItuna in Tunis, the Azhar in Cairo, and their equivalents in Mecca and the two Yemens, the IbadT Jabal Akhdar region of Oman, and Qum in Iran were all well known throughout the Middle East. Beginning with the nineteenth century, the financial base upon which many of these institutions depended was increasingly undermined both by "native" regimes such as Muhammad ^cAll's in Egypt and by colonial regimes such as that of the French in Algeria. Moreover, as European-style schooling, first provided only for specialized military training, rapidly expanded in scope and attracted students from the more privileged social strata and more ambitious poorer ones, Islamic schools were left to students of a modest and often rural origin. Some mosque-universities were "reformed," ostensibly to improve their curricula and standards but also to bring them firmly under government control, but these moves only accelerated their decline. Some mosque-universities continued to thrive until fairly recent dates—those of Morocco until the 1920s and early 1930s, those of the Yemen (San^ca') and the Sultanate of Oman until the middle of this century. Still, the social networks of influence and patronage formed in part through such mosqueuniversities have remained remarkably intact in many countries and the "cognitive style" conveyed by Islamic education retains a popular legitimacy.

The cultural idea of religious knowledge has remained remarkably constant over time throughout the regions of Islamic influence. Writing specifically of

FIGURE 9-12 Discussing a Quranic commentary, Ghazni, Afghanistan, 1973. (Courtesy Jon Anderson.)

medieval Islamic civilization, Marshall Hodgson states that education was “commonly conceived as the teaching of fixed and memorizable statements and formulas which could be learned without any process of thinking as such.”[366] This last phrase raises the crucial issue of the meaning of “understanding” associated with such a concept of knowledge. The supposedly fixed and memorizable statements conveyed by education constitute the religious sciences, the totality of knowledge and technique necessary in principle for a Muslim to lead the fullest possible religious life. These memorizable statements also constitute the most valued knowledge. The paradigm of all such knowledge is the Quran; its “mnemonic domination” (malaka l-hifd) is the starting point for the mastery of the religious sciences. To facilitate the task of memorizing other key texts of grammar and law, many of them are written in rhymed verse.

Because historians and sociologists have tended to take at face value the ideological claim in Islam of the fixed nature of religious knowledge, not much attention has been given to the critical topic of how such knowledge is linked with other aspects of society. In fact, Western scholars and many Muslims who have received a Western-style education merely assume that “stifling dullness” is characteristic of such education.[367] These extreme reactions to Islamic education suggest unfamiliarity with the principles upon which it is based.

Two linked propositions can be made concerning the form of Islamic knowledge. The first is that an intellectual tradition which emphasizes fixity and memory, as is characteristic of many other traditions of religious knowledge, can still be capable of flexibility. In practice there is considerable variation over time and place throughout the Islamic world as to the exact bodies of knowledge to be included in the religious sciences. Once this shifting is recognized, the interesting issue is the circumstances under which redefinitions occur as to what constitutes the proper scope of the religious sciences. The notion of what is meant by “tradition” in Islam, even the “high” tradition of scholarship and learning, may be fixed as to form and style (as the notion of what constitutes “valued” knowledge may be fixed in form and style in any educational system) but not as to content. If the compass of primarily religious studies appears unduly narrow, it was no more so than the curriculum of English public schools in the Victorian era, with their emphasis upon Greek and Latin, or of French lycees with their emphasis until recently upon classical training. As with the graduates of these institutions, former students of mosqueuniversities have become not only scholars but also politicians, ministers of state, merchants, and financiers who are quite capable of dealing with contemporary economic and political problems. Hence one must look beyond the mere scope of such learning to understand its significance.

The second proposition is that the cognitive style associated with Islamic education is closely tied to popular understandings of Islam and has important analogues in nonreligious spheres of knowledge. This formal congruence has served to enhance the popular legitimacy of religious knowledge and of its carriers but at the same time has shaped the ways in which changes are perceived. Earlier in this chapter I indicated how a Moroccan religious judge (qacfi) explained to me the notion of Islamic law in its jural sense and as a code for personal conduct. Everything within the two parallel lines which he drew on a sheet of paper were fixed— the content of Islamic law—everything else constituted innovation. Yet not all innovations are negative—they are tolerated so long as they do not explicitly contradict the principles of Islamic law. This formula might not be accepted by all Muslims, but it is one of the several means by which the notion of the fixity of tradition can be maintained while at the same time accommodating political and economic change. Most Muslims do not possess in fact an exact knowledge of the religious sciences but nonetheless share the assumption that religious knowledge is fixed and knowable and that it is known by men of learning.

Secular knowledge encompasses everything not included in the religious sciences, such as knowledge related to commerce and crafts, music and oral poetry. These last have significant parallels in form with the religious sciences and are also presumed to be contained by fixed, memorizable truths. Popular oral poetry takes this shape, just as effective public speech involves both the skillful invocation of Quranic phrases and the more mundane but memorizable stock of knowledge drawn from poetry and proverbs.[368] A further parallel is. in the model for the transmission of knowledge. The religious sciences in Morocco and throughout the Islamic world are thought to be transmitted through a quasi-genealogical chain of authority which descends from master or teacher to student to ensure that the knowledge of prior generations is passed on intact. Knowledge of crafts is passed on in an analogous fashion. The measure of “understanding” appropriate to such forms of knowledge is its use, often creative, in wider social contexts than those provided by the milieu of learning itself or by the abstract manipulation of memorized material in “classroom” situations, as is characteristic of some contemporary education in the West.

Any analysis of learning in Islam must convey an idea of how many persons were traditionally educated and who they were, in order to understand the contemporary role of religious learning. The first years of study in Islamic education consisted of memorizing and reciting the Quran; only at later stages did the more advanced students learn to read and write, usually outside the context of the mosque school. In many rural areas that lack adequate “modem” schools, such schools remain the only available form of education. Contemporary literacy is difficult to measure, let alone the literacy rates of earlier periods, but approximate t

estimates are necessary to indicate the scope of Islamic education. Thus for Morocco for the 1920s and 1930s, it appears reasonable to assume that 4 percent of the adult male rural population was literate, allowing for regional variations, and j perhaps 10 to 20 percent of

the adult male urban population. My own estimate is that similar figures would prevail for Oman, a country which possessed only three “modern” primary schools as late as 1970 and in which most education was necessarily carried out in mosque-schools.[66] i

Religious learning was popularly respected, yet Quranic schools in their j traditional settings were characterized by a high rate of attrition. Virtually every ?

urban quarter and rural/tribal community maintained a mosque school, as is still \

the case, for which a teacher (faqih) was contracted on an annual basis to teach and]

to perform certain other religious services. Most students attended such schools 5

only long enough to commit to memory a few passages of the Quran; few remained j for the long time necessary to memorize the entire Quran.

The formal features of these schools have frequently been described; although | the consequences of the form of pedagogical action upon modes of thought have only begun to be critically explored. A typical teacher had between fifteen to i twenty students in his charge, ranging widely in age. Printed or manuscript copies of the Quran were not often used, in part because of the lack of printed copies but also because the cultural concept of learning emphasized memorization. Each morning the teacher wrote on a slate the verses to be memorized by the student. The child then spent the rest of the day memorizing these verses and systematically reciting the verses learned earlier. Students were not grouped into “classes” based on age or on progress in memorization.

Two features consistently associated with Islamic education are its rigorous discipline and its lack of explicit explanation of memorized material. Both of these features are congruent with the concept of knowledge as essentially fixed and, of course, with the notion of reason (^cqal) as the ability to discipline one’s nature, as explained in Chapter 8. The firm discipline of Quranic education was thus just one of many ways in which the respect for the unchanging word of God could be inculcated in students. At least in Morocco, it is popularly believed that any part of a student’s body struck in the course of memorizing the Quran will never burn in hell. To indicate the parallel with secular knowledge, the same notion applies to beatings given by a craftsman to his apprentice.

As to the “explanation” of what is memorized, former students of traditional Islamic education have emphasized to me that throughout the long process of

[66] Sources for the Moroccan estimate are provided in Eickehnan, “The Art of Memory,” ;

492. Fanny Colonna, Instituteurs Algeriens: 1883-1939 (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1975), p. 30, suggests that around 40 percent of Algeria’s male population could read and write just prior to French conquest in the 1830s. Under the French, literacy suffered a precipitous decline because of the systematic destruction of educational institutions.

FIGURE 9-13 Rural families often made financial sacrifices to send their sons to mosque-universities. Moroccan religious student, c. 1946. (Courtesy Bouzekri Draiouiy.)

memorizing the Quran, often six to eight years, they did not ask questions directly concerning its meaning, nor did it occur to them to do so, even when Arabic was not their first language. “Understanding” in the context of such concepts of learning was not measured by any ability to “explain” particular verses explicitly. Such explanation (tafsTr) was considered to be a science in itself. Instead, the measure of understanding was implicit and consisted of the ability to use particular Quranic verses in appropriate contexts. Originality was shown by working Quranic references into novel but appropriate contexts, just as knowledge and manipulation of secular oral poetry and proverbs in a parallel fashion were also the signs of good rhetorical style. This notion of style continues to hold in many parts of the Muslim world.

The high rate of attrition from Quranic schools suggests that mnemonic “possession” of the Quran and related texts can be considered to be a form of cultural capital. Aside from small traditional gifts by the parents of the children to their teachers, Quranic education was free. Yet most students were compelled to drop out after a short period in order to contribute to the support of their families or because they failed to receive parental support for the arduous and imperfectly understood process of learning. In practice, memorization of the Quran was accomplished primarily by the children of relatively prosperous households or by those whose fathers or guardians were already literate. I say “primarily,” for education was still a means to social mobility, especially if a student managed to progress despite all obstacles through higher, post-Quranic education. Moreover, the children of the- wealthy and powerful had more opportunities to observe gatherings where the proper use of educated rhetorical style was employed than did poorer students. In fact, the biographies of men of learning repeatedly stress the importance of their family milieu in successfully mastering the traditional texts.

Magic Invocation and Charm.

"Tarshun! Taryooshun! Comedown!

Come down I Be present! Whither are gone the prince and his troops ? Where are El-Ahmar the prince and his troops ? Be present ye servants of these names!”

“And this is the removal. 'And we have removed from thee thy veil ; and thy sight to-day

is piercing.’ Correct: correct.”

FIGURE 9-14 Even among illiterates, writing is highly respected. Invocation for an amulet. (From Edward William Lane, An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians [London: John Murray, Publishers, Ltd., 1860], p. 269.)

The scope of traditional higher education is also significant to consider because of the importance attributed to men of learning in many accounts of the social structure of “traditional” Islamic society. For Morocco in 1931, the year of the first reliable census in at least the French-controlled part of the country, such students constituted a minuscule 0.02 percent of the population.[369] Moreover, since most students left their studies after a few years to become merchants, village teachers, notaries, and the like, the limited number who eventually could claim to be men of learning is readily evident. Mosque-universities in their “traditional” sense (that is, before the al-Azhar reforms of the late nineteenth century and those of Morocco in the 1930s) constituted institutions in the basic sense of a field of activity whose members shared subjectively held ideas and conventions as to how given tasks should be accomplished. In the first place, the use of space in such mosque-universities indicated their lack of separation from the rest of society. Lessons were conducted in the same space used by the wider community for purposes of worship and other gatherings. Onlookers or persons seeking merely to acquire God’s blessings by being close to persons discussing religious texts were free to join the lesson circles. Mosque-universities had no sharply defined body of students or faculty, administration, entrance or course examinations, curriculum, or in most cases unified sources of funds. Teachers (shaykh-s) did not form a corporate group as they did in medieval Europe, although older and respected shaykh-s served as spokesmen for their colleagues on various occasions. In some parts of the Muslim world, shaykhs were formally appointed, but this was just as often not the case. The lack of formal appointment meant that younger scholars had to be especially scrupulous about comporting themselves in ways expected of men of learning and commenting on texts in expected ways in order to demonstrate their claims to be men of learning. Moreover, the formal lesson circles of the mosqueuniversities often provided virtually no opportunity for students actively to acquire, the skills needed to master the rhetorical skills expected of men of learning or to learn the poetry, history, and literature which such men were often expected to learn but which were not formally taught in the public lesson circles of the mosques themselves.

As in any educational system with diffuse, implicit criteria for success, and in which essential skills were not fully embodied in formal learning, the existing elite was favored and certain families often became distinguished for their learning over generations. This was especially so as many of the essential skills needed by educated men were acquired through peer learning and through acquiring the sponsorship of established men of learning. In such activities, students from urban families which already contained men of learning or influence were at a competitive advantage. Students from rural regions were at an initial disadvantage, although once again those from families of rural notables were in a better situation. It was often through peer learning that new interpretations of Islamic tradition, such as the reformist (Salafiya) movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century first became disseminated. As such learning was strictly informal, it also was extremely difficult for political authorities to monitor. In addition, teaching licenses tended to be perfunctory documents; what counted was sponsorship by influential men of learning and acquiring public recognition, usually from persons not themselves in scholarly circles.

Despite the great respect in which religious learning and men of learning are held in many parts of the Islamic world, the majority of students at traditional mosque-universities rarely ever used such knowledge in more than an iconic fashion, as a marker of participation in the milieu of learning. When in the course of my own research in Morocco I asked former students of such schools why they left their studies rather than remain in the scholarly milieu, most expressed a formal sense of regret, but few considered such “attrition” to be a failure on their part. Instead, most emphasized the opportunities their years at the mosque-university created to secure ties with persons within and outside the community of learning. These ties often were of use later in facilitating commercial, political, and entrepreneurial activities. Most of them stated that their intention in participating in the mosque-university milieu in the first place was to acquire knowledge of the religious sciences. The response was to be expected given the cultural emphasis placed upon such valued knowledge. Acquiring the religious sciences additionally implied participation in social networks with persons drawn from different backgrounds and regions of the country and thus actual or potential access to a wide range of centers of power. No other preparation, except perhaps association with the sultan’s entourage, enabled a person to acquire such a wide range of potential associations. Knowledge of the religious sciences was of course a necessary technical prerequisite to performing certain tasks, but these did not begin to exhaust the meaning of education. Acquiring such knowledge also provided the conspciational base from which a wide range of extralocal political, economic, and social activities could be undertaken, at least so long as there were no major alternatives to Islamic higher education.

In many contexts throughout the Middle East until recent times, Islamic men of learning were in the heart of political affairs. If a new ruler was to be recognized, the men of learning of each town conveyed or withheld the oath of allegiance of the population to the new sultan. Popular protest often began at the mosqueuniversities, even though it usually was not initiated by men of learning themselves. Since men of learning tended to be members of the social elite and at the same time appropriated for themselves the symbols of legitimacy provided by religious scholarship, they often represented the will of the population to the government and the intentions of the government to the populace. If the government

performed acts which men of learning considered outside the bounds of Islam and if the men of learning were capable of withstanding the ruler's displeasure, the ruler was often compelled to change his course of action. As Albert Hourani has cogently argued, because men of learning had access to rulers, they acted as popular leaders, and because their popular religious legitimacy gave them autonomous authority of their own, rulers needed them and were compelled to listen to them. "But for this reason, [their] modes of action must in normal circumstances be cautious and even ambiguous" so that they do not appear to be either the instruments of authority or the enemies of authority. Hence men of learning usually chose to exercise their influence discreetly in private. Hourani in fact uses the term "patrician politics" to characterize the nature of their influence.[370]

A number of excellent studies by social historians and anthropologists on the role of men of learning in various Muslim communities have recently become available.[371] One of the first of this "new wave" of accounts is Ira Lapidus's study of medieval Damascus from the thirteenth through the early sixteenth centuries.[372] Because most of these studies implicitly suggest the importance of ties of personal dependence in both urban and rural contexts and the importance of informal patterns of authority, they suggest key continuities in patterns of authority and legitimacy with many modem situations. In Lapidus's description of medieval Damascus, no special interest group could entirely stand apart from the men of learning or fail to be represented by them. They did not form an organized, collective body and were drawn from heterogeneous origins. Some represented scholarly circles, others important and wealthy families, others major religious brotherhoods appealing to various social groups. The multiple informal roles they played held society together in the sense that this informal body had contact with virtually all elements of society. They had no military power and thus could not defend cities, nor could they always suppress violence. Yet their informal consensus provided the legitimacy and moral authority needed by any ruler to survive or conversely to legitimate popular protest.

In every case where alternatives developed to higher Islamic education, mosque-universities quickly lost their former vitality. Even when families which produced men of learning continued to predominate, it was because of their ability to adapt to new circumstances. In almost every instance, the sons and daughters of such men of learning have been given "modem" education in the light of changing circumstances. However it is still appropriate to say that the popular legitimacy of the form of knowledge conveyed by Islamic education and its carriers remains largely intact, as shown collectively by the sustained prestige accorded to men of learning in Iran and in certain other contexts in the Muslim world.

In the past, the memorizable truths of Islamic learning were passed from

generation to generation. Since the collapse of most Islamic higher education, this j is no longer the case. So far, this collapse of the "technology" of intellectual reproduction has had no pronounced effect, but, as elsewhere, major changes in educational systems take a long time to have a widespread impact. Popular respect] for the concept of Islamic knowledge as

fixed and memorizable and the cognitive 1 style represented by such education remains largely intact, as does respect for what j in many cases may be the last prestigious generation of its carriers.[71]

The shift of religious knowledge from that which is mnemonically possessed j to material that can only be consulted in books suggests a major change in the nature of knowledge and its carriers. Ideologically it may still be maintained that]

religious knowledge is memorizable and immutable, as is certainly the case for the j word of God as recorded in the Quran, but the lack of concrete embodiment of this ! premise in the carriers of such knowledge indicates a major shift. This shift may not be consciously recognized, just as many Muslim intellectuals claim that the imposi- i tion of colonial rule in many regions had little impact on the belief and practice of Islam, which from a sociological point of view is decidedly not the case.[72] One of the crucial consequences of this shift is that socially recognized carriers of religious learning are no longer confined to those who have memorized authoritative texts in ' circumstances equivalent to those of the mosque-universities, with their bias toward favoring members of the elite. Those who can interpret what Islam “really” is are ? now of more variable social status than was the case when mnemosyne was an essential feature of the legitimacy of knowledge. The carriers of religious knowledge in Islam increasingly are persons capable of claiming a strong Islamic commitment; freed from mnemonic domination, religious knowledge can increasingly, be delineated and interpreted in a more abstract and flexible fashion. A long apprenticeship under an established man of learning is no longer a prerequisite to legitimizing one’s own religious knowledge.

*** Reform: The Self-Renewal of Islamic Tradition

The dates in the title of Albert Hourani’s Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 suggest indirectly that the main impetus for reform in Islamic thought was the challenge of Western encroachment upon the area.[73] Egypt was for a long time

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For contemporary examples of such style translated directly into English, see the speeches contained in the First World Conference on Muslim Education, Conference Book, 31 March - 8 April 1977 (Mecca and Jeddah: King Abdul Aziz University, 1977). /

[72] For a highly intellectualized example of implicit colonial influence, see Sayyid Amir ^cAli's influential The Spirit of Islam (London: Christopher's Ltd., 1922), in which the Prophet Muhammad is portrayed with all the virtues of a Victorian gentleman. The author, a leading Muslim modernist, was a civil servant in colonial India and wrote in English. See also Dale F. ; Eickelman, "Islam and the Impact of the French Colonial System in Morocco," Humaniora Islamica, 2 (1974), 215-35.

[73] Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). ; the center of such reformist activities. The influence of nineteenth-century intellectuals upon the Islamic body politic was a profound one, and such activities as the "organization" (nizam)—the word reform was scrupulously avoided—of the al- Azhar mosque-university had a profound if delayed impact. It was toward the end of the nineteenth century through the 1930s that reformist Islam began to gain popular momentum. In Morocco, the impetus was linked with the impending threat of European penetration. Reformist thought primarily spread in the circles of intellectuals connected with the sultan's court and among educated merchants of the urban bourgeoisie informally linked with the milieu of the mosque-university. It took the form both of the dissemination of the ideas of religious reformers from the Arab "East" such as Jamal ad-Dih al-Afghanl (1839-1897) and Muhammad ^cAbduh (1849-1905), both of whom attracted disciples throughout the region. Certain religious brotherhoods with modernist tendencies appealed significantly to members of the mercantile and administrative elite.[373]

The concern of this account is primarily with the popular impact of reform or modernist Islam. Ideologically, the essence of the movement was to divest Islam of what the reformers considered to be its particularistic accretions and to return to the essential principles of faith; hence the name of the movement in Arabic, Salafiya, which suggests a return to the Islam of the venerable forebears. In Islam it is common for both modernists and conservatives to justify their ideological position by emphasizing that it is a return to essential principles and not an innovation. Clifford Geertz has suggested an association between the crystallization of regionfocusing markets in Morocco and the rise of reformist Islam and religious brotherhoods with modernist tendencies. In my own work in western Morocco, the major popular spread of reformist ideas came in the 1930s. The principal carriers of these ideas were urban merchants, many of whom had been associated with mosqueuniversities. Reformist Islam gave them an ideological base to challenge the domination of a maraboutic family influential in the region which formerly also controlled much of the commercial activity. The Islam which they propagated was one of coherent doctrines based on clearly stated, universalistic grounds, as opposed to the traditional, largely implicit, maraboutic belief system. In many regions, reformist Islam became in part a vehicle for asserting autonomy from the dominant groups of earlier generations and in addition became a prototype for the nationalist movement.[374] Organizationally, it was common in the 1930s for merchants and craftsmen caught up with the reformist movement to set up loosely knit, ephemeral committees to negotiate various matters with the local administration, such as the construction of schools. Reformist Islam had few adherents in this period, but the few tended to be members of influential families. In contrast, marabouts and their supporters were too tied to the particular circumstances of the local communities

to serve as vehicles for an emerging national consciousness or the practical imple- j mentation of a nationalist movement.

The reformist movement in Algeria is one of the best documented in terms of ; its popular spread. As Ali Merad has written, before the emergence of the reformist movement virtually no Algerian Muslim thought that Islam was anything except maraboutism.[76] Marabouts were the only religious spokesmen for most Algerians and the only alternative to them was a "clergy," subsidized by the French, that was officially authorized to conduct Friday prayers in the mosques of the country. In the Algerian case, an initial impetus for the reform movement was the brief visit of the Egyptian reformer Muhammad ^cAbduh to Algeria in September 1903. ^cAbduh's local contacts, although few, were with Algerians influential in religious 1 circles. The popular impact of the reformist movement accelerated after World War 3 I with the return of Algerians who had fought with the French and who were disillusioned with resuming their former subservient status. Algerians from all parts of j the country began to recognize their common situation despite linguistic and regional differences. (Perhaps an unintended byproduct of French rule was to bring "natives" of different regions into more contact with one another.) Distant problems became more familiar, and Algerians began to think actively in terms of a national community. The term "Young Algerian" began to be used, in parallel with the term "Young Turk" for the Ottoman province of Anatolia. The small Algerian cadre of French-trained schoolteachers, doctors, journalists, and attorneys formed 3 the vanguard of this movement, but their direct influence upon other Algerians was limited by their minimal contacts with Algerians who were not so trained and an j inability to communicate effectively with this vast majority. Because marabouts I and the "official clergy" had supported the French against the Ottoman empire s (allied with the Germans) during the war, they rapidly lost popular support. A number of Algerian reformist leaders emerged, of whom ^cAbd al-Hamid ibn Badis (ben Badis) (1889-1940) was the key and representative leader. Ibn Badis was from 3 a leading family of Constantine. Immersed in Islamic scholarship, he was influenced J by reformist ideas from the Arab East and maintained active ties with Algerians from many walks of life. The high social class of these reformers meant that the French dealt circumspectly with them. Reformists began to visit mosques throughout Algeria, emphasizing in their preachings the unity of Islam, charity, worship, and mutual assistance. While trying to avoid direct confrontation with the marabouts, who were often strongly embedded in local political networks, they challenged the maraboutic claim of communication with the Prophet, their power of intercession and miraculous healing, and magic and sought to convince Algerians that these notions were not part of good Islamic doctrine. By 1933 the French administration had become concerned about the reformists and placed restrictions on them, especially as some of them had become directly involved in the incipient 3 nationalist movement.

[76] Merad, Reformisme, p. 58. See also Ernest Gellner, "The Unknown Apollo of Biskra: The Social Base of Algerian Puritanism," Government and Opposition (London), 9 (1974), 277-310, which contains an excellent analysis of Merad's work.

Merad makes two major points. First of all, maraboutism was the backdrop against which reformist ideologies in Algeria were forged and elaborated. No matter how many educated Muslims deride the implicit assumptions of maraboutism today, the maraboutic interpretation of Islam was a major force in the 1930s and in many parts of North Africa continues to play a significant role. Secondly, reformism mounted an offensive of educated urban interpretations of Islam, “intelligible and simple,” against a tribal and rural religious orientation: Merad argues that consciously or not, urban values impregnated the religious conceptions of the reformist movement and paved the way for “rationalist” conceptions of Islam. He goes so far as to say that without intending to do so, the carriers of reformist Islam managed to secularize Islam by conveying it as doctrines and practices set apart from other aspects of life and to popularize “confused” notions of modernism.[375]

It is possible to argue, as has Wilfred Cantwell Smith, that there has been a tendency in the Islamic world as in the Christian one for religious traditions that once were “coterminous with human life in all its comprehensiveness” to become transformed so that now “the religious seems to be one facet of a person’s life alongside many others.”[376] Still, it is important to recognize that the reformist movement, by simplifying religion and making it popularly intelligible, also made it a universal vehicle for national and wider anticolonial identities. In fact, it is significant that Mu^cammar al-Qadhdhaff, the “teacher-leader” of Libya, proclaims himself a devout Muslim, yet his Green Book, two pocket-sized tracts concerning social justice and economy, never explicitly mentions Islam. The language of the Arabic version makes clear his reliance upon key themes of Islamic modernism but not upon organized Islam or its men of learning.[377]

The richness of modernist and reformist movements in contemporary Islam is too great to allow a detailed survey here, but another important component of the emerging “essential” Islam of the educated middle classes is a militancy against what they see as any religious compromise or temporizing. In the vocabulary of Ernest Gellner, it can be considered to be a sort of Islamic puritanism.[378] One of the best known of such movements is the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) of Egypt, founded in 1928. The Muslim Brothers appropriated for themselves the right to challenge organized political authority, and, as a consequence, the movement was forced to go underground several times. Equivalent movements have been created in other Middle Eastern countries and in many cases exercise a strong political influence. This is a movement perhaps more politically committed than other forms of Islamic modernism, although as indicated earlier, other versions of

Islamic reform (or for that matter Islamic conservatism) also carry strong political implications.[379] The founder of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, Hasan al-Banna, was born in 1906. His father had been educated at the Azhar, earned his livelihood as a watchmaker, and passed his piety and classical learning on to his son. From the time he entered primary school, Hasan al-Banna was involved in different religious societies and became strongly interested in Sufi teachings. As with other educated youth of the 1920s, he constantly discussed with his associates the state of Islam and the nation and was concerned with the defection of many of the educated from the Islamic way of life. When he founded the Muslim

Brotherhood, he was held in personal veneration by many of his followers. Members had to swear complete obedience to the movement, although there were degrees of membership. At the same time, there were punishments for negligent members, so the society had a built-in discipline which set it apart from other religious associations and political movements. Because the organization implicitly made no distinction between the political and social order and called for the purification of society, successive governments saw it as a revolutionary force.[380] The organization was suspected of and actually was involved in considerable political violence.

As for the ideology of the movement, Richard P. Mitchell has characterized it as “the first mass-supported and organized, essentially urban-oriented effort to cope with the plight of Islam in the modern world.”[381] Mitchell sees a continuity between earlier reform movements, including the Wahhabi movement of eighteenth-century Arabia. Members of the movement see themselves as practical successors to the reformist ideas of earlier leaders such as al-Afghanf. The goals of the Muslim Brotherhood include renewed unity of the Muslim community and an appeal for personal reform as a prelude to making the Islamic community realize its full potential for development in the modern world. Their starting point for this revitalization is Islam and its tradition. Western influences are not excluded but are accommodated only insofar as they can be harnessed to the service of an “integral” Islamic code of behavior. Such ideological notions are very much in line with contemporary Saudi thinking, which is one of the reasons that “integralist” and fundamentalist movements reflecting ideologies similar to the Muslim Brothers appear to receive active financial backing from the Saudi state throughout the Middle East. Saudis evidently see such government as more congenial to their own political and religious interests than other forms of radicalism.®*

As Mitchell indicates, it is difficult to ascertain with any precision the social origins of a quasi-secret organization, but available documentation suggests that despite its large rural membership, the Egyptian brotherhood was dominated by urban activists. These activists were in addition predominantly from the urban middle class. Mitchell attended many of the open meetings of the Brothers between 1953 and 1955 and reports that he saw a fairly regular pattern of attendance: servants, merchants, craftsmen, and a few Azharites but an “overwhelming majority” of students, civil servants, office workers, and professionals in Western dress—in short, “an emergent and self-conscious Muslim middle class” hostile to imperialism and its “internal” agents and interested in conservative reform and the reinstitutionalization of religious life as they conceive it.[383]

In discussing modernist trends in Islam it is easy to convey the impression of highly organized movements with clearly articulated ideologies and political goals. Certainly such movements have been a significant component of modernist tendencies and suggest the continuing capacity of Islam to encompass a variety of social situations. Patterns of financial backing from certain conservative Arab states interested in encouraging political thought which parallels their own interests make such organizations perhaps even more visible.[384] Yet such movements do not exhaust the range of religious expression, which in times of crisis even can cross the boundaries of major world religions.

One such event was the widespread belief in Egypt that the Virgin Mary appeared over a church in a suburb of Cairo from April 2,1968 until several years later.[385] Thousands of pilgrims flocked daily to the site hoping to see the miracle. As Cynthia Nelson relates, the Virgin commands the respect of both Muslims and Christians in Egypt. Soon after the first apparition, the Coptic Patriarch of Egypt and All Africa announced at a press conference that the Virgin's appearance was real. The government subsequently took formal notice of the event. What is significant about the apparition is the way that it served as a symbol of unity for many Egyptians. Most Egyptians connected the apparition of the Virgin with the Six- Day War of June 1967, "a military defeat that left the country in despair and its people confronting perhaps the severest crisis in their contemporary history."[386] Both Copts and Muslims saw the Virgin as having come to extricate them from their crisis. Copts interpreted her appearance as reaffirming their role in the future of Egypt to the Muslim community. Many educated students and others who had lost their faith, whether Christian or Muslim, interpreted the event either as a ruse of a foreign intelligence agency (the presumably ubiquitous CIA) or alternatively as a warning to restore their faith in the non visible and nonrational. Again, the form of the transcendent is tied to the nature of political and social realities.

*** Beginnings

The flexibility and capacity for self-renewal of Islam are perhaps nowhere more clearly exemplified than in the formation of the early Islamic polity in seventhcentury Arabia. In fact, because of the attention lavished on the events of this period by generations of scholars, the origins of Islam are in some respects more fully documented than the beliefs and religious practices of some contemporary Middle Eastern societies. Moreover, much of the key primary literature has been translated into English, so that it is readily accessible to nonspecialists.[89]

In thinking of the great world religions and the polities associated with them, there is a tendency to gloss over their tentative beginnings and to see them as emerging intact in the forms by which they are later characterized. Admittedly the early rise of Islam was spectacular. At the death of Muhammad in 632, many tribesmen and oasis dwellers on the Arabian peninsula interpreted their pledge of submission to Islam as a personal covenant with Muhammad from which they were released upon his death. The fact that Muhammad left no clear successor led further to the temporary disarray of the nascent Islamic state (a "disarray" which incidentally is invaluable analytically for suggesting the popular bases of the strength of ; Islam). Yet by 634, most of Arabia was firmly within the Islamic polity, and the major conquests had begun. By a.d. 700, all of North Africa and Persia had been

[89] A good place to begin a consideration of this period is with W. Montgomery Watt's two volumes, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953) and Muhammad at Medina (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956). These volumes are preferable

to a later abridgment, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) because they clearly indicate the nature of the sources and how they can be used. Watt's own interpretations should, however, be regarded with caution (for example, he avers that marriage patterns suggest vestiges of a "matriarchate"). Three explicitly anthropological analyses of this period exist. The earliest is Eric Wolf, "The Social Organization of Mecca and the Origins of Islam," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 7 (Winter 1951), 329-56. Two later accounts are Barbara C. Aswad, "Social and Ecological Aspects in the Formation of Islam," in Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, Vol. 1, ed. Louise E. Sweet (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co. for the Natural History Press, 1970), pp. 53-73, and Dale F. Eickelman, "Musaylima: An Approach to the Social Anthropology of Seventh Century Arabia," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 10 (1967), 17-52. Wolf and Aswad concentrate upon the economic and ecological background to the rise of Islam; Eickelman is concerned primarily with contrasting notions of prophetic authority and their relation to the tribal structure. The "Musaylima" article also lists the primary sources which have been translated into English. Maxime Rodin- son's "The Life of Muhammad and the Sociological Problem of the Beginnings of Islam," Diogenes, 20 (1957), 28-51, and his "Bilan des Etudes mohammadiejjnes," Revue Historique, 229 (1963), 169-220, provide highly valuable reviews of the sources for the study of seventhcentury Arabia and how scholars have used them. See also his Mohammed, trans. Anne Carter (New York: Vintage Books 1971 [French original 1961]) which provides an overall study of the period. Most studies of the period rely principally upon Arabic sources or translations of them. However, Patricia Crone and Michael Cook's Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), radically (and unevenly in my judgment) reinterprets the origins of Islam by relying upon Byzantine and other non-Arab sources. A major change in scholarly knowledge of this period may emerge as it becomes known archaeologically. Archaeological research now being conducted in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states promise to transform what is now known of trade and political relations of the pre-Islamic period.

252 J conquered, and in less than a century after the Prophet's death, the Islamic empire had expanded beyond Persia to India (a.d. 713) and west into Spain (a.d. 711).

The argument throughout this chapter has been that ideologies, even prophecies, are communicated in the context of particular economic and social conditions and are profoundly affected by them. A discussion of the rise of Islam, especially in the period from when Muhammad first revealed himself as a prophet to the years immediately following his death, provides a privileged insight into the relation between ideology and practice because of the abundant documentation of primary sources.

The first thing to note is that Arabia was not a tribal backwater in the sixth and seventh centuries as it has at times been represented. Research in recent years has firmly established that the trade routes crossing the Arabian peninsula were crucial for an expanding long-distance trade and that this commerce was conducted through complex, sophisticated links between nomads and settlers on the peninsula, who in turn had ties with

the surrounding great empires. None of the surrounding empires, however, managed to establish firm control over the peninsula itself. Thus the Sassanian (Persian) empire occupied South Arabia around a.d. 570-575 in an effort to safeguard the trade routes but was unable to expand its domination over the rest of the region. The Byzantine empire was more realistic in what might be called the Arab policy. It refrained from any direct military involvement in Arabia, although it encouraged the Abyssinian empire, a Christian ally, to conquer the Yemen in 525 and to conduct a raid (unsuccessful) on Mecca soon after.

In the century before the rise of Islam, Arabia was surrounded by a ring of “buffer” or client states heavily influenced by the ideologies of the dominant powers. Internally, there were Jewish settlements engaged in agriculture and commerce, as well as Christian monks and monasteries. Thus in one of the states allied with the Byzantine empire, Monophysite Christians had success in converting the seminomadic Arab population to their beliefs. Rather than relying solely upon a highly trained priesthood in urban centers, the Monophysites ordained large numbers of priests with little training so that each encampment had a “native” clergy present to perform rites. The ability of the Monophysites to adapt structurally to tribal conditions in Cyrenaica was a key factor in attracting tribal allegiance.[387] In other client states, the rulers bore titles such as king (malik). This is an important consideration, for in the Quran and in other sources for seventh-century Arabia, Muhammad is made to convey revelations denying that he aspires to be a “king” of the Arabs. Such patterns of leadership were clearly known to Muhammad’s potential supporters, even if not accepted as legitimate by them.

This whole system of buffer states suffered a serious decline in sixth- and seventh-century Arabia, resulting in a major loss of trade. In the late sixth century the Sassanian and Byzantine empires engagedin conflicts with each other. In 628, Khusraw, the Sassanian emperor, died, and in Persia there was a violent internal struggle for power. It was during this period that the Muslim conquests began in i earnest.

Where did Mecca fit into the political and economic realities of this time? The first permanent settlement at Mecca appears to have been established about a.d. >

400. The settlement was much as it is today: barren and arid. There was no agriculture in the immediate region and water was scarce. It is difficult to think of Mecca even in pre-Islamic times except in terms of trade and as a religious center. The town was considered a haram, or sacred enclave, even prior to the advent of Islam. The notion of haram is a particularly significant one because of the way in which early Islam reformulated the notion and invested it with new implications.[388] The pre-Islamic sanctuary was associated with an elaborate system of sacred months in which surrounding tribes agreed to cease raiding one another during certain periods in order to make a pilgrimage to the haram. No blood could be shed within its precincts and tribes could meet there to settle outstanding disputes, agree to the terms by which commerce could pass through their territories, and the like. To violate the rules of the sanctuary was to

risk supernatural sanctions and collective retribution from other participants in the haram. Mecca was far from being the only sanctuary in Arabia; the distribution of sanctuaries appears to coincide with major nodes in the trade routes of the period. The Quraysh, Muhammad's own tribal group, appears to have had a special connection with the sanctuary at Mecca and because of this played an important role in the caravan traffic. Caravans as large as 2,500 camels crossed the peninsula by way of Mecca.

In the immediate period before the advent of Islam, each tribal group appears to have had its own deity, although Mecca's was gaining preeminence. The symbols representing the deity of each tribe participating in the Mecca haram were placed in the Ka^cba. The deity particularly associated with Mecca, al-Lat, seems to have been considered vaguely superior to the others. As Mecca consolidated its religious preeminence in the mid-sixth century (about eighty years before Muhammad's claim to prophecy) the major commercial expansion of Mecca occurred.[389]

The control of the Quraysh over Mecca and the surrounding tribal groups was tenuous, as not all tribes were part of the Meccan religious-commercial system. Leading Meccans proposed to the tribes that in return for a pact of security, they would provide a market for the products of oases under their control in Syria and return the capital and profits to participants. Tribes participating in these arrangements were significantly called ahi Allah, "the people of God." A common name among Muhammad's immediate forebears was ^cAbdallah, "servant of God."

As these commercial arrangements became more complex, tension seems to have arisen between "traditional" tribal obligations based upon kinlike egalitarian principles and the consequences of the unequal distribution of commercial wealth. By the early seventh century there were signs of a growing class differentiation with wealth concentrated into a few hands to the exclusion of the poorer clans in Mecca. Certain clans within the Quraysh monopolized the benefits of trade. An oligarchy emerged, with the more powerful clans using mercenaries to enhance their position.

Into this situation came the Prophet Muhammad. He was bom between 570- 580, an orphan from the age of six and from a clan whose importance had diminished. The clan head took care of him but died when Muhammad was eight. From an early age Muhammad undertook caravan journeys and appears to have acted as a mediator in various commercial disputes, suggesting that his clan must have played an important role in the functioning of the haram. He was poor but worked as a camel driver for a rich widow whom he married when he was about twenty-five and she was forty.

For the next fifteen years little is known of Muhammad. The first revelations came to him in 610. At first Muhammad was uncertain of the meaning of these visions but soon became convinced that he was God's messenger. The first revelations came to him in short, rhythmic

lines, called saf^c verse in Arabic. This is a verse form used also by pre-Islamic kahin-s, or soothsayers, and is the form in which supernatural communication was recognized by pre-Islamic Arabs. Arberry's translation of the Quran seeks to convey the rhythm of the original.

By the sun and his morning brightness and by the moon when she follows him, and by the day when it displays him and by the night when it enshrouds him!

(Sura 91 :l-4)[390]

There is a short, staccato pattern with an emphasis on every other syllable in the Arabic original. Given the vocal patterns in Arabic, with six vowels in the language and triliteral roots for most words, it is relatively easy to find rhyming sounds.

From 610 to 613 Muhammad kept the fact of his revelations to the very intimate circle of his wife and close friends. When he finally began to preach, there was initially little opposition to him, but his disciples were not among the rich and powerful. A few were younger men from influential families, others were younger men from weaker families and clans, and others were persons from outside the clan system—persons, in short, with little to gain from the traditional system of alliances.

Muhammad's early preachings can be summed up by four points which served mostly to "warn" men of their ways rather than to challenge existing political and religious patterns.[391] First was an emphasis on God's goodness and power, which was not so much a criticism of paganism as an articulate expression of the emerging predominant role of the Lord of the Ka^cba. The intent of these verses was not always clear. Coincidental with the first strong opposition to Muhammad's teachings, he had the so-called "Satanic" verses revealed to him, in which some of the divinities in the Meccan pantheon were accepted as associates with Allah.[392] Muhammad later retracted these verses, saying that he mistook Satan for the angel Gabriel. A second emphasis of the early revelations is upon a lurid description of Judgment Day and its consequences, evidently to instill in men a notion of responsibility for their acts. Third was the use to which the Quraysh put their wealth, with God encouraging deeds of generosity and works in the service of the community. Finally was an emphasis upon Muhammad as a "wamer." The notion of Muhammad as prophet of God appears to have gained importance only later.

Thus the first preachings were not very revolutionary. The major themes were to reexamine the bases of Mecca's prosperity and to emphasize the brotherhood of all Meccans. In fact, it is possible to argue that initially Muhammad thought of himself as sent to his own tribe (qawm), the Quraysh, and only gradually to have realized his wider mission.

In the nine years that Muhammad preached at Mecca, taunting and harassment of him and his followers increased. Economic warfare ensued between Muhammad’s followers and the Quraysh oligarchy, and Muhammad began appealing for support to the tribes allied with the sanctuary at Mecca. Finally, the leading clans of Quraysh agreed upon a plan to assassinate Muhammad.

Warned of this plot, Muhammad turned to Yathrib (today Medina), a settlement three hundred miles to the north of Mecca. Yathrib was principally an agricultural settlement with its own patterns of internal strife, including tensions between Jewish and non-Jewish clans. Negotiations were conducted with Muhammad, and in 622 an agreement was drawn up specifying his role as an arbiter (hakim).[393] Shortly afterward in the same year, Muhammad took flight (hijra) from Mecca with seventy of his followers and settled in Medina. This is the time from which years are counted in the Muslim lunar calendar.

The fact that there was an explicit agreement concerning Muhammad’s role as arbiter suggests that the members of the Quraysh played similar roles elsewhere in Arabia due to their privileged connection with the sanctuary at Mecca. Muhammad’s claim to prophecy does not figure in the agreement with the Medinans, and very few Medinans appear to have become Muslims at this time.

The transformation in Muhammad’s religious and political authority after his arrival in Medina reveals how his claims to authority were initially understood in the Arabian context. The commonwealth at Medina was called the umma, and each group participating in it was specifically enumerated. Initially in 622, being a member of the umma did not entail accepting Muhammad’s religious claims. As Muhammad was only an arbiter, Jews were among those who adhered to the umma.

There was only a small core of Muhammad’s followers from Mecca ideologically committed to Islam.

The Quraysh in Medina soon realized that Muhammad’s goals included the reconquest of Mecca; Muslims and their allies began to attack the Meccan caravans. In this period Muhammad tolerated temporary alignments with his cause. In fact, he needed all the diplomacy for which he was famous during these early years. Tensions rose high as some Medinans feared risking ah all-out war with Mecca, especially as trade fell off. Moreover, although some Jewish groups were included in the umma, they were hostile to

Muhammad’s claims of prophecy. Eventually they were accused of siding with the enemies of the umma and were fiercely attacked, with the survivors forced to emigrate and settle elsewhere.

For several years Muhammad conducted touch-and-go skirmishes with the Meccans; these gradually had their toll and Meccan prestige began to wane. Mecca’s leaders accepted Muhammad’s terms for his return to the city in 630. He was generous to most of his former opponents except those who in one form or another had taunted his claims to prophecy. Once Muhammad assumed control over the Ka^cba, terms for joining the umma became harder. Tribal delegations poured in from all Arabia. To become a member of the umma, it was now necessary to accept Islam and to pay a tax called the zakat. There had formerly been a tax paid to Meccans by those tribes desiring to participate in trade alliances, so this development was not without precedent.

Trade patterns centering upon Mecca were temporarily restored, but beginning in 630—some sources suggest after the death of Muhammad in 632—rival prophetic movements sprang up elsewhere in Arabia. Muslim accounts of these “false prophets” are understandably hostile, but an analysis of the sources suggests the underlying pattern of cultural assumptions by which Arabs initially interpreted Muhammad’s claim to prophecy.

Four major “false prophets” are known through the Muslims sources, including Musaylima, a derogatory epithet meaning “little Muslim.”[394] He was from an eastern Arabian tribe called the BanI Hamfa. This tribe had control of a major caravan center called al-Hijr, which like Mecca was considered a haram. Caravan routes went from there to Mecca and Medina, Oman, South Arabia, and Persia.[395]

Obviously, there is no reason to believe that the content of Musaylima’s claimed revelations has been preserved intact by Muslim, tradition; he is, in fact, made to appear ridiculous. Of more significance is the fact that his revelations are also in saj^c verse,- a rhetorical style that marks the early revelations of the Quran and the sayings of pre-Islamic soothsayers. As for differences, the sources suggest a clear distinction between Muhammad’s and Musaylima’s conception of authority. Some sources suggest that Musaylima communicated with Muhammad, suggesting that they settle their differences by dividing their respective spheres of authority, with Musaylima of the Baril Harilfa claiming hegemony over eastern Arabia and

Muhammad of Quraysh claiming hegemony elsewhere. Muhammad’s reply was to resist any encroachment upon his authority.

Some accounts clearly reveal the cultural expectation that prophets were aligned with particular social groups. Here, as elsewhere, the Muslim chronicles make for lively reading. One account has a tribesman from eastern Arabia asking Musaylima the source of his prophecy. Musaylima replies that it is ar-Rahman. The tribesman then asks whether ar-Rahman came to Musaylima in light or in shadow, a distinction which makes sense perhaps in terms of Semitic understandings of prophecy in which God's revelations are in the form of light or in visions and, consequently, were distinguished from those of kahin-s who worked in darkness and who were thus associated with the pre-Islamic epoch of ignorance (jahiliya). Musaylima replies that he came in shadows,, to which the tribesman responds: "I testify that you are a liar and that Muhammad is telling the truth. But a liar of [our tribal group] is better for us than a true prophet of [Muhammad's tribal group]." Another version of the same account has the tribesman say that a liar of Musaylima's tribal group is better than a liar of Muhammad's. It should be kept in mind that these accounts derive from Muslim sources, so that such frank recognition of how claims to prophecy actually are understood gives a ring of authenticity to them since they do not always depict the early years of Islam in a reverent way." In any case, prophetic form and the nature of authority appear inextricably linked.

The conception of prophetic authority as exemplified by Muhammad was not limited in scope to the interests of any particular tribal or ethnic group, whereas the notions of authority of his rivals and their supporters appear to have, had such limitations. How Muhammad's claims to authority were popularly understood was a major problem for the early Islamic community. At the Prophet's death there were no clear plans for the succession, and many tribes considered their covenant of submission to Islam to be at an end. When finally Muhammad's successor was chosen, the caliph Abu Bakr (632-634), his authority was far from carefully defined. He continued to be a merchant and even had to milk his neighbor's sheep until finally he was allowed money from the communal purse. Fortunately, the Islamic community possessed tacticians capable of using an inferior military force slowly to unify the tribes of the peninsula and bring them back to the Islamic fold.

Perhaps because sociological approaches to the study of religion are often misunderstood, particularly by those committed to the religious tradition which is the subject of consideration, I should state my own commitment to making sense

[9] Cited in Tabari (d. 923), History of Prophets and Kings (in Arabic), ed. Muhammad Abu 1-Fadl Ibrahim (Cairo: Dar al-Ma^carif, 1962), p. 1937. (My translation.) After a series of military reverses, another source records the following dry humor of a tribal ally of the Muslims: "Muhammad used to promise that we should eat the treasures of Chosroes and Caesar and today not one of us can feel safe in going to the privy!" Cited in al-Waqidi (d. 822), The Book of Campaigns (in Arabic), Vol. 2, ed. Marsden Jones (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 675. (My bowdlerized translation.) of Islam in seventh-century Arabia. Tor me, a study of Muhammad's political strategies and marriage alliances, the apparent development both of his prophetic message

and how it was understood in seventh-century Arabia, and the growing richness and complexity of the Islamic tradition are made more meaningful when they are viewed with all the critical resources that anthropology and social history allow. The originality and strength of Muhammad's prophetic message become all the more vivid as one begins to see patterns in the economy, polity, and ideology of the time in which he lived, and how the popular understandings of man and the divine and the implications for human society were reworked and put into practice.

Thus far the economic and political transformations of seventh-century Arabia and the period immediately preceding it have been discussed, although the episode of the "false prophets" has suggested the relation between conceptions of man and the divine and the role of prophecy and the practical importance of these issues. One of the best sources for the nature of pre-Islamic beliefs is the Quran itself, for many of its revelations record the skepticism with which some of Muhammad's preachings were received and the nature of earlier understandings of the relation between man and the divine. There are other sources as well, but the Quran itself is the best record of the ideological transformations implicit in Muhammad's prophetic message. Toshihiko Izutsu, a Japanese scholar trained in anthropological linguistics, has written seminal books on the relation of Muhammad's prophetic message to his sociohistorical context.[396] Despite the forbidding titles of his two studies and the forbidding (but necessary) use of citations from the Arabic original alongside the translated verses, his studies are the best available which show how key Quranic concepts are related to one another and how the message of the Quran brought about fundamental shifts in the meaning of these concepts. To take only one key concept, that of God, Izutsu indicates from Quranic texts how Allah was comprehended in pre-Islamic times. In different verses, Allah is referred to as creator of the world, as giver of rain and life, as the supernatural being who presides over solemn oaths at the Ka^cba, as a God above all other gods, and as "Lord of the Ka^cba." The Quran makes clear the pre-Islamic status of these beliefs.

If you ask them [that is, the pagan Arabs] "Who has created the heavens and the earth, and has imposed law and order upon the sun and the moon?" They will surely answer, "Allah!" (Sura 39, v. 61)

Other verses can be cited which just as directly confirm the complex of beliefs, not necessarily fully systematic, of pre-Islamic Arabs. An indication of the lack of consistency is in the verses which suggest that Allah is sometimes thought of as the only God. Thus in one Quranic context pre-Islamic Arabs are made to call upon Allah alone in times of imminent danger such as shipwrecks.

But when He brings them safe to land, behold, they begin to ascribe partners. (Sura 39, v. 65)[397]

Thus the inconsistency in how Allah’s status was regarded is made apparent. Similarly, other verses document the notion that Allah was the God particularly associated with the Ka^cba, a guarantor of two major annual caravans and of the sanctity of the haram. Even Izutsu’s analysis of how the concept of Allah was reformulated cannot be taken by itself but must be considered in light of the entire complex of assumptions made by pre-Islamic Arabs and later by Muslims about a range of key topics: notions of the person, of relations between man and man, and of relations between man and God. The Islamic vision of religion and society continues to be capable of the effective reformulation of what are regarded to be eternal truths.

* Part IV: The Shape of Change

** 10. Cities in Their Place

Cities aren’t isolates, but wide-ranging flows of people, authority systems, cultural symbols, capital innovations.[398]

*** Issues

Anthropologists, social historians, sociologists, and a rapidly disappearing breed of area specialists called “Orientalists” have written substantially on cities in the Middle East. Until recently these discussions have been hampered by two factors. One has been a lack of communication between disciplines. Social scientists, on the one hand, knew their social theory but were less familiar with materials specifically dealing with the Middle East. For their part, Orientalists tended to be so wrapped up in their immediate data that their descriptions rarely posed broader sociological questions. Secondly, scholars concerned with the classical question of the nature of the Islamic city as an ideal type by and large did not seek to articulate their analysis with those scholars concerned with contemporary Middle Eastern cities, the consequences of major economic changes (which of course were not confined only to the last two centuries), migration, and population growth.

Within the last two decades, scholars have sought to join historical with contemporary domains of interest and the insights of area scholarship with broader disciplinary trends in sociology and social history.[399] This chapter will assess how the main contours of past and present urban life have been interpreted by anthropologists and scholars in related disciplines. Also it will suggest some of the major social and cultural consequences of the rapid transformation of the urban landscape in the last four or five decades. If there has been a “great divide” until recently between scholars interested in “premodem” Middle Eastern cities and contemporary ones, this is in part because of the lack of adequate social theory to deal with processes and change in values and institutions. Even if such theory is not yet fully developed, anthropologists are now much more aware of the

necessity of describing the direction of change and of making full use of social historical materials, as Brown’s People of Sale and similar studies demonstrate.

One presentational caveat concerning this chapter must be kept in mind. It is short. The reason for this is quite straightforward if a distinction is made between the anthropology of cities and anthropology in cities. Many studies which are categorized as urban anthropology merely conduct studies of significant anthropological topics in urban milieu. Many such studies have been referred to throughout this book and are reintroduced here only briefly and usually by reference to discussions in earlier chapters. The anthropology of cities, or of urban forms, is more limited in scope. Here is where the integration of studies concerning earlier urban forms and those of the present has been particularly beneficial. This chapter is particularly concerned with the anthropology of cities. Of course, the two concerns with cities are not fully separable. The social organization of work in cities and the intensity of their exposure to economic and political currents from elsewhere are such that processes of class formation often appear more pronounced in cities. Hence the topic of class formation and how anthropologists have evaluated it is introduced in this chapter, but discussion of it continues in the wider context of Chapter 11.

In considering cities past and present and their implications for culture and society in general, the magnitude of the growth of the urban population of the

7000,

5000

CAIRO

URBANIZATION /

4000

3000

OF THE NEAR EAST 1800-1980

2000

TEHRAN-

1000-

/AMMAN

i /BAGHDAD / /' [1]

/ ; BEIRUT

1800 ’40 ’80 1920 ’60 ’80

FIGURE 10-1 Urbanization of the Near East, 1800-1980. (Figures are in thousands. From L. Carl Brown, ed.. From Madina to Metropolis [Princeton, N. J.: Darwin Press, Inc., 1973], p. 107. Courtesy of L. Carl Brown and The Darwin Press, Inc.)

Middle East in recent years is an important consideration. As with the rest of the Third World, urban growth in the region has occurred at an accelerated pace. In 1900 less than 10 percent of the inhabitants of the Middle East were urban. By mid-century, 25 percent were urban and the projections for 1985 are for 43 percent of North Africa and 47 percent of Southwest Asia’s populations to be urban. Moreover, urbanization tends to be overconcentrated in a few centers.[400] Thus in Morocco, which despite an accelerated urbanization remains over 60 percent rural, much of the urban population is concentrated in a narrow strip of land extending 150 km north from Casablanca and 50 km inland.[401] Statistics for Casablanca and Cairo dramatize the rapidity of this growth. At the turn of the century, Casablanca had a population of 20,000. By 1936 it had grown to 260,000, one-third of which was European: By 1963 it had over a million inhabitants despite the fact that the European population had dropped to less than 10 percent and continues to decline.

FIGURE 10-2 Urban hierarchy of the Islamic Middle East in thie[;] tenth century. (From Paul Wheatley, "Levels of Space Awareness in the Traditional Islamic City," Ekistics, 42, no. 253 [December 1976], p. 360. Courtesy of the author and publisher.)

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FIGURE 10-3 The distribution of cities today suggests an overconcentration in a few major centers. (Not all smaller cities are shown on this map.)

In the late 1970s the city's population was nearing the two million mark.[5] Cairo in 1806 had a population of about 250,000. It had 800,000 at the turn of the century, 3.5 million by 1960, and over 5 million in 1970. Since the absorption of refugees from the Suez Canal zone after the June 1967 war and a continuing influx of immigrants from other areas, it will probably have 8 million inhabitants by 1980.[6] Elsewhere the strength of urban growth is equally pronounced, with over half of Lebanon's population concentrated in the capital area and less than onefourth in villages; Tunis contains over half of the country's population, and the Tel Aviv district has over half of Israel's. Similar overconcentration occurs elsewhere and shows no sign of reversal.[7] The current pace of urban growth is particularly critical. Clifford Geertz, after due cautions concerning comparisons between different historical periods, observes that the period of 1800-1850 is considered one of rapid urban growth in the West, with seven million additional urban inhabitants. In the 1950-1970 period it is safe to estimate that the urban population of the Middle East has nearly doubled and involves a much larger number of persons. Moreover, the urban "leap" in Western Europe and the United States took place in the context of rapid economic development and industrialization. This has not been the case for much of the Middle East. "If seven million over half a century convulsed European social structure," Geertz suggests, the more rapid growth in a shorter period elsewhere "can be expected to raise problems of adjustment which [will] make those of nineteenth century Europe seem like the merest of growing pains."[8]

*** The "Islamic" City

Any assessment of "growing pains" or adjustment necessitates an understanding of the social history and patterns of growth of Middle Eastern urban forms. Until recently, most scholars have dealt with the issue in terms of the "Islamic" city, a notion which presumes that Islam prescribes particular urban forms. Only in recent years have advances been made

in how this problem is conceived. Social historians and anthropologists concerned with urbanism in the Middle East were handicapped by the form in which the German sociologist Max Weber posed his famous question of comparative urbanism. Why, Weber asked, did a distinct form of urban organization, the commune, arise only in medieval Europe and not elsewhere? Weber discerned a distinctly urban, corporate form of social organization in European towns which distinguished them from the larger society of which they

[S] J. Martin, H. Jover, J. Le Coz, G. Murer, and D. Noin, Geographic du Maroc (Casablanca: Librairie Nationale, 1967), p. 175.

[6] These figures are derived from Janet Abu-Lughod, “Cairo: Perspective and Prospectus,” tri Madina to Metropolis, ed. Brown, pp. 95-113, esp. p. 106.

[7] Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff, The Middle East, p. 207. Q

The analogy and citation are derived from Clifford Geertz, “The Social History of a Moroccan Town,” Princeton (March 1971), mimeo. (Used by permission of the author.) formed a part, but he found no equivalent in the Orient.[402] His discussion of cities elsewhere merely served as a backdrop for what he regarded as the uniqueness of cities in the West. Despite the fact that many traditional cities in the Muslim world were often set apart from their surroundings by towering walls (as were many cities in medieval Europe), in general they possessed little autonomy from the state and no distinctive formal organization. Led, or misled, by Weber’s formulation of comparative urbanism and similar ones posed by other scholars, some Orientalists sought the equivalent to European communes in the Muslim world but predictably had little success. For instance, the French Orientalist Louis Massignon argued that the so-called guilds of merchants and craftsmen in the Muslim Middle East served much the same purpose as the communes but never produced evidence to support his assertion. As one critic recently commented, despite Massignon’s stature as a scholar his work on urban forms abused evidence and constituted no more than a “tissue of fallacies”—strong language in the relatively genteel work of Orientalist scholarship.[403] Other scholars tended to get bogged down in descriptiv- ism, enumerating the features that appeared to characterize particular Islamic cities or “the” Islamic city as an ideal type. Features such as the presence of mosques, marketplaces, public baths, and so on were suggested as essential characteristics of such cities, but exceptions can be found to each of these enumerations. For example, virtually every rural local community in Morocco has a mosque, although not of course as impressive as those of the great urban centers, and many markets in Morocco are unrelated to cities. An enumeration of such features cannot in itself distinguish towns from villages. Other scholars have represented the characteristics of towns as enumerated by Muslim theologians.[404] As the morphology and functioning of cities throughout the Islamic world has become better known, the inadequacies of stereotypic notions of Islamic cites have become increasingly apparent. For instance, Bonine has argued that the gridlike form of medieval Iranian cities is

derived primarily from the exigencies of irrigation systems and is not an outgrowth of specifically Islamic influences. Lapidus has reminded scholars that Muslims conquerors more often took over cities from earlier rulers rather than build them anew, and the balance between urban and nonurban populations was not significantly changed by the Islamic conquests in themselves despite the fact that many Orientalists have characterized Islam misleadingly as an “urban” religion.[405]

Despite the shortcomings of earlier studies, a number of meticulously detailed descriptive monographs concerning “representative” Islamic cities emerged. Thus Le Tourneau’s massive work on Fez made the assumption that the city’s spatial layout and the economic, political, and social institutions until just prior to French conquest in 1912 were essentially the same as they were for half a millennium.[406] This presumed stasis of urban development encouraged many scholars to think of Islamic cities as analogous to those of Europe in the Middle Ages.

The atemporal assumptions and misplaced analogies of the French tradition concerning the nature of Islamic cities did not prevent the resulting descriptive ethnographies and historical studies from becoming an irreplaceable primary documentation upon which later scholars now rely.

FIGURE 10-4 Traditional South Arabian architecture. For defensive purposes, there are no windows on lower stories. (From Freya Stark, Seen in the Hadhramaut [London: John Murray, Publishers, Ltd., 1939], p. 19. Courtesy of the author and the publisher.)

One of the first breakthroughs in the scholarly impasse of how Islamic cities were studied was the appearance in 1967 of Lapidus’s Muslim Cities.[407] Essentially, Lapidus changed the form of sociological question asked. Rather than search for social forms that were unique to cities, as suggested by the approach of Weber, Lapidus instead sought to delineate the social forms which were in cities and which allowed for the orderly conduct of social life. His emphasis was upon such fundamental social institutions as families and quarters, religious organization, and how the administrative machinery of the state effectively worked. For Lapidus, “Muslim cities are cities by virtue of social processes which are not peculiar to any given culture, but they are Muslim by virtue of the predominance of subcommunities which embodied Muslim beliefs and a Muslim way of life.” It is the interaction of the various subcommunities and of the various elites which created the urban community and achieved a “sufficiently good order.”[408] There were informal, but crucial, cross-cutting patterns of kinship, religion, politics, and economics. He focuses upon the nature and the comparison of social structures rather than upon cities themselves, firmly breaking with Weber’s approach to discussing urban forms.

Lapidus’s analysis is in general congruent with the recurrent argument of this book that many of the most significant patterns of constancy and order in Middle Eastern cultures are to be found in what scholars earlier dismissed as “informal” social groupings. There are shared cultural perceptions of how persons relate to each other which do not necessarily manifest themselves in the form of organized groups or classes.

One of the ways in which these underlying cultural notions of the social order ; are manifested is in their influence upon spatial perceptions and the use of space.[409] This relationship has been a long-standing concern in Middle Eastern studies, but the form in which the issue is discussed has shifted substantially in recent years. For instance, an earlier generation of colonial ethnographers considered the confusing—from a European perspective—maze of narrow, winding streets and blind alleys of traditional North African cities (madiha-s)to be a direct spatial projection of the “alogical” disorder of the “indigenous mentality,” a notion which unfortunately j has not entirely disappeared from the scholarly corpus.[410] There is no generalizing principle which allows a person to get from one place to another on the basis of abstract spatial criteria. In essence, one learns how to get from one point to another

FIGURE 10-5 The winding streets and blind alleys of traditional North African cities constituted a puzzle for colonial ethnographers.

(Courtesy of the author.)

by having gone there before. Even in smaller towns in North Africa, it is not uncommon for persons from one part of town to get lost in unfamiliar sections, and residents will routinely ask “strangers” from elsewhere in their town what they are doing there. Moreover, residential quarters and houses within them are not now and have not been in the past clearly distinguished in any exterior way on the basis of wealth or other criteria, although in southwest Asian cities such as Antioch and Baghdad sectarian groups generally cluster in separate urban quarters.[18] With the exception of Jewish quarters (mallah-s) in many towns, such separation is generally lacking in North Africa.

Four discernible patterns of spatial order can be found in most precolonial Middle Eastern cities: the relation of towns to the state, the market (suq) or economic complex, the relation of religious institutions to the town, and the'organization of residential and domestic space.[412] These various principles of order overlap. The presence of the central power is often represented by a separate, fortified quarter either within the larger cities or alongside it. In North Africa such a compound is called a qasba, or fortress. Soldiers or government representatives would be settled in this compound and usually were distinguishable from other townsfolk. A second pattern of order is the complex of economic activity, the traditional patterns of which have been extensively analyzed by Clifford Geertz.[413] There is a

[18] Jacques Weulersse, “Antioche: Essai de Geographic urbaine,” Bulletin d’Etudes Orientates, 4 (1934), 27-80; John Gulick, “Baghdad: Portrait of a Gty in Physical and Cultural Change,”AIP Journal, 33 (July 1967), 246-55.

FIGURE 10-6 Major commercial streets are often partially separated from residential ones. Covered suq, Tetouan, Morocco. (Courtesy of the author.)

tendency for commercial and craft activities to be separated from places of residence, so that with the exception of small shops within residential quarters, most mercantile activities and the circulation of people, carts, and animals associated with them are removed from the semiprivate space of residential quarters. There is also a tendency for commercial and artisanal activities to be hierarchically ordered, with the more prestipous closest to the principal mosque and others located on the principal arteries.

The religious institutions cross-cut many of the other notions of order. In larger urban centers such as Tunis and Fez, the principal mosque is the place for the Friday sermon and the rituals associated with major feast days. In the past, it also served as a place of learning and frequently was the focal point for public protest in times of civil unrest. This symbolic centrality of the mosque was frequently replicated by its spatial centrality. In Tunis, the mosque is accessible by major arteries leading to the principal gates of the madina, facilitating access to it from all residential quarters. As earlier discussed, an additional tie between religious institutions and commercial activities is provided by the pious endowments (waqf; habus), which rent a number of shops in the commercial sector at below market values.[414] Finally, there are the maraboutic shrines associated with each city or town which even today serve occasionally as focal points of communal activities.

A final principle of order is the division of traditional matttna-s into residential quarters, with the households of each quarter claiming multiple personal ties

and common interests based on varying combinations of kinship, common origin, ethnicity, patronage and clientship, participation in factional alliances, and spatial propinquity itself. In a small Moroccan town in which I conducted research between 1968-1970, residents divided their town into anything from thirty to forty-three quarters. The fact that there is such a discrepancy in how townsmen evaluate space even in such a small setting indicates that space is not conceived entirely in a fixed way or primarily by abstract physical features. How

quarters were evaluated depended on what people knew of the social history of their town, which varied with generation and social position, and formative experiences shared with other persons in the community. The demarcation of quarters cannot always be discerned by physical signs. Many are clustered around impasses, but this is not always the case. For one thing, the social boundaries of many quarters are subject to modification; for another, not all houses are necessarily thought to be part of quarters. Only those clusters of households evaluated as sustaining a particular quality of life are known as quarters.

As previously indicated in Chapter 6, that quality of life is defined by the extension in contiguous physical space of the notion of “closeness” (qaraba); component households in a quarter assume that they share a certain moral unity so that in some respects social space in their quarter can be regarded as an extension of their own households. This closeness is symbolized in a number of ways: the exchange of visits on feast days, assistance and participation in the activities connected with births, circumcisions, weddings and funerals of component households, and the like. The heads of household of a quarter share certain minimal collective responsibilities. They often construct and maintain a mosque and hire a Quranic teacher for it. Because of the multiple ties which link the residents of a quarter, respectable women who never venture to the main market can circulate discreetly within their quarter, since the residents all assume a closeness to each other. In Chapter 6, I provided an example of the “formation” of a new quarter due to long-term shifts in social status as perceived by residents of a town. Quarters also decline and lose their cohesiveness. Thus certain quarters took shape in the 1920s and 1930s with the rapid ascendancy of certain rural Qa’id-s. Another quarter which emerged in this period was named after a family which had as its “founding” ancestor a merchant who traded in the Berber highlands prior to the arrival of the French in 1912. The descendants of this merchant became prosperous soon after the advent of the colonial era and purchased land on which the French built a major extension of the town in the 1930s. In the nationalist fervor that began in the 1930s and continued for some years after independence, two of the merchant’s sons (also merchants themselves) became the leaders of rival political parties. Despite their rivalries, both lived in nearly adjoining houses, and other residents of the quarter continue to stress a variety of ties with the brothers’ family. As long as a quarter had men of prominence or “word” capable of acting as their leaders, some sort of claim of common descent or origin, and the ability at least in some contexts to act collectively, it constituted a feature in people’s shared conceptual image of the town. As the distribution of power, authority, and prestige shifts, so does the conception of space. Thus despite the apparent “disarray” of such spatial conceptions to outsiders, they follow an articulate cultural logic. Similar Conceptions of space appear to prevail elsewhere in the Middle East. To use Kevin Lynch’s term, the imageability of residential space in the Middle East is not principally in terms of physical landmarks but in shared conceptions of the social order. The cultural bases of these conceptions can be abstractly delineated, but a particular knowledge is needed for orientation in the social space of each town. Gulick’s study of Tripoli, Lebanon, clearly indicates that the notion of imageability is more useful when it encompasses not only visual form (which is Lynch’s emphasis), but also those which are socioculturally significant in both “modem” and traditional settings.[22] Studies such as Gulick’s suggest some of the significant continuities between the social and spatial order discerned for “Islamic” cities and contemporary urban forms,

*** Colonial Cities and Their Legacy

Colonial principles of spatial order are particular instances of the spatial projection of dominant cultural values or, to be more precise, the values of the dominating political power. The colonial cities of French North Africa, especially in Morocco, i provide particularly clear examples of the basic principles of colonial urban plan- j ning. If India was the colony upon which Great Britain lavished the most elaborate | attention, then Morocco was its equivalent for the French. Colonial cities were not just the juxtaposition of the urban forms of the dominating power and the dominated. They were new creations with specific and lasting social consequences.[23] In j cities such as Casablanca, commercial and economic interests were so powerful and growth so rapid that colonial authorities were unable to plan effectively for rational growth and development. Elsewhere, however, the French developed almost Cartesian plans which clearly articulated the legitimizing ideology of colonial domination. One of the myths of legitimacy used by the French in Tunisia and Morocco was that they were not a colonial power. “Native” regimes were maintained intact in both countries, and these regimes were “aided” by the authorities ! of the Protectorate who acted in the name of the Muslim rulers. Technically the ; French role was one of preserving native institutions. The consequence for urban, planning—and in the case of Morocco every town had a developmental plan by the 1930s—was a basic dualism in urban growth. In nearly every case, the “traditional”, [22] Kevin Lynch, The Image of the City (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, I960); John Gulick, “Images of an Arab City,” Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 29, no. 3 ■ (August 1963), 196-97. See also Gulick’s Tripoli: A Modem Arab City, Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs, 12 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).

[23] See Anthony D. King, Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power and Environment (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976).

madma was preserved more or less intact, while a “new” town, meant primarily, but not exclusively, for Europeans, grew up alongside it. In some cases, two “new” towns were created: one for “evolved” natives, another for Europeans. The overall shape of the town of Tunis (Fig. 10-7) suggests how this philosophy was spatially projected. As some Tunisians comment, the overall street plan takes the form of a cross being rammed into the madma, making the colonial imagery even more suggestive. One plan for Tunis, elaborated during the Vichy regime but never carried out, took the notion of colonial planning one step further. The “modem” part of Tunis was divided along one main axis between Christians and Muslims (with a few “neutral” places in between) and along the other axis between bourgeoisie and workers, thus using the principles of religion and class for the spatial ordering of society.[415]

The initial colonial planning for Morocco from the inception of the Protectorate in 1912 until the 1930s was highly coherent and based upon three principles.[416]

FIGURE 10-7 "Tunis showing juxtaposition of old and new city, and Bourguiba Avenue as battering ram against old city." (From Brown, ed., From Madina to Metropolis, p. 29.

Courtesy of L. Carl Brown and The Darwin Press, Inc.)

The first was that madinas were to be separated from European quarters. This division corresponded to what the French saw as the fundamentally “different” mentalities of the Muslims and Europeans. Thus it was argued that most “traditional” Moroccans preferred to be insulated from the outside world so that the vitality of traditional life could be preserved. Although an effort was made to provide the madma-s with improved sewers, water systems, and electricity, the seeds were planted for many madma-s to deteriorate into historic slums, dying a slow death of benign neglect. There were exceptions for cities such as Sale and Tetouan, where many of the traditional bourgeoisie maintained their houses for reasons of prestige, but the overall trend, especially after the economic dislocations of the Second World War, was to abandon such housing to impoverished rural immigrants.

A second principle was for town planning to protect the cultural heritage. Colonial planners enforced strict regulations designed to protect the town as an overall monument, a notion which began to be applied internationally in most countries only by the 1960s. As Dethier suggests, whatever the intentions of the planners, Moroccans often interpreted the decision to retain walls around the madma as a security measure. In fact, some of the older “native” housing developments, one in the phosphate mining center Khouribga and the other in Casablanca, had walls with guards posted at the gates for just such a purpose, although the security was ostensibly for the inhabitants of the developments and not against them.

The final hotion was that of constructing the “new” cities according to the most up-to-date principles of planning. The result for many Moroccan towns was the provision of parks and green spaces (admittedly often serving as a buffer between European and Moroccan quarters) and zoning regulations which except for Casablanca adequately managed to control the direction of growth. The state also purchased tracts of land which were then sold under strict controls to prevent speculation. Public buildings were designed and situated so as to contribute to the overall symmetry of towns, and town planners took special care to use distinctive features of local topography. With the exception of the provision of “evolved” native quarters until the late 1940s, such planning was primarily for the benefit of Europeans, as if the political and economic transformations of the colonial regime could leave the indigenous population undisturbed. And in the “evolved” settlements, the proviso that construction had to begin immediately and according to strict (and expensive) specifications ensured that only wealthier Moroccans could take advantage of them. Despite the efforts of colonial authorities to Emit emigration from rural areas, so-called “clandestine”

housing emerged, especially in the form of the shantytowns, or bidonvilles, whose inhabitants were primarily emigrants from rural areas. Such “temporary” housing has become a permanent feature of most large Middle Eastern cities, with local variations such as Cairo’s “City of the Dead,” where families have taken above-ground tombs for housing. Studies that have been conducted on the value of land in shantytowns indicate that unscrupulous realtors can realize a larger profit from collecting rents from such lands than in building more expensive housing. Because of the illegal nature

FIGURE 10-8 Such "temporary” housing as this has become a permanent feature of many Middle Eastern cities. Bidon- ville Bni Msik, Casablanca, 1968. (Photograph by D. PaPini. Daniel Noin, La Population rurale du Maroc [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970], plate 48. Used by permission of the publisher.)

of such housing, when the land is needed for other purposes the shacks on it technically can be cleared, although actual exercise of such rights involves political risks. Although planners often have thought of shantytowns as a passing phenomenon, the attempts made after the end of the Second World War by the Protectorate government and by Morocco’s independent government have never effectively managed to stem their growth. Analogous developments occurred throughout the Middle East; in Turkey fully 13 percent of the urban population live in shantytowns (gecekondu-s), and in many towns of the Middle East the figure may be significantly higher.[417]

The planning policies of independent regimes throughout the Middle East unsurprisingly reflect the ideology of dominant groups and the legacy of colonial assumptions concerning urban life. Ellen Micaud has produced what amounts to an ethnography of successive urban plans for post-independence Tunis. Immediately after Independence in 1956, the Tunisian elite viewed the madina as an obstacle to be surmounted so that the country could have “a capital worthy of the active modernizing image being fashioned on all fronts.”[418] After Independence the exodus of all who could afford to leave the madma for other housing rapidly

I j j 3 accelerated, thus leaving the madina to rural immigrants and others who had no

1 active say in its future. Commercial and administrative activities had increasingly

shifted away from the madma during the colonial period. Finally, the nationalization of pious endowments in 1957 radically changed the economic and legal structure of the madma. At best, some visionary plans called for the neglect of the

1 madma as a sort of natural obstacle which planners sought to avoid. This stage of

i post-independence planning can in some ways be considered an implicit acceptance

j of the colonial devaluation of the madina, in the sense that it was associated with

s an inferior status and an unvalued past. In the late 1960s with the burgeoning of the

j tourist industry, there was a shift to regarding the madma as part of the natural

j heritage, and various plans, some of which were the subject of international com-

j petitions, were evolved in an effort to regard it as part of the national tourist

'] business. A final, more realistic phase was begun in 1973 with more modest projects

1 but ones designed to encourage the maintenance of housing within the madma

’ (through legislation to facilitate owner-occupied dwellings) and to provide subsidies

1 for various craft and artisanal activities. Planners began to realize that it was not

i possible to allow any further deterioration of the madma, given the worsening hous

ing crisis throughout the capital region. Only after two decades of Independence has j it been possible to regard the madma as an integral and enduring part of Tunisia’s 3 heritage and living present.

*** Cities Now

The study of cities necessarily involves evaluation of the approaches used by a number of disciplines. Fuad I. Khuri, whose studies on the urbanization of the i greater Beirut region have been discussed in earlier contexts, sees Middle Eastern

i urban studies as falling into three major categories.[28] First is what he calls the

| survey approach: the compilation of demographic data which indicate something

3 about the age distribution of urban residents as opposed to those of the country,

j levels of consumption, size and density of urban areas, and other such indices. In

j the main, he states, such compilations of statistics are part of international efforts

1 to assess the extent of urbanization and the administrative problems associated with

] it. He writes that although the theoretical contribution of such studies is minimal

! and their interpretation is often relatively haphazard, such statistics can often high

light problems which require explanation.[29]

I A second major approach is the study of particular problems—religious beliefs

and practice, child rearing, educational aspirations, and the like—in terms of urban- rural contrasts, sectarian differences, and socioeconomic backgrounds. According to Khuri, the difficulty with most such studies is that they accept uncritically the

3 [28] Fuad I. Khuri, From Village to Suburb: Order and Change in Greater Beirut (Chicago

j and London: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 1-15.

j [29] Ibid., p. 2.

validity of the categories used, such as rural and urban. Such studies often do not provide a comprehensive theory of the nature of urban life with which the various characteristics attributed to urban and rural communities or to various socioeconomic classes can be systematically linked. He provides as a key example Janet Abu-Lughod's major study of Cairo in which she contrasts the "modem urban" style of life of Cairo as opposed to the "rural." Khuri argues that Abu-Lughod's contrast can be accounted for just as well in both Egyptian and Lebanese contexts by whether people are rich or poor, so that the presumption that the differences are urban and rural is misleading. Rural dwellers can be separated from urban ones on the basis of a set of distinguishing factors or variables, but Khuri questions whether these define the character of either society unless the interconnectedness among the itemized variables is shown.[419] He suggests that other studies (with the exception of Abu-Lughod's meticulous analysis of the demography, socioeconomic characteristics, and social history of every major district of Cairo) have ignored the impressive changes that have modified the "social character" of Middle Eastern cities since the 1930s, and have written, instead, of villages or cities as if they were constants. Khuri sees his own "community" study of two contrasting Beirut suburbs as a third approach which does not assume such constancy. For Khuri, suburbs are communities that are still finding their form and coming into being. His approach to their analysis is to deal "with a wide range of structures, organizations, institutions, customs, socioeconomic differentiation, and political action." Khuri's self-description of his methodological approach is unexceptionable, despite the quality of his analysis, because he downplays his sustained attention to the social history of how these communities came into being. This provides the necessary background against which notions of ethnic and sectarian identity can be evaluated.

In contrast to the Western pattern of specialized suburban communities, many of which serve as dormitories for nearby business and industrial districts, Khuri indicates that there is a tendency for Lebanese suburban communities to be economically independent and self-contained. He concludes that in the communities studied, "Class is the least important

instrument of organization. Neither neighborhoods, quarters, or suburbs, nor voluntary associations, societies, clubs, or political constellations are based on class affinities."[420] It is visible in political roles and apartment styles, but there is no American-style association between class and area of residence.

Unless Khuri's argument is taken as limited to the relation of class to residential area, his conclusion is markedly controversial in terms of Lebanon, where other analysts have asserted that class factors are decisive and underlie other characteristics such as sectarian loyalties. In fact, Khuri's argument as to the association of class and residential area deserves careful attention because elsewhere in the Middle East spatial differentiation based upon wealth, migrant status, and other key variables has become increasingly common and suggests the increasing importance of class, occupation, and wealth as organizing factors of the social order.[421] In many of the oil-wealthy Gulf states, which have experienced massive building growth since the 1960s, it has been common to construct large blocks of housing designed for particular occupational categories, with regions of villas reserved for engineers, merchants, and other persons of high status, and three-storied walk-up apartment buildings for those of more limited income groups. Such a pattern is also common in older cities. Baghdad has large sectors marked off for particular types of housing—for military officers, civil service employees, and those of particular industries such as oil, railroads, utilities, and banks.[422] Similar patterns prevail throughout North Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East.

Another sort of spatial order is provided by the settlement of migrants in cities, a phenomenon which accelerated at the end of the Second World War and

FIGURE 10-9 Modern construction in Oman dates almost entirely from the post-1970 era. (Courtesy of the author.)

has continued unabated ever since. Abu-Lughod has presented a portrait of a "typical" migrant to Cairo in the late 1950s. He was a young male, who spent his first days in the city with a relative or friend from his village of origin. When he found more permanent lodging, it usually was in a neighborhood or subsection of the town occupied by other migrants from the same region. A similar pattern prevails today. Such migrants often formed benevolent associations to look after some of their common interests. To help them to adjust to city life, migrants have a network of primary personal associations "far beyond" what is deemed possible in the West to help them adjust, enmeshing "not hundreds but thousands of individuals."[423] A similar pattern of settlement and the use of personal networks to adapt to new situations prevails elsewhere in the Middle East.[424]

Not all recent settlements of migrants consist of shantytowns; often individuals move out of them when their financial circumstances allow. For modest civil servants, employees of factories, bus conductors, and persons of similar occupation, this means renting or buying a

house in a neighborhood such as Casablanca’s ^cAyn Shuq (Ain Chok). This is a neighborhood about half an hour to the east from the center of town by municipal bus, named after one of the first postWorld War II housing developments constructed for Moroccans by the French. It is close to what in 1979 was still the periphery of a rapidly expanding Casablanca. The original development consists of carefully laid out rectangular streets; only the principal streets can be used by automobiles. Shops, a bath, and a mosque are located along these main internal streets; impasses lead off them, and the whole complex is accessible from the outside by only a few streets, so that the overall spatial principles of a traditional madina are replicated. The visual impression of its inhabitants suggests that they are older, retired persons or elderly soldiers, including many of those initially granted rights to housing in the development. Because rents for government developments are lower than commercial ones, such rights are jealously protected. In fact, with Morocco’s current housing crisis, rights to such housing are often seconded to others at higher prices.

The original project is now dwarfed by the adjoining housing which is privately constructed. Principal shops are located along a major highway and boulevard which determine the limits of the quarter. These are almost the only streets which have trees along them. The remaining sides of the quarter are bounded by empty lands owned in part by the government. Large primary and secondary schools and an orphanage adjoin the quarter. Every morning thousands of schoolchildren cross paths through the garbage-strewn empty spaces to these various schools, some ,for boys and girls together, others with separate education. Most of these schools are of recent construction, in a desperate effort to keep up with population growth in which over half the population is under the age of eighteen. Because schools can be a symbol of progress and improvement, it is important to indicate how they are experienced by the children of the quarter. So much time is spent by the under-eighteen population in school or in school-related defined activities that the relation of the school to other aspects of society is decidedly crucial. The school buildings are modestly but adequately designed, with a high wall cutting them off from the outside, adequate lighting on sunny days, and small internal courtyards. In the late 1970s there was no problem of ventilation as virtually every window was broken during a series of student demonstrations against the growing inadequacies of an educational system unable to cope with rapid expansion. Even the fewer than 10 percent of the entering school students who eventually obtain diplomas cannot be assured of gainful employment. School furniture is broken or defective; blackboards and books are few. For the teachers who take an interest in them, students show a marked enthusiasm. For the others, especially when official visitors are present to evaluate teaching performance, students deliberately show inattention or indifference. More than twenty years after Morocco’s independence, many of the teachers in the secondary cycle continue to be foreigners, some from France and other European countries, including Eastern Europe, and a few from Eastern Arab countries. Almost none of the

FIGURE 10-10 Fewer than 10 percent of entering secondary school students eventually obtain diplomas. Secondary school in ^cAyn Shuq, Casablanca. (Courtesy of the author.)

European teachers makes any effort to learn Arabic, to converse with their Moroccan colleagues outside of formal meetings, or to meet with their students outside of classroom situations. The moment school is over, they leave for other parts of Casablanca, much like many teachers in America’s inner cities. Only the younger Moroccan teachers live in the quarter itself, unless they have a family or relatives elsewhere in Casablanca. Almost all of these teachers meet informally with their students to discuss their progress and offer them advice.

As for the quarter itself, few of its streets are paved. The streets are laid out in rectangular fashion and houses are provided with sewers, electricity, and water, all indicating the essentials of urban facilities even if no other amenities are provided. Only a few of the larger stores on the periphery of the quarter are well stocked. Most stores sell in small quantities, carry only basic commodities and sell at higher prices to their clients in exchange for extended credit. Several garages have been converted into mosques without minarets. Houses are mostly two-storied, but the houses of the entire quarter, with their gaudy facades of pink, light blue, green, yellow, and orange indicate that most inhabitants gradually constructed their own properties. The interiors of many houses show that originally they were singlestoried with open courtyards. As owners acquire the funds, they add on, a room or a story at a time. Many owners rent part of their houses to other families or to single civil servants such as teachers in order to pay for additional construction. Casablanca has rent control laws as do many other cities in the Middle East, but in practice they work effectively only for long-term tenants.

There are virtually no factories near the quarter, and many inhabitants are underemployed or support numbers of persons not in the labor force. Outside of school hours, the streets are crowded with children playing; radios blare throughout the daytime, and in the early evening they are joined by the noise of television sets. There are some cars parked on the streets and a much larger number of scooters, but most residents depend upon public buses. Bus rides to elsewhere in the city are long and often uncomfortable, but the lower rent and cost of housing in a peripheral, popular quarter outweigh such inconvenience.

Most of the quarter’s residents are by origin from elsewhere in Morocco, but there are no evident patterns of settlement. Neighbors are civil and cooperate with each other but usually at a fairly minimum level. The structure of ownership and the feeling of many residents that they belong to the quarter only until they find more substantial housing militates against more permanent bonds. Teenagers and young adults—both men and women in the case of Casablanca—are attracted more by the bright lights and amusements of promenading in Casablanca’s center or sitting in its cafe's, where they are freer than in their own quarter to meet friends. There are virtually no cafds, cinemas, or recreational facilities beyond the streets and vacant land on the quarter’s edge. In all, the quarter shows only minimally the forms of solidarity which develop in older, more established madmas or even in the city’s bidonvilles, where residents are perhaps compelled to cooperate more with each other.

*** Cities and Social Class

One of the few substantial attempts to relate the impact of shifts in world economic currents upon the social order of a Middle Eastern city is Kenneth L. Brown's People of Sale. Brown makes the important point, confirmed by numerous other studies, that status and social relations were not determined by any fixed characteristics. Attributes such as Arab or Berber identity, religious learning, patrilineal descent, and membership in occupational groups and religious brotherhoods constituted "cultural categories, not concrete, isolated social aggregations or classes." Social relations were instead "characterized by a pattern of shifting coalitions, of networks of patrons and clients" based upon common interests that were "sometimes strengthened (but not determined) by descent, marriage, or friendship."[425] His description of the elite of the city is likewise congruent with descriptions of other Middle Eastern contexts. They were persons "who dominated cross-cutting social networks" and who were less leaders of "powerful extended families" than "men who controlled clientele groups held together by mutual interests, not ties of consanguity."[426]

The long-range consequences of capitalist and colonial penetration, Brown argues, were to create a situation in which a few entrepreneurs amassed considerable wealth while the majority of small merchants, artisans, and peasants became increasingly impoverished and social mobility became more difficult. Stated in the abstract this theme of the growth of class relationships instead of vertical ones of patron-client and other ties recurs in contemporary anthropological and social historical literature. Brown's almost unique contribution is twofold. First, he analyzes in detail and over long historical periods the consequences for particular crafts and mercantile activities of these economic and political changes; most other studies merely juxtapose before and after contexts without assessing the interplay between market forces and social relations. Second, he argues that the "local patterns of relationships," which he meticulously describes, remain largely intact and to date have not led to a "class-based social structure."[427] Thus, even with the growing differentiation of persons along lines of wealth, individuals perceived their "interests" in a multiplicity of settings and manipulated an intricate range of identities and loyalties.

If the growing importance of economic differentiation was apparent in the critical period dealt with by Brown through the 1930s, it has become much more so in the accelerated social change of the post-World War Two era. For this more recent period, Alan Duben's (Dubetsky's) 1970-1971 research in a mahalle (neighborhood) of thirty thousand persons which he calls Aktepe, located on the outskirts of Istanbul, is one of the more intensive studies available. Aktepe's population is heterogeneous in origin, ranging from the "religiously conservative" Black Sea Sunni-s to Alevi-s from east and east-central Anatolia. Duben is concerned with understanding the interplay between older notions of consociation, which he glosses as "the moral community which is Islam," and "the organization of individuals according to social class."[428]

Aktepe is divided into two principal quarters. One is. occupied by people of Black Sea origin (“Laz” territory, after the principal ethnic characterization of the Black Sea region). The other consists predominantly of persons of eastern Anatolian origin. It is known as “Kurdish” territory, although not all persons from this region are Kurds. A few persons from other regions are interspersed in these two quarters. This regional/ethnic distinction is also taken as a religious one. The Kurds (Alevi-s) live in the lower part of the neighborhood. There are no mosques there and during Ramadan a number of residents appear not to be keeping the fast. In contrast, the upper Sunm (“Laz”) part of the neighborhood has two mosques. Although administratively united, Duben characterizes the upper and lower quarters of Aktepe as “two rather different moral communities” in terms of the “objective facts” of regional ties, marriage patterns, and “different religious belief systems.” In the sense that a “moral community is a self-conscious social unit,” the residents of the two quarters belong to different social worlds; in this sense their differences are comparable to those of the two suburban Lebanese communities described by Khuri in From Village to Suburb. [429]

The pattern of migrants settling in Aktepe is much the same as that described by Abu-Lughod for Cairo. Persons from the same village or general region settle together. In the case of Aktepe, a common pattern is for persons first of all to construct single-story makeshift homes and later to move into four- and five-floor modern apartment buildings nearby. There is an evident differentiation of wealth and occupation, as a few laborers have formed their own small workshops or as others become successful as entrepreneurs in real estate or in commerce. Most residents of the quarter remain laborers, either in the small workshops and factories within Aktepe itself or in the large industrial zone which adjoins it.

Duben views classes “as conflict groups determined by their relation to the means of production.” He argues that it is more useful to consider classes merely as one type of conflict group, together with others such as “status groups, sects, or regional groupings.”[430] There is an unequal distribution of wealth and power among Aktepe’s residents, as elsewhere in Turkey, but for Duben the nature of significant groupings within this inegalitarian framework remains to be classified empirically; he does not regard the formation of social classes as a self-evident

FIGURE 10-11 Workers in small factories and workshops are thought to work better when they are all from the same region of origin. Aktepe, Turkey. (Courtesy Alan Duben.)

phenomenon nor the existence of other forms of conflict groups as a “false” consciousness. All such groupings which are significant to the members of a particular society and which serve as a guide to social action must be taken into consideration. For Duben, any use of terms such as class must take into account both the social and historical institutions of the society being studied and economic and ! social forces from outside the

area.[42] In fact, he reviews recent work on the consequences of industrialization in non-Westem contexts which suggest that | increasing social differentiation, including the separation of kinship ties from those of work, is not a necessary concomitant of industrial development. In the Turkish case, he points out that in many of the small factories and workshops of Aktepe, workers are hired according to the patron's assessment of a worker's reliability and j trustworthiness (diirustluk). Such relationships of trust are particularly developed j among persons with a common religious identity. Patrons and workers are linked by

J a complex of social obligations which extend beyond the workplace. Some of the

larger workplaces even provide mosques on their premises. These complex bonds of social obligations ensure the workers' loyalty. The principle of recruiting workers with such common bonds is also followed by larger industries such as textile factories. Only when a high level of skill is necessary are technical factors given predominance. Duben's argument is that these "traditional" social alignments structure the workplace and contribute to its effective functioning. In short, the more important grouping for patrons and workers is community instead of class, and bonds of class solidarity are not inevitably a consequence of increasing economic differentiation. Neighborhood improvement associations among both the

^Ibid., pp. 364-65.

Alevi "Kurds" and the Sunni "Laz" populations pay for the support of various community facilities, including primary schools, dispensaries, and (for the Sunni population) a mosque, and the wealthier members of the two communities are the leaders in these associations.[43]

Nonetheless, Duben acknowledges the development of a "politically conscious" labor movement and the growth of class consciousness among some Turks. He concludes that such consciousness has become increasingly important, particularly in Turkey's larger industries and among workers returning from Europe; but that in Aktepe, where most Individuals work in smaller factories and workshops, a sense of distinct class has developed most clearly only among the patrons. Their wealth and mobility enables them to meet other persons in similar positions elsewhere in the city, and many are becoming distinguished by a distinctive style of dress and manners. In Duben's argument, class differentiation is becoming more significant, but a comprehension of how it shapes Turkish notions of society and identity necessitates comprehending other forms of social cohesion as well and not postulating that class consciousness alone will shape the future.[44]

Another valuable argument concerning the significance of class relationships in an urban context is provided by the work of Nicholas S. Hopkins in Testour, Tunisia, a town about fifty miles southwest of Tunis with approximately ten thousand persons in the mid-1970s.[45] The town is an active craft and marketing center in the middle of a fertile region with an economy of extensive agriculture based on wheat, barley, and olives as well as irrigated orchards and gardens. Much of the land and many of the flocks in the region are owned by townsmen. In Hopkins's study as in others concerned with the concept of class, constant reference is necessarily made to the national and international economic and political context; although Hopkins stresses the advantage which anthropologists possess in being able to ascertain empirically the significance of the notion of class. Hopkins, like Duben, stresses the importance of the differential access which members of society have to the mode of production, the emergence of two (and sometimes more) groups based on this differential access, and the political opposition associated with them. This "contradictory relationship" does not mean that humans are lined up like manikins on the dominating or dominated sides of the class line or that notions of class can automatically be derived from the mode of production. The "life experience" of individuals, the "degree of consciousness" of class, and observations of behavior (which can be an indirect index of class) are all equally important and must be taken into account. Individuals must possess the ideologi-

^[3] Ibid., p. 367. See also his "Kinship, Primordial Ties, and Factory Organization in Turkey. An Anthropological View," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 7, no. 3 (July 1976), 433-51.

A A

Dubetsky, "Class and Community," pp. 368-69.

[4s] Nicholas S. Hopkins, "The Emergence of Class in a Tunisian Town," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 8, no. 4 (October 1977), 453-91, and his "The Articulation of the Modes of Production: Tailoring in Tunisia," American Ethnologist, 5, no. 3 (August 1978), 468-83.

cal forms in which to express class consciousness, and Hopkins sensitively portrays just what the nature of these forms is and their relation to the mode of production in one Tunisian context.[431]

Hopkins suggests that the most important factors in the emergence of class i consciousness in the Testour context are the improvement of communications and the mechanization of agriculture which have made a market orientation possible and that change in productive forces is linked with changes in other aspects of society.[432]

j In earlier, especially precolonial, times, the work force was mobilized from

! within the family and extended kin, with the occasional use of various sharing arrangements. This earlier system of production was correlated with a complex evaluative process involving wealth, religious status, and the honorable behavior of 'j family members, and links within the society tended to be vertical, patron-client ; ones. Land was concentrated in the hands of town notables. With the shift to

i mechanized agriculture beginning with the colonial period, there has been a shift

to agricultural wage labor along with the emergence of horizontal social links in which many persons recognize their common interests with other persons in j society. This has particularly been the case for landowners and for agricultural workers. Employers for the most part tend to be Testouris. They live in the center of town, share a number of activities together, including control of some of the key local shrines, and think of themselves as a group. The agricultural laborers tend to be migrants from poorer regions of Tunisia who live in adobe houses on the periphery of the town itself. Their tenure in the houses is insecure. Employers speak of the lack of confidence (thiqa) they have in their workers, claiming that the j workers are bad Muslims and even practice witchcraft. The laborers, for their part, have to some extent organized (as have the employers) to defend their common interests, such as gaining more secure title to their houses and obtaining better

' - working conditions.

! Hopkins clearly points out that the class system which he is describing does

not embrace the entire population. There are still a number of independent small j farmers who own and work their land, and a number of people in transport, crafts, and mercantile activities who are not enveloped by the class system. In his intensive study of tailoring, for instance, Hopkins has described an aggregate shift in the mode of production from an artisanal to a manufacturing mode of product'on. Many tailors accept piecework at unfavorable rates but do so because of a vaiue system in which independence or the appearance of-it is highly valued. A cooperative might secure them a higher return for their labor, but the tailors would have to give up some of their independence. Because of their value system workers tend “to think in terms of individual advancement rather than collective experience.” As a result, tailors do not realize the commonality of their interests. Hopkins concludes that they are not fully integrated into the capitalist mode of production, but that once they are, then there might be a “full emergence of class relations.”[48] Hopkins goes beyond Duben in suggesting that class relationships will eventually diminish

the importance of all other forms of relationship, and that certain “value systems” impede some persons and categories of occupations from realizing where their economic interests lie. Both of their analyses stress the importance of considering how class relations articulate with other forms of social solidarity and identity.

In, discussions of the emergence of class relationships, the importance of the distinction between the anthropology of cities and the anthropology in cities becomes paramount. The emergence of class relationships is a process which affects entire economies and regions and cannot be confined to a discussion of urban milieus. Certain transformations may appear more pronounced in urban contexts but cannot be explained within those contexts alone.

[4S] Hopkins, “Tailoring,” p. 481.

** 11. Political Economy: Past and Present

Speculation about connections between economics and politics becomes much more profitable when one focuses not on the roughest outline, but on the finer features.[1]

In nineteenth-century anthropology, long-term perspectives prevailed which conceived of cultural and civilizational growth in terms of developmental stages much like geological layers. These models were discarded when too few examples could be found to fit the stages meaningfully. Today, anthropologists and scholars in related disciplines , are shifting their attention to how systems of meaning shape and are in turn shaped by configurations of power and economic relations in different societies. This has resulted in a renewed interest in long-term perspectives on the societies they study, but with markedly different assumptions than those of the past.

Patterns of trade relations are a case in point. Archaeologists and social historians interested in ancient trade assumed all too readily that in the past the movement of goods followed habitual patterns. More recently it has been argued that patterns of trade, symbiosis and predation often begin and are broken off in “dizzyingly abrupt shifts” in which entrepreneurs and “self-conscious individuals and groups” take advantage of risks and uncertainties rapidly to innovate and to adapt to situations not fully known or perhaps unlpiowable. Instead of gradualist progress along an evolutionary ladder to more complex organization, increases in scale and complexity are seen to depend much more upon reactions to situations and opportunities in which individuals are never fully conscious of where their actions and ideas ultimately will lead. Nonetheless, meaningful correlations can be made between forms of

production, political authority, and the ideologies which people use to shape and to make sense of these developments? Such arguments have been most intensively pursued in the contexts of the ancient Near East and medieval Europe, but such a perspective is equally useful in understanding the empires of the medieval Middle East and the states of the present.

'Albert O. Hirschman, A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 9.

In the Middle East as elsewhere in the world, anthropologists have produced valuable studies of local-level politics, administration, and economics. Unlike some other parts of the world, social historical resources are available to place such studies in the broader perspective which is necessary to comprehend just what politics and economics mean today and meant in the past. In studying such topics, the contribution of anthropology has been to look at the “finer features” of the relation, not always a straightforward one, between politics, economics, native concepts of the social order, and programs of development and progress, in short, political economy. This chapter analyzes the approaches which anthropologists have used to make sense of rapid social, political, and cultural change in the Middle East today and to relate them to the historical past.

*** Medieval *Muslim* States: Problems of Authority and Interpretation

As a focus of scholarly inquiry, the medieval Middle East has concerned anthropologists and social historians, even those primarily interested in postmedieval periods, in two principal ways. First, Islamic empires and states have frequently been characterized by historians and sociologists as representing extreme types of political authority. In his analysis of the writings of Max Weber on Islam, Bryan S. Turner concludes that Weber concentrated upon analyzing two aspects of domination in the Muslim world: the charismatic authority represented by the Prophet Muhammad and sultanism, representing for Weber the arbitrary free will of the ruler released from most traditional limitations? The second principal use of

[2] Quoted material is from Robert McC. Adams, “Anthropological Perspectives on Ancient Trade,” Current Anthropology, 15, no. 3 (September 1974), 239-58; see also Jane Schneider, “Peacocks and Penguins: The Political Economy of European Cloths and Colors,” American Ethnologist, 5, no. 3 (August 1978), 413-47.

[3] Bryan S. Turner, 'Weber and Islam: A Critical Study (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 75-92. The following account of Weber's ideas derives largely from Turner's excellent discussion. See also his Marx and the End of Orientalism, Controversies in Sociology, 7 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978). This short study is essentially a review the medieval period—"classical Islam" or "the grandeur that was" in the phrasing of some Orientalists—was to serve as a backdrop against which the "decline" of the Middle East could be measured. Coon's mosaic characterization of Middle Eastern polities and other prevailing ahistorical images of Middle Eastern societies derive from the general assumptions made of this period, and the ideological assumption of the decline of the region in many instances provided a convenient justification for colonial intervention.

As Turner indicates, Weber's investigations concerning Islamic society were not as complete as his interpretations of other civilizational traditions and he "often failed to adhere to his own methodological principles" of seeking to understand the motivations and intentions of individuals acting in particular historical contexts. "In Weber's analysis, it was the patrimonial structure of traditional Islam which was incompatible with political radicalism, the freedom of cities, the autonomy of rational law and hence with the emergence of capitalism."[4]

Over a period of several centuries, what Weber and others considered to be the "classical" form of Islamic society emerged based upon a combination of patrimonial politics (as in the social order of cities) and of feudalism. Turner explains in the following manner how these two principles were supposed to combine. A patrimonial ruler (whose rule in its most primitive form is "characteristic of the authority of a lord over his own household") seeks to convert his extended family ■ and others into dependent subjects. A principal way of doing this is through the use of slaves and mercenaries who are dependent upon the royal household. The patrimonial ruler must then seek to minimize the independence of his mercenaries and that of notables and merchants. One technique of doing this was to make official appointments deliberately insecure so that subordinates could be used as J scapegoats for popular discontent and the ruler could preserve the "fiction that he is benevolent and concerned for the welfare of his subjects." Turner explains that the paradox of this form of rule and especially of sultanism, its most extreme form, is that "the more a ruler has to rely on his mercenaries or slave army, the more dependent he becomes on their power to subjugate the masses." Soon, mercenary armies are able to extract fiefs and regular advantages from the ruler, forcing him ■ further to pauperize the peasantry while continuing to represent himself as the people's benefactor. The result is two forms of protest: periodic millennial outbursts, usually based upon religious principles, and the "periodic dynastic, political change" which did not result in the change of form of rule but which resulted in prolonged conflicts over succession.[5]

essay concerning the major approaches to the understanding of the Middle East in the light of "critical" Marxist theory. Turner's general tone on the state of Middle Eastern studies is

dyspeptic; he doubts whether the study of the Middle East has contributed significantly to the analytic development of the academic disciplines involved, although he concedes that anthropology “may be” partially exempt from his negative judgment (p. 1).

[4] Turner, Weber, p. 75.

[5] Ibid., pp. 80-81.

f This central problem in the succession of dynasties was recognized by

t medieval Muslim intellectuals themselves, of whom the best known is the North

African Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406). His theories of dynastic succession are worth L introducing here because a succession of scholars, including Ernest Gellner, have

| used Ibn Khaldun as a point of departure for their own discussions of the nature of

j premodern political authority.[433] Together with other contemporaries, Ibn Khaldun

acquired an education by traveling to various centers of learning throughout North | Africa and the Middle East, serving as counselor of state to a number of North

i African rulers and to Spanish ones when Spain was still under Muslim domination.

Ibn Khaldun makes for fascinating reading even today, as he had to struggle to create a vocabulary through which he could articulate sociologically the rise and decay of dynasties throughout the Muslim world.

Ibn Khaldun must have been acutely sensitive to the problems of the decay of dynasties and political domination, for in his lifetime the Spanish Muslim principalities collapsed one after another. One clear threat was from Christian invaders; another was from sudden shifts in the political climate of the Muslim world itself. It has sometimes been argued that Ibn Khaldun sought to provide a universal model for political developments. I prefer to think that he was primarily concerned with medieval North Africa and southern Spain, from where most of his

examples are drawn. His observations on the nature of political domination make more sense in j this primary context than if they are made to encompass all forms of domination.

I Ibn Khaldun sees the successive ideal stages of a dynasty as follows. At its

i inception, it must possess “group feeling” ([z] asabtya), which roughly can be glossed

j by acting as if compelling ties of obligation bind members of a group together. Such

compelling notions of group feeling are more likely to be found in rural or tribal contexts (the notion that group feeling is primarily confined to nomads or Bedouin is, I think, based on a misinterpretation of the Arabic original). Group feeling need not depend upon blood relationships existing between those persons who share it, but the bonds of solidarity must be such that they take precedence over all other bonds of association. The parallels of this notion with the contemporary notion of “closeness,” discussed in Chapter 6, are obvious. Such ties imply that persons act together in one another’s interests over extended periods of time. Ibn Khaldun suggests that such solidarity is needed for a dynasty to come into existence, and he gives a number of examples from the North African context. Moreover, he argues that a new dynasty is most likely to be established when it can claim a religious basis of legitimacy: prophecy, reform or some other “religious coloring.” Only with group feeling can a religious ideology be practically implemented; thus Ibn Khaldun used the notion to link ideologies to their political contexts.

Like most political thinkers, Ibn Khaldun chose a striking metaphor to depict his view of the nature of political change, the metaphor of the human life span—growth, maturity, and decay. Each stage of this cycle generated the conditions necessary for the next, and in this sense his theory of dynastic change is pessimistic because he saw the cyclical succession of stages as inevitable.

The first of his stages was the overthrow of an earlier dynasty and the appro- ■ priation of royal authority (mulk). The ruler at this stage appropriates few luxuries for himself and serves as a model of discipline, nobleness, and restraint to his followers.

In the second stage of authority, the ruler gains complete control over his people and appropriates royal authority entirely to himself. Now he is interested in acquiring adherents and followers in greater numbers and in barring those who helped him to power from appropriating any of his authority. He spends as much time in subduing his potential challengers as the first member of the dynasty spent in the overthrow of his predecessors.

The third stage is one of leisure and tranquility in which the ruler and his entourage enjoy the fruits of royal authority. Monuments and public benefices commemorating the dynasty are erected and largesse is distributed to the dynasty's supporters. The ruler's talents are now directed to bookkeeping and planning. This | stage merges imperceptibly into the fourth, one of contentment and peacefulness,

: in which the ruler is satisfied with what his predecessors have built. He relies upon

and imitates the ways of his predecessors.

The final stage is one of waste and squandering. The ruler spends his time in pleasures and amusements, dissipating the former strength of his regime. To maintain himself in power, he seeks to destroy all those whom he regards as competent to replace him and thus tends to surround himself with incompetent lackeys. This is the stage of senility of the dynasty when it is ripe for collapse.

For later generations of Western scholars influenced by Ibn Khaldun, the organization and nature of political power within the Ottoman empire has been a source of fascination and until recently the point from which the "decline" of Middle Eastern civilization was measured. The Ottoman empire, at its height in the seventeenth century, controlled a significant part of the Middle Eastern Muslim world and parts of eastern Europe. Gustave E. von Grunebaum, one of the best known scholars of the twentieth century, had the Ottoman empire in mind when he depicted the principles of order in "Islamic" societies in highly formal terms. These were: the separation of the Muslim from the non-Muslim subject; the setting apart (and toleration) of a number of different religious groups under the aegis of Islam in which Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians possessed a large measure of internal autonomy for their own communities; the marking off of different "nationalities" within the Islamic community; and the narrow delimitation of

"social distinctions that assigned people to a more or less definite hierarchy of professions."[434] The mere delineation of these "principles" suggests von Giunebaum's assumption of rigid social hierarchies and distinctions in contrast to the more flexible notions of social order suggested by scholars such as Ira Lapidus and Richard Bulliet, who seek a more thoroughly sociological comprehension of medieval Muslim society instead of a search for a timeless "essence."

A number of analyses exist of the implicit assumptions concerning "oriental" rule made by a prior generation of scholars.[435] The rather contradictory earlier assumptions are

characterized as follows by Talal Asad, based primarily upon the influential works of Sir Hamilton Gibb, von Grunebaum, and Snouck Hurgronje:

An emphasis on the absolute power of the ruler, and the whimsical, generally illegitimate nature of his demands; on the indifference or involuntary submission on the part of the ruled; on a somewhat irrational form of conflict in which sudden, irresponsible urges to riot are met with violent repression; and, finally, an emphasis on the overall inefficiency and corruption of political life.[436]

It is relevant here simply to note these assumptions, not to show how they masked a highly fluid situation, as Roger Owen has sought to do in indicating how a greater knowledge of economic conditions in the period of Ottoman rule, for example, the development of cash crops in the regions of Lower Egypt, Mount Lebanon, and Izmir, the rapid spread of maize cultivation throughout the seventeenth century, and shifting patterns of trade, can be related to specific political and social developments. Earlier scholars tended to disregard the importance of trade and economics in their accounts of Islamic polities.[437] Similarly, many of the “spontaneous” riots in cities and rural regions during Ottoman times are beginning to be studied, like comparable phenomena in Europe, as popular reactions against accepted notions of political and economic justice. If grain was hoarded by merchants and the price of bread became unconscionable, so-called rioters became violent only when authorities refused to enforce prices which were considered just. In some of the Arab Gulf states, merchants and fishermen at the end of the nineteenth century simply voted with their feet and moved to another city-state if the ruling family sought to make illegitimate exactions. The option of migration effectively provided an informal check on the excesses of rulers.[438] In larger states, the fact that mosques often were the rallying points for demonstrations suggests that “rioters” considered their demands to be moral and just. As with the layout of traditional cities in the Middle East, the imagined “irrationality” of the “crowd” often has been nothing more than a failure on the part of earlier scholars to perceive implicit assumptions of legitimacy and justice. In any case, a convenient excuse for colonial rule was the presumed inability of the “Orient” to govern itself responsibly. As Edward Said has stated, a concrete and conscientious understanding of Middle Eastern societies and civilizations will emerge only when specific societies and problems of the Middle East are studied instead of the “Orient” writ large, or an Islamic “essence,” or the “Arab mind.”[439]

One of the few anthropologists whose approach is singled out for approval by Said is Clifford Geertz. The latter’s analysis of the royal progress in nineteenthcentury Morocco can be taken as an example of how popular notions of legitimacy for contemporary or historically known periods can be elicited.[440] A royal progress is a journey by a monarch throughout his domain which symbolically establishes or reaffirms possession of the realm. For Geertz, the royal progress is a striking symbolic representation of how political domination is asserted. In fact, he argues that an examination of the symbols of power and the nature of power often shows that both are one and the same thing, a conjunction especially apparent in traditional monarchies as opposed to modem political regimes in which the relation between the symbols of power and men of power is better disguised.[441]

In medieval England, the monarch was entertained during the royal progress with public pageants in which subjects dressed up in costumes which depicted the virtues of the realm and the vices which threatened it. In nineteenth-century Morocco, “strength did not have to be represented as other than what it was.” Society was “a tournament of wills,” and hence so was kingship and its symbolism: “Progresses here were not always easy to tell from raids.”[442] Geertz’s language is more luxurious than my brief account can begin to suggest, but in essence he argues that the surest sign of grace, baraka, was the ability of one man to prevail over another. A number of strongmen—qaids, pashas, marabouts, and others—sought to build and maintain personal configurations of power, with the sultan striving to dominate them all.

In Morocco of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the fertile Atlantic plains and those of the region of Fez and Meknes were firmly dominated by the sul-

FIGURE 11-1 Royal mahalla, Morocco, 1911. (From Gaston Doumargue, Histoire popv- iaire des Colonies franqaises [Paris: Editions du Ve'lin, 1932], p. 112.)

tan, but his authority was threatened on all sides by “charismatic adventurers” and periodically had to be reestablished. For the sultan to affirm his boraka and hence his “capacity to dominate,” he quite simply had to prevail over others. “[Baraka] was not a condition, like chastity, or a trait, like pride, that shines by itself but a movement, like will, that exists in its impact.”[443] g

One way of demonstrating this capacity was through a royal progress (harka or mahalla), and Geertz describes in detail the last major one by Sultan Mulay Hasan I (d. 1894). Mulay Hasan was usually on the move half of each year, shifting his capital periodically among the so-called imperial cities—Fez, Marrakesh, Meknes, and Rabat. When he moved beyond these capitals, his entourage often numbered between thirty thousand and forty thousand persons. A suitable chastisement for a region unwilling to pay its share of taxes was for the harka to stop in one place consuming the grain and herds of the region until tribes and their leaders were worn into renewed submission. Geertz’s argument is that the mobility of the sultan was a central element both in his power and, inseparably, in the concept of royal authority in Morocco. “The realm was unified ... by a restless searching-out of contact, most of it agonistic, with literally hundreds of lesser centers of power within it.”[444]

The resiliency of the forms in which political domination is expressed is demonstrated by their use throughout the colonial era and after Morocco regained its independence in 1956. In the colonial era, royal progresses included officials of the French residence traveling with the sultan (after 1956 sultan was replaced by the more modem designation of king (malik); in nationalist circles the newer designation was

common currency from at least the mid-1940s) and appearing in all formal ceremonials except specifically religious ones. The symbolism of the colonial royal progress also included[3] such features as visits by the sultan to the tomb of the unknown soldier in France and other ceremonies visually suggesting the “protected” status of the royal family. In the current fighting for control and sovereignty in the Sahara, those tribal groups wishing to express fealty to the Moroccan throne continue to do so in the form of the traditional oath of fealty (bay^ca), in which tribal delegations offer sacrifices of bulls and sheep to renew their covenant with the Moroccan throne.[445] The “Green March” of King Hasan II to the Sahara in 1976 with tens of thousands of Moroccans can also be seen as a classical royal progress. Similarly symbolism prevails in the conduct of monarchies and republics elsewhere.

*** The Colonial Experience

Many anthropological studies were conducted during the colonial era in the Middle East although, with the exception of French North Africa, these studies were generally not as intensive and thorough as those conducted by English social anthropologists in Black Africa. Many of the contributions to Gellner and Micaud’s Arabs and Berbers suggest the continuing pervasiveness of the categories initially created by French colonial sociologists: Arabs versus Berbers, town versus tribe, lands of submission (to royal authority) versus lands of dissidence, and other stereotypic representations of North African society.[449] Some of the studies in the Gellner and Micaud volume, notably that of Edmund Burke III, indicate how this “colonial vulgate” came into being; a few merely take the colonial vulgate for granted; others continue to use the colonial vulgate as a scholarly point of departure. Even as late as 1951, when independence movements in the Middle East were rapidly gaining momentum, one of the most distinguished French ethnographers (earlier a military officer) of colonial Morocco could brush aside the delay in publication of a book on Moroccan religious brotherhoods by writing that in Islam “evolution is boundlessly slow. For Islam, even more than for other religions, one has to count not in years but in centuries.”[450] These sentiments matched precisely the notion of the timeless nature of “Oriental” society prevalent in the nineteenth century. Still other studies exist which, like their equivalents in Black Africa, ignored almost completely the impact of colonial administration upon political life. Local disputes were treated as if they had no wider implications and the relations between native officials and foreign administrators, as with the impact of the expropriation of indigenous lands, were mentioned only in passing. One of the few exceptions to these strictures was Evans-Pritchard’s study of the Italian colonization of Libya, significantly a study made of the policies of a defeated European power.[451] Evans- Pritchard made no similar analysis of colonial rule in regions under British domination.

At one time or another in the past century and a half, most of the Middle East has experienced colonial domination or, in the case of the Arab Gulf states, decisive foreign influence. This fact is significant in two ways. Colonial society can be studied in itself as a unique, and now passing, social form, as the discussion of colonial urbanization in Chapter

10 has suggested. Secondly, colonial domination has had a formative influence on the shape of the present Middle Eastern polities and societies.

Rene Maunier, at one time head of the French Academy of Colonial Science, defined colonialism as “occupation with domination and emigration with government.”[452] His definition has the advantage of facilitating the comparative study of colonial systems, a field in which Maunier was a leader. His book on the sociology of colonies was for a long time one of the standard texts on the subject, in which Maunier discussed the early Phoenician colonies of the Mediterranean, the Roman Empire, and the more recent experience of European colonial expansion and reactions to it.

The notion of a “colonial science” is of course an indication that colonial rule could be rationalized and systematized and was here to stay, an idea perhaps easy to accept (for Europeans at least) in the early 1930s, when congresses were routinely held in Europe and attended by representatives of various colonial administrations. Jacques Berque, a prominent French social historian of colonial rule in North Africa, suggests that 1930 be taken as its apogee.[453] The year was marked by

FIGURE 11-2 Jacques Berque, in uniform, center right, with General Nogues, Resident-General of Morocco and notables of Fez, October 1937. Berque is today one of France's most distinguished interpreters of Middle Eastern civilizations. (Courtesy Jacques Berque.)

an International Colonial Exposition in France, and celebrations took place throughout the year to commemorate the centenary of French Algeria.

The 1918 European armistice is a convenient point from which to survey the extent of colonial dominion in the Middle East. All the Levant except Turkey was firmly occupied by colonial powers, and only stiff resistance by the Turks kept Anatolia as well from succumbing to foreign domination. Syria and Lebanon were under the French, the spoils of the defeated Ottoman empire. Iraq was under the British, who also exercised a major influence over the mini-states of the Persian/ Arab Gulf, with British residents exercising significant control over tribal politics and ordering air strikes when necessary to facilitate accommodation to British imperial interests. Saudi Arabia managed to escape the direct impact of European colonial control, mainly because its autonomy suited the European colonial powers. Both Jordan and Palestine fell within the British sphere of domination. Egypt had been under English domination since 1882, although like the other countries, significant European control over its finances dated from an earlier period. In the Levant as in Egypt, there was virtually no European settlement, although Greeks and others served as artisans in larger cities such as Alexandria, and the British performed many of the higher administrative and military functions, effectively blocking training for Middle Easterners themselves. The prevalent thought of such rule, to paraphrase Lord Cromer, one of the British proconsuls in Egypt, was

to do what was good for “Orientals,” not necessarily to do what they thought was good for themselves.

Each North African country from Libya to Morocco experienced colonialism

FIGURE 11-3 British political residents in the Arab Gulf states commonly adopted Arab dress as late as the 1930s. H. R. P. Dickson, British Resident for Kuwait and his wife. (From H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert [London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 19491, opp. p. 48.)

in a different form, but all had a significant population of European settlers. The short-lived Italian colonial experiment in Libya is instructive.[24] In 1911 Italy joined the other European powers in the scramble for power, and by the followingyear the Ottomans ceded Libya to them. By 1931 a major influx of settlers had begun, each allotted lands, houses, and tools at government expense, the property tosbecome theirs after 20 years of labor. There were only 30,000 settlers in 1921,50,000 by 1931, and 150,000 by 1940. These settlers were concentrated in the fertile lands of the north. To make room for them, the native population was forced to emigrate to the less productive parts of the country or was confined to camps. At the height of Italy’s dominion of Libya, roughly one-fifth of the country was Italian. As with the other countries in the Maghrib, concern for the indigenous population was decidedly secondary.

The rest of North Africa came under French colonial domination, with the exception of Morocco’s northern zone and its southern fringes, both of which came under Spanish rule. The earliest French colony in North Africa was Algeria, first occupied by the French in 1830 by means of tactics recognized as brutal even in terms of contemporary standards.[454] Native lands were systematically expropriated, traditional learning and administration were systematically destroyed. Even advocates of French colonial expansion recognized the misrule and brutality expert-

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See Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi.

enced by the colony. The presence of a large-settler class effectively wrested control of the administration from metropolitan Fiance, Between Algerian French and Algerian Muslims there was a marked tradition of violence and mutual incomprehension from the very beginning of colonial rule.

Morocco, in contrast, was the last North African territory to be brought into the French empire (1912), and it was considered by many French to be the jewel of their colonies—an example of “scientific” colonialism at its best. It certainly was the best studied; no Middle Eastern country under English domination has been as thoroughly described ethnographically. One can only concur with Edmund Burke III’s judgment that an assessment today of the work of the earlier generation of colonial ethnographers concerned with Morocco can prove to be highly valuable even if one disagrees with the implicit assumptions of their work and the motivation for it. The corpus of ethnographic work is of high quality and the intensity of the work undertaken makes Morocco “a particularly illuminating place to study the ways in which colonial ethnographers went about their business in the generation or so preceding the First World War.”[455]

The French intention to colonize Morocco was clear by the end of the nineteenth century, but opposition by the British and the Germans to direct French expansion prevented direct colonization.[456] Nonetheless, clandestine domination took place. One means was by military expansion in Morocco’s southeast, where oases were forced to collaborate with the French or risk destruction of their date palms and herds. Another device (used as well throughout the Middle East in various guises) was through control of the police of the major Moroccan ports (together with the Spanish), collection of customs revenues, expansion of commercial operations with extraterritorial protection granted to Moroccans acting in French interests, and from 1907 the creation of the Bank of Morocco to control the country’s finances. Ostensibly these measures were to ensure repayment of loans forced upon Morocco by European countries, often at highly disadvantageous terms. By 1907, using as a pretext the struggle over control of the throne between the brothers Mulay ^cAbd al-^cAziz and Mulay Hafid, three thousand French and five hundred Spanish troops landed at Casablanca and began to occupy the surrounding region to protect the port. The following year the expeditionary force had expanded to fifteen thousand men, and beginning in 1910 Morocco was compelled to indemnify the French for the cost of the force.

Finally in November 1911 the French reached an agreement with the other major European powers, and the road was clear for the direct occupation of Morocco. Five thousand troops advanced from Algeria to Fez, where Mulay Haffd was in his palace. The Spaniards occupied points along Morocco’s northern coast. Moroccan ability to resist these incursions was virtually nil. In March, the Minister of France at Tangier (where all embassies to Morocco were situated) set out to Fez on horseback. The sultan briefly considered resistance but finally agreed to sign the treaty of the protectorate after six days of being bullied by the French. He abdicated almost immediately afterward in favor of his younger brother, Mulay Yusif. Formal French domination of Morocco had begun.

Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey was appointed first Resident-General of Morocco (1912-1925). During the period of his administration he set the tone for what was considered to be an enlightened, “scientific” colonial administration.[457] Lyautey was a champion of “indirect” rule and in fact elaborated an administration which was remarkably economical, requiring only a handful of Frenchmen to supervise vast expenses of territory and which was almost entirely self-financing. He assiduously cultivated ties with Morocco’s urban aristocracy and rural strongmen, often overlooking their excesses in exchange for their continued support. Thus

FIGURE 11-4 Lyautey, Resident-General of Morocco, talks with Berber leaders, c. 1913. (From Doumergue, Histoire Populaire, p. 30.)

during the difficult period of the initial takeover of Morocco, when there was pronounced resistance in many regions, Lyautey sent letters by messenger to Moroccan notables, an act which in itself indicated the sophisticated French knowledge of Morocco, stating that their interests would be protected if they proved themselves to be “friends” of France. France, the letters explained, was in Morocco only to defend the interests of the sultanate. It is unlikely that many Moroccan notables were convinced by this claim, but they had the terrifying example before them of the fate of Algeria’s elite. Many leaders visited Lyautey directly; others sent emissaries who were reassured of France’s intentions. Medical services were made strategically available and used to further military intelligence, and the French bought grain and animals at high prices to encourage Moroccans to deal with them. When such methods failed, dissident tribes were denied access to markets; transhumant groups were denied vital pastures, and in the last resort villages could be burned and crops destroyed. Most military operations were accomplished with relatively few losses; in any case, many soldiers fighting for France were from Senegal and other French colonies. Lyautey’s tactics worked so well that when many French forces had to be withdrawn at the beginning of the First World War and French control was precarious, there was no major rebellion against French rule.

Lyautey’s patrician image of how Morocco should be ruled prevented the worst excesses of colonial intervention but by and large prevailed most firmly only in those parts of the country not desired by the growing influx of settlers. For many colonizers, the so-called “civilizing mission” of France was a mere fapade for the acquisition of land and economic gain. For Lyautey, it was something to be taken seriously, as indicated by his insistence upon urban planning, the preservation of Morocco’s traditional architecture, and protection of the interests of those Moroccans designated as notables. He did everything in his power to discourage the development- of a French settler population in Morocco, but it nonetheless developed, along with the flourishing of large commercial enterprises, banks, railroad interests, agribusiness, and mining companies. By the 1920s, the land grabs of the settler population and large commercial interests increased, but even in the expropriation of lands held by Moroccans or in its acquisition by various forms of fraud or administrative

chicanery, the niceties of colonial rhetoric were preserved. In one case the expropriation of a vast tract of land from a tribe in western Morocco was claimed to be beneficial for the tribe involved because it would be “educational” for them to see how European farms were run. [458] This dispossession had serious consequences in turning tribesmen of many regions into a landless, impoverished proletariat.

The impact of French rule in most of Morocco outside of the cities was to freeze a local elite into place. Lyautey’s policy had been to select local strongmen and to maintain them in place if they proved good at the job. If certain strongmen such as Pasha Hajj Thami Glawi of Marrekesh were notorious for their abuses of power, continued French support for them could be rationalized by saying that Moroccans were used to ruthless officials. The pasha’s ability to grasp the nuances of colonial politics meant that he ran Marrakesh and its many lucrative enterprises to his liking until the last days of French rule.

After the 1920s, there were very few changes in local dynasties of privilege and authority until the end of the colonial era. Even then, because of the competitive advantage that such individuals and their families had held in the past, a very common pattern was for brothers, uncles, and cousins in a single family to specialize in the complementary fields of agribusiness, administration, and commerce, thus maintaining their privileged position despite major political and economic changes. It has been argued that until the last days of their rule the French maintained a fragile balance between local elites and the central power at the expense of significant rural social change. This was managed by a succession of independent Moroccan governments dependent upon French support.[30]

Morocco was “improved” by the French, but the educational achievements of the Protectorate speak eloquently of how little emphasis was placed upon providing Moroccans with the skills necessary for the “evolution” promised by France’s civilizing mission. For the French school-aged children in Morocco .education was virtually universal. The education of Jews was for practical purposes in the hands of private organizations and again was virtually universal in towns and cities. As for Moroccan Muslims, in practice only those recognized as the sons (and

social consequences of the expropriation of land for colons. For a meticulous study of another locale, see Paul Pascon, Le Haouz de Marrakech (Rabat: Centre Universitaire de la Recherche Scientifique, 1977). The best long-term study of the relation between political forms and economic conditions in North Africa is Lucette Valensi, Fellahs Tunisians: L ’Economic rurale et la Vie des Campagnes aux 18e et 19e siecles (Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1977). See also her On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest, 1790-1830, translated by Kenneth J. Perkins (New York and London: Africana Publishing Co., 1977 [French orig. 1969]), with accompanying appendices containing interesting primary source materials.

[30] The two best sources on continuity in patterns of the Moroccan elite are John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), and R. Leveau, “The Rural Elite as an Element in the Social Stratification of Morocco,” in Commoners, Climbers and Notables, ed. C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), pp. 268-78. Waterbury’s study is perhaps one of the best available to date on the “political culture” of a Middle Eastern country. For one of the rare interpretive essays concerning the sort of men who became colonial administrators in various epochs, see Vincent Monteil (himself a former colonial officer), “Les Bureaux arabes au Maghreb (1833- 1961),” Esprit (November 1961), 575-606.

to a much lesser extent daughters) of notables had relatively easy access to education. Some primary education was provided for the other students, but in general it was felt that only a modicum of education was “realistic.” Moroccans set up their own system of “Free Schools” beginning in the 1930s, so that a “modern” education could be obtained independently from French control, but the standards of these schools were generally mediocre, and they did not provide the certification necessary for governmental and private employment. The educational statistics of the Protectorate almost speak for themselves. Even with a major effort to broaden the educational base after World War II, the results were meager. Of school-age Muslims in Morocco in 1938, only 1.7 percent were in primary school and 0.1 percent in secondary; in 1945 the figures were 2.7 percent and 0.2 percent respectively; in 1950 they were 7.0 percent and 0.6 percent; and in 1955 they were 11.2 percent and 1.2 percent. The dropout rate for primary school alone was 90 percent. As for secondary education, it is sufficient to say that between 1912 and 1956, the years of French rule, only 530 Moroccans had passed the French baccalaureat examination, a necessary prerequisite to entering the university.[459]

The ironies of Protectorate government were abundant. The formal fiction of a Morocco simply under the tutelage of France was preserved, but real political power rested with the French. The sultan could still emerge from his palace on feast days to act as head of the Muslim community and slaughter a sheep on behalf of the Muslims in his domain, but access to him was strictly controlled by the French. All messages to his subordinates had to pass through French hands. Appointments at local administrative levels were chosen from lists of nominees approved by the French. In the name of preserving traditional forms, Moroccan ministers were not permitted offices and desks but had to use low-lying benches. Even Qadl-s, or religious judges, could not assume office until they passed an examination set by a French Orientalist who advised the sultan’s entourage as to whether the candidate possessed an adequate knowledge of Islamic law.

After World War II the colonial system elaborated by the French rapidly disintegrated. Disparities between Europeans and Moroccans had become too pronounced with the dislocation of the wartime black market, the Vichy debacle, the expropriation of tribal lands, rising nationalist expectations, and a monarchy which increasingly asserted its autonomy. The French responded with repression and in 1953 made the decisive error of deposing Sultan Muhammad V in favor of an ineffective relative. The result was to galvanize Moroccan resistance to French rule. Rural terrorism mounted and bloody urban demonstrations and

strikes became routine. The price of maintaining colonial rule became too high, and by late 1955 the French had negotiated the terms of transition to an independent government.

*** The Social Anthropology of the Nation-State

A map of the Middle East through the 1950s still indicated the presence of colonial powers in a number of settings, or of regimes such as the Egyptian and Iraqi monarchies that were regarded by many intellectuals as too close to the interests of the former colonial power. A map of the region today indicates a very different picture. Virtually the only remaining colonial enclaves possessed by European powers are the Spanish presidios of Ceuta and Melilla on Morocco's northern coast (but considered by Spaniards to be an integral part of their nation). The contemporary balance of forces includes religious fundamentalism, varieties of radical socialism and liberal constitutional regimes, and monarchies, each with particular constellations of internal and foreign support.[32] If colonial regimes are easier to grasp analytically and to oppose given their "external" nature, a measure of the balance of forces in contemporary states is a much more complex task. Many governments seek to exploit potential or real distinctions of class, regionalism, religion, and ethnicity in order to destabilize neighboring states considered hostile to their interests. If some issues such as the Palestine question can galvanize popular opinion in some instances into a unity based upon Arab nationalism and Islamic brotherhood, how such bases for unity figure alongside the wide range of potential bases for social unity and difference is a more difficult issue. What political scientists called "nation-building" in the 1960s is a meaningful point of entry into some of the issues involved, although today most scholars would place a much greater emphasis upon the interconnection between economics and politics than was the case when the concept was first developed. [s]

The work of Lloyd A. Fallers illustrates the distinctive contribution which anthropologists have sought to make to the study of nation-states.[33] He argues that the dilemma of the contemporary nation-state is that it unites what in the past was often diverse and scattered, but at the same time it often creates particularism where formerly there was an attachment to more universal ideals, such as those of religion. Fallers argues that nation-states are popular in the sense that both rulers and ruled lay claim to "qualities which are felt to be ancient, inherent, given,however new they may in fact be: language, territory, culture, race."[34] Whether it be celebrated as the "people's liberator" or condemned as more authoritarian than the older empires which it replaced, "the nation-state within an international system of nation-states remains in our time a fundamental feature of the human condition, in spite of widespread aspiration to a more firmly-based international order."[35]

For a preliminary general sketch of some of these cross-currents and the sort of persons who support them, see Abdallah Laroui’s The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977).

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Lloyd A. Fallers, The Social Anthropology of the Nation-State (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1974).

^Ibid., p. 1.

[35] Ibid., p. 2.

Fallers states that a central issue in the formation of any nation-state is the development of civility, “a tolerant and generous recognition of common attachment to, and responsibility for, the social order, despite diversity.”[460] Cleavages of language, religion, and ethnicity rarely coincide fully with the boundaries of nationstates. In ordinary times, the personal ties of neighborhood and workplace, worship and daily activities do not engage such identities in a potentially destructive way. External threatsfto a nation may allow them to be relegated to the background. But in crisis situations, the ordinarily innocuous acts of daily life can become suffused with larger meaning. A song, an item of clothing, a sporting event, or a funeral may become an incitement to conflict. Fallers writes that such issues are hardly confined to the Third World, as the continuing school busing controversy reminds Americans. Civility is a virtue which must consciously be maintained and which requires the exercise of self-restraint on the part of leaders and intellectuals so as not to appeal to baser sentiments.

An anthropologist can grasp the practical construction and maintenance of civility by using what remains one of the principal techniques of the discipline, the intensive participant-observational study of small groups of men and women in social interaction. As stated in Chapter 1, the fact that such small groups are embedded in much larger entities which are the subject of concern does not in itself create a problem of generalization; as with any other discipline, the issue is how the generalizations are made. By grasping the meaning of civility in particular social circumstances, the anthropologist contributes to the comprehension of how nation-states are elaborated and practically experienced.

The comparative study of nation-building is facilitated by looking at transformations over longer time periods and by evaluating the options of emerging political systems for the integration of their diverse communities, the institutionalization of new forms of social and

political identity, economic development, and notions of what Elbaki Hermassi has called “distributive justice.”[461] As he writes, foreign economic and political domination, international pressures, and endo- geneous and exogeneous factors of change cannot be taken as givens but must be carefully examined in specific instances as to their impact. Even where some of the forces impinging on contemporary societies appear everywhere to be the same, as with international economic pressures, how these are experienced and responded to varies with each society and must be explained in part by its particular historical context. Four contrasting cases are considered here: Turkey, the Sultanate of Oman, Somalia, and Israel. These four examples do not represent the gamut of problems facing Middle Eastern countries or developing nations elsewhere, but each of these countries has significantly transformed its identity or created a new one in the fairly recent past and thus indicates in sharper focus than other possible examples the problems of forging shared identities in a nation-state.

Turkey. Only in the last sixty years could Turkey be considered a nationstate. For more than six centuries before then, it had been at the heart of the polyglot Ottoman empire, controlling a political community that ranged from North Africa and southern Europe to the west and the frontiers of Russia and Persia to the east. This empire was beginning to disintegrate during the nineteenth century, but its demise was hastened by its fateful alliance with the Central Powers during the First World War. In the space of less than a decade after the defeat of 1918, the Turks passed from the status of “faltering imperial overlords to that of nationalist freedom-fighters.”[38]

In his studies of Turkey, the late Lloyd A.. Fallers sought to analyze the impact of this transformation upon Turkish society. He and his wife spent eighteen months in a provincial town in western Turkey, and a much longer period studying Turkish society. The town in question is Edremit. It has a wholly Turkish-Muslim population of some thirty thousand merchants, artisans, olive growers, wage workers, and small commercial and industrial entrepreneurs and their families. By Turkish provincial standards, Edremit is a prosperous town, and in the 1960s its economy was beginning to diversify from an earlier nearly total dependence upon olive cultivation. All the principal offices of the national government have branches there; there are numerous schools, two hospitals, political party branches, more than a dozen mosques, and an army training base. Its population, says Fallers, has a sense of well-being about it, yet its citizens are profoundly affected by and concerned about Turkey’s very real economic and political problems. Mature townsmen personally experienced the turbulent last years of empire and the first years of the republic. Middle-aged people at the time of Fallers’s work spoke of themselves as the “fatherless” generation because so many draft-age men were called up for service and never returned. The major battles of the Turkish war of independence were fought elsewhere, but the town experienced two years of enemy occupation with the ensuing consequences of demoralization, collaboration, repression, and revenge.

Kemal Ataturk intended Turkey’s war of independence to be a crisis of identity to pave the way for legitimating new forms of authority. The sultanate was abolished in 1922 and the caliphate followed in 1924: Men and women were compelled to choose between ethnic

nationalism and loyalty to the vestiges of a theocratic dynasty. Turkish Republican identity did not involve a one-time transformation; it entailed a continuing working out of commitments and personal relationships. Fallers traces these transformations in the context of Edremit so as to give concrete meaning to how the nation-state has been experienced in recent social history. In rapid succession in the 1920s, Ataturk suppressed the dervish (Sufi) orders, substituted European legal codes for Islamic personal law, decreed that the fez could no longer be worn in public (in practice it was replaced by European hats), adopted the Western calendar, decreed that Turkish was henceforth to be

[3S] Fallers, Nation-State, p. 75. The following narrative account of national identity in Turkey is based extensively upon Fallers, pp. 71-116.

written in the Latin alphabet rather than Arabic script (a move which shocked many conservative Muslims because of the association of Arabic script with the Quran), legally emancipated women and gave them access to education, established state banks and industries to stimulate economic growth, and created a new capital, Ankara. Formally, Turkey had become a secular state, although the fact that a Ministry of Religious Affairs was established indicates the continuing interest of the state in religious matters.

During the -one-party period of the 1930s and 1940s, most people participated, if not always wholeheartedly, in the new order. A cultural center was created to propagate the new Western life-style, including mixed “ballroom” dancing by the elite on formal occasions. Elite women adopted Western fashions. Islam was not suppressed, but fasting and public displays of piety fell out of style, as was indicated by Ataturk’s own ostentatiously secular funeral in 1938.

During the war years of the 1940s, the Kemalist one-party state began to lose its grip. Because of the major economic transformations engendered by the war, salaried workers and entrepreneurs became more numerous and more assertive; they and Turkish intellectuals began to demand greater freedom. From 1950 onward, with several interruptions due to military takeovers of the civilian government, Turkey can be described as a liberal, if turbulent, democracy subject to rapidly shifting forces and combinations and recombinations of power and authority.

Turkish intellectuals characterize the basic issues of politics in terms of an abstract struggle between the forces of religion and secularism. As Fallers explains, these are not disembodied forces in Turkish society; one way of grasping these forces is by seeing what they mean in practice and how they inform and shape the experience of the men and women who created them. Thus those Turks who stress their identity as Muslims adhere to an ideology that has an internal logic of its own which at times contrasts significantly with the secularist ideology of some of the Turkish elite. For such persons, the formal separation which prevails between

religion and the state in Turkish society is not easy to comprehend and even is seen to be contrary to the teachings of Islam.

The secular reformist ideology forged by Ataturk maintains its strength especially in industrial centers and among an older generation of educated Turks. For other Turks, from regions with heavy emigration to Europe, leftist ideologies also provide increasingly strong expressions of political identity. The major problem for secularists of Ataturk's generation was to provide Turks with an ideology to enable them to live civilly within their national boundaries. The major ideological problem facing Turkey today is to come to terms with the increasingly critical economic conditions and the consequent internal unrest. AsDubetsky suggests, even when leftist movements in Turkey borrow the vocabulary and policies of the European left to face these issues, in practice both the ideology and the organizational forms have been modified by prevailing regional and religious identities.[462]

In provincial centers such as Edremit even more than in the major cities, persons of different social types and ideological persuasions are too small in number to exist in closed social groups. The tensions of ideological and political differences are held in check by cross-cutting personal ties. The secular reformists have their public celebrations, such as the fiercely patriotic parades and speeches commemorating Ataturk's death. Religious officials are invited as guests, but the occasion is decidedly nonreligious. Those who emphasize Islam and traditionalism, including a growing number of youth, also have their celebrations: the public prayers on Fridays, Islamic feast days, and the fast of Ramadan.

Most Turks seek a compromise among ideological extremes. One result of the growing maturity of the Turkish republic has been a broadening of social and political choices. In the ordinary round of activities, what emerges from the experience of everyday life is a compromise and synthesis, not merely a different mixture of sociocultural elements. The compromise is not always an easy one. Turkey is neither oil-rich nor mineral-rich, and its economy has increasingly weakened, especially as opportunities for labor emigration to Europe are becoming scarcer. Political violence is not unknown on university campuses and elsewhere. Yet the fact that most Turks recognize these problems and seek to resolve them short of violence suggests the resilience and personal courage of many Turks and provides a basis for guarded optimism.

The Sultanate of Oman. The Sultanate of Oman is unique in its nearly total isolation from the outside world until 1970 and the intensity with which its oil resources have been applied to massive economic development since then. In part due to the personal idiosyncrasies of its former Sultan, Sa^cTd bin taymur (r. 1932-1970), aided by compliant British advisors and military support, Oman was almost as isolated as Tibet until a palace coup in 1970 replaced the Sultan with his son, Qabus bin Sa^cid. ■

Before 1970 the country was extremely poor in contrast to most of its neighbors, and the meager revenues derived from British subsidies went mostly for defense purposes and internal security. There were only ten kilometers of paved roads, three primary schools, and one hospital for a population estimated at 750,000. The Sultan felt that higher education only radicalized its recipients, so he allowed few Omanis with more than a primary education to return. Omanis had to tolerate such vagaries as the closing of the gates of Muscat, the capital, three hours after sundown and imprisonment if they did not carry a kerosene lantern on the streets after that time; obtaining the personal permission of the Sultan to make improvements on their houses and to purchase vehicles; and a prohibition against the wearing of Western shoes in Salala, capital of Dhufar, in the southern region of the country f° Even after oil was discovered in 1964 and began to be exported, the

[40] This section is based upon J. E. Peterson, Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State (London: Croom Helm, 1978); John Townsend, Oman: The Making of the Modem State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977); Fred Halliday, Arabia With- Sultan applied the revenues only in the most grudging fashion to development projects, few of which were under way at the time of his deposition.

By the late 1960s, there were over fifty thousand Omanis living and working in the various Gulf states, with more in other Arab states.[41] Many of these, including members of the Sultan’s family itself, were in self-imposed or forced exile and increasingly favored the overthrow of the old Sultan. Open rebellion gained momentum in the southern province of Dhufar in the mid-1960s and by 1968 had become radicalized. Sa^cTd bin Taymur was incapable of meeting this threat effectively, and his obdurate resistance to change or development of any kind increasingly made him an embarrassment to Great Britain. The British Foreign Office may not have directly conspired to bring about the events which led to the accession of Qabus bin Sa^cId (who had been kept isolated by his father in Salala and denied access to the palace), but a number of local British officials actively supported the 42 coup.

If most “new” nations face a major challenge in constructing “a civil politics of primordial compromise” as the only alternative to the “forcible suppression of ethnic assertion or a political Balkanization,”[43] the problems facing post-1970 Oman were particularly complex for a country of its relatively small size. Omani government spokesmen are understandably reluctant to speak of the potential lines of division in the country because they have been used in the past as a means of weakening it and to some extent by the former Sultan as a means of ensuring no challenge to his rule. Although Arabic is the principal language of communication, Persian, Baluchi, Sindi, Swahili, several Indian languages, and non-Arabic indigenous languages are known. Especially in the coastal region, many persons are bi- and trilingual. In terms of religious distinctions, there are Sunni, Shi^cT, and Ibadi Muslims and especially in the capital region a considerable number of Banian (Hindu) merchants. There is a similar ethnic and tribal diversity, with Arab, Baluchi, Indian, African, and non-Arab indigenous populations, the disappearing distinction of slave/nonslave origin, and large numbers (approximately forty-five thousand as of 1976) of “temporary” workers

from the Indian subcontinent. Additionally, many persons of Omani descent have returned from East Africa over the last decade. Because of conditions prevailing in Oman until 1970, these immigrants have tended to be better educated than native Omanis and have been given responsible posts in government and commerce.

Oman’s regional diversity also contributes to its cultural and social richness.

out Sultans (New York: Vintage Books, 1975) (his figures for Iran and the Arabian peninsula are necessarily outdated, but the study contains data difficult to obtain from other sources); and the Ministry of Information and Culture, Sultanate of Oman, “Facts about Oman” (Muscat: mimeo., 1977).

[41] Peterson, Oman, p. 207.

[42] For a concise account of the organization of the coup, see Peterson, Oman, pp. 201-3.

[43] Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,” in Old Societies and New States, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-57.

Economically and (in the past) politically, the country faces two directions. The culturally and socially complex coastal mercantile community traditionally has faced toward the outside. Through the 1870s, this community conducted a prosperous external commerce. The Sultanate then was comprised of present-day Oman, Zanzibar, enclaves along the East African coast, and Gwadar, an island enclave off Pakistan which was sold to Pakistan in 1958 to help finance a military expedition of Sa^cid bin Taymur into Oman’s interior. [463] The country also faces inward, to the agricultural villages of the mountainous Jabal Akhdar region of “inner” Oman. Each of these villages was nearly self-sufficient economically, raising a variety of irrigated crops, sheep, and goats but politically integrated into several major tribal units, and religiously united under an IbadT Imam. In contrast to the linguistically and religiously complex coastal region, “inner” Oman’s potential divisions were primarily tribal. In addition, the southern province of Dhufar has traditionally been isolated from the rest of Oman.

In the late nineteenth century and in the twentieth century the Sultanate suffered serious economic and political decline. The British suppressed the lucrative slave trade, the Sultanate lost its East African possessions, and the coming of steamships seriously affected the key role which Omanis had earlier played in the commerce of the Indian Ocean. By 1920 the highlands had in practice become autonomous under the Ibadi Imam,

leaving Sa^cId bin Taymur dependent upon the British to administer the remainder of his realm.

The major accomplishment of Sa^cid bin Taymur’s reign was slowly to bring the entire country under his effective control. He was a master of internal politics and adroitly played tribal and other social groups against each other to preserve his own strength. In the late 1940s, he managed to obtain British support (not always willingly offered) to expand the scope of his control and to meet external threats. Because of the country’s oil potential, Saudi Arabia supported dissident movements in the Jabal Akhdar region through the mid-1950s, but Sa'Td became the first Omani Sultan in the twentieth century to bring this region under his control, a control which became increasingly tenuous as Omanis realized that it was not being used for any constructive purpose.

From 1970 to date, the challenges of open rebellion in the south and of creating a better life for all Omanis are being met. The Dhufar rebellion was effectively quelled through a combination of military force and, more importantly for the long term, through the sustained commitment of the government to use the country’s resources to improve its standard of living and to involve Omanis from all backgrounds in the country’s government and development. Several statistics suggest the scope of what has been achieved. In 1970 there were three schools in the Sultanate and 909 students, all boys. As of 1977, there were 261 schools through the secondary level and 65,000 students, boys and girls, in school. From one hospital in 1970, there were 13 by 1975, with a large number of supplementary clinics and dispensaries. From 10 kilometers of paved roads in 1970, the Sultanate possesses roughly 3,000 as of 1979. In practical terms this means that the time for trips to interior points has been greatly shortened. The trip to Nizwa, for instance, which once took two days over rough track, now takes slighty over two hours.[464]

As in all developing countries, disparities inevitably exist between regions and between the capital cities and the hinterland, but Omanis are aware of this and are seeking to mitigate them. The country was dependent upon oil exports for 90 percent of its revenues as of 1978, although the government is actively seeking ways to diversify the economy and to stem the decline of traditional agricultural activities as Omanis find more lucrative careers elsewhere.[465]

Perhaps the most important long-term indices of the country’s ability to construct a resurgent and transformed national identity are those which are most difficult to quantify. Sectarian differences within Islam have lost the divisive significance which in the past they sometimes have had. Omanis of non-Arab origin have increasingly made the conscious decision to communicate with their children at home in Arabic instead of Sindi, Baluchi, or other languages, a decision indicative of a renewed commitment to Omani national identity and to the faith placed in education as a means of social advancement. Through the late 1960s, marriages between various sectarian groups were relatively infrequent. Even groups that once had deserved reputations for not tolerating marriages

with “outsiders” now encourage intermarriage. Especially in a society in which a large part of social life is carried on within the confines of the extended family, such decisions suggest not only the consequences of recent social and economic change but also a confident self-awareness of many Omanis toward the changed basis of their cultural and social identity. Omanis are actually aware that their future is dependent only in part upon technical and economic resources—Oman’s oil reserves are estimated to be much more limited than those of some of its neighbors—and that an even more important consideration is the ability of all Omanis to continue to develop the virtues of civility which have been nurtured over the last decade.

Somalia: Scientific Socialism. Like Oman, Somalia is a small nation, 3.2 million inhabitants as of 1977, but one which traditionally has had a strong sense of ethnic and collective homogeneity. As Ioan Lewis has remarked, Somalis have traditionally tended to see social relations in terms of an expanding universe of kinship.[466] Tribalism for Somalis has traditionally meant ties of kinship and clan. The presence of ethnic Somalis beyond the borders of the present-day country has led to a certain political instability in recent years. Roughly 75 percent of all Somalis were nomadic pastoralists until the drought of the early 1970s forced the rapid sedentarization of much of the population.

In 1969 Colonel (now General) Siad Barre successfully led an officers’ revolt which resulted in the founding of the Somali Democratic Republic. Somali politics from independence in 1961 until 1969 shared much in common with other recently independent nations. A major organizational problem was integrating the former Italian and British administered zones of the country and operating modern political forms such as a parliament in a milieu in which clan identity remained paramount. Most Somalis presumed with some justification that government officials and their elected representatives acted principally along clan lines.

The revolutionary government aimed to transform Somali identity completely to bring the country into the ranks of “scientific socialism.” The use of kinship terms of address was made illegal. Homicides, which previously were regulated by conventions of clan vengeance and blood money, were firmly suppressed with the public execution of violators. The chewing of qat, a mild narcotic popular with many Somalis and Yemenis, was restricted to the hours between dusk and dawn. The government became highly centralized, with the unemployed youth organized into squads of “Victory Pioneers,” or vigilantes, to see that the government’s directives were carried out. Even the most remote towns were provided with orientation centers.

The leaders of Somalia’s revolution were obliged to create Somali terms to express the goals of the revolution. Scientific socialism was translated as “lyealth- sharing based on wisdom,” a phrase actually first used by the BBC Somali Service. Jalle, a Somali term which earlier meant “playmate” or “mate,” was used for comrade. Posters of Marx, Lenin, Kim Il-Sung of North Korea, and Siad Barre began to emerge everywhere. Kim Il-Sung was especially popular because his country managed to balance

itself with relative success between the superpowers of China and the USSR and stressed the virtue of self-reliance (juche). Even before their revolution Somalis regarded their own country as delicately poised between East and West and placed a high value upon their own autonomy.

In October 1973 Somalia adopted the Latin script; government officials were given two months to learn the new script. Somali had until then been an unwritten language, and there were stiff debates as to whether Arabic script (favored by the religiously traditional) or Latin script should be adopted. Traditionalists objected to Latin script on the grounds that it was areligious and to indicate their sentiments pronounced Latin as la din, which in Arabic means “no religion.” The strength of Siad Barre’s government allowed the reform to be effectively imposed. Later, in 1974-1975, all schools in the country were closed so that students could teach the rest of the largely illiterate population to read and write. This movement emerged as one of the world’s more successful mass literacy campaigns.

The way in which these reforms were popularly interpreted demonstrated how even “scientific socialism” had to accommodate implicitly popular notions of legitimacy and how much the revolution as practiced owed to a continuity of cultural form. The banning of kinship terms of address was intended as a break with the prerevolutionary past, although in government propaganda, the Head of State is often referred to as the father, the revolution as the mother, and the people as the issue of the two, with the orphans and unemployed, the “flowers of the revolution,” receiving particular attention of the state. M.O.D., a code name for the revolution which in Somali means hail (as in a greeting), is interpreted by many Somali as ,an acronym for the three important clans bridged by General Barre’s own kinship ties. Although the state seeks to separate itself from religious traditionalism,- it uses the imagery of Islam as locally understood to win popular support for many of its programs. General Bane allows himself to be compared with Muhammad ^cAbdille Hassan, a Somali religious leader who in the 1920s led an almost successful revolt against the British and whose kinship ties, like those of Barre, bridged Somalia’s most important clans. Scientific socialism is repeatedly claimed to be compatible with the Quran, and the Quran is regularly broadcast by Somali radio with commentaries on it being used in subtle ways to win popular acceptance of governmental reforms. Most innovations are introduced in the form of “crash” programs, most of which are labeled as jihad-s, or holy struggles.

Israel. The anthropological literature concerning Israel as a nation-state and an emerging nation is extremely rich, so that here it is possible only to indicate some of the principal approaches that have been used in its study. One of the major points of departure concerns the changing position of Arab Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, and their class situation vis-a-vis the Jewish population. A second approach has been concerned primarily with the “ingathering of the exiles” and the forging of a Jewish/Israeli national identity in the context of immigrants with highly disparate backgrounds and skills. The first approach entails understanding the patterns of Jewish settlement in Palestine prior to the foundation of the state of Israel.[467] From 1882 to 1903, a small number of Jewish settlers arrived from eastern Europe, and the rate of arrivals increased somewhat for the period

1919-1931. By 1931, there were 175,000 Jews in Palestine, both indigenous and nonindigenous, out of a total population of 1,036,000. Jews thus constituted 17 percent of the population. The period of 1932-1939 was marked by outbursts of violence between the Jewish population on the one hand and Palestinian Christians and Muslims on the other. The British Mandate authorities sought to limit the potential for violence in part by placing immigration quotas oh Jewish settlers, but these restrictions were largely ineffective. On May 14, 1948, the Mandate was terminated and the State of Israel came into being. The population of Palestine has been estimated to be 2,065,000 as of May 1948, of which 31 percent (or 650,000) were Jews. Jews owned 6 percent of the total area and 15 percent of the cultivable land. By November 1948 in that part of Palestine which became Israel, 82 percent of the population of 873,000 was Jewish. This dramatic increase in the proportion of the Jewish population was due in part to the flight or expulsion of an estimated 650,000-700,000 Arabs and the accelerated immigration of over 100,000 Jews in the months following independence.

The new state gave priority to the problems of assimilating massive numbers of Jewish immigrants of diverse backgrounds. For this reason and for reasons of security, restrictions were placed upon the movements and labor opportunities of the Arab population. The consequences of these restrictions and their effect upon the Arab population are documented by studies such as Cohen's Arab Border Villages and Emanuel Marx's Bedouin of the Negev, the latter of which describes the economic and political life of the Bedouin during a period when Israeli military rule still applied to them.[468] Other anthropologists and political scientists have adopted the complementary perspective of studying the economic status of various groups in Israeli society and relating the class situation of the Arab and Jewish population to recent political history. Joel Migdal has linked the lack of a growth of class consciousness among Palestinian Arabs in the 1930s to the fact that no specifically urban Arab political elite had emerged. Rosenfeld has dealt with the same issue but over a longer time span which includes the thirty years since the founding of the state of Israel.[469]

Many of the studies concerning Israel as a nation-state and the politics of assimilation began as part of the Bernstein Israel Research Project, initiated at the University of Manchester in 1963 by Max Gluckman and Emrys Peters.[470] The intent of this project was to undertake comparative studies of family and kinship among Israel's different ethnic groups, to analyze varieties of leadership and local political organization, and to assess the changing relations between ethnic groups, including comparative studies of Jewish and non-Jewish communities. In practice, the resulting studies concentrated upon only a few aspects of Israel society such as cooperative rural villages (moshavim), collective settlements (kibbutzim), and the newer towns which contain higher proportions of recent immigrants.

If the first generation of these studies has concentrated upon particular communities within Israeli society, later essays have sought to interpret major trends in Israeli society on the basis of detailed prior research. One such seminal study is Deshen's "Israeli Judaism."[471] Deshen sees two major trends in the varieties of patterns of religious observance and

nonobservance among Israel’s Jews. One is the emergence of the “new” ethnic/religious category of “Oriental” Jew, formed as Jews of Middle Eastern origin have come to realize how their divergent heritages differ substantially from that of Jews of European origin. Secondly, Deshen suggests that one of the reasons that Israel’s orthodox Jews have a political significance far beyond their numbers (less than 5 percent of the population) is because of the religious basis of Israeli national identity. Although orthodox Jews have not always offered viable solutions to Israel’s major political and economic crises, no other version of Judaism has been identified as closely with the symbols of tradition and religious legitimacy. Deshen sees the continuing debate among Israelis as to the meaning of Jewish tradition as one of the keys to understanding Israeli society today.

*** Development in Perspective

The Middle East contains a range of state forms—the traditional monarchies of Morocco, Jordan, and the Arabian peninsula, democracies, such as Turkey and Israel, and one-party or military regimes in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Some of these states advocate radical political doctrines; others are profoundly conservative. A major feature of all of them is a professed commitment to development, an improved life for their citizens, and either a popular participation in government or the state’s claim to speak “for the people.” Whether the states are devoid of major economic resources, such as Turkey, Jordan, and the two Yemens, or possess major oil reserves, as do Algeria and many states of the Arabian peninsula, they seek to provide services such as schools, hospitals, roads, and other community improvements within the limits of their resources. Especially as oil revenues have increased massively in recent years, the pace of development has had a profound impact upon many Middle Eastern societies. [472] In many instances the efforts to bring about economic, administrative, and in some cases political reform have led to profound social transformations of Middle Eastern political and economic life.

In seeking to understand these transformations, some anthropologists have emphasized how, despite changes in economic opportunities and patterns of political action, locally held conceptions of power and authority often suggest major continuities with those of the past. [473] Other studies of political activity, including those of Peter Gubser and Richard T. Antoun on Jordanian communities, place greatest emphasis upon the rapid economic and political change of the last thirty years.[474] Gubser, a political scientist who conducted a field study in Al-Karak, stresses the increased differentiation of townsmen in socioeconomic status, especially over the decades since the Second World War. One result of this is that an educated middle stratum of townsmen, teachers, government officials, and others has drawn away from the mass of the population and is in a position to express dissatisfaction with the traditional tribal political leaders. He documents how changing economic patterns have diminished the role of traditional leaders, how the growth of the central government and increased socioeconomic differentiation has created new cleavages between nation-state and province, although the government has sought to mitigate these cleavages through agricultural cooperatives and expanded social services. Antoun traces a similar development in his two studies, especially in Low-Key Politics. He writes that

village life, both in the past and today, has been characterized by considerable economic mobility and social differentiation. The shortage of land has acted as a constant pressure toward emigration, both in the form of military service and in wage labor elsewhere. In terms of long-term change, Antoun sees a shift in the way that day-to-day village issues are intertwined and resolved. Villagers who in the past were tied to lineage and tribal leaders now have a greater individuality and freedom to switch alliances, although their leaders enjoy no comparable flexibility. Even given these shifts, personal interrelatiopships remain so complex that with the exception of politicized schoolteachers and other persons not intimately tied to village politics, confrontations rarely involve overt challenges with the ensuing risk of total disruption of social and economic life.

A trend in virtually every Middle Eastern country has been toward more centralized state control and allocation of major resources: The consequences of investment in development are not always as intended by planners. The experience of many countries with schooling is highly significant in this respect. We have already seen how education was highly valued during the colonial era in Morocco. Relatively few persons received education and a diploma was almost a guarantee of significant employment. One of the first commitments of the independent Moroccan government was to expand the school system dramatically. In the early years after independence, students and parents in many parts of the country enthusiastically assisted in the building of schools. The Moroccan government has continued to build schools but has been unable to keep pace with the rapid population growth. Of those who can attend school and graduate—the dropout rate at all levels hovers near 90 percent—the government and the nearly stagnant private sector of the economy have been able to absorb only a few. Rapid expansion has entailed lower educational standards, so that those who can afford to do so send their children to private schools or pay for tutoring. This trend in turn encourages the poorly paid teachers to reserve their best efforts for students who can pay private tuition, a trend already prevalent for several decades in Egypt. Hence education now more than ever tends to reinforce disparities between those who can pay and those who cannot, and the initial promise of “progress” through education has abated.[475] In other countries, such as those of the Arabian Peninsula, educational facilities have been expanded only in recent years, salaries are high enough to attract competent teachers from other countries, and recent graduates are rapidly employed. In such cases, the hope placed in education as a vehicle for social change remains unshaken.

The nether side of expanded governmental services has been the expanded opportunities for corruption. In an unusual essay, John Waterbury has sought to assess systematically various patterns of corruption, using Egypt and Morocco as examples. He distinguishes three major types: endemic, planned, and developmental corruption, all of which are inherent in and exacerbated by the processes of economic development. Endemic corruption “is the abuse of public office that occurs to varying degrees in any system.”[476] When civil servants are poorly paid and there is more demand for government services than can be fulfilled, access to services often can be had only upon payment of an extralegal fee. This may be for medical attention, housing, documents such as passports and driving permits, or for the tutoring offered by teachers at all educational levels which is necessary for students to pass critical examinations. Promotions may also hinge upon payment of such

fees. Such practices are not condoned in either Egypt or Morocco, but Waterbury reports that their existence is widespread and known. So long as such exactions are kept within tolerable limits, public protest is negligible. When it reaches too high a level, resentment often takes a violent turn.

Planned corruption occurs when political leaders find it desirable to achieve a certain level of short- and medium-range control of subordinates. There are three short-term advantages to planned corruption over the distribution of rewards by objective needs or merit: The principal distributor of spoils guarantees his indispensability to the system; it undercuts the emergence of too rigorous a meritocracy, which in the case of “kings in particular, but many republican heads of state as well,” might lead to questioning the competence of the ruler. With a spoils system, rewards come from loyalty to the boss, and officials are rewarded for concentrating on their narrow self-interest. Finally, Waterbury argues that planned corruption mitigates class and social cleavages by building vertically integrated clientele through which spoils are distributed.[58] The result is to encourage a dependency and subservience toward central authorities and to dilute the ideological content of politics. Waterbury argues that this form of corruption exists both in Egypt and in Morocco but is more extensive in Morocco, where the political elite’s comparatively small size makes it easier to control. If the short-term gains are considerable for rulers, in states with limited resources such as Egypt and Morocco, the negative consequences are to squander public resources and to increase the cynicism of the elite and the masses toward governmental initiatives.

Developmental corruption occurs in situations in which the state owns or controls most of the major resources and makes most major new capital investments.[59] In the overall context of low standards of living and low literacy rates, no group except the state can play a major role. In this context there are opportunities for “brokerage” fees, noncompetitive contracts, the siphoning of foreign aid for black-market use, the evasion of currency and import regulations, and other practices which enable elements of the governmental elite and poorly paid bureaucrats at lower levels to make fortunes or at least to live more tolerably. In countries rich with oil or other resources, the consequences of such discriminatory awarding of services and favors are sometimes less damaging, but in countries where resources are meager, as in Egypt and Morocco, they reinforce “the resentment and suspicion on the part of the great mass of the poor citizenry towards the civil service and public authorities in general” and “have pernicious effects on the will of a national collectivity to work toward developmental goals.”[60]

While Waterbury’s focus is upon a prevalent yet unfortunate byproduct of development, several anthropologists have sought to evaluate the long-term implications of developmental schemes. As Nicholas S. Hopkins explains, a manifest function of development is to improve the income, the health, and the educational standards of the poor. Indirectly, development projects function to reinforce the authority of the central government and its scope of control, consequences regarded by the political elite as desirable.[61] He reviews the developmental trans-

[ss] Ibid., 432-34.

[59] Ibid., 438-39.

[60] Ibid„ 444.

[61] Nicholas S. Hopkins, “Development and Center-Building in the Middle East,” paper presented at the conference on “Strategies of Local Development in the Middle East,” University of Maryland, Baltimore County, September 20-23, 1978 (mimeo.). Used by permission. A discussion of this issue is also contained in the “Introduction to Part III: Agrarian Transformaformations of Egypt over the last two centuries. In the early nineteenth century, Sultan Muhammad ^cA1F Pasha introduced new agricultural techniques and the cultivation of cotton as a major cash crop. Annual basin irrigation in the Nile valley was increasingly replaced by perennial canal irrigation, and a small rural elite eventually managed to acquire control of much of the best agricultural land.

This technological and economic pattern remained relatively constant until the Egyptian revolution of 1952. One of the goals of the revolution was to maintain the technical advantages of the first agricultural transformation but to neutralize its built-in tendency toward social inequality. The size of rural landholdings was limited; large estates were broken up as part of a program of extensive land reform; and cooperatives were established in an effort to retain the economic advantages of large estates. The declared policy of the government was the mobilization of the peasantry, but despite these intentions major decisions were made by an administrative elite that often looked with disdain upon peasants and regarded them as incapable of acting in their own best interests. Nonetheless, Egyptian land reform was undertaken in earnest and had a major social impact.[62]

FIGURE 11-5 Mechanization of agriculture hasJed to major social changes in the rural Middle East. Combine harvester, Tunisia. (Courtesy Nicholas S. Hopkins.)

tion and Rural Values,” in Arab Society in Transition, eds. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Nicholas S. Hopkins, pp- 179-82. See also Hopkins’s “Modem Agriculture and Political Centralization: A Case from Tunisia,” Human Organization, 37, no. 1 (Spring 1978), 83-87.

[62] Hopkins, “Development,” p. 8; for a critique of Western studies of Middle Eastern politics and an analysis of why many governments are reluctant to involve the bulk of the population in political discussion despite their declared commitment to political mobilization,

see R. M. Burrell, “New Questions or Old: Tradition and Modernity in the Middle East,” Encounter 39, no. 5 (July 1972), 69-73. For discussions of landownership and land reform elsewhere in the Middle East, see Nur Yalman, “On Land Disputes in Eastern Turkey,” in Islam and Its Cultural Divergence, ed. G. L. Tikku (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 180-218, and Robert A. Femea, “Land Reform and Ecology in Postrevolutionary Iraq,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 17, no. 3 (April 1969), 356-81.

Hopkins describes a third transformation of agricultural technology which is now under way. Part of it has been engendered by the “green revolution,” new high-yield seeds and agricultural techniques, dam building, the use of computers, and intensive mechanization. The land reform of the “second transformation” created holdings too small to make mechanization pay. Effective use of the new technology requires the coordination of large numbers of peasants and the coordination of many of these holdings. Despite the effort to achieve these goals through cooperatives, the government was not wholly successful. Moreover, the expense of developing the new technology requires the central government to extract a maximum surplus from rural areas. Hopkins’s argument is essentially that the prior transformations of agricultural technology and landownership had major consequences upon social differentiation and that the present one is having equally profound, if not fully predictable, implications.

Other anthropological studies confirm the unintended consequences of economic development and planned change. David Seddon describes recent economic change in an impoverished Riffian village in northern Morocco.[477] He reports that the great majority of the active population is involved in agriculture but that only a few persons find farming sufficiently productive to live from it. Many people are compelled to emigrate in search of work, although it is increasingly hard to obtain. At the same time, farming as a way of life and wage labor in agriculturally active seasons are becoming increasingly indistinguishable. Sharecropping arrangements, which in the past provided a modicum of security for poorer families, have become rare. Labor is now treated as a commodity, and landowners find daily salaries to be a more “economic” arrangement.

Jon Anderson’s account of the introduction of tractors to tribal Afghanistan traces the social consequences of technological innovation in particular detail, especially as it has affected the relations between khans and their supporters.[478] He writes that khan in Turkic means “lord” or “chief’ of a tribe or component of it, but that in highland Afghanistan the term merely “denotes big men who are economically and politically prominent in their communities.” Khans develop leadership through patronage: gifts, favors, even regular stipends in return for support; locally, they are known for their ability to “feed their people.” Supporters are not considered employees or dependents, but as “equals” who “just miss having the wherewithal to actualize this equality in a politically meaningful way.”[479] If they were fully dependent, there would be no prestige to be gained by having them as followers. Major khans are distinguished from lesser ones by their ability to mediate disputes between tribesmen and to represent their group to those outside of it.

Beginning in 1966, tractors were introduced in the region and cultivation was markedly increased. Planners intended the tractors to be purchased collectively, but in practice they ended up in the hands of the wealthier individuals. Anderson explains that Pakhtuns favor personal autonomy and prefer not to participate in corporate ventures they cannot personally control. Moreover, the cost of tractors was too high for all but the most wealthy (which Anderson calculates in terms of 350,000 pounds of bread at retail prices or nearly twenty brides in 1973).[480] Only the wealthy purchased the machines, but rather than use the expensive technology for developing unimproved land, they not surprisingly used the tractors to bring the most immediate return. This was the cultivation of wheat on rainfall irrigated lands, which previously were regarded as a supplement to crops grown on stream-fed lands. These “supplemental” lands now were commercially plowed. Owners of tractors rented them out by the hour at a rate which was eight to ten times the going daily wage of an unskilled laborer. Tractors became strictly economic investments for “quick return and high profit” and had the consequence of diverting the investment of khans in maintaining their followings. Perennially irrigated lands of the Pakhtun require intensive labor which often is secured through sharecropping ventures among relatives and fellow community members. As economic interest has shifted to rainfall-fed lands and to crops such as wheat which require only short periods of intensive labor, long-term economic relationships such as sharecropping have declined and have been replaced by short-term migrant workers paid by the day.[481]

The social consequences of this economic shift have been dramatic. Social relations have become more strictly economic. Anderson reports that the rich tend to get richer by diverting the proceeds of their agricultural production to non- agricultural investments. Marginal landowners are unable to generate the capital needed for agricultural production and are being squeezed out, while poorer tribesmen, whose social status was traditionally ambiguous, are becoming peasants.

Like the “green revolution” elsewhere, introducing tractors into Pakhtun farming is nothing more than the spread of agribusiness with its high technology of hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers, mechanical cultivation and commodity markets which, by dismembering an integrated enterprise, reduced labor as well to a commodity, usually the one that “costs” the least. Paradoxically, it is not a rising standard of living and greater security that is purchased by increased production but increased dependence on larger and more diversified spheres of exchange and an overall diminution of security.[482]

*** Conclusion

The emphasis which I have placed on the unplanned consequences of technological innovation and economic change implies a vision of the social sciences at marked variance with some popular conceptions of it. The French social historian Marc Bloch made the profound comment that new social forms are not usually consciously intended, but usually

occur “in the process of trying to adapt the old.”[483] There is a strain of reform and idealism which has characterized social science since the nineteenth century: an attempt to assess social forms “scientifically,” to assure social progress, and even to plan it. One theme of this book has been to stress the inadequacy of simple formulas to account for the direction and consequences of social and cultural change, and instead to seek to interpret events and their significance. Many countries in the Middle East and elsewhere face profound challenges in development, including incorporation in a world market economy, technological and organizational innovations which permit a centralization of states that would have been unimaginable in earlier epochs, and a quantum leap in the size of populations. Egypt is typical of many countries in this regard. Its population was 38.5 million in 1976, and current estimates expect this figure to double within thirty years, with no major expansion of cultivable land or of other economic resources.[484] Such challenges may be common to many countries, but each adapts to these developments and alters its direction in the light of its own history and long-established practices. The Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 serves as a poignant reminder that the direction of change cannot be “read” or predicted from general indicators and that popular notions of legitimate authority, like other fundamental .cultural values, are often much more stable and enduring than the massive technological, economic, and political transformations of recent years initially suggest and have profound consequences for the direction of change.

A second theme of this book has been to seek to compare a wide range of more specialized studies of the Middle East. The comparison of specialized studies and the particular topics and contexts which they interpret are used to sharpen our understanding of distinctive Middle Eastern cultures and societies, not to seek an illusory overall synthesis. Such comparison is used to sharpen qualitative judgments and interpretations of evidence for such general issues as the nature of legitimate authority, social inequality, conceptions of family, community, and state and how these are affected by economic and political development, the significance of transnational identities such as Muslim, Jew, and Arab, and of religious belief and practice past and present.[485] The initial questions posed must be broad enough to permit meaningful comparison, but significant interpretation involves using these concepts in such, a way as to clarify particular historical and contemporary developments. This interpretative vision of anthropology and related disciplines is necessarily complex and requires a sensitivity to particular cultural and historical details. Yet its rewards for those interested in the main issues of social thought and a greater understanding of their own and other cultures and societies are also substantial.

Two recent studies, one on Islam, the other on a small country on the Arabian Peninsula, conclude with similar images. Geertz’s Islam Observed concludes with what the author calls the “human metaphor” of a traditionally raised but French-speaking Moroccan student on an airplane bound for New York to study at an American university. It is the student’s first trip away from home, and Geertz writes that “he passes the entire trip with the Koran gripped in one hand and a glass of scotch in the other.” The second book describes an Omani who carries a dagger but adorns it with a wristwatch, who holds a camelstick in his hand but travels by Datsun, who dresses in dishdasha and skullcap but conducts business in English and spends holidays in London.[486]

Both “human metaphors” describe real comportment (although the student passing the entire trip from Morocco to New York grasping a Quran and a scotch is difficult to accept), and they are contrived to suggest strikingly contradictory and ambivalent elements of comportment. There is an element of perhaps inescapable caricature in both metaphors. I am writing the conclusion to this book in a small provincial center on the Arabian peninsula. A group of young officials has just paid me an unexpected visit. I translated the passages containing the human metaphors described above for them. They were uneasy with them, and we sought to find out why.

My friends acknowledged that the comportment described in the metaphors was probably realistic but that the choice of images was wrong because they implied a contradiction of thought and action which they found inaccurate and misleading. Our discussion led us to suggest the following description of their present situation as a more satisfactory one, although admittedly less visually striking. Intellectuals in the Middle East have often used ideological models borrowed from the West to explain developments in their countries and their aspirations. This is probably an inescapable phenomenon given world historical developments. At the same time, in the name of what the West (especially the French) calls authenticity and the Arabs call asala, Middle Easterners seek to cultivate or to revive native traditions and ideals and to achieve international recognition and respect. Middle Easterners and those of other traditions interested in comprehending Middle Eastern developments must admire the efforts, often courageous and resourceful, and at other times unavoidably hesitant and faltering, of persons and nations seeking to renew long-standing values and traditions in the exigent context of modern political and economic developments.

** Glossary

Terms are defined here according to local usages. Many terms, especially those used in religious contexts, appear in slightly different forms in each of the major languages of the Middle East; not all of these variants are given here. (P = Persian; A = Arabic; T = Turkish; H = Hebrew.) The spellings given here often reflect local usages and not the conventions of written Arabic.

Al (A): family, clan, people

^cAlawT (A), Alevi (T): Shl^ci religious sect found in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon

^caiim, pl. ^culama' (A): religious scholar

amTr, pl. umara' (A): prince or tribal chief

^car (Mor. A): conditional supernatural curse or compulsion

^casabTya (A): “group feeling” (Ibn Khaldun)

asala (A): authenticity

ayatullah (A and P): principal Shi^cT religious leader

^caynayn (Saudi A): “eyes,” tribal leaders

baraka (A): supernatural blessing; abundance

bayt (A): house; household

bay^ca (A): oath of fealty; homage

bin ^camm (A): father’s brother’s son (for a full listing of kinship terms, see Chapter 6, note 2)

dam (A): blood

dar (A): house; tribal territory

darb (Mor. A): quarter, neighborhood

dawra (P and A): circle; discussion group

dawwar (Mor. A): rural local community

dhikr (A): Sufi term for repetition of certain words or phrases in praise of God

dishdasha (A): a long, flowing garment, usually white for men, worn in Eastern Arabia

diya (A): blood money; recompense for bodily injury

durustliik (T): trustworthiness

fakhda (A): subdivision of a tribe; thigh

falaj, pl. aflaj (A): imgational canal, partially underground (Oman)

fqlh (cl. faqlh), pl. fuqaha' (A): a person who knows Islamic law; a Quranic teacher

ghattara (A): irrigation canal, partially underground (Morocco)

habus, pl. ahbas (North African A): religious bequest; same as waqf

hajj (A): pilgrimage to Mecca

hajj (A): a pilgrim, also the title assumed by one who has made the pilgrimage

hakim (A): ruler or judge; arbiter in pre-Islamic times

hal (A): Sufi term for mystic exaltation

hamula (A): kinship group (esp. Arabs in Israel)

haqq (A): obligation; share or right; truth

haram (A): religious sanctuary; that which is sacred or forbidden

harka (Mor. A): royal progress; movement

hijra (A): emigration; Prophet’s emigration from Mecca to Madina in 622.

hillula (Mor. A): festival for a Jewish saint

hshumlya (A): propriety; deference

^cId al-Kabir (A): the Great Feast, or Feast of Abraham

ihram (A): white seamless garment worn by pilgrims to Mecca

ijaza (A): teaching license

ijma^ca (A): concensus

^cilm, pl. ^culum (A): religious knowledge; religious scholarship

imam (A): spiritual leader; prayer leader

jahilTya (A): the pre-Islamic time of ignorance

jalle (Somali): comrade; playmate jihad (A): religious struggle or endea

vor

jinn, pl. jnun (A): a form of supernatural being

juche (Somaliborrowing fromKorean): self-reliance

Ka^cba (A): sacred enclosure at Mecca kahin (A): soothsayer khan (P): tribal leader khanqah (P): religious lodge khayma (A): tent

khuwa (A): brotherhood; tax paid for protection to a more powerful tribal group

kibbutz, pi. kibbutzim (H): collective settlement

kizb (A): lie;lying

kunya;pl. kunan (A): surname laqab; pl. alqab (A): nickname madlna, pl. mudun (A): town mahalla (Mor. A): royal encampment or progress

mahdl (A): the rightly guided one; religious leader

makruh (A): reprehensible

maktub (A): that which is written, foreordained

malaka l-hifd (A): mnemonic domination; the faculty of memory

malik, pi. muluk (A): king, sovereign mallah (A): Jewish quarter

marabout: a person, living or dead, thought to have a special relation toward God which enables him to ask for God’s grace on behalf of his clients and to communicate it to them (North Africa)

ma^crifa (A): secular knowledge

ma^cruf (A): known; used with reference to distinguished or noble families

moshav, pl. moshavim (H): agricultural colony

mudrf (Iraqi A): guest house

mujtahid (A and P): ShPT religious leader

mulk (A): royal authority; sovereignty

mullah (P): village preacher

murid (A): Sufi term for student or disciple

musha^c (A): collective landownership musim (Mor. A): a periodic festival in honor of a marabout

nafs (A): the self; the passions

nazdik (P): nearness or closeness

nisba, pl. nisab (A): name derived from occupation or origin

riiya (A): faith;intent

nizam (A): order; organization

pfr (P): Sufi master

qbila (Mor. A), gabha (Saudi A), pl. qaba'il or gaba'il: tribe

qadf, pl. quda (A): religious judge

qa'id, pl. qada (Mor. A): tribal chief appointed over a tribe or small town during the protectorate; now ^cqal (A): reason

qanat (A and P): irrigation canal, partly underground

qaraba (A): nearness or closeness

qasba (A): citadel or fortress

qat (A): mild narcotic plant, the leaves of which are chewed in Somalia, Djibouti, and the Yemen

qawm (A and P): people or nation; kinship term in Afghanistan

qudrat Allah (A): God’s will

rak^ca (A): a bending of the torso from an upright position, followed by two prostrations in Islamic prayer

Ramadan (A): lunar month of fasting

rasu l (A): messenger; envoy

ruh (A): spirit

rukn, pl. arkan (A): pillar or principle

safayi batin (P): integrity and inner purity

saj^c (A): rhymed prose

salafiya (A): Islamic reform movement

salat, pl. salawat (A): Islamic prayer ritual

SanusTya: North African religious order

sawm (A): fast

sayyid, pl. sada (Iraqi A): descendants of the Prophet

sdaq (A): bridewealth

shahada (A): declaration of faith

SharPa (A): the revealed, or canonical, law of Islam

sharTf, pl. shurafa' (A): descendant of the Prophet through his son-in-law, ^cAli, and his daughter, Fatima

shaykh, pl. shuyukh (A): tribal or religious leader

ShT^ca: major subdivision of the Islamic community

silsila (A): chain; patrilineal genealogy su ft: Islamic mystic

SunnT: major subdivision of the suq, pl. aswaq (A): market

ta^caruf (A and P): etiquette

tafsTr: sciences of interpreting the

Quran

tahrTk (Mor. A): competitive display of horsemanship

taqTya (A): concealment

tarlqa, pl. turuq (A): religious order

tasawwuf (A): mysticism; Sufism

tata (Berber): contractual ritual alliance

tawaf (A): act of circumambulating the Ka^cba

ta^czTya (A): mourning

tekke (T): religious lodge

thiqa (A): confidence

umma (A): Islamic community

wall, pl. awliya' (North African A): saint

waqf, pl. awqaf (A): pious endowment

za^cTm, pl. zu'ama' (A): leader or strongman

zawiya, pl. zawaya (A): religious lodge zawwar, pl. zawawir (Mor. A): a visitor;

a maraboutic descendant who acts as intermediary between clients and his maraboutic ancestor

zakat (A): alms tax

zerangi (P): cleverness; insincerity

[49] See P. M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958); for discussions of the Sudanese Mahdist movement in the light of later religious developments and a broad spectrum of religious movements in Islam, see John Voll, “Islam: Its Future in the Sudan,” The Muslim World, 63, no. 4 (1973), 280-96, and his“The Sudanese Mahdi:

[1] Carleton S. Coon, Caravan: The Story of the Middle East, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961).

[2] Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 60-62.

[3] Nikki R. Keddie, “Is There a Middle East?” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 4 (1973), 255-71.

[4] Hodgson, Venture, pp. 60-61.

[5] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

[6] 1 prefer the neologism anormal to abnormal because the latter term implies that an established body of orthodoxy is necessary and desirable in all the sciences and an indication of disciplinary health.

[7] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology and Other Essays (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 1.

[8] Leach first expressed this opinion in 1954 and reiterated it in Culture and Communication (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 1.

[9] Jean Paul Sartre, Literary and Philosophic Essays (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p.

[10] Raymond Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), p. 124.

[11] Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. 2, trans. Richard Howard and Helen Weaver (New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books, 1970), p. 245. A similar argument, based in part upon the arguments of classic anthropological monographs, can be found in W. G. Runciman, Sociology in Its Place and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-44.

[12] An extreme formulation of this notion which for a time blocked a more sophisticated consideration of the nature of anthropological thought can be found in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (London: Cohen and West, Ltd., 1952), pp. 1-3.

[13] Marc Bloch, Feudal Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964 [orig. 1939- 1940]); Edmund Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965 [orig. 1954]).

[14] David M. Schneider, American Kinship: A Cultural Account (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).

[15] The definition of institution varies significantly in the social sciences. By the term I mean customary, accepted ways of doing things in a given society. The emphasis in this definition is upon the culturally shared patterns of meaning and mutual expectations which underlie such conventions. For what I regard as the best account of the psychological aspect of the relations of the anthropologist and those cultures studied, and the consequences of this relationship for how the anthropologist conceptualizes social experience, see Vincent Crapanzano, Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[16] Clifford Geertz, “Comments,” in Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, eds. Richard Antoun and Iliya Harik (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 460. The discussion of these issues which follows owes much to Geertz’s succinct presentation of the issues in pp. 460-67 of the Antoun and Harik volume.

[17] Geertz, ibid., p. 463.

[18] Georges Hardy, L’Ame Marocaine d’apres la Litterature Franqaise (Paris: Librairie Larose, 1926), pp. 20-67.

[19] Carleton S. Coon, Caravan: The Story of the Middle East, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961 [orig. 1951]).

[20] Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, and J. Malcolm Wagstaff, The Middle East: A Geographical Study (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), pp. 160,184-85. The limits of the Middle East as defined by Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff exclude all of the Maghrib except Libya, so these statistics should be regarded as approximate.

[21] These figures are derived from Donald Powell Cole, Nomads of the Nomads (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1975), p. 143, and Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff, The Middle East, p. 185. The tentative nature of all such overall estimates should always be kept in mind. To cite two extreme examples, population estimates for Afghanistan in 1968 ranged from 7 to 17 million. A census in Saudi Arabia in 1962-1963 (the results of which were never officially recognized) revealed the population to be only 3.9 million as opposed to earlier estimates of 7 million and a 1972 estimate of 8 million. See Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff, The Middle East, pp. 176-77, and Robert J. Lapham, “Population Policies in the Middle East and North Africa,” Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 11, no. 2 (May 1977), 16:

[22] Lapham, ibid., p. 4, and Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff, The Middle East, p. 185.

[23] Paul Magnarella, Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town (New York: Halstead Press, 1974), p. 33. For a fuller account of Middle Eastern languages, see Gemot L. Windfuhr, “Linguistics,” in The Study of the Middle East, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), pp. 347-97.

[24] Robert A. Femea, “Ethnographic Essay,” in Nubians in Egypt: Peaceful People, eds. Robert A. Femea and Georg Gerster (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1973), pp. 15,4546.

[25] Charles Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta (New York: Random House, n.d. [orig. 1888]). In terms of literary style, Doughty’s Travels is probably one of the greatest nineteenth- century travel accounts, although it had little success in the author’s lifetime.

[26] Lewis, “Study of Islam,” pp. 35-36.

[27] Alan Moorehead, The Blue Nile (London: Four Square Editions, 1965), pp. 55-133, provides a well-written general account of the French occupation of Egypt.

[28] Sir Richard F. Burton, A Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah & Meccah (New York: Dover Books, 1964 [orig. 1855]),p. 17.

[29] Burton, Personal Narrative, p. 5.

[30] The biographical details presented here are derived from Katharine Sim, Desert Traveller: The Life of Jean Louis Burckhardt (London: Gollancz, 1969).

[31] John Lewis Burckhardt, Arabic Proverbs; or, the Mamers and Customs of the Modem Egyptians (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972 [orig. 1830]); Travels in Nubia (London: J. Murray, 1822); Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys (London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1831). All three books are available in reprint editions. The comments concerning the implications of Burckhardt’s modes of description for his assumptions concerning Bedouin social life are derived from an unpublished paper by my student, Kenneth Sandbank, “The Relation of Literary Form to Cognitive Style in the Work of J. L. Burckhardt,” typescript, June 1979.

[32] 0ne of the best of such accounts is Henry Rosenfeld, “The Role of the Military in State Formation in Arabia,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 95 (1965), 75-86, 174-94.

[33] Fifth edition (1860) reprinted (New York: Dover Publications, 1973).

[34] T. O. Beidelman, W. Robertson Smith and the Sociological Study of Religion (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 29.

[35] Ibid„ p. 13.

[36] Smith wrote extensively on his trip to western Arabia. See his “Journey in the Hejaz,” in his Lectures and Essays of William Robertson Smith, ed. by J. S. Black and G. Chrystal (London: A. & C. Black, 1912), pp. 484-597. This account was first published serially in The Scotsman (February-June 1880).

[37] Smith, Lectures and Essays, pp. 491-92.

[38] William Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967 [orig. 1885]); Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (New York: Schocken. Books, 1972 [orig. 1889]). The account of Robertson Smith’s ideas is largely derived from Beidelman, Robertson Smith.

[39] W. Robertson Smith, The Prophets of Israel and Their Place in History to the Close of the Eighth Century B.C. (London: A. & C. Black, 1919 [orig. 1882]).

[40] See T. O. Beidelman’s review of the Beacon paperback edition of Kinship and Marriage, Anthropos, 63/64 (1968-1969), 592-95. Beidelman, who studied under Evans-Pritchard at Oxford, provides, the following further clarification (personal communication, April 1977): “Evans-Pritchard told me that he got his insights on segmentation from Smith and also indicated that he read Smith either before or while at Cairo [where Evans-Pritchard held a teaching post prior to his fieldwork among the Nuer], so that would suggest that the notion was in his head before fieldwork. ... He certainly had a complete and well-used set of Smith, some of which I now have.”

[41] Beidelman, W. Robertson Smith, p. 65.

[42] Smith, Kinship and Marriage, pp. 5,7,4243,269.

[43] See Talal Asad, ed., Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (London: Ithaca Press, 1973). Asad's essay in this volume, "Two European Images of Non-European Rule," pp. 103- 18, partly concerns Snouck Hurgronje, discussed below. A more thorough study has been made of the basic assumptions of Islamic scholars, again including Snouck Hurgronje, by J. D. G. Waardenburg, L'Islam dans le Miroir de l'Occident, 3rd ed. (Paris and The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1969).

[44] One of the few exceptions I know of to this generalization is a small, neglected book by Arnold Van Gennep, better known for his The Rites of Passage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). Van Gennep's En Algeria (Paris: Mercure de Fiance, 1914) devotes several chapters to the means by which French settlers alienated land from native Algerians and the social consequences of these and similar actions of dispossession and political subjugation.

[45] Said, Orientalism.

[46] This section is based largely upon Waardenburg, L 'Islam.

[47] The photographs were published in portfolio form in C. Snouck Hurgronje, Bilder-Atlas zu Mekka (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1888).

[48] C. Snbuck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Later Part of the Nineteenth Century, trans. J. H. Monahan (Leiden: E. J. Brill and London: Luzac & Co., 1931). This is Volume 2 of a study which originally appeared in 1888-1889. Unlike his early work in the Middle East, Snouck Hurgronje's work in the Dutch East Indies (again as ^cAbd al-Ghaffar) was directly related to the interests of Dutch colonial rule over its Muslim subjects.

[49] See, for instance, Edmond Doutte, a lecturer on Islam at the University of Algiers, "Les Morocains et la societe Marocaine," Revue Generate des Sciences, 14 (1903), 190-208, 258-74, 314-27, 372-87, and Eugene Aubin [pseud, for Eugene Descos, a French diplomatic official], Morocco of Today (London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1906; New York: Gordon Press Publishers, 1977 [orig. French, 1904]).

[50] Their investigations were published in two series of monographs, Archives Marocaines and Villes et. Tribus du Maroc, as well as in several journals. The main journals were Archives Berb'eres (1915-1920), the Revue du Monde Musulman (founded in Tangier in 1906), and after 1921,

Hesperis, which became Hesperis-Tamuda shortly after Morocco’s independence.

[51] Cited in Abdelkabir Khatibi, Bilan de la Sociologie au Maroc (Rabat: Association des Sciences de 1’Homme, 1967), p. 10. My translation.

[52] Marcel Granet, The Religion of the Chinese People, trans. Maurice Freedman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976).

[53] This literature is conveniently summarized in Douglas L. Johnson, The Nature of Nomadism, Research Paper 118 (Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1969).

[54] Radcliffe-Brown’s “horse” analogy is contained in his Structure and Function in Primitive Society (London: Cohen and West, 1952), pp. 184-85; Evans-Pritchard’s critique is in his Social Anthropology and Other Essays (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964), p. 181.

[55] Abner Cohen’s Arab Border Villages in Israel (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1965) is a clear example of such an approach. For a detailed critique of Cohen’s study, see Talal Asad, “Anthropological Texts and Ideological Problems: An Analysis of Cohen on Arab Villages in Israel,” Economy and Society, 4, no. 3 (August 1975), 251-82.

[56] This is one of the elements of the argument presented in Ernest Gellner’s Saints of the Atlas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), a complex study that will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter. See also Paul Stirling, “Cause, Knowledge and Change: Turkish Village Revisited,” in John Davis, ed., Choice and Change: Essays in Honour of Lucy Mair (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), pp. 191-229. Stirling’s original fieldwork in Turkey was conducted at intervals between 1949 and 1952 and is presented in<his monograph Turkish Village (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; 1965), now unfortunately out of print. In 1971 Stirling was allowed to return to the villages he had studied for the brief period of a week. His “Cause, Knowledge and Change,” based on this visit, recognizes the problems of studying change within the compass of a functionalist framework.

[57] Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949.

[58] Carieton S. Coon, Caravan: The Story of the Middle East, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961), p. 8.

[59] Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1957).

[60] Abdul Hamid M. el-Zein, “Water and Wheel in a Nubian Village.” M.A. thesis, American University in Cairo, 1966. A published summary of el-Zein’s argument is his “Socioeconomic Implications of the Water Wheel in Adendan, Nubia,” in Contemporary Egyptian Nubia, ed. Robert A. Fernea (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 1966), Vol. 2, pp. 298- 322. For a general account of Nubian society accompanied by an outstanding photographic essay, see Robert A. Fernea and Georg Gerster, Nubians in Egypt: Peaceful People (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1973). Zein’s principal “structural” study of an Islamic community is The Sacred Meadows: A Structural Analysis of Religious Symbolism in an East African Town (Evanston, Hl.: Northwestern University Press, 1974). For the life history of an individual Nubian, see John G. Kennedy, Struggle for Change in a Nubian Community, Explorations in World Ethnography (Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1977).

[61] Ibid., p. 104. The implications of characterizing a society as “segmentary” are discussed in Chapter 5.

[62] Ibid., p. 104.

[63] See especially Robert A. Femea and James M. Malarkey, “Anthropology of the Middle East and North Africa: A Critical Assessment,” in Bernard J. Siegal, Alan R. Beals, and Stephen A. Tyler, eds., Annual Review of Anthropology, 4 (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1975), pp. 193-206.

[64] Emrys L. Peters, “Aspects of Rank and Status among Muslims in a Lebanese Village,” in Mediterranean Countrymen, ed. Julian Pitt-Rivers (Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1963), pp. 159-202. This has been reprinted in Volume 2 of Louise E. Sweet, ed., Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East (Garden City: Natural History Press, 1970), pp. 76-123. Peters’s “recantation” (my term) is contained in his “Shifts in Power in a Lebanese Village,”’ in Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, eds. Richard Antoun and Hiya Harik (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972). pp. 165-97.

[65] Peters, “Shifts in Power,” p. 165.

[1] The most significant recent studies include Fredrik Barth, Nomads of South Persia (New York: Humanities Press, 1965); Daniel G. Bates, Nomads and Farmers: A Study of the Yoriik of Southeastern Turkey, Anthropological Papers, 52 (Ann Arhor: University of Michigan Museum of Anthropology, 1973); William Irons, The Yomut Turkmen: A Study of Social Organization among a Central Asian Turkic-speaking Population, Anthropological Papers, 58 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Museum of Anthropology, 1975); I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Hom of Africa (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1961); Emanuel Marx, Bedouin of the Negev (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967); Talal Asad, The Kababish Arabs: Power, Authority and Consent in a Nomadic Tribe (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1970); and a series of articles by Emrys Peters on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica (Libya), including “Some Structural Aspects of the Feud among the Camel-Herding Bedouin of Cyrenaica,” Africa, 37 (1967), 261-82, and “The Tied and the Free: An Account of a Type of Patron-Client Relationship among the Bedouin Pastoralists of Cyrenaica,” in Contributions to Mediterranean Sociology, ed. J . G. Peristiany (Paris and The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1968), pp. 167-88. The only recent monograph_on pastoralism on the Arabian peninsula is Donald Powell Cole, Nomads o f the Nomads: The Al Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter, Worlds of Man (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1975). Three useful collections of recent papers are Perspectives on Nomadism, eds. William Irons and Neville Dyson-Hudson, International Studies

[67] This observation is one of the essential features of Ibn Khaldun’s reflections on tribesmen, peasants, and urban dwellers. See Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), The Muqaddimah, 2nd ed., trans. Franz Rosenthal,, Bollingen Series, 43 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 247-310. Among contemporary anthropologists, see Talal Asad, “The Bedouin as a Military Force: Notes on Some Aspects of Power Relations between Nomads and Sedentaries in Historical Perspective,” in Desert and Sown, ed. Nelson, p. 71; and Philip Carl Salzman, “The Study of ‘Complex Society’ in the Middle East: A Review Essay,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9, no. 4 (November 1978), 539-57. For a major geographical study emphasizing the importance of studying regions instead of treating communities as if they were social, political, and economic isolates, see Paul Ward English, City and Village in Iran (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966).

[68] Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, and J. Malcolm Wagstaff, The Middle East: A Geographical Study (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), p. 187. Cf. p. 124, where the figure is given as 1.1 percent for 1947.

[69] [s] The following account is based upon Gabriel Baer, Studies in the Social History of Modem Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 3-16.

[70] The appropriation of lands intended for collectivities by personal title was not confined to attempts to induce nomads to settle. In Syria and Palestine it was common for cultivated lands to be collectively held by villages under a system of land tenure known as musha^c. In 1858 the Ottoman administration enacted a major reform involving land registration and intended to eliminate the earlier system of tax fanning and its accompanying abuses by making cultivators directly responsible for the tax on their lands. Like many reforms, this one had unintended consequences. It provided an opportunity for unscrupulous village headmen to acquire personal title to the lands of entire villages. See Talal Asad, "'Anthropological Texts and Ideological Problems: An Analysis of Cohen on Arab Border Villages in Israel," Economy and Society, 4, no. 3 (August 1975), 261.

[71] For example, Irons, Yomut Turkmen, pp. 21-27, 61-81.

[72] "The Social Composition of the Military in the Process of State Formation in the Arabian Desert," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 95 (1965), 75-86,174-94.

[73] John Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys,Vol. 1 (London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1831), p. 117.

[74] For an interesting reconstruction of "traditional" raiding patterns and an explanation of how such raiding served as a means of redistributing livestock wealth, see Louise E. Sweet, "Camel Raiding of North Arabian Bedouin: A Mechanism of Ecological Adaptation," in Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, Vol. 1, ed. Louise E. Sweet (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1970), pp. 265-89.

[75] Rosenfeld, "Social Composition," pp. 78-79.

[76] Asad, "The Bedouin as a Military Force," p. 62.

[77] As with many religious movements, the Wahhabi movement is known by separate names to its adherents and to outsiders. Adherents know it as "the call to the doctrine of the Oneness of God," after its claim to return to the original principles of Islam as they were in seventh-century Arabia and to eliminate later accretions to Islamic practice. Other Muslims and Westerners know the movement by the name of its founder, Ibn ^cAbd al-Wahhab (1703/4- 1792), who persuaded the ruler of a small oasis settlement (an ancestor of the present Saudi dynasty) to accept his religious teachings and to undertake a series of military raids to persuade other tribes and settlements to accept them as well. For a compact account, see George Rentz, "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia," in

The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics, ed. Derek Hopwood, Studies on Modem Asia and Africa, 8 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), pp. 54-66.

[78] Few anthropological studies have been made of the Arab/Persian Gulf states, but useful studies by nonanthropologists include J. B. Kelly, “A Prevalence of Furies: Tribes, Politics, and Religion in Oman and Trucial Oman,” in Arabian Peninsula, ed. Hopwood, pp. 107-41, and Frank Stoakes, “Social and Political Change in the Third World: Some Peculiarities of Oil- Producing Principalities of the Persian Gulf,” ibid,, pp. 189-215, For the role of tribes inTran, see Philip C. Salzman, “National Integration of the Tribes in Modem Iran,” Middle East Journal, 25, no. 3 (Summer 1971), 325-36.

[79] Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, pp. 266-95; also I. M. Lewis, “The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup,” Journal of Modem African Studies, IQ, no. 3 (October 1972), 383-408.

[80] Fredrik Barth, “Nomadism in the Mountain and Plateau Areas of South West Asia,” Problems of the Arid Zone, UNESCO (1960) [Bobbs-MerriU Reprint A-263], p. 341; Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff, The Middle East, pp. 187,321.

[81] [1&] Ibid„ p. 187; Abdalla Said Bujra, “The Social Implications of Development Policies: A Case Study from Egypt,” in Desert and Sown, ed. Nelson, p. 156.

[82] Bates, Nomads and Farmers, p. 222.

[83] Another reason for the strengthening of traditional leadership and loyalties appears to be the large-scale involvement of the Bedouin in smuggling activities. Livestock is smuggled into Libya, where prices are much higher than in Egypt. Such practices, had to be concealed from government officials, at least at a formal level. See Bujra, “Social Implications,” p. 150.

[84] Cole, Nomads, pp. 144-63; Cole, “The Enmeshment of Nomads in Sa’udi Arabian Society: The Case of Al Murrah,” in Desert and Sown, ed. Nelson, pp. 113-28.

[85] Cole, Nomads, pp. 24,161.

[86] Ibid., p. 39.

[87] Seasons are determined by climatic conditions, not by calendar months, so their occurrence varies widely from year to year.

[88] Cole,Nomads, pp. 41-43.

[89] Dar, like many other terms relating to kinship, residence, and “tribe,” has differing meanings throughout the Arab world, so that usage in one locale and context is not necessarily a reliable guide for usage elsewhere. In other contexts in Saudi Arabia, colloquial Arabic dialects elsewhere, and in classical Arabic, dar, for example, is translated as “house.”

[90] Cole, Nomads, pp. 43-46.

[91] Ibid., p. 21;

[92] Ibid., p. 47; Fredrik Barth, “The Land Use Pattern of Migratory Tribes of South Persia,”Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift, 17 (1959) [Bobbs-Merrfll Reprint A-ll], 1-11.

[93] Cole, Nomads, pp. 46-51.

[94] Ibid., pp. 51-52.

[95] Ibid., pp. 36-39, 69, 90. Throughout his study (for example, p. 96), Cole stresses the egalitarian ideology of the Al Murra, but as he points out on p. 90, poor lineages that are obliged to hire out as herders are considered to be inferior by birth. Such lineages frequently are considered to have as ancestors an Al Murra male and a slave woman rather than a woman of the Al Murra itself. These nuances of genealogical manipulation point to a more complicated ideology of social identity than the simple premise of equality asserted by the Al Murra.

[96] Ibid., p. 85.

[97] Ibid., pp. 85-88.

[98] Ibid., p. 86. Although Cole uses the present tense, it is likely that the statements of his informants refer to conditions in the past, before the effective emergence of Saudi government control.

[99] /bid., p. 96.

[100] ftid„ pp. 95-101,108-10.

[101] Jacob Black, “Tyranny as a Strategy for Survival in an ‘Egalitarian’ Society: Luri Facts Versus an Anthropological Mystique,” Man, n.s., 7, no. 4 (December 1972), 614-34.

[102] ZWd„ p. 623.

[103] ^Ibid, p. 627.

[104] ^Ibid., p. 631. For an alternative account of the effects of economic processes upon social differentiation and settlement as a consequence both of wealth at one end of the economic spectrum and poverty at the other, see Barth, Nomads, pp. 101-11.

[105] My “Ideological Change and Regional Cults: Maraboutism and Ties of ‘Closeness’ in Western Morocco,” in Regional Cults, ed. Richard P. Werbner, A.S.A. Monograph 16 (New York and London: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 3-28, used the term part-ideology instead of practical ideology. Out of context, the earlier term could be taken to imply a weakness or i inferiority of such ideologies in contrast to those which are formally elaborated; the term practical ideology is less likely to be so construed.

[106] 1. M. Lewis, “Kim Il-Sung in Somalia: The End of Tribalism?" in Politics in Leadership: A Comparative Perspective, eds. William A. Shack and Percy S. Cohen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 1344.

[107] The emphasis upon the practical contexts in which social forms are used follows Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice, Cambridge

Studies in Social Anthropology, 16 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 35-36.

[108] For a brief review of these usages, see Marx, “The Tribe,” 343-44.

[109] Eickelman, “Time,” pp. 50-52. The discussion of Moroccan tribal organization is further documented in Eickelman,Moroccan Islam, pp. 115-21.

[110] Marx, “The Tribe," pp. 356,359.

[111] Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1933), p. 175.

[112] ’ [ls] Ibid„ pp. 174-81.

[113] He made , this point in speaking with Robert Femea at Oxford in the early 1960s (Robert Fernea, “Sunrise Semester,” CBS-TV, October 10, 1975). Evans-Pritchard taught in Cairo from 1932 to 1934 and made numerous trips to the Bedouin during this period. He later applied the notion of segmentation to the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, Libya, but only in a highly condensed form devoid of specific historical examples. See his The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949).

[114] Emrys L. Peters, “Some Structural Aspects of the Feud among the Camel-Herding Bedouin of Cyrenaica," Africa, 37, no. 3 (July 1967), 261-81. Except where otherwise noted, the following account is based primarily upon Peters’s critique, For Peters's more general views on the use of segmentary lineage theory in Middle Eastern contexts, see his “Aspects of Affinity in a Lebanese Maronite Village,” in Mediterranean Family Structures, ed. J. G. Peristiany, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, 13 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976). The article has a much wider significance than Peters’s title indicates. For an excellent comparative discussion of the feud and its importance for understanding “tribal” societies in the Mediterranean, see Jacob Black-Michaud, Cohesive Force: Feud in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975). In many ways Black- Michaud’s argument develops Peters’s insights on the feud. A foreword by Peters presents a summary of his views of the subject.

[115] David Hart describes a situation in the Moroccan Rif prior to colonial rule in which feuds were so endemic that each house took the form of a pillbox in some regions. Since

[116] women were left out of feuds, special women's markets developed so that households could maintain economic contact with the outside world. Several exclusively women's markets still exist in the region. For an elaborate account of feuds in the Rif using segmentary lineage theory, see David M. Hart, "Clan, Lineage, Local Community and the Feud in a Riflan Tribe [Aith Waryaghar, Morocco]," in Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, Volume 2: Life in the Cities, Towns, and Countryside, ed. Louise E. Sweet (Garden City, N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1970), pp. 3-75. Another useful study by Hart which historically examines the relation of Moroccan "tribes" to the country as a whole is "The Tribe in Modern Morocco: Two Case Studies," in Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa, eds. Ernest Gellnet and Charles Micaud (London: Duckwoith, 1972), pp. 25-58. For a description ot endemic feuding in southern Arabia prior to colonial rule in the 1930s, see H. W. Ingrams, A Report on the Soda! Economic, and Political Conditions of the Hadramaut, Colonial Office, No. 123 (Longon: H.M.S.O., 1936).

[19] For example, see Emest Gellner, Saints of the Atlas, The Nature of Human Society Series (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).

[117] Pierre Bourdieu, Outline, pp. 30-71, is one of the few social anthropologists besides Peters who has realized the full significance of such ties.

[118] See ibid., pp. 33-38 and the discussion in Chapter 6 of this hook concerning father's brother's daughter's marriage.

[119] 0n the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, see Peters, "Some Structural Aspects," esp. pp. 269, 280-81.

[120] Ernest Gellner, "Political and Religious Organization of the Berbers of the Central High Atlas," in Arabs and Berbers, p. 59.

[121] Detailed analysis of Gellner's use of the concept of segmentation can be found elsewhere. Black-Michaud discusses Gellner throughout his Cohesive Force, esp. pp. 269, 280-81, while I have discussed it implicitly in Moroccan Islam, pp. 105-21, and explicitly in "Ideological Change and Regional Cults," esp. pp. 23-24. A highly original and detailed critique by a Moroccan sociologist who has worked in the same region as Gellner is Abdellah Hammoudi, "Segmentarity, Social Stratification, Political Power and Sainthood: Reflections on Gellner's Theses," Economy and Society, 9, no. 3 (August 1980), 279-303. Another useful discussion of Gellner's thesis is Mildred Geertz's review of Saints of the Atlas, which appeared in the American Jouma! of Sociology, 7 6(1971),763-6 6.

[122] cates in detail how informants can have genealogical models “suggested” to them by anthropologists, see Hildred Geertz, “The Meanings of Family Ties,” pp. 349-56. Emrys Peters, “Aspects of Affinity in a Lebanese Maronite Village,” in Mediterranean Family Structures, ed. J. G. Peristiany, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology 13 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 27-28, discusses the perils of drawing unwarranted inferences from kinship terminology alone, citing examples from contemporary anthropological literature.

[123] Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 312. Said’s quote is from Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1964), p. 151.

[124] Robert Leroy Canfield, Paction and Conversion in a Plural Society: Religious Alignments in the Hindu Kush, Anthropological Papers, 50 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Museum of Anthropology, 1973), pp. 34-35.

[125] [s] Abner Cohen, Arab Border Villages in Israel (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1965), pp. 2-3,105-29.

[126] Abner Cohen, “The Politics of Marriage in Changing Middle Eastern Stratification Systems,’’ in Kssays in Comparative Social Stratification, eds. Leonard Plotnicov and Arthur Tuden (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), pp. 195-209.

[127] See Cohen, Arab Border Villages, pp. 71-93, for his best example of historical changes in the politics of marriage alliances and the elasticity with which normative claims of marriage “rules” are interpreted. Cohen’s observations are far from isolated ones. In his study of a provincial urban center in Turkey, Peter Benedict, also reacting against prevailing assumptions of lineage theory arid the solidarity of extended families, found that even when there was a compact arrangement of the houses of married sons within a natal courtyard, “many of the households so arranged . . . had virtually nothing to do with their close agnatic neighbors.” See Peter Benedict, “Aspects of the Domestic Cycle in a Turkish Provincial Town,” in Mediterranean Family Structures^ p. 239.

[128] For a more detailed discussion of this concept and its use, see my Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center, Modem Middle East Series, 1 (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1976), pp. 95-105,183-210.

[129] Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., Bollingen Series 43 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 249-310, esp. p. 264.

[130] This distinction is elaborated in Clifford Geertz, “On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding,” American Scientist, 63, no. 1 (January-February 1975), 47-48.

[131] The identifying numbers are keyed to Fig. 6-2.

[132] Peters, “Aspects of Affinity," p. 32, also emphasizes this point.

[133] For details of the incident, see Dale F. Eickelman, “Is There an Islamic City? The Making of a Quarter in a Moroccan Town,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 5, no. 3 (July 1974), 289-93.

[134] See Colette Petonnet, “Espace, Distance et Dimension dans une Socidt^ musulmane: APropos du Bidonville marocain deDouar Doum a Rabat,”L’Homme, 12 (1972),47-84.

[135] Fuad I. Khuri, From Village to Suburb: Order and Change in Greater Beirut (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 37-62.

[136] Fuad I. Khuri, “A Profile of Family Association in Two Suburbs of Beirut,” in Mediterranean Family Structures, p. 93.

[137] Some of the basic theoretical points were published earlier in Clifford Geertz and Hildred Geertz, Kinship in Bali; nonetheless, Hildred Geertz“s Moroccan work (“Family Ties,” pp. 315-91) tends to be presented in a more extensive manner which lends itself more readily to intraregional comparison.

[138] H. Geertz, “Family Ties,” p. 333.

[139] Ibid., p, 334. Such pressures were even more intense in[!] the large households of an earlier generation of the wealthy throughout the Middle East. An Egyptian historian, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, drawing upon the recollections of her family and friends, writes of her research concerning such houses: “I was given multiple examples of houses where three generations lived together and who with their servants and retainers came to well over sixty inmates- the women could not exactly remember the names of all the retainers so only accounted for the major ones.” Polygamy was also prevalent in such circles, although in Egypt at present only 0.05 percent of marriages are polygamous; See her

“The Revolutionary Gentlewomen in Egypt,” in Women in the Muslim World, eds. Lois Beck and Nikki Keddi (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 263, 275. As with the formal contours of any institution, it would be misleading to regard the social significance of polygamy In one-dimensional terms. Clearly, the institution favors male dominance. In the past, especially when combined with the practice of concubinage, polygamy could be used as a means of sealing political alliances. In other cases, even by contemporary sensibilities, its use could be more benign. For example, a young Moroccan religious scholar was studying at one of the country’s mosqueuniversities just after the inception of the French protectorate in 1912. He was lodged in the house of one of his teachers and took his meals there. In the early 1960s, the wife of his teacher was widowed and left with no adequate means of support. Out of respect and gratitude to both . his former teacher and his wife, the former student, now a distinguished qddr(religious judge), took the widow as his second wife. Marriage was the only available means by which he could incorporate her into his household and care for her in her later years.

[140] Khuri, Village to Suburb; Richard T. Antoun, Arab Village: A Social Structural Study of a Transjordanian Peasant Community (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972).

[141] [32] Michael ,M. J. Fischer, “On Changing the Concept and Position of Persian Women,” in

[142] Women in the Muslim World, pp. 207-8.

[143] For an excellent coUection of articles which deal with the nature of visiting patterns and their relationship to notions of family and social prestige, see the special issue of the Anthropological Quarterly, 12, no. 1 (January 1974), entitled “Visiting Patterns and Social Dynamics in Eastern Mediterranean Communities.”

[144] Miibeccel Kiray, “The New Role of Mothers: Changing Intra-familial Relationships in a Small Town in Turkey,” in Mediterranean Family Structures, pp. 261-71. See also the important article by Alan Dubetsky [Duben] “Kinship, Primordial Ties, and Factory Organization in Turkey: An Anthropologies] View,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1, no. 3 (July 1976), 433-51.

[145] Vanessa Maher, Women and Property in Morocco, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, 10 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 157.

[146] Ibid„ pp. 191-220.

[147] A Moroccan informant discussing marriage practices with Hildred Geertz, cited in “Family Ties,” p. 363.

[148] For an elaboration of the similarities of Muslim and Jewish practices in many domains, see S. D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the. Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geriza. Volume III: The Family (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978). Although Goitein is principally concerned with the tenth through the thirteenth centuries, he frequently introduces comparative material from contemporary periods. For particularly useful accounts of marriage negotiations and ceremonies elsewhere in the Middle East, see Hamed Ammar, Growing Up in an Egyptian Village (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954), pp. 192-201; Paul J. Magnarella, Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town (New York: Halstead Press, 1974),,pp. 107-30; Richard T. Antoun, Arab Village: A Social Structural Study of a Transjordanian Peasant Community (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), pp. 114-53; and Ladislav Holy, Neighbours and Kinsmen: A Study of the Barti Peoples of Darfur (London: C. Hurst, 1974). For valuable older accounts of nineteenth-century marriage practices, see C. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1931) pp. 83-144, and Edward William Lane, An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1973 [orig. 1836],pp. 155-85.

[149] Daisy Hilse Dwyer, Images and Self-Images: Male and Female in Morocco (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), indicates the complementary images Which Moroccan men and women hold of each other, although again Hiidred Geertz’s “The Meanings of Family Ties” provides the most circumstantial account of marriage negotiations. There are limits in many regions even today, as to how actively women participate In marriage choices. In Turkey, a country with a long tradition of legal reform favoring the equality of women with men, females in small urban centers continue to be “severely segregated” from the age of eleven onward. One Turkish scholar reports that “63 percent of the girls who live in small towns see their husband for the first time on their wedding day, while the proportion for the three large cities and the villages are 16 and 19 percent, respectively.” Fatma Mansur Cojar, “Women in Turkish Society,” in Women in the Muslim World, p. 133.

[150] Note the self-fulfilling cultural definition of reason. Since women at least traditionally have been restricted from participating fully in a wide range of public activities, it follows that in comparison with men when they do participate in such activities they do so often less effectively than do men. See Eickelman, Moroccan Islam, pp. 130-38.

[151] Lawrence Rosen, “I Divorce Thee,” Transaction, 7, no. 8 (June 1970), 35. Among the Yoriik of southeastern Turkey, one means of coping with the impossible escalation

of bridewealth is by kidnapping, usually done by preanangement with the couple involved and their

[152] trusted relatives. See Daniel G. Bates, Nomads and Parmers: A Study of the Yoruk of Southeastern Turkey, Anthropological Papers, 52 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Museum of Anthropology, 1973), pp. 59-86.

[153] Abdelhaq Cohen, “Le Coutdu Manage a Fes,” Lamalif (Casablanca), no. 69 (March 1975), 14-16.

[154] Maher, Women and Property, pp. 17,196-98. Maher’s comparison of her findings with those of other scholars on pp. 196-97 is particularly useful. For an excellent empirical account, including a discussion of polygamous households, see Gillian Lewando-Hunt, “Conflicts among Bedouin Women,” Royal Anthropological Institute Newsletter, no. 19 (April 1977), 4-7.

[155] Richard T. Antoun, “Anthropology,” in The Study of the Middle East, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley &. Sons, 1976), pp. 166-68.

[156] Keyser, “The Middle Eastern Case,” 293.

[157] Khuri, “Parallel Cousin Marriage,” p. 606, points out that in any case, a man’s nephews are normatively committed to support him, so that such a marriage is “strategically” unnecessary. Khuri’s critique of alternative approaches is interesting, but his own concluding argument that such a union psychologically contributes to harmonious family relationships in that it blends roles that persons leam as children with the responsibilities they have as married adults is as single-stranded and tenuous as the other, arguments considered here.

[158] Maher, Women and Property, pp. 2, 3,222-24.

[159] Keyser, “The Middle Eastern Case," 294.

[160] *[s] Ibid., 295-96, 307.

[161] Thls illustration is also found in Eickelman, Moroccan Islam, p. 208.

[162] Bourdieu, Outline, p. 35.

[163] Maher, Women and Property, p. 104.

[164] Boutdieu, Outline, pp. 43-52. For a more thorough analysis of Bourdieu's argument and its implications, see Dale F. Eickelman, “The Political Economy of Meaning,” American Ethnologist, 6, no. 2 (May 1979), 386-93.

[165] Constance Cronin, “The Effect of Development on the Urban Family,” in The Social Sciences and Problems of Development, ed. Khodadad Farmanfarmian, Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Program in Near Eastern Studies, 1976), pp. 261-72.

[166] Antoun, “Anthropology,” pp. 166-68.

[167] S. D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza. Volume III: The Family: (Berkeley and Los Angeles'. University of California Press, 1978), p. 314.

[168] Goitein, Mediterranean Society, pp. 315-19.

[169] Richard W. Bulliet, “First Names and Political Change in Modern Turkey,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9, no. 4 (November 1978), 489-95.

[170] Hildrcd Geertz, “The Meanings of Family Ties,” in Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society, Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and Lawrence Rosen (New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 341-56.

[171] Part of the following discussion on naming is adapted from Dale F. Eickelman, “Time in a Complex Society: A Moroccan Example,” Ethnology 16, no. 1 (January 1977), 48-50. A thorough discussion of names which relates them to the notions of kinship and patronymic association is found in Geertz, “Family Ties,” pp. 341-56. This is one of the best discussions of naming available for Middle Eastern contexts. For a discussion of naming ceremonies and the effect of government-imposed civil registries on patterns of naming, see Hamed Ammar, Growing Up in an Egyptian Village (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954), pp. 91-93,97.

[172] Geertz, “Family Ties,” p. 342.

[173] Professor Abdul Hamid M. el-Zein, Temple University, persona] communication (June 1979). Ammar, Growing Up, pp. 92-93, points out that in Middle Eastern contexts where formal naming ceremonies for children do not exist (such as Palestine in the 1930s) the names of children are sometimes changed in later years from the ones initially given them. This is almost never the case when formal naming ceremonies exist, as occurs seven days after the birth of the child in Egypt and Morocco, among other Middle Eastern countries.

[174] Richard T. Antoun, “On the Significance of Names in an Arab Village," Ethnology, 7, no. 2 (April 1968), 159.

[175] Ibid., 164-69.

[176] Clifford Geertz, “On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding,” American Scientist, 63, no. 1 (January-February 1975), 47-53. For a more extended discussion by the same author of the significance of nisba-s in relation to economic roles, see his “Suq: The Bazaar Economy,” in Meaning and Order, pp. 140-50.

[177] C. Geertz, “On the Nature,” 52. n

[178] See, for instance, C. C. Stewart, Islam and Social Order in Mauritania (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 62, 134-35, and Abd-al Ghaffar Muhammad Ahmad, Shaykhs and Followers: Political Struggle in the Rufu^ca al-HoiNazirate in the Sudan (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1974), pp. 84-92.

[179] Roxann A. Van Dusen, “The Study of Women in the Middle East: Some Thoughts,” Middle East Studies A ssociation Bulletin, 10, no. 2 (May 1976), 2.

[180] /2>W„ 340.

[181] The two collections complement each other. The earlier of the two, Elizabeth Warnock Femea and Basima Qattan Bezirgan, eds., Middle Eastern Muslim Women Speak (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1977), is an anthology of writings by and about Middle Eastern Muslim women. The collection is specifically intended as a primary document. Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie, eds., Women in the Muslim

World (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1978), is more deliberately analytical. Ayad al-Qazzaz, Women in the Middle East and North Africa: An Annotated Bibliography, Modern Middle East Monographs, 2 (Austin: University of Texas Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1977), contains useful entries. Cynthia Nelson’s “Public and Private Politics: Women hi the Middle Eastern World," American Ethnologist, 1, no. 3 (August 1974), 551-63, contains an excellent review of how the subject of women has been handled in a variety of ethnographic accounts. For an excellent survey of evidence-historical and contemporary-concerning the “informal" political leadership of women, especially in royal circles, see James A. Bill and Cari Leiden, Politics in the Middle East (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 98-111.

[182] Unni Wikan, “Man Becomes Woman: Transsexualism in Oman as a Key to Gender Roles,” Man (N.S.), 12, no. 2 (August 1977), 304.

[183] excruciatingly painful operation and sometimes has resulted in death. See Rose Oldfield Hayes, “Female Genital Mutilation, Fertility Control, Women's Roles, and the Patrilineage in Modern Sudan: A Functional Analysis,” American Ethnologist, 2, no. 4 (November 1975), 617-33, The topic is predictably a sensitive one which especially educated Sudanese tend to approach with caution in public discussion, because of the disapproval which such practices arouse among both popular and educated circles in countries such as those of North Africa, where equivalent rites are unknown. It should be noted that such physically painful rites are not entirely confined to women. Although male circumcision occurs in most parts of the Middle East at an early age, in some parts of North Yemen circumcision occurs only between the ages of twelve and fifteen. The child is surrounded by a crowd of men and women. A knife is held to his foreskin while he recites the Muslim creed, “There is no God but God and Muhammad is his Prophet," three times. The foreskin is then cut and thrown into the crowd and then picked up by the youth, who proudly displays it. He is placed on his mother’s shoulders where he continues to show it off, then he leads a procession of dancers, brandishing a dagger. The boy is humiliated for life if he shows any signs of pain or distress. The practice is outlawed, but nonetheless see the photographs taken of one such ceremony in 1972 in Claudie Fayein, Yemen (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975), pp. 34-35. In general, such brutally direct rituals of social identity are beginning to disappear, in part through government action.

[184] Vieille, “Iranian Women,” p. 452.

[185] Ammar, Growing Up, p. 183; John Gulick and Margaret E. Gulick, “The Domestic Social Environment of Women and Girls in Isfahan, Iran," in Beck and Keddie, Women, p. 504.

[186] Nikki Keddie and Lois Beck, “Introduction,” in Beck and Keddie, Women, p. 25.

[187] Emrys L. Peters, “The Status of Women in Four Middle East Communities,” in Beck and Keddie, Women, pp. 311-50.

[188] Ibid., p. 343.

[189] See in particular Afaf Lutfl al-Sayyid Marsot, “The Revolutionary Gentlewoman in Egypt,” in Beck and Keddie, Women, pp. 261-76; Fatma Mansur Co§ar, “Women in Turkish Society,” Ibid,, pp. 124-40; Mangol Bayat-Philipp, “Women and Revolution in Iran, 1905- 1911,” Ibid., pp. 295-308; and Mark A. Tessier, “Women’s Emancipation in Tunisia,” Ibid,, pp. 141-58.

[190] Two useful surveys of the legal situation of women are Noel Coulson and Doreen Hinchcliffe, “Women and Law in Contemporary Islam,” in Beck and Keddie, Women, pp. 37- 51, and the more comprehensive chapter in the same volume by Elizabeth H. White, “Legal Reform as an Indicator of Women’s Status in Muslim Nations,” pp. 52-68, which correlates the legal status of women with educational statistics and other data.

[191] Coulson and Hinchcliffe, “Women," p. 30.

[192] Ibid., pp. 44,47.

[193] June Starr and Jonathan Pool, “The Impact of a Legal Revolution in Rural Turkey," Law and Society Review, no. 3 (Summer 1974), 533-60.

[194] Fayein, Yemen, p. 184; Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp. 388-93.

[195] From Table 2.2 in White, “Legal Reform,” p. 63.

[196] Susan Schaefer Davis, “Working Women in a Moroccan Village," in Beck and Keddie, Women, pp. 416-33, See Davis’s companion account of the life history of a village woman, “Zahrah Muhammad,” in Fernea and Bezirgan, Women Speak, pp. 201-19.

[197] For a poetic view of what such “free” women think of men and marriage, see splendid poems translated by Elizabeth Femea in “Seven Women’s Songs from the Berber Mountains of Morocco,” in Fernea and Bezirgan, Women Speak, pp. 127-34.

[198] Vanessa Maher, “Women and Social Change in Morocco,” in Beck and Keddie, Women, pp. 100-123.

[199] Fatima Memissi, “The Degrading Effect of Capitalism on Female Labour,” Peuples Mediterraneens/Mediterranean Peoples, no. 6 (January-March 1978), 41-57. For a similar argument based upon colonial political conditions, see Amal Rassam Vinogradov, “French Colonialism as Reflected in the Male-Female Interaction in Morocco,” Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, set. 2, 36, no. 2 (February 1974), 192-99.

[200] Maher, “Women,” p. 113.

[201] See Dawn Chatty, “Changing Sex Roles in Bedouin Society in Syria and Lebanon,” in Beck and Keddie, Women, pp. 399-415, and Barbara C. Aswad, “Women, Class, and Power: Examples from the Hatay, Turkey,” Ibid., pp. 473-81.

[202] Michael M. J. Fischer, “On Changing the Concept and Position of Persian Women,” in Beck and Keddie, Women, pp. 189-215.

[203] Elizabeth Femea, personal communication, 1978. Femea and Bezirgan’s translation of “Excerpts from The Umm Kulthum Nobody Knows, as Told by Umm Kulthum,” in Femea and Bezirgan, Women Speak, pp. 135-66, is a poignant account of the famous singer’s transformation from a village girl to an international celebrity.

[204] This is a difficulty with Fatima Memissi’s Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim Society (New York: Halstead Press, 1975), which gives summaries of Robertson Smith’s speculations concerning women in pre-Islamic Arabia, the Prophet Muhammad’s treatment of women in the seventh century, a superficial analysis of the writings of a twelfthcentury mystic and scholar, al-GhazzaE, interviews with fourteen Moroccan women, and an analysis of letters written to a Moroccan radio program to construct an Islamic “ideal type” of male-female relations not clearly related to historical or regional context. Nonetheless, her book is passionately argued and poses some interesting questions.

[205] The Koran Interpreted, trans. Arthur J. Arberry (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), vol. 1, pp. 59, 105-6. (Courtesy of the publishers.)

[206] Richard T. Antoun, “On the Modesty of Women in Arab Muslim Villages: A Study in the Accommodation of Traditions,” American Anthropologist, 70, no. 4 (August 1968), 671- 97; see also Nadia M. Abu-Zahra, “‘On the Modesty of Women in Arab Villages’: A Reply,” American Anthropologist, 12, no. 5 (October 1970), 1079-88, and Antoun’s reply, 1088-92.

[207] John P. Mason, “Sex and Symbol in the Treatment of Women: The Wedding Rite in a Libyan Oasis Community,” American Ethnologist, 2, no. 4 (November 1975), 649-61.

[208] Lawrence Rosen, “The Negotiation of Reality: Male-Female Relations in Sefrou, Morocco,” in Beck and Keddie, Women, p. 561. See also Amal Rassam Vinogradov, “French Colonialism.”

[209] Rosen, “Negotiation of Reality,” pp. 566-68. In the interview cited by Rosen on which this discussion is based, the notion of soul (ruh) is also introduced as a key term but its significance is not developed.

[210] [SS] Ibid„ p. 567.

[211] /bid., p. 568.

[212] Ibid„ pp. 569-70. See also Daisy Hilse Dwyer, Images and Self-Images: Male and Female in Morocco (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).

[213] Fischer, “Persian Women,” pp. 189-215.

[214] Vieille, “Iranian Women,” pp. 461-68.

[215] Ibid., p. 468.

[216] 77/e Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night, trans. Richard F. Burton (New York: The Heritage Press, 1962 [orig. 1886]), pp. 3653-819. A quotation of Burton's opinion of the Chinese conveys the flavor of his judgments: "The Chinese, as far as we know them ... are the chosen people of debauchery, and their systematic bestiality with ducks, goats, and other animals is equalled only by their pederasty" (p. 3770). Although to my knowledge he uses the term "systematic bestiality" only once, his catalogue of presumed Middle Eastern amusements is equally hyperbolic.

[217] C. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century (Leiden: E. J. BriU, 1931), pp. 51,106.

[218] For a discussion of Gide's sexual "pilgrimage," see Ernest Gellner, "The Unknown Apollo of Biskra: The Social Base of Algerian Puritanism," Government and Opposition, 9 (1974), 279-82.

[219] Gavin Maxwell, People of the Reeds (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 205. For a more balanced and nonexoticized treatment of the same topic in Morocco, see Maxwell's later Lords of the Atlas: The Rise and Fall of the House of Glaoua, 1893-1956 (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., lhc., 1966), pp. 286-87.

[220] A point also argued by Keddie, "Problems in the Study of Women," p. 240. An idea of how interviewing on such delicate subjects can be successfully conducted in Middle Eastern conditions is provided by the frank discussions of sexuality contained in Paul Pascon's and Mekki Bentahar's "Ce Que Disent 296 Jeunes Ruraux," in Etudes Sociologiques sur le Maroc, ed. A. Khatibi (Rabat: Bulletin Economique et Social du Maroc, 1971), pp. 147-48 and pp. 211-21, in which the basic technique was collective interviewing.

[221] Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, La Sexualite eh Islam, Sociologie d'Aujourd'hui (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975), pp. 127-28. His text is one of the few that includes brief but interesting accounts of concubinage, prostitution, and homosexuality, and references to these topics in medieval Arabic literature.

[222] Fredrick Barth, "Introduction," Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference, ed. Fredrik Barth (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), pp. 10-14. For an analysis of the persisting use of the "mosaic" model of ethnicity in the Middle East, see Bryan S. Turner, Marx and the End of Orientalism, Controversies in Sociology, 7 (London and Boston: George Allan & Unwin, 1978), pp. 39-52.

[223] For an elaboration of this point, see Dale F. Eickelman, “The Political Economy of Meaning,” American Ethnologist, 6, no. 2 (May 1979), 386-93.

[224] Ethnic Groups, pp. 13,15.

[225] Gunnar Haaland, “Economic Determinants in Ethnic Processes,” in Barth, Ethnic Groups, p. 71.

[226] For an example of a study which incorporates such considerations, see Karen I. Blu, “Varieties of Ethnic Identity: Anglo-Saxons, Blacks, Indians, and Jews in a Southern Count'',” Ethnicity, 4 (1977), 263-86.

[227] Fredrik Barth, “Pathan Identity and Its Maintenance,” in Barth, Ethnic Groups, p. 117.

[228] Amal (Rassam) Vinogradov, “Ethnicity, Cultural Discontinuity and Power Brokers in Northern Iraq:. The Case of the Shabak,” American Ethnologist, 1, no. 1 (February 1974), 207- 18; Amal Rassam (Vinogradov), “Al-Taba^ciyya: Power, Patronage and Marginal Groups in Northern Iraq,” in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, eds. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 157-66. (To avoid bibliographic confusion, it should be noted that studies by Amal Rassam prior to 1976 appeared under the name of Amal Vinogradov.) See also Robert Leroy Canfield’s excellent Faction and Conversion in a Plural

[229] Suad Joseph, “Muslim-Christian Conflict in Lebanon: A Perspective on the Evolution of Sectarianism,” in Muslim-Christian Conflicts: Economic, Political and Social Origins, eds. Suad Joseph and Barbara L. K. Pillsbury (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), p. 64. See also Suad Joseph, “Women and the Neighborhood Street in Boij Hammoud, Lebanon,” in Beck and Keddie, Women, p. 554.

[230] Fuad I. Khuri, From Village to Suburb: Order and Change in Greater Beirut (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1975).

[231] Ibid., p. 93.

[232] Ibid., p. 57.

[233] Joseph, “Muslim-Christian Conflict,” pp. 64, 85. Also personal communications with the author, 1977.

[234] Joseph, “Neighborhood Street,” p. 544.

[235] [1,9] Ibid., pp. 548-53.

[236] Ibid., pp. 552-53.

[237] Khuri, Village to Suburb, pp. 200-201.

[238] Michael Gilsenan, “Against Patron-Client Relations,” in Gellner and Waterbury, Patrons and Oients, p. 182. See also Michael Gilsenan, “Lying, Honor, and Contradiction,” in

[239] “Kurds on the Move,” pp. 47-52.

[240] Lawrence Rosen, “The Social and Conceptual Framework of Arab-Berber Relations in Central Morocco,” in Arabs and Berbers, eds. Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1972), pp. 155-73; and also his “Muslim-Jewish Relations in a Moroccan City,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3, no. 4 (October 1972), 435-49. For a review of earlier anthropological approaches to the study of North African Jewish communities, see also Rosen’s “North African Jewish Studies,” Judaism - 17, no. 4 (Fall 1968), 422-29. For a critique of Rosen’s position concerning Muslim-Jewish relations, see Norman A. Stillman, “The Moroccah Jewish Experience: A Revisionist View,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 9 (Fall 1978), 111-23. See also Mark A. Tessier, “The Identity of Religious Minorities in Non-secular States: Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 20, no. 3 (July 1978), 359-73; and Norman A. Stillman’s excellent The Jews of Arab Lands-A History and Source Book (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979).

[241] On the shaping of these French colonial assumptions and their impact upon Moroccan society, see Edmund Burke Ill’s excellent “The Image of the Moroccan State in French Ethnological Literature: A New Look at the Origin of Lyautey’s Berber Policy,” in Gellner and Micaud, Arabs and Berbers, pp. 175-99; Kenneth Brown’s “The Impact of the Dahir Berbere in Sale'” in the same volume, pp. 201-15; and Charles F. Gallagher, “Language and Identity,” in State and Society in Independent North Africa, ed. Leon Carl Brown (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1966), pp. 73-96.

[242] Lawrence Rosen provides the following estimates as of the late 1960s for the Jewish populations of various Arab countries, together with the estimates (in parentheses) of the 1948 populations. “Morocco: 45,000 (225,000); Tunisia: 12,000-14,000 (100,000); Lebanon: 4,000; Syria: 2,5004,000 (30,000); Iraq: 3,500 (130,000); Algeria: 2,000 (140,000); Egypt: 1,000 (80,000); Yemen: 1,000 (70,000); Libya: nil (35,000). Rosen; “Muslim-Jewish Relations,” p. 436, where the sources of these estimates are cited. For Iran, Laurence D. Loeb, Outcast: Jewish Life in Southern Iran, Library of Anthropology (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1977), p. 4, provides the contemporary estimate of 85,000, most of whom reside in Tehran. Figures for the late 1970s, if available, would indicate a smaller Jewish community in most cases. For example, Morocco’s Jewish population is now estimated to be 25,000.

[243] See Dale F. Eickelman, Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage. Center, Modem Middle East Series, 1 (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1976), pp. 45-48, 78.

[244] For a full account of the role of Jews in.Morocco’s bazaar economy, see Clifford Geertz, “Suq: The Bazaar Economy,” in Geertz, Geertz, and Rosen, Meaning and Order, pp. 164-72.

[245] See Norman A. Stillman, “Muslims and Jews in Morocco: Perceptions, Images, Stereotypes,” in Proceedings of the Seminar on Muslim-Jewish Relations in North Africa (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1975), pp. 13-39, especially the comments by Paul Raccah and Moise Ohana on pp. 28-29. See also Lawrence Rosen, “A Moroccan Jewish Community during the Middle Eastern Crisis,” The American Scholar, 37, no. 3 (Summer 1968), 435-51.

[246] Rosen, “Arab-Berber Relations,” p. 167; also his “Muslim-Jewish Relations,” pp. 440-41.

[247] See Clifford Geertz, “Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 360-411. This essay was originally published in 1966.

[248] Rosen, “Arab-Berber Relations,” p. 158.

[249] /Wd., p. 169.

[250] [10s] lbid„ p. 171.

[251] Geertz, “Suq: The Bazaar Economy.”

[252] Rosen, “Muslim-Jewish Relations,” pp. 44446.

[253] For a discussion of intercommunal relations in Israel in the early 1970s, see Amnon Rubenstein, “Jewish Panthers and Other Problems,” Encounter, 38, no. 6 (June 1972), 80-85.

[254] Ibid.

[255] Shlomo Deshen, “Ethnic Boundaries and Cultural Paradigms: The Case of Southern Tunisian Immigrants in Israel,” Ethos 4 (1976), 271-94, and Shlomo Deshen and Moshe Shokeid, The Predicament of Homecoming: Cultural and Social Life of North African Immigrants in Israel, Symbol, Myth, and Ritual (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974). See also Harvey E. Goldberg, “The Mimuna and the Minority Status of Moroccan Jews,” Ethnology, 17, no. 1 (January 1978), 75-87. See also Shlomo Deshen, “Israeli Judaism: Introduction to the Major Patterns,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9, no. 2 (May 1978), 141-69.

[256] Deshen, “Ethnic Boundaries,” p. 292.

[257] Ibid„ p. 293.

[258] Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,” in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-57.

[259] This point was made with respect to sex roles by Daisy Hilse Dwyer, “Ideologies of Sexual Inequality and Strategies for Change in Male-Female Relations,” American Ethnologist, 5, no. 2 (May 1978), 22740.

[260] See Alan Dubetsky (Duben), “Kinship, Primordial Ties, and Factory Organization in Turkey: An Anthropological View,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 7, no. 3 (July 1978), 433-51, and also his “Class and Community in Urban Turkey,” in

Commoners, Climbers and Notables, ed. C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), pp. 360-71.

[261] The complementarity of these two approaches is emphasized by Michael Gilsenan, “Lying, Honor, and Contradiction,” in Transaction and Meaning: Directions in the Anthropology of Exchange and Symbolic Behavior, ed. Bruce Kapferer, ASA Essays in Social Anthropology, 1 (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1976), pp. 191, 214.

[262] Winifred S. Blackman, The Fellahin of Upper Egypt (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1968 [orig. 1927]); Henry Habib Ayrout, 77ze Egyptian Peasant (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). For a review of earlier studies, see Fouad M. Moughrabi, “The Arabic Basic Personality: A Critical Survey of the Literature,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9, no. 1 (February 1978), 99-112.

[263] An example of such a guide is Louis Brunot, Premiers Conseils [First Advice] (Rabat: Ecole du Livre, 1934). Brunot was director of Muslim education in Morocco in the early 1930s.

[264] See the discussion in Chapter 3 of this book, especially the critique of Carleton S. Coon, Caravan: The Story of the Middle East, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961).

[265] Lloyd A. Fallers, The Social Anthropology of the Nation-State (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1974), p. 8.

[266] The notion of the “natural” attitude toward the social world is developed in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, I: The Problem of Social Reality (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), and in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973).

[267] Monographs or book-length essays elaborating such notions include Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968); Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and Lawrence Rosen, Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society: Three Essays in Cultural Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Dale F. Eickelman, Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center, Modern Middle East Series, 1 (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1976); Paul Rabinow, Symbolic Domination: Cultural Form and Historical Change in Morocco (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1975); John Waterbury, North for the Trade: The Life and Times of a Berber Merchant

(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972); and Kenneth L. Brown, People of Sale: Tradition and Change in a Moroccan City, 1830-1930 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).

[268] This formulation is derived from a fuller discussion of the notion in my Moroccan Islam, p. 90, which contains references to the related work of other scholars.

[269] I specify implicit because a number of Moroccan intellectuals write of their own society in terms of the principles of class analysis. For a discussion of the limitations of an uncritical borrowing of the notion of class from European ideological contexts, see A. R. Dubetsky (Duben), “Class and Community in Urban Turkey,” in Commoners, Climbers and Notables, ed. C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), pp. 360-71.

[270] The discussion of these notions is adapted from Eickelman,Moroccan Islam, pp. 123- 54. (Courtesy of the author and the publisher.)

[271] Toshihiko Izutsu, God and Man in the Koran (Tokyo: Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1964); and James Siegal, The Rope of God (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).

[272] Cited in Eickelman, Moroccan Islam, p. 128.

[273] Ibid„ p. 133.

[274] Moshe Shokeid, The Dual Heritage: Immigrants from the Atlas Mountains in an Israeli Village (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971). See also Harvey E. Goldberg, Cave Dwellers and Citrus Growers: A Jewish Community in Libya and Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

[275] An excellent traditional ethnographic account exists in French for a .nearby Jewish community in the 1950s, prior to massive emigration. See Pierre Flamand, Un Mellah en Pays berbere: Demnate, Institut des Hautes-Etudes Marocaines, Notes et Documents, 10 (Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1952).

[276] Shokeid, Dual Heritage, p. 17; for a parallel Muslim settlement myth, see Eickelman, Moroccan Islam, pp. 163-68.

[277] Shokeid, Dual Heritage, p. 22.

[278] Ibid., pp. 23-28. His use of patronymic grouping is essentially equivalent to the term patronymic,association as used in Chapter 6 of this book.

[279] Ibid., pp. 34-47.

[280] Ibid., pp. 62-83; Lawrence Rosen, “Rural Political Process and National Political Structure in Morocco,” in Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, eds. Richard Antoun and Iliya Harik (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972), pp. 214- 36; Eickelman,Moroccan Islam, pp. 211-37.

[281] Shokeid, Dual Heritage, p. 71.

[282] Ibid., pp. 118-29,14347.

[283] Ibid„ pp. 152-53.

[284] For example, see Emanuel Marx, The Social Context of Violent Behaviour: A Social Anthropological Study in an Israeli Immigrant Town (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 63-74. What Marx calls “appealing violence” bears significant parallels with the Moroccan notion of compulsion.

[285] Shokeid, Dual Heritage, p. 62.

[286] Ibid., p. 230.

[287] Clifford Geertz, “Suq: The Bazaar Economy in Sefrou,” in Geertz, Geertz, and Rosen, Meaning and Order, pp. 123-313.

[288] Ibid., see also Fuad I. Khuri, “The Etiquette of Bargaining in the Middle East,” American Anthropologist, 70, no. 4 (August 1968), 698-706.

[289] Clifford Geertz, “Suq,” pp. 140-50.

[290] [M] Ibid„ p. 151.

[291] Ibid„ p. 170.

[292] [3] °Ibid., p. 199.

[293] Ibid., p. 139.

[294] In “Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali,” an essay originally published in 1966 and reprinted in Geertz, Interpretation of Culture, p. 408, Geertz wrote that change occurs “rather like an octopus ... by disjointed movements of this part, then that, and now the other which somehow cumulate to directional change.” Octopoid analogies aside, Geertz recognized the problem of cultural change but chose not to give it central analytical importance, as is also the case with the study of the Moroccan bazaar.

[295] Gilsenan, “Lying,” pp. 191-92.

[296] Ibid., p. 193. This is a topic explored with special intensity in Michael Meeker, Literature and Violence in North Arabia, Cambridge Studies in Cultural Systems, 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), through the analysis of Bedouin poetry and oral narratives and their relationship to notions of religious and political authority.

[297] Gilsenan, “Lying,” pp. 211-12.

[298] Ibid., pp. 208-9.

[299] ^Ibid., p. 212.

[300] ™Ibid„ pp. 213-14.

[301] These attitudes toward the practical use of time and space are discussed by Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959).

[302] Edward William Lane, An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modem Egyptians (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1973 [orig. 1836]), pp. 198-206.

[303] S. M. Salim, Marsh Dwellers of the Euphrates Delta, L.S.E. Monographs on Social Anthropology, 23 (London: The Athlone Press, 1962), pp. 72-80.

[304] These early studies are reviewed with appropriate reserve in Ali Banuazizi, “Iranian ‘National Character’: A Critique of Some Western Perspectives,” in Psychological Dimensions of Near Eastern Studies, eds. L. Carl Brown and Norman Itzkowitz (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1977), pp. 210-39. The safayi batin/zerangi distinction is developed in M. C. Bateson, J. W. Clinton, J. B. M. Kassarjian, H. Safari, and M. Soraya, “Safa-yi Baten: A Study of the Interrelations of a Set of Iranian Ideal Character Types,” in Psychological Dimensions, eds. Brown and Itzkowitz, pp. 257-73.

[305] Wiliiam O. Beeman, “Status, Style and Strategy in Iranian Interaction,” Anthropological Linguistics, 18 (1976), 305-22.

[306] /bid., p. 317,

[307] James A. Bill, “The Plasticity of Informal Politics: The Case of Iran,” The Middle East Journal, 27, no. 2 (Spring 1973), 131-51.

[308] Ibid., 138.1 have seen notebooks serving the same purpose kept by Moroccans.

[309] [s] *Ibid„ 13940.

[310] Yet as Alan Dubetsky (Duben) demonstrates in “Kinship, Primordial Ties, and Factory Organization in Turkey: An Anthropological View,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 7, no. 3 (July 1976), 433-51, such personalistic ties can be highly functional in many modem industrial settings.

[311] as World History: Marshall Hodgson, ‘The Venture of Islam,’” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10, no. 2 (May 1979), 241-64. A good general bibliographic survey of the Islamic tradition and sources for its study, despite a weak coverage of sociologically oriented studies, is Charles J. Adams, “Islamic Religious Tradition,” in The Study of the Middle East, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), pp. 29-95.

[312] Abdul Hamid el-Zein, “Beyond Ideology and Theology: The Search for the Anthropology of Islam,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 6 (1977), 227-54. Despite Zein’s many insightful comments, his representations of the analytic assumptions of some of the authors he reviews should not be regarded as substitutes for the original.

[313] Bryan S. Turner, Weber and Islam: A Critical Study (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).

[314] ^The Koran Interpreted, tr. Arthur J. Arberry (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), Vol. 2, p. 310. (Courtesy of the publishers.)

[315] Victor Turner, “The Center Out There: Pilgrim’s Goal,” History of Religions, 12, no. 3 (1973), 191-230.

[316] See Richard F. Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah andMeccah (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1964 [orig. 1893]).

[317] An excellent account of the pilgrimage in the last century and the arrangements made by Meccans to receive pilgrims can be found in C. Snouck Hurgronje. Afefcfaz in the Latter Part of the 19th Century (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1931).

[318] Malcolm X, with the assistance of Alex Haley, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York: Grove Press, 1966), pp. 338-39.

[319] Burton, Personal Narrative, Vol. 2, pp 160-61. (Emphasis added.)

[320] See in particular the sensitive, beautifully illustrated account of Emel Esin,Mecca the Blessed, Madinah the Radiant (London: Elek Books, 1963) which cites copiously from literature concerning Mecca and the pilgrimage. Numbers in the

text identifying the stages in the pilgrimage are keyed to Fig. 9-4. See also Muhammad Abdul-Rauf, “Pilgrimage to Mecca,” National Geographic, 154, no. 5 (November 1978), 581-607.

[321] Leonard Binder, “The Proofs of Islam: Religion and Politics in Iran,” in Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb, ed. George Makdisi (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), pp. 118-40.

[322] Ibid., p. 121.

[323] See Michael Max Jonathon Fischer, “Zoroastrian Iran between Myth and Praxis,” Ph.D. Dissertation in Anthropology submitted to the University of Chicago, August 1973. This unpublished study remains the richest circumstantial account of the parallels and interrelationships among the carriers of the diverse religious traditions of Iran, their relation to social class and political authority.

[324] See Chapter 7 and Amal (Rassam) Vinogradov, “Ethnicity, Cultural Discontinuity and Power Brokers in Northern Iraq: The Case of the Shabak,” American Ethnologist, 1, no. 1 (February 1974), 207-18. -

[325] James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, Politics in the Middle East (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 39, are bewildered as to how to “classify” them, for they “maintain a mixture of Christian, Muslim, and pagan beliefs.” The authors also report that as of 1973, the ^cAlawT-s were formally recognized [by whom?] as part of Lebanon’s Shi[0] ! community. See later in this chapter for a discussion of ^cAlSwT beliefs.

[326] Binder, “Proofs,” p. 132.

[327] ™Ibid., p. 134.

[328] For an analysis of the impact of recent economic reforms upon Iranian society, see Farhad Kazemi and Ervand Abrahamian, “The Nonrevolutionary Peasantry of Modem Iran,” Iranian Studies, 11 (1978), 259-304. See also the special issues of MERIP Reports devoted to the Iranian crisis: 8, no. 6 (July-August 1978), no. 8 (October 1978), and 9, nos. 2-3 (March- April 1979).

[329] Binder, “Proofs,” p. 139.

[330] von Grunebauiri, Muhammedan Festivals, p..87.

[331] Elizabeth Warnock Femea, Guests of the Sheik (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 194-208; see also von Grunebaum, Muhammadan Festivals, pp. 85- 94 (on which portions of the following account of the Muharram festivals are based).

[332] For accounts of the local interpretation and significance of the mourning of Husayn in addition to Fernea’s, see Emrys L. Peters, “Aspects of Rank and Status among Muslims in a Lebanese Village,” in Mediterranean Countrymen, ed. Julian Pitt-Rivers (Paris and The Hague:

Mouton & Co., 1963), pp. 195-200, and Chapter 3 of this book. For Iran, see Gus Thaiss, “Religious Symbolism and Social Change: The Drama of Husain,” in Scholars, Saints and Sufis, ed. Nikki Keddie (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 349-66. s The excessively brief remarks of S. M. Salim, Marsh Dwellers of the Euphrates Delta, London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology, 23 (London: The Athlone Press, 1962), pp. 12-13, are also of value. For an overview of ta^cztya performances in various historical and contemporary contexts, see Peter J. Chelkowski, TaFziyeh: Indigenous Avant- Garde Theatre of Iran (Tehran: NIRT Publications, 1957), and accompanying bibliography.

[333] von Gninebaum,Muhammedan Festivals, p. 90.

[334] See Robert L. Canfield, “What They Do When the Lights Are Out: Myth and Social Order in Afghanistan,” paper presented at the ACLS/SSRC Joint Committee on the Near and Middle East Conference on Symbols of Social Differentiation, 25-28 May 1978, Baltimore, Maryland.

[335] Nur Yalman, “Islamic Reform and the Mystic Tradition in Eastern Turkey,” European Journal of Sociology, 10 (1969), 41-60.

[336] Yalman, “Islamic Reform,” 43. See also the important essay by Charles F. Gallagher, “Contemporary Islam: The Straits of Secularism,” AUFS Field Staff Reports, Southwest Asia Series, 15, no. 3 (1966). See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964); and

W. C. Smith’s succinct Islam in Modem History (New York: New American Library, 1957), pp. 164-208, for standard accounts of religion in modern Turkey.

[337] John Kingsley Birge, The Bektashi Order of Dervishes (London: Luzac & Co., 1937), is especially useful in describing the role of this order in consolidating opposition to the government. On the Naqshbandi in another country, see Hamid Algar, “Some Notes on the Naqshbandi Tariqatin Bosnia,” Die Welt des Islams, 13 (1971), 168-203.

[338] Amal (Rassam) Vinogradov, “Ethnicity,” 207-10.

[339] Yalman, “Islamic Reform,” 48-49.

[340] Ibid„ 50.

[341] Ibid., 51-52.

[342] [3i] Ibid„ 55.

[343] Ibid., 58-60.

[344] Geertz, Islam Observed, p. 24.

[345] See Eickelman, Moroccan Islam; Brown, People of Sale.

[346] The best account of the development of Sufi thought is probably Hodgson, Venture, I, 359409; II, 201-54.

[347] Hodgson, Venture, II, 201-54.

[348] Such assumptions of a “decline” as Sufi ideas became popularly received unfortunately permeates most of the Orientalist literature on the subject. See A. J. Arberry, Sufism: An Account of the Mystics of Islam (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1950); W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim Intellectual: A Study of Al-Ghazzali (Edinburgh: University Press, 1963), esp. pp. 128-33; Rahman, Islam. On this

point, see also the analysis of the classic study by the French Orientalist Alfred Bel contained in Eickelman, Moroccan Islam, pp. 22-29.

[349] Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, The Tijaniya: A Sufi Order in the Modem World, Middle Eastern Monographs, 7 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965).

[350] See Vincent Crapanzano, The Hamadsha.

[351] See the map in Octave Depont and Xavier Coppolani, Les Confreries religieuses musulmanes (Algiers: A. Jourdan, 1897), for the most sinister representation of the influence of these orders. The authors were French government specialists on native affairs in Algeria.

[352] Turner, Weber and Islam, pp. 57-62, 66.

[353] Frontier Fundamentalist," International Journal of Middle East Studies 10, no. 2 (May 1979), 145-66. For an account of an Algerian religious figure that is excellent in portraying doctrine, but less so in describing the nature of the shaykh's popularity, see Martin Lings, A Moslem Saint of the Twentieth Century (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961). A useful study with comparative materials is B. G. Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth-Century Africa, African Studies Series, 18 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

[354] Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi.

[355] Ibid., pp. 150-51.

[356] Cited in Eickelman, Moroccan Islam, pp. 161-62. This study contains a more extensive discussion of maraboutism as an element of popular Islamic thought. (Courtesy of the author and publisher.)

[357] For an example of such a myth, see ibid., pp. 163-68. An analysis of that particular text in the wider context of the relation between oral narratives and Middle Eastern social forms can be found in Michael E. Meeker, Literature and Violence in North Arabia, Cambridge Studies in Cultural Systems, 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 214-44.

[358] The primary literature on these practices is prindpally in French. See Pierre Flamand, Un Mellah en Pays berb'ere: Demnate, Institut des Hautes-Etudes Marocaines, Notes et Documents, 10 (Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1952), pp. 93-122; J. Goulven, Les Mellahs de Rabat-Sale (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1927), pp. 91- 98; and L. Voinot, Pelerinages Judeo-musulmans du Maroc (Paris: Editions Larose, 1948). For Israel, see Shlomo Deshen and Moshe Shokeid, The Predicament of Homecoming (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), esp. pp. 100-105.

[359] The most comprehensive and elegant case for the opposite point of view is Ernest Gellner’s Saints of the Atlas, The Nature of Human Society Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). See the discussion of Gellner’s argument in Chapter 5 of this book. The argument concerning the tendency of marabouts to benefit from alliances with royal authority is most extensively documented in Abdellah Hammoudi, “Saintete, Pouvoir et Societe: Tamgrout au XVIIe etXVIIIe Sizcles" Annales E.S.C. (in press).

[360] Abdellah Hammoudi, “Aspects de la mobilisation populaire a la campagne, vus a travers la biographie d’un mahdi mort en 1919,” Centre de Recherches et d’Etudes sur les Societes Mediterraneenes, CNRS (in press).

[361] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusiya of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949).

[362] Ibid., pp. 104-5. See also Peters’s analysis of the social structure of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, discussed (with references) in Chapter 5, and his “From Particularism to Universalism, or the Religion of the Cyrenaica Bedouin,” Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 3, no. 1 (1976), 5-14. For a rich Mauritanian study parallel to Evan- Pritchard’s, see C. C. Stewart (with E. K. Stewart), Islam and Social Order in Mauritania, Oxford Studies in African Affairs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973). For a study which has the advantage of discussing the contemporary influence of a religious order in a situation where such orders have substantial political and economic influence, see Donald B. Cruise O’Brien, The Mourides of Senegal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), and his Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society, African Studies Series, 15 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

[363] Lewis has three major studies relevant to the role of Islam in Somalia. See I. M. Lewis, “Sufism in Somaliland: A Study in Tribal Islam,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 17, no. 3 (1955), 581-602, and 18, no. 1 (1956), 146-60; I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), esp. pp. 196-241, and his “Shaikhs and Warriors in Somaliland,” in African Systems of

Thought, eds. G. Dieterlen and Meyer Fortes (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 204-223. Another study of Islamic religious leadership in a tribal milieu is Fredrik Barth, Political Leadership among Swat Pathans, L.S.E. Monographs on Social Anthropology, 19 (London: The Athlone Press, 1959), esp. pp. 92-103. Extensive critiques of Barth's presentation can be found in Talal Asad, "Market Model, Class Structure and Consent: A Reconsideration of Swat Political Organisation," Man (N.S.), 7, no. 1 (March 1972), 74-94, and Akbar S. Ahmed, Millennium and Charisma among the Pathans, International Library in Anthropology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976). Despite the title of J. C Wilkinson's Water and Tribal Settlement in South-East Arabia, Oxford Research Studies in Geography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), it is ah excellent resource for documenting the relation of the Ibadi religious establishment and popular notions of legitimacy to tribal social structure.

[364] Part of the discussion in this section is based upon Dale F. Eickelman, "The Art of Memory." The quotation defining cognitive style is from Pierre Bourdieu, "Systems of Education and Systems of Thought," International Social Science Journal, 19 (1967), 343.

[365] One of the few essays concerning the Muslim Middle East that deals extensively with the relation of language and artistic expression to society is Jacque Berque's Cultural Expression in Arab Society Today, Modern Middle East Series, 3 (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1978). Meeker's Literature and Violence is also a seminal study. Even when some modem forms of musical and graphic expression have sought to break away from more traditional art forms, they must generally do so on the basis of popular understandings of creative form, at least if their creators seek a wide audience. The major work on Arabic music (with four volumes of translations of Arabic treatises and two volumes devoted to contemporary modal, rhythmic, and formal structures) is Baron Rudolphe d'Erlanger's six-volume La Musique Arabe (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1930-1959). For useful monographs and articles on the subject, see Hiromi L. Sakata, "The Concept of Musician in Three Persian-speaking Areas of Afghanistan," PhJ). Dissertation submitted to the University of Washington, in 1976; Philip D. Schuyler, "A Repertory of Ideas: The Music of the Rwais, Berber Professional Musicians from Southwestern Morocco,". Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to the University of Washington, in 1979, and his "Berber Professional Musicians in Performance," in Performance Practice: The Ethnomusicological View, ed. Gerard Behague (New York: New York University Press, 1980); Karl L. Signed, Makam: Modal Practices in Turkish Art Music (Seattle: Asian Music Publications [Series D., no. 4], 1977); Mark Slobin, Music in the Culture of Northern Afghanistan, Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, 54 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976); and Ella Zonis, Classical Persian Music: An Introduction (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973). The forms used in the traditional crafts of carpet-wearing, embroidery, woodcarving, and architecture show similar influences, although with the exception of Berque's and a few other interpretive essays, most literature on crafts and music remains highly descriptive. The transmission of many such crafts-and music is considered a craft as opposed to an art in many parts of the Middle East-has important parallels with the form in which religious knowledge was traditionally transmitted.

[366] Hodgson, Venture of Islam, H, p. 438. (Emphasis added.)

[367] The phrase is from Leon Carl Brown, “The Religious Establishment in Husainid Tunisia,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), p. 31. For a similar view expressed by an Egyptian writer (who later studied in France and became Minister of Education), see Taha Hussein, The Stream of Days, trans. Hilary Waymont (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1948). This book has been used as a required text in Egyptian primary schools, so it can be assumed that its implicit views concerning religious education have been widely disseminated.

[368] See Clifford Geertz, “Art as a Cultural System,” Modern Language Notes, 91 (1976), 1473-99, and John Paul Mason, “Structural Congruities in the Arab Genealogical Form and the Arabesque Motif,” Muslim World, 64, no. 1 (1975), 21-38.

[369] Sources for these figures are provided in Eickelman, “The Art of Memory,” 497.

[370] Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” in The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century, eds. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 41-68.

[371] Some of the outstanding studies now available are Leon Carl Brown, “The Religious Establishment”; Kenneth L. Brown, “Profile of a Nineteenth-Century Moroccan Scholar,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis, ed. Keddie, pp. 127-48, and his People of Sale, pp. 66-99; Edmund Burke, III, “The Moroccan Ulama, 1860-1912: An Introduction,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis, pp. 93-125, and his Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco, Studies in Imperialism (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976). For medieval Iran, see Richard Bulliet, The Patricians of Nishapur (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) for which the review by Roy P. Mottahedeh in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, 95 (1975), 491-95, provides an interesting critique. For Tunisia, see Arnold H. Green, The Tunisian Ulama, 1873- 1915: Social Structure and Response to Ideological Currents (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978).

[372] Ira Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).

[373] K. Brown, “Profile,” pp. 13546. On Afghani, ^cAbduh, and their disciples, see Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 103-92.

[374] Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, “The Salafiyya Movement in Morocco: The Religious Basis of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement,”St. Antony’s Papers, 16 (1963), 90-105.

[375] Merad, Reformisme, pp. 437-39.

[376] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 124.

[377] Muammar al-Qadhafl, The Green Book. Part One is subtitled “The Solution of the Problem of Democracy: ‘The Authority of the People’ Part Two, “The Solution of the Economic Problem: ‘Socialism.’ ” Neither the Arabic nor the English version contains date or place of publication, perhaps to indicate the document’s timelessness. They are available from most Libyan diplomatic missions.

[378] Gellner, “The Unknown Apollo.”

[379] Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Middle Eastern Monographs, 9 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[380] Ibid., p. 312.

[381] p. 321.

[382] On the popular bases of contemporary fundamentalist movements and the support which such movements receive from Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent from Libya, see Detlev H. Khalid, “The Phenomenon of Re-Islamization,” Aussenpolitik (German Foreign Affairs Review), 29, no. 4 (1978), 433-53. For a Saudi-backed “charter” to design a modern Islamic educational curriculum, see First World Conference on Muslim Education, Conference Book.

[383] Mitchell, Muslim Brothers, pp. 328-31. For a parallel discussion elsewhere of the emergence of a “middle class” interpretation of Islam, see Voll, “Islam: Its Future.”

[384] Khalid, “Re-Islamization.”

[385] Cynthia Nelson, “Religious Experience, Sacred Symbols, and Social Reality: An Illustration from Egypt,” Humaniora Islamica, 2 (1974), 253-66. Also see her comments on Jones, “World Views—Their Nature and Their Function,” Current Anthropology, 13 (1972), 98-102.

[386] Nelson, “Religious Experience,” p. 260.

[387] Henri Charles, Le Christianisme des Arabes nomades (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1936); Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica.

[388] The best source on the significance of the haram is R. B. Serjeant, “Haram and Hawtah, The Sacred Enclave in Arabia,” in Melanges fahdHusayn, ed. A. Badawi (Cairo: Dar al-Ma^carif, 1962), pp. 41-58. See also Eickelman, “Musaylima,” 24-26.

[389] M. J. Kister, “Some Reports Concerning Mecca from Jahiliyya to Islam,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 15 (1972), 65-92. Despite the modest titles of this and other papers by Kister, his assessment of social and economic conditions in seventhcentury Arabia is seminal.

[390] Koran Interpreted, trans. Arberry, vol. 2, p. 340. (Courtesy of the publishers.)

[391] "These four-points follow Watt, Mecca, pp. 62-72. The analysis of Muhammad’s early followers is also derived from Watt.

[392] See the Quran, Sura 53, w. 19-20 and Sura 22, v. 51, and Watt, Mecca, pp. 101-9.

[393] R. B. Serjeant, “The Constitution of Medina,” Islamic Quarterly, 8 (1964), 3-16.

[394] See Eickelman, “Musaylima.”

[395] The significance- of towns such as al-Hijr is one of the issues which may be clarified once the historical archaeology of the Arabian peninsula begins in earnest.

[396] Toshihiko Izutsu, God and Man in the Koran: Semantics of the Koranic Weltanschauung, Studies in the Humanities and Social Relations, 5 (Tokyo: Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1964), and his Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'an, McGill Islamic Studies, 1 (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1966).

[397] Izutsu, God and Man, pp. 100-105. The English translations of the Quran are Izutsu's.

[398] Robert McC. Adams, "World Picture, Anthropological Frame, ''American Anthropologist, 19, no. 2 (June 1977), 268.

[399] Three outstanding collections of essays have appeared in recent years which effectively serve as guides to the major research. A. H. Hourani and S. M. Stern, eds., The Islamic City, Papers on Islamic History, 1 (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, and Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), concentrates on research concerning the premodem period. Ira M. Lapidus, ed., Middle Eastern Studies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), is now dated by more recent studies by the editor and several of the contributors. L. Carl Brown, ed., From Madina to Metropolis, Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1973), is an excellent collection of copiously illustrated essays. Robert McC. Adams, The Evolution of Urban Society (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966), comparatively assesses the beginnings of urbanization in early Mesopotamia and Mexico. Michael Bonine has prepared two comprehensive review essays on Middle Eastern urbanization. These are "Urban Studies in the Middle East," Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 10, no. 3 (October 1976), 1-37, and "From Uruk to Casablanca: Perspectives on the Urban Experience of the Middle East," Journal of Urban History, 3, no 2 (February 1977), 141-80. An essential analytic review of approaches to the study of urban phenomena is Paul Wheatley, "Levels of Space Awareness in the Traditional Islamic City," Ekistics, 42, no. 253 (December 1976), 354-66. For a review of "community studies" in general, not specifically confined to urban milieu, see Erik Cohen, "Recent Anthropological Studies of Middle Eastern Communities and Ethnic Groups," Annuid Review of Anthropology, 6 (1977), 315-47.

[400] Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, and J. Malcolm Wagstaff, The Middle East: A Geographical Study (London and New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), p. 206.

[401] J. I. Clarke, “Introduction,” in Populations of the Middle East and North Africa, eds. John I. Clarke and W. B. Fisher (New York: Africans Publishing Company, 1972), p. 31.

[402] Max Weber, Economy and Society, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), pp. 1212-36, esp. pp. 1226, 1233. For references to the relevant literature concerning the Middle East, see A. H. Hourani, “The Islamic City in the Light of Recent Research,” in The Islamic City, eds. Hourani and Stern, pp. 9-24; Dale F. Eickelman, “Is There an Islamic City? The Making of a Quarter in a Moroccan Town,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 5, no. 3 (June 1974), 274-78; Francisco Benet, “The Ideology of Islamic Urbanism,” in Urbanism and Urbanization, ed. Nels Anderson (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964), pp. 211-26; and Bryan S. Turner, Weber and Islam: A Critical Study (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 93-106.

[403] S. M. Stem; “The Constitution of the Islamic City,” in The Islamic City, eds. Hourani and Stern, pp. 37,42. •

[404] For example, Gustave E. von Grunebaum, “The Sacred Character of Islamic Cities,” in Melanges Taha Husain, ed. A. Badawi (Cairo: Dar al-Ma^carif, 1962), pp. 25-37.

[405] Michael E. Bonine, “The Morphogenesis of Iranian Cities,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 69, no. 2 (June 1979), 208-24; Ira M. Lapidus, “The Evolution of Muslim Urban Society,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 15, no. 1 (January 1973), 21-50.

[406] Roger Le Tourneau, Fes avant le Protectorat, Institut des Hautes Etudes marocaines, Publications, 45 (Casablanca: Societe Marocaine de Librairie et d’Edition, 1949). For an example of a monograph dealing with a modern Moroccan city in the same style, see Andre Adam’s encyclopedic Casablanca: Essai sur la Transformation de la Societe marocaine au Contact de l’Occident (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1972). A comprehensive inventory of French urban studies is contained in Bonine, “Urban Studies.”

[407] Ira Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).

[408] Lapidus, “Evolution,” 47-48.

[409] See Wheatley, “Levels of Space Awareness.”

[410] [11] Madina in Arabic simply means “town” or “city.” In North Africa it has taken on the narrower connotation of the older “native” component of contemporary cities. The quotations are from Louis Brunot, in Georges Hardy, L'Ame marocaine d'apres la litterature franqaise (Paris; Librairie Emile Larose, 1926), p. 20; for a more recent example of the assumption of urban disorder, see Xavier de Planhol, The World of Islam (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

[411] 1959), pp. 14-15 [original French 1957].

[412] F. Stambouli and A. Zghal, “Urban Life in Precolonial North Africa,” The British Journal of Sociology, 27, no. 1 (March 1976), 1-20. The principles of order applied specifically to North Africa may be used in large part elsewhere as well, especially their interesting summary of the “informal” status of elite authority and the general lack of importance of organized groups and classes. See the text and accompanying photographs in James Kirkman, ed. City of San^ca ’(London: World of Islam Festival Publishing Company, Ltd., 1976).

[413] on Clifford Geertz, “Suq: The Bazaar Economy in Sefrou,” in Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and Lawrence Rosen, Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society: Three Essays in Cultural Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), also discussed in Chapter 8 of this book.

[414] C. Geertz, “Suq,”pp. 151-54.

[415] I am grateful to Ellen C. Micaud (personal communication) for a description of thi» plan.

[416] Jean Dethier, “Evolution of Concepts of Housing, Urbanism, and Country Planning in a Developing Country: Morocco, 1900-1972,” in From Madina to Metropolis, ed. Brown, pp. 197-243.

[417] Alan Duben, “Review of Kemal Karpat, The Geqekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization," Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 12, no. 3 (December 1978), 50.

[418] Ellen C. Micaud, “Urbanization, Urbanism, and the Medina of Tunis,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9, no. 4 (November 1978), 433.

[419] Ibid., pp. 4, 6. Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious, Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[420] Khuri, Village to Suburb, p. 217. For markedly contrasting views of the importance of class in Lebanon, see Suad Joseph, “Muslim-Christian Conflict in Lebanon: A Perspective on the Evolution of Sectarianism,” in Muslim-Christian Conflicts: Economic, Political, and Social Origins, eds. Suad Joseph and Barbara L. K. Pillsbury (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 63-97; and Michael Gilsenan, “Against Patron-Client Relations,” in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, eds. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 167-83.

[421] See Nicholas S. Hopkins, “Traditional Tunis and its Transformations,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 220 (1974), 427-40; and Janet Abu-Lughod, “Urban Structure under Decolonization: The Factorial Ecology of Rabat-Sale’, Morocco,” in Syst'eme urbain et Developpement au Maghreb, eds. Abdelkader Zghal and Amal Rassam (Tunis: Editions CERES-Productions, forthcoming).

[422] On Kuwait, see Saba George Shiber, “Kuwait: A Case Study,” in From Madina to Metropolis, ed. Brown, pp. 168-93. On Baghdad, see Gulick, “Baghdad.”

[423] Janet Abu-Lughod, “Migrant Adjustment to City Life: The Egyptian Case,” in Arab Society in Transition, eds. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Nicholas S. Hopkins (Cairo: The American University in Cairo, 1977 [orig. 1970], pp. 395,402.

[424] See Khuri, From Village to Suburb; Colette Petonnet, “Espace, Distance et Dimension dans une Societe musulmane: A Propos du Bidonville marocain de Douar Doum a Rabat,” L’Homme, 12 (1972), 47-84; Alan Dubetsky (Duben), “Class and Community in Urban Turkey,” in Commoners, Climbers and Notables, ed. C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), pp. 360-71; John Waterbury, North for the Trade: The Life and Times of a Berber Merchant (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 37-88.

[425] Kenneth L. Brown, People of Sale: Tradition and Change in a Moroccan City, 1850- 1950 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 6. For one of the earliest

accounts recognizing the impact of colonial penetration upon social relations, see Charles Le Coeur, Le Rite et l’Outil (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969 [orig. 1939]), pp. 59-131. I am grateful to Nicholas S. Hopkins for first referring me to this neglected study.

[426] Brown,People of Sale, pp. 56,60.

[427] [3i] Ibid„ p.224.

[428] Dubetsky, “Class and Community,” p. 360.

[429] Ibid„ p. 362.

[430] Ibid., p. 364.

[431] Hopkins, “Emergence of Class,” p. 454.

[432] R>z<Z, p. 455.

[433] Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal, 2nd ed., Bollingen Series, 43 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), Vol. I, pp. 249-355; Ernest Gellner, Saints of the Atlas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Muhsin Mahdi’s Ibn. Khaldun's Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957) remains the best study in English on Ibn Khaldun; Yves Lacoste, Ibn Khaldun: Naissance de I'Histoire passe du Tiers Monde (Paris: Francois Maspe'ro, 1973), is a convenient point of departure for a fresh reappraisal of Ibn Khaldun’s work.

[434] Gustave E. von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 177.

[435] [s] Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) provides a forceful critique of such studies, although his argument is unfortunately marred by the same sort of ahistorical assumptions which he attributes to Orientalists. For concise analyses of specific Orientalists, see Talal Asad, “Two European Images of Non-European Rule,” in Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter, ed. Talal Asad (London: Ithaca Press; New York: Humanities Press, 1973), pp. 103-18; Turner, Weber and

Islam, pp. 122-34; and Roger Owen, “The Middle East in the Eighteenth Century—An ‘Islamic’ Society in Decline: A Critique of Gibb and Bowen’s Islamic Society and the West,” Review of Middle East Studies, 1 (1975), 101-12. Owen’s study is particularly valuable, for it provides an outline of the materials with which revised images of the Middle East’s past are being forged.

[436] Asad, “Two European Images,” p. 107.

[437] Owen, “The Middle East in the Eighteenth Century,” p. 110.

[438] Peter jLienhardt, “The Authority of Shaykhs in the Gulf: An Essay in Nineteenth-Century History,” Arabian Studies, 2 (1975), 61-75.

[439] Said, Orientalism, p. 326.

[440] Clifford Geertz, “Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power,” in Culture and Its Creators: Essays in Honor of Edward Shils, eds. Joseph Ben-David and Terry N. Clark (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 150-171.

[441] ^Ibid., p. 153.

[442] Ibid., p. 161.

[443] Ibid„ p. 162.

[444] "ibid., p. 163.

[445] The newspaper al-Muharrir (Casablanca), August 16, 1979, describes the reception of

[446] tribal delegations totaling three hundred men and sixty women from the Sahara’s Wadi Dhahb region to renew their oath of allegiance to the Moroccan throne. The ceremony involved the

[447] sacrifice of sheep and bulls. In the colonial era, similar sacrifices were offered to the French to

[448] signify the cessation of hostilities.

[449] Emest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa (London: Duckworth; Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972).

[450] Robert Montagne, in his foreword to Georges Drague [Spillman], Esquisse d'Histoire religieuse du Maroc (Paris: J. Peyronnet, 1951). (My translation.) Montagne was one of colonial Morocco's outstanding sociologists. For a translation of one of his key works in English, with an excellent introduction by David Seddon, see Robert Montagne, The Berbers: Their Social and Political Organization (London: Frank Cass Co., 1973).

[451] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), pp. 90-229.

[452] Rene Maunier, The Sociology of Colonies, trans. E. O. Lorimer (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), Vol. I, p. 19. This remains one of the best available accounts of "colonial sociology" and in some ways is all the more valuable for its "insider" perspective.

[453] 0ne of the best accounts of the varieties of North African colonial experience is Jacques Berque's masterly, French North Africa: The Maghrib Between Two World Wars (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967). Berque's method is essentially to paint vivid word pictures of tribes, towns, persons, events,' and the attitudes of those who experienced them. A more analytical account of comparative colonial rule in North Africa and its impact upon different forms of independent government is Elbaki Hermassi, Leadership and National Development in North Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972). See also Abdelkader Zghal's excellent "Nation-building in the Maghreb," International Social Science Journal, 23, no. 3 (1971), 435-51.

[454] On Algeria, in addition to Berque's French North Africa; a good point of departure is Pierre Bourdieu's The Algerians (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962). This study was written at the height of the Algerian conflict and should be complemented by his

later Algeria 1960, Studies in Modern Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[455] Edmund Burke III, “Fez, the Setting Sun of Islam: A Study of the Politics of Colonial Ethnography,” The Maghreb Review, 2, no. 4 (July-August 1977), 1. See also Burke’s excellent Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Precolonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912, Studies in Imperialism (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

[456] A now-standard French source on this early period and on the Riffian war of the 1920s is Germain Ay ache, Etudes d’fflstoire marocaine (Rabat: Societe Marocaine des Editeurs Reunis, 1979); see also Abdallah Laroui, Les Origines sociales et culturelles du Nationalism marocain (1830-1912) (Paris: Librairie Francois Maspero, 1977). For a sensitive account of French penetration of Morocco’s southeast, see Ross E. Dunn, Resistance in the Desert: Moroccan Responses to French Imperialism, 1881-1912 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press; London: Croom Helm, Ltd., 1977).

[457] A sort of colonial vulgate describing the French administrative machinery from the perspective of a former member of the British Colonial Service in West Aden Protectorate is Robin Bidwell’s Morocco Under Colonial Rule: French Administration of Tribal Areas, 1912- 1956 (London: Frank Cass, 1973).

[458] For accounts of the impact of colonial penetration in various locales, see Dunn, Resistance; Dale F. Eickelman; Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center, Modern Middle East Series, 1 (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1976), pp. 211- 54; and (for the ex-Spanish zone) David Montgomery Hart, The Aith SVaryaghar of the Moroccan Rif, Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, 55 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976). Amal Rassam Vinogradov, The Ait Ndhir of Morocco: A Study of the Social Transformation of a Berber Tribe, Anthropological Papers, 55 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Museum of Anthropology, 1974), pp. 79-105, is particularly good in describing the

[459] On education, see John Damis, “Early Moroccan Reactions to the French Protectorate: The Cultural Dimension,” Humaniora Islamica, 1 (1973), 15-31. The cited figures are from Ladislav Cerych, Europeens et Marocains, 1930-1956: Sociologie d’une Decolonisation (Bruges: De Tempel, 1964), p. 297; and Waterbury, Commander, p. 84.

[460] Ibid., p. 5.

[461] Elbaki Hermassi, Leadership and National Development in North Africa: A Comparative Study (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), p. 5.

[462] Alan Dubetsky (Duben), “Class and Community in Urban Turkey,” in Commoners, Climbers and Notables, ed. C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), pp. 360-71.

[463] Peterson, Oman, pp. 87-88.

[464] Ministry of Information and Culture, “Facts about Oman.”

[465] “Oman: A Report,” The Economist, 272, no. 7093 (London: August 11, 1979), 57-68.

[466] The following discussion of “scientific socialism” in Somalia is based upon Ioan M. Lewis, “Kim Il-Sung in Somalia: The End of Tribalism?” in Politics in Leadership: A Comparative Perspective, ed. William A. Shack and Percy S. Cohen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 13-44. The classic standard work on Somali politics and clan identity is Lewis’s A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Hom of Africa (London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1961). See also his “The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup,” Journal of Modem African Studies, 10, no. 3 (October 1972), 383-408.

[467] Two succinct and readable accounts of these developments are Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, and J. Malcolm Wagstaff, The Middle East: A Geographical Study (London and New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), pp. 404-25, and Nicholas S. Hopkins, “The Evolution of Palestinian Arab Society,” in Arab Society in Transition: A Reader, eds. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Nicholas S. Hopkins (Cairo: The American University in Cairo, 1977), pp. 418- 39. The statistics in the following paragraph are based upon Beaumont, Blake and Wagstaff, pp. 414-20, where full bibliographical references are provided.

[468] Abner Cohen, Arab Border Villages in Israel (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1965), pp. 22-23; see also Talal Asad, “Anthropological Texts and Ideological Problems: An Analysis of Cohen on Arab Villages in Israel,” Economy and Society, 4, no. 3 (August 1975), 251-82; and Emanuel Marx, Bedouin of the Negev (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967), pp. 37-39,46-47.

[469] Asad, “Anthropological Texts”; Joel Migdal, “Urbanization and Political Change: The Impact of Foreign Rule,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 19, no. 3 (July 1977), 328-49; and Henry Rosenfeld, “The Class Situation of the Arab National Minority in Israel,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 20, no. 3 (July 1978), 374407.

[470] For a complete description of this project, from which my following comments are derived, see Emanuel Marx, “Anthropological Studies in a Centralized State: The Bernstein Research Project in Israel,” The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 17, no. 2 (December 1975), 131- 50. Some of the studies which resulted from the Bernstein Research Project, including those by Deshen, Shokeid, and Marx, are discussed in Chapter 7 of this book. See also Marx’s “Introduction” in A Composite Portrait of Israel, ed. E. Marx (London: Academic Press, 1980). This work is the tenth and concluding volume of the Bernstein Research Project and launches out into new fields such as slums, factories, ports, and old-age homes among other topics.

[471] Shlomo Deshen, “Israeli Judaism: Introduction to the Major Patterns,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9, no. 2 (May 1978), 141-69.

[472] See Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans.

[473] For example, see Lawrence Rosen, “Rural Political Process and National Political Structure in Morocco,” in Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, eds. Richard Antoun and Iliya Harik (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972), pp. 214- 36; Leveau, “The Rural Elite”; and Michael E. Meeker, “The Great Family Aghas of Turkey: A Study of Changing Political Culture,” in Rural Politics, eds. Antoun and Harik, pp. 237-66.

[474] Peter Gubser, Politics and Change in Al-Karak, Jordan (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Richard T. Antoun, Arab Village: A Social Structural Study of a Trans-Jordanian Peasant Community (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972); and also his Low-Key Politics: Local-Level Leadership and Change in the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979).

[475] For a highly readable account of the initial popular enthusiasm for education in Morocco and the reasons for later disenchantment, see Thomas W. Dichter’s excellent, but unfortunately unpublished, “The Problem of How to Act on an Undefined Stage: An Exploration of Culture, Change, and Individual Consciousness in the Moroccan Town of Sefrou —With a Focus on Three Modem Schools,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 1976. Dichter, initially a Peace Corps volunteer teaching

in a secondary school in Sefrou, later returned as an anthropologist to study education more systematically.

[476] John Waterbury, “Corruption, Political Stability and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco,” Government and Opposition, 11 (1976), 428,437.

[477] J. David Seddon, “Aspects of Kinship and Family Structure among Ulad Stut of Zaio Rural Commune, Nador Province, Morocco,” in Mediterranean Family Structures, ed. J. G. Peristiany, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, 13 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 173-94. See also his companion study, “Economic Anthropology or Political Economy? Approaches to the Analysis of Pre-capitalist Formations in the Maghreb,” in The New Economic Anthropology, ed. John Clammer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1978) pp. 61-109.

[478] Jon W. Anderson, “There Are No Khans Anymore: Economic Development and Social Change in Afghanistan,” The Middle East Journal, 32, no. 2 (Spring 1978), 167-83.

[479] Ibid., 168-69.

[480] Ibid., 112-13.

[481] [61] Ibid., 176.

[482] [6&] Ibid„ 181-82. For other studies of economic development, see Dawn Chatty, “Leaders, Land, and Limousines: Emir versus Sheikh,” Ethnology, 16, no. 4 (October 1977), 385-97; and (for one of the few studies by a sociologist ever turned into a filni), Jean Duvignaud, Change at Shebika: Report from a North African Village (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1977).

[483] Marc Bloch, Feudal Society (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1961, p. 148 [French orig. 1939]).

[484] Egyptian Census Foretells Doubled Population in 30 Years, Negating Economic Gains,” New York Times, April 26,1977, p. 8.

[485] This formulation is strongly influenced by discussions with Clifford Geertz and the late Lloyd A. Fallers and their writings.

[486] Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed (New Haven." Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 116- 17; Peterson, Oman, p. 213.

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** [Front Matter]

PRINCETON STUDIES ON

THE NEAR EAST

*** [Title Page]

KNOWLEDGE AND POWER

IN MOROCCO

The Education

of a Twentieth-Century

Notable

DALE F. EICKELMAN

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*** [Dedication]

To

Amal and Miriam

*** Illustrations

1. The Sultan of Tulba, Fez, 1925

2. The Anthropologist and the Qadi, 1969

3. ’Abd ar-Rahman, 1939

4. The Qadi, 1969

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** Foreword

by Clifford Geertz

It used to be that people called ethnographers asked questions and people called informants answered the questions, which the ethnographers duly recorded and worked into monographs, but things don't work that way anymore. It is not merely that the subjects of ethnographical study are increasingly unwilling to submit to so one-sided an exchange, one which reduces them to walking-around archives from which data are to be extracted; ethnographers have a clearer understanding of what it is they must do if they are to comprehend people different from themselves—start a conversation and maintain one. It is dialogue that does it, however delicate and liable to misfire, not inquisition, however orderly and straight from the shoulder.

But if Notes and Queries anthropology is dead or dying, along with the "we are the knowers, you are the known" cultural confidence that generated it, it is not always possible to discern the fact from anthropological writings which are still most commonly presented as summary reports of distant discoveries: rocks from the moon. There have been some scattered attempts to make the dialogical nature of contemporary ethnographic research more apparent to the world at large, but they have largely consisted in informal prefaces, personal confessions, or word-literal reproductions of particular interchanges, all of which more evoke the fact than put it to analytical use. There have been only a very few studies in which the anthropological conversation has been used to reshape the way in which material is presented and its implications explored. It is to this select company that Dr. Eickelman's work belongs. Setting the relation between himself, an intrusive American intellectual, and Qadi Hajj Abd ar-Rahman Mansuri, a rooted Moroccan one, at the very center of his narrative, he has altered the form of a scholarly genre.

He has also extended its reach. His attempt to write a "social biography"—an account of his struggle to describe a traditional Islamic educational system and that of a rural judge to make his way through that system, set against the background of their momentarily converging lives—makes it possible for Eickelman to approach some typical anthropological issues in a quite untypical way. It is not just local color that this "The Judge and I" approach to things provides (though it does that too), nor but a backstage view of how an ethnographer works (though such a view is usefully demystifying). It provides an unusual angle from which to view an old and powerful cultural institution—an angle rather close to that from which its champions, or its prisoners, themselves view it.

The sense of what description and explanation amount to in anthropology that emerges from Eickelman's pages is thus a quite distinctive one. It is not at all usual to find in a work such as this extended discussions of the pursuit of a cache of disintegrating manuscripts through a labyrinth of factional jealousy, proprietary claims, family secrecy, and cultural suspicion. Even less, does one expect to encounter images of a young fieldworker and an indigenous scholar, thirty years his senior, bent over such manuscripts, admiring calligraphy, hunting

for traces of economic dependencies, reading between the lines of political gossip, and discoursing on caravans and dress codes. And, perhaps least of all, is it common to come upon vignette narratives of such an odd couple working together, like a good cop and a bad cop, to worm the true story of a tribal massacre out of a peasant intruder at a landlord luncheon. An Eickelman explicitly remarks, what we have here is not a Berber judge "speaking for himself" (something he does quite well in his own ways, with his own means, and to his own ends), nor an American anthropologist speaking for him (something he is in no position, morally or inteilectually, to do). What we have is a mixture of these unlike and jostling voices inscribed in a text: a "social document" in which they can be heard happily discoursing.

It is out of this discoursing that the substantive contributions of Eickelman's study come. The very figure of the qadi, reflective, questioning, shrewd, and knowledgeable in everything from linguistics to jurisprudence, undercuts the "wild west" image of Morocco (horses, guns, and wild-eyed holy men), and the story of his career, mosque school to Muslim university, demolishes the notion (one not only foreigners share, but many "evolue" Moroccans as well) that Islamic education was decadent there at its birth and declined thereafter. A simple opposition of an oral tradition and a written one, the first mindless and habitual, the second self-conscious and critical, can hardly survive a man who first reduces texts to memory—the Quran, a rhymed grammar, a legal handbook—and then starts to employ Arabic as a spoken language. (I once asked a Moroccan oral poet how he acquired his skill. "I memorized the Quran," he said; "Then I forgot the sentences and remembered the words.") The picture of the qadi and his brother's constant movement back and forth between a Muslim Podunk like Bzu or Boujad and a Muslim Paris like Marrakesh similarly dissolves any very sharp distinction between "great" and "little" traditions, "normative" and "folk" Islam, or urban cosmopolitanism and rural provincialism. 'Abd ar-Rahman escapes a lot of categories.

But it is not from his side only that enlightenment comes. Dr. Eickelman's role in the conversation is hardly passive; he is no I-am-a-recorder anthropologist registering what he sees and hears and passing it on uninterfered with. The formulation of "Islamic knowledge" in Morocco as a matter of "mnemonic possession," the connection of such a notion to the means by which such knowledge is developed and transmitted, and the observation that elsewhere in the Islamic world—Oman, Iran—other notions lead to other means define 'Abd ar-Rahman's style of thought in a way he is unlikely to be able to do himself, or, indeed, concerned with more instant matters, to have much interest in doing.

So do the careful tracing of the interplay between scholastic and brotherhood currents within Moroccan Islam, of the origins and nature of "reformism" within it, of its vicissitudes in the nationalist period, and of its present state and possible futures. The intrusion of a Western perspective, cast in terms of "cultural capital," "the stranger" and "the art of memory," does not displace the Moroccan perspective, blot it out with alien conceptions—it reframes it. It makes of the Qadi's Story much more than a recounting of a life. It makes of it, in good Muslim fashion as a matter of fact, an emblem and figuration of the civilization in which it was formed.

** Preface

This book concerns the changing role of Islamic education, the concept of knowledge inherent in it, and the relation of its carriers to wider society from the early years of colonial rule in twentieth-century Morocco to the present. These complex themes are concretely presented through an intensive “social biography,” an approach which allows them to be explored in contextual detail without losing sight of more general issues of historical and social thought.

The subject of this study is a rural judge whose life and self-description contribute significantly to understanding the changing social role of religious intellectuals. Biography is a time-honored genre in American anthropology, and there are distinguished antecedents for the anthropological study of traditional intellectuals. Yet only in recent years have these concerns begun to be linked explicitly to the main currents of anthropological thought.

“Traditional” religious education, which thrived in Morocco until the 1930s, carried with it a sense of career which profoundly influenced the self-image of its carriers and their perception by others. Although the institutions of higher learning described in this study continue today only in highly altered form, the pervasive notions of personal responsibility, economic activities, and political authority shaped by them remain influential. Since the Iranian revolution, studies of Islam have focussed upon “resurgent” and militant movements. This study suggests alternative, popularly supported Islamic attitudes toward the contemporary world that form part of the background against which more radical Islamic visions can be better understood. It is also intended to complement studies of Islamic education in earlier historical periods, which have mostly concentrated upon institutional development and the political role of urban men of learning.

At another level, this book seeks to challenge the conventional view in Islamic studies and in studies of the Third World in general that “traditional” intellectuals constitute a social category of declining significance in modern political and cultural life. Western scholars have for the most part downplayed the vitality of Islamic learning in the modern era, a neglect reinforced by the tendency of nationalists and technocrats in North Africa and elsewhere to deny significance to men of learning whose notions of political action have differed from their own. Throughout widely fluctuating national political contexts, the ideas of knowledge prevalent in traditional Islamic education have continued to be largely congruent with popular understandings of religious knowledge. More than the study of earlier “golden” eras, a critical analysis of Islamic learning and its carriers in twentieth-century Morocco suggests the intricate ways in which ideas of learning and their modes of transmission influence, and

in turn are influenced by, the shifting historical and political contexts in which they are maintained and reproduced.

A number of people have generously contributed to shaping this book through extensive discussions, readings of earlier versions, and practical advice during my stays in Morocco. Early discussions with Ernest Gellner and the late Lloyd A. Fallers first suggested to me the range of issues related to the study of traditional intellectuals. Clifford Geertz provided intellectual support when this book began to take practical shape, especially during my tenure as a member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, during the 1976–1977 academic year. As editor, Margaret Case provided strategic encouragement throughout its writing. §erif Mardin, who has been working on comparable issues in Turkey, has also generously shared his ideas with me, and has allowed me to quote in Chapter Seven from a work in progress. David Hart, an institution in his own right, has set a standard of collegiality in sharing his Moroccan experiences that his Moroccan and foreign successors can aspire to emulate, and Kenneth Brown provided useful suggestions regarding the life of Mukhtar as-Susi.

Muhammad Aafif of the Universite Mohamed V (Rabat) is largely responsible for introducing me to recent historical writing in Arabic, has verified Arabic usage throughout the text, and in innumerable ways has helped me appreciate Morocco's contemporary intellectual traditions. Ross Dunn of San Diego State University and Lawrence Rosen of Princeton University have likewise offered valuable advice that has contributed to shaping the present text. Dr. Fred A. Levin, Assistant Professor of Clinical Psychiatry, Northwestern University School of Medicine, and Instructor, The Institute for Psychoanalysis (Chicago), has put his earlier training as an anthropologist to use in helping me explore the personal relationships depicted in this text. Abdellah Hammoudi and Roy P. Mottahedeh have also provided useful comments. Christine Eickelman's suggestions for this manuscript have as always been perceptive.

For the discussion of specific points and practical assistance in meeting participants in Morocco's traditional learning, I am especially grateful to Attouarti Ali ben Mouallem (Marrakesh), Hajj Ahmad bin 'Abd as-Salam al-Bu 'Ayyashi (Tangier), Mohammed Cherkaoui (Casablanca), Bouzekri Draiouiy (Casablanca), Miloudi Draiouiy (Boujad), and Najmi Mohammad (Casablanca). For nearly two decades, I have benefited from the intellectual encouragement and hospitality of friends and colleagues at Morocco's institutions of higher learning and have sought whenever possible to strengthen the practical ties between our institutions. If these colleagues are not mentioned by name, I nonetheless feel an equal gratitude toward them.

Finally, I thank Qadi Hajj 'Abd ar-Rahman Mansuri and his family. Hajj 'Abd ar-Rahman agrees with me that disguising their identity in a book of this nature would have obscured much of the specific networks of learning that this book is intended to explore. I hope that the final version of this book merits the trust they have placed in me. Final responsibility for errors of

fact and for interpretation is mine alone. To Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman is the credit for the openness and creativity characteristic to the world of traditional Islamic learning.

Portions of this book, especially Chapters Four and Five, appeared earlier in Comparative Studies in Society and History 20 (1978). The two maps have been prepared by Michael Bonine of the University of Arizona.

Arabic names and terms are fully transliterated upon first occurrence only and in the glossary. Any analysis which draws upon extensive interviews as well as written sources must necessarily cross the line between colloquial and written usage. I have usually given precedence to the colloquial form of terms and phrases.

* Knowledge and Power in Morocco

** Introduction

*** Learning and the State

The nineteenth century was a period of intellectual ferment for scholars and students at Morocco’s mosque-universities. In spite of the growing involvement of European powers in Morocco from the 1830s onward and the steadily worsening financial situation of the Moroccan state, higher education thrived and was alive with attempts at reform. As early as the reign of Sultan Sidi Muhammad bin ‘Abd ar-Rahman (r. 18591873), mathematics, engineering and astronomy were reintroduced as taught subjects, admittedly on a rudimentary level. Men of learning associated with the government were in the vanguard of the reform movement. At the center of reformist thought of the period was a rededication to the values which made the Islamic community {umma) great in the past. Through personal and collective effort {ijtihad.) and a renewed discipline of self and society through education and control {nizam), they considered that Islamic society would become revitalized, offset the growing European challenge, and at the same time accept useful contemporary innovations (Binsahd 1983: 28–33). To achieve this goal, some religious scholars were ordered to pursue studies, including military science, in Egypt and in Europe (al-Manuni 1973: 96–103; 114–125). The introduction of a lithograph printing press in Fez by 1865 significantly accelerated the diffusion of knowledge (Ayache 1979: 147; al-Manuni 1973: 203–212).

Sultan Mulay Hasan I (r. 1873–1894) also strongly encouraged scholars imbued with modernist, reform-minded ideologies derived from studies in the Arab East, primarily Cairo and Mecca. He took a personal interest in the debates of men of learning {‘ulama’-, s. ‘alim) (Jirarl 1976: 17–18) and encouraged higher education. His concern for higher religious studies was integrally linked to his efforts, not always successful, to modernize and expand the Makhzan (lit. “storehouse” or “coffer”), the name by which Morocco’s government continues to be known. These efforts necessarily involved recruiting men of learning for the administration. Likewise Mulay ‘Abd al-Hafiz, who was deputy sultan (khalifa) in Marrakesh prior to assuming rule himself (r. 19081912), was recognized as a scholar in his own right. Like some of his predecessors, he took a direct interest in propagating reformist Islam (Burke 1976: 135).

Despite occasional setbacks, reformist ideologies had become quite influential in Morocco’s ruling circles and with urban notables by the early twentieth century (Burke 1976: 37,101,135). There was a direct link between state authority (quwwa; sulta) and progress (al-taqaddum). At crucial moments in precolonial Morocco, as elsewhere in the Islamic world at earlier periods, men of learning played significant, if not always willing, political roles as spokesmen for the community (Burke 1972; 1976: 114–117; cf. Bulliet 1972; Hourani 1968; Lapidus 1967; Mottahedeh 1980). At the same time, Morocco’s rulers recognized the support of men of learning as a profound source of legitimacy (al-Fassi 1954: 2762–77)-

Until 1925, the convergence of popular and royal support for learning was exemplified in the annual feasts for religious students, discussed in Chapter Four, held at both the Qarawiym mosque-university (jami‘a) in Fez and the Yusufiya in Marrakesh. Students at both institutions selected a “mock” sultan among their numbers and other students formed his entourage. These feasts culminated in a public parody of Makhzan ceremonial, including the sermons (khutbas) delivered on Fridays and feast days. Often the real sultan was in attendance enjoying the spectacle, and the “mock” sultan had the right at the end of his “reign” to ask a favor of the real sultan.

Public recognition of the special role played by religious studies—no other category of Moroccans were accorded license equivalent to that of the students of religion—continued after the advent of colonial rule. At least once, in 1915, Marshal Hubert Lyautey, Morocco’s first Resident-General, personally attended the Feast of Students in Fez (Bidwell 1973: 19). Colonial authorities were acutely sensitive of the political overtones of the event and finally sought to curtail the practice in 1925 (Cenival 1925: 139). Nonetheless, the Feast of Students continued on a reduced scale until the early 1960s. Traditionally educated men of learning continued to enjoy widespread respect.

Morocco’s two mosque-universities continued to attract children of the country’s intellectual and political elite until the 193 os. At the Qarawiyin and the Yusufiya, men of learning acquired a culturally valued cognitive style, “a set of basic, deeply interiorized master-

patterns” of language and thought on the basis of which other patterns are subsequently acquired (Bourdieu 1967: 343), as distinct in its own way as was the tradition of learning epitomized by the legon in French higher education. In spite of the effective collapse of traditional Islamic higher education in the 1930s, the cognitive style exemplified by men of learning continued to be the most popularly respected form of knowledge, shaping the language of politics and political action.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-knowledge-and-power-in-morocc-2.png][Figure 1. The Sultan of Tulba, Fez, 1925. [Reprinted with permission from Hesperis 5 (1925)].]]

The disjunction between the collapse of higher Islamic education in the 1930s and the continued respect for the culturally valued knowledge which these institutions transmitted and reproduced provides a useful point of departure for exploring the relation between systems of meaning and the social contexts in which they occur. There is an anthropological tradition, still very much alive, that presumes a direct, one-to-one correlation between ideology and social action (e.g., Douglas 1973; Durkheim 1915; Evans-Pritchard 1940; Lienhardt 1967; Mauss 1966). However questionable such an assumption of correspondence may be when applied to “simple” societies, it is decidedly inadequate when applied to societies such as Morocco that are complex, internally differentiated, and historically known. As Emile Durkheim recognizes in his largely neglected Evolution of Educational Thought (1977), changes in ideas of knowledge in complex societies and the means by which such ideas are transmitted result from continual struggles among competing groups within society, each of which seeks domination or influence.

The study of the role of men of Islamic learning in Morocco’s recent history also raises basic issues concerning the political responsibilities of men of learning, and the relationship between knowledge and political and economic domination. Just as Morocco’s rulers necessarily turned to men of learning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to expand the scope of governmental activities, so did the French once they established their protectorate in 1912. In the first decade of Morocco’s colonial era, religious scholars were almost the only Moroccans with full literacy in Arabic. Without the cooptation of men of learning, the colonial regime would not have been able to have expanded rapidly its administrative and taxation apparatus into rural areas.

Moroccan men of learning were opposed to the growing French encroachment (K. Brown 1972.); after direct French intervention, some men of learning and other religious leaders figured prominently in open resistance (Hammoudi 1981). But for the most part, they refrained from direct political involvement, as was earlier the case in neighboring Tunisia (L. C. Brown 1972; Green 1978) and Algeria (Christelow 1982; cf. Merad 1967). Others, recognizing the futility of direct resistance, allowed themselves to be used in “pacification” efforts in order to avert bloodshed. Particularly in rural society, where the overwhelming majority of Moroccans lived,[1] many men of learning, often from families of rural notables, agreed only with reluctance to cooperate with the colonial administration.

“Cooperation” with the French was an effective means of social mobility for many Moroccan notables, especially in the early years of colonial rule. It would be wrong to assume that all such “friends of France” were acting primarily in terms of self-interest, a charge subsequently leveled by many nationalists after Morocco regained its independence. Such interpretation in hindsight by nationalists admittedly explains why many men of learning have remained silent on their role during the colonial era. Some undoubtedly were opportunists. Military intelligence reports written during the first years of French presence in Morocco often suggest that the principal concern of notables was with preserving their wealth and status.[2] Yet these same reports make clear that the French were careful in their contact with notables, especially religious scholars, to stress that the French were acting at the request of the Makhzan in order to bring order and peace to Morocco. This fiction quickly wore thin, but men of learning and other notables recognized that they had no means of directly opposing the French.

Moroccan men of learning in the early part of this century resented the colonial presence but felt that the means of recovering Morocco’s autonomy was internal renewal and a recommitment to education and discipline. In this reformist “neo-Salafi” view, to adopt Binsa‘id’s useful term, Islam was the “religion of order” or self-discipline {din al-nizam) (Binsa’id 1983: 33). By the late 1940s popular nationalism eclipsed such ideas among a younger generation of educated Moroccans, but it would be wrong to regard such neo-Salafi ideas as no more than precursors of nationalism. I suggest in Chapter Seven that neo-Salafi thought may have more in common with what is generically known today as “resurgent” Islam than with nationalist thought. Many Moroccans remain uneasy in discussing neo-Salafi ideas today because of their implications for “collaboration.” Such a blanket interpretation constitutes an anachronistic misreading of an earlier era in which alternative notions of political responsibility prevailed among men of learning, ideas that remain important in defining the attitudes of many Moroccans toward state authority. Just as the French have found it difficult to recount the Vichy era, and for similar reasons, Moroccans have passed over many aspects of colonial rule in silence. Much of this silence is due to the difficulty the generation of Moroccans who experienced the earlier part of this era first-hand have in explaining its subtleties and ironies to those who only know it through the political rhetoric of later times.

*** Intellectuals: Context and Style

The Moroccan historian Abdallah Laroui (1977b: 191) argues that Moroccan men of learning in the nineteenth century possessed “the moral influence that legitimates all political action.” By the late 1920s they ceased to form the near-totality of educated Moroccans, especially after the children of the elite shifted from the great mosque-universities to the schools established by the French for the sons of notables. The influence of men of learning nonetheless remained significant, especially in the countryside. In the independence movement of the early 1950s, some formed the cadres of rural resistance or actively supported them, especially in the hinterland of Marrakesh. In some regions of southern

Morocco in the 1960s, notables who were also men of learning could still win elections simply by standing for them (Leveau 1976: 93, 116, 188–189), although this was no longer the case for many other regions of the country (e.g., Rosen 1979: 50–53).

The relation between prevalent style of religious knowledge carried by the traditionally educated and the wider social context in which such notions are maintained is especially evident in rural Morocco. As a category, men of learning in rural society constituted an important pool from which Morocco's "secondary elite" were drawn, those who allowed the rulers to rule (Mosca 1939). I describe them as a category rather than as a group because the carriers of religious learning are recognized as sharing that attribute alone, and do not constitute a group that acts together politically or in any other way. Indeed, although some men of learning compose an important element of the rural elite, others, such as rural Quranic teachers, do not.

Writing of an admittedly different social and cultural context, Antonio Gramschi (1971: 14–15) considers rural intellectuals to be "organic" in the sense that every development among the peasantry "up to a certain point, is linked to and depends upon movements among the intellectuals." For Gramschi, intellectuals—clerks, judges, teachers, scribes, other professionals, and (my own addition for the Moroccan context) educated merchants—bring the peasantry into contact with the local and state administration. Gramschi argues that intellectuals are few in number in rural society, their command of literacy is understood by few, and their social position is such that it is difficult for them to act independently of the established social order (cf. Schumpeter 1962: 147). Even if rural intellectuals are not directly involved in political administration, it is difficult to separate their various roles as judges, notaries, and clerics from the political milieu. Moreover, the standard of living of rural intellectuals is generally higher than that of much of the rest of the rural population, so that the peasantry looks to the "gentlemanly" rural intellectual as a social model to which at least one of his own sons might aspire. Even if not always resulting in economic advancement, the pursuit of religious knowledge in rural Morocco is seen as a commendable end in itself.

Gramschi's notion of intellectuals in rural society needs comment. Other scholars, notably Edward Shils (1972: 3), characterize intellectuals as persons "with an unusual sensitivity to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their universe and the rules which govern their society." An intellectual by this definition need not be confined to the formally educated or to those explicitly engaged in mental work. Nor is it evident that persons engaged in such pursuits as notaries, scribes, and judges lead an "intellectual" life by reason of their profession. Despite Gramschi's choice of terms, his formulation equally approximates the original Russian notion of intelligentsia as the educated class of society, or those to whom "advanced" political or, as in rural Morocco, religious ideas are attributed. Although it is useful to separate the two notions of intellectual and intelligentsia for some purposes, Gramschi's merging of the two notions points to a necessary and significant overlap in contexts where full literacy is possessed only by a minority, as has been the case in Morocco until recent decades (see Chapter Three).

Profound changes are underway in the role of Islamic learning and of its carriers in Moroccan society and in other Islamic countries, although, given the lack until recently of scholarly attention to contemporary Islamic learning, it has been difficult to trace these changes in detail. Only within the last decade (esp. Akhavi 1980; Fischer 1980a, 1980b, 1982), has there been renewed interest in the subject. In the case of Morocco, an interest in contemporary Islamic learning was sustained almost alone for many years by a talented colonial administrator, who subsequently became an academic at the end of the colonial era (Berque 1938,1974). Scholarly interest in the theme was marginal.

A compelling reason for the benign scholarly neglect of “traditional” intellectuals is that there was no clear place for them in prevailing assumptions concerning the role of intellectuals in contemporary societies. Abdallah Laroui (1967: 19–28), for example, divides contemporary Arab intellectuals into three main categories, a triad implicit in the writings of many other Arab intellectuals. First are the clerics, the religious intellectuals who seek a definition of society and the means to its improvement in religious ideology. Second are the politician-liberals, who seek the betterment of society through adopting political forms inspired largely by the West. Technocrats constitute a third broad category encompassing everything from militant Marxists to “apolitical,” Western-educated advocates of social engineering. Despite other differences, intellectuals in this category share the conviction that society can be improved largely through “rational” means that require minimal attention to their society’s specific cultural heritage.

Laroui’s argument that each of these three intellectual styles has predominated in successive historical contexts is problematical. It ignores the progressive differentiation of intellectual styles and orientations that has taken place in the twentieth century. These intellectual styles coexist in the contemporary Middle East and, as indicated by Laroui’s repeated and appropriate invocation of the experience of his native Morocco, often overlap in intricate ways.

In contrast to Laroui’s sharp delineation of politican-liberals and technocrats, his category of “cleric,” the most complex of the three, is the most vaguely delineated and residual. Fischer (1982: 108), more immediately concerned with contemporary clerics, delineates five major clerical orientations in Iran, each with differing ideological and organizational implications. Fischer’s categorization is more effective than Laroui’s, at least for Iran, in suggesting the wide spectrum of available and emerging religious ideologies and orientations to action, ranging from “reformist” ideologies that require active persuasion to win adherents and that represent a break with the status quo, to notions that profoundly resonate with popular, existing religious understandings.

Of Laroui’s categories, the clerics are for the most part also less interested than the carriers of the other two intellectual styles in pursuing dialogues with Westerners or with Western-educated scholars. As Albert Hourani (1970: viii) wrote in the first reissue of Arabic

Thought in the Liberal Age, most studies of Arab intellectuals, including his own, “did not say enough” about those who rejected or disregarded “the dominant ideas of modern Europe.” The resulting miscomprehension of Iranian society requires no further reiteration, but in other countries there has been a similar neglect of the influence of the traditionally educated. In the case of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani argues that the traditionally educated intellectuals, many of whom today have also had some education in state-sponsored educational institutions, continue to play an important role in shaping attitudes toward modernism and the west.[3] The publication of the works of a fourteenth-century theologian, Ibn Taymiyya, can stir major intellectual and political controversy in Egypt in the 1980s (Sivan 1983). “Traditional” intellectuals place a particular value upon the past, but are not necessarily locked into the past. Intellectual traditions can undergo major changes that their carriers do not regard as such (Shils 1981: 14). I argue that this has been the case with Islamic “clerics.”

The notion of contemporary clerics as a residual category equally pervades the influential work of Edward Shils. For Shils, intellectuals possess an “innate need” to be in “frequent communion with symbols which are more general than the immediate concrete situations of everyday life” (Shils 1972: 16). Although intellectual work originally arose from religious occupations, Shils writes that religious orientations in modern times attract “a diminishing share of the creative capacities of the oncoming intellectual elite” (ibid.). In Shils’ view, among Western intellectuals in earlier periods, and Asian and African intellectuals since the nineteenth century, “the tradition of distrust of secular and ecclesiastical authority—and in fact of tradition as such—has become the chief secondary tradition of the intellectuals” (1972: 17). The notion of the sacred has shifted in his view from religious concerns to a focus upon and mastery of the technological, organizational, and political skills most useful in forging a modern state in the face of congeries of primordial loyalties. In terms of Laroui’s categories, the present belongs to the liberals and the technocrats. Shils argues that in the contemporary world, intellectuals are found primarily in the differentiated “modern” class. He argues that only intellectuals attached to “modern” values have the vision to rise above parochial identities and to attach themselves to the notion of a modern nation-state.

Shils notwithstanding, traditionally educated Islamic intellectuals also emphasize identities that are far from parochial, even if not wholly congruent with the technocratic and “liberal” vision of what is needed to maintain a modern nationstate. Unfortunately, the notion of an all-important “modern” category of intellectuals that accompanied the heyday of modernization theory in the 1950s reinforced the tendency to treat clerics as a residual or disappearing category on the margin of significant political activity. As a practical reminder of this attitude, a reviewer for a proposal I wrote in the mid-1970s commented that it had merit only as history, not as anthropology, for “traditional” Islamic intellectuals throughout the Middle East were isolated, dying old men with no significant influence upon contemporary events. There are specifically anthropological precedents for the study of intellectuals and intellectual traditions elsewhere in the world (e.g., Griaule 1965; Radin 1957; Turner 1967: 131–150), but not for the Middle East. Only the 1978–1979 Iranian revolution returned to the center stage of social thought a tradition that has remained vigorous, if not always politically dominant.

** One: Biography as a Social Document

Because of its complexity, Moroccan society lends itself to the use of biographies as a means of understanding wider social and political realities. Two talented journalists (Lacouture and Lacouture 1958) portrayed the key social and political forces of the period leading to Morocco's independence through biographical profiles of major French and Moroccan political figures. Jacques Berque's (1958) account of the seventeenth-century religious scholar Sidi al-Hasan al-Yusi (1631–1691), who also figures prominently in Clifford Geertz's Islam Observed (1968a), depicts the intellectual and religious milieu of a crucial era in Moroccan history. A political scientist (Waterbury 1972) has used the life of a prominent Susi merchant in Casablanca to exemplify the economic and political sensibilities of an entire generation, and anthropologists have used biographies as devices to analyze such diverse topics as possession states (Crapanzano 1980), the nature of ethnography and the ethnographic encounter (Crapanzano 1980; Dwyer 1982), family relationships (Munson 1984), and political and "cultural" alienation (Rabinow 1975). Each of these studies succeeds to the extent that it convincingly depicts major social and cultural issues. Yet, for English-speaking readers, the notion of biography immediately evokes a Victorian genre for which, because its primary audience is assumed to share a common cultural heritage and knowledge of historical context, more general issues are often raised only obliquely.

The study presented here is intended as a social biography. By focusing upon the training, career, and moral imagination of a rural qadi, it reduces the familiar notion of the "documentary method" to its minimal form. Clifford Geertz, who traces the notion through Harold Garfinkel and Karl Mannheim, characterizes this approach as the interpretation of

... a single naturally coherent social phenomenon ... a specific manifestation of a more comprehensive pattern which has a very large, in some cases virtually infinite, number of such embodiments and manifestations, the one at hand simply being regarded as particularly telling in the fullness, the clarity, and the elegance with which it exhibits the general pattern (Geertz 1965: 15 3–154).

Social biographies, called life histories by some anthropologists, are often considered to be closer to raw data than analytical presentations. The distinction between the anecdotal and the social document is often unclear. Yet as an analytic device, the social document can be an effective means of exploring uncharted territory (Young 1983: 479–480). In Islamic studies, Louis Massignon (1982) uses a biography of the Sufi al-Hallaj (858–922) as a point of departure for a comprehensive discussion of Islamic mysticism. In this study, I use a social biographical approach to break accepted stereotypes held both by Westerners and by many Middle Easterners themselves of Islamic learning and its carriers.

I use the term social biography rather than life history to emphasize that this narrative does not purport to be a vehicle to allow a Berber qddi, Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman Mansuri, a friend and consociate thirty years my senior, to speak for himself. His voice is present throughout the text, but so is mine. A significant part of this account is the result of extended dialogues in some respects like those contained in Marcel Griaule’s Conversations with Ogotemmeli (1965). Unlike Griaule’s narrative, which is primarily a one-way representation of indigenous thought, this account incorporates multiple voices, especially that of the ethnographer. An awareness of multiple voices is, I think, essential to understanding the nature of the anthropological encounter today (cf. Geertz 1968b). The ethnographer’s presence is almost invisible in a monograph such as Evans-Pritchard’s The Nuer (1940) or even in “autobiographical” narratives such as those presented by Oscar Lewis (1961); in some recent ethnographies the selfreflexivity of the ethnographer, concerned about the “power relationships” of the ethnographic encounter, almost preclude further ethnographic analysis. I think that ethnography involves a balance between the two extremes. As the qadi and I worked together, we both became aware of our differences in understanding how events could be narrated and interpreted, of what was said and what was left out. These differences became part of the record of interpretation. Through my questions and his, we became mutually aware and appreciative of our respective intellectual projects. When I first became acquainted with the qadi, I was barely aware of this dimension of ethnographic understanding. Especially in the heydey of structuralist analysis in the 1960s, ethnographic analysis had been conveyed to me as a priestly tradition in which the conscious understanding of “natives” or their efforts at understanding their own society played a minimal role.

The decision to portray the social context of Islamic knowledge in rural Morocco through the social biography of a living qadi is in part fortuitous. Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman was born in 1912 in Bzu, a small Berber town in the foothills of the High Atlas mountains. After studying in Bzu and its environs, learning to speak Arabic in the process, he went in 1928 to the famed Yusufiya mosque-university in Marrakesh, where he remained until 1935. Then his politically minded elder brother, by then the qadi of Bzu, cut short his studies in order to have him appointed as Bzu’s deputy qadi.

I met Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman during my first field research in Morocco (1968–1970). He was then qadi of Boujad, the regional pilgrimage center in which I had chosen to work. He was also my landlord. Only toward the end of my first stay in Morocco did the idea of specifically writing about his life begin to take shape. I first broached the idea to him in late 1969, although in reviewing my notes prior to then I find extensive entries related to his personal experiences, perceptions, and participation in the events of this century. At first I regarded these discussions to be on the margins of my primary work on Boujad, since the Hajj was from elsewhere in Morocco. Nonetheless, I recorded them as systematically as I did all my field notes, as soon after discussions as possible, in order to preserve the texture of the original discussions. At his request, we never used a tape recorder; he regarded the device as breaking the confidentiality of discussion. In any case, when I failed to understand a point developed in my notes, we could return to it later. The extensive record of our discussions was completed before I raised the possibility of writing specifically on him, and has served as an excellent check on whether he subsequently shaped his narrative and presentation of

self to accommodate his new role as the subject of a book. Because of his notion of presentation of self, discussed in detail later in this chapter, I think that such distortion has been minimal.

I subsequently returned to Morocco several times (summers of 1972-, 1973, 1976,1978,1981 and 1984). Each time I took the opportunity to work further with Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman and to interview other scholars and associates of his who were at the Yusufiya. The task was made easier by the fact that he had kept a diary and assorted personal papers since the early 1930s, though they were in part destroyed for fear of reprisals during the colonial era, and the diary was not, in the Western sense, a systematic, cumulative record of personal events and experiences. It was episodic, recording only those actions and events that to him formed “history.” The fact that it was not a Western-style diary was in itself significant. It provided a document which, although it was his creation, was independent of the two of us and could be used as a point of departure for interpretation.

I agree with Laroui when he observes that of his three types of Arab intellectuals, the “clerics” are those least interested in communicating with Western scholars. Yet he also notes that the foreign scholar has, at least at the outset, certain advantages over the indigenous one, especially in the study of elites. As an outsider, the foreign scholar is less suspect of participating in local rivalries and thus is more likely to secure cooperation (Laroui 1977b: 15). As a “stranger” (Simmel 1964) at the outset, the foreigner is also obliged to ask basic questions about the nature of the social world that “natives” are supposed to know and therefore do not or cannot ordinarily discuss with one another.

I shared at least part of ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s social world on a long-term, first-hand basis for two years in Boujad. During this time, in company with him and on my own, I also met many of his friends and fellow administrators in visits throughout western Morocco, Marrakesh, and its hinterland. In subsequent returns to Morocco, after I had specifically decided to write about ‘Abd ar-Rahman and traditional Islamic learning, I built upon these existing ties and developed others.

Some Moroccan men of learning discouraged me from writing about a rural qadi. They felt that I should invest my time in studying the pinnacle of erudition as they conceived it, and argued that the life of a country judge would provide me with a distorted, impoverished image of Islamic learning. My response was to observe that Moroccan men of learning themselves were much better situated than I was to interpret trends in the body of Islamic knowledge as it is understood and developed in Morocco today. My own intent was instead to focus upon the contexts in which such knowledge was learned, elaborated, and reproduced, and how it was valued in society at large. Once some men of learning realized that my intent was not to replicate Islamic knowledge as they alone could understand it, they agreed that the world of traditional learning about which I chose to write was rapidly becoming unfamiliar even to a younger generation of Moroccans, so that there might be some value in my scholarly project after all. Perhaps some merely appeared to acquiesce in

my rationale because they saw there was no point in dissuading me, although the tenor of questions suggested a clear understanding of my project, if not always acceptance of it. The fact that my initially “unfamiliar” goals could be comprehended and respected by traditional men of learning, especially those who had little to do with foreigners or the foreign-educated, reaffirmed for me the openness and flexibility of the world of traditional Islamic learning, attributes not generally accorded to it by those who observe it from a distance.

*** The Anthropologist and the Judge

In November 1968, once I decided to work in Boujad, I had the difficult task of finding a place to live. In the company of an impoverished tribesman who had recently settled in Boujad in order to become an underemployed tailor, I spent several chilled, drizzly days on foot in Boujad, looking at dozens of houses that my wife and I heard might be available for rent. With the exception of an English missionary who had been in Boujad since the late 1930s, no foreigner ever chose to live in the old quarters Imadtna). The few French teachers assigned to Boujad were spatially segregated in bungalows next to the administrative center, and kept largely to themselves, socializing only minimally with their Moroccan colleagues. Adequate housing was scarce, and my insistence upon living in the madina was viewed as odd. Local government officials, who to their credit were indifferent to my presence rather than hostile, were not prepared to offer any suggestions. They simply did not know how to handle foreigners who did not fall into the accepted pattern of self-segregation. As I trudged through the madina, it was depressing to be offered everything from houses with caved-in second stories (“Just step around the hole in the floor, and it’s a fine apartment”) to one vacant for a decade because it was said to be occupied by jinn (“They shouldn’t affect you”). In retrospect, I obtained a very good idea of the traditional quarters and was informally introduced to a number of merchants and residents. At the time, however, the sheer bleakness of available housing weighed more heavily upon me. Finally, at dusk on the third day, just before the sunset prayers, I was led to the house of the qadi.

Over tea, the qadi questioned me at length about my work and had me translate into Arabic my official Moroccan letter of introduction, written in French. He then left us to say his sunset prayers at the neighborhood mosque. When he returned, he said that he was willing to rent us his empty two-room apartment across the street.

So Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman Mansuri became our landlord. As the notable of our quarter, Darb Zalaghi, he was impeccably hospitable to my wife and me. Due to my own inexperience, our relations were nonetheless rocky at first. For instance, we had a misunderstanding on the electricity bill, which he had agreed to pay until it became clear that our working habits made us major consumers. Then, a month later, I was at home recovering from anthrax (an unexpected fringe hazard of field research), when a workman suddenly began removing our windows from the outside in order to brick up the openings. Our landlord had not informed us that he was building a second house abutting our own. Work was suspended until I had

recovered, but the fact that we were not informed about his building plans and had to endure the noise from months of intermittent construction did not please us. I fortunately vented most, but not all, of my petulance only in my field notes.

In January 1969, I began regularly to attend the weekly sessions of the Islamic court (mahkamat ash-shra") held each Thursday, the day of Boujad's weekly market. The court handled all matters pertaining to marriage, divorce, support, inheritance, and land transactions subject to Islamic law. Because court business in Boujad itself was light, Hajj 'Abd ar-Rahman had become a Moroccan circuit rider. On rotating days of the week, his one-armed bailiff drove him to other courts in the region: Wad Zam, Qasba Tadla, and Bnl Millal.

Sometimes I accompanied Hajj 'Abd ar-Rahman on his rounds, but it was easier to follow court proceedings in Boujad than elsewhere. Until the mid-1970s, when a new building was constructed by the Ministry of Justice, sessions were held in a small room in the former colonial administrative center (controle), constructed in 1931. The only furnishings in the room beside a telephone (one of some thirty in Boujad) were a rickety table with three chairs, for the judge, his clerk, and (when I was present) the anthropologist. Litigants sat on a narrow wooden bench about ten feet long, situated about six feet in front of the qadi's table. Except for myself, no spectators were allowed. Litigants waited their turn outside or followed proceedings from the windows.

The modern courts in larger towns, designed by French architects, were much more august and spacious, with imposing desks for judges on an elevated dais. Litigants were kept up to twenty feet away. Much as in an American court, a large number of spectators were accommodated on rows of wooden benches with backrests. In such conditions, it was difficult to follow proceedings. In part this was because of poor acoustics, but it was also because many spectators spoke in low voices to one another while awaiting the case of particular interest to them. The spatial design and presence of spectators also imposed a formality on the proceedings not present in the Boujad court.

In Boujad, the qadi decided that I must sit with him and his clerk, since I could not sit with the litigants. I always moved my chair to the edge of the table to indicate that I was not part of the proceedings. Nonetheless some tribesmen unfamiliar with court procedures recognized me as a foreigner and sometimes saluted, perhaps assuming that a small pocket of colonial influence survived independence in 1956. Others paid scant regard to me. With writing-pad before me, I was taken to be another clerk. Litigants would rise and try to move even closer when proceedings got heated. One task of the bailiff, usually armed with a cane, was to push them back. The qadi had worked with his baliff and one of the two rotating clerks for years, so that there was an easy working relationship among the court officers.

For each court case, litigants had to engage a notary to prepare a deposition. Since notaries charge by the page for such documents, many had little concern as to whether claims and

counterclaims had legal validity or even fell within the jurisdiction of the court. The qadi took a few moments to study these documents. If the claim was properly prepared and fell within the scope of the court, a summary of it was dictated into the record by the qadi. The qadi put questions to the litigants to verify the facts of each case. A summary of questions and his decision were then dictated in classical Arabic, accompanied by citation of the appropriate sections of the Moroccan personal status code.[4]

Few tribesmen could follow the proceedings. When the facts of a case had to be clarified through questioning, the litigants more often than not tried to recite the entire history of the dispute, which was extremely useful to me but not to the court. The qadi usually put his questions in colloquial Arabic. Since the verdict, however, was given in classical Arabic, litigants often were unaware of the decision. The judge left it to the bailiff to “translate” the verdict into colloquial speech, which he often did by pointing to litigants and saying, “You won! You lost!” and ushering them, confused and protesting, out of the room.

In contrast, the qadi welcomed my interest in court proceedings. Because the Boujad court calendar was usually uncrowded, Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman often took a few minutes between cases to explain to me the legal issues involved and what the litigants were trying to accomplish. Often he knew the background to the cases from sources outside of the court. Many litigants, especially townspeople, often sought his advice outside of formal court sessions in order to avoid court proceedings.

When I first began to attend these sessions, ‘Abd ar-Rahman and his clerks tested my understanding of the proceedings. They were difficult to follow, but my prior training in classical Arabic was useful: I knew much of the legal terminology, and the legal issues involved were rarely complicated. The major initial problem in anthropological inquiry is how to get people to explain their perception of events as they would to an “insider” (Merton 1972). The most valuable anthropological work begins once people take for granted a shared appreciation of the issues at hand, although these “background” perceptions are usually the most difficult to elicit. Some people, including Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman, began to see not only that I knew more than I could readily explain but that there was a pattern to my questions and started to take an interest in them.

Regular attendance at the court meant that I soon learned the issues involved. I began to ask questions that “insiders” could conceivably ask. If I learned that someone had brought the same case to the court in i960,1 would ask how the i960 case differed from the 1968 one. This type of question engendered specific responses, usually laced with other practical examples indicating how the use of courts was but one element in the resolution of grievances. If, on the other hand, I asked an abstract question about property or inheritance rights, Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s response was usually as formal and devoid of realistic context as the initial question.

Thursday and Friday were the social high points of the week for Boujad's notables. On Thursdays they held major lunches for one another and for tribal clients who had come in for the market. Lunches were also held on Fridays, after the prayers and sermon in the principal mosque. After court, the qadi often invited me to accompany him, so I regularly saw notables who were otherwise indifferent to my presence. Ordinary conversations concerned real estate and market transactions, and cryptic local gossip not openly explained to me. With my notebook often near at hand, I may have appealed to Hajj 'Abd ar-Rahman as a poor man's Boswell and obliquely lent him status. When I put questions to him directly, he seemed pleased to live up to his reputation as a man of learning and speak "high words," quotations from the Quran and classical Arabic literature. Sometimes he used a discussion with me as a polite way of extricating himself from other conversations. In any case, I was tolerated, and pretended to understand and appreciate more of his quotations from legal texts and Andalusian poets than I, or most of the others present, could readily assimilate.

I rarely saw Hajj 'Abd ar-Rahman alone during the first months of our stay in Boujad. In March 1969, he invited my wife and me to travel with him to Bzu, his village of birth, where I met his elder brother, Ahmad Mansun, for the first time. I knew of his elder brother's reputation for Islamic learning, but I was still unaware that there were interesting questions to ask concerning the role of Islamic learning and that it was as necessary to understanding Islam in Moroccan society as were the maraboutic practices that were then at the center of my research (Eickelman 1976). Maraboutism was the prevalent popular belief that certain persons, living or dead, possess a special relation toward God which makes them particularly well placed to act as intermediaries and to communicate God's grace (baraka) to their clients. This implicit belief was in uncomfortable tension with Islam as understood by educated Moroccans and many townsmen. Tribesmen from throughout western Morocco annually visited Boujad because of the presence there of major shrines, and the town's religious, political and economic leadership had until recent times been held largely by members of the Sharqawi maraboutic descent group.

Understanding these popular religious beliefs and historical change in them was in itself a complex, engrossing task. My attitude at the time was that visiting with rural notables in other parts of Morocco provided me with an interesting break in routine and an opportunity to set my own intensive work in Boujad and the Tadla plain in an appropriate wider context. I could not possibly master the nuances of local political detail for other regions, and I had not yet realized the significance of formal Islamic learning and its carriers in establishing important transregional links.

*** The Sharqawi Papers

In June 1969 my conception of what was important and possible in field research changed abruptly through one of the accidents common to anthropological fieldwork. Since the late nineteenth century, the Sharqawa of Boujad, the maraboutic descent group that I was studying, had been divided into two major factions, made all the more permanent when the

French conferred the title of qadi upon the leader of one and qa’id, meaning in this case an urban chieftainship, upon the leader of the other (Eickelman 1976: 196–202, 239–254). At the beginning of the Protectorate in 1912, the office of qaid looked like the more significant of the two (Cimitiere 1913). Yet by the 1940s it became clear that this office, more than that of qadi, was compromised through collaboration with the French. Its attentions were devoted almost exclusively to local concerns, and its leaders proved unprepared to adapt constructively to Morocco’s changing political circumstances.

Unlike the faction and descent group allied with the qaid, members of the faction awarded the “consolation” of the qadiship invested heavily in education and moved to Rabat and Casablanca. Some of its members were early participants in the nationalist movement. The marriage of a prominent member of this faction to the daughter of King Muhammad bin Yusif (Muhammad V) (r. 1927–1961) shortly after independence, and his subsequent appointment to ministerial and ambassadorial posts, assured the eclipse of the other faction.

In the first month of my stay in Boujad, I met one of the notables of the “Zawiya” Sharqawa, as the faction that formerly held the qaidship was locally called. He showed me a cache of documents, most of which dated from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, related to Sharqawi leaders and their ties with tribes, merchants, Morocco’s rulers, and the French. He assumed at the time that I had no command of written Arabic. I was supposed to admire the calligraphy and the seals of various sultans. When it became clear that I could also read the documents, they were quietly eased away from me. I was repeatedly assured that I could study them later, but as the months passed an excuse was always found not to produce them.

In the meantime my wife, who also speaks Arabic, had developed cordial ties with some of the women of the notable’s household. Contrary to popular stereotypes, some Moroccan women are quite independent and decide household matters themselves (Davis 1983). My wife mentioned my interest in seeing the documents and the fact that I had been assured access to them. Somewhat to her surprise, one day they were produced without fuss, and I had them on loan for several months.

There were some six hundred documents in all. Some concerned marriage contracts and inheritance. Others were letters to and from various Sharqawi leaders concerning such topics as revenues from estates, pilgrimage income, safe conducts and the release of prisoners, local and national politics, and relations with French military intelligence. Collectively the documents provided an intimate view of the practical operations of a religious lodge during the tumultuous final years before the protectorate.

The notarial script of most of the documents was excruciatingly difficult for me to read, and the nibblings of mice at many of the documents did not facilitate my task. I engaged a local notary Cadi) to dictate them into a tape recorder. Even with this help, the

language of the documents was difficult and depended for interpretation upon a knowledge of the personalities and unrecorded local events of the period.

I assumed at the outset that Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman was too busy with other matters to be concerned with my inquiries, but I asked one of his sons, an excellent student then in secondary school, to assist me with the letters. Every few days he took some letters home and returned with meticulous transcriptions into ordinary Arabic script, as opposed to the difficult notarial one, and reasonably accurate translations into French. I was impressed by his apparent ease in deciphering notarial script and explaining the letters. One day I asked him to assist me on the spot with a document on which I had been working alone. He then casually told me that he couldn’t read the script either. His father had actually been doing the work.

Just before the sunset prayers that very evening, I noticed the qadi himself standing on the street outside our apartment. Men of the neighborhood often gathered outside the small mosque adjoining our apartment before and after the evening prayers, but the qadi rarely joined them for long. Moreover, this evening he was alone. I guessed that he wanted to see me. I went out to the street to join him, exchanged courtesies, and as if by chance showed him a few of the documents. He smiled and immediately invited me to his house.

That evening we began a series of meetings that went on for three months, until Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s unexpected transfer to neighboring Wad Zam in September 1969. Depending on his schedule and mine, we met daily for as long as six hours. On days when his official schedule was full, he eliminated his customary afternoon nap in favor of our work. Sometimes we began after a light supper and continued until midnight. After our first few meetings, he ordered his family and servants to say that he was not in if anyone called who could be sent away. When he was unavoidably called away, he left me by myself in one room and dealt quickly with the caller. His excitement in working with the documents was transparent and contagious.

His interest in the documents was complex. After our first month of work, he showed me notebooks he had prepared when he was first assigned as a qadi to Boujad in 1957. The Sharqawa had owned agricultural estates in Bzu since the eighteenth century, so Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman had prior familiarity with some Sharqawi notables. Nonetheless, his notebooks showed that he had faced the same initial difficulty as I had in tracing out the intricate ties of local kinship and patronage. Whenever he had come across marriage contracts or inheritance documents in the course of his work which clarified Sharqawi interconnections, he had recorded their relevant details in his notebooks. Since his arrival in Boujad, he had been aware of the existence of the documents we were now studying, but he was never given an opportunity to see them. I subsequently learned that the notable holding the documents, himself unable to read them properly, feared that some papers might have a bearing upon current inheritance disputes; none did.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-knowledge-and-power-in-morocc-3.png][Figure 2. The Anthropologist and the Qadi, 1969. The photograph is posed at the qadi's request. Hence the bound volume in his hands.]]

Making sense of the "Sharqawi papers" was exciting but grueling work. Cohn (1981: 247) writes of the rise in recent years of an "anthropological history" whose goal is to "grasp the meanings of the forms and contents of texts and codified oral traditions in their own cultural terms" instead of as reflections of European history (see also Becker and Yengoyan 1979). I was learning to follow the contours of an "indigenous form of knowledge" in a manner that was as rewarding as the interviews I was conducting in other contexts. Moreover, I was working side by side with a "native" scholar, then in his late fifties, with his own fully developed perspective on how to interpret the documents.

The terms, concepts, and social world evoked by these documents were at first bewildering. The style in which Hajj 'Abd ar-Rahman related events was likewise difficult to comprehend, and I began to realize that understanding how he interpreted historical documents and learned to do so would in itself be an important component of our common work.

As we sorted through the mass of documents, Hajj 'Abd ar-Rahman made linkages between persons, incidents, and property of which I was at first only dimly aware. Of equal importance, I needed innumerable glosses on the evaluative terms invoked by the qadi in order to understand the significance of the papers. For instance, the qadi would refer to the style and calligraphy of a particular Sharqawi as "common" 1,'dmmi). I knew the term of course, and the notable/commoner (nas khassa/'awam) distinction which was invoked in a variety of contexts, often on the basis of claimed descent in Boujad. Hajj 'Abd ar-Rahman usually used the term to distinguish between those who were educated and those who were not. My questions, intended to confirm my understanding of this distinction, led to a concrete discussion on the nuances of writing and how the "educated" perceived historical events. We discussed such topics as the contents in which the various documents were originally written, the importance of calligraphic style to men of learning, and why there is no terminological distinction among men of learning between biography and autobiography, both known as tarjama (pl. tardjim). I was being given a practical introduction to the rhetorical style valued among men of learning and how it was acquired.

Often I was astonished at 'Abd ar-Rahman's assiduity in extracting full meaning from every document. Marriage contracts were one such subset of the documents. He knew enough of the background of the persons involved, often long deceased, to suggest why a certain marriage may have occurred. Or, quite frequently, he would make discreet inquiries of other persons to confirm his speculations. On one occasion, I was present at a luncheon with a Sharqawi notable when the qadi worked a question concerning some nearly forgotten marriage into his conversation, then feigning disinterest so as not to arouse too much

curiosity. He carefully separated his own assumption of motives from “real” history, which to him was a reliable record of actual speech and action.

Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman enjoyed work on the Sharqawi papers as much as I did. An enumeration of the property included in the bridewealth (sdaq) of a marriage in the 1890s enabled Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman, prompted by my questions, to organize his own thoughts (and information sometimes scattered in his notebooks) on the rural economy of an earlier period, caravan routes and their organizers, and the Makhzan’s varying practical scope. During one of our sessions, I recall setting aside a document because in my judgment it had served too long as a rodent snack to be of further value. Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman was not so easily deterred. From the date, the handwriting, and a few decipherable phrases he was able convincingly to explain to me how the letter was related to more complete documents we had already seen.

Almost any topic triggered a systematic introduction to another domain of knowledge and practice. One day, entering his courtyard, I saw a number of men’s tunics (jallabas) being sunned. I had not previously sought to distinguish among them, and casually asked the provenance of one. The result was an hour’s discussion of the origins of particular materials, regional styles and how they were linked to different claims to status, how they were obtained and distributed, and the progressive impact in his lifetime of European textiles upon their production and manufacture.

Despite a difference of thirty years in our ages and radically disparate backgrounds—for my part I was not born a Berberspeaking Muslim nor educated to be a qadi—we began to regard one another as colleagues because of our work on a common project. Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s Boujad notebooks indicated his own ethnographic efforts. My own notes were better than his in terms of explaining general patterns of relationships. He was fascinated that this could be so, given the thinness of my understandings of local conventions in other respects. He was especially fascinated by the information codified in my yards-long charts of Sharqawi family ties and later his own. He knew far more local and regional history and could relate it quite intelligibly to his peers, although I had a decided advantage in interpreting local social history for a wider audience. We learned from one another and we both were aware of the fact.

I also learned the art of framing delicate questions from Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman. As we worked on the Sharqawi papers, he began to see more clearly a pattern in the issues I pursued with other people. Sometimes he would lend a hand. Late in my initial period of field research I tackled the sensitive issue of resistance against the French in neighboring Wad Zam, the scene of a bloody uprising in August 1955. It was instigated by the Wlad ‘Isa section of the Sma‘la tribe; ninety-five French colons were killed in the course of a morning. Colonial authorities were shocked at the strength of this rural uprising. They had come to assume that militant resistance to colonial rule was predominantly urban.

‘Abd ar-Rahman and I had accepted an invitation of a local notable to lunch. A tribesman from the Wlad ‘Isa had somehow invited himself along. Our host, an influential landowner and notary, was visibly annoyed. He made jokes at the expense of the tribesman and his illiteracy. The tribesman made no reply. Later, I asked him if he knew anything of the 1955 “event.” He replied that he had participated. From his distant corner of the long guest room —he was placed near the last in seating order—he began to give me a detailed account. In order to hear him better, I changed places.

At first the others ignored us, but I noticed that Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman was listening. Soon the room was quiet except for the tribesman. I confined my questions to those necessary to follow his narrative. Few tribesmen were anxious to speak about that event. The version given to the French and, later, to Moroccan officials (who regard the Sma‘la as a “rough” tribe to govern because they stand up to local government officials) was that the tribesmen had come to Wad Zam with peaceful intentions but subsequently “lost their heads,” having been stirred up by unidentified “outside agitators.” In this convenient formulation the question of leadership was muted. Imprecise stereotypes of a “collective” tribal mentality could be invoked to obscure individual responsibility. A week after the event, after the Foreign Legion conservatively estimated that it has killed 300 “rebels” in Wad Zam (then a town of 12,000, including 800 foreigners prior to the massacre) and another 200 in the surrounding region, a by then anachronistic collective sacrifice (t‘argiba) of twelve bulls was offered to the commander of the French forces to secure an amnesty (aman). At the end of the commander’s speech granting pardon, a squadron of military planes overflew the assembly to signify, wrote Le Monde’s reporter, French might.[5] In the twilight of Morocco’s colonial era, the incident was closed, and Wad Zam’s one claim to world attention faded into oblivion.

Throughout the tribesman’s narrative, ‘Abd ar-Rahman was silent. Then he quietly asked, “Did you come armed?” Ordinarily the Sma‘la would not have done so. “Yes,” was the answer. It did not occur to me to ask the question directly, and most Moroccans were afraid to ask. The question took the tribesman by surprise, as the qadi later told me it was intended. His one-word answer suggested prior intent, and upset the standard recital of events. Then we started the narrative all over. From what followed, it was clear that the tribal incursion was not only locally organized, but that there was a pattern in the killing that implied an attempt to identify specific targets: Wad Zam was a hotbed of the Presence franqaise, a militant settler anti-nationalist movement with its own record of assassinations and injustice.

I think that the tribesman deliberately made his account gruesome as a way of repaying the rudeness of our host. It took a special act of the sociological imagination to see how the massacre of ninety-five civilians appeared from the vantage of an enthusiastic participant. Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman later told me that the narrative of the bloody events of that day upset him considerably. Like myself, he sought to maintain a neutral countenance in order to hear the man out. The tribesman, however, always greeted me like an old friend whenever I saw him after that.

Much of what I describe in this book was learned from Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman himself. He necessarily served as my guide to the stacks of unsorted papers and notebooks which he had kept since his student days at the Yusufiya. In the course of return visits to Morocco, especially in 1976,1 managed to see much of what remained of the Yusufiya mosque-university milieu and of key persons associated with it. I was given access to some of the old student lodgings and the mosques where lesson-circles were held. I met many persons who knew Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman and his family, and who assisted me in placing this particular family of rural notables in a wider social and intellectual context.

Work with ‘Abd ar-Rahman quickly shattered my prior assumptions as to the “static” nature of Islamic education. His ability to question persons and interpret documents and to render intelligible complex patterns of social history impressed me. I attributed much of his spirit of critical inquiry to the early upbringing and educational tradition in which he was shaped, and began to consider this tradition, at least as it survived in Morocco through the 1930s, to be as vital as my own tradition of learning aspired to be. ‘Abd ar-Rahman was, I think, aware of my attitude.

I had previously uncritically assumed, for I had been so taught, that the special knowledge possessed by Moroccan men of learning was essentially fixed, remote from everyday life, and artificial, loosely tacked on to the implicit assumptions by which Moroccans shaped their social world and made sense of it. I began to realize how much the world of learning was an integral part of Moroccan life, this world began to feel less remote to me. I asked Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman systematically about his own family, upbringing, and education. Having worked closely with him on the Sharqawi papers, I was again initially attributed with more understanding than I had actually attained. Many of my questions were unfamiliar. Given my own perceptions of what constituted essential knowledge, they compelled him to go beyond the formal presentation of self (as in the tarjama) common to men of learning. His sense of history, perceptions of status, attitudes toward knowledge, and the responsibilities of men of learning toward fellow Muslims and society were issues that I felt I could understand only with a more complete idea of his own experience. By then he again had confidence that there was a pattern to my questions (to my mind often a diffuse one) and trusted me to deal with his answers with appropriate discretion.

Once, when I returned to Morocco alone in 1976, he gave me a key to his house and specifically told me that I should enter without knocking. It appeared that the only way my presence could be assimilated was to treat me (and my wife on subsequent return visits) as part of his own household. As I typed notes in one of the multipurpose rooms of his house, the women of the household sometimes entered alone and unself-consciously spoke with me. The fact that they could do so affirmed that I was quite literally taken to be part of the household.

The Mansuri household as I knew it through the mid-1970s was a warm and intense one. Most of the children have now moved elsewhere in Morocco to pursue their studies or to set up households of their own, although one son, a schoolteacher also involved in local politics, has chosen to remain in Boujad. The Hajj and his wife, Laila Malika (d. 1978), took intense pride in their sons and daughters. In spite of the formality with which husband-wife relationships are portrayed to the outside world by traditional Moroccans, the affection and mutual trust of this particular marriage was pervasive. Our experience of the Mansuri household shattered many of the preconceptions we had assimilated from our readings on the Middle East. In 1978, not long after Laila Malika's death, I returned to Boujad. Together with some of his children, the Hajj took me to see his wife's grave. One accepts God's will, so the Hajj never spoke of his grief. As one of his sons later said, he did not have to use words. I was too choked up to speak, so intense were my memories of the warmth with which we had been received over the years and the realization of what her loss meant for the Hajj. By then he had retired. His openness remained, but the elaborate, often joyous, hospitality of his household was now a past memory.

There is no easy answer to why Hajj 'Abd ar-Rahman chose to work with me. As one of his sons later said, his father never particularly liked Europeans and, as a speaker of only Arabic and tashalhit, he had limited means of communicating with them, in any case. Part of the answer lies, of course, in the common project of analyzing the Sharqawi papers, the importance of which we each understood in our different ways, but with a growing mutual respect for the questions and perceptions of the other. Our style of work and living also overlapped, at least in superficial respects. There was enough of the ascetic in me to dispense with ordinary periods of rest and eating to accomplish my self-imposed tasks. I soon learned that in addition to observing the Ramadan fast, 'Abd ar-Rahman fasted several days every month, a habit acquired from his father. Another consideration was that the qadi was engaged in identifiable scholarship in our common project. I think that he enjoyed such work as an end in itself. With me, even as a non-Muslim, he could at least temporarily pick up the threads of the world of learning he was abruptly compelled to leave when recalled by his elder brother to Bzu in 1935.

In more recent years 1 have had several opportunities to speak about my intended book with his children, now adults, and they have freely shared with me their thoughts about their father. As one of them observed, their father discussed his own youth and education with me in a detail that he did not seek to convey to his own children, although his relation with them was close, supportive, and affectionate. They are of a generation that has received a Western-style education in Moroccan government schools, in one case the palace school. For this generation, Quranic education has been little more than a preschool. Even the technical terms necessary to discuss the style of education their father received remain unfamiliar to them, as is the emphasis upon memorization of the word of God and related texts. In contrast, I was interested in the world of learning as 'Abd ar-Rahman had experienced it, and by trial and error found the questions to ask so that this world began to make sense.

A colleague, a psychoanalyst with anthropological training, suggests a complementary reason for the close ties which developed between 'Abd ar-Rahman and myself. For the qadi,

I may have taken over the role of a younger brother, allowing him to recreate the supportive relationship which he had with his own elder brother, described in the next three chapters, and at the same time pick up his commitment to learning where he left off decades earlier. He could transmit to me, as he unconsciously felt he could not to his own children, his own values and sensibilities concerning Islamic learning. I listened and judged, but also appreciated.

Each time I returned to Morocco in the 1970s, Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman asked if my wife and I had children yet. Just before my wife and I adopted our first child in 1978, he said to me: “It doesn’t matter. Books are the children of a man of learning.” My books have decidedly taken a form other than the preferred ones of the “sciences” (‘uliim-, sing, ‘Um’) of his tradition of origin. But his tradition of learning has allowed him to find at least partial homologies in other traditions and to respect them. As I learned through our discussions of religious studies and the Yusufiya milieu, learning how to ask questions and make sense of other traditions of knowledge was in itself a component of the mosque-university tradition.

** Two: Beginnings

The ancient towne of Bzo is built vpon a high hill ... The townesmen are honest people, exercising merchandize, and going decently apparelled: To them which inhabit the deserts they carie cloth, oile, and leather. Their mountaines abound with oliues, corne, and all kinde of fruits: and of their grapes they make euery yeere most excellent and sweete raisins. Figs they haue great plentie: and their walnut-trees are so high, that a puttocke may securely builde his nest vpon the tops: for it is impossible for any man to climbe vp. On each side of the way which leadeth from hence to the riuer Guadelhabid there are most pleasant and beautiful gardens. My selfe (I remember) was here present when their oranges, figs, and other fruits were growen to ripenes.

—Leo Africanus 1896 (orig. 152.6): n, 304

*** Bzu and Its Region

‘Abd ar-Rahman’s home from his birth until 1957 does not entirely live up to the rhapsodic description of Leo Africanus. For a piedmont (dir) village in the Marrakesh hinterland, Bzu nevertheless has a pleasant, modestly prosperous appearance in sharp contrast to the scorched villages of the Sraghna plain to its immediate south. Bzu is actually a cluster of juxtaposed hamlets on adjacent hills, located about ten kilometers south of the main highway that connects it with Marrakesh, the imperial capital and commercial entrepot for Morocco’s south. Travel to the main highway was by mule until the 1930s. Now busses leave directly from Bzu’s marketplace for Marrakesh, 130 kilometers and by bus three hours

away, and Qal‘at Sraghna, a dusty provincial capital 50 kilometers to the west. Sraghna’s expansion since the mid-1960s is linked to the massive growth of agribusiness in its immediate hinterland. Its growth sharply differs from the relative decline of piedmont villages such as Bzu, located in regions marginally suitable for modern agricultural techniques.

Until the late 1960s, many cultivators near Bzu still used camels and mules to draw irrigation water, although today small motor pumps have finally replaced most animal power. The Bzu region is given over to the herding of sheep and goats, and to orchard cultivation, principally of olives, oranges, and figs, and secondarily pomegranates and other fruits. The countryside is dry and barren for most of the year except for the irrigated orchards, although wheat and barley are grown in years when rainfall is sufficient.

Rainfall averages 400 millimeters (16 inches) annually, concentrated mostly in the months of November through April, although droughts regularly recur. Those of 1936 and 1945 enabled major local notables vastly to expand their personal holdings at the expense of tribesmen with small plots, many of whom became reluctant sharecroppers. Until the late 1960s, when money sent home by emigrant workers began to alleviate the poverty of some families, there was a substantial economic gap between a few prosperous notables and the large number of sharecroppers and tenants. In Bzu in 1969, it was still common to see sharecroppers and tenants kiss the hands of local notables, a greeting practiced further north only by sons to their fathers as an act of deference and respect. Only a few sullen, “progressive” schoolteachers posted from elsewhere in Morocco ostentatiously used the less inegalitarian handshake. A few tribesmen went so far as to kiss feet, although local notables were embarrassed by this gesture in the presence of foreign visitors.

Bzu still had a limited importance as a regional market until the late 1940s for nearby tribes of the High Atlas region and those of the plains. Olive oil is processed locally and shipped to other regions, and most of the oranges find their way through auction to markets in Casablanca and Marrakesh.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-knowledge-and-power-in-morocc-4.png][Map i. Map of Morocco.]]

Until the early 1960s, one of the hamlets of Bzu was a Jewish settlement. Its economic activities included itinerant trade with outlying villages, tailoring, shoemaking, blacksmithing, and carpentry, activities now continued by former Muslim apprentices. The manufacture of large clay jars is still a local speciality, although Bzu is best known for its distinctive silk tunics (jallabas) with alternating black and white stripes, a speciality of the artisans of the region. Sultan Mulay Hasan I (r. 1873–1894) was so impressed by these tunics that he attached Bzu weavers to his entourage. The silk was locally spun until the late nineteenth century, when higher-quality thread imported from Europe undercut its production. Bzu jallabas continued to be woven locally through the 1920s (Pascon 1977:

398,414); their manufacture now survives with two old couples living inside the palace compound in Rabat, who weave them exclusively for the royal family. Women in Bzu still weave and sell for the local market the distinctive hayk Bziwi, a brightly colored blanket worn as an outer garment by rural women.

Inhabitants of the region nearly all speak tashalhit, the Berber language of the High Atlas mountains, although by the 1920s many of the men and some of the women were already fluent in Arabic. By the early 1970s only older women and a few men in outlying settlements were unable to converse in Arabic.

Bzu's economic and political ties with the rest of Morocco are shifting and complex. Since at least the late eighteenth century, the region has been firmly under Makhzan control (Tawfiq 1983). Beginning with the reign of Mulay Hasan I, the region was subject to a qaid appointed by the sultan, who resided in the High Atlas town of Damnat. Nonetheless, government presence in the region remained modest. Until almost the very end of the French protectorate (1912–1956), the religious court was held in the house of the qadi, 'Abd ar-Rahman's elder brother, who was also one of the major landowners. Today there is a small administrative center with a deputy qaid, a school, a court, and a small medical dispensary next to the marketplace.

Until the late 1960s these buildings and a few small shops next to the market were almost the only ones of outwardly modern construction. Most of the houses were adobe and mud brick. Today there are many cement houses, constructed with remittances from workers in France and other European countries. Although it is increasingly difficult to secure work in Europe and many "guest workers"—called "vacationers" (fakdns'} in local Arabic because they return to Morocco only for their annual leave—have now permanently returned to Morocco, the economic impact of remittances and exposure to life elsewhere has mitigated the more extreme expressions of status inequality in the region. By the 1980s, the kissing of hands of notables was a rapidly dying tradition, although the marks of economic inequality remain strong.

*** The Family Milieu: Origins

The Arabic literary form of the tarjama encompasses the two genres of biography and autobiography in contemporary Western literature. Knowing the highly stylized conventions of the tar jama and being able to use them to describe one's own life or the lives of others is a skill known to every man of learning. For this reason, asking a man of learning for his tarjama acknowledges his status and provides a convenient port of entry to comprehending his social world.

A tar jama is always written in the third person, even if the life described is one's own. Its components include a genealogy, an account of formal education beginning with memorization of the Quran, specific books and subjects studied, poetry, aphorisms and other contributions to learning, sons taught by the father, and the names of important pupils. Specific dates are provided whenever possible, for the ability to date events itself distinguishes the traditionally educated from the unlearned.

The tarjama represents reality in a highly stylized manner. Any element of the tar jama can be elaborated through relevant anecdotes or citations for which the exact provenance is specified. The words uttered are reported as if they were verbatim. Quotation marks are not used, and the stylistic tag, "he said to him" (qal lu) does not clearly distinguish between actual speech and paraphrase. The tarjama asserts a literal representation of words and deeds based upon credible sources.

Although the tarjama is a necessary point of departure in describing the life of a man of learning, its stylistic conventions render it incomplete. No women are mentioned in it, so the family and household context in which early learning occurs is difficult to comprehend. Likewise, although teachers are mentioned, peer learning does not form part of the convention of the tarjama and is passed over in silence, as are politics and economic transactions, subjects that occupy a not insignificant amount of time for many men of learning.

Tarjamas of Moroccan men of learning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggest the pervasive importance of close relatives in shaping their attitude toward learning. Mukhtar as-Susfs al-Ma'sill (1961), a compendium of such biographies for Morocco's Sus region, famous for its scholars, indicates that men of learning most often come from households in which the father or another close relative is already literate and takes an active role in teaching Quranic recitation or encouraging its study (e.g., as-Susi 1961: ix, 3536, 101, 168).

Mansur bin Ahmad (d. 1946), 'Abd ar-Rahman's father, was closely involved in the early education of his sons. Mansur had three sons and a daughter by Fatima, his first wife and 'Abd ar-Rahman's mother. Mansur divorced Fatima when 'Abd ar-Rahman was about five years old, and she left Bzu to return to her father. The eldest son was Ahmad (1312/ 1894–1895—1975), followed in order of birth by 'Abd ar-Rahman (1330/1912-), Zahra (c. 1914-1344/1925), and Muhammad (c. 1915–1978). He also had three sons and three daughters from Batul, his second wife. The daughters by both marriages remained illiterate, but all his sons by the first marriage studied at the Yusufiya, and two of them completed their studies with distinction, as did two of the three sons by his second marriage.[6] Batul's youngest son, 'Abd al-Kablr, born in the mid-19 3 os, was the only one not to receive a traditional education. Traditional religious studies had declined by the time he was ready for school, so he entered a government school instead. Soon after independence in 1956 he became a primary school teacher.

‘Abd ar-Rahman knows little of his father’s origins. Mansur rarely spoke of the subject to his children. Hence what they know of their father derives largely from what they observed and later discovered for themselves. Unlike many Moroccans, ‘Abd ar-Rahman says he also knows little of his maternal relatives, although a maternal uncle taught him part of the Quran and was influential in his early education. His claim to know little of them, like the claim that he never visited his mother after her divorce because of the difficulty of travel, may relate more to the tensions present in the household of his youth than to actual circumstances.

Some religious figures and men of learning assert long genealogies linking them to famous ancestors or the house of the Prophet (Eickelman 1976: 183–2.10). ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s legal studies and sense of self led him to claim descent only from ancestors he could verify. Thus his “chain” of descent stopped at the level of his paternal grandfather. For ‘Abd ar-Rahman, it is more important for a man of learning to assert only verifiable descent than to speculate over possible antecedents, even when suggested by other men of learning. He recalled three childhood incidents that fed his curiosity as to his father’s origins. On one occasion, a descendant of the Prophet (shrtf-, pl. shurfa) visited his father and asked him to visit his other shrif relations in Ait Shitashin, a tribe in the High Atlas mountains. Mansur declined the invitation. ‘Abd ar-Rahman explained that such a journey would have been extremely arduous in the early part of this century. There were still no roads into the High Atlas mountains, and the region was outside the sphere of effective colonial control.

**Table 1. The Descendants of Mansur B. Ahmad of Bzu (d.1946)
(most dates are approximate)**

| Children | Children’s Spouses, Grandchildren, and Great-Grandchildren in 1978 |

| By his first wife, Fatima B. al-Kabir
(divorced 1917, d.1928) |

| 1. Ahmad (1895–1975), Yusufiya student (1913—1918), notary and scribe for French Native Affairs officers (1919—1925), qadi of Bzu (1925–1953), qaid and qadi of Ntifa (1956), qadi (1956–1957), member of Constitutional Council (i960), member of parliament (1963). | First wife-, daughter of a Bzu shaykh (m.1920, d.i93os). Children: Muhammad al-Kabir (1926–). Yusufiya dropout; oversees father’s estates. Married; childless.
Muhammad as-Saghir (1939–). Qarawiyin

dropout. Works with elder brother. Married a soldier’s daughter, Bni Millal. Four sons, two daughters.
Second wife: Daughter of protectorate qaid of Bzu (m.1935, d.1960s).
Children: One daughter, Fatima, married to a court clerk. |

| 2. ‘Abd ar-Rahman (1912–), Yusufiya student (1928–1935), deputy qadi of Bzu (1935–1953), qadi of Boujad (1957—1969), elsewhere (1969–1975). Pilgrimage to Mecca, 1960. | Wife: Laila Malika (m.1941, d.1978). Sister of Ahmad’s second wife.
Children:
Hasan, inspector of finance. Married, three children. Casablanca. Mukhtar, accountant. Married, two small children.
Habiba, married. Husband is provincial director of education. Four children.
‘Abd al-Ghani, secondary school teacher, member of municipal council, Boujad.
al-Ha;i, student.
Yasin, formerly student at Palace school, now in university, Rabat. Fatima Zahra, student.
Three other children who died as infants, Bzu; two in Boujad. |

Table I (cont.)

| Children | Children’s Spouses, Grandchildren, and Great-Grandchildren in 1978 |

| 3. Muhammad (1915–1978), Yu-sufiya dropout, notary. | Wife: Daughter of a local shaykh. Several small children.
Husband: From Bzu. One son, a cupper (hajjdm), two daughters. |

| 4. Zahra, d.192.5. |

| By his second wife, Batul bint Salah |

| 1. ‘Abd al-Hayy (1922–1977), Yusufiya student to 1935, then Qarawiyin (1937–1949). Scribe, Ministry of Justice, Rabat (19491956), qadi in Damnat (19561959), as-Swira (1959–1962). Examining magistrate, Marrakesh (1962–1974), qadi (1974–1977). Pilgrimage in 1968. | Wife: From Bzu.
Children: One daughter (1959–), English teacher, Marrakesh. Three sons; one is a merchant, two are students. |

| 2. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (d.1936), had just begun studies at Yusufiya. | |

| 3. Mina (d. 1930s). | Husband: ‘Umar, a fqih from Bzu.
Children: A son, now teaching in Rabat. Two daughters; one died young, the other is married and living in Bzu. |

| 4. ‘Abd al-Kabir (1935–), primary school teacher, near Bni Mallal. | Wife: Unknown.
Children: Several. |

| 5. ‘Aysha | Husband: From Bzu.
Children: One daughter, Bzu. |

| 6. Fatima | Husband: Brother of a qadi.
Children: Unknown. |

On another occasion, tribesmen claiming to be “close” (qrib’j to his father visited Bzu.[7] Pointing to Ahmad, they said that one day he would become a great man. The implication of this account is that the visitors, by prescient allusion to Ahmad’s future success, may have claimed powers sometimes attributed to descendants of the Prophet. If they were shurfa and their claims of “closeness” with Mansur were valid, then of course Mansur could also claim descent from Muhammad. Finally, in the 1940s, by which time the Mansuris had long been established as prominent rural notables, a scholar from Marrakesh visited them on the pretext that he had managed to trace their lineage back to the Prophet. His intent was to be rewarded financially for the effort, which the Mansuri brothers declined to do although he was honored as a guest. ‘Abd ar-Rahman cautioned me to regard these incidents as “just so” stories.

How Mansur settled in Bzu and established ties in the region remains unclear. Mansur told his sons that he came from Tagharat, a Berber village “above” Damnat in the High Atlas mountains. Neither ‘Abd ar-Rahman nor his elder brother ever visited the village. However, Mansur once told Ahmad that a major land dispute broke out between two tribal groups in Tagharat. Mansur’s father, Ahmad, had been warned to come down to Bzu to avoid being attacked. He ignored the warning, so one night four marauders broke into his house, killing him and plundering his belongings. Mansur managed to escape to Bzu, together with his son Ahmad, then barely forty days old, hidden in his tunic. The incident is indirectly datable. In Ahmad’s tarjama, written in 1962, at the request of a schoolteacher from another region of Morocco assigned to Bzu, he gives the year of his birth as 1312/1894-1895. This incident may have been another compelling reason that Mansur declined to return to his village of origin later in his life.

Marriages among rural notables in the first part of this century were strategically calculated political events. One of Mansur’s sisters married a rural shaykh of the Bzu region whose family had held the shaykhship since the mid-nineteenth century. Mansur’s first wife and ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s mother, Fatima, was daughter of a rural shaykh from Tamannt, a village about fifteen kilometers distant from Bzu on a difficult mountain path. These marriages suggest that Mansur had some sort of claim to notable status and a specific link to the Bzu region prior to his sudden flight from Tagharat. Yet the matter remains unclear. His younger sisters all married Quranic teachers or literate men—the term fqth covers both — in the Bzu region, one of whom was a messenger for Sultan Mulay Hasan I. Mansur’s only brother, Muhammad, described by ‘Abd ar-Rahman as “tough and harsh” in temperament, joined the Spanish army in the Rif in the 192.0s, served with Franco’s forces in the Spanish Civil War, and remained in the Spanish army until 1950, when he retired to Bzu and died there a few years later. Muhammad claimed that his wife, from Morocco’s Spanish zone, was a descendant of the prophet (shnfa), another assertion regarded as unverifiable by ‘Abd ar-Rahman.

More certain is the fact that by the time of ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s birth in 1330/1912, Mansur had become a minor landowner in the region and was respected throughout the region for his stern piety. Because of his dual reputation for piety and hospitality, Mansur often entertained men of learning and religious figures as they passed through Bzu. He was an adherent of the Kittaniya religious order (tariqa). He regularly set aside a few days each month for fasts supplemental to that incumbent upon all Muslims in the month of Ramadan, made a personal prayer (da‘wa) before every meal and, when not engaged in conversation, moved his lips in silent recitation of the Quran. These practices are still common among pious Moroccans, but Mansur adopted other practices now deemed religiously questionable. Every afternoon, as he sat in the courtyard of his house in Tagunnt, the hilltop hamlet in Bzu where his house was located, he struck a sharp rock rhythmically against his head and forearms, often drawing blood. During ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s youth, this was a practice common to members of the Kittani order.

From today’s vantage point, Mansur’s personal piety may appear part of a “traditional” practical religion with no certain temporal dimension. At least for the Bzu region, the Kittani practice of self-mortification was an early twentieth-century innovation. Self-mortification was practiced by other religious orders such as the Haddawa (Brunel 1955) and the Hamadsha (Crapanzano 1973), but not by religious orders such as the Kittaniya, which attracted notables as adherents. Mansur’s style of religiosity marked an era, for none of his sons joined the Kittaniya or adopted any of the practices identified with religious orders. Although the sons avoided direct confrontation with their father, they flatly considered selfmortification to be beyond the pale of Islamic practice. Their generation was one heavily influenced by reformist Islam, which considered religious orders and their practices as distortions of Islam. Nonetheless, the Mansuri brothers were their father’s sons in other respects. From their youth they performed supplemental fasts, recited invocations before meals, and moved their lips in recitation of the Quran when not engaged in conversation.

Mansur’s piety gave him a quasi-maraboutic status among the tribesmen of the region. He often was called upon to mediate local disputes. From 1916 until his death from typhus in 1946 he was prayer-leader (iwam) at the principal mosque in Bzu, and until the French reformed the notarial system in the early 1920s he served as notary. He wrote whatever documents tribesmen requested of him in the marketplace or wherever he happened to be. As was the practice prior to the French reforms, he kept no copy or register of documents that he prepared, nor did he ask a fee. If grateful tribesmen gave him money, he disbursed it as alms to children and the poor at the market. Once French reforms were implemented, the documents he prepared were no longer regarded as legally valid; the French never granted him notarial status. Nonetheless, tribesmen unaware of the fact continued to seek his services until his death. Ahmad, after he became qadi of Bzu in 1344/1925, quietly avoided confrontation with his father by redoing without payment his father’s documents in acceptable form. Mansur never learned of his son’s emendations. To his death, he thought that he had successfully avoided the strictures placed upon him by French rule.

Two incidents indicate Mansur’s stature in the region and also suggest the nuances of successful adjustment to colonial rule. In 1338/1919 Ahmad was engaged by the French to

make an inventory of all pious endowment (abbas) lands in the Ntifa region, of which Bzu formed a part. In that same year the French began to implement the rural tax (tartib). Since this was a non-Islamic tax, tribesmen resisted paying in many regions. Like many other educated persons in rural Morocco, Ahmad was obliged by the French to cooperate with the qaids and shaykhs, many of whom were illiterate, in establishing the system. In Bzu the tax was at first paid in kind. To avoid resistance to its payment, Ahmad arranged for his father's house to be used as a collection point for the produce. As a consequence, resistance to imposition of the new tax was minimal because most tribesmen assumed that they were making a religiously sanctioned tithe ('ushur).

The second incident occurred in 1925. The government-appointed shaykhs and headmen (mqaddims) of the Bzu region, together with Mansur, were called to a meeting at the weekly Bzu market with the new qaid of Ntifa, Si Muhammad bin 'Abd Allah ash-Shtiwl. The qaid, an illiterate, raised publicly the issue of a contested property title (rasm) that Mansur had prepared. It was common knowledge that documents prepared by him were invalid. The qaid looked briefly at the document, which he pretended to read, then handed it back to Mansur, saying that it was improperly executed. Mansur bluntly asked the qaid: "And just what do you know of Islamic law? Absolutely nothing." The qaid slapped Mansur and curtly ordered him to leave the assembly. Mansur did, but immediately sent a messenger to his eldest son with a letter, asking him to return immediately to Bzu. In the meantime, friends of the qaid informed him that Mansur and his elder son were the two most influential men in Bzu, and that the incident might spark a local uprising that would call the qaid's ability to govern into doubt. Once Ahmad returned to Bzu — he had been working elsewhere as a scribe (then an influential post) for a French Native Affairs officer—he arranged an uneasy truce (sulh) between the qaid and his father. From that time on, the qaid sought to better his relations with the Mansuri family. The qaid supported appointing Ahmad as overseer (nadir) of pious endowments that same year, and his appointment as qadi a few months later.

*** A Qadi's Childhood

The first step in acquiring an Islamic education in Morocco is memorization of the Quran and its proper recitation. 'Abd ar-Rahman first entered the mosque-school (msid), at the age of four, just before his mother left the household, and became a "memorizer" (hdfid) around 1924. Mansur was as stern with his sons in disciplining them to memorize the word of God as he was with himself. 'Abd ar-Rahman recalled:

What I remember most of my childhood is the cane. When we were young, my brothers and I were beaten three times daily by my father: morning, noon, and night. Each night he required us to stand before him and recite five hizbs of the Quran.[8] Other children were only expected to recite one. If we made a mistake, then we would be beaten again.

At no time throughout our discussions did ‘Abd ar-Rahman indicate resentment over such beatings. On the contrary, he says that the beatings were a sign of his father’s concern for him and his other brothers. As he emphasizes, his father never beat him in anger. Another Moroccan educated in this tradition has shown me the scars encircling his neck from where his father regularly twisted his flesh whenever he made a mistake in recitation. In this case as well, the father’s actions were described as proper concern for conveying the word of God to the son, not as cruelty.[9]

The patterns of domestic authority in the households in which ‘Abd ar-Rahman matured are central to his early memories. As was common with other families of notables, the households in which he grew up—there were several—each consisted of several conjugal couples and their children. Frequent shifts in the membership of these households were not uncommon.

When ‘Abd ar-Rahman was five, Mansur took a second wife, Batul. This radically altered the household, for Fatima was adamantly opposed to the second marriage and returned to her father’s house in Tamannt. She took her daughter, Zahra, with her, but was compelled to leave her sons behind. Soon afterward she was divorced. ‘Abd ar-Rahman saw her only once more before she died in the late 1920s.

His mother’s departure was a significant loss. In common with other educated Moroccans of his generation, ‘Abd ar-Rahman did not dwell upon his “inner” feelings or elaborate upon the psychological consequences of separation from his mother. Even in speaking of women we had radically departed from the conventions of biography.Yet his choice of recollections suggests a sense of profound loss. In practical terms, ‘Abd ar-Rahman and his younger brother (Ahmad had already left Bzu to pursue studies in Marrakesh) were left in a household with a young stepmother, unsure of her status because she was still without children of her own. She was hostile toward the children of Mansur’s first marriage from the start. Her attitude did not soften after she bore her own children, who in birth order were ‘Abd al-Hayy (1922–1977). ‘Abd al-‘Azlz (d. 1936), Mina (d. 1930s), ‘Abd al-Kabir (c. 1935–), ‘Aysha and Fatima. ‘Abd ar-Rahman remembers sitting in the courtyard when his stepmother came up behind him with a bucket of filthy washing-water which she poured over his head. He says that such incidents were common. Even if his recollection of this incident is highly selective, it probably conveys accurately how he felt at this time in his life. Mansur continued his strict supervision of his sons’ Quranic studies, but left household matters to his second wife.

A comparison with the seventeenth-century Moroccan scholar, Sidi al-Hasan al-Yusi, also born in a rural milieu, serves to place ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s childhood trauma in perspective. Berque (1958: 10) comments that the death of al-Yusi’s mother in his early childhood was a shock that “emptied the home and discolored the universe,” with the consequence that al-Y’usi intellectualized his loss and took refuge in his studies.

Given the vicissitudes of natural circumstances and the facility with which divorce can be accomplished, many Moroccans experience the loss of a parent in childhood.[10] A mitigating factor, much less present in situations in which nuclear families are separately housed, is that several relatives often share responsibilities for raising children. This was the case for ‘Abd ar-Rahman. After his mother’s divorce, ‘Abd ar-Rahman often stayed for weeks on end at the nearby house of a maternal uncle, Muhammad bin al-Kabir Abarrah, who was also one of his Quranic teachers. Perhaps indirectly recognizing the tense situation in his own household, Mansur intermittently gave small gratuities to this uncle until his death in the early 192.0s, in recognition of his role in ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s education and upbringing. ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s elder brother later took over this role.

In 1918, when Ahmad returned temporarily to Bzu and resided in his father’s house, his presence and forceful personality restrained Batul’s cruelty. ‘Abd ar-Rahman says that she was afraid of him. When Ahmad returned from Marrakesh, Mansur built a small mosque within the compound of his house. There ‘Abd ar-Rahman continued his memorization alongside his younger half-brothers, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and ‘Abd al-Hayy.

*** His Brother’s Footsteps

Ahmad’s career framed that of ‘Abd ar-Rahman. Not only did ‘Abd ar-Rahman admire his elder brother; his elder brother’s decisive influence in local politics defined his practical possibilities until the end of the colonial era.

Although Ahmad was only eight years older than ‘Abd ar-Rahman, he belonged to a generation of men of learning who came to maturity just as the machinery of the protectorate was set into place. Some opportunistically realized the possibilities open to them through collaboration. Others, although displeased with French rule, saw no realistic alternative to working within the system being established by the French. Only a few chose openly to resist the French (see Hamtnoudi 1981). Ahmad, a devout Muslim and courageous in his own right—the French awarded him a medal—was a realist.

Ahmad completed memorizing the Quran in 1328/1911. Soon afterward he left Bzu to study with Muhammad bin ‘AF al-Mshabbkl, a scholar who taught religious studies to a fluctuating number of ten to twenty Berber-speaking students in a tent school at Dawwar Mshabbak, located twelve kilometers south of Bzu. ‘Abd ar-Rahman was to attend this same school a decade later. Such tent schools were especially common among Berber scholars, who had first to acquire sufficient skill in Arabic in order later to pursue studies at such centers of higher learning as the Yusufiya. The school at Dawwar Mshabbak was sophisticated enough that in addition to teaching the religious sciences, one of its teachers during Ahmad’s stay there also taught elementary arithmetic, at the time a curricular innovation.[11]

In 1331/1913, Ahmad left the Bzu region for the Yusufiya, where he remained until 1336/1918. Upon his return to Bzu in that year, he set up a school (madrasa) of his own in his father's house, where he fed and clothed a fluctuating number of six to twelve religious students (tulba-, s. talib), characterized by 'Abd ar-Rahman as mostly impecunious blacks from southern Morocco.

In 1338/1919 Ahmad again left Bzu under orders to assist the French Native Affairs officer responsible for Ntifa. He also received a military medal that year from the French, the Ouissam al-Harb, a fact omitted from his 1962 tarjama, for his aid in pacifying the Ait 'Tab (Ait Attab), a large tribe near Azilal. He also became a notary in 1919, at the time a significant post, especially for a youth of twenty-four. As miniscule as the rural administrative apparatus that was elaborated in the first years of the colonial era retrospectively appears, it constituted a major expansion over precolonial local administration. Many of the Moroccans to participate in colonial administration from the outset were quickly promoted to posts that secured their prominence as regional notables in the years to come. Ahmad bin Mansur was one of them.

In 1920 Ahmad returned once again to Bzu, already a prominent local notable despite his youth. Although he at first lived once again in his father's house, he was aware of the serious potential for conflict. Ahmad had begun to eclipse his father in importance, because Mansur was unsuccessful in adapting to the changed circumstances of colonial administration. Although Mansur continued to be highly respected, an increasing stream of visitors came primarily to see Ahmad. Recognizing the delicacy of the situation, Ahmad began construction of his own house, some 800 meters away from that of his father's. It was completed in 1923. From that time on, 'Abd ar-Rahman spent most of his time at his brother's house.

In 1343/1924-1925, Ahmad was called away again by the French to become secretary to the French officer in Azilal assigned to the Ait 'Tab. He at first refused, but was obliged to accept the assignment for a year. He took 'Abd ar-Rahman along with him. In the third-person usage characteristic of tarjamas, one of which 'Abd ar-Rahman prepared at my request in 1976, he records that his brother placed him in the care of a renowned teacher among the Ait 'Tab, "one of God's people" (min ahi Allah), who supervised his studies in a mosque-school "which attracted a large number of students. [The teacher] slept little in the night; instead, he praised God. This teacher favored the fqih 'Abd ar-Rahman [over other students] to accompany him in the dawn prayers." Although 'Abd ar-Rahman had not yet completed memorization of the Quran, he began parallel memorization of the Ajdrumiya, a compact grammar in verse.[12] He also began memorizing the Alfiya of Ibn Malik (d. 672/1274). This book is a grammar in one thousand rhymed verses judged by Berque (1949: 75) to be so compact as to be obscure and often unintelligible. Both these treatises were recognized as beginner's texts (al-mabadi'), commonly the first books after the Quran to be memorized by students (as-Susi 1961: ix, 101). Since these texts and certain others were memorized by all educated men, there was no ambiguity in

the common practice of referring to them by title only. Although these two books are not memorized with the same care as the Quran, rural men of learning often lace verses from them into their conversations and vie with one another to recall their verses.

From 1925 until early 1927, ‘Abd ar-Rahman returned to Bzu, where he studied alongside his half-brothers in his father’s house. He continued memorization of the Quran, the Ajarumiya, and the Alfiya, and in addition began memorization of Ibn ‘Asim’s (d. 1426) Tuhfat al-Hukkdm, a chapter handbook of practical jurisprudence with 1,679 verses. He also was introduced to the Mukhtasar of Khalil ibn Ishaq (d. 1378), the staple summary of the Maliki school of jurisprudence in Morocco and cornerstone to the mnemonic culture of Moroccan men of learning. His activities were confined to memorizing these texts. Only later, as we shall see in the next chapter, did he acquire an understanding of what they meant.

** Three: The Education of a Qadi: The Quranic Presence

*** Islamic Knowledge in Morocco

Why should some children spend years memorizing the Quran? The cultural idea of religious knowledge has remained remarkably constant over time throughout the regions of Islamic influence. Writing specifically of medieval Islamic civilization, Marshall Hodgson states that education was “commonly conceived as the teaching of fixed and memorizable statements and formulas which could be learned without any process of thinking as such” (Hodgson 1974: 438; emphasis added). The last phrase raises the crucial issue of the meaning of “understanding” associated with such a concept of knowledge. The “static and finite sum of statements” (ibid.) conveyed by education constitutes the religious sciences, the totality of knowledge and technique necessary in principle for a Muslim to lead the fullest possible religious life. They also constitute the most culturally valued knowledge (cf. Rosenthal 1970). The paradigm of all such knowledge is the Quran, considered literally to be the word of God; in Morocco its accurate memorization in one or more of the seven conventional recitational forms is the first step in mastering the religious sciences through “mnemonic possession” (malakat al-hifd}.[13] The memorization of key texts just as the Quran is memorized is also the starting point for the mastery of the religious sciences. To facilitate this task, most of the standard treatises used by Moroccan men of learning are written in rhymed verse.

Historians and sociologists have tended to take at face value the ideological claim in Islam of the fixed nature of religious knowledge. Consequently, not much attention has been given to a more critical analysis of how such a system of knowledge is affected by its mode of transmission and its linkages with other aspects of society. Thus, educated Muslims consider all bodies of knowledge that elucidate the “high words” (al-klam (al-‘ali) of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet to comprise the religious sciences. Normatively

speaking, the emphasis in transmitting this knowledge is conservational, especially in Morocco. Even Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) noted that the role of memory was stressed more in Morocco than elsewhere in the Islamic Middle East. It took sixteen years to acquire sufficient mastery of texts to teach on one's own in Morocco, owing to the necessity of memorization, but only five in Tunis (Ibn Khaldun 1967: n, 430–431). Given this emphasis, it is not surprising that contemporary Muslim and European scholars have expressed the most extreme opinions about Moroccan traditional education. Writing with a firsthand knowledge of the Qarawiyin of sixty years ago, a distinguished French historian and Arabist noted the "astonishing" (to a European) domestication of the memory involved in Islamic higher education. He claimed that it deadened the student's sense of inquiry to the point that the knowledge and comportment of twentieth-century men of learning could be assumed "without fear of anachronism" to be exact replicas of their predecessors of four centuries earlier (Levi-Provencal 192.2: 11). More recently, a Western scholar has written of the "stifling dullness" of Islamic education (L. C. Brown 1972: 71) and another, indicating perhaps an impatience with the unfamiliar principles upon which traditional Islamic education is based, claims that it "defies all [sic] pedagogical technique" (Berque 1974: 167). Islamic education fares no better in the hands of Western-educated Muslims, who write of it as a "purely mechanical, monotonous form of study" (Zerdoumi 1970: 196; also Hussein 1948).

Such common assumptions effectively mask the variety of Islamic educations—I deliberately use the plural—in different cultural contexts and historical periods. In my own experience, men of learning in Oman have listened in astonishment and occasional disbelief when I have stated that their counterparts in Morocco and even village Quranic teachers know the Quran by heart. In Oman, its proper recitation suffices. Moroccan scholars, for their part, show an equal astonishment to learn that they have counterparts elsewhere in the Islamic world who do not possess the Quran and other basic texts by memory. In twentieth-century Iran, there is much more formal dialogue between teachers and students as an ordinary component of higher education than is the case for Morocco, where such exchanges occurred principally in peer learning and private discussions. The presumption that Islamic learning in Morocco was merely a decayed form of the formal disputanda of some versions of "classical" and contemporary Islamic education is to neglect the diversity of this vital and complex tradition and favor description of those aspects of it, especially formal dialogue, that are more immediately appreciated by contemporary Western scholarship (Fischer 1980b; 1982; Makdisi 1981).

*** The Social Context of Religious Learning

Sixty years ago, literacy in rural Morocco necessarily implied religious schooling, although schooling did not necessarily imply literacy. The first years of study consisted of memorizing and reciting the Quran; only at later stages did more advanced students learn to read and write, and then usually outside the context of the mosque school. Contemporary literacy is difficult to measure, let alone the literacy rates of earlier periods, but estimates are essential to indicate the scale of traditional education. For the 1920s and 1930s it appears reasonable to assume that a maximum of 4 percent of the adult male rural population was literate,

allowing for regional variations, and perhaps 10–10 percent of the adult male urban population (Hart 1976: 183; H. Geertz 1979: 470–487; Brown 1976: 107). The rural estimate is appropriate to Bzu, where the uses for literacy outside of Quranic recitation included chiefly the ability of agricultural overseers to keep accounts for absentee landlords and write simple narratives of events in a rough and ready colloquial Arabic. Merchants and traders also had use for a limited literacy in corresponding with their suppliers elsewhere in Morocco. Quranic teachers sometimes wrote amulets and charms. A more complete literacy was required only by notaries, who had mastery of conventional legal formulas. Only a handful of persons possessed the self-consciously ornate literary style eventually mastered by ‘Abd ar-Rahman. Arabic was an established second language in Bzu, Tasha-Ihit was not used in written communications and records.

Religious learning was popularly respected. Some accounts of Morocco have postulated a sharp distinction between urban and rural religious practices. This is a difficult distinction to maintain. It has long been recognized that virtually every rural local community (dawwar) and traditional urban quarter is socially distinguished by a maraboutic shrine and ties with one or several maraboutic figures (Castries 1924; Jemma 1972; Eickelman 1976: 97, 102–103, m-113). In the 1920s, as today, virtually every urban quarter and rural local community maintains a mosque school for which a teacher (fqih) was contracted on an annual basis to teach and to perform certain other religious services for the community.[14] Few of these teachers are supported by pious endowment funds in urban contexts and almost none in rural ones. Their maintenance consequently indicates current and sustained community support. In rural contexts these schools often consisted of no more than an ordinary tent or rural hut (nwala), distinguishable from other dwellings only by a small flag run up on a pole. The modest stipend for teachers was often partially paid in kind, with even meals being prepared on a rotational basis by members of the community.

Most Moroccan males and a fair number of females, at least in towns, attended Quranic schools long enough to commit to memory a few passages of the Quran, but Quranic schools were characterized by a high rate of attrition. Most students left before they acquired literacy. Few remained the six to eight years that were generally required to memorize the entire Quran.[15]

The formal features of Quranic schools have been frequently described (e.g., Michaux-Bellaire 1911), although the specific consequences of their form of pedagogy upon modes of thought have only begun to be critically explored (see Wagner 1978, 1983; Wagner and Lotfi 1980). The Islamic emphasis upon memory is not unique, as has been implied by some scholars. Elaborate mnemonic systems were developed in classical Greece and Rome, which facilitated memorization through the regular association of “material with “memory posts,” visual images such as the columns of a building or places at a banquet table (Yates 1966: 2.-7). Accompanying such techniques was the notion that mnemonic knowledge was “purer” than that communicated through writing (Notopoulos 1938: 478). What is remarkable about the use of memory in the context of Islamic education in Morocco is not the performance of “prodigious” mnemonic feats, therefore. Such feats were fully paralleled in Europe (Yates

1966). Rather, it is the insistence by former students that there were no devices to facilitate memorization. Although ‘Abd ar-Rahman and most other former students can recall being able to visualize the shape of the letters upon their slates and even the circumstances associated with the memorization of particular Quranic verses and other texts, such potential mnemonic cues were not formally expressed, perhaps for the implicit reason that their use would associate extraneous images with the word of God and thus dilute its transmission. Although students deny the existence of mnemonic devices, Wagner (1978: 14) suggests that patterns of intonation and rhythm systematically serve as mnemonic markers.

A typical fqih had between fifteen and twenty students in his charge at any time, ranging in age from four to sixteen. No printed or manuscript copies of the Quran were used in the process of memorization. Each morning the fqih wrote the verses to be memorized on each student’s wooden slate (lilh). The child then spent the rest of the day memorizing these verses by reciting them out loud, as well as systematically reciting verses that had been previously learned. Some students, such as ‘Abd ar-Rahman, also laboriously traced the fqih’s letters with a quill pen and an ink made locally of burned wool and charred sheep’s horn.

Two features consistently associated with Islamic education are its rigorous discipline and the lack of explicit explanation of memorized material. Both of these features are congruent with the concept of essentially fixed knowledge which is at the base of Islamic education, at least in the Moroccan context, and the associated concept of “reason” (,‘qal) prevalent in Moroccan society. Reason is popularly conceived as man’s ability to discipline his nature in order to act in accord with the arbitrary code of conduct laid down by God and epitomized by such acts of communal obedience as the fast of Ramadan (see Eickelman 1976: 130–138). Thus a firm discipline in the course of learning the Quran is culturally regarded as an integral part of socialization. This underlying popular attitude toward learning is one of the reasons why it is inappropriate and misleading to see Islamic education as a “high tradition” grafted upon or independent of more popular implicit understandings of religion and society, as has been done by an earlier tradition of Orientalist and anthropological scholarship. In Moroccan towns and villages, the discipline of Quranic memorization is an integral part of learning to be human and Muslim.

When a father handed his son over to a fqih, he did so with the formulaic phrase that the child could be beaten as the fqih saw fit. Such punishments were considered necessary for accurate Quranic recitation of the word of God. Former students explained that the fqih (or the student’s father, when he participated in supervising the process of memorization) was regarded as only the impersonal agency of the occasional punishments which, like the unchanging word of God itself, were merely transmitted by him. Moreover, as ‘Abd ar-Rahman and others explained to me, students were told that any part of their bodies struck in the process of Quranic memorization would not burn in hell. (The same notion popularly applied to beatings which apprentices received from craftsmen [m’allmm dyal l-harfa], including musicians, since music is popularly considered to be a craft [Schuyler 1979: 21–17]). In practice, students were slapped or whipped only when their

attention flagged or when they repeated errors, although my impression from contemporary mosque schools is that the children of high-status fathers are struck much less frequently than other children.

Former students emphasized that throughout the long process of memorizing the Quran, they asked no questions concerning the meaning of verses, even among themselves, nor did it occur to them to do so. Their sole activity was memorizing proper Quranic recitation. It should be kept in mind that the grammar and vocabulary of the Quran are not immediately accessible to speakers of colloquial Arabic, and are even less so to students from Berber-speaking regions; ‘Abd ar-Rahman, together with other former students, readily admitted to not comprehending what he was memorizing until fairly late in his studies (see also Hart 1976: 85; Waterbury 1972: 32). Only after ‘Abd ar-Rahman had memorized the entire Quran did he hesitantly begin to converse in Arabic.

“Understanding” (fahm) was not measured by any ability explicitly to “explain” particular verses. Explanation was considered a science in itself to be acquired only through years in the advanced study of exegetical literature (tafsir). Any informal attempt to explain meaning was considered blasphemy and simply did not occur. Instead, the measure of understanding was implicit and consisted in the ability to use particular Quranic verses in appropriate contexts. In the first few years of Quranic school, students recalled that they had little control over what they recited. They could not, for instance, recite specific chapters of the Quran if asked to do so, but had to begin by one of the sixty principal recitational sections. Firmer control was achieved as students accompanied their father, other relatives, and occasionally their fqih to social gatherings. On such occasions they heard adults incorporate Quranic verses into particular contexts and gradually acquired the ability to do so themselves, as well as to recite specific sections of the Quran without regard for the order in which they had memorized it. Thus the measure of understanding was the ability to make appropriate practical reference to the memorized text, just as originality was shown in working Quranic references into novel but appropriate contexts in conversation, in sermons, and on formal occasions. Knowledge and manipulation of secular oral poetry and proverbs in a parallel fashion is still a sign of good rhetorical style; the skill is not confined to religious learning (Geertz 1983: 112–113).

The high rate of attrition from Quranic schools supports the notion that mnemonic “possession” can be considered a form of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1973: 80). Aside from small customary gifts given by the parents of children to the fqih, education was free. Yet most students were compelled to drop out after a short period in order to contribute to the support of their families or because they failed to receive familial support, as did ‘Abd ar-Rahman, for the arduous and imperfectly understood process of learning. In practice, memorization of the Quran was accomplished primarily by the children of relatively prosperous households or by those whose fathers or guardians were already literate. I say primarily, for education was still a means to social mobility, especially if a poor student managed to progress despite all obstacles through higher, post-Quranic education (cf. Green 1976: 218–221).

The notion of cultural capital implies more than the possession of the material resources to allow a child to spend six to eight years in the memorization of the Quran; it also implies a sustained adult discipline over the child. Many contemporary Western pedagogical concepts treat education as a separable institutional activity, but this idea is inappropriate to learning in the traditional Islamic context.[16] Students' fathers, elder brothers, other close relatives —including women in some cases (e.g., Waterbury 1972: 31–32)—and peers, especially at later stages of learning, were integrally involved in the learning process. These all provided contexts in which learning could continue. Even for urban students from wealthy families, formal education did not involve being systematically taught to read and write outside of the context of the Quran. Students acquired such skills, if at all, from relatives or older students apart from their studies in Quranic schools (Berque 1974: 167–168), just as they acquired a demonstrated understanding of the Quran through social situations in which Quranic verses and other memorized materials were used.

*** Carriers of the Quran

A student became a "memorizer" (hafid) once he knew the entire Quran; its memorization gave him a special status in ordinary society.[17] During a child's memorization of the Quran, there was periodic public recognition of his progress. The Quran is composed of four quarters {silkas, lit. "threads") of fifteen hizbs each. After successful memorization of each quarter, a child's household was expected to offer a feast to which the teacher, neighbors, and others were invited. The largest celebration was reserved for memorization of the entire Quran, when the student would often be mounted on a gaily decorated mule (as was 'Abd ar-Rahman in 1927–192.8) or horse for a celebratory progression through his town or village, accompanied by musicians, other students, and ululating women. Through the 1960s, such celebrations accompanied the awarding of diplomas in government schools. Now that education no longer guarantees employment or high status, the practice has fallen off.

In the precolonial era, fqihs, religious students, and Jewish traders, who themselves had a separate, distinctive role (Eickelman 1983), often were the only strangers who could travel in safety through tribal regions without making prior arrangements for protection. This special status was especially pronounced in rural and tribal milieus, where the Quranic teacher was often the only "stranger," in Simmel's (1964: 402–405) sense of the term, to live regularly in smaller villages and settlements.

Analysis of the role of rural Quranic teachers is especially useful in eliciting the popular significance of memorizing the Quran. Some teachers remained for decades with particular communities (e.g., Waterbury 1972: 32); in other cases, Quranic teachers changed locales at frequent intervals. Many fqihs lived from little more than small fees in cash and kind, sometimes supplemented by the weaving of jallabas (Hart 1976: 183–184). Poverty did not preclude respect for Quranic teachers as carriers of the Quran.

Simmel’s concept of the “stranger” is useful in comprehending the Quranic teacher’s position in rural communities. As a “stranger,’’the fqih “has not belonged to [local society] from the beginning” and “he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself” (Simmel 1964: 402). The fqih is “objective” in that he is not “radically committed” to the community, but his objectivity, to continue to apply Simmel’s analysis, “does not simply involve passivity and detachment; it is a particular structure composed of distance and nearness, indifference and involvement.” As a stranger, the fqih has only more general and abstract qualities in common with members of the community in which he participates. “He is near and far at the same time” (Simmel 1964: 406–407), and is a concrete symbol of the link between the local community and the wider one of Islam.

Fqihs, also called “students” or “seekers after knowledge” (tulba), also serve as prayer-leaders for rural local communities at Friday prayers, write letters or contracts on demand (although after French reforms only authorized notaries could prepare legally binding contracts), provide Quranic recitations at weddings, funerals, and other life crises, and prepare protective amulets. Some fqihs additionally engage in magic (sihr) to influence the course of amorous affairs or the outcome of disputes (e.g., Berque 1955: 316–318, 329, 355), although such practices are considered beyond the pale of Islam (haram) by conscientious Muslims.

As professional outsiders with an intimate knowledge of the regions in which they taught and freedom to circulate in rural areas, fqihs constituted informal networks among themselves by which news of openings for Quranic teachers and other information was passed among colleagues. Significantly, in the years immediately prior to Moroccan independence, these networks were used to advantage by the nationalist movement, especially in southern Morocco. Within a decade after independence, the selling of textiles and certain other goods in rural markets and communities in some areas fell almost exclusively into the hands of former Quranic teachers, who took over this activity from departing Jewish traders. The Quranic teachers, like their predecessors, were already clustered into informal networks of trust and cooperation, and had a wide knowledge of the regions in which they worked. Aside from their Jewish predecessors, Quranic teachers constituted the only category of “outsider” ordinarily present in rural society. As “outsiders,” they had no direct stake in the local politics of land and water rights (Eickelman 1983).

*** Places of Study

In the larger towns throughout Morocco, students wishing to pursue their studies began by sitting with the circles of men of learning and their disciples that met regularly in the principal mosques (see Laroui 1977b: 196–197, 199–201; Brown 1976: 77). In rural areas, most advanced students continued for at least a few years at one of the numerous madrasas located throughout the country until the early decades of this century (Moulieras

1895; 1899; Michaux-Bellaire 1911: 436; Waterbury 1972: 30); only a few survive today. Often the level of learning at rural madrasas and zawyas compared favorably with the education obtainable in major urban centers (Berque 1958: 12; Eickelman 1976: 39, 60, 222, 249; as-Susi 1961; Doutte 1914: 269; Moulieras 1895: 76, 124, 187; 1899: 49, 583).

Such madrasas—and rural zawiyas in many regions—were an essential intermediate stage when Arabic was a student's second language. For many students content with the life of rural Quranic teachers, they could be a final educational stage. In some regions, such as Bzu, these madrasas were only clusters of tents; others were village mosques with adjoining lodgings for the shaykh and his students, who were supported, albeit frugally, by gifts of food from villagers and tribesmen.[18] Most students attended madrasas, often several in succession, as did 'Abd ar-Rahman. The three to five years characteristically spent in this all-male milieu, at least partially removed from their families and communities of origin, was an intense socializing experience. Students often developed close ties with their shaykhs, who could introduce them to scholars elsewhere in Morocco, and with fellow students. This was the case both in 'Abd ar-Rahman's stay in Ait 'Tab, mentioned in the last chapter, and his subsequent one in Dawwar Mshabbak.

In 1927 'Abd ar-Rahman was fifteen years old. His older brother, by then his de facto guardian and Qadi of Bzu, sent him to continue his studies at nearby Dawwar Mshabbak, as he had done earlier. The student body there was a fluctuating one, and students were not constrained to remain for any specific time. Many students simply drifted from encampment to encampment, much as was the pattern in medieval Europe, living a picaresque existence and remaining wherever there was sufficient largesse to maintain them (Aubin 1906: 78–79; Michaux-Bellaire 1911: 437; cf. Aries 1962: 190–191). To join an encampment, a student approached a mosque at which a fqih was conducting lessons and asked for permission to join them. Hospitality would almost always be offered overnight or for a few days. Longer stays depended upon the resources of the supporting community. Committed students such as 'Abd ar-Rahman sought out specific teachers by their reputation and remained with one teacher long enough to commit to memory and begin to understand some of the principal commentaries and key texts.

'Abd ar-Rahman began to speak Arabic at Dawwar Mshabbak. Its madrasa consisted of several tents, one of which served as a mosque. The students lived five to eight in a tent, with their total number fluctuating between fifteen and thirty. The age of students varied from six to forty, with about half coming from the immediate region and the remainder from Morocco's impoverished south. Some of the more advanced students were simply there waiting for an opportunity to become contracted Imshdrt) as teachers for rural local communities in the region. Others were preparing for higher studies at the Yusufiya.

As at the Ait 'Tab madrasa, student life at Dawwar Mshabbak was intensely communal. Lifelong friendships were forged there. The shaykh and students worked before dawn to perform their ablutions and prepare for the dawn prayer. They then ate together a thick

lentil soup (harira). From early morning until just before midday, students individually recited the texts on which they were working. Older students sat with the fqih, who recited and commented upon basic texts. Intermittently the fqih and some of the more advanced students left off their lesson circle to supervise the Quranic memorization of younger students. Lessons stopped just before the midday (duhr) prayer, after which students were free to do whatever they wanted until the sunset (maghrib) prayers. The evening meal, eaten about an hour and a half after sundown, was donated to the scholars on a rotational basis by households of the rural local community. Afterward, the older and more serious students studied by oil lamps or spoke quietly among themselves. Younger students were expected to do the washing and other chores for older ones in exchange for lessons.

‘Abd ar-Rahman’s participation in the scholarly community at Dawwar Mshabbak was cut short by a severe drought that affected the region in 1928. He says that conditions were so serious in Bzu’s hinterland that tribesmen were reduced to eating a poisonous plant in the region known in tashalhit as izatti.[19] In an earlier epoch, the madrasa might have been reconstituted once economic conditions improved, but with the changed circumstances of the colonial era and the demands for taxes from the colonial administration, the madrasa at Dawwar Mshabbak was unable to recover. ‘Abd ar-Rahman continued his studies in Bzu until 16 RabFa II 1347/2 October 1928. On that day, carefully recorded in his notebook, he set out for the first time to Marrakesh and studies at the Yusufiya.

** Four: The Yusufiya: A Profile of Higher Islamic Learning

For a Berber youth of sixteen setting out from Bzu in 192.8, even if he was the younger brother of the town’s qadi, the social universe remained very small. The improved roads and transport of the colonial era had done little to widen it. No Moroccan in Bzu yet owned an automobile, so most local travel was still by mule and horse; ‘Abd ar-Rahman set off for the Yusufiya on a mule. His baggage followed on another mule, with a household servant on foot. Once ‘Abd ar-Rahman reached the main road at Wad al-‘Abid, he waited for a bus to take him to Marrakesh. ‘Abd ar-Rahman had never before been to Marrakesh. Previously he had traveled in the company of his elder brother only to the nearby settlements of Damnat, Azilal, and Sraghna. It would be another decade before he was to travel as far as Casablanca, Rabat, Fez, and Meknes.

Marrakesh in 1928 was composed of the sharply contrasting madina and European ville nouvelle, a contrast which is today blurred despite the wall surrounding the old quarters, because the two “separate” towns have grown into one another. As early as 1914, French colonial authorities began to draw up plans to direct the future growth of

major Moroccan towns (Abu-Lughod 1980: 146). In Marrakesh as elsewhere, these plans called for the separation of the European “new town” from the “native” quarters. Except for the eventual provision of some piped water, sewers, and electricity, the madina was left “undisturbed.” The “new town” of Marrakesh, called Gueliz after a mountain located to its immediate north, was designed with wide avenues radiating from a central point. The main public and commercial buildings were located close to this center, with residential villas located along branching side streets. Gueliz grew modestly through the 1930s and at a more rapid pace only after the Second World War.

In 19x8, Marrakesh was still largely encircled almost entirely by palm groves. Today many of these have been cut down to make way for large tracts of popular housing. The wall surrounding its vast madina was built with the reddish clay of the region, which is why the city is affectionately referred to as the “Red City” {madinat al-hamra’). Then as now, Marrakesh is a staging point (and sometimes an end point) for the emigration of Berber-speaking tribesmen from the High Atlas mountains and the Sus river valley. Much of its population is bilingual in Arabic and Berber.

Gueliz was still roughly three kilometers from the walled city of Marrakesh in the late 1920s. At this time, Marrakesh was the largest city in Morocco. It was over one and one-half times the size of Fez and slightly larger than Casablanca. (Like Fez, Marrakesh was to be outstripped in size by the late 1930s by other cities more oriented to industrial and agricultural growth.) Although it was Morocco’s largest city, it attracted the fewest Europeans. Except for guided forays of tourists and a few small European enterprises such as carpentry shops, virtually no Europeans entered the madina, and those that did confined themselves to the wider passages. Most went no further than Jama‘a al-Fna’, the main square enlivened by musicians, jugglers, storytellers, beggars, and aspiring guides. Marrakesh lacked major industrial establishments, and European-style education for Muslims was available only on a reduced scale. A French-run School for the Sons of Notables opened in 1919. In contrast to Fez, where a fairly elaborate educational system was in place for the native elite by the 1920s, a secondary school {college musulman) was opened in Marrakesh only in 1936 (French Protectorate 1931: 58, Deverdun 1959: ix).

In the 19 20s, Morocco’s south still contained pockets of resistance to the French. Parts of the High Atlas mountains remained outside effective colonial control until 1933. Their final pacification, together with the earlier quelling of ‘Abd al-Krim’s Riffian rebellion in 1927, signalled to all Moroccans the futility of further direct confrontation with colonial authorities. Until ‘Abd al-Krim’s defeat, many elite of Fez kept their children away from French schools. After his defeat and exile, enrollments soared.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-knowledge-and-power-in-morocc-5.png][Map 2. Map of Marrakesh, 1930. Based upon Prosper Ricard, Le Maroc (Les Guides Bleus), 4th ed. Paris: Librairie Hachette (1930), p.136.]]

Table 2. The Population of Marrakesh, Casablanca, and Fez, 1931

| | Marrakesh | | Casablanca | | Fez | |

| | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |

| Muslims | 167,136 | 86 | 85,167 | 52 | 95,436 | 85 |

| Jews | 21,607 | 11 | 19,960 | 12 | 7,826 | 7 |

| Europeans | 6,379 | 3 | 57,981 | 36 | 9,201 | 8 |

| Total | 195,122 | IOO | 163,108 | 100 | 112,463 | 100 |

Source: 1931 census with corrections (Ricard 1936: 12.2; Adam 1968: 147). Census figures for the Muslim population were based upon administrative estimates.

Marrakesh was for centuries the center of the political and economic universe for southern Morocco. With colonial improvements in communications and the decision early in the protectorate to rule the southern region indirectly through tribal strongmen, its political leaders soon became frozen in place for the duration of French rule. The most powerful of the strongmen was Hajj Thaml al-Glawl (1879–1956), who emerged as France’s principal ally in the south after the death of his elder brother Madam in 1918. By the late 1920s he was well on his way to consolidating his political control over the entire region, influencing even minor administrative appointments. Although there were few French in Marrakesh, their influence was decidedly felt. It guaranteed the authority of Hajj Thami and his collaborators, over whom the French exercised minimal restraint.

Because of its traditionally high influx of rural immigrants, Marrakesh has sometimes been described as a city overwhelmed by its hinterland. This characterization is misleading. Several of the interior quarters of the madina are as distinguished and exclusive as their equivalents in other “Makhzan” cities such as Fez and Rabat. As in these cities, at least some of the elite have chosen to continue living in the madina. Not far from the Yusufiya mosque-university, for example, is Darb ‘AHlsh, a long, covered impasse in the interior of the madina. The street is also a cohesive neighborhood. There are no shops on the street to attract strangers. The nearest ones are on the “main” street, also inaccessible to vehicles,

perpendicular to Darb ‘Alilsh. As with most such quarters, the doors to individual houses give little clue as to the wealth of the inhabitants. The houses of scholars, wealthy merchants, and craftsmen are juxtaposed. Persons who enter the street and are unknown to residents are looked upon with suspicion, for the street is regarded as a spatial extension of its component households. Although not all residents of Darb ‘Alilsh have been there for generations, its population is stable and is composed primarily of persons born in Marrakesh itself.

Darb Mwasln is another such neighborhood, although it is composed of less prosperous households and is adjacent to the street of the dyers (Darb Sabbaghin). Many of its shopkeepers were born in the neighborhood and continue to live there. Through the 1930s, several distinguished but impecunious men of learning lived there who taught at the Yusufiya. Darb Mwasin is known architecturally for the mosque that carries its name, constructed between 1562 and 1573 by a Sa‘adi dynasty sultan, Sidi ‘Abd Allah bin Muhammad (r. ¹557–1574), and an adjacent fountain which has ceased functioning in recent years from lack of repair. It also contains the hostel (madrasa: the same term designates any place where lesson circles are held) for religious students in which ‘Abd ar-Rahman spent his seven years in Marrakesh. In contrast to the mosque, the madrasa has been dismissed by an architectural historian as “without character” and is difficult even to date (Deverdun 1959: 73). Closed in the early 1950s, it enjoys today a second life as a government orphanage for girls who claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad.

Older residents and shopkeepers of Darb Mwasin recall that the hostel was an integral part of the neighborhood, even if its students were always thought of as “outsiders” {afaqr, pl. dfaqiri). They were often called upon to recite the Quran at appropriate household occasions, and some people regularly brought food to needy students. Religious students of rural origin sometimes developed intimate community ties in Marrakesh. Virtually all the activities associated with the mosqueuniversity were intricately meshed with the wider social and cultural life of the community, a linkage that constituted both a major strength and an inherent limitation upon mosqueuniversity education.

*** Rural Students in Marrakesh

Rural students were readily distinguished from townsmen by their clothing and what townsmen judged as their awkward comportment. In the 1920s, most students of rural origin, including ‘Abd ar-Rahman, still shaved their heads and, as a sign of humility toward their shaykhs, did not wear turbans. This practice had virtually disappeared among younger townsmen, who in general adopted the fez as a sign of modernity. Despite their status as carriers of the Quran, most students were awkward and naive in the ways of the city because of their country origin. Townsmen were not averse to making jokes at their expense when they ventured beyond the immediate confines of the mosque-university and the hostels in which all but the most wealthy “outsider” students, usually of urban origin, were

lodged. Nonetheless, some rural students, especially those who came from families of learning, attained scholarly distinction by the most exigent urban standards.

Significantly, two of the most influential reformist shaykhs of the early twentieth century in Morocco, Bu Shu‘ayb ad-Dukkali (1878–1937) and Mukhtar as-Susi (1900–1963), were of rural origin, as were several of the other leading shaykhs of the Yusufiya. Ad-Dukkali was from a rural family that included several generations of men of learning. He first gained attention in Marrakesh at the age of thirteen by reciting all of Sidi Khalil’s Mukhtasar before Sultan Mulay Hasan I and showing a precocious command of classical Arabic. Later he gained further recognition through studies in Mecca and Cairo. In 1910, at the age of thirty-two, he was appointed qadi of Marrakesh and subsequently became minister of justice (Jirari 1976: 9–18). As-Susi was from a family of learning from the Sus region of Morocco’s south, where his father was a leader in the Darqawi religious order. He studied at a rural madrasa in the Sus and from 1919 to 1923 at the Yusufiya, where he was a student of ad-Dukkali and a contemporary of Bzu’s Qadi Ahmad. From 1923 to 1927 he was at the Qarawiyin, where he came into contact with most of the later leaders of the nationalist movement. In 1929 he returned to Marrakesh, where his lesson circles were highly popular among students. The French grew suspicious of his growing influence and in 1935 assigned him to forced residence in his natal village in the Sus (Touimi, Khatibi, and Kably 1974: 4041).

‘Abd ar-Rahman and other students from families of rural notables had economic and social advantages in securing ties with persons in the mosque-university milieu that were not available to poorer students. When ‘Abd ar-Rahman set out for Marrakesh, his elder brother gave him 600 ryals, an amount that ‘Abd ar-Rahman describes as “a lot of money” for the time. His brother also regularly sent him olive oil for cooking, flour, and additional funds as needed. Occasionally his father also sent him money, but not as much.

‘Abd ar-Rahman’s older brother maintained active ties with several of his former teachers. Upon his arrival in Marrakesh, one of the first things that ‘Abd ar-Rahman did was to convey his brother’s greetings to his former teachers. One was the reformist shaykh, Bu Shu‘ayb ad-Dukkali. Another, more traditionalist, was Muhammad ibn ‘Umar as-Sarghlm (d. 1938), who lectured daily from early morning until late afternoon. By the late 192.0s, Muhammad ibn ‘Umar was recognized as the leading shaykh of the Yusufiya. When he died, he was buried in the shrine of ‘Abd al-‘Azlz at-Tabba’, one of the patron marabouts of Marrakesh. ‘Abd ar-Rahman recalls that these shaykhs received him cordially, but because of his youth and inexperience, none paid any particular attention to him. In their guest rooms, however, he met other students and scholars whom he presumed by their presence to be serious and of good reputation. In this way he began to discern who was significant in the milieu of higher learning.

*** Student Hostels

Dormitories constituted a significant aspect of the experience of rural students, and for this reason are worth describing in detail. Madrasa students shared many common characteristics and activities. They were unmarried and usually relatively young, between the ages of sixteen and forty. Each hostel usually attracted students from particular regions, as was also the case in Fez (Marty 1924: 337–339).

By the late 1920s, most hostels were suffering from decades of neglect. In principle they were owned and maintained by revenues from pious endowments. Students paid no rents, although they often had to pay key money for rooms, the rights to which could be purchased. Rural students and others from outside Marrakesh also received a daily loaf of bread, the distribution of which was organized by the overseer of a separate pious endowment established for that specific purpose. The occupancy of rooms and the right to a bread allowance were obtained through the spokesman (mqaddam dyal at-tulba) of each hostel, a student informally selected by his peers for his ability to speak on their behalf when necessary and to see to the fair allocation of bread.

Because of the system of key rights, ‘Abd ar-Rahman had no difficulty in securing lodgings upon his arrival. His elder brother had purchased a key to a room at the Mwasin madrasa from one of his shaykhs a decade earlier.[20] After Ahmad left the Yusufiya in 1917, he allowed a succession of needy students from the Bzu region to use it until his younger brother required the room for himself. Such patronage was another of the multiple ways in which ties were made between persons in the community of learning. It is also responsible in part for the tendency of students from the same region to be clustered together.

Table 3. Principal Madrasas and Other Lodgings for Rural Students in Marrakesh, 1928–1934

Founded{1}	Rooms{2}	Students	Region of Origin
Yusufiya (madrasa)	1564/1565	60—70	150–200	Sraghna, Rahamna, Shawiya, Dukkala, Shiyadma
Mwasin (madrasa)	1500–1700	34–38	50	Dukkala, Sraghna, Shiyadma, ‘Abda, Sus, Sahara
Ibn Salih	c.1670	6	IO	Varied

| Bab Dukkala | c.1700? | 25–30 | 6–8 | Unknown |

| (vacant shops) Sidi bil ‘Abbas Sabti (shrine | 5 | ? | 30–40 | Varied |

| with sleeping rooms used by students) | | | | |

| Total | | 127—146 | 246–308 | |

{1} Deverdun 1959: 59, 373, 415, 467

{2} interviews with former students.

The Mwasin was considerably smaller than the nearby Yusufiya madrasa. Its thirty-eight rooms were equally divided between two stories. In the center of the ground floor was a fountain for ablutions. In contrast, the Yusufiya hostel is a vast, imposing structure, with a unified rectilineal design, a well-lit principal courtyard with a large, oblong basin fed by underground pipes iqadus) for ablutions, Andalusian woodwork, and stucco ornamentation.[21] The rooms were small in both madrasas, no more than 1.5 by 2. meters each, and furnished with little more than wooden coffers for the meager possessions of students and sleeping mats, which were placed on the floors or on elevated wooden platforms (katris). The wooden door of each room had a small opening through which the student’s bread ration could be tossed if the student was not present. For lighting, students had small oil lamps that could be placed in a niche in one of the walls. Each room also had a wooden beam in a corner on which clothes could be hung to protect them from mice.

Poor students slept two to three to a room. Wealthier ones such as ‘Abd ar-Rahman had rooms to themselves. After residing in the madrasa for several months, ‘Abd ar-Rahman acquired two additional rooms, using one for cooking and the storage of foodstuffs, another for sleeping, and retaining his original room for studying.

The life of wealthier students such as ‘Abd ar-Rahman was reasonably comfortable. He had regular remittances in cash and kind from Bzu, and cooperated with several other students in paying a man to came to the madrasa daily to do their cooking and washing.

‘Abd ar-Rahman and other well-off students regularly shared their food and other resources with poor (da’if) colleagues, who were by far the majority. These students sought in multiple ways to supplement their meager bread ration. Some received a small stipend from pious endowment revenues for reciting the Quran regularly in neighborhood

mosques. Others sought out occasions to recite it at weddings, circumcisions, and funerals, for which they received a meal and a modest fee. A few developed client relations with wealthy urban households that provided them regularly with food. Until the early twentieth century in Marrakesh, each religious student also received an annual gift of a jallaba from the sultan on the occasion of the Great Feast {‘Id al-Kabir), but this practice ceased with the advent of French rule.

There was sustained community support for higher Islamic learning. Humble artisans and even rural tribesmen periodically came to the Yusufiya to offer gifts of produce, clothes, and other goods to prominent scholars and donations on a smaller scale to needy students. Such actions brought good fortune (baraka) to the donor, for whom such donations were considered a pious act (ihsdri). Wealthy men of learning also contributed. In a 1936 letter, the religious students of Bzu origin in Marrakesh collectively wrote Qadi Ahmad, asking him to contribute money for the Feast of Students. Such requests were regularly made. By the 1940s, “Abd ar-Rahman began to receive similar requests (e.g., letter of 4 Jamada I 1365 / 6 April 1946).

More formal although by no means regular support was provided through pious endowment revenues. A pious endowment was established when a person irrevocably designated the income from a specified property for a pious purpose such as the construction of a mosque or madrasa, its maintenance, the provision of bread for students, a water fountain, the payment of stipends to religious students to recite the Quran regularly, or some equivalent purpose (see Le Tourneau 1949: 465; C. Geertz 1979: 151–154). No new major pious foundations appear to have been established since at least the mid-nineteenth century.[22] Moreover, the economic disruption that accompanied growing European intervention in Morocco had a negative effect upon pious foundation revenues. Nonetheless, successive rulers, local officials, and prominent townsmen saw sporadically to the maintenance and essential repair of mosques, madrasas, and the shrines of key marabouts. Donations for these repairs, like the construction of such buildings in more prosperous eras, was a pious act.

The collection and distribution of pious foundation revenues was supervised in theory by the chief qadi of Marrakesh, who also acted as overseer (nadir) of pious endowment revenues. Given the lack of control over this system, it was inevitable that revenues should be irregularly allocated and often be insufficient to cover the purposes for which they were designated. Often there was no formal accounting at all of income and expenses. Consequently, some madrasas and other buildings simply collapsed from neglect. Deverdun (1959: 567) mentions a madrasa in decrepit condition in the 1850s. No trace of it remained in ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s time. In practice, each pious foundation had its own administrator. After the protectorate was established in 1912, the French sought to centralize the administration of these revenues and to maintain an accurate inventory of them. According to ‘Abd ar-Rahman, the overseer appointed for Marrakesh in the 1920s, a relative of the pasha, had the obvious handicap of illiteracy. Because of ineffective administration, protectorate reforms were slow to come to the Marrakesh region. In Bzu, which was under the formal jurisdiction

of Marrakesh for pious endowments, the revenues of each pious endowment continued to be separately administered through the late 1930s.

A description of the role of hostel mqaddams indicates how pious foundations affected the lives of students in practice and and how students were governed. Spokesmen were selected informally by the students of each hostel for an ability to speak effectively on their behalf. In principle, the pasha of Marrakesh or those in charge of disbursing pious endowment funds could object to nominations, but rarely did. In Fez, there appears to have been a formal confirmation from the Makhzan of such spokesmen because they received a small monthly stipend (Le Tourneau 1949: 464). In Marrakesh confirmation was informal. Spokesmen were simply “known” (ma‘ruf). Thus Ahmad, ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s elder brother, was spokesman for the Mwasin madrasa during his stay in Marrakesh. He received neither a stipend, which in any case he did not require, nor a formal confirmation of his appointment.

To obtain the bread allowance, each new student paid a small fee to the spokesman, sixty francs as of 1928. The spokesman handed the funds over to the notary responsible for overseeing the distribution of bread to students. The spokesman could also recommend particular students when townsmen came to ask for tulba to recite the Quran for weddings, funerals, and other occasions. It was he who saw to the distribution within the hostel of gifts periodically offered by some wealthy merchants, and the allocation of rooms.

The informal criteria of eligibility to reside in a hostel suggests the unimportance of clearly defined formal authority in the mosque-university milieu. Deverdun (1959: 377) cites the opinion of a fourteenth-century Fassi jurist to the effect that students were obliged to attend lesson circles regularly and were subject to expulsion “by authority” in the case of misconduct or lack of “sufficient aptitude” for studies. One of the few critical cases of expulsion which occurred during ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s student days indicates how eligibility was withheld in Marrakesh. A Susi student in his late forties had lived for at least two decades at the Mwasin hostel. He was present when Ahmad Mansuri arrived in 1913, and was still there when ‘Abd ar-Rahman took up residence in 1928. ‘Abd ar-Rahman related:

In order to get money, he dabbled in magic. So did other students, especially those from the Sus. This meant that quite often he wrote charms for women. He also regularly brought girls and young boys to his rooms. Finally, the students formed a delegation to go to the pasha, Hajj Thami al-Glawi, to have him expelled. We were unsuccessful.

Eventually the collective pressure of the students led to his removal, but the incident underlines the lack of formal authority in student life. The moral authority of shared communal norms was not necessarily backed by formal sanctions. In the past, when the Makhzan provided more regular subsidies to teachers and students alike in the form of stipends— salted beef, grain, oil, and candles (Deverdun 1969: 467; Peretie 1912: 324–334), and rulers such as Muiay Hasan I took a direct interest in the scholarly community, collective

activity appears to have been more effective. Nonetheless, the designation of student, literally a “seeker of knowledge” {talib ‘Um), was applied to anyone who had memorized the Quran (or claimed to have done so) and who was oriented toward lifelong religious learning. Such a notion of scholar was highly diffuse, and was shared equally by the scholars of the mosque-university milieu and the wider community.

*** Higher Learning and Society

A sense of the scale of religious education in the 192.0s, however tentative, facilitates understanding how the cultural notion of knowledge was articulated in practice. Traditional higher education was considerably more restricted in scale than Quranic education. In 1931, the year of the first reliable census in the French zone of Morocco, there were approximately 1,200 students in Morocco’s two mosque-universities. The country’s total population (including estimates for the Spanish zone of influence) was 5,800,000 (Noin 1970: 1, 30, 32), so that mosque-university students constituted a miniscule 0.02 percent of the population. [23] Since most students left their studies after a few years to became merchants, village teachers, notaries, and the like, only a limited number could eventually claim to be men of learning.

The Yusufiya was smaller in scale than its Fez counterpart, and for most of its existence tended to attract students and scholars only from the hinterland of Marrakesh and Morocco’s south. Marrakesh first emerged as a major center of learning in the twelfth century, when it rivaled Seville and Cordoba in Muslim Spain. In following centuries its reputation as a center of learning rose and fell with the political vicissitudes of the city itself. Thus it thrived early in the nineteenth century, and again reached national prominence with the residence of the sultan there almost continuously from 1895 to 1901 (Burke 1976: 42, 59). In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the period of immediate concern to this study, the Yusufiya milieu contained roughly four hundred students. Six to eight shaykhs met daily with students in roughly ten lesson circles {halqas)^

The Yusufiya, like the Qarawiyin, constituted an institution in the basic sense of a field of activity whose members shared subjectively held ideas and conventions as to how given tasks should be accomplished. Although students and, to a more limited extent, their teachers were only transient members of the community of learning, most persons participated in the mosque-university milieu long enough to give it stability in terms of its participants and their relations with wider society.

The mosque-university’s use of space indicates its lack of sharp separation from the rest of society. The activities of the Yusufiya, like those of its counterpart in Fez, were concentrated in space that was shared with the wider community for purposes of worship and other gatherings. Lesson circles of teachers, students, and onlookers met regularly in the Yusufiya (Ibn Yusif) mosque, one of the largest and most central in Marrakesh, as well as in some of

the smaller mosques, religious lodges, and at least one shrine, that of the principal marabout of Marrakesh, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz at-Tabba‘. Only the hostels for rural students were reserved exclusively for students.

The Yusufiya had no sharply defined body of students or faculty, administration, entrance or course examinations, curriculum, or unified sources of funds. In fact, its former teachers related with amusement the frustrated efforts of French colonial officials to determine who its “responsible” leaders were and to treat it as a corporate entity analogous to a medieval European university.[24] Although teachers did not act as a formal collectivity, several older and respected shaykhs served as informal spokesmen for their colleagues on various occasions. Because of their recognition by the wider community, such individuals in fact controlled the distribution of gifts given by wealthy or powerful individuals to the community of learning. The ability of certain men of learning to control such distributions and to exercise influence on other occasions did much to consolidate their reputations.

The activities of higher learning were integrally related to and limited by the values and expectations of wider society in numerous ways. Teachers were not formally appointed, although some held royal decrees (dahirs) providing them with recognition and specified emoluments. Younger shaykhs simply began to teach after they were assured of the implicit consent of established men of learning capable of sponsoring them and defending them when necessary from the criticism of students and outsiders. The lack of formal appointment meant that shaykhs of lesser reputation had to be especially scrupulous about comporting themselves and commenting on texts in expected ways. Recognition brought most, but not all, teachers small stipends from pious endowments designated for their support, in addition to occasional gifts of grain, olive oil, and clothing from pious townsmen, tribesmen, the sultan, and his entourage.

The publicly accessible activities of the mosque-university did not provide the full range of knowledge, including poetry, history, and literature, or training in the rhetorical style considered essential for men of learning. The formal speech of men of learning was replete with allusions to classical texts and used stylistic conventions that were far removed from ordinary speech. These conventions included the deliberate rhyming of words and phrases and the use of a classicized diction that avoided the intrusion of colloquial or “common” (‘ammi) syntax or phrases. Another quality prized by men of learning was the ability to compose verses for particular occasions. These circulated constantly in oral and written form. Most such poetry drew upon stock formulas, but these still had to be learned and were expected of educated men.[25]

As in any educational system with diffuse, implicit criteria for success and in which essential skills were not fully embodied in formal learning, the existing elite was favored. Moreover, the attribute of “student” did not in itself form much of a basis for meaningful collective action, at least by the late 1920s. Students became “known” as such through their comportment and acceptance by persons in the community of learning, not through any

formal procedures. Each student was on his own to discern those persons and ideas that were significant in the world of learning and to create a constellation of effective personal ties with which to function. Students from Marrakesh itself, especially those from wealthy or powerful families, had substantial initial advantages in securing useful ties. They continued to be enmeshed in their families' networks of kinship, friendship, and patronage. Since all students from Marrakesh continued to live at home, those from wealthier and more prestigious families were in a position to invite shaykhs to their homes and to arrange for formal or informal tutoring. Such students often attended the public lesson circles of the mosques and shrines only irregularly.

A significant exception to the diffuse nature of student identity in both Fez and Marrakesh, was the annual "Carnival" or "Feast of Students," introduced in Chapter One. It was an annual occasion on which the sultan and his entourage publicly acknowledged students as a collectivity. Each spring, students solicited contributions from townsmen, and a student was proclaimed "sultan" for the duration of a three-week outing (nuzha). The real sultan's parasol, a symbol of authority, was often loaned to the student sultan for the duration. The student sultan appointed his peers to offices in his entourage, mirroring the real Makhzan. The first week of festivities included a major Friday procession. The next day, the real sultan's ministers visited their student counterparts with gifts. Sunday was the turn of the real sultan, before whom a burlesque Friday sermon (khutba) was delivered. Doutte (1905: 200) demurely refrains from citing obscene versions in circulation, but provides others. I translate a brief extract, lacking the rhyme of the original, from one of his examples:

Praise be to God, Creator of incisors and molars

And who has prepared them to bite into apples and pears And who has created the hand and the mouth

And who has prepared them to make mouthfuls disappear. O my brothers, he who eats butter and honey acts well and proceeds in the good way

And follows the straight path and the just one.

He who eats beans and mallow strays and does wrong And he harms only his stomach and wrongs no one else. Worshippers of God, For he who makes me eat white bread and chicken, God will open wide the door of Paradise

And he who gives me barley bread and camel meat Shall share in hell, the worst of soujourns

—Doutte 1905: 214–215.

At the end of the sermon, the real sultan gives his student counterpart cash and gifts so that the students can prolong their festivities. Doutte also describes in detail the public processions and provides an inventory of the gifts presented by the real sultan to the students as a collectivity on one occasion: thirty-eight sheep, twenty jars of butter, and four sacks of seminola, in addition to gifts from other officials.[26]

On no other public occasion in Morocco was satire directed against the protocol of the Makhzan and its authority, which may be one reason why the French brought about its demise. One aspect of the occasion particularly concerned the French. At the very end of his tenure, the student sultan had the right to throw himself at the feet of the real sultan and present him with a list of favors to be granted. One reason that wealthy merchants often subsidized the bidding of their candidates for the role was that the favors granted could be quite substantial. According to Cenival (1915: 139), the cost of purchasing the right to becoming student sultan escalated in Fez from 750 francs in 1916 to 4,000 in 1917, 2.2,500 in 1923, and 13,250 in 1924. The unusually high figure for 1923 was caused by a qaid who wanted the student sultan to ask that a member of his family be appointed as his deputy; the request was refused. In 1925 the protectorate administration forbade seeking favors of the real sultan during the carnival. As a result, the auction price for the privilege of becoming mock sultan in Fez immediately fell to 1,350 francs. Comparable figures for Marrakesh are unavailable.

Although the French sought to discourage the Feast of Students, it continued to thrive in Marrakesh throughout ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s stay. For most of his years there, the Sultan of the Students was from Dukkala. Religious students from that region were given bridewealth and a home if they returned as Sultan of the Students, so competition was intense. Some students prolonged their stay in Marrakesh in order to be selected. Although the pasha did not attend the event personally, presumably at the instigation of the French, his deputy was present and provided funds, soldiers, and the loan of a horse.

‘Abd ar-Rahman usually returned to Bzu during the time of the Feast of the Students, but he remained in 1928 because a friend of his, Si ‘Umar ad-Dukkali, became mock sultan. After his week as sultan in Marrakesh, Si ‘Umar returned to Dukkala. ‘Abd ar-Rahman accompanied him. Once they arrived at the house of the qaid of the region, they were entertained lavishly and then provided with a car and a tribal guard of honor for the remainder of the journey.

*** The Mosque-University Milieu

Students acquired the necessary knowledge and personal contacts to achieve reputations as men of learning through three overlapping spheres of activity: lesson circles; peer learning, including participation in student literary circles; and sponsorship by established men of learning. The first and third spheres are familiar elements in accounts of Islamic education. Peer learning is not, since traditional Arabic sources have stylistic conventions that render them almost entirely silent on informal patterns of learning. Thus, when several Moroccan men of learning were asked to prepare short written autobiographies (tarjamas), they mentioned only learning derived from their shaykhs, in conformity with explicit cultural assumptions concerning the proper acquisition and transmission of learning.

**** Lesson Circles

The spatial and temporal setting of formal learning is highly significant in suggesting the relation of religious knowledge to society at large. Almost all of the lesson circles that met in the daytime were held in the Yusufiya mosque itself and concerned the most traditional and accepted texts of jurisprudence, grammar, and rhetoric. They were conducted by shaykhs regarded as the most senior and conventional. Evening lesson circles were usually held only in shrines, religious lodges, and smaller mosques. These were conventionally devoted to less established subjects and texts, and were generally conducted by reformist shaykhs and those of reformist sympathies, although a few were also conducted by shaykhs who lectured in the daytime at the Yusufiya.

Daytime lesson circles met five times weekly, Saturdays through Wednesdays. The shaykhs who conducted these lesson circles usually also conducted lesson circles on Thursday and Friday mornings, but would comment on different texts. During the major religious holidays, commentary on the regular texts were also suspended. The holidays were ‘Ashura, the tenth day after the start of the Muslim New Year; the Prophet’s birthday {‘Id Mtlud); Ramadan, the lunar month of fasting; and the period of the Great Feast, from 25 Dhu Qa‘ada in the lunar calendar to 25 Dhu Hijja. The texts commented upon during these periods included panegyrics on the Prophet, biographical literature on him, and commentaries on the sayings and actions of the prophet {hadith). Rural students took advantage of the longer holidays to return to their regions of origin, so that at these times the audiences of shaykhs was less rurally oriented than they were for the rest of the year.

As in the rest of Marrakesh, mosque-university activities were organized around the daily cycle of prayers. ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s schedule appears to have been fairly representative of that of serious rural students. He woke up just before dawn to perform his ablutions and prayers. Then he read and memorized in his room until eight in the morning, when the first lesson circles began at the Yusufiya. Each was attended by ten to thirty regular students, depending upon the popularity of the shaykh. The first lesson circles of the day concerned jurisprudence. Throughout his six years at the Yusufiya, ‘Abd ar-Rahman followed the lessons of Shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Umar as-Sarghini on Ibn Ishaq’s Mukhtasar. Indicative of the lack of “closure” in traditional studies, Ibn ‘Umar was unable to complete

his commentary on the entire treatise in the six years that ‘Abd ar-Rahman followed his lessons.

A second group of lesson circles began mid-morning. These were primarily concerned with grammar, and ‘Abd ar-Rahman followed the commentaries of Shaykh Ahmad Agurram, a Berber of rural origin, who commented on Ibn Malik’s Alfiya. The midday prayers marked the beginning of the next cycle of lesson circles, when ‘Abd ar-Rahman returned to Shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Umar for his commentary on texts dealing with grammar, rhetoric, and the conjugation of verbs—sciences that were important, ‘Abd ar-Rahman explained, in order to establish the precise meaning of utterances. Following the mid-afternoon (‘asr) prayers, ‘Abd ar-Rahman joined Shaykh Mulay Ahmad al-‘Alami for his commentaries upon Ibn ‘Asim’s Tuhfa and, in later years, his Quranic exegesis, a subject that was then being reemphasized in the lesson circles of the Yusufiya under the stimulus of reformist shaykhs.

There was more flexibility in the content and conduct of the lesson circles that met after the sunset prayers. After sunset, Shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Umar went to a small mosque in a fort (qasr) situated next to the royal palace, where he lectured on Ibn Abi Zayd’s Risala, a twelfth-century legal text characterized by Berque (1949: 75) as a “juridical vegetation of practical applications, cases in point, and legal justifications.” The reformist shaykh, Mukhtar as-Susi, regularly lectured evenings at the shrine of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz at-Tabba‘ and in the Darqawi religious lodge, which also served as his residence. He even commented upon texts of poetry, including the Maqamat of al-Harirl and occasionally lectured in colloquial Arabic, so that his lectures could be widely understood.

The conduct of lesson circles in public settings, where they were accessible to nonstudents at all times, indicated popular support of and respect for the activities of learning, but also imposed implicit constraints upon what was learned and the conduct of the lessons. Leading shaykhs were publicly treated with deference and respect as they walked through the streets; their hands were kissed, and it was not unusual for gifts to be offered them by pious townsmen and villagers. As another indication of respect, many merchants and craftsmen regularly attended lesson circles for the religious merit they felt such participation would bring, despite the fact that few of them could follow the classical Arabic in which they were presented. Nonetheless, their presence restricted the introduction of unfamiliar material in lesson circles, informal discussions between teachers and students, and anything that deviated from popular expectations of what was “proper” for such activities.

Propriety of form obliged shaykhs to adhere to the rhetoric of classical Arabic and to comment only upon the texts of others. The formal necessity to do so, no matter how urgent some considered the political issues of the day to be (Berque 1974: 174–175), constrained both reformist and other shaykhs to stress that they spoke less for themselves than in their roles as transmitters of a fixed body of knowledge. As Bloch (1975: 16) has observed, at a high level of rhetorical formality, the content of speech and the order in which material is

arranged are not seen “as the result of the acts of anybody in particular, but of a state which has always existed.” Such form is, of course, congruent with the paradigm of mnemonic (and popularly legitimate) learning. The same level of formality is apparent in the preparation of tarjamas. The impersonal nature of the tarjama’s literary form, in which the third person is used both for biographies and autobiographies, reinforces the formal ideological conviction that religious knowledge is transmitted intact from generation to generation without alteration by persons or events. But although the words could be the same, meaning could shift, and the use of some texts and the neglect of others could be used to make a statement on contemporary events. Only those with a sophisticated command of such textual nuances could follow the meaning of the lecturer first-hand.

In practice, shaykhs could introduce a wide variety of material into their commentaries, but the base of the educational process was still a set of texts that took years to memorize and even more time to use actively in discourse. In itself, the form of commentaries did not limit innovation in subject matter and adaptation to change, except that it deflected attention from awareness of historical and contextual transformations.

The form of lesson circles conveyed the notion of the fixity of knowledge by minimizing active student contributions and by providing no checks upon what students understood. Only the student chosen as reader (sarid) of the text to be commented upon took an active role. As this task was rarely rotated, few students acquired even this experience. The shaykh interrupted the student’s reading only to correct errors of vocalization and to deliver his commentary. As with Greek and Latin literature in medieval Europe, the transmission of a text entailed taking it by dictation from someone reputed to know its proper form, so as to prevent the accretion of errors (Reynolds and Wilson 1974). More significantly, however, only the oral transmission of knowledge was regarded as culturally legitimate in the Moroccan context; knowledge acquired exclusively from the study of books, as in classical Greece (Ong 1981) was considered unreliable. Interruption of student readings was a way of signaling important points, and verbal emphases could be used to communicate more than a written text could convey. Significantly, the introduction of printed texts after 1865 (al-Manuni 1974: 207–213) had minimal impact upon the form of the lesson circles. No questions were asked during these sessions, and students rarely took notes or made annotations in the printed copies of texts that a few possessed. Former students explained that deference and propriety toward their shaykhs prevented their openly raising any issues. Questions had to be placed indirectly, usually in private as the shaykh prepared to leave the mosque or shrine, so as not to suggest a public challenge to his scholarship (see also Delphin 1889: 28). Moreover, as former students emphasized, informal contact with their shaykhs to discuss specifically textual matters was exceptional. Thus there were no significant practical opportunities for students to use the concepts or materials they sought to learn under the guidance of their shaykhs.

A parenthetical comment is essential here. There is no reason to assume, as many scholars have, that latter-day Islamic higher education in Morocco was a “decayed” remnant of earlier periods. Intra-Islamic differences noted by Ibn Khaldun have already been mentioned. In Morocco at least, the educational process was never fully encompassed within the public

activities of lesson circles. In other countries lesson circles sometimes were arenas for long-term dialogues between teachers and their students (e.g., Snouck Hurgronje 1931: 190; Fischer 1980a: 61–103; Makdisi 1981); this pattern is only one of several that Islamic education has taken, although it has often incorrectly been assumed to be normative for the entire Islamic world. Thus there were several patterns of Islamic education, of which the Moroccan emphasis upon mnemonic possession is but one realized form. Indeed, when some reformers decided in Fez that French should be added to the curriculum of religious students —it was never added at the Yusufiya—study of this foreign language took the characteristic form of memorized verses, in Arabic script:

sabah al-khayri ‘indahum “Bonjour” wa-in ’ardta tul ad-dawami qul “Toujours” as-su’al ‘an al-hal ‘indahum “Comment §a va?” wa-l-jawdbu ‘ind al-ghaya “Qi va.”[27]

“Good morning” among them is Bonjour, To express forever say: Toujours,

Asking “How’s it going?” among them is Comment ga va? And the reply to that is T’a va.

Reformist shaykhs sought to introduce new material into lesson circles and to draw students into a critical questioning of the relation of Islam to contemporary society (Merad 1971). A description and analysis of the context of their lesson circles and the extent to which they were innovative indicate the constraints that the public and religious conception of valued knowledge placed upon the potential for adaptation. Former students of the period, including ‘Abd ar-Rahman, spoke enthusiastically of the reformist shaykhs as having “liberated” (harrar) them from what they regarded as commentaries upon a narrow range of subjects that had remained unchanged for three or four hundred years. Such hyperbolic claims accurately reflect the attitude of students, but reformist teachings fit well within the “prismatic” nature of Islamic learning. A comparison of lists of texts commented upon at different periods from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century indicated regular variations in both subjects and texts (Delphin 1889: 30–41; Michaux-Bellaire 1911: 434–449; Peretie 1912: 334345; Marty 1924: 345–347; Berque 1949).

In practice, the principal achievement of the reformers of the 1920s was to introduce material into lesson circles that men of learning earlier had privately acquired in the houses of the elite: Quranic exegesis, theology, history, and classical poetry and literature (adab). The reformers argued that these topics were as much a part of the religious sciences as those subjects that had been taught conventionally in Morocco prior to their time (as-Susi 1961: ix, 167–168), a contention that engendered animosity from more traditionalist shaykhs. As Mukhtar as-Susi gained in popularity at the Yusufiya during the late 1920s, men of learning opposed to him went to the pasha and attributed to him the claim

that he saw himself as another mahdi like Ibn Tumart (d. 1130), the Berber religious reformer and founder of the Almohad [al-Muwahidun} movement, who modeled his life on that of the Prophet Muhammad and who saw himself as the Prophet's spiritual heir. As-Susi's detractors also claimed, with some contradiction, that he had students read poetry about women and drinking, not about religion. His more modernist detractors told students inclined to support him that they were not modernists {'asriyuri) but left-handed {'isriyuri), those who were not following the right path of Islam. The allusion to left-turning referred to lefthanded locks, those that did not conform to accepted patterns, and not to the political left of European politics. Such borrowed allusions became prevalent only later.

Despite reformist innovations and efforts to instil a new critical approach to the religious sciences that went beyond the assimilation of received texts and tradition, knowledge continued to be legitimized by indicating how it fitted within the established religious sciences. It also had to be conveyed in classical Arabic, which limited its accessibility to the same select few who participated in traditional Islamic education. Reformists made some use of colloquial Arabic, an immensely popular innovation, but mostly on the occasion of religious holidays.

The political authorities were aware how easily lessons in colloquial Arabic could become a formidable political vehicle. Nonetheless, even reformist shaykhs, to seek legitimacy for their teachings, lectured within the range of popularly expected places and times. The fact that they lectured only after the sunset prayers, a time set aside for the more peripheral religious sciences or for less established shaykhs, and in locales such as religious lodges and smaller mosques, signaled to all but their immediate followers that their teachings were not symbolically as central as the "core" components of the religious sciences taught during the day at the Yusufiya. Within the restricted group of mosque-university students, reformist shaykhs enjoyed a considerable following, despite the active opposition of many of the more traditional shaykhs, who were frequently backed by support of the public and the political authorities. In the context of the lesson circles, the reformists did little to make their teachings accessible to a wider audience or fundamentally to change prevalent understandings of the forms in which valued knowledge was conveyed.

**** Peer Learning

Peer learning has been neglected in the study of many educational systems, including Western ones, because it is characteristically informal.[28] In Morocco it provided what public lesson circles could not—an active engagement with and practice in the comprehension of basic texts. For most rural students, peer learning had special importance, since such students were usually even more cut off than their urban counterparts from initiating informal contacts with their shaykhs, especially during the earlier years of their studies. Even in urban milieus, reading and writing were often learned from peers and not from formal education.

‘Abd ar-Rahman’s experience in Marrakesh indicates the significance of peer learning. For the first three months after his arrival in Marrakesh, he lived alone at the Mwasin and gradually got to know which of his fellow students were intent upon their studies. In the room above him, for example, was a Susi, ST Muhammad Tanani, who later got a job working for the Ministry of Justice; he read in his room until as late as one in the morning. “I could tell because there was a light on his room for all that time.” During his early months in Marrakesh, ‘Abd ar-Rahman continued to visit the shaykhs with whom his brother studied, including Bu Shu‘ayb ad-Dukkali. One of the fellow students he met during one visit to Bu Shu‘ayb was Si Muhammad bin Talib ad-Dukkali, an older, impecunious student who was also living at the Mwasin. Because Si Muhammad was also from Dukkala and was a coguest with Shaykh Bu Shu’ayb, ‘Abd ar-Rahman assumed that the two scholars from Dukkala were “close” (qrib), another indication of Si Muhammad’s integrity. ‘Abd ar-Rahman explained how Si Muhammad came to share his rooms:

Si Muhammad (d. 1946) was a great man of learning who never spoke unless it was necessary. The Quran was always on his lips. He lived from the daily bread given rural students and from the daily eight francs he received for reciting [the Quran] at a mosque. I observed his conduct for some time. Finally, I spoke to him and said that I was a beginner [in the religious sciences] and wanted someone to live with me who could help me in my studies. So I gave him the key to one of my rooms and said it was his. I wanted nothing in return except the opportunity to speak with him about the books I was reading. Si Muhammad was in his thirties and I was sixteen or seventeen when we began to live together. Whenever he needed a little money, I gave it to him.

What I had been doing until I met him was memorizing books, but without understanding what I read. We worked alone for the first several months that we lived together. Then, although I was a newcomer to Marrakesh, students who had been there for years asked me to read with them. They saw that I was a serious student and wanted to study with me.

For seven years I lived with Si Muhammad.... This was the real learning that I did in my years at the Yusufiya. Of course I learned much at the lesson circles, but it was in reading texts {al-mutun) with Si Muhammad and with other students and in explaining them to each other that most of the real learning went on.

After he left the Yusufiya in the mid-193os, Si Muhammad became a minor official with the Ministry of Justice and married a daughter of the qadi of Dukkala, his region of origin. Some men of learning in Marrakesh are less admiring of Si Muhammad’s scholarly credentials; one described him to me as an ordinary, plodding rural fqih. Such an evaluation in no way vitiates the fact that he provided ‘Abd ar-Rahman with what the public lesson circles could not: an active engagement with and comprehension of the basic texts.

Knowledge of basic texts, however, was sufficient qualification only for modest positions as notaries or village teachers, though it was the terminal stage of learning for all but a few students. The additional knowledge considered essential for men of learning and the practice necessary to develop competent rhetorical style took place in a complementary form of peer learning—the small, ephemeral literary circles to which a large number of the more successful students belonged.[29] These literary circles flourished especially with the rise of the proto-nationalist movement in the late 192.0s, but similar groups existed in earlier periods and were by no means unique to Morocco (Delphin 1889: 27, 53; Heyworth-Dunne 1968: 13, 40, 66). Participants in these circles read and discussed the Moroccan literary magazines (e.g., Majallat al-Maghrib and Majallat as-Saldm) that had begun to emerge during this period, Moroccan newspapers and those of the Arab East (banned by the French), books on subjects such as history (including that of Morocco), geography, poetry, and their own compositions.

As was the case with other aspects of higher Islamic education, student literary circles were weak in organizational form and dissolved frequently. Most were relatively small, with a dozen or so members, and usually met daily, after the sunset prayers. ‘Abd ar-Rahman belonged to the “League of Goodness and Fortune” (jam‘iyat al-khayr wa-s-sadad), which lasted for about six months in 1932, until it was forced to dissolve by agents of the pasha. Although it was referred to in formal Arabic as a “league” or “association” (jami’a), ‘Abd ar-Rahman informally referred to the group as a ta’ifa, using a word associated with religious lodges, which the League resembled in form. The League’s informal leader was Ibrahim al-Ilghi, a younger brother of the reformist shaykh Mukhtar as-Susi, who rented a small house adjacent to his brother’s Darqawi religious lodge for the use of the group. A small fine was levied on members whenever they missed a meeting, the proceeds of which paid for a meal that its members shared each Friday after the communal prayers, a practice also common to the religious brotherhoods of the period.

The League of Goodness and Fortune, like other peer associations, provided a training ground for debating, speaking, and writing within the conventions of formal Arabic. Relations among its members approached equality, so that participants took turns in delivering speeches which were subjected to the criticism of the group.

To indicate the tenor of these speeches, ‘Abd ar-Rahman showed me a notebook containing a speech that he presented to the League. The aim of the speech was to defend Marrakesh against the charge that it was not a major cultural center because so many of its inhabitants were Berber-speakers and because it had a smaller community of learned men than Fez. In alliterative, rhymed prose, ‘Abd ar-Rahman defended Marrakesh by describing its physical beauty and its great poets and men of letters, both past and contemporary. The speech further enumerates the major marabouts (salihiln) associated with Marrakesh, confirming the lack of a sharp dichotomy in the early 1930s between a reform-minded Islam and a more popular form in which local maraboutic beliefs were considered to be an integral

part of Islam (see Eickelman 1976: 2.11230). The speech concludes by exuberantly labeling Marrakesh the “Baghdad of the Maghrib.” Most of the speech consists of conventional platitudes, but its content, diction, and syntax reflect a style mastered only by the traditionally educated.[30]

Some literary circles, especially those influenced by reformist ideas such as the League of Goodness and Fortune, were concerned to a limited extent with undertaking political action for the benefit of the wider Islamic community. Carriers of religious knowledge regarded themselves as legitimate spokesmen for Islam, and were popularly regarded as such. This was especially the case after the “Berber Proclamation” of 1930, by which the French formally extracted certain Berber-speaking regions of Morocco from the jurisdiction of Islamic law courts. This event had repercussions throughout the Islamic world as a symbol of the efforts of European colonial powers to weaken Islam. The practical influence of men of learning, sharply circumscribed since the advent of colonial rule, temporarily reemerged with this event. In some Moroccan cities, including Fez, protests organized against this proclamation were overtly political and occasionally violent (see Brown 1973: 201–215; 1976: 198–206). In general, however, protests took traditional and nonviolent forms such as public communal prayers similar to those in cases of drought or other natural disasters. Many of these prayers were organized by literary circles. In Marrakesh, firmly under the control of its pasha, Hajj Thami al-Glawi, demonstrations were rapidly quelled. Students with ties to urban and rural notables were warned in advance by their relatives to stay removed from the “troubles.” Said ‘Abd ar-Rahman:

A few days before the Berber proclamation, a messenger came to me from [my elder brother in] Bzu. He said that something big was going to happen in a few days and to stay away from it by remaining in the hostel. I didn’t know what it was. I thought that perhaps it had to do with a film the Jews were making.[31]

I remained in my rooms, but many of the other students went into the streets to demonstrate. Soldiers {makhaznis} from the pasha arrested many of them and took them to prison. Later, much later, some of the men of learning went to the pasha to plead for the students’ release, and most of them were. I wanted to continue my studies and these demonstrations had nothing to do with my studies.

Participants in several literary circles nonetheless took action that could at least formally be construed as nonpolitical. One such action taken by the League of Goodness and Fortune was for its members to persuade individually (to avoid suspicions of organized group activity) the men who gathered each evening in the town’s mosques to recite the Quran in unison instead of separately, as had been the practice, in order to symbolize the unity of Islam. In this activity they were successful, but the pasha’s police soon discovered who instigated it. Some leading religious scholars vouched for the intentions of the League’s members, so they avoided arrest. Still, they were compelled to give up their meeting place and refrain from meeting in the future.

The narrow range of political actions undertaken by participants in lesson circles and even student associations suggests the restricted vision of public responsibility associated with the Islamic tradition of “gentlemanly” education as elaborated in Morocco. A man of learning’s primary responsibility was to acquire religious knowledge and to use it in prescribed ways, not to seek to alter the shape of society. Reformist Muslim intellectuals in North Africa, stimulated at least in part by the fact of European political dominance, challenged many aspects of Islam as it was locally understood, both popularly and in educated circles, but they fell short of offering ideological and practical alternatives to the existing social order. Reformist teachings in the 1930s offered no alternative to the accepted popular notion of social inequality as a “natural” fact of the social order, nor did they elaborate a wider notion of social responsibility to men of learning than that of perfecting their own understanding of religious knowledge and communicating it to relatively restricted circles (Merad 1971: 193–227; Eickelman 1976: 126–130).

**** Sponsorship

Students remained in the milieu of learning for as long as they chose or were able to. Just as there were no formal markers of entry to this milieu, there were none upon leaving it. Only a few students managed to acquire reputations as men of learning. There were no explicit criteria by which recognition could be achieved, so education could not assume the function of “certification” so closely associated with modern Western institutions.

One means, however, of signaling the completion of studies was for a student to ask each of his shaykhs for a “teaching license” (ijaza). Such documents specified the texts or subjects studied and the qualifications of the teacher. In Morocco and throughout the Islamic world, teaching licenses were only as good as the reputations of their writers and the facility with which their bearers could use them (cf. Heyworth-Dunne 1968: 67–69; Makdisi 1981). As ‘Abd ar-Rahman commented, one sought ijazas from those shaykhs who “had God’s blessings in the religious sciences and feared God the most, those who were older and more powerful and who always had their hands kissed in the street.” In practice, many outstanding students of the period, especially those from Marrakesh itself, claim that they deliberately did not ask for such documents; many were prepared as mere courtesies for educated rural notables, and not to possess them could in some circumstances be a mark of higher status. What counted was sponsorship and active recognition by established men of learning and the effective use to which an individual could put such ties as well as those with other persons of influence.

Since the world of learning was not a closed community, support in nonlearned environments could also be decisive in acquiring a reputation for learning. As indicated in the following chapter, Moroccan men of learning of the generation of the 1930s have significant ties with each other, created in part through common schooling; but these ties are not exclusive, and overlap with social bonds created on other bases. Social recognition

as a man of learning is an attribute that is used variously according to social context. In Morocco such persons constitute a social type rather than a distinct group that has sharply defined boundaries or that acts collectively now or did so in the past (Brown 1976: 75–81; Burke 1976: 218; cf. Eickelman 1976: 89–91, 183–189).[32]

The majority of students rarely used religious knowledge in more than an iconic fashion, as a marker of one-time participation in the milieu of learning. When I asked former students about the fact that most left their studies prior to acquiring scholarly recognition, there was often a formal expression of regret but none of failure attached to such attrition. In discussing their years at the mosque-university, most emphasized the opportunities they created to secure ties with persons within and outside the community of learning. These ties often were of use later in facilitating commercial, political, and entrepreneurial activities. The frequency with which such ties were mentioned suggests an implicitly shared conception of career, although not in the narrowly occupational sense of the term. When I asked former students what their goals were at the time of their studies, most replied that they were concerned primarily with the acquisition of the religious sciences. This was to be expected, given the cultural emphasis upon such valued knowledge. Acquiring the religious sciences additionally implied participation in social networks with persons drawn from different backgrounds and regions of Morocco, and thus with actual or potential access to a wide range of centers of power. No other preparation, except perhaps association with the Sultan’s entourage, enabled a person to acquire such a wide range of potential associations. Knowledge of the religious sciences was, of course, essential at some level in order to function as a qadi, a notary, a scribe with the government, or a teacher in the religious sciences. Acquiring such knowledge also provided the consociational base from which a wide range of extralocal political, economic, and social activities could be undertaken, at least so long as there were no major alternatives to Islamic higher education.

** Five: The World of the Educated Rural Notable

“I received,” says Husserl, “the education of a German, not that of a Chinaman. But my education was also that of the inhabitant of a small town, with a home background, attending a school for children of the lower middle class, not that of a country landowner’s son educated at military college.”

—cited in Bourdieu 1967: 358

In the beginning of 1354 (April 1935), [‘Abd ar-Rahman] unwillingly returned to Bzu because his brother Ahmad (may God comfort him) appointed him as notary and deputy (nd’ib} without prior consultation. He intended to continue steadfastly in his studies but his hopes in this were extinguished. Circumstances did not otherwise permit.”

—Tarjama, November 20, 1976

*** The Return

One morning in April 1935, the car and driver of the qaid of Azilal, Qadi Ahmad Mansuri's father-in-law, arrived unexpectedly in Marrakesh. The driver had orders to take 'Abd ar-Rahman immediately to Azilal. Through friends traveling from Bzu to Marrakesh, 'Abd ar-Rahman knew that a notary in Bzu had recently died and that there was no other qualified notary of Bzu origin to take his place. He was also aware that his elder brother intended to appoint him to keep the post from going to an "outsider" (barrant).

'Abd ar-Rahman arrived at the Native Affairs Administration (Controle) building in Azilal later that day and was immediately ushered into the office of the French officer; his brother was also there. The officer took one look at 'Abd ar-Rahman and said that he was too young for the post. He was only twenty-two at the time. After further discussion, the captain finally allowed 'Abd ar-Rahman to proceed to Rabat to be examined by the minister of justice on his knowledge of Islamic law and to leave the final decision to Rabat officialdom. A mere notary could be examined and confirmed in Marrakesh, but appointment to the post of deputy qadi, even if unpaid except in the case of the qadi's absence, could be made only in Rabat.

Late that afternoon, 'Abd ar-Rahman left Azilal. He stayed overnight in Casablanca and at dawn proceeded to Rabat. As a religious student with little experience of the world beyond Marrakesh, 'Abd ar-Rahman had no clear notion of the hours of government offices. At seven in the morning, he arrived by mistake at the door of the Direction des Affaires Cherifiennes, the French-directed section of the protectorate administration charged with "advising" the sultan and the "Moroccan" ministries, which included the Ministry of Justice. After an hour's wait, a porter (shawsh) arrived and brusquely directed him, in a manner reserved for persons of country appearance, to the Dar al-Makhzan, where the Ministry of Justice was located.

At the Dar al-Makhzan, 'Abd ar-Rahman showed his letter from the Native Affairs Officer in Azilal to another porter and explained the purpose of his visit. So that he would be properly attired for the interview, Ahmad had lent his younger brother a silham, a light cloak worn over the jallaba on formal occasions. 'Abd ar-Rahman had no idea how to wear it, so simply draped it over his shoulders. The porter grabbed it from him and forced it over his head in the proper manner, then directed him to another porter. After another long wait, 'Abd ar-Rahman was ushered into a room with seven Moroccan "scribes" (katibs), seated on low-lying benches arranged along the walls of the room. In a curious attempt to preserve the "authenticity" of the "Moroccan" ministries, the French discouraged desks and chairs.

In retrospect, ‘Abd ar-Rahman admits with amusement that he did not cut an imposing figure. In the rapidly disappearing fashion of a rural religious student, his head was shaved and he wore no turban. His appearance alone was sufficient to amuse sophisticated Makhzan officials. They asked ‘Abd ar-Rahman where he was from, and he showed them the papers he had been given in Azilal. Teasing him, the clerks asked him how a Berber like himself learned to speak proper Arabic. ‘Abd ar-Rahman answered that he had memorized the Quran, so of course he could speak a correct Arabic. Then they asked him a number of historical questions, including the names of the founders of Morocco’s dynasties. The officials clapped their hands each time he answered correctly, saying how pleased they were to find a Berber notary who also knew history. Their other questions were more directly related to notarial tasks, including the fine points of formulaic phrases that notaries used in their work. ‘Abd ar-Rahman was not familiar with all of these, but he managed to answer to the satisfaction of his questioners. Finally they teased him about whether he knew how to prepare a marriage contract, saying that he was too young to be expected to possess such knowledge.

After an hour of questioning, ‘Abd ar-Rahman was told to leave the room. A porter escorted him outside the building to wait a further summons. After an interval, the porter beckoned to him, saying that the Moroccan minister of justice had arrived, but that the French delegate to the Ministry of Justice was not yet present. After another wait, ‘Abd ar-Rahman was called inside and made to sit in a chair between the minister and the French delegate. The minister asked him to read aloud and explain about fifteen lines of a text on jurisprudence. Other questions included explaining the meaning of “to judge” (gada) in Arabic and the six conditions necessary for a qadi properly to perform his tasks.

At first, the “Christian” delegate remained silent.[33] Then he posed, in Arabic, a problem in inheritance (mirath)-. “If a man dies and leaves a full sister (by his mother and father) and a sister by his father only, how is the inheritance divided?” ‘Abd ar-Rahman gave the proper answer: “The full sister was entitled to half, the half-sister to one sixth of the inheritance.” At this point, the “Christian”—‘Abd ar-Rahman could not further identify him—indicated his agreement to the appointment and left the room. The minister then told him that he was pleased with his answers, and informed ‘Abd ar-Rahman that a proclamation confirming his appointment as deputy to his brother would be issued.

‘Abd ar-Rahman left immediately for Casablanca. His older brother was waiting for him there, together with Hasan al-Bu Na‘manl, a poet and a friend of ‘Abd ar-Rahman.[34][35] He wrote a twenty-two-line poem, a qasida, for the occasion, the first line of which reads, “You gave me good news in the morning, then he walked in proudly” (Naba’ ‘atantft as-sabah mubashiran/fa-mashit li-ma an ‘ata mutabakhtiran) (reproduced in as-Susi 1961: xm, 171–172). After their meeting, Ahmad returned to Bzu. ‘Abd ar-Rahman returned directly to Marrakesh to pack his belongings.

As his brother’s unpaid deputy, ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s responsibilities were minimal. He attended all sessions of the court, held in his brother’s house, and acted as overseer for the various lands in possession of his family. As Ahmad was almost never absent from court, ‘Abd ar-Rahman first acted in the place of his brother only in December 1953, when his brother was summarily transferred to the coastal city of as-Swlra (Mogador), where he served briefly as qadi until being removed from the post because of failure to support the French deposition of Sultan Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif.[36]

Once in Bzu, ‘Abd ar-Rahman set about soliciting ijazas from his teachers in Marrakesh and men of learning of his acquaintance. Such documents had become devalued in urban milieus, but they still carried weight in rural settings. ‘Abd ar-Rahman eventually acquired four ijazas, three from shaykhs at the Yusufiya, Mukhtar as-Susi, Muhammad bin ’Umar as-Sarghini, and Mulay Ahmad al-‘Alami. The fourth he acquired in 1938, from the leader of the Kittaniya religious order in Fez, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani.

These ijazas retain a profound meaning for ‘Abd ar-Rahman. He copied by hand each of his letters requesting them, written in the flowery, rhymed prose similar to that of his speech defending Marrakesh, and preserved them carefully along with the documents he received. Since Mukhtar as-Susi was arrested by the French in 1935 and thereafter confined to his natal village in the Sus, signs of association with him might have been construed as incriminating in 1946 and 1953, the two times when ‘Abd ar-Rahman destroyed many of his papers out of fear of imminent arrest by the French. Despite the danger involved, ‘Abd ar-Rahman carefully preserved as-Susi’s ijaza.

As-Susi used the ijazas he wrote for rural men of learning as vehicles to further his views on Islam and Moroccan society. Although the ijazas from ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s two other teachers adhered to earlier forms, listing the qualifications and education of the teacher and the texts studied with the student, as-Susi’s ranged beyond these themes. His ijaza for ‘Abd ar-Rahman is dated z Safar 1354/6 May 1935. It begins by saying that the entire world is changing except for Morocco, which remains in ignorance. Fez and Marrakesh, he wrote, are still asleep, and the men of learning are dying one by one. Religious learning by itself no longer suffices to maintain a sound society. After this unconventional prelude, as-Susi describes the circumstances of his own life. He relates that his father died in 1328/1910-1911, before he completed memorizing the Quran, and he describes his studies at various madrasas in southern Morocco, the continuation of his studies under Bu Shu‘ayb and other scholars during his first stay at the Yusufiya (1919–1923), subsequent studies at the Qarawiyin at the time of the Riffian revolt (1923–1927), subsequent travels, and his return to teach at the Yusufiya in 1929. His style is lively and intimate, even when adhering to the contours of the traditional ijaza. He shapes the genre to his own sense of learning rather than merely perpetuating a received literary form. Although as-Susi uses the third person characteristic of such documents, he infuses the ijaza with personal opinion and reflection. By according similar documents to other rural students attracted by his ideas, he propagated his vision of reformist Islam into Morocco’s smaller towns and villages, an elusive task for most reformists.

As-Susi does not enumerate the books he commented upon when ‘Abd ar-Rahman attended his lesson circles. Such enumerations are, in fact, rare for ijazas written in the 1930s. Due to his frequent travels, his lesson circles were in any case only irregularly offered in Marrakesh. Instead, he lists the subjects studied: grammar, jurisprudence, rhetoric, literature, history, the sayings and actions of the Prophet, and Quranic exegesis. This range of subjects was far beyond the more limited scope offered by most men of learning. As-Susi’s conclusion is unique, for he writes that ‘Abd ar-Rahman is not his student, but his brother. He used similar language in other ijazas.

‘Abd ar-Rahman’s ijaza from ‘Abd al-Hayy is quite different. It is dated 19 Rajab 1357/14 September 1938, when ‘Abd al-Hayy was at the end of a week-long stay in Bzu as part of a protectorate-approved circuit throughout rural Morocco in order to collect donations for his religious activities. Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hayy was then at the height of his powers. A distinguished scholar who also enjoyed considerable popular support, he was also known to be quietly antagonistic to the ‘Alawi dynasty. His opposition to political movements brought him further favor with protectorate authorities, who accorded him privileges they withheld from other religious leaders. His downfall came in the 1950s, when he was one of the principal leaders of the movement leading to the deposition of Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif. In the 1930s, however, his friendship was still desirable. Shortly after his visit to Bzu, he was instrumental in securing admission of ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s half-brother, ‘Abd al-Hayy, to the Qarawiyin (see Chapter Two).

‘Abd ar-Rahman’s ijaza from ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani represents a breakthrough in the vulgarization of the genre. It was a printed form with blank lines for the date, the name of the supplicant, and the books “studied.” Rather than certify the transmission of a designated body of learning from one generation of scholars to another, it took more the form of a certificate of attendance at a lecture by the shaykh. Each night during the shaykh’s stay in Bzu, between the sunset and evening prayers, ‘Abd al-Hayy commented on al-Bukhari’s collection of the sayings of the Prophet. ‘Abd ar-Rahman acted as his reader.

‘Abd al-Hayy’s direct contact with ‘Abd ar-Rahman was thus minimal. He had only visited Bzu once before, and ‘Abd ar-Rahman saw him face to face only twice again. An avid bibliophile, the shaykh visited Bzu again in January 1944, where he remained as a guest of Qadi Ahmad while visiting the nearby zawiya of Ait Umghar and the shrine of Mulay Husayn, a claimed ancestor of the Kittanis. Another reason for the visit was to inspect the manuscripts of the zawiya of Tamanghilt, also close to Bzu. Qadi Ahmad doubled locally as overseer of pious endowments, so he was in a position to oblige the zawiya to allow the inspection of its holdings; he dutifully led ‘Abd al-Hayy there with other men of learning assembled for the purpose. The final occasion was in Fez, where ‘Abd ar-Rahman and his friend, Hasan al-Bu Na‘mani, visited the shaykh’s house in 1944.

‘Abd ar-Rahman proudly identifies himself as a carrier of reformist thought and is skeptical of religious brotherhoods. Yet he respected ‘Abd al-Hayy sufficiently to seek an ijaza from him. His subsequent ambivalence toward ‘Abd al-Hayy, discussed below, suggests both an implicit realization of the practical constraints upon men of learning in a rural context and ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s own emerging intellectual and political maturity.

*** Discerning Islam

Like their urban counterparts, men of learning in rural Morocco were aware of the major intellectual and political movements of their generation. At the same time, they were firmly enmeshed in local politics and society, where prevalent conceptions of Islamic belief and practice were not in accord with either reformist thought or entrenched interests. As unchanging as the image of formal religious learning was to some French observers of the colonial era, this learning was undergoing major internal debate and challenge.[37] This was also the case for more “popular” understandings of Islamic belief and practice (Eickelman 1976). As ‘Abd ar-Rahman matured, his conceptions of Islam underwent transformations that were mirrored in the experiences of many other men of learning in rural Morocco.

In the 192.0s and early 1930s, in Morocco as in neighboring Algeria (Merad 1967: 58–76), reformists saw major threats to Islam in the prevailing participation in religious brotherhoods and in various maraboutic practices, which are based upon the belief that certain persons, living or dead, have a special relation to God that makes them particularly well placed to serve as intermediaries with the supernatural and to communicate God’s grace (baraka) to their clients.

Although reformist Islam received limited support in Morocco in the early nineteenth century (Abun-Nasr 1963), by the late nineteenth century it had emerged as a major influence among Morocco’s religious intelligentsia and received the support of a succession of sultans. In Marrakesh, reformist thought was promoted by influential advocates, including Bu Shu’ayb ad-Dukkali, his student Mukhtar as-Susi, and Muhammad ibn ‘Uthman.[38] Because Marrakesh was under the heavy hand of Hajj Thami al-Glawi, the fusion of reformist thought and nationalist politics that was taking place in Fez in the early 1930s was less publicly apparent in Marrakesh. In Fez, men such as ‘Allal al-Fassi could form a bridge between the traditional world of learning (he lectured at the Qarawiyin) and the early nationalist movement (al-Fassi 1954: 111–136). Nonetheless, no significant obstacles were placed to the spread of reformist doctrines, so long as their advocates refrained from endorsing nationalist aspirations. Many rural students at the Yusufiya were strongly influenced by reformist Islam and carried the lessons of their shaykhs back to their small towns and villages of origin, where they were confronted daily with the contrasts between reformist teachings and prevalent local understandings of Islam. As-Susi and ad-Dukkali, themselves of rural origin, were especially aware of the importance of disseminating reformist thought in

rural areas, and kept regular contact with former students throughout the region by far-flung networks of patronage and influence.

Through studies at the Yusufiya, ‘Abd ar-Rahman became caught up in the reformist movement. At the same time, as the son of a tribal notable and landowner and younger brother of an influential judge, he was aware of the political and economic realities of rural Morocco. In 1976 he recalled:

Until I went to the Yusufiya, I thought that the religious brotherhoods were a part of Islam. In my studies, I read commentaries against the brotherhoods. I began to realize that even the practices of my father were not part of Islam. By the time I left the Yusufiya, I knew that the brotherhoods were an error.

When he first arrived at the Yusufiya, ‘Abd ar-Rahman was himself drawn to one of the religious orders. Many Makhzan officials were members of the Tijani order. He attended some of their meetings and read their literature. What stuck most in his memory was their practice of wearing a shawl (lizar) when reciting the litany (wird) of the order. After a member’s death, the Tijani shawl doubled as his shroud. For ‘Abd ar-Rahman, the symbolic use of such a material object was highly suspect and therefore to be avoided.

For ‘Abd ar-Rahman, some religious orders are more in violation of authentic Islamic practices than others, and must be explained in historical context. His father, he explained, distanced himself from a number of practices almost universal in his generation, such as visits (ziyaras) to maraboutic shrines and the reading of books of the miraculous deeds of maraboutic figures. The Kittani religious order, like the Tijani, attracted adherents from the sultan’s entourage in the early twentieth century. He did not use the dismissive tone for these orders that he reserved for comment on the less exclusive ones. In any case, before and during the protectorate era, Morocco’s rulers gave the leaders of religious orders decrees of investiture, providing them with a cachet of approval. Nonetheless, after his studies at the Yusufiya, ‘Abd ar-Rahman decided that all religious orders deviated to some degree from authentic Islamic practice. He explained his personal opposition to religious brotherhoods by elaborating on the distinction between the path of Islam (ash-shra‘), a term that encompasses both formal Islamic law and accepted Islamic practice, and innovation (bid‘a), for which there is no Islamic precedent. This distinction is integrally related to his sense of history and personal responsibility.

To clarify the distinction, ‘Abd ar-Rahman drew two parallel lines on a sheet of paper. He explained that everything within the lines was shra‘, the path constituted by the Quran and the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, as they are interpreted by Islamic jurists. All other practice—and here he indicated the boundless space outside of his parallel lines—

was bid’a, beyond the pale of Islamic conduct. He further explained that some practices were outside the path of Islam but not directly opposed to it. He penciled a line just outside one of the two parallel lines. He used this notion to explain legislative innovations not contained in Islamic law and the varying degrees to which the practices of religious brotherhoods constituted innovation.

In this conception of Islam, the advice of men of learning distinguished by their knowledge of the religious sciences and “the way things are done” (al-qa’ida) is essential to delineate authoritatively authentic Islamic practice. Such persons ‘Abd ar-Rahman refers to collectively as the elite (nas khassa). They are distinguished by an ability to discern between shra‘ and bid’a. Other persons, even if they are of high political rank, are commoners (‘awam). Those informed by a proper sense of the path of Islam are less likely to be taken in by confidence men (dajjdla) from religious orders or maraboutic shrines, and to be aware of the fundamental precepts of Islamic law governing marriage contracts and inheritance settlements. It is in any case the duty of a Muslim is to seek authoritative advice.

The distinction is not between urban and rural society, although he argues that persons in the country are less likely to have a clear understanding of Islamic practice. To illustrate his argument, he asked me to consider the courtroom comportment of persons of rural origin. In the courtroom, many tribesmen and women have difficulty in explaining the facts of their case in an appropriate form. Their descriptions of incidents are tied to highly local knowledge and they are often unable to describe the timing and duration of events in the abstract, datable form necessary for the application of Islamic law (Davis 1983: 95–97). Compared to town-dwellers, rural persons are less able to perform such a “translation” from locally comprehended descriptions of events, and lack a clear understanding of the specific requirements of Islamic law.

For ‘Abd ar-Rahman, bid‘a exists historically. Before Islam, no one was capable of living by the shra’ because it was not yet revealed, so that everything was bid‘a. Consider, he explained, the state of mystical exaltation (hal), for which some participants in religious orders work themselves into a trance (jadba). He explained that this is a vestige of the time of Sidna Musa (Moses), the prophet “who came before Muhammad offered mankind the keys to the mosque.” After Islam, some people added to Islam practices that do not exist within Islam itself. Muhammad came as the “seal” of the prophets, so that actions attributed to him carry a validity above that of the other prophets, and to which nothing further can be added. Yet the practices that preceded the coming of the Prophet have not disappeared, so the problem remains of how to reconcile them with Islam. He provided as an example the issue of saints (waits) in Islam.

Commoners are ignorant (jubhal). Many of them do not know what Islam is, and what their ancestors did. So someone can tell them a story of the miracles of a marabout and they will be happy.

Only the prophets, including Muhammad and his predecessors, can perform miracles. But there have been men since the time of the prophet Muhammad who are blessed (‘andhum karama) in the sense that they are used as instruments of God’s will. The naive and the gullible in Morocco attribute miraculous powers to certain marabouts, persons whom men of learning regard as distinguished only by piety, lineage, and scholarship. He dismissed the miracle-working powers attributed to Sharqawi marabouts with a wave of his hand.

To ‘Abd ar-Rahman, men of learning are also distinguished from other Muslims through possession of a sense of history that encompasses a knowledge of genealogies (hasab wa-na-sab){see K. Brown 1972: 131), prior rulers and dynasties, and key Islamic events. Although history ‘ta’rikh) refers broadly to a knowledge of all past events and an ability to place them in their proper context, the illustrations upon which Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman constantly drew concerned the immediate antecedents of men of power and learning. Knowledge of their genealogies, intermarriages, economic interests, and antagonisms rendered contemporary social action more predictable. Thus he characterized ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani, a religious leader with whose conduct he disagreed strongly, in the following terms:

He was a great man of learning (‘alim kbir). There were few like him in all the Maghrib. His library was one of the finest in the country. He could talk to a man and know everything about him: the name of his father, his grandfather, his ancestors, his brothers. Likewise he knew the history of everyone in the Maghrib.

Along the same lines, the first entries in ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s notebooks after he arrived in Boujad in 1957 are copies of sections of court documents related to Sharqawi kinship relations and property. Such history was directly useful in dealing knowledgeably with persons of influence.

Access to such historical knowledge is most readily available to the elite, who are better qualified to obtain knowledge through chains of reliable, known witnesses. Important knowledge, especially of political events, is often passed only by word of mouth among trusted confidants, signaling its exclusive nature. ‘Abd ar-Rahman explained that the chronicles of kings and the actions of their key ministers were often deliberately obscure in written sources. Everyone is afraid to write of such events. But the oral tradition available to men of learning provides the background necessary to understand events and their significance. Commoners lack access to such knowledge and the ability to assess its veracity.

As an example of such historical knowledge, ‘Abd ar-Rahman explained to me how he first learned of the militant antagonism of ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani to the ‘Alawi dynasty.[39]

I heard this [in the 1930s] from an ex-slave of Mulay ‘Abd al-Hafid [r. 1908–1912.], ‘Abd al-Baqi. Before becoming a slave of the sultan, he was a slave at the zawiya of Sidi Muhammad bin Nasir in Tanaghmilt (Ntifa). Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Kabir al-Kittani ad-Drlsl was head of the Qarawiyin [and of the Kittaniya order]. He refused to give the oath of allegiance to Mulay ‘Abd al-Hafid unless the sultan agreed to certain conditions. The sultan was angered. ‘Abd al-Kabir fled, together with his wives, family, and servants to the Bni Mgild, a tribe which was then out of reach of the Makhzan and loyal to the Kit-taniyin shurfa.[40] Before he fled from Fez, ‘Abd al-Kabir sent a rosary [tasbih] and a copy of the Quran to the sultan, the traditional tokens for requesting a pardon. The sultan had the slave who carried the message buried alive at night, together with the gifts, so that no one [except presumably the slaves such as ‘Abd al-Baqi who were entrusted with the task] would know that al-Kittani ever sought a pardon.

A document prepared by ‘Abd ar-Rahman just after he was appointed qadi of Boujad (May 6, 1957) gives a practical indication of whom he considered to be men of learning. Since his appointment obliged him to leave Bzu indefinitely—indeed, he subsequently chose to retire in Boujad—he was aware that an era had come to an end. He prepared a list of men of learning who had been entertained at his brother’s house in Bzu from its construction in the 1920s until Morocco’s independence. The heading of the list specifies “ ‘ulama’ wa-shu-rafa’,” but only those shurfa who were also men of learning are included. Most visits occurred in the 1930s, the apogee of the colonial period.

‘Abd ar-Rahman’s list encompassed 130 individuals, all of whom he also described as nas khassa, the learned elite. His list included the leaders of two key religious orders—religious orders retained popular respect in Morocco until the postwar rise of mass nationalism—urban and rural judges, high officials of the Ministry of Justice, a few educated shurfa, teachers at the Qarawiyin and Yusifiya mosque-universities, traditionally educated tutors of the children of Hajj Thami al-Glawi and the royal family, and several urban merchants and pashas (political administrators of principal towns). Most persons on the list were at least moderately wealthy, although there were exceptions. It included an itinerant Sufi (majdilb), dressed in rags, reputed throughout southern Morocco with mystical insight although he never uttered a word. He was assured hospitality at the houses of men of learning throughout southern Morocco. Other exceptions were some of the teachers at the two mosque-universities. Islamic learning had provided them with a means of social mobility. Jewish men of learning, like the French, were not enumerated, although ‘Abd ar-Rahman recalls that one of his elder brother’s respected local friends was a rabbi in Bzu who visited him regularly.

I asked a man of learning who was a contemporary of ‘Abd ar-Rahman but from Marrakesh to evaluate the names on his list. His assessment of who were “really” men of learning was much more restricted than ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s. He dismissed a number of qadis and clerks in the protectorate’s Ministry of Justice as “mere functionaries” who had no more than a rudimentary understanding of the religious sciences. Despite disagreement as to who properly qualified as men of learning, the scholar from Marrakesh used the same implicit

criteria as ‘Abd ar-Rahman: a demonstrated command of Islamic knowledge and its acquisition from men previously recognized as men of learning themselves.

*** Self-Images

When he first visited Bzu, Hasan al-Bu Na‘mani wrote a long, vivid letter to Mukhtar as-Susi, then in forced residence in High, his natal village in the Sus. The letter, dated 14 Jumada 1355/2 August 1936 (reproduced in as-Susi 1961: xm, 174180), was recited to his hosts before his departure. The letter offers vivid insight into the self-image of men of learning, an issue implicit in ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s careful inventory of learned visitors to Bzu. In his letter, Bu Na‘mani writes ironically of France’s protectorate as the “brotherly dictatorship” (al-diktaturtya al-ikha’iya) (as-Susi 1961: xm, 180). The letter alludes to politics, but politics is not its central concern. It is a mixture of circumstantial detail and exuberant literary allusion, so that its audience is self-consciously confined to those who share an awareness of valued literary texts, just as men of learning “possessed” common religious texts.

Bu Na‘mani writes that as soon as he stepped off the bus at the Wad al-‘Abid bridge, where the track to Bzu joined the motor road, he was approached by a servant leading a “superb” riding mule. Indeed, he claims hyperbolically that the servant and the mule were both so distinguished in appearance that they attracted the attention of bystanders gathered at the banks of the river. Later, as he approached “fragrant” Bzu, he discerned villagers standing on a small promontory overlooking the path, with the women ululating in pleasure at his arrival. He finally arrived at the house of Qadi Ahmad, which was also the law court. “Sidi”[41] ‘Abd ar-Rahman, the respected man of letters, waited for him at the door, surrounded by retainers, assistants, relatives, and a crowd of litigants. “Happiness and pleasure overflowed on their faces.” After saying “in the name of God” at the threshhold, Bu Na’mani and the group entered the elegant garden of Qadi Ahmad’s courtyard. It was “as fragrant as a garden of paradise.” Bu Na‘mani assures his audience that even the birds broke out in song for the occasion.

“Then as a sign of great happiness, court was suspended for the day and the litigants dispersed. We devoted ourselves wholeheartedly to pleasures and conversed delightfully on whatever pleased us.” The “us” in Bu Na‘mani’s narrative presumably excluded the litigants, who may not have been entirely overjoyed at having their concerns abruptly set aside in honor of a young poet from Marrakesh. Bu Na‘mani’s “us” also refers implicitly to the elite, in this case formed by men of learning, as opposed to commoners. Citing lines from contemporary Moroccan poets and those of earlier generations, Bu Na’mani narrates that the abundance of literary allusions raised in their meeting “almost swept away dignified bearing” on the part of those present, so intoxicated were they with the occasion. It was the sort of occasion where “brotherhood and forthrightness prevail ... in which princes forget their responsibilities and their dignified countenance before the world, and the modest man of letters forgets his reserve.”

Bu Na‘mani’s letter includes a description of the food he was served, the verses he composed in praise of Bzu during his stay, and the entire letter in which ‘Abd ar-Rahman initially invited him to Bzu. He comments of this letter that anyone reading it would immediately think that it was written by a man of letters from Muslim Cordoba in a playful mood. As for Bzu, Bu Na’mani avers that its beauty, graced by the presence of ‘Abd ar-Rahman and his cultured elder brother, made him forget even Marrakesh. Despite its hyperbole, the letter also conveys informality. Bu Na‘mani even alludes to a concubine provided for his stay (as-Susi 1961: xm, 180).

The letter’s style is self-consciously what Moroccans today call “Egyptian writing,” a style specific to the literary rennaissance (nahda) and proliferation of small literary magazines in Morocco during the 1930s.[42] Although this style bears no inherent correlation to reformist Islam, it was introduced primarily by men of learning influenced by Egyptian thought. This “new literature” (al-adab al-jadid), a term used by as-Susi (1961: xni, 174) to characterize Bu Na‘mani’s letter, is distinguished by references to classical Arabic poetry, especially that of Muslim Spain, and by frequent reference to books and manuscripts by other men of learning.

Men such as Bu Na’mani were in some respects “hired guns,” to adapt Schumpeter’s (1962: 147–148) description of medieval European intellectuals whose fortunes were closely attached to those of their patrons. Bu Na‘mani was not independently wealthy and lived off his wits. Like other men of learning in his condition, the occasional poems and letters he wrote while making the rounds of rural notables were recompensed with presents and lavish hospitality. Letters were his precarious metier. Others made the rounds of men of learning to secure institutional funds. Madani bin Husni, director of the Free School (madrasa hurra) in Marrakesh, an “independent” school established by urban merchants and other Muslims concerned with creating an Islamic alternative to colonial schooling (see Damis 1974), also travelled regularly to rural notables to collect funds for his school. Such visitors enhanced the reputations of rural hosts.

*** Bzu: The Two Faces of Learning

Successful comportment as a notable involved maintaining a delicate balance between competing pressures: competition from other notables, local supporters, the sultan’s entourage, and the French administration. Because Bzu remained a region without significant colonization, the Islamic lav/ court continued to be the primary vehicle for the resolution of land disputes for all lands except those considered “tribal,” which fell directly under the jurisdiction of French authorities. In outlying rural regions, some inheritance and land disputes were resolved without recourse to the courts, although an aggrieved party in an extra-court settlement could always later exercise the option of formally initiating a claim in court.

In a rural setting such as Bzu, there was a constant interplay between a knowledge of the formalities of Islamic law and an understanding of the limits of what could be accomplished in any given context. The Mansuri brothers were credited with a knowledge of the precepts of Islamic law and of accepted local practice (al-qa'ida), together with the "social rationality" or "reason" ('qal) to resolve disputes equitably. Hence the work of qadi was conducted on two levels, that of Islamic law and that of local understandings of what was right and just. A qadi was not just a functionary, as he has too often become in contemporary Morocco; his sound knowledge of the law was combined with an understanding of local society. Quite often much of the work of the qadi consisted in advising persons on how to conduct themselves in accord with the precepts of Islam so as to avoid resolution of their disputes in court. Continuing the tradition of their father, the Mansuri brothers were respected for their willingness out of court to help their clients reconcile what they considered their rights with what was accorded them by Islamic law.

As carriers of religious knowledge, respected by men of learning and by persons in political authority, the Mansuris were treated with deference in Bzu. They were also respected as landowners and local functionaries. In the 1930s, as in preceding decades, marriage continued to be an important means for cementing political bonds. Qadi Ahmad's first marriage in the early 192.0s was to the daughter of a local tribal shaykh and landowner. His second marriage in 1353/19341935 was to a daughter of the qaid of Ntifa, the same one with whom Ahmad's father had a serious dispute a decade earlier (see Chapter Two). In 1941, at the suggestion of his elder brother, 'Abd ar-Rahman further solidified this tie by marrying another daughter of the same qaid. These links provided the Mansuri brothers with the outside support they needed to maintain their local preeminence.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-knowledge-and-power-in-morocc-6.png][Figure 3. 'Abd ar-Rahman, 1939.]]

The Mansuri brothers were wealthy by the standards of the Marrakesh hinterland, but not extragavantly so. By the late 1930s they had acquired roughly 400 hectares (988 acres) of land and sizable livestock herds. They introduced mechanized agriculture and motor pumps for irrigation to some of their fields, and possessed two automobiles.

A major advantage of being considered among the "known people" (nds ma'ruftri) was a greater security of property. Title to lands in much of the Bzu region was by rasm, written agreement between buyer and seller drawn up in accordance with the tenets of Islamic law. The land involved in such transactions was often specified by local names, with actual boundaries known to members of the community rather than formally specified. When disputes over the actual limits of such land occurred, they could be resolved only by persons already familiar with the parcels of land in question and the validity of the claims of documents and witnesses to the land in question. In

adjudicating such disputes, judges relied inevitably upon the word of shaykhs and local notables. In the Bzu region itself, Qadi Ahmad was clearly the ultimate arbiter.

Unlike other parts of Morocco, virtually no land around Bzu was registered by the Torrens system of land registration, introduced by colonial authorities. Under the Torrens system, persons wishing to claim title to a plot of land register their claim, which is then surveyed to determine precise boundaries. Official notice is then given of the claim. Prior or conflicting documents are examined to evaluate their validity. All documents are registered in one central place, so that a single search reveals the status of a title. Registration of land under the Torrens system is known among Moroccan notables as possession by titre-, the French term is used. In principle, possession of a Torrens title greatly reduced the possibility of boundary disputes. Yet as ‘Abd ar-Rahman pointed out, notables rarely needed such protection. In fact, there was a clear disadvantage to holding a Torrens title, for it left no ambiguity over the extent of holdings for taxation purposes. Official French reports gave the extent of the Mansuri family’s property at roughly half of what they actually possessed. Such ambiguity was an unintended advantage of maintaining title whenever possible under Islamic law.

Prestige and authority exist to the extent that they are publicly displayed and reaffirmed. The attention given by rural notables to attending wedding feasts, funerals, and other significant gatherings of notables served not only to confirm patterns of practical domination, but sought to reaffirm it to outsiders. As ‘Abd ar-Rahman explained, having a constant flow of visitors to one’s house and visiting notables elsewhere lets one know what is going on in the world. The search for information and ability to obtain and recognize firm “news” (C. Geertz 1979:198–212) is facilitated when one is a notable. Whenever decisions had to be made affecting Bzu, the Man-suris were consulted and their advice heeded. Through regular patterns of reciprocal visiting, notables became apprised of one another’s interests and the practical limits of what was possible in current political situations. By the late 1930s and early 1940s, ‘Abd ar-Rahman began visiting other urban centers and rural notables on his own, at times in the company of his friend, Hasan al-Bu Na‘mani.

A sense of the scale and importance of such feasting is provided by the marriages of Ahmad in the mid-193 os and ‘Abd ar-Rahman in 1941. For Ahmad’s wedding, ‘Abd ar-Rahman recorded the name of each prominent guest, together with the present given to each of them, a varying mixture of cash and locally made Bziwi jallabas. The guests included qaids, qadis and their deputies from the regions adjoining Bzu; the deputy pasha of Marrakesh, Captain Ben Daoud, an Algerian-born military interpreter who was also editor of the protectorate newspaper, as-Sa‘ada (“Happiness”) (distributed free by colonial authorities to all persons designated as notables, and hence itself a minor indicum of status); several members of the Glawi family (although not the pasha himself); teachers from the Yusufiya; and key officials in the Ministry of Justice. ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani and Bu Shu’ayb ad-Dukkali both declined invitations to attend, but were nonetheless sent gifts, one jallaba for ad-Dukkali and three for al-Kittani. The total expense for the wedding was carefully recorded as 5,644 Hassani ryals. French colonial authorities and local Jewish notables were also present, although ‘Abd ar-Rahman did not record their names. Nine

thousand ryals were spent on a 1937 visit by ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani, and 160,000 for a visit of Sultan Muhammad bin Yusif to nearby Tamghalt, a visit hosted by the Mansuri brothers, in 1950.

‘Abd ar-Rahman’s own wedding is carefully reported in articles that appeared in issues 5,429 and 5,430 of as-Sa‘ada, dated December 27 and December 28, 1941. The categories of notables attending the wedding and the geographical range of invitees parallel those present at the wedding of his elder brother. As-Sa‘ada reported that wedding guests were entertained throughout a month. The newspaper estimated that food for the wedding guests was provided through the slaughter of 800 sheep and 300–400 cows. These indications of scale are perhaps more significant than attempts to assign specific monetary value to the proceedings.

As an example of how the Mansuri brothers used their ties with other notables to defend their interests, a serious conflict developed between Qadi Ahmad and a new official appointed as overseer for pious endowments.[43] Shortly after being appointed qadi of Bzu in 1926, Ahmad Mansuri was given the additional appointment of overseer of pious endowments for the Bzu region. His letters of investiture from Sultan Mulay Yusuf (r. 1912–1927) for both posts were renewed when Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif assumed the throne in 1927. Ahmad continued to hold both posts until 1943, when the colonial government decided that henceforth no official could hold two posts simultaneously. This move coincided with a long-delayed implementation of an earlier reorganization of pious endowment administration in the region. A single overseer was appointed with responsibilities for the entire region of Marrakesh and Ntifa. Unlike his illiterate predecessor, the new overseer was literate and reasonably effective, and actually secured support for extending his effective control over the hinterland of Marrakesh. Qadi Ahmad remained as deputy overseer for the Bzu region, an unpaid position. Former overseers in other regions, often qadis, likewise continued as unpaid deputies.

The new overseer, from an influential family in Marrakesh, at first had the support of Qadi Ahmad. According to ‘Abd ar-Rahman, when the new overseer was first appointed the Mansuri brothers considered him to be “close” to the sultan, in the sense of being in his favor. The man dressed poorly to indicate his humility and lack of avarice, and was himself considered to be a man of learning. Soon after his appointment, however, ‘Abd ar-Rahman claimed that he began to exploit his office for personal gain.

In 1942. Qadi Ahmad acquired land in Marrakesh. On part of this land he constructed a funduq, an all-purpose caravanserai used for merchants’ stalls, stored goods, stables, and, in this case, rooms for religious students. Its construction was completed in 1944. The overseer decided that he wanted to acquire Qadi Ahmad’s Marrakesh property for himself. The land does not appear have fallen within his official jurisdiction, despite the fact that Qadi Ahmad allowed the hostel to be used in part to lodge religious students. He successfully acquired the land and the funduq. From the point of view of the Mansuri

brothers, this was because he was supported by the French administration, with which the Mansuris were beginning to have difficulties. The dispute flared into the open and lasted for two years. After complicated maneuvers involving multiple intermediaries, this dispute and other outstanding ones were finally resolved in 1946 by Hajj Thami al-Glawi in the course of a personal visit to Bzu, during which he, of course, had to be suitably entertained. Qadi Ahmad failed to recover his lands in Marrakesh, but the pasha brought an end to the harrassment of the Mansuri brothers by local French officials, an objective that by then was more significant than lost property in Marrakesh.

*** The Responsibilities of Learning

If a man of learning stands out because of his better knowledge of the straight path of Islam and of the skills needed to discern this path, I asked ‘Abd ar-Rahman, then what is his responsibility toward his fellow Muslims? His reply was a paean to personal autonomy:

A Muslim’s duty is just to show the path to those who want to be with God, and that is that. Either they take it or leave it. The prophets allow them the choice. There is paradise and there is hell, and God selects who goes to each (see also Eickelman 1976: 116–130).

‘Abd ar-Rahman’s notion of responsibility focuses upon the social rationality of individuals regardless of economic class, their ability to discern their status and to act realistically in the context of contemporary society. As pointed out in Islamic contexts elsewhere (e.g., Kessler 1978: 2,11), such a notion of responsibility is profoundly asocial in the sense that the Islamic ideal is to be realized through individuals each improving his own conduct. There is no clear sense of collective goals short of those to be realized by the entire Islamic community. Such a conception of responsibility does not lend itself to a direct or central involvement in politics, although ‘Abd ar-Rahman recognized that the political context in which the shra‘ is realized is important, if only because political authorities, both in the colonial era and subsequent to it, have had the capacity to thwart Islamic practice.

Even within the sphere of “nonpolitical” Islamic practice, the responsibilities of men of learning are circumscribed. ‘Abd ar-Rahman described his only direct confrontation with ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani:

In 1944 I went with my father to a big reunion of the Kittaniya in Fez. Followers came from all over the Maghrib—Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Many of them were beating themselves, like my father did, and some went into trance. I said nothing. After all, my father and I were guests in the house of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hayy and most of the people there were under his authority (imra).

Finally, although I was the shaykh’s guest, I said to him that I had read an account of the orders which argued that the very practices I had seen that day in Fez were bid‘a, beyond the limits of Islamic conduct. ‘Abd al-Hayy replied: “No. These practices help people to remain on the path of Islam.” I replied: “Tell me [how]” (‘allimm). The shaykh did not reply. We did not return again to the subject.

‘Abd ar-Rahman’s direct challenge to the shaykh was contained in the public utterance of precisely one word, ‘allimni. I raised the question of why he did not further pursue the issue if he felt so strongly about the pernicious influence of brotherhoods. He replied that both he and Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hayy were aware of their entrenched and divergent views. ‘Abd ar-Rahman was moreover aware of the vastly superior status of the shaykh. Direct confrontation would have accomplished nothing. A futile display of anger or a persistent attempt to persuade a person irrevocably committed to a course of action to change his mind would display a lack of “reason” in the social arena. “Reasonable” men do not stand on absolute rights and wrongs. They seek to discern accurately the contours of existing social and political realities and on this basis calculate an effective course of action (see Eickelman 1976: 130–138).

In ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s view, there was also ample precedent for men of learning to cooperate with political authorities, even if they were French, provided that the wishes of the sultan and the principles of Islam were respected.

There is a saying of the prophet that we must obey God, the Prophet, and persons of authority (ahi al-amr). Ahl al-amr here in Morocco means the sultan.[44] So if the sultan decrees something which is not in the shra‘, I must nonetheless judge by it.

I then asked ‘Abd ar-Rahman whether he felt that some of the laws by which he conducted his court were therefore bid[45] a.

The sultan does not issue decrees on his own. He tells us that the decree prohibiting the division of inherited lands below a certain size is in the interests (maslaha) of promoting agricultural development. He also decrees that according to doctors it is not good for women to have children before they are fifteen because they are not yet ready. I married my wife when she was thirteen, well before the new decree, and her first two children died. So perhaps what the doctors say is true. Still, some women can have babies early. I heard on the news yesterday that a nine-year old American girl gave birth, but doctors say that most women cannot. So our decree says that if a woman does not get a paper from the doctor saying that she is at least fifteen years old, a judge cannot declare her marriage valid. It is in the interest of the woman that the decree is made.

Moreover, when the sultan issues a decree, first he consults with fifteen or twenty men of learning. So if the sultan wants a decree which is against the principles (qawa'id) of Islam, he cannot get it because he will find no men of learning willing to say that the decree is not contradictory to Islamic principles. So the sultan cannot issue decrees which are against Islamic law.

The sophistry of the ruler being unable to legislate against the shra' is arguable in practice. After all, some men of learning, including 'Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani, signed the Glawi's petition calling for the deposition of Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif in 1953. Yet there are cases in recent Moroccan history in which the interpretations of men of learning have been used to legitimate opposition to the express wishes of the ruler. The most dramatic case in recent Moroccan history was the opposition to the new Moroccan constitution by the scholar Mulay aPArabi aPAlawi, a sharif, student of Bu Shu'ayb ad-Dukkali, and tutor to the nationalist leader 'Allal al-Fassi. He opposed the constitution's endorsement of primogeniture in dynastic succession and a legislative assembly (see Waterbury 1970: 44, 92). He was not successful, but his objections were given wide publicity by those opposed to the constitution.

For 'Abd ar-Rahman, the implementation of Islamic law, not Islamic law itself, changes to accommodate political realities. He and his brother were not men of authority (sulta) in the sense of themselves making explicit political decisions. In times of acute crisis under the French, they sought to influence the political conduct of others by withholding support, not by actively working against the colonial system. For precedent they frequently cited the conduct of the monarch himself. Beginning in the late 1940s, political activists in the Istiqlal and other parties labeled such persons as "mystics" (sufis), using the term in a context which implies that they remained aloof from political activism.

The nationalist claim that men of traditional learning were "mystics" or "non-rational" (Waterbury 1970: 92) in this sense is incorrect. 'Allal al-Fassi, for example, despite his years as a student and teacher at the Qarawiyin, had developed significant contacts with both French opposition parties and Moroccans familiar with European political ideas (al-Fassi 1954). Their political ideas often paralleled those of their European and colonial counterparts, although their goal became liberation from European rule. Traditional men of learning recognized the fact of European political and technological superiority and resented it. Their response, however, was to address what they considered to be the most basic issue facing the Islamic community, to recapture its former momentum toward progress through internal discipline and educational reform (Binsa'id 1983: 32–35). When traditional men of learning were directly challenged, as they were with the deposition of Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif in 1953, an act that stripped all pretense of legitimacy from French rule, they were capable of courageous action.

** Six: Politics and Religion: From Protectorate to Independence

*** The Berber Decree

Explicit political challenge to colonial rule began to crystallize in 1930. The challenge was initially formulated as a religious one. The Berber Decree formally extracted certain Berberspeaking areas of Morocco from the jurisdiction of Islamic courts, submitting disputes to customary law courts instead. The decree was issued on May 16, 1930. The first demonstration against it took place in Sale, Rabat's twin city, on June 20, 1930. Kenneth Brown's (1973) excellent account of the event, based in part upon interviews with participants, 'Abd ar-Rahman's contemporaries, makes it clear that the leadership was almost entirely in the hands of the sons of the town's elite, both those who were attending French schools and those with a traditional education. They shaped their protest in religious terms that won widespread popular support.

The protest took the form of public recitations of the latif, a collective invocation to God in times of disaster or distress. The issue was framed as one of purification of the Muslim community, in this case from a disaster attributable to rule by non-Muslims, the Berber Decree. The latif was a form of public gathering understood by all generations of Moroccans. Soon other cities throughout Morocco followed the lead of Sale. Marrakesh was an exception. For 'Abd ar-Rahman, ignorance was to blame, although the fact that his brother warned him to stay away from imminent demonstrations for fear of arrest suggests an equal concern with political reprisals. Few people in Marrakesh could then read or understand what the French were doing. Fez was burning with reaction to the proclamation. In Marrakesh, we read the newspapers [prohibited by the French], but did not know what they meant. The [Berber] proclamation was against the shra', but we didn't realize that at the time. Besides, the city was under the firm hand of the Glawi. Anyone who went against him risked certain imprisonment.

When I pressed him on why he did not seek to explain to people in Marrakesh the implications of the Berber Decree if indeed they were unaware that it was a threat against Islam, he replied that his primary concern was his religious studies, which participation in political activity could bring to a sudden end.

'Abd ar-Rahman nevertheless shared with the early nationalists the sentiment that Islam was threatened. Before he left for studies at the Yusufiya, he remembers once having visited a small, French-run school. He recalls the older boys at the school smoking, allowing their hair to grow, and knowing nothing of the Quran. "They had lost Islam." Despite Lyautey's earlier efforts to create an amalgam of French and Islamic education for notables, French educational efforts were regarded with mistrust. Colonial rule was an attack upon Islam, and it was in these terms that French rule was most readily understood. For many educated urban youth of his generation, the shift to proto-nationalist activities began in the early and

mid-1950s. For ‘Abd ar-Rahman this shift never took place, although he was intimately aware of nationalist activities and goals.

So long as the fiction of respect for Islam and the formal consent of the sultan could be maintained, the French had the acquiesence of most men of learning. Once that fiction began to crack in the late 1940s with a series of open confrontations between the Palace and the Residence, the days of French rule were numbered.

*** The Colonial Apogee

Colonial rule unintentionally strengthened the networks linking educated rural notables. The size of rural administration during the colonial era was admittedly miniscule in comparison with the burgeoning bureaucracy of the postcolonial era, but it nonetheless provided a number of previously unavailable sinecures for the traditionally educated.

The French vision of rural Morocco was that of a honeycomb, with the notables within each cell jockeying over matters of local import (Montagne 1941: 19; Gellner 1973: 367368). The French, by favoring what one intelligence officer called the “natural leaders” (Berriau 1918: 4–5) within each ceil, supported those local notables whose interests could be made to articulate most closely with their own. In this French vision, the highest local Moroccan official, the qaid, would only communicate officially outside of his cell through a French Native Affairs Officer {hakim) or Civil Controller [muraqib), the lowest officials in the French native administrative hierarchy. Consequently all communications between the sultan and his appointed local officials were to be brokered through the French administration (Gellner 1973: 367–368).

French understanding of Moroccan rural society neglected the pervasive transregional ties of patronage and influence among notables and men of learning, which could be used to subvert the official French hierarchy. Rural notables easily remained abreast of major political developments throughout Morocco and the Islamic world, often obtained access to confidential French documents concerning themselves, and circulated banned newspapers with ease. Especially after relations between the sultan and the French deteriorated in the decade following the Second World War, local notables devised means of regular communication with the Palace that evaded French control.

In discussing the Mansun brothers in the 1970s, some urban-born scholars in Marrakesh described them to me as modest country fqihs who like others of their kind owed their careers to collaboration with the French. Moroccan intellectuals, like others, are capable of judging past actions through the simplified prism of the present. The Mansuri brothers, together with many other men of learning of their generation, collaborated with the men of authority. In doing so, they followed the lead of their monarchs, a succession of whom

accepted French “tutelage.” When the ruler began increasingly to chart a course independent from that of the French, the Mansuri brothers continued to follow his lead, often displaying personal courage.

In 1962–1963, a schoolteacher from Tetouan, capital of Morocco’s former Spanish zone and a center of learning, asked Qadi Ahmad to prepare a tarjama, so that his participation in the events of the early part of this century would be recorded in his own hand. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Qadi Ahmad did not rewrite his personal history to conform to contemporary fashion. It did not omit his role in organizing the first rural tax and the “pacification” of the Ait ‘Tab, an act which in his view averted unnecessary bloodshed. The tar jama omits only the fact that he was awarded a colonial medal for his actions. It is admittedly somewhat self-serving in recounting how a local Native Affairs officer in 1953 recognized Qadi Ahmad’s integrity and therefore successfully recommended against sending him to prison, the fate of many other notables courageous enough to refrain from publicly supporting the sultan’s exile to Madagascar in 1953.

The tarjamas of many of Qadi Ahmad’s contemporaries often downplay the significance of their involvement with the French. An example is provided in as-Susi’s (1961: ix, 3537) compendium of men of learning in the Sus. According to one entry, when in 1914 the French conquered the region in which Sidi Ahmad al-Ahrlyi al-Tajarmunti (b. 1897) was teaching, they saw his excellence in spite of his youth. “Humbly and deferentially,” the French invited Sidi Ahmad’s cooperation. The tarjama then depicts a career in which the scholar first was obliged to assist the French in making a survey of land ownership in the region, then returned to religious teaching, a second interval of unspecified work for the French, and finally a return to madrasa teaching. Since the scholar was compelled to cooperate, he is freed of responsibility.

As was the case with most rural notables, the tenor of Mansuri relations with French authorities changed significantly over time. Through the 1930s, relations remained correct and reasonably cordial. Reports of Qadi Ahmad’s activities in the “heroic” early days of the protectorate were faithfully passed along to new administrators in his confidential intelligence dossier.[46] As is standard in such reports, his politically important family ties are listed as are his properties, although as mentioned in Chapter Five, the size of his agricultural holdings and herds are underreported by roughly half: four houses, fourteen gardens, two hundred hectares of cultivated land, two mules, fourteen cows and four hundred sheep. The report continues that Qadi Ahmad is distinguished in his knowledge of Islamic scholarship and possesses a “first class diploma” [sic] from the Yusufiya. “He knows Arabic literature and is informed on modern social life. He is considered to be a just qadi and is respected, enjoying a major influence in the entire region. He is helpful toward the French and has the aptitude to be appointed a qadi in a city or a qaid in a rural area.”

*** The War Years

Protectorate rural administration worked reasonably well until the Second World War. Many civil and military administrators were rapidly trained to replace officers who refused to serve with Vichy or who had earlier chosen to return to France for active military service.[47] More important than the declining quality of available administrators were the economic and political dislocations of the war years and a renewed impetus to the nationalist movement from the realization that the French were not invincible.

In the course of our discussions, ‘Abd ar-Rahman was the first to raise the subject of the declining quality of French administrators in the war years. He observed that the French began to recruit their officers from a different category of persons in France. My notes on August 28, 1969 record:

He asked me whether there wasn’t an equivalent to shurfa in France, who all had pierced ears so that they could recognize one another. I asked him whether he ever saw an A.I. officer or civil controller with a pierced ear. ‘Abd ar-Rahman replied that he had not, but only “heard” that French shurfa had distinguishing marks. I tried to explain as best as I could the hidden marks of social class in France—language, style, and attitudes toward society.

‘Abd ar-Rahman’s concept of divisions in French society, like his perceptions of the European war, “the fuss in Europe” (as-sda‘ fi-‘uruba) is imperfect. European society is at the periphery of his social imagination, and is as blurred as counterpart French colonial visions of the Moroccan social order. In contrast, his comments on French local policy during the war years are concrete and precise. ‘Abd ar-Rahman says that the “non-shurfa” administrators of these years had orders to follow the lead of local qaids, who were assumed to know how to “handle” the populations under their jurisdiction. After the defeat of France by the Germans, colonial officials were also concerned that an uprising against colonial rule might occur in Morocco.[48]

Whatever the deficiencies of personnel assigned to rural posts in Morocco during the Vichy years, the officer in charge of the Azilal post for seven years beginning in 1941 achieved the grudging respect of the Mansuri brothers. A surviving fragment of ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s diary, written on March 4, 1948, the day that Captain Fist left Azilal, describes the hakim as a “human devil” (insan min ash-shayatm), the only instance in which such extraordinary language occurs in his writing.[49] According to the diary entry, Captain Fist was a fencer and skilled horseman, married to an “American.” This is an extraordinarily remote possibility for a French colonial officer of the period. Given the presence of Americans in Morocco after the Allied landings, ‘Abd ar-Rahman appears to have assumed that all non-French foreigners of the period were American. Fist was so fluent in classical Arabic that he could speak for half an hour without error or pause.

Although recognizing his extraordinary qualities, the diary also describes Fist as perfidious ‘fih al-khda‘). He introduced a network of spies and informers into the region,

held back the distribution of some ration coupons to sell them on the black market and, despite the presence of his “American” wife, cavorted with dancer/prostitutes {shaykhat). The quasiheroic and contradictory qualities attributed to Fist indicate how peripheral the European presence was to the society and administration as experienced by ‘Abd ar-Rahman, despite the fact of colonial political and economic domination.

It would have been difficult for any Native Affairs officer to have been liked by tribesmen or notables as political and economic conditions progressively deteriorated. The use of corvee labor was intensified. To feed France and Morocco’s urban population, Vichy introduced food rationing, even to rural regions, and requisitioned crops and livestock against paper money that was almost worthless because there was nothing to buy with it. The black market flourished, often with the connivance of local officials. Whatever the alleged deficiencies of Fist’s character, ‘Abd ar-Rahman grudgingly admitted that the captain knew with precision what occurred in his jurisdiction and extracted the maximum resources from it.

The Mansuri brothers had had reasonably good relations with earlier local officials. With Fist, there was animosity from the beginning. Once the captain’s coolness toward the Man-suris became public knowledge, those engaged in land disputes and other quarrels with them initiated denunciations, often anonymous, against them, knowing that they had a receptive audience. Cordial relations with earlier officers had insulated the Mansuris from such attacks.

An initial cause of contention between Fist and the Mansuri brothers was a late-model Dodge that Qadi Ahmad imported just before wartime restrictions were imposed. At the time, only the sultan possessed the same model of automobile in Morocco. Because of fuel rationing, Qadi Ahmad put the Dodge up on blocks and used another, smaller vehicle that consumed less fuel. Later, when the sultan required a spare part for his own vehicle, he sent his chauffeur to Bzu for it. Qadi Ahmad willingly stripped it from his car. Fist was furious. He wanted the Dodge for himself. Fist cut off the food rationing coupons of the two brothers. A Jewish merchant in a nearby town managed clandestinely to deliver food to them in the night.

Qadi Ahmad responded in kind. He wrote an anonymous letter denouncing Fist to his superiors. Because of restrictions on travel and the risk of immediate detection if the letter were mailed locally, Qadi Ahmad gave the letter to a Bzu merchant with a travel permit, who posted it in Casablanca. Fist suspected the Mansuri brothers of orchestrating local protests against his conduct, an act that he regarded as sedition (fitna).

One reason for his suspicions were the brothers’ informal communications with the palace. Especially after his meeting in Anfa, near Casablanca, with Roosevelt and Churchill on January 22, 1943 (Hassan II 1978: 29–30), the monarch disregarded official channels for communicating with local officials and contacted them directly. On January 11 of the

following year, the leaders of Morocco's Istiqlal (Independence) party gave the monarch a copy of their manifesto, which included the demand for independence. Under intense French pressure, Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif issued a statement that the word "independence" should not be used. The Istiqlal party, which until that year had received its support primarily from the urban bourgeoisie, began to achieve a much wider base of popular support. Recognizing this, the French initiated a wave of arrests in February 1944, which included a number of prominent men of learning (Julien 1972: 198–199). Despite French intimidation, the ruler maintained informal channels of communication. An unsigned note on fine paper dated October 31, 1945, summoned Qadi Ahmad to the sultan in Rabat, just as the sultan summoned scores of other local notables to take measure of his support. It also said that the king "was pleased with his actions and aware of what Hajj Ahmad was doing," a sentiment ambiguous enough to withstand possible French interception. The Qadi traveled to Rabat without formal permission from the French, thus earning more censure from local authorities.

In 1944 there were violent pronationalist riots in the major cities. The French suspected collusion between the Palace and nationalist leaders, and there was a wave of repression in which both nationalist leaders and men of learning were interrogated and imprisoned (Bernard 1968: 24). The accusation of suspected nationalist activity, like the legal offense of having a mauvais esprit, was increasingly used as a tool of intimidation by colonial authorities, who now had added pretexts to intervene in local quarrels. Fist received letters denouncing the Mansuri brothers for giving money to 'Allal al-Fassi and the Istiqlal movement. 'Abd ar-Rahman says that they never made such contributions, but his brother's contacts with the palace and refusal to denounce local nationalists led them both to be suspect. By late 1944, open hostilities between Fist and the Mansuris were attenuated by a personal visit from Hajj Thami al-Glawi to Bzu, said to be acting on instructions from the monarch. Hajj Thami arranged a reconciliation between Fist and the Mansuri brothers, and brought an end to several other outstanding disputes in the region.

'Abd ar-Rahman's surviving notebooks for the 1944–1946 period contain a mixture of information on local events and radio news: the end of the Second World War in Europe (May 8, 1945), the resignation of De Gaulle (January 21, 1946), and commemorative verses written by men of learning. The most striking element of the diary is its relentless recording of local economic conditions. It is difficult to provide meaningful conversion figures for the rapid fluctuations in currency in the last days of Vichy, but the dramatic escalation of prices as commodities disappeared from the market indicates the increasing gravity of the situation.

A prolonged drought and famine in 1945–1946 exacerbated conditions. 'Abd ar-Rahman's penciled diary entries record the lack of rain, massive crop failures, and the widespread death of animals and humans from starvation and typhus. In the immediate vicinity of Bzu, he records that 5,000 persons died between 1941 and 1944 (1360–1363). When finally rains fell for a week in 1944, they were immediately followed by an attack of locusts that stripped even the bark from trees. Despite these hardships, the French intensified the corvee and requisitioned the meager crops of olives and oranges. In famine conditions, law and order broke down. Tribesmen took to killing travelers, and no one was brought to justice. By early

1946 in the Ntifa region, 11,000 deaths were attributed to typhus. Pestilence took over from hunger and cold as the leading cause of death. Some wealthy merchants and notables made enormous profits from the black market during this period. Others, especially during the 1945 famine, massively expanded their landholdings by purchasing land and houses for a few measures of grain, turning tribesmen into sharecroppers and townsmen into tenants.

Table 4. Price Increases in Bzu, 1942–1944

| Commodity | Unit of Measure | 1942 | 1944 | Inflation Rate (%) |

| Barley | ‘abra{3} | IO F. | 1,000 F. | 10,000 |

| Wheat | ‘abra | 200 | 1,500 | 750 |

| Mutton | kilo | 10 | 150 | 1,500 |

| Chickens | each | 15 | 22.5 | 1,500 |

| Sugar | kilo | 7 | 2,000 | 28,571 |

| Tea | kilo | 30 | 400 | 1,333 |

| Olives | kilo | IO | 250 | 2,500 |

| Lard | kilo | 15 | 250 | 1,667 |

| Honey | kilo | 20 | 250 | 1,250 |

| Candles | each | 3 | 100{4} | 3,333 |

| Charcoal | kilo | 2 | 100{5} | 2,500 |

| Cotton fabric: men’s clothing | meter | 2 | 3,500 | 175,000 |

| women’s | | 6 | {6} | |

| “Heavy” textiles | meter | IO | 800 | 8,000 |

| Silk (black market) | meter | 10 | 7,500 | 7,500 |

| Sargha (cloth for jallabas) | meter | 150 | 5,ooof | 3,333 |

| Iron Balgha (trad, shoes): | kilo | 2 | 50 | 2,500 |

| Men’s | pair | 30 | 750 | 2,500 |

| Women’s | | 40 | 2,500 | 6,250 |

{3} Lit. “measure.” A local measure used for cereals; equivalent to 12 kilograms in Bzu.

{4} Subsequently disappeared from the market.

{5} Ibid.

{6} Ibid.

Source: Diary of Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman, 1944.

Conditions improved after September 1945, when food and seeds provided by American aid began to be distributed through the colonial administration. ‘Abd ar-Rahman wrote in his diary in that month, “Because of the great dollar, people were freed from famime. People thanked God for what the Americans did and recognized the greatness and goodness of the American empire” (dawla). He also wrote a qasida in praise of the occasion. The price of wheat fell from 1,5 00 francs to 750 francs, and that of barley from 1,000 francs to 45 francs.

The Fist era came to an end precisely on March 4, 1948. On that date he summoned the notables of the region to Azilal—shaykhs, qadis, and qaids—and ordered the qaids to bring tribesmen on horseback. French officers from other regions were also present. Fist reviewed the assembly, shook the hand of each in farewell, and then provided a lunch for the notables. ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s diary records that the real celebrations began once he left the region.

*** Postwar Nationalism

For a brief period after the Second World War, especially during the tenure of Eirik Labonne as Resident-General (19461947), colonial policy became liberal and reformist. Agricultural development schemes were initiated and major efforts were made to expand facilities for health and education. Pressure from colons and the more conservative elements of the colonial administration soon eviscerated the most basic reforms, especially efforts to

modernize indigenous agricultural production (see Berque and Couleau 1946; Bidwell 1973:228232). _

A key political event reflecting changed Moroccan sensibilities toward colonial rule was a speech delivered by Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif in Tangier on April 10, 1947, the text of which had been submitted under pressure to the French for prior approval. Three days before the king's speech, Senegalese troops in Casablanca opened fire on demonstrators, leaving hundreds of casualties. When the king delivered his speech in Tangier, he left out a phrase praising the French Julien 1972.: 311). Moroccan nationalists enthusiastically welcomed this first public indication of the king's opposition to the French. On May 14, 1947, Labonne was replaced as a consequence of this incident by General Alphonse Juin, who sought through vigorous police action to suppress the nationalists and to compel the Palace to disown them. Under intense pressure, the monarch agreed to restate his loyalty to France, but refused to speak against the nationalist movement. Repression intensified and Juin became increasingly impatient with the silence of the palace Julien 1972: 324–326).

The main consequence for Bzu of the brief postwar liberal interlude were plans to expand the French administrative presence, which, however, were implemented only after the return to more repressive colonial policies. In June 1949 a Captain "Boeuf" arrived in Bzu. In addition to overseeing construction of the new administrative center and adjacent houses for government employees, he supervised construction of a bridge for one of the major access roads to the Bzu market and set up Bzu's first electric generator. It provided electricity for the administrative center, a school, and a few nearby houses for civil servants. Boeuf amazed villagers by performing manual labor alongside his workers, and paid wages rather than relying upon the detested earlier practice of the corvee.

The administrative center was officially opened on December 12, 1949. A feast marked the occasion, attended by the Moroccan notables of the region and key regional French officials: "Talig" (Bni Millal), "Alexandre" and "Gamsi" (Azilal) and "Doyen" (Tanant). The qaid of Azilal had until then successfully opposed the opening of additional French administrative centers, correctly sensing that an expansion of the French administration would diminish his own influence. Prior to 1949, the French Native Affairs officer was present in Bzu only the weekly market day.

The strongest indication of a shift in popular sentiment toward the monarchy during the 1940s was the widespread replacement of the title "sultan" with the more "modern" usage of "king" (malik), a usage that first gained currency among the educated in the 1930s. For the French, the ruler of Morocco was the sultan, and his entity of rule was the Sharifian Empire, concepts that nationalists regarded as archaic. "King," in contrast, delineated the ruler of a specifically delimited territory. For the French, use of the title "king" was evidence of nationalist agitation and therefore illegal.

Although the French sought to discourage travel by the monarch in the late 1940s, they allowed the leaders of complaisant religious orders to circulate freely, collecting gifts and donations from their remaining supporters. ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani continued to travel throughout Morocco with the blessings of the French, as did Hajj ‘Abd as-Salam an-Nasiri, head of the the Nasiri religious order in Tamgrut. Hajj ‘Abd as-Salam last visited Bzu in a car surrounded by fifty splendidly dressed, armed retainers on horseback in 1949. ‘Abd ar-Rahman described his “progress” (harka) as being “like that of the sultan.” Such visits nonetheless ceased after 1949, as the safety of these religious leaders in their travels could no longer be assured because of their open support for the French.

When the king was allowed to travel, he was enthusiastically received. In April 1950 he visited Marrakesh. ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s diary records the visit. To get a glimpse of their ruler, crowds, including ‘Abd ar-Rahman, lined his intended route from early in the morning. At 10:20, Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif got out of his automobile in Jama’a al-Fna’, entered the madina and walked to the Yusufiya. Carpets were spread over the entire route. Although the walk was a short one and the monarch was not permitted by the French to make a speech or to pause at the Yusufiya, he returned to the motorcade only at 11:15. Along the route, spectators continuously chanted “Long Live the King!” and “Long Live the ‘Alawi dynasty!,” words that ordinarily led to arrest. ‘Abd ar-Rahman recorded: “Those lining the route cried out these slogans until the colonialists (al-musta’mirin) wanted to close their ears.” The king then proceeded to the pasha’s house in Ryad Zaytun for lunch, and in the evening met there with the men of learning of the Yusufiya.

As with any royal progress, there was competition among local notables to entertain the king and his entourage. One spinoff of the monarch’s visit was a separate visit to Bzu by several ranking members of his entourage, including Madani bin al-Husni of the Ministry of Justice, the historian Muhammad bin ‘Abbas al-Kabbaj, the ubiquitous poet Hasan al-Bu Na‘mani, and Mukhtar as-Susi. The member of the group who arranged the visit, Hasan bin Ahmad bin Mas’ud, was a close friend of Qadi Ahmad. He sent a letter in advance (dated April 23) from Marrakesh announcing their arrival time and specified the desired menu. For one dish he even provided the recipe, just in case the preparation of the Rabati speciality was unknown in rustic Bzu. The visit, of course, reaffirmed the prominence of the Mansuris.

The Mansuris were so firmly entrenched in the administrative apparatus of rural Morocco that they could occasionally get their way over the objections of local French authorities. In September 1950, local French authorities at first denied ‘Abd ar-Rahman permission to go on the pilgrimage, a key event for which he had been planning for years. For the French, participation in the pilgrimage was a potential danger. It usually entailed visits en route to Arab countries antagonistic to colonial rule. Withholding permission was also a stick to be used against lukewarm local officials. For ‘Abd ar-Rahman, it was interference with one of his most important obligations as a Muslim. In undertaking the pilgrimage, a Muslim undertakes formally to commit the rest of his life to God. Almost the only decorations in ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s house, in addition to portraits of Morocco’s present king and Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif, is one of ‘Abd ar-Rahman himself, taken upon his return from Mekka, together with the

prayer-mat he used there and other souvenirs. The pilgrimage had profound meaning to him.

To secure permission to undertake it, he used the complex lines of communication available to established notables to bypass the local French hierarchy. The contact that eventually worked was established through an influential notary in Marrakesh of Bzu origin, who maintained amicable relations with the French and the Glawi, although he had clandestinely cast his lot with the king and the Istiqlal party.[50] Another channel was through his wife's family, distant relations of Hajj Thami al-Glawi. Finally the pasha's son, Ibrahim al-Glawi, wrote a letter on 'Abd ar-Rahman's behalf to Philippe Boniface, commandant of the Casablanca region, who authorized 'Abd ar-Rahman to leave for the pilgrimage in September. By that time, however, 'Abd ar-Rahman decided not to go. Participation in the pilgrimage in 1950 would have been construed by most Moroccans as a sign of collaboration with the French. Only after Independence, in i960, did he actually leave for Mecca, returning by way of Spain in order to visit the former Islamic capitals of Granada and Cordoba. This was the only occasion on which he ever left Morocco.

The Mansuri brothers, like most other men of learning, followed the cautious political lead of Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif. The monarch carefully avoided direct confrontation with French authorities, but at the same time lent tacit support to nationalist leaders. Relations with the French and their Moroccan allies became increasingly bitter. Finally, there was a face-to-face confrontation between Hajj Thami al-Glawi and the king, in which the pasha of Marrakesh informed the monarch that he was the sultan of the Istiqlal party and not of Morocco (Julien 1972.: 32.4). When the encounter was first publicly reported, Mukhtar as-Susi was a guest of the Man-suris in Bzu.

When [Mukhtar as-Susi] first heard the news on the radio, he said nothing. Later in the day, he asked Qadi Ahmad to accompany him on a long walk. He told the qadi that he would have to leave the next day. My brother protested that he had just arrived, but he insisted he must leave to put his affairs in order. Indeed, soon afterward he was arrested by the French.

*** The Deposition

To justify their increasing pressure against the king, the French encouraged Hajj Thami al-Glawi to circulate a petition denouncing Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif for, among other matters, his disregard of Islamic values. 'Abd ar-Rahman claimed that even Hajj Thami al-Glawi was against the wording of the petition and "raised his hand" against it, although in the end he yielded to the French. When the petition was circulated, notables were told that it was against communism. Most would not have signed if they knew its actual content. The qaids of the southern regions of Morocco, for the most part poorly educated or illiterate, readily signed. Most men of learning, including the Mansuri brothers, refused to do so despite intimidation and threats.

The French deposed the monarch on August 20, 1953, exiling him and his immediate family to Madagascar. He was replaced by a reluctant and ineffectual distant relative, Muhammad bin ‘Arafa. It became increasingly difficult to remain uncommitted in the struggle against the French. After the monarch’s deposition, ostensibly carried out at the request of Moroccan notables, men of learning were expected to offer an oath of fealty (bay‘a) to the “puppet” sultan. Most refused to do so. The attitude of most was that withholding consent was in itself a sufficient political statement. Both the French and their Moroccan supporters such as Hajj Thami al-Glawi freely used threats and intimidation to secure compliance to their will.

The day after the exile of Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif was the Feast of Abraham (‘Id al-Kabir) in Morocco, a day on which the entire community of men assemble for collective prayers at the prayer-ground (msalla) adjoining every Moroccan town. As a prelude to the sermon delivered on such occasions, each prayer-leader customarily recites an oath of fealty to the reigning sultan. At the time, ‘Abd ar-Rahman was imam for Bzu.

That day, when I went to the prayer-ground to say the sermon, I left the keys to the house with my wife. I had never done that before. I said to her: “I don’t know what will happen. I don’t know if I will return. Take the keys and look after the children. When I got to the msalla, I saw members of the Foreign Legion on a ridge overlooking the assembly, with machine guns trained on us. By the time the sermon was over, everyone was in tears.

I asked ‘Abd ar-Rahman in whose name he said the sermon.

I got to “in the name of the sultan,” then I coughed. I didn’t pronounce the sermon in the name of any sultan.

But you could have, I persisted.

Yes, but to have said it in the name of Muhammad bin Yusif would have been sedition to the French. To have said it in the name of Muhammad bin ‘Arafa would have been a lie. It would have been against the shra‘. So I said nothing clearly. And everyone went away weeping. The French were very afraid that night. Before morning, sixteen people were arrested in Bzu.

A declaration in the name of the deposed sultan would have been a futile gesture, and therefore an “unreasonable” one. French troops were present and there was no way in which the immediate return of the deposed king could have been realized. Nonetheless, ‘Abd ar-

Rahman was unwilling to compromise his Islamic principles and declare an oath of fealty to an illegitimate ruler.

The Mansuri brothers did nothing to affirm the legitimacy of Muhammad bin ‘Arafa, but neither did they overtly work for his fall. In a term of self-description current among many men of learning of the period, they were neutre, a term that entered colloquial Moroccan Arabic after 1953 and that carried a very special contextual meaning. As in prior times of political crisis in Morocco (Burke 1972; 1976), men of learning were reluctant to enter the political arena, but being “neutral” was in itself a political act that increasingly paralyzed the French administrative apparatus. They remained overtly aloof from the nationalists, but withheld support from the French. They knew who the local nationalists were and who participated in the terrorist bands that became increasingly active after the monarch’s exile. Support for Muhammad bin Yusif indirectly united nationalists and “neutrals.”

To the French, Moroccans could assert that their neutrality implied nothing more than political noninvolvement, precisely the sort of attitude colonial officials encouraged all along. Virtually all work in the Islamic law courts and the “traditional” law courts in Berber regions ceased. Court officials declined to recognize the legitimacy of the ruler in whose name they were expected to act. They appeared at their places of employment, but performed no work.

In their own way, men of learning were just as effective in paralyzing the work of the protectorate as were nationalist merchants in paralyzing food distribution systems and militant dockworkers in controlling the Casablanca port. An open declaration in support of the exiled sultan brought swift punishment and immediate removal from office. Being “neutral” tied up the French in their own style of feint and required time-consuming actions against individual officials. Moreover, the information the French needed to proceed against individuals ultimately had to come from Moroccans themselves. Even the pasha of Marrakesh, to whom the French provided an unrestrained hand in suppressing opponents to their policies, were held back from decisive action by the complex, interlocking ties among notables. No one was certain of the outcome of events, so that most Moroccans temporized rather than openly take sides. At the same time, the rhythm of strikes, sabotage, and open violence dramatically increased (Le Tourneau 1962: 233, 238–244).

As in earlier periods under French colonial rule, ties of kinship and friendship with officials elsewhere in Morocco kept the Mansuri brothers informed of hostile moves against them. By 1954 the French began to remove from office Moroccans suspected of supporting the deposed monarch. Many officials and notables were imprisoned and had their lands and other property confiscated. The local administrator in Bzu recommended prison for Qadi Ahmad and the confiscation of his properties. The recommendation was vetoed by his immediate superior in Azilal, Alexandre, an officer with decades of experience in the region. Alexandre appeared to be aware that the decision to depose the king had been maladroit and numbered the days of colonial Morocco. ‘Abd ar-Rahman narrated:

Alexandre summoned the qadi to Azilal. There he asked him whether it was true that he said to Hajj Thami al-Glawi that he still recognized only Muhammad bin Yusif as sultan. The qadi replied that he was a “friend of France” (a conventional phrase often used by the deposed monarch himself) but that the only sultan he recognized was Muhammad bin Yusif. Another French officer, also present, suggested that the only hope of the qadi to avoid exile and confiscation of his lands was to seek the pardon of ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani.

Alexandre then asked the qadi to step outside, in order to speak with him in private. He proposed that the qadi accept a transfer to as-Swira for a few years. In time, he said, death by old age would overtake Muhammad bin ‘Arafa and Hajj Thami, and by then Muhammad bin Yusif might well return to the throne. Alexandre also told my brother that the Glawi was rapidly losing his ability to influence events. My brother listened to Alexandre and left for as-Swira.

“Why did Alexandre do this for your brother?”

Alexandre understood the situation like a French noble. He had worked earlier with Qadi Ahmad and spoke excellent Arabic. He argued with his superiors that if the Mansuris or their properties were touched because of the incident in the msalla or their refusal to recognize Muhammad bin ‘Arafa, it would be like lighting a fire under the earth that would build up and eventually lead to an explosion. Alexandre knew the reputation of our father, of how tribesmen paid the first taxes thinking they were alms. He feared an uprising.

So a French officer invoked his reading of local tradition with his superiors to head off a local confrontation with erstwhile Moroccan colleagues. In January 1954 Qadi Ahmad left for as-Swira, but by April was removed from his official functions there for unspecified “administrative reasons.” Nonetheless, he remained in as-Swira for two years and three months, until Morocco’s independence in March 1956. For the first time since becoming his brother’s deputy in 1932., ‘Abd ar-Rahman officially assumed the function of qadi in Bzu in January 1954, although he too was removed from his post in April. In November 1955, when Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif returned from exile, the two brothers sought an audience with him in Rabat. Qadi Ahmad was so overcome with emotion that he cried in their monarch’s presence, leaving his younger brother to speak for the two. ‘Abd ar-Rahman simply declared that the two of them were following the path set for them by their monarch (Sidna), and the king thanked them. The audience lasted five minutes.

*** Independence: The View from the Periphery

Many Moroccans enthusiastically anticipated the beginning of a new social and economic order in 1956. Yet by the 1970s, a leading Moroccan intellectual could write in retrospect that the post-1956 Moroccan government was not a “resumption of the precolonial past, but a continuation of the regime of the Protectorate” (Laroui 1974: 53; 1977a: 348). In the first few years after independence, it appeared as if rural notables, for the most part compromised with the protectorate, were to be shunted aside in favor of the urban bourgeosie, who formed the backbone of nationalist leadership, provided the cadres of the new administration, and supported most of the new government’s plans for industrialization and modernization, much of which were inherited from the last years of French rule. In 1958 a decree was passed that sequestered the property of “feudal and traiterous elements,” principally the rural elite, although it was never vigorously applied (Leveau 1977: 275).

In retrospect it is possible to discern, as does Laroui, a strong continuity between the protectorate and postcolonial regimes. For persons who lived through the often violent events of this period, no such continuity was apparent at the time. Yet almost without exception, the families of notables influential under the protectorate remained in place after independence. In the turbulent first years after independence, the monarchy came to realize that one of its principal pillars was the category of landed rural notables, who also constituted the bulwark of the former protectorate (Marais 1969; Leveau 1977). After a period of indecision, by i960 the monarchy decided to avoid measures that would alienate the support of rural notables (Leveau 1977: 273–278; Marais 1969; Gellner 1973).

On the one hand, the Mansuri brothers were denounced by their enemies during the protectorate as nationalist supporters, and their refusal to acquiesce in the deposition of Muhammad bin Yusif cost them their sinecures in the judiciary and threatened the confiscation of their lands. On the other hand, after independence, the nationalists accused them of collaboration. Such accusations caused temporary setbacks for rural notables in many regions of Morocco, but Qadi Ahmad’s ties with the Palace, and probably his reputation with liberal French administrators who remained at their posts to ease the transition to independence, insulated him from the excesses to which other rural notables were sometimes exposed.

The months before and after independence in March 1956 were a confused period. Immediately after independence, Qadi Ahmad was appointed simultaneously in two separate decrees as qaid and qadi of Ntifa, although after a month and seven days the qadiship was taken away from him, leaving him to continue reluctantly in his role as qaid. Because the judiciary in rural Morocco was in general not seriously compromised by their prior dealings with the French, many qadis found themselves the only available persons to work with the new Ministry of the Interior in rural areas.[51] Ahmad Mansuri submitted his resignation on February 28, 1957. It was finally accepted on June 17. As a sign of the continued esteem in which he was held by Muhammad bin Yusif, he was appointed to Morocco’s Constitutional Council in i960. Indicative of his local support, he was subsequently elected a delegate to Morocco’s first parliament in 1963, the last formal function he was to exercise prior to his death on March 6, 1975.

Qadi Ahmad’s appointment as qaid was made over the opposition of local activists in the Istiqlal party. In the first years after independence, the monarchy was still uncertain of its strength and, as ‘Abd ar-Rahman recalled, local leaders of the Istiqlal party installed themselves as necessary intermediaries to the administration. Urban militants of the party were frequently made administrators of rural areas, but their inexperience and unfamiliarity with the rural milieu handicapped effective administration. Prior to independence, a modest monthly subscription had bought membership in the Istiqlal party, but after independence, the cost of adhesion escalated considerably as persons who had stood on the sidelines sought to insure their future. Every application to the government for employment, use of forest lands, adjustment of taxes, went forward only with a recommendation by the local Istiqlal bureau.

As for ‘Abd ar-Rahman, his first appointment came nearly a year later. In independent Morocco, the greatest urgency was attached to insuring continuity in the Ministry of the Interior. Local appointments to the judiciary took somewhat longer. On May 6, 1957, while he was overseeing the use of a mechanical harvester on his fields, he was brought a message to return to Bzu immediately for a telephone call from the minister of justice, ‘Abd al-Krim bin Jallun, offering him the post of qadi of Boujad. Ele accepted. The official proclamation arrived nine days later.

For ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s generation, there is a close link between the structure and goals of religious orders and those of political parties (hizb) (cf. Rezette 1955: 2.7), an attitude not dispelled by his experiences of political interference with the Islamic judiciary in the first years of independence. “They fight with one another and deceive people to win their support. Like the brotherhoods, the political parties are primarily interested in pulling political power in their direction (fa-yjurru l-quwwat).” As a key example, he cited the practice of the Istiqlal party in the early 1950s of requiring adherents to swear an oath {qasni} on the Quran, a practice also used by some brotherhoods and taken very seriously. ‘Abd ar-Rahman considers such oaths to be bid‘a. Many early nationalist meetings were also held in mosques. Men now in their forties and fifties continue to vote for the Istiqlal party in Morocco, even though it is rapidly declining in popular support, because of the oath they swore years earlier.

When ‘Abd ar-Rahman arrived in Boujad as judge in 1957, the Istiqlal party was still more important than the local administration. It successfully “sponsored” all routine administrative requests and sought to intervene in the Islamic court, a move that ‘Abd ar-Rahman says he successfully opposed. The fragmentation of the Istiqlal party into various factions (ta’ifas) shortly after independence is interpreted by ‘Abd ar-Rahman as just another sign of the concern of political leaders with nothing but opportunities for themselves.

A second element to contend with in rural areas immediately after independence, especially in southern Morocco, was the self-proclaimed units of the Army of Liberation (jaysh at-

tahrir). In some regions efforts were made to incorporate these bands into the newly formed Moroccan army. Elsewhere the activities of independent units increased rather than diminished with independence, suggesting a hazy demarcation between brigandage and politically motivated terrorism. For ‘Abd ar-Rahman, participants in the Liberation Army were prone to anarchy (siba) because they failed to ascertain the wishes of the monarch, the source of legitimate Islamic authority. By failing to do so, they were in his judgment no better than the rioters in Marrakesh in 1956 who burned to death several of the Glawi’s most notorious collaborators (see Maxwell 1966: 266–268).

Liberation Army units were active in Bzu, especially after France announced its intention to grant independence to Morocco. ‘Abd ar-Rahman describes one incident:

A squad of them came to me one day [after independence] in Bzu. They were from the region, but not from Bzu itself. They all had rifles. I didn’t know them, but they knew my brother and myself. My brother was qaid in Azilal at the time. They knew his reputation as a tough man, so they spoke to me instead. They said they wanted our car, so that they could go on a mission to “visit” a traitor [name deleted], who was a qaid in the Protectorate. All those who worked for the Protectorate were being threatened.

“Who gave you the orders to kill him?” I asked. “Was it the sultan?”

They replied that they didn’t know the sultan. All they knew was ‘Allal [al-Fassi] and the [Istiqlal] party. Often they chose their own targets. They took our car and went that night to the qaid’s, but he put up a fight, killed one of them, and escaped. They killed the qaid’s son, though. For that they got five years in prison.

At first, the sultan said nothing. He watched these things happen. Once he knew where his power was, he began moving against [the Liberation Army]. They had become like the [political] parties, always looking for money. Later the sultan also moved to limit the power of the parties. People were becoming afraid of the Istiqlal party because if the Istiqlal said that someone was against them, the man might be dead not long after.

The idea that at least some political leaders might have been motivated by notions of social justice was difficult for ‘Abd ar-Rahman to comprehend. For him and like-minded men of learning, men’s responsibilities toward one another were those laid out in the Quran and in Islamic law. As understood by Hajj ‘Abd ar-Rahman, these responsibilities delineate individual ethics and ignore the presence of classes and social groups (cf. Kessler 1978: 210–213). ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s concern is principally with how to guide individual conduct by the higher principles of the word of God as known through the Quran, the traditions of the Prophet, and Islamic law. Such concepts explicitly restrain and control base self-interest, but do not easily lead to collective notions of social justice.

** Seven: The Great Transformation?

*** The Erosion of Traditional Learning

‘Abd ar-Rahman became qadi in a world substantially different from that for which he had been educated. By 1957, higher religious learning was an empty shell of its former self. Men of learning retained widespread popular respect but their numbers were no longer being reproduced. Yet men of learning voiced no sense of crisis. No major efforts were made to sustain religious education in its older form.

When alternatives to the mosque-university developed on a wide scale in the 1930s, higher Islamic education quickly lost its former vitality. Its sudden decline can be attributed to a relatively straightforward conjunction of events. First was the French “organization” of Morocco’s two principal mosque-universities, the Qarawiyin in 1931 and the Yusufiya in 1939, undertaken ostensibly to improve the standard of learning. These “reforms” came in the wake of major protests against French rule in which the mosque-universities had played a role (al-Fassi 1954: 128–129, ¹33-¹3S’)- French “organization” made the faculty salaried civil servants subject to governmental control. Those teachers remaining in the organized institutions suffered a significant loss of popular prestige. Gifts to them by pious Moroccans, rich and poor, virtually ceased. Rather than teach in the “organized” milieu of the Qarawiyin after 1931, several of its leading teachers left for elsewhere in the country, including the Yusufiya and mosques in smaller towns. A similar exodus occurred from the Yusufiya when organization was imposed upon it in November 1939.

The procedure used by the French to appoint mosque-university leadership was identical to that used for the appointment of local officials. Protectorate authorities proposed three candidates to the sultan, leaving him the final choice. In the shell game of the protectorate, the French still reserved the right to veto the sultan’s selection.[52] The Yusufiya was given a rector and a Scholarly Council (al-Majlis al-‘Ilmi), composed of leading teachers at the Yusufiya.

The work of the rector and the Scholarly Council was monitored by a controller (muraqib) empowered to veto decisions reached by the scholarly council. The appointment of controller did not require the sultan’s approval and thus served as a useful check upon possible actions by the Council. From the “organization” of the Yusufiya until August 1953, the controller was Muhammad Burghba, known to have been working for French intelligence. After Muhammad bin Yusif’s deposition, he was appointed Minister of Pious Endowments under the “puppet” sultan, Bu ‘Arafa. Burghba was subsequently killed during the April 195 6 riots, a month after independence, in Marrakesh

(Maxwell 1966: 266–2.68). Burgh-ba's replacement as controller for the last two years of colonial rule was 'Abd al-Wahhab as-Sahrawi ad-Dukkali.

The four successive rectors under French rule were respected scholars. The first was Mulay Mubarik al-Amranl, originally a learned shaykh of a religious lodge in Tafilalt, in southern Morocco. In January 1941 al-Amrani left for the Qarawiyin and was replaced by Muhammad ibn 'Uthman, a reformist who had studied for eight years at the al-Azhar in Cairo and wrote a book on the Yusufiya's early history ('Uthman 1935). Former students remember him with affection because he distributed his entire salary among needy students. He was replaced after his death in March 1944 by 'Abd al-Qadir bin 'All al-Misfiwi, a man of learning whose father was a minister in the prior century under Sidi Hasan bin Muhammad. He was removed in August 1953 for protesting the king's deposition, and replaced briefly by Muhammad bin Hashmi al-Misfiwi. After August 1953, the Scholarly Council continued only as a fiction. Upon his return to Morocco in November 1955, Sidi Muhammad bin Yusif dismissed both the rector and the controller.

French "organization" of the mosque-universities played a role in undermining the organizational basis of higher Islamic learning, but a more significant factor was the increasing availability beginning in the 1930s of government schools run by the French, which siphoned off the children of Morocco's elite. In a context analogous to what Colonna (1975) has described for Algeria, Islamic institutions became the least attractive option open to Moroccan Muslims in colonial society. Moreover, significant numbers of Moroccan graduates from French schools began by the 1930s to fill posts in the colonial bureaucracy and to play other key roles in colonial society that remained open to Muslims. Studies in a mosque-university ceased to be an effective means of social advancement.

The consequence was to leave the mosque-universities primarily to poor students of rural origin. Contemporary estimates of the number of students of rural and urban origin at the Qarawiyin indicate the significance of these changes. In 192.4, 300 students were from Fez itself, whereas 419 were from outlying and predominantly rural regions (Marty 1924: 337). By 1938, only 100 students were from Fez and 800 were of rural origin (Berque 1938: 197). Although exact figures are unavailable for Marrakesh, consultants estimate that there were roughly 400 students at the Yusufiya in the early 1930s, of whom about 150 were from Marrakesh itself. The number of urban students had dropped to a handful by 1935, and almost none were from prominent rural or urban families. Islamic education had begun to be regarded with disdain even by those who took part in it during earlier periods because of the lack of "analysis and synthesis" in its style and content (Berque 1974: 173–179). Such a criticism implicitly compared the style and content of Islamic education with that at least ideally available in schools provided by the French.

In the first decade after colonial rule was established, concerned Moroccan bourgeoisie sought to meet the challenge of French-controlled education through the creation of "Free Schools" that were independent of French control but that adopted some European subjects

and pedagogical methods to provide an alternative education, primarily in Arabic. These schools reached their maximum enrollments of 1,500–2,000 students in the mid-19 20s, a significant figure since total Moroccan Muslim enrollment in French schools was about 6,000 in the same period, after which enrollments steadily declined (Damis 1973: 16). As important as such schools were as an ideological expression on the part of those who backed them, their long-term educational impact was minimal. Moroccan notables saw their children's futures and their own increasingly tied to the training and certification that only French schools could provide.

The more interesting, and difficult, question is why this collapse had no direct impact upon the basic popular and learned paradigm of valued knowledge as fixed and memorizable, especially since at least in principle the social reproduction of such knowledge was necessary to make available the word of God for the guidance of the Islamic community. Why did the effective collapse not result in any major concerted action, or reaction, on the part of men of learning? This issue directly involves the relation of knowledge to society in the Moroccan context and the way in which value is placed on various bodies of knowledge and its carriers.

Traditionally educated Moroccan intellectuals were acutely aware of the major transformations that their society was experiencing as a consequence of colonial rule. In practical terms, the principal response of reformist intellectuals to this perceived crisis was merely to seek to persuade those who already possessed an understanding of the religious sciences to accept the "new orthodoxy" which they advocated. Yet many of these same individuals sent their sons and daughters, as did 'Abd ar-Rahman, to French-run schools rather than to mosque-universities or even the independent "Free Schools."

A partial explanation for the inaction of men of learning is that colonial rule posed no direct threat to their material interests. As with their nineteenth-century counterparts in British India (Metcalf 1982: 87–88), Morocco's men of learning realistically concluded that there was little effective resistance they could make against foreign rule, so sought instead to maintain their religious integrity. From the inception of the protectorate the French sought to engage the support of this elite by assimilating them into their system of indirect rule, a system that functioned with a high measure of success in the first two decades of colonial rule, especially under Lyautey (Rivet 1980). Unlike neighboring Algeria, where the influence of the traditional elite was systematically destroyed, the Moroccan traditional elite were given administrative and political preferment and their children were given access to French education. Despite radical political and economic transformations, the elite managed in general to confer their status upon their descendants (Leveau 1977; Waterbury 1970; cf. Bourdieu and Passeron 1977).

Taken by itself, an explanation based on material interests is insufficient. It does not account for the continued popular respect enjoyed by men of learning. In rural Morocco, religious intellectuals today are profoundly respected for the knowledge they possess even when as a

body they did not actively participate in the nationalist and anticolonial movements. In Morocco's 1963 parliamentary elections, they constituted 130, or 57.4 percent, of the 223 candidates, and 27, or 55.2 percent, of the 49 actually elected (Leveau 1976: 188189). A few traditionally educated intellectuals from prominent urban families, including 'Allal al-Fassi (see al-Fassi 1954; Rezette 1955; Waterbury 1970: 44) bridged the world of traditional learning and that of "liberal," European-style politics, but such transitions were exceptional. Most "ordinary" exemplars of mosque-university education regarded direct engagement in organized political activity as suspect and alien. Although their mistrust of political parties and plans for economic development have been characterized as based upon "a certain confused ideal of social justice" (Leveau 1976: 93), they enjoy extensive support among peasants and tribesmen, small landholders and shopkeepers.

The ideal of social justice held by traditional men of learning is "confused" only when analysts consider it in Western categories. Two implicit premises of the world view of traditionally educated Moroccan intellectuals have already been indicated—the notion of inequality as a natural fact of the social order and a highly restricted sense of social responsibility. These premises are perhaps most effectively delineated through comparison with two contrasting traditions of "gentlemanly" education, English and Chinese, which also possessed implicit notions of social inequality. Students of public schools in Victorian England were instilled with a sense of equity or "fair play," leadership, and public spirit which had its analogues in political life, whereas in China men of learning were considered to possess exemplary moral virtues that suited them for positions of authority (Wilkinson 1964; Weber 1958). There was no expectation in Morocco that Islamic men of learning should constitute an ideological vanguard, even in times of major social upheaval. They could on occasion serve as iconic expressions of popular sentiment, but there was no developed tradition in which they were able to shape these sentiments or guide the direction of social change.

The affinity between popular conceptions of valued knowledge and those conveyed in Islamic education explain the continuing popular legitimacy of such forms of knowledge and, at least in principle, of its carriers. What of the limitations of form of Islamic knowledge and its associated intellectual technology? The notion that the most valued knowledge was fixed by memorization in the first place limited the number of texts that any individual could "possess" thoroughly, just as did the notion that valued knowledge was accessible to all men of learning. A range of new materials could be introduced, but there was no value placed upon specialization in a given field of knowledge within this tradition of learning. The consequence was that innovations of content tended to suffer the same fate as innovations in societies without developed traditions of writing. Men of influence in the milieus of learning could to a limited extent introduce new materials, but innovations suggested by others had little chance of taking hold. Nor could specialized forms of knowledge proliferate, even the valued attempts to introduce mathematics and military technology in the nineteenth century (al-Manuni 1973). The body of valued knowledge shared by men of learning of any generation shifted over time, but it did not become more elaborate in form. There was no room in this tradition for disciplinary competences to be carved out and elaborated by smaller, specialized communities of men of learning. Moreover, since knowledge was considered to be fixed and memorizable, the central ideological problem was

that of justifying any change of form or content in terms of its essential replication of past forms, instead of allowing an elaboration of form and content at least partially autonomous from generally accepted forms.

In the past, the memorizable truths of Islamic education were passed from generation to generation. With the collapse of Islamic education in the 1930s, this is no longer the case. To the present, this demise of the technology of intellectual reproduction has had no pronounced impact; as elsewhere, major changes in educational systems take a long time to have a widespread impact. The concept of knowledge as fixed and memorizable truths is still concretely demonstrated in Moroccan society by men who have memorized the Quran and its proper recitation, and associated texts are still mnemonically carried by the last generation of traditionally educated men of learning. Yet the number of individuals who are able to demonstrate “possession” of such knowledge is rapidly diminishing. One consequence is that the older generation of men of learning consider their younger replacements as essentially ignorant, knowing little of Islamic law beyond the bilingual French and Arabic handbooks prepared by the Ministry of Justice. The accuracy of this appraisal is not at issue here, but implied in it is the notion that their replacements are little more than bureaucratically appointed specialists who carry neither the authority nor the sense of legitimacy that they regard themselves as having possessed in the past. This notion appears largely to be popularly shared.

The shift of religious knowledge from that which is mnemonically possessed to material that can only be consulted in books suggests a major transformation in the nature of knowledge and its carriers. It may still be ideologically maintained that religious knowledge is memorizable and immutable, as is certainly the case for the word of God as recorded in the Quran, but the lack of concrete embodiment of this premise in the carriers of such knowledge indicates a major shift. This shift may not be consciously recognized, just as many Muslim intellectuals claim that the French colonial experience had little impact on the belief and practice of Islam, which from a sociological point of view is decidedly not the case (Eickelman 1974).

One consequence of this shift is that socially recognized carriers of religious learning are no longer confined to those who have studied accepted texts in circumstances equivalent to those of the mosque-universities, with their bias toward favoring members of the elite. Those who can interpret what Islam “really” is can now be of more variable social status than was the case when mnemonics were an essential element in the legitimacy of knowledge. The carriers of religious knowledge will increasingly be anyone who can claim a strong Islamic commitment, as is the case among many of the educated urban youth. Freed from mnemonic domination, religious knowledge can be delineated and interpreted in a more abstract and flexible fashion. A long apprenticeship under an established man of learning is no longer a necessary prerequisite to legitimizing one’s own religious knowledge. Printed and mimeographed tracts and the clandestine dissemination of “lessons” on cassettes have begun to replace the mosque as the center for disseminating visions of Islam that challenge those offered by the state.

*** From Mosque-University to Religious Institute

After Morocco’s independence in 1956, the French were in some ways able to play a larger role in formulating Morocco’s educational policies than they could in the protectorate. In 1955, only 25,000 new students entered the primary cycle. In the fall of 1956, 130,000 new students were enrolled (Dichter 1976: 127). Between 1912 and 1954, only 530 Moroccan Muslims passed both sections of the baccalaureat examination; in 1957, 13,374 baccalaureate degrees were awarded (Lacouture and Lacouture 1958: 248; Waterbury 1970: 84). The French widened educational opportunities after 1945, but mass education began only after independence.

Under French rule, education continued to be elitist, as it was in practice at the Qarawiyin and the Yusufiya. Educational standards were high, as they remained for the first few years after independence. Even holders of primary school certificates attained positions of responsibility. But because of its commitment to mass education, independent Morocco’s educational budget was overextended from the start. In the late 1950s, local communities enthusiastically contributed money and labor to supplement government efforts (Dichter 1976: 127). Once it became evident that the linkage between socioeconomic opportunity and educational attainment had become weakened, however, popular enthusiasm for modern education precipitously declined. As one traditional scholar commented, the long-term consequence of French and independent Moroccan educational policy was to destroy traditional education—today officially called “original” education—without replacing it with a strong, workable “modern” system?

Islamic higher education, although neglected in the years immediately after independence, never entirely disappeared. Since the late 1960s, it has received renewed official attention as the government recognizes the advantages of retaining control over it. To accommodate the traditionally educated, the government took over and in some cases established religious institutes (ma‘ahid al-Islamiya) at the secondary and postsecondary levels. Thus in 1938, religious education in Spanish Morocco was organized by the colonial government to include several provincial religious institutes (ma‘dhid ad-dtniya), and after 1944 an Institute for Higher Religious Studies (Instituto Superior Religioso) in Tetouan (Valderrama 1956: 342–366). After independence, the Tetouan Institute was officially integrated into Morocco’s national university system as the Faculty of Islamic Theology of the Qarawiyin University. Also integrated into the Qarawiyin were the Institute of Islamic Studies (now Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniya) in Rabat, responsible for the training of contemporary Islamic scholars. What remains of the Yusufiya is now officially called the Faculty of Arabic Language and Literature of the Qarawiyin in Marrakesh, with nineteen formally recognized faculty as of 1976 and 236 “undergraduates,” of whom twenty-two are women (afme 1976: 2). Other institutes, including Taroudant and Tamgrut (established in the precincts of the old religious lodge in 1982), operate roughly at a postprimary educational level.

Instruction is exclusively in Arabic (except for the Qarawiyin in Fez, where French is officially available as a foreign language). Most graduates end up teaching in government-sponsored Quranic schools. Unlike the Qarawiyin, where many teachers are currently drawn from other Arab countries because of earlier gaps in the training of religious scholars in Morocco, the faculty in Marrakesh are primarily Moroccan.

The last rector of the Yusufiya, appointed shortly after independence, was Rahhal al-Farruqi, who is now dean of the Faculty of Arabic Language and Literature in Marrakesh. Originally from Awlad Hammu of the Ahl Ghaba tribe of the Sraghna plain, he was born into a lineage that consolidated its local authority during the protectorate. His father hired a talib to supervise his studies, and the talib even accompanied his protege to the Qarawiyin in the 1930s. Today he is head of Morocco's League of Ulama (ar-Rabita al-'ularna), and is considered to be Morocco's foremost grammarian and traditional orator. His lectures are televised every Ramadan, with the king among those in attendance.

As disenchantment with modern education grew more widespread in the 1960s, the government sought to expand the role of "original" education. In 1968, the government mandated a year of Quranic schooling prior to admission to the primary school cycle. This move temporarily lessened pressure on public schools, which can accommodate only roughly half of all eligible students. It also reaffirmed government respect for original education and provided additional sinecures for the traditionally educated. Original education thus regained a modicum of respectability. But the "new" system of original education is not a straightforward resurrection of the old. To the extent that memorization still occurs, it is on the basis of mass production to a standard curriculum, complete with examinations, as opposed to the style of earlier institutions. It also systematically introduces students to the reading and writing of secular texts, something that traditional Quranic schools did not do.

*** Personal Choices

When I asked 'Abd ar-Rahman why he did not encourage his own children to pursue religious studies, he responded quite simply that "times change" (tbaddal al-waqt). The circumstances ordained by God for the community of believers today are different from those in the past. The theme of the presentday world as defective, deteriorating, and corrupt, often casually invoked by 'Abd ar-Rahman, is not unique to his generation. It is characteristic of writings of Moroccan historians from at least the sixteenth century to the present (Levi-Provencal 192.2). A consequence of this stylized characterization of social reality is to accept as given the impermanence and provisionality of all human affairs. It discourages metaphysical reflection on how things might have been, reflections that would challenge what God had actually ordained, or how things ought to be. It encourages instead attention to perceiving the exact present state of social and political affairs (Eickelman 1976: 126–130; see also Waterbury 1972: 156–158).

All of ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s seven children received education in government schools. The eldest son was born in the early 1940s; the youngest in the mid-1960s. His eldest son entered primary school under the French and received a secondary degree after independence. In a pattern common with many Moroccans who completed secondary studies in the 1960s, he joined the administration rather than continue directly to higher studies, although his ministry subsequently sent him to France for advanced specialized training. ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s eldest daughter received a primary education in the late 1950s and early 1960s but, again in common with women of the period in smaller towns, where higher education was locally unavailable, she did not continue at the time. The qadi’s younger daughter, who began primary studies in the late 1960s, is presently engaged in secondary studies. The other sons all studied through the secondary level. One is a senior manager for an investment firm in Casablanca; another is an intermediate schoolteacher in Boujad and has been a member of the town’s municipal council. A younger son was selected for the Palace school as a classmate for the crown prince.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-knowledge-and-power-in-morocc-7.png][Figure 4. The Qadi in his Courtyard, 1969.]]

*** Challenges

Changes in basic patterns of thought and religiosity are often evident only in retrospect. As the late Raymond Aron (1970: 245) wrote, the main task of sociological explanation is “to render social or historical content more intelligible than it was in the experience of those who lived it.” The implication of major changes in political and economic forms and in the intellectual technology of how ideas get reproduced and disseminated are just beginning to be explored, in the context of Islamic and Middle Eastern studies.

One such “great transformation” is the introduction of literacy upon historically known and contemporary societies. Most of Jack Goody’s The Domestication of the Savage Mind (1977} is concerned with the introduction of literacy in nonliterate societies. His discussion of the more nuanced problem of the shift from restricted to generalized literacy, from literacy possessed by a minority specialist elite to that accessible to wider elements of the population, occupies only the last ten pages of his book (1977: 152–162; see also Waldman 1985).

§erif Mardin (1982a; 1982b) suggests the consequences of changes in styles of literacy and changes in the intellectual technology through which ideas are transmitted upon forms of religious knowledge and organization in his studies on the Turkish fundamentalist Said Nursi (1873–1960), the Bediiizzaman (“Nonpareil of the Times”) and founder of the Nur (“Light”) movement. Through the nineteenth century, the accepted popular and elite notion was that religious knowledge and insight were acquired only with the guidance of a reputed master. In

the Nur movement the “message” of the founder— his opinions on religious subjects and his commentaries on the Quran (written in Turkish, in itself a major innovation)— were more important than his person or personal ties to him. This aspect of the Nur movement was remarkably different from the practices of other Sufi orders. The form of Said Nursi’s message was thus characterized by “the written text replacing the instructions of the charismatic leader and the attempt to make the central truths of the Koran intelligible to a wide audience” (Mardin 1982b: 19).

This style of religiosity was made possible by what Mardin terms the “communications revolution” that began to be felt in Turkey by the late nineteenth century. Patterns of governmental organization and authority changed substantially, as well as the forms in which knowledge and information were construed and communicated. Even when persons in authority thought they were using new technologies to preserve the old, new forms of thought and authority were shaped by the telegraph, newspapers, magazines, and an expanded (even if not mass) educational system. Newspapers and magazines, for instance, “replaced expostulation [with] arguments which were addressed to the presumed shared rationality of the readers” (Mardin 1982b: 13). The Nur movement spread with particular rapidity among the intelligentsia of Turkey’s provincial centers: schoolteachers, functionaries, and others who were linked at least indirectly with the new communicative styles and who constituted the principal audience for the proliferation of newspapers and pamphlets.

An equivalent incipient “great transformation” of religiosity in Morocco may be the recent proliferation of loosely organized associations of Islamic militants who characterize themselves as “neo-Salafis,” perhaps unaware that the same term was used by many men of learning in the 1930s, or even “the Muslims” (al-islamiyiin), in recognition of their self-proclaimed role of being the true carriers of Islam (Etienne and Tozy 1979: 2.45). The latter term also has a prior usage, known to professional historians in Morocco: in the late nineteenth century it referred to Jews who had converted to Islam.

The growth of these informal associations of young militants is linked to disenchantment with the results of over two decades of independence and an awareness of similar movements elsewhere in the Middle East. Interviews with participants in these groups, composed of students, schoolteachers, shopkeepers, and craftsmen, especially those living in the “popular” quarters of large towns in which recent rural emigrants predominate, suggest that they share a strong consciousness of social inequality, and a belief that the government will do little to ameliorate their situation. In their judgment, the government’s objective is primarily to increase the wealth of the present political elite (Etienne and Tozy 1979: 251). Etienne and Tozy hypothesize that the growth of these associations is a “compensatory phenomenon.” Independence in their view did not substantially improve the conditions of life in Morocco, so participants in the militant Islamic groups turn to renewed Islamic faith to avert “despair.” For them, the dynamism associated in the past with independence is now associated with Islam.

The growth of Islamic militancy in Morocco is more than the displacement of unrealized hopes associated with independence. A stronger case can be made for interpreting the proliferation of these groups in the context of long-term changes in styles of religiosity more akin to those suggested by Goody and Mardin. Organizationally, the neo-Salafi groups bear superficial resemblance to the student groups prevalent during ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s years at the Yusufiya. Their formal organization is minimal, so that not all groups even have distinctive names. They seek to disseminate their ideas through discussions at accommodating mosques and in secondary schools. As with roughly analogous groups in Egypt, recruits are mainly educated youth of small town or village origin, politically aware and currently living in communities experiencing rapid urbanization (Ansari 1984: 132134; Ibrahim 1980: 438). Proselytism is mainly through discreet personal contact. Unlike the religious groups of ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s generation or the early political groups of the 193os, their supporters are not primarily culled from the sons (and, today, daughters) of the elite. They attract persons with some education who are unaffiliated to political parties, and their goal is to create a distinctly Islamic public opinion (Etienne and Tozy 1979: 248). Some receive modest financial support from fundamentalist groups elsewhere, notably Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iraq. All deprecate the traditional religious orders as possessing a weak intellectual level, an argument that would appear to have been won long ago, at least among the educated. A more contemporary concern is their view of the “official” men of learning, those honored by the state, as “bought” men who have too readily acquiesced to the wishes of the monarch. Some attribute the monarchy with weakening the influence of the men of learning of the mosqueuniversities (evidently forgetting the role of the French), compelling them to endorse such non-Islamic practices as the clause in the Moroccan constitution that declares that succession to the monarchy is henceforth to be by male primogeniture (Hassan II 1978: 2.2.8). Some also interpret the appointment of a Syrian to head the Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniya in Rabat as indicative of governmental efforts to circumscribe the role of Morocco’s men of learning.

Another distinction by which Islamic militants distance themselves from the men of learning of ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s generation is their linkage between personal immorality, which is also roundly condemned by the older ‘ulama, and the nature of the economic and political system, which is not (Yasin 1979). Some militants say that they are “preparing” for political action (Etienne and Tozy 1979: 2.55), an interesting phrase that presumably shielded them until recently from government interference. Yet the attitude of the state toward these groups has rapidly changed. It is significant that in the 1981 riots in Casablanca, no claims were made that Islamic militants played a major part. Perhaps because the monarchy itself relies upon religious legitimation, it has acted with caution in curbing these groups. At the time of Etienne and Tozy’s study, their activities were monitored but not proscribed. That situation has now changed. After the January 1984 riots in Morocco, coinciding with the Islamic summit conference held in Casablanca, seventy-one arrests of Islamic militants were made. They were charged with incitement to rebellion and threats to internal security. Some of those charged allegedly possessed photographs of key officials, in order to identify them for kidnaping or assassination (Mekki 1984). The evidence presented by the prosecution failed to convince outside observers at the trial. The handling of the case and the severity of the sentences imposed, including thirteen death sentences, indicates the severity with which the government views the challenge posed by Islamic militants.

One of the most important new elements in Islamic militancy in Morocco is a sharp break with the past tradition of reliance upon authoritative commentary from qualified men of learning. Militants assert implicitly that each Muslim can personally judge whether the state, the monarch, and the “official” men of learning act in accord with the precepts of Islam. This attitude is less a challenge to the monarchy than to the religious monopoly of “official” Islamic spokesmen (Etienne and Tozy 1979: 2.44, 259). The notion that Muslims can directly interpret their faith without reliance upon intermediaries represents a significant break with the past, one made feasible by greater access to an educational system freed from direct ties to official orthodoxy.

There is growing disenchantment with the monarchy, some of which has been openly expressed, if with caution. Nonetheless, the fragmented associations of Islamic militants have yet to widen their respective bases of support outside major urban centers. The religious attitudes represented by traditional men of learning sustain widespread support in large part because the carriers of competing attitudes, however perceptive they may be in their analysis of some of Morocco’s political, social, and economic problems, have not yet managed to find a resonance in popular understandings of the linkage between Islam and politics. Unlike Iran, where the religious establishment has had an organized financial base largely autonomous from government control, a tradition of opposition to secular authority, and a monarchy that never directly claimed religious legitimacy as one of its central tenets, the Moroccan monarch continues to be regarded by the “silent majority” in the countryside as “God’s deputy on earth” (khalifat Allah fi-l-’ard). Morocco’s religious “establishment” does not possess an organized financial base independent from political authority, so that even the possibility of independent oppositional action is seriously circumscribed. Nor is there the popular expectation that royal authority and religious authority are meant to be autonomous. The prevalent popular notion of the monarch as God’s deputy is rarely invoked among the educated, even supporters of the monarchy, but indicates the presumption of religious legitimacy with which any self-consciously Islamic or political opposition must contend.

Any society contains competing discourses, which are not internally consistent and are filled with tensions and ambiguities. In Morocco, these competing voices are unequally weighted. Activists in organized political groups and Islamic militants each seek a departure from the accepted status quo. As such they must consciously articulate and win acceptance for wide-ranging reorientations toward politics and society. In contrast, Morocco’s men of learning can draw upon the mainstream of existing implicit acceptance of what Karl Mannheim calls “enduring actuality as compared with the progressive desire for change,” a preference for “organic,” existing social units rather than “classes,” and above all an emphasis upon concreteness in its discussion of politics and society (Mannheim 1971: 172.). Advocates of change from the status quo must fully articulate their intentions in seeking to win support.

Men of learning, by accepting existing social and religious arrangements, can presume support without fully elaborating the ideological basis of their actions. Thomas S. Kuhn,

analyzing changing support for scientific paradigms, argues that scientists who have invested their training and entire productive careers in a certain way of doing things often resist or place little value on newer approaches. They are confident that “the older paradigm will ultimately solve all its problems, that nature can be shoved into the box the paradigm provides” (Kuhn 1962: 150). Applied to the Moroccan case, the analogy of Morocco’s traditional men of learning with Kuhn’s scientific communities is only partial. The scientific community as described by Kuhn is more closed and self-contained, while the strength, and limitation, of Morocco’s men of learning is the extent to which they articulate the views of a majority of the population, even if they are not the political activists. The conservative thought represented by Morocco’s men of learning survives in part because its supporters move in separate grooves from those civil servants, educated youth, and others caught in Morocco’s “modern” sector. Within these categories of Morocco’s population, popular support for a more traditional intellectual and religious style has waned. Competing styles of religious thought and action have begun to emerge. In Iran, the organization and ideology of the religious establishment remained autonomous in spite of vigorous efforts by the state to curb its influence prior to the revolution. Morocco’s traditional men of learning have had neither the independent base nor the organization to pose a political challenge. They continue to benefit from state patronage, but the state-sponsored centers of religious learning are not producing a new generation capable of exercising religious leadership of a scope comparable to that of an older, disappearing generation. The fact of competing voices of Islam, some of which claim to be more “authentic” than the others, is not in itself new to Morocco or to other parts of the Islamic world. At the pinnacle of Moroccan society, key traditional religious leaders continue to have royal patronage and access to state-controlled radio and television. Increasingly absent, however, are the complex local expressions of traditional learning and the persons to maintain it. Traditional learning and its carriers in the past stood outside the political arena. It is unlikely that its successors will continue to follow this particular aspect of tradition.

** Glossary

The second of two forms indicates the plural. Transcription is according to local usage unless otherwise indicated.

‘adl: Notary.

‘alim-, ‘ulamd: Religious scholar.

‘dmmi; ‘awam: Common; ordinary.

bakans: Emigrant worker; from French vacance.

baraka: Supernatural blessing; abundance.

bay’a: Oath of fealty.

bid‘a: Innovation.

da‘wa: Personal prayer.

dahir: Royal decree.

dawwdr: Rural local community.

dir-. Piedmont.

fahm-. Understanding.

fitna: Sedition.

fqih; fuqaha: An Islamic jurist; a Quranic teacher; a literate person (now archaic).

habus-, abbas: Pious endowment.

hafid: A major scholar; a person who has memorized the entire Quran. Literary usage, hdfiz.

hajj: The pilgrimage to Mecca; also an honorific title used by those who have made the pilgrimage.

haram: Forbidden; religiously impure.

hizb: One of the sixty divisions of the Quran for recitational purposes.

ijdza: Teaching license.

‘ilm; ‘uliim: Religious knowledge or scholarship.

imam-. Prayer leader; leader of the faithful.

jami‘a: Mosque-university; mosque.

jalldba: Tunic.

katib: Clerk or scribe.

khalifa: Deputy.

khdssa: elite, special.

khutba: Friday sermon.

latif: Collective prayer in time of distress.

madina: City; in North Africa this term often specifically designates the precolonial part of a city.

madrasa: Place of study; a school; hostel for religious students.

ma‘had-, ma‘ahid: Institute.

Makhzan: Moroccan government; lit. “strongbox.”

mdlik: King.

marabout: A person, living or dead, thought to have a special relation toward God which enables him or her to ask for God’s grace on behalf of clients and to communicate it to them. See also sdlih.

ma‘riif: Known; socially recognized.

mqaddam: Spokesman (used in a variety of contexts); minor government official.

msId: Quranic school.

nadir: Overseer. Literary usage, ndzir,

nds khdssa: Lit. “special” people; the elite.

nizam: Organization; order.

qadv, quda: A religious judge.

qaid: Tribal chief or leader appointed over a tribe or small town during the protectorate; now an official of the Ministry of the Interior responsible for a rural or urban administrative unit. Literary usage, qa’id.

qd’ida; qawd’id: “The way things are done.”

‘qal: Reason.

qasam: Oath.

qasida: A verse form.

qrib: “Close.”

rasm: Property title.

Salafi: Reformist Muslim.

sdlih: A pious or devout person; a saint; in some contexts, a marabout.

sdaq: Bridewealth.

shaykh: Religious teacher or head of a mystic order; government official.

shra‘: Islamic law (with definite article); straight path. Classical usage: shana.

shrif; sburfa: Patrilineal descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter, Fatima. Literary usage, sharif.

s’iba: Anarchy; dissidence.

sihr: Magic.

silka: A recitational quarter of the Quran (lit. “thread”).

sulh: Truce.

sulta: Authority.

tafsir: Quranic exegesis.

ta‘ifa: Group; sect; faction.

talib-, tulba: Religious student; scholar.

tarjama-, tardjim: Traditional biography or autobiography.
t’arqiba- The sacrifice of a bull or bulls to conclude or renew an oath of allegiance or to seek a truce.

tartib-. Rural tax on herds and crops established by the French in Morocco.

tashalhit-. One of the three major Berber languages spoken in Morocco.

‘ushilr: Islamic tithe.

zawiya: Religious lodge or residence of a prominent marabout.

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[1] In 1914, an estimated 89 percent of Morocco’s total population was rural. As late as 1969, 68.5 percent were still so classified, although by the 1960s remittances from emigrant labor began to figure significantly in the rural economy (Noin 1970: 42). In 1980 an estimated 57 percent of Morocco’s population was rural (Escallier 1981: iz).

[2] For detailed examples of such reporting, see Eickelman (1976: zn-254).

[3] Personal communication, May 31, 1983.

[4] See Rosen (1980) for a formal analysis of Moroccan Islamic law courts.

[5] Le Monde, August 26, 1955, p. 3, and August 28–29, 1955, pp. 1–2.

[6] ‘Abd al-Hayy, the eldest son by this marriage, began his studies in Marrakesh in the early 1930s, not at the Yusufiya, but at the Darqawi zawiya under the reformist shaykh, Mukhtar as-Susi (1900–1963). In 1935 as-Susi was exiled to his native Sus and the zawiya closed. A year later, ‘Abd al-Hayy went to Fez, where, with the intervention of his father, who had excellent relations with the influential Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kittani, he managed to enter the Qarawiyin. In 1949 he obtained a diploma from the Qara-wiyin, then became a secretary in the Ministry of Justice in Rabat. After independence he was appointed successively as qadi in Damnat, as-Swira (1959), examining magistrate in Marrakesh (1962.) and finally Qadi for Personal Affairs and Property in 1974, a post he held until his death.

[7] See Eickelman (1976: 96–99) for an account of the variable ways in which social ties are elaborated and expressed in Morocco.

[8] For recitational purposes, the Quran is divided into sixty sections (hizbs) of approximately equal length.

[9] The Senegalese novelist Cheikh Hamidou Kane (1963: 3–38) provides the only account of which I am aware that manages to convey the mixture of pious respect for exact recitation of the word of God and affection for their students associated with the severity of Quranic teachers toward their students. In one of many tarjamas presented by as-Susi (1961: ix, 35), a father obliged his son constantly to accompany him and to hold his slate, on which were written the Quranic passages to be memorized, before him. If his attention wandered and he was within reach of his father’s stick he would be beaten. If he was further away his father threw small stones. In this fashion the student memorized the Quran in six different recitational forms.

[10] Maher (1974: 193–198) reports that divorces as a percentage of marriages in the Middle Atlas region which she studied in the 1960s was 52. percent in villages and 38 percent in towns. Roughly comparable figures are provided by Geertz, Geertz, and Rosen (1979: 386–391).

[11] The math taught was similar to our own conception of the subject. This specification is needed because there was another form of mathematics prevalent in traditional learning in the Marrakesh region, al-hisab al-himdri, in which all basic mathematical functions were performed, but in a manner more cumbersome than that taught in European schools. According to Muhammad Aafif (personal communication, 1984), it was still taught at zawiya Sidi Zwayn, about 30 kilometers west of Marrakesh, in the 1950s.

[12] Written by Abu ‘Abd Allah Sidi Muhammad ibn Da’ud as-Sanhaji (“Ibn Ajarrum”) (d. 726/1324).

[13] This is the contextual meaning of the term among contemporary Moroccan men of learning. Its meaning differs in other sociohistorical contexts. For instance, in psychological treatises of the ‘Abbasid period the term implies “the faculty of memory.” I am grateful to Roy Mottahedeh for pointing out this earlier usage.

[14] The only estimate of the number of these schools in any region is contained in a 1955 census conducted in Spanish Morocco: 3,392. for a population estimated at 917,000 (Valderrama 1956: map opposite p. 155; Noin 1970: 1, 33). This means that there was a Quranic school for every 279 persons. Since none of the schools was supported by the government, it is reasonable to assume a similar proportion of schools to the population in the 1920s and 1930s.

[15] A 1974 study found that the average number of years spent in Quranic school varied from close to two years in Marrakesh to a low of 0.33 years in small mountain villages in the Middle Atlas (Wagner and Lotfi 1980: 241). Most mosque schools today have taken on the role of preschools. Only in remote rural areas do some students continue to remain for the time required to memorize the entire Quran.

[16] Such notions have also hampered the study of education in the West. For colonial America, see Bailyn (1960).

[17] Like other technical terms, hafid is subject to contextual variation. For ‘Abd ar-Rahman and other educated Moroccans, the term is sparingly applied only to the most outstanding scholars of any generation. In popular usage, the term refers to anyone who has memorized the Quran.

[18] Until the late nineteenth century, students in rural regions also made collective visits to surrounding villages each year after harvest to collect donations of grain and animals. With these donations, students then camped together and feasted for a week or longer. This practice ceased with the disorders which accompanied increasing European penetration (Aubin 1906: 78–79; Michaux-Bellaire 1911: 437). The urban counterparts of these outings were the “Feasts of Students.”

[19] I have been unable to provide further identification for this plant, which ‘Abd ar-Rahman knows only by its name in tashalhit.

[20] The shaykh was Bu Shu’ayb ash-Shawf al-Bahluli, who was poor and in need of money. Ahmad’s purchase of key rights from him was an indirect way of contributing to his support.

[21] See Deverdun (1966:11, Pl. 36) for a floor plan.

[22] Muhammad Aafif (personal communication) cautions that this prevailing notion of the decline of pious endowments in the nineteenth century may soon change as the result of studies now underway at the Universite Muhammad V in Rabat. Until now, no systematic investigation has been undertaken of nineteenth-century source materials.

[23] In comparison, French secondary education for Moroccan Muslims accounted for 505 students in 1924–1925 and 1,618 students in 1930–1931 (French Protectorate 1931: 245).

[24] The Qarawiyin had 700 students in the early 1920s with roughly 40 lesson circles meeting regularly, given by 25 shaykhs (Marty 1924: 345).

[25] Interviews with at-Tuwartl ‘All bin Mu’allim, July 25 and 26, 1976.

[26] As-Susi’s voluminous writings provide particularly useful anthologies of these conventions. Since he was aware that he was documenting a world of learning that was not being transmitted to a younger generation, most of the literary allusions in the writings which he cites are fully annotated, a practice not characteristic of most writings of the period.

[27] Rolleaux-Dugage (1915: 67) mentions in passing that the cost of becoming mock sultan in Marrakesh in 1913 was 1,200 francs, and that the real sultan presented the student one with a cardboard crown and a horse. For 1919, see the general description of Wattier (1919).

[28] I am grateful to Muhammad Aafif for providing this example.

[29] The overall neglect of the importance of peer learning (e.g., Makdisi 1981) in studies of Islamic education is still remarkable, even considering the silence of traditional sources. McLachlan (1974: 474) describes a similar neglect in the study of colleges in early nineteenth-century America, despite the fact that the core of learning during this period was “an extraordinarily intense system of education by peers.”

[30] Unlike ‘Abd ar-Rahman, Si Muhammad belonged to none of these associations.

[31] A quality praised by men of learning was the ability to compose verses for particular occasions such as appointments to government posts, weddings, and the birth of children. There was a constant circulation of such commemorative verses orally and in writing among men of learning. Most such poetry involved little originality, as its creators drew upon stock phrases, conventions, and images, but these creations deliberately avoided the diction and syntax of “commoner” speech.

[32] Because the Alliance Israelite had been active since the nineteenth century in Marrakesh in providing education in French to Moroccan Jews, many had become clerks and interpreters for the protectorate government and commercial interests. If indeed a film was then being prepared in Marrakesh, it would have been perceived as having been organized by “Jews,” because local Jewish interpreter/assistants would have been the most readily available and the only personnel of any film crews likely to be able to converse in Arabic.

[33] For discussion of Islamic men of learning in other cultural contexts in the Muslim world, see Baer (1971), Bulliet (1972.), Green (1976), Hourani (1968), Keddie (1972), Lapidus (1967), Mottahedeh (1975, 1981), and Saad (1983).

[34] In speaking with me on general themes, ‘Abd ar-Rahman was careful always to refer to non-Muslims by their nationality, and corrected members of his household when they employed the more popular usages of “Christian” (nasrdni) and “Roman” (rumt). In speaking of his own past, he used the terms he then employed.

[35] In 1950 Bu Na‘mani was appointed deputy {khalifa’) to Hajj Thami al-Glawi, although he lost this post after 1953 because he was a “neutral” who did not support the French deposition of the sultan that year. After independence in 1956 he became Pasha of Agadir, a post which he retained until the earthquake which destroyed much of the city in 1960.

[36] Because he also declined to support the new sultan, ‘Abd ar-Rahman was also removed from his brief tenure as qadi of Bzu on April z8, 1954.

[37] One of the few colonial observers aware of the significance of these debates was Jacques Berque. See Berque (1974: 162–188) for an excellent discussion, based upon his contemporary notes and discussions with the principals, of the concerns of religious intellectuals in the 1930s.

[38] A leading figure at the Yusufiya during the 1930s who was recognized by the French as “rector” (ra’ts) of the Yusufiya from 1941 until his death in March 1944. He is the author of a history of the Yusufiya (‘Uthman 1935), printed in Cairo, which unfortunately stops before the nineteenth century.

[39] Kittani hostility to the ‘Alawi dynasty culminated in ‘Abd al-Hayy’s active collaboration in colonial efforts to discredit Muhammad bin Yusif and support Mulay ‘Arafa, the “puppet” sultan enthroned by the French after Muhammad bin Yusif’s exile to Madagascar in 1953.

[40] ‘Abd ar-Rahman here telescopes a complex series of events. In March 1909, to discourage rebellion during his absence in Marrakesh, Sultan Mulay ‘Abd al-Hafid intended to secure several Fassi notables as hostages. When news of the sultan’s intentions reached Muhammad al-Kittani on March 19, he secretly fled to the Middle Atlas mountains. He was eventually brought back to Fez, where he later died from beatings he received in prison (see Burke 1976: 133–134).

[41] Sidi is an honorific generally reserved for royalty and prominent marabouts. Bu Na‘mani here deliberately uses it to elevate ‘Abd ar-Rahman in status. The ordinary term of address would be Si.

[42] I am grateful to Muhammad Aafif for explaining to me the implications of this style of writing in Morocco.

[43] This account is based upon a narrative written by ‘Abd ar-Rahman dated March 29, 1945, with supplementary verbal commentary provided in July 1976.

[44] Like other men of his generation, ‘Abd ar-Rahman frequently interchanges the terms “sultan” and “king.”

[45] A copy of this document was taken from official files in Casablanca, translated into Arabic by Sa‘id Guessous, a translator-interpreter working with the French administration, and mailed to Qadi Ahmad. Evidently the mails were often regarded as secure. I saw the document preserved in its original envelope. The report was written by Captain “Dulur” [the name is given only in Arabic transcription], Chief of the Bureau des Affaires Indigenes of Ntifa and Azilal, and is dated June 2.5, 1937.

[46] For an excellent general account of the rise and fall of the French native affairs administration in rural Morocco, see Bidwell (1973). Vincent Monteil (1961), himself a onetime Affaires Indigenes officer, provides a thoughtful complementary “insider’s” account.

[47] In July 1941, a secret circular from the office of the Resident-General ordered each local post to draw up contingency plans for the defense of French administrators and settlers in rural areas. Cabinet du Resident-General, circular 422 DM, dated July 4,1941. Copy preserved in the file, “Securite locale,” archives of the Controle Civil, Boujad.

[48] I have been unsuccessful in efforts to identify this officer more precisely. In any case, what is important in the present context is ‘Abd ar-Rahman’s conception of the officer. ‘Abd ar-Rahman thinks that he was transferred to a post near Fez, and that he died in the early 1950s.

[49] Interview, Hajj Ahmad bin ‘Abd as-Salam al-Bu ‘Ayyashi, Tangier, June 23, 1973. Hajj Ahmad, himself a qadi in Spanish Morocco, found himself appointed as a “super-qaid” {qa’id mumtaz} shortly after independence, although like others in his situation, he spent his efforts in securing a transfer back to the Ministry of Justice.

[50] Interview, Mulay Hasan al-Bziwi, Marrakesh, July 26, 1976. From 1949 to 1952, Mulay Hasan was deputy pasha of Marrakesh. His role as a confidential informant for the king went undetected until 1952, when the pasha succeeded in removing him from office.

[51] This discussion is based upon events at the Yusufiya, although procedures at the Qarawiyin appear to have been broadly analogous. 1 am especially indebted to at-Touarti ‘Ali bin al-Mu‘allim, a former member of the Yusu-fiyya’s Scholarly Council, ardent bibliophile, confidant of Mukhtar as-Susi and, in the late 1950s, liquidator of the estate of Hajj Thami al-Glawi, for sharing with me his perceptive comments on the workings of the Yusufiya under the French. Interviews, Skhirat and Marrakesh, June and July 1976.

[52] Thomas Dichter (1976), a former teacher in a Moroccan secondary school in the 1960s who subsequently returned to study it as an anthropologist, provides an excellent “insider” account of schooling and attitudes toward it. The French also maintain a network of private lycees, administered through the Mission Universitaire et Culturelle Fran^aise. These schools ostensibly are for the children of French citizens in Morocco, but most of their students are from the Moroccan elite. In addition, the various military and police services run their own academies for the equivalent of secondary and postsecondary education. Unlike their civilian counterparts, these schools are adequately funded and staffed and have suffered no known disruptions from protests or strikes.

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[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-1.jpg][Seventeenth century Turkish tile (Iznik ware) depicting the Great Mosque at Mecca. Painted blue, turquoise, black, and red under a clear glaze. Part of the inscription enjoins pilgrimage upon “whoever is able to undertake the journey”. (Walters Art Gallery, Baltimore. Used by permission.)]]

*** [Title Page]

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Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori

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*** Note on transliteration

Any book that draws upon materials in Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Malay, Turkish, Dyula, and Hebrew poses considerable problems of transliteration, especially as many contributors stress colloquial rather than literary usages. The system employed here, with as much consistency as possible, has been to use the system adopted by the International Journal of Middle East Studies for Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Hebrew, with additions to represent other languages as necessary. Diacritics have been omitted, except in the glossary, where they are given in full. As suggested by Judith Butcher's Copy-Editing: The Cambridge Handbook, the plural of words has been formed by the addition of an "s" to the singular, except in such cases as 'ulama' in which the transliterated plural form has become standard.

*** Preface

The subject of Muslim travel is unexpectedly complex. One might assume that religious doctrine prescribes certain kinds of travel, and that the ritual movement of Muslims leads to a heightened identification with Islam and with fellow Muslims. But the chapters of this book question such conventional wisdom. In looking for the answers to the basic questions that underlie this discussion — What does travel mean to Muslims? What are its motivations? What are its effects — we are struck by a pervasive intricacy and even ambiguity.

When the first question on the nature of Muslim travel is considered, it seems judicious to infer that, like all travel, it is principally a journey of the mind. Travel is pre-eminently an act of imagination, and, as our contributors amply demonstrate, a literal reading of hajj (pilgrimage), hijra (emigration), rihla (travel for learning and other purposes), ziyara (visits to shrines), and even labour migration, is inappropriate. These obviously constitute physical movement from one place to another, but, owing to the power of the religious imagination, they involve spiritual or

temporal movement at the same time. Muhammad Khalid Masud indicates that one sense of hijra is movement of the soul from a state of corruption to one of purity, and Julia Clancy-Smith shows that for Rahmaniyya adepts in North Africa, ziyara to the tomb of their founder guarantees movement from unhappiness to happiness in this world, and from damnation to salvation in the next.

There may also be imagined movement across gender or ethnic lines. Nancy Tapper points out that for Turkish women, participation in the hajj, ziyarets to local shrines and religious festivals becomes an act of affirmation that, before God, they are equal to men, and that they too can attain salvation. Referring to a non-Muslim but parallel context, Alex Weingrod shows how visits to saint shrines in Israel are, for Moroccan and Tunisian Jews, a sign of their passage from hesitant, socially and politically distinct

immigrants to self-confident, equal citizens. Finally, Muslims may envision travel across time as a substitute for physical travel, as when, in the case of the pre-twentieth-century Dyula whom Robert Launay describes, travel to the Hijaz was unnecessary to trace one's line of intellectual descent (isnad) back to illustrious Muslims of the early Islamic period.

Yet the very idea of travel, however much it may project the believer across spiritual space and time, and overcome barriers of gender and politics, cannot be separated from the anticipation of return to home. Here, too, travel is an inventive journey. Whether home is the place of departure, as in the case of the hajjis whom Barbara Metcalf and Mary McDonnell describe, or a new place of settlement, as in the case of the Turkish Gastarbeiter in Germany whom Ruth Mandel details, or the Balkan muhajirs on whom Kemal Karpat writes, travel has inevitably invested it with new meanings. Travellers may, as the labour migrants generally do, long for the old home; or, like the children of those migrants, increasingly regard the old as incomprehensible and in any case irrelevant; or, like the Balkan muhajirs to Turkey, believe that they have at last gone home. What seems clear is that travel and home — motion and place — constitute one process, and that in travelling beyond one's local time and space, one enters a mythical realm where home, the "fixed point" of departure and return, is reimagined and further travel inspired. In the Enigma of Arrival, V.S. Naipul (1987: 318) testifies to the power of this process when he speaks of:

Places doubly and trebly sacred to me because far away in England I had lived them imaginatively over many books and had in my fantasy set in those places the very beginning of things, had constructed of them a fantasy of home.

When we turn to the second question — the motivations for travel — we confront head on the role that religion, and specifically Islam, has to play. It is tempting to take the view that religion, as a set of universal and authoritative beliefs and practices, enjoins certain conduct

upon Muslims everywhere. But the contributors to this volume illuminate inherent tensions that belie such a decided view. The presumed constancy of dogma competes with the actual shift in meanings that dogma acquires in differing contexts, and the presumed universality of the Islamic community competes with the local communities in which Muslims actually live. But what also emerges is that the co-existence of these contrasting tendencies, however forced it may seem in the abstract, is largely unremarked upon by Muslims themselves.

Ideas such as hijra and rihla do change over time and in various places, but, as Masud observes, there is also a “semantics of expectation” that makes such key terms instantly recognisable, and valued in themselves, as signposts on a changing landscape. In a similar manner, Muslims seem effortlessly to juggle local and multiple identities — villager, tribesman, woman, citizen — with the broader identity of believer and to legitimise them all by reference to the idiom of the cosmopolitan community of believers (umma). This is not to suggest, however, that the modes of Islamic belief are uniform. Rather, as Launay points out, a greater sensitivity to the tenets of the law among the Dyula — “shari‘a-mindedness”, to use Hodgson’s evocative phrase — is related to economic liberalisation and the rise of a more pronounced social hierarchy. In addition, Tapper notes that the emphasis which Turkish women place upon travel for religious purposes depends to a considerable extent upon their general attitude towards the role of men and women in society.

The image of a flexible Islam in thought and practice thus emerges in this book, and we see that the motives for action in general, as for travel in particular, are inevitably mixed — a combination of holy reason and social, economic, and political concerns. As the introduction points out, ideas are unquestionably important spurs to social action, but they are not the sole determinants. Our contributors show that such factors as status, self-affirmation, and economic interest are equally as important as the sense of obligation, and that such categories as class, ethnicity, gender, and historical memory are as relevant as doctrine.

Sam Gellens, for example, observes that rihla in the tenth and eleventh centuries was often intimately connected with trade and associated with a certain class structure — traders, commercial middle-men, and intellectuals — and both Metcalf and McDonnell demonstrate that the hope of enhanced social standing accounts, in part, for why people of varying social backgrounds undertake the pilgrimage to the holy places. The attractions of the “centre” may be several, therefore, but what also emerges in these pages is a questioning of the received wisdom that there is but one validating centre in Islam. To use Tapper’s expression, a more complex “sacred geography” appears, as does a more subtle sense of location, of where Muslims stand in relationship to each other and to religiously defined space. The need to travel to saintly shrines or, as Mandel shows, the need of Turkish workers in Europe to travel back to Turkey, may be as compelling as the doctrinally enjoined pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

In turning to the third basic question, concerning the effects of travel, we find that a heightened identification with Islam may

result. However, as Abderrahmane El Moudden says of Moroccan travellers in the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, an ambivalence of identity is also as likely, if not more likely, to result. Cornell Fleischer (personal communication) suggests that the consciousness of locality and difference appears to have intensified in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries throughout the Middle Eastern Muslim world in general. This intensification allows one to infer that the transition to territorially-based plural communities preceded the advent of western powers in the region, the normally accepted bench-mark for the emergence of the “modern” era.

From this transitional period suggested by Fleischer and El Moudden to the present, the travellers for religious purposes have, as in earlier periods, been aware of the community of faith and goals that ties them to fellow travellers. But at the same time, they have come into direct contact with the real differences of language, sect, race, and customs that unavoidably make up the umma. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of western social scientists, therefore, the encounter with the Muslim “other” has been at least as important for self-definition as the confrontation with the European “other”.

Indeed, even as travellers sense participation in a great enterprise, they become aware of the lack of commonalities and are sometimes overwhelmed by them. Whether it is the sixteenth-century Arab traveller to Istanbul whom El Moudden describes; or Kemal Karpat, the Romanian-born ethnic Turk who migrated to Turkey in the 1940s; or the Europeanised Turkish worker returning to Turkey whom Mandel describes, each has the unsettling experience of feeling different within a Muslim community when only familiarity, even solace, was anticipated. The ironic counterpoint to travel broadening one’s consciouness of the spiritual unity of the umma is that travel may define frontiers between Muslims and thus narrow their horizons.

Travel can also be politically subversive. Launay explains how the Dyula, who travelled to Mecca and Medina for pilgrimage or religious learning, returned to advocate greater orthodoxy — thus undermining the established order based upon local notions of scholarly and political legitimacy. Mandel shows how the Turkish Alevi Gastarbeiter who are marginalised twice over — Turkish in Germany, Alevi in Sunni Turkey — reshape their Islamic and political identities in their new environment and, in the process, seek to reverse the pattern of Sunni domination and even to create an Alevi nationalism. Weingrod demonstrates that travel to saint shrines and proximity to saintly baraka (grace) have served as a focal point for Sephardic Israelis who take pride in their recent

assimilation into the society, and have thus helped to encourage the growth of rightist-nationalist political ideologies among them.

But governments, always mindful of the political potential of Islam, have sought to co-opt religious practice. The Turkish government has promoted the identification of “modern” Islam with republicanism and, as McDonnell documents in the case of Malaysia, the hajj has to a considerable extent been nationalised. Pilgrims travel in national delegations under the auspices of the national bureaucracy and spend the brief time in Arabia in minimal contact with other pilgrims. Popular identification of the nation with Islam is in the government’s interest, and a probable result. Yet political identities, like religious ones, are constantly re-imagined, and the effects of travel are as ambiguous as the motives for it.

In the preparation of this book, we have become acutely aware that the role of travel in Muslim societies and in Islamic doctrine is not a topic which has been systematically explored by historians or social scientists. Moreover, we have tried to encourage thinking on a common topic among scholars concerned with historical periods ranging from the first centuries of Islam to the present, and with Muslims in societies ranging from Malaysia and West Africa to Western Europe, and from different traditions of scholarly enquiry. This has posed particular challenges. As we suggest above, at an abstract level, travel for pilgrimage, scholarly learning, proselytisation, visits to saints’ shrines, commerce and migration, both forced and voluntary, has contributed significantly to shaping the religious imagination in both the past and the present. Moreover, travel for these various purposes is not mutually exclusive. None the less, there appears to have been an implicit scholarly division of labour among disciplines, with historians and scholars in the history of religions focusing upon various aspects of the pilgrimage and the religious imagination, while social scientists have for the most part concentrated upon migration, particularly labour migration, to the exclusion of considering its impact upon religious expression and thought.

As we suggest in the bibliographic essay at the end of this volume, until the mid-1980s, few studies crossed this line. We find it encouraging that this implicit disciplinary division of labour has become increasingly blurred in recent years. Anthropological studies of pilgrimage and other forms of travel have now become much more common. Indeed, some of the most significant recent contributions are studies of Muslims who have migrated to or settled in Europe. Likewise, most of the chapters in this volume

derive from recent field research or historical inquiry, or, as in the case of Masud, represent new directions of research by senior scholars.

As in any collective enterprise intended to represent cross-disciplinary approaches, we have faced a more substantial editorial challenge than would be the case with an endeavour in which most contributors share the same disciplinary training or are at comparable levels in their scholarly careers. Whereas some contributtions represent single-case studies, the comparisons built into many of the papers — across region (e.g. Gellens), time (e.g. El Moudden, McDonnell, and Metcalf), or both (e.g. Masud) — suggest a surprising level of

linkages. Other contributions, including the introductory chapter by the editors, are intended to set a framework for wide-ranging comparison and to elicit the conceptual issues, both implicit and explicit, underlying this book.

Not the least of the challenges in creating this book has been to encourage contributors from varying disciplines and national scholarly traditions to speak to one another in a mutually intelligible language. The conceptual language invoked by participants in one discipline as practised in, say, North America, might adequately convey in shorthand form the lineage of an idea or a particular theoretical orientation, but may appear as impenetrable jargon to other scholars. Indeed, as an anthropologist and a political scientist respectively, we acknowledge that the contributions from social scientists, including ourselves, have often verged upon the semi-private vocabularies of our respective trades, while the early drafts of other contributions often unrealistically assumed prior knowledge of specific historical periods and places. As editors and contributors, we have made an effort in good faith to avoid the private languages of disciplinary specialists.

Chapters 2 and 3 provide complementary discussions of doctrines of travel in Muslim societies. We begin with a discussion of doctrine because it has often been argued that Muslims share more explicit doctrinal tenets enjoining movement than do the followers of other major religious traditions. The originality of Muhammad Khalid Masud's analysis of doctrinal issues is twofold. First, in contrast to many accounts of Muslim jurisprudence, he stresses the necessity of considering the contexts in which doctrines are developed and propagated. Second, he considers how the rise of "new intellectuals" in the Muslim world — i.e. those who have graduated from western-style schools and universities — affects the interpretation and justification of "traditional" doctrine. He argues that one consequence of not being tied to the interpretive styles of the traditional schools of jurisprudence is to create an opening for extremism, although the impact of such radical interpretations is often "partial and ephemeral".

Sam Gellens's chapter complements Masud's in indicating the importance accorded to travel in the hadith literature, and the practical importance of travel in the forms of pilgrimage, trade, and, in particular, scholarship. Gellens argues that doctrines of travel and travel for the sake of religious learning framed issues of locality, universality, and identity in the medieval Muslim world from the ninth through the eleventh centuries. Through comparing three contemporary Muslim societies in communication with one another — Andalusia, Egypt, and Khurasan — Gellens suggests why travel for learning shaped a cosmopolitan sense of identity in all cases, but was particularly important in shaping a sense of local identity for Andalusia, which sought intellectual succor from more secure centres of learning. Indeed, one of Gellens's major points is that the changing military and political conditions — particularly as Andalusia's relations with its Christian neighbours to the north steadily deteriorated — led to shifts in notions of centre and periphery. Although he only briefly considers the importance of scholarly travel in shaping the sense of identity of Jewish communities in the medieval Muslim world, he points out important parallels with Muslim senses of centre. For both communities, Andalusia became increasingly peripheral, and Iraq, Egypt (and, in the Jewish case, Tunisia) became increasingly "central".

Chapters 4 and 5 deal with travel accounts, particularly those related to the hajj, in different historical periods. Abderrahmane El Moudden’s account compares the importance of travel — in particular, for commerce, diplomacy, and learning — to Moroccans from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the subtle ways in which practice and perceptions varied over time and place, and the importance of travel accounts for those unable to undertake such arduous journeys. If, as with the accounts analysed by Gellens, travel offered the opportunity to imagine the wider, encompassing horizons of Muslim community, it also progressively contributed to an emerging awareness of being at the frontier of the Islamic world and of a sense of distinctive political identity.

Barbara Metcalf similarly deals with differences in travel accounts from the Indian sub-continent from the late eighteenth century to the present. As she points out, the pace at which this genre of narratives is produced accelerates with the onset of British colonial rule, in part because the new technology of the printing press accelerates their dissemination. Indeed, by the late nineteenth century many accounts began to be produced in English. She notes in particular the changing sense of person which emerges over time from these accounts, and the growing importance of individual, internalised experience. Yet even if many of these accounts internalise European notions of governance and some imitate European travel writing, they do not simply mirror European individualism.

The section on pilgrimage and migration emphasises how these experiences complement one another and shape

religious experience. In Chapter 6, Mary McDonnell discusses patterns of pilgrimage from Malaysia over the past century, assessing how changing economic, political, and social contexts have affected its conduct and significance. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the typical pilgrim was a member of the elite. Increasingly since the 1930s, however, pilgrims have come from the middle classes and, since the 1970s, from the wealthier rural areas. In earlier periods, almost no women participated in the hajj, but their participation has steadily increased since the 1930s to the point where nearly half of all Malaysian pilgrims today are women. Parallel to trends described by Metcalf, McDonnell shows how the pilgrimage has both a communal and an individual importance and how “external” considerations of status blend with “internal” considerations of state of mind. Moreover, she shows that enhanced state supervision of the hajj is one of the most important developments of the post-colonial period. Contrary to the general trend established in this book, however, McDonnell argues that Malaysians have an undifferentiated concept of centre — modern-day Saudi Arabia — and are drawn to it because of the perception of their own “peripheral” position. The result, she argues, is a suffusion of the periphery with the “central” values of a non-revivalist, politically accommodationist Islam that the Saudis espouse and the Malaysian government favours.

In Chapter 7, Kemal Karpat deals primarily with Muslim identity in the Balkans from the mid-nineteenth century to 1914, and the ways in which forced migrations during this period — an all too common occurrence — served as catalysts for re-imagining complex national, ethnic, and religious identities. If, unlike Metcalf, Karpat emphasises changes in collective, communal identities, we find particularly fascinating the juxtaposition of his historical narrative with a postscript in which he describes his personal experience of migration from Romania in the 1940s.

Karpat's argument echoes what might be called the "Turkish-Islamic synthesis". In his view, an apolitical sense of Muslim identity, which obtained in the pre-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, was transformed into a politicised one largely because of the new immigrants to Turkey. This transformation, in turn, is made to account for the emergence of the Turkish nation-state.

The assumptions underlying the "Turkish-Islamic" synthesis are admittedly controversial. But Karpat's narrative, representing a distinct school of thought, becomes all the more useful because of its admixture of "objective" and "personal" histories, with the one informing the other. Karpat's essay, like all historical representations, may be read as an ethnographic text.

In Chapter 8, Ruth Mandel traces how the sense of centre becomes transformed over time for Turkish workers in Europe, so that West Germany itself becomes "central" for the second generation while Turkey becomes peripheral. Turkish Alevi Muslims, often perceived as a "fifth column" in the Ottoman Empire and identified with the political left by Sunni Muslims in contemporary Turkey, have emerged in West Germany as the dominant group instead of Sunni Muslims. The Alevis consider themselves to be more "democratic, tolerant, and progressive" than their Sunni Turkish counterparts and feel less threatened by German society. In Turkey, Alevi identity is constructed primarily in contrast to that of Sunni Turks; in Germany, both Germans and Sunni Turks become the "other".

The final section, "Saints, Scholars, and Travel", concerns more particularistic forms of travel for religious purposes. In scholarship on Islam and in the history of religions in general, there is often a tendency to assume that the more encompassing formulations of belief and practice shared by the community of believers inevitably overshadow more particularistic and locally oriented ones in importance. In Chapter 9, Robert Launay's account of scholarly credentials among the Dyula indicates the links between travel, commerce, and religious learning, but cautions against the a priori assumption that travel and study in the Arabic-speaking Middle East were more prestigious than access to local knowledge. However, local controls over knowledge were challenged by revivalist movements from the mid-nineteenth century. Their adherents had gone to the Arab East in search of superior knowledge. Upon returning, they questioned the social distinctions of the religious and political status quo, based upon both heredity and a monopoly of Islamic knowledge. This tension between locally derived answers to what is Islam and "being Muslim", and answers

inspired by contact with the wider community of the believers, continues to the present period.

In Chapter 10, Julia Clancy-Smith's essay on the Rahmaniyya religious order in Algeria during the late eighteenth century also concerns the shifting balance between local, regional, and wider bases for religious authority. Her account combines attention to the biography of the movement's founder, regional politics, and

social history to explain why new networks of religious authority arose during the late eighteenth century. She demonstrates the way in which the founder gained adherents during his travels at a time of political uncertainty, and the importance subsequently attached to visits to his shrines. The individual act of self-assertation that such visits represented also enhanced a sense of solidarity which sustained the new brotherhood.

In Chapter 11, Alex Weingrod's study of visits to saints' shrines in Israel since the early 1960s amplifies this connection between individual movement and collective religious experience. For the newly arrived Moroccan and Tunisian Jews, or for those who have long settled but who have not socially or politically "arrived", the hope of acquiring saintly blessings can be comforting, and even transforming. The sense of being part of a great movement results, and in fact the shrine visits often take on institutional form through the establishment of associated educational and social centres and through their explicit politicisation. Although obviously not directly concerned with the Muslim world, Weingrod's essay provides an instructive comparison with it. The Israeli Sephardic experience points to a larger Maghribi culture shared by both Muslims and Jews and which leads to the linking of spiritual fulfilment with periodic visits to saints' shrines and even to the need for "living saints".

In Chapter 12, Nancy Tapper demonstrates that visits to saints' shrines, often thought to be especially pronounced in the Maghrib, are significant in Turkey. She also confirms that travel associated with religious purposes has more to do with spiritual and social compensations than with doctrine, and shows that visits to shrines are officially discouraged, but that women especially undertake them. The opportunity to travel and visit together, without men present on these occasions, provides companionship and a network of support, and when men and women do travel together, as on the hajj or to visit family members at the end of the month of fasting, women are afforded the opportunity to assert their equality.

With these examples of travel provided by Tapper and the other contributors, we have juxtaposed ideas and activities whose generic diversity is vast. Defenders of comparative studies would acknowledge that these studies are difficult to elaborate in cases such as the wider Muslim community in which the existence of a presumed cultural whole may render its independent units virtually indistinguishable. In the search for common elements, it is also

possible that we may force comparisons. Furthermore, to the extent that common elements are found, there is the danger of unintentionally generating an essentialist view of Islam or of being Muslim. We believe, however, that the comparative nature of this volume has its uses. It specifically helps us to avoid what Skocpol (1984: 376) calls “the interpretive tendency to attribute self-contained significance” to each form of travel in the Muslim world that either is initiated for religious purposes or comes to assume religious significance.

Our comparative focus has been facilitated by the collaborative quality of this project. With one exception, the contributions to this book were initially presented in a workshop on “Movement and Exchange in Muslim Societies”, New York, 24–26 April 1986, and in a conference on the same topic held in Princeton, 17–19 September 1987. Both were sponsored by the Joint Committee for the Comparative Study of Muslim Societies of the Social Science Research Council and American Council of Learned Societies, of which the co-editors were members. The committee also generously provided support for the preparation of this volume, the first to result from projects initiated directly by the committee since its formal inception. The editors thank David L. Szanton, Executive Associate, for support rendered at critical stages; Cornell Fleischer, Ladislav Holy, and William R. Roff for reading the typescript in its entirety in an earlier version; Carol Delaney for valuable insights along the way; and Barbara D. Metcalf for ideas towards an appropriate title.

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* Introduction

** Chapter One: Social theory in the study of Muslim societies

Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori

Pilgrimage and migration in Muslim societies are forms of political and social action. These forms of action, like others, raise basic questions for the contemporary social scientific study of Islam. The most basic issue is how to understand such action — in this case, the actions of Muslims and the thoughts presumed to guide them — in various places and times.

This problem is especially acute because it brings us into the opaque realm, on the one hand, of reasons for action (i.e. why is it undertaken) and, on the other, of the meanings that various actors impute to action (i.e. what impact or change is generated by it). This is to say nothing of the ability of actors to accomplish an action (Giddens 1984: 5–13).

Our argument takes the following course in explaining travel as specific forms of social action within Muslim religious traditions. First, we consider what is meant by “Islam” itself as a social phenomenon in which these actions take place. Second, we indicate the specific importance of travel and its significance as a process of social action in understanding “Islam” and ideas of Muslim community. Third, we consider the idea of motives and “interests”, those culturally and materially informed incentives to travel. In doing so, we seek to clarify key concepts which are relevant in general to social thought in religious contexts and in particular to the issue at hand: doctrine in context; the relationship between centre and periphery; and scale. Fourth, we turn to the complementary issue of effects and identities, those specific social and religious meanings created through travel which inspire changes in how Muslims conceive of and experience “Islam” and the communities in which they live.

*** “Islam” as a social phenomenon

Muslim communities, like all religious communities, are imagined (Anderson 1983: 14–16). They are created — and knowable — through the vision, faith, and practices of their adherents. Faith is accepted and sustained through symbol and metaphor, the very stuff of imagination which not only enlarges adherents’ perceptions but reorders them so that the validity and rationality of religious faith and practice seem only natural (Coulson 1981: 3–8). However, the senses of community which derive from faith and practice are necessarily interpreted and shaped in distinct ways in differing places, times, and societies. Participants may assert that their representations of practice and tradition are stable, uniform, and derive from the distant past, yet an examination of the history of these communities indicates both the diversity of these practices and traditions, and their transformations over time.

The paradoxes encountered by theorists of nationalism apply equally to scholars concerned with religious traditions. Historians, writes Anderson (1983: 14), see ideas of nationalism and nation as “objectively modern”, although nationalists consider these notions to possess a “subjective antiquity”; nationality is formally enshrined in international law but irremediably

particular in its concrete manifestations; nationalisms carry political force yet often reflect a “philosophical poverty or even incoherence Like Gertrude Stein in the face of Oakland, one can rather quickly conclude that there is ‘no there there’”.

In a similar manner, the concept of “religion” is paradoxically consistent and clear to most carriers of particular religious traditions, yet unsettled, and perhaps even inherently ambiguous, in content and form to others — including many committed to these traditions. Religious adherents often assert that their beliefs and practices have been fixed over time, and scholars who have argued for placing religious thought and practice into their different historical contexts have often encountered stiff opposition. In the particular case of Islam, advocates of such studies, including the late Fazlur Rahman (1982, 1985), have often faced criticisms similar to those levied earlier against W. Robertson Smith (1956 [orig. 1889]), who argued for the historical study of biblical texts and institutions. But, as Coulson (1981: 3) says: “When the vital connection between religion and imagination is either overlooked or denied, it is not merely theology or the theologian that suffers. The very life of religion ebbs and becomes infertile”. Indeed, the reality is that religious communities, like all “imagined” communities, change over time. Their boundaries are shifted by, and shift,

the political, economic, and social contexts in which these participants find themselves.

*** Muslim travel as social action

As in other civilisations and traditions, travel is particularly important when considering changes in Muslim imagined communities past and present. Travel creates boundaries and distinctions, even as travellers believe that they are transcending them. In the hope of creating new horizons, travellers set off from home, encounter “others” and return with a sharpened awareness of difference and similarity.

Muslim doctrine explicitly enjoins or encourages certain forms of travel. One is the express obligation to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). Another, hijra, is the obligation to migrate from lands where the practice of Islam is constrained to those where in principle no such constraints exist. Visits to local or regional shrines (ziyaras) and travel in search of knowledge (rihla) provide further examples of religiously inspired travel. Yet other forms of travel unrecognised in doctrine can have equal or even greater significance. For example, Muslims have often mixed travel for trade purposes with religiously motivated travel. Moroccan travellers from the sixteenth through the eighteenth century (see El Moudden, Chapter 4 of this volume) and Dyula ones in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see Launay, Chapter 9 of this volume) combined travel and rihla. To take another example, contemporary labour migration within the Muslim world, but also in Europe — called Islam’s new “frontier” in one recent study (Dassetto and Bastenier 1988) and its “suburbs” in another (Kepel 1987) — has facilitated changes in religious institutions and practices at least

as important as those inspired by earlier generations of elite Muslim intellectuals in the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent.

Travel of several kinds is therefore significant for Muslim self-expression, and travel is of course informed by the cultural and social contexts in which Muslims are located. None the less, such phenomena need not be seen as unique to the Muslim world in order for their significance to be affirmed. The argument can be made that pilgrimage as a form of movement is significant in both Hindu and Christian traditions, as it is in Judaism in the Middle East (see Weingrod, Chapter 11 of this volume). Moreover, just as the hijra, the migration of the Prophet and his followers from Mecca to Medina in 622, became a dominant theme in Islamic political thought (see Masud, Chapter 2 of this volume), Walzer

(1985: 142) argues that the biblical story of Exodus has served as a key metaphor — the flight from bondage to freedom — in western political thought over the centuries.

*** Motives and interests

It would be helpful if, with some confidence, we could understand why certain types of persons or social categories in Muslim societies are disposed to undertake pilgrimage, other travel for religious reasons, or economic migration. The difficulty of imputing motives and interests to individuals or peoples is now commonly recognised. The literature of the social sciences offers two suggestive yet incomplete approaches to dealing with this issue.

The first is to examine social status and class position and to presume that the “interests” associated with them inform conduct. It might be assumed, for example, that the educated or intellectual elites are more likely to be influenced by doctrinal considerations, or at least to say that they are. It might also be assumed that those deemed by the upper strata of their own society to constitute the “lower” orders — in terms of birth, gender, ethnicity, education, wealth, or authority — are motivated primarily by social, political, and economic deprivation. The “middle” orders, or the bourgeoisie, would then be assumed to be particularly sensitive to questions of status, both to enhance their image in the eyes of those whom they consider to be above them and to differentiate themselves clearly from those below. Some nineteenth- and twentieth-century pilgrims to Mecca from the Indian sub-continent, for example, wrote accounts of their travels in English (see Metcalf, Chapter 5 of this volume). These accounts were accessible only to the British and British-educated Indian elite. Their authors thereby distanced themselves from both the traditional Muslim elite and other Muslims, and implicitly fulfilled the British image of the good and loyal Muslim.

Tempting though such generalisations may be, however, studies of specific Muslim societies provide contrary interpretations of the relationship between styles of Islamic belief and

social origins. The case of Islamic activism in Egypt is instructive. One observer (Ibrahim 1980: 438–9) suggests that most of the Islamic activists responsible for violent acts against the Egyptian state were from modest, but not poor, backgrounds and were first-generation city dwellers. Another (Kepel 1986: 221) implies that a significant number had professional middle or upper class backgrounds. Still another (Ansari 1984) argues that the most successful activist groups contained persons of varying social backgrounds and that it was this mixture that accounted for their success.

In the case of northern Nigeria, the official report (Federal Government of Nigeria 1981: 79) on the Kano disturbances in 1980 attributed them to rural migrants who had been "brought up in extreme poverty [and] generally had a grudge against privileged people in the society". A recent study (Lubeck 1987) suggests a more complex relationship to social origins. Both industrial workers and marginalised "lumpen" labourers in northern Nigeria are predominantly of rural origin. The industrial workers generally seem to remain active in Qur'anic school networks, and use Islamic symbols and slogans in the effort to negotiate improved working conditions with their employers. The more marginal workers, including seasonal labourers and street peddlers, seem to be more inclined to adhere to itinerant Muslim preachers. It was only this group that was attracted to the millenarian violence of Alhaji Mohammed Marwa, known as Maitatsine ("the one who damns"), instigator of the Kano riots. The distinction between factory and "marginal" workers may partly be explained by the differences in their capability to effect changes in their living conditions.

Yet the specific case of northern Nigeria also suggests that explanations based upon social class or the relationship to specific modes of production cannot in themselves account for motives and interests. It is important, for example, to recall that millenarianism in Africa antedates Islam and that, in present-day northern Nigeria, there is a division between an "establishment" claiming descent from the eighteenth-century religious reformer 'Uthman dan Fodio and those Muslims who, for whatever reason, are not part of it. Thus explanations based upon social class or background must be supplemented by an appreciation of the larger historical circumstances.

The second approach offered by the social sciences focuses upon the rational choice of actors. This approach, in assuming that individuals or groups discern and choose among their interests according to a code of rationality, leaves the disquieting impression that they will reach the same decisions given similar circumstances. In this sense, both interests and rational choice become overly abstract. Apart from the inherent philosophical problem of the relationship between choice and rationality, this kind of conclusion fails to acknowledge that rationality needs to be interpreted and put into context.

The manifestly political example of the 1956 Suez crisis illustrates this. The Shuckburgh diaries (1986: 341) confirm that Anthony Eden, who incidentally had read Persian and Arabic at

Cambridge, thought of ‘Abd al-Nasir as an Arab Mussolini. ‘Abd al-Nasir could proclaim that the time of the Arab nation had come, and that moral power had shifted in favour of the non-aligned movement. Yet in Eden’s view, the Egyptian leader could not fail to see that he still had to accommodate the military and economic might of the great powers. Heikal’s (1986) account of Suez shows that ‘Abd al-Nasir, for his part, believed that Eden could not fail to recognise that the great powers were no longer able to exercise their military options without incurring unacceptable political risks. Both leaders thought that the other was acting irrationally and therefore against his own interests.

This discussion of rationality reminds us of how difficult it is to establish the relationship between motives and social action with precision. None the less, this relationship can be more clearly discerned by elaborating upon its complexity, and that, in turn, suggests, in the case of action in religious contexts — specifically Muslim travel — the need to place doctrine in context, reconsider the centre-periphery dichotomy, and take into account the scale of Muslim societies and communities.

**** Doctrine

Many studies of doctrine imply or assume that it has an independent existence and is invariable across time and place. Committed believers make this assumption, but so do many scholarly observers who may be either sympathetic to Islam or not. Qur’anic injunctions, although almost self-evidently applicable to all Muslims, are none the less necessarily subject to differing social and political interpretations. The injunction to undertake the hajj is not necessarily invested with the same meaning for all Muslims, as those who write devotional literature on the pilgrimage sometimes assert. For Iranian Muslims in recent years, the pilgrimage to Mecca has had a political significance and intent certainly not shared by the keepers of the holy places. Moreover, Muhammad Ilyas, the founder of the transnational reform movement Jama‘ at Tabligh, suggested that tabligh, or proselytisation, is as important as, if not more important than, the hajj itself (Nadwi 1983: 44).

The Islamic notion of almsgiving (zakat) also illustrates the variability of doctrine according to circumstances. Some Muslims contend that zakat is a voluntary act of piety; others maintain that it is obligatory — to be collected and disbursed by the central government. There is also debate as to what percentage of income should be collected and how often. In the particular case of Shi‘i Islam, the relationship between zakat and khums, that portion of income that the Shi‘a give to their leading religious scholars (‘ulama’), is a matter of active debate. The obligatory collection of zakat from bank accounts in Zia’s Pakistan, part of an effort to impose an Islamic order, stimulated Shi‘i opposition. Opposition to the mandatory collection of the zakat also appeared in Saudi Arabia (Piscatori 1986: 179) in the early 1950s and among peasants in Malaysia (Scott 1985).

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-2.jpg][Figure 1.1 The cover art and title of this book, The Slaughter at Mecca, represent a contemporary, Iranian-influenced attempt to invest the hajj with political significance. Needless to say, the Saudi view of their management of the pilgrimage would be radically different from the one presented here. (Used by permission of the Committee for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula, London.)]]

Another example is the interpretation of the well-known Qur'anic phrase referring to the "oppressed" (mustad'afun) of the earth (Sura 4: 97), juxtaposed with the "oppressors" (mustak-barun) (Sura 16: 22–3). These terms have obviously had different meanings throughout history, and possess a special significance for contemporary Iranian Shi'a. The late Ayatollah Khomeini's use of these terms ironically evoked for some of his Iranian audience the secular discourse of the 1950s and 1960s on the dispossessed and the wretched of the earth.

Yet one must do more than acknowledge that the interpretation of doctrine changes according to prevailing economic, social, and political contexts. What is also required is a more nuanced consideration of time. Attempts to distinguish between classical and modern doctrines, for example, inadvertently create crude typologies that obscure the social and political forces which render certain doctrines more acceptable than others at any given time. Take the conventional assumption that the "gate of independent reasoning" (bab al-ijtihad) of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence was effectively closed by the beginning of the tenth century. It is generally accepted that the initial inspiration for this was the decision by the early 'Abbasid court that the interdiction on interpretive licence would support the political status quo. Independent reasoning, so the argument runs, was only re-allowed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the disruption of Muslim political authority that accompanied growing European hegemony. Liberal reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1893–97) assumed a causal link between the supposed stagnation of Muslim society and the prohibition on independent reasoning. It was presumed that, between the tenth and the eighteenth centuries, legal interpretations somehow went politically unchallenged.

This view belies the reality of both an almost continuous process of interpretation over the centuries and a complex relationship between legal and political authorities (Halleq 1984). Such conventional wisdom is also misleading when applied to the Shi'a. Their supposed continuous reliance on ijtihad, in contrast to Sunni Muslims, simplifies a complex situation in which various factions of Imami Shi'a struggled from the eleventh to the seventeenth

centuries over whether the traditions of the Imams should take precedence over the reasoning of contemporary religious leaders (mujtahids).

A layer-cake form of historical periods, or even the separation of Islamic history into “pre-modern” and “modern” eras, is predicated on a sequential view of history — one authoritative act of domination following another. There are indeed discernible historical shifts in ideas as well as practices — as, for example, in the distinct appearance of rihla texts and their association with the hajj beginning in the twelfth century (see Gellens, Chapter 3 of this volume), and the emergence of an explicit notion of “Morocco” in the sixteenth (see El Moudden, Chapter 4 of this volume). Although less dramatic, generational changes are also important, as testified by the differences between Turkish migrant workers in Germany and their German-born children (see Mandel, Chapter 8 of this volume) or ritual offerings and sacrifices performed by various generations of Pakistani labour migrants in Manchester (Werbner 1988).

The division of history into sharply delineated periods, however, may encourage the assumption that there are dominant doctrines in any given time, unchallenged by competing doctrines and their carriers. An alternative view of time accepts the simultaneity, and the continuity, of ideas which are fundamentally dependent upon the groups, social institutions, and status of those who use and select them.

It is tempting, for example, to make the symmetrical argument that hijra in the classical period meant the obligation to migrate from non-Muslim lands (dar al-kufr) to Muslim ones (dar al-Islam), and that today the notion is principally metaphorical, implying only a spiritual migration. But as this century demonstrates, various ideas of hijra co-exist with each other (see Masud, Chapter 2 of this volume). For some Muslims, hijra means the transition from accommodating state authority to resisting it because of a growing realisation of its illegitimacy. For others, it means the transition from poverty to a better life through affiliation with specific Islamic movements. For the Wahhabiyya of Saudi Arabia, it meant the transition from nomadic to settled life.[1] The Muridiyya of Senegal stand the presumed classical notion on its head. Hijra in their case means emigration from a land where Muslims are in a majority but face poverty, to places such as New York and Paris, where, under the direction of their spiritual leaders and largely perhaps for their benefit, they find economic opportunity (Diop 1985).

**** Centre and periphery

The concept of centre is important in understanding motives and interests because of the appeal the centre, as sacred space, has for Muslims. Proximity to the centre is assumed to invest persons or institutions with greater sanctity and thus, religious or political legitimacy. Muslims pray towards Mecca, and if possible culminate their lives by making the pilgrimage to it. Visits to regional shrines complement the pilgrimage, and such key institutions of learning as al-Azhar in Cairo, the Qarawiyyin in Fez, and the religious colleges of Qum have regularly attracted students and scholars from across the Muslim world.

Sociologists and political scientists who have predicated the success of development upon secularisation find the idea of centre and periphery as the key to their analysis of national and state authority. Indeed, the prevailing orthodoxy of the social sciences from the 1950s through the 1970s was modernisation theory (Binder 1986). It presupposed that a prerequisite of political development, and sometimes of political liberty, was the integration of outlying regions to national and international, political and economic networks through a common educational, economic, and communications system.[2] These ideas have percolated into the study of Islam within both the social sciences and the humanities in such forms as the dichotomy of “great tradition” and “little tradition” (Eickelman 1982: 10–11), the division between “central” and outlying lands, as in the Cambridge History of Islam (Holt et al. 1970), and the idea of I’Islamperipherique among some French scholars.[3]

The first difficulty with such organising schemes is that they presuppose only one centre rather than multiple ones. Can it be said of Shi‘i Muslims that Mecca is more their spiritual centre than Karbala, Najaf, or indeed Qum? Or that Mecca is “central” for an Alevi, for whom the genuine pilgrimage is one of the heart? (See Yalman 1969: 61–2.) Conceptualising the centre in a more institutional or political fashion leads to similar difficulties. When the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the caliphate in March 1924, several competitors unhesitatingly claimed the mantle: Egypt’s King Fu’ad, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, Sharif Husayn of Mecca, and even the French-dominated Sultan of Morocco.[4] More recently, the elites of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and, of course, Iran have competed — probably for political reasons — for leadership of the international Islamic movement.

The idea of centrality can be modified to presume an agreed hierarchy (or, indeed, hierarchies) of centres. In this view, the key

to the integration of the community, whether it is the nation-state of modernisation theories or the Islamic community (umma) of pan-Islamic literature, involves the projection of hierarchical order upon the periphery. Yet the problem with this conceptualisation is that it is possible to conceive of forms of integration which do not presuppose such an order. In many parts of the world, and certainly within the Muslim world, there exist multiple linkages among the various ethnic, kinship-based, regional, and religious communities which do not arrange themselves into an agreed ranking or which do not allow the emergence of a code for such ranking. The relations and even alliances among these groups often shift, frequently in ways that block or thwart bureaucracies of the modern state. Terrorist networks in Lebanon and Iran may be extreme examples, but such networks illustrate the fragility of modern state authority and the way in which modern politics may not be so much the struggle of the centre to dominate the periphery, as the struggle of multiple centres to retain their autonomy.

Our basic point is that although there doubtless is a powerful tendency in modern societies towards the establishment and maintenance of central authority, there is a persistence of

other networks of value and authority which are independent, or at least partially independent, of that authority, and do not appear to be on the wane. Thus, the straightforward distinction between centre and periphery is called into question, and the image of the Chinese puzzle may not be entirely inappropriate.[5]

The notion of centrality also becomes problematic if we think in terms of transnational movements. By definition, transnational institutions range across national borders and involve “non-state” actors, although they are not exclusively limited to them. An obvious example is the Catholic Church, and another, clearly, is Islam. But the example of the Catholic Church may be misleading if it leads us to assert that transnational movements require an organisational centre. A specific example in the Muslim world is the Barelwi movement. Although its ideas have spread from the Indian sub-continent, they have done so without the benefit of a clear, authoritative ideological centre such as the Deobandis possessed with their educational institutions (Metcalf 1982; Gaborieau 1986).

Terrorism can be another form of transnational movement. In the context of the contemporary Muslim world, it has become common currency to accuse Tehran, and also Tripoli and Damascus, of masterminding or directing a vast terrorist network whose aim is to intimidate other regimes and eliminate opponents. While these centres have provided political inspiration and material support, it would be incorrect to conclude that local groups committed to violent political action, such as Hizb Allah in southern Lebanon, are merely extensions of these centres. They have agendas, political leadership, and multiple — if shifting — lines of support of their own (Raufer 1987: 213–28).

Finally, in the study of Muslim societies, there has been the almost unquestioned assumption that written texts are more central than oral traditions or other cultural forms of authority. The Qur’an is at the apex of formal sources of jurisprudence, followed by the examples of the Prophet (sunna) and sayings attributed to him (hadith). Legal scholars say that those who practise the subsidiary sources of law, consensus (ijma‘) and independent reasoning (ijtihad), must rely upon the Qur’an, the sunna and the hadith literature to inform their judgement. Yet there are times when the sunna seems to take precedence over the Qur’an in the formation of consensus and the exercise of independent reasoning. In any case, as we have discussed earlier, there is no reason to assume that a standard interpretation of either exists. The significance of texts derives not from their inherent centrality but from the contingent political, social, and

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**** Scale

Most scholars acknowledge the need to place Islamic thought and practice into some sort of context, but do so without sufficient attention to the scale of what they describe. We regard the issue of scale as particularly important (see Eickelman 1987: 23–5). Devout Muslim writers tend to focus upon the universality of the umma, whereas social scientists usually look at less comprehensive entities, whether they are the nations of the political scientists or the local communities of the anthropologists. Each approach has its strengths and drawbacks in examining a phenomenon such as the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Muslim writers emphasise that the pilgrimage is a communal and personal experience shared by Muslims across the world, but overlook many aspects of its impact upon the individual pilgrim returning to his or her local community (see, for example, Esin 1963). Anthropologists have explored its impact at the local level and remind us that in small-scale, face-to-face communities, many facets of religious experience are inherently parochial and intensely personal, deriving their strength from this depth of shared local experience (Appardurai 1986; Turner 1973).[6] They are perhaps less sensitively attuned to pilgrimage as a national event and political act. Political scientists rarely study the pilgrimage — itself a telling commentary — but when they do consider it, it is briefly to make the point that it is an aspect of colonial, national, or international politics (e.g. Piscatori 1983; Kramer 1988). Similarly, studies of contemporary migration focus upon its political and economic implications, but often neglect its important consequences for religious beliefs and practice (e.g. Owen 1985). Colonial scholarship, by way of contrast, took the political potential of the pilgrimage seriously but commonly neglected its local and personal characteristics.[7] Social scientists have until recently tended to downplay the transnational dimensions.

Ideally, analysis of the pilgrimage, and indeed of all travel, requires dealing simultaneously with these several levels of experience and the linkages among them. For the Turkish or Malay hajji, for instance, the pilgrimage is often simultaneously a village, national and international phenomenon (see McDonnell, Chapter 6 of this volume). The problem is all the more challenging because the relationships among these levels are not

necessarily arranged in a nesting order. Nor should they imply a preferred order. There is no reason to presume that the more universal or encompassing community is inherently more attractive than the small-scale particularistic one. Launay (Chapter 9 of this volume) stresses that in the realm of religious learning, locally-oriented regional networks of scholarship in West Africa were for long regarded as superior in authority to those based upon links with the more externally oriented centres of learning such as Mecca. In the later clash between a Wahhabi-influenced vision of Islamic community and the locally inspired vision, the Dyula tended to choose the latter, even as they continued to feel the pull of the former. Of course, the constraints on achieving a sustained awareness of multiple levels and perspectives such as this are substantial: limitations of time and scholarly access, and the continuing hold of disciplinary traditions in spite of the “blurring” of genres that may have occurred.

*** Effects and identities

Up to this point we have been concerned with the complex issue of what motivates social action in the religious environment. We consider now the complementary issue of effect — that is, the specific social and religious meanings that Muslims, or groups of

Muslims, attach to various forms of travel and the changes that travel induces in imagining their communities.

The most perplexing question to ask is whether there is a direct causal relationship between the act of travel and a heightened sense of being Muslim. We initially assumed that there was such a causal relationship in the discussions that led to this book. In time, however, it became clear that the disadvantage of such an assumption is that it implies that Muslim identity is an object whose contours can be specified. As it is impossible to say with certainty at any given moment precisely what Islam is, so is it impossible to specify the contours of Muslim identity. After the Ahmadi riots in Pakistan in 1953, when the Pakistani government asked the Munir Commission to define what a Muslim was, it admitted an inability of religious scholars to agree on such a definition: “[I]f considerable confusion exists in the minds of ‘ulama’ on such a simple matter, one can easily imagine what the differences on more complicated matters will be” (Punjab Government 1954: 215). After twenty years of debate, all that the writers of the Pakistani constitution could agree upon was belief in the oneness of God and the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood (Rahman 1981: 13), but, it should be noted, in the political context of excluding the Ahmadis and thereby making them second-class citizens.

It would also be misleading to assume a uniformity of Muslim identity. The Shi‘a, the Alevis, the Muwahhidun (the Wahhabiyya) of Saudi Arabia, the Ibadiyya, the Isma‘iliyya, the Zaydis, the Sunnis, and so on, all possess — at least on the basis of self-assertion — a Muslim identity. Individual believers or groups of believers may at times more strongly identify, or be

identified, with the concrete sect or rite than with the abstract community of Islam. Indeed, political circumstances often compel individuals and sects to emphasise and act in terms of their more parochial identities. This has been the case with the ‘Alawis in Syria and their Turkish counterparts. The Sunni majority of Syria has, until fairly recently, questioned whether the ‘Alawis are Muslim. The issue has also arisen in Turkey (see Mandel, Chapter 8 of this volume), even as both the questioners and those questioned fervently maintain that there are no divisions within the house of Islam.

In the earlier discussion of centre and periphery, we have seen some of the difficulties in presuming that values and institutional loyalties are hierarchically arranged. The creation of a hierarchy of identities is also misleading. There is an almost infinitely diverse literature on the concept of identities and little agreement on how they are formed and change over time. One way of ordering this complex debate is to distinguish between the “primordialist” and

“instrumentalist” perspectives (Bentley 1987). The primordialist view holds that identity flows from shared cultural or symbolic values; the instrumentalist perspective maintains that individuals or groups assert or emphasise particular identities because they provide a means to maximise their individual or collective interests.

Both views are suggestive but neither is satisfactory. The fundamental difficulty with them is that they predicate the formulation of identity upon a reality that appears abstract and somehow independent of those persons or groups who perceive and participate in it. The specific difficulty with the instrumentalist approach is that it imputes to actors an ordering and clarity of goals, but these goals are necessarily dependent upon ever-shifting cultural and social contexts and are often ambiguous as a consequence (Laitin 1986: 10–11). Moreover, social action, as Weingrod (Chapter 11, this volume) shows, may well generate unforeseen consequences. The growing attachment of Sephardic Israeli Jews to saints and shrines, for example, has reinforced the emergence of radical, right-wing nationalism. As for the primordialist perspective, it leaves the impression that shared cultural and symbolic values are fixed, or at least change only in the long run.[8]

Identities change over time, as studies of migration amply demonstrate. Some migrants continue to regard their land of birth as “home”, while others come to identify primarily with their land of settlement (see Karpat, Chapter 7 of this volume). Others, such as Turkish workers in Germany (see Mandel, Chapter 8 of this volume), or indeed such intellectuals as Salman Rushdie (1988), may feel at home in neither place, at ease in neither their land of settlement nor their land of origin. There may also be multiple, co-existing identities. For instance, Moroccan travel accounts (see Moudden, Chapter 4 of this volume) suggest that travellers identified at various times with their region of origin within Morocco; Morocco itself; the cosmopolitan centres such as Cairo, Medina, or Istanbul to which they journeyed; and (with some ambivalence) the umma. At various times — and perhaps simultaneously — class, ethnicity, nation, and Islam itself have been defining characteristics for Malay pilgrims (see McDonnell, Chapter 6 of this volume).

There is no reason to assume that multiple identities such as those described by McDonnell exist necessarily in a hierarchical order. For instance, Turkish women sometimes identify first with their families and then with other Muslims — men and women — as during the hajj and major religious festivals. At other times, however — as during visits to saint shrines — they identify primarily with other women (see Tapper, Chapter 12 of this volume). That no fixed hierarchical order exists is also demonstrated by another example from South-east Asia. In parts of the Tengger highlands of eastern Java in the nineteenth century, some villages consisted of both Muslim and non-Muslim (Buda) hamlets. The introduction of coffee as a cash crop by the early years of the century led to subtle changes of political and economic balance both between and within these hamlets. In addition, Dutch colonial policies in central Java stimulated

labour migration to the eastern highlands, and links to cities were developed because of the need to market the coffee crop. Questions of identity were intensified and complicated by changes in wealth, status, and regular contact with central Java. Islam was one factor among many, and did not appear to be particularly “central”, as is demonstrated by the example of the first Muslim chief in one of these villages, Besuki.

A wealthy entrepreneur and the first villager ever to make the hajj pilgrimage, he was none the less Javanese and a native son of Besuki, from one of the first local families to break into the coffee industry previously monopolized by the [immigrant] Madurese.

(Hefner 1987: 61–2)

*** Conclusion

We have been concerned with discerning how instances of social action can be understood and illuminated within religious traditions, and, specifically, within Muslim religious traditions. The deliberate use of “traditions” in the plural suggests the view that historical “Islam” does not neatly coincide with doctrinal “Islam” and that the practice and significance of Islamic faith in any given historical setting cannot readily be predicted from first principles of dogma or belief. It is difficult to assess motive and effect in the general realm of social action, but it would seem all the more difficult in the case of religious traditions such as Islam, whose adherents assert that Islamic directives are universal and clear and yet whose manifestations in thought and practice are so varied and indeterminate.

As iconoclastic as it may seem, even the basics of faith are not as luminous or lucid as one might hope for the purpose of eliciting the contours of the religious imagination of the Muslim community past and present. Of the “five” pillars of faith — ritual prayer, pilgrimage

to Mecca, almsgiving, fasting, and the profession of faith — four have been subject to dispute and different interpretation at various times, and continue to be so today (Eickelman 1989: 262–73). Similar difficulties adhere to substituting the search for explicitly shared fixed beliefs transcending time and place with one for authoritative uniform practice, or orthopraxy, since again there are significant divergences among Muslims. Alternatively, it is possible to say, as indeed one Muslim scholar has, that there is no Islam but “islams” (Zein 1977). This approach, intended to displace “essentialist” views, ironically creates a new essentialism by assuming that all the various “islams” are composed of common structural elements. The “islams” approach also underplays the “rather unique” insistence by most Muslims that Islam is “a coherent and closed system” (Smith 1963: 84).

An alternative to the “essentialist” approach of discerning the religious imagination within Muslim traditions is to acknowledge that many Muslims share a common vocabulary of key terms which shape their experience and perceptions of it. These terms, not necessarily Qur’anic or doctrinal, such as the Arabic ‘aql (“reason”) and nafs (“passions” or the “lower” human instincts), appear throughout the non-Arab Muslim world. Such terms were, indeed, often introduced with the spread of Islam. Yet one must exercise caution in assuming that common items of vocabulary constitute a shared language through which ideas of self, society, responsibility, justice and so on shape and express social experience. After all, in any given context there are a number of non-Islamic terms and concepts used by Muslims which equally shape and express ideas such as these. As indicated earlier, the Qur’anic verse referring to the “oppressed of the earth” resonated profoundly in the 1960s with Fanon’s “wretched of the earth” and became consciously (and brilliantly) fused in the speeches and writings of such figures as Ali Shari’ati (d. 1977). For some of the audience for such writings, the Qur’anic language was undoubtedly “central”, but for others it was not. The appeal of the phrase related largely to its bridging of Islamic and non-Islamic concepts. To assume that the concepts and vocabulary identified as “Islamic” carry greater authority than any others may distort how Muslims themselves address these issues.

A more effective first step towards depicting Islam is to acknowledge that there are particular difficulties in understanding action within “religious” fields because, by their very nature, “religions”, or at least world religions, are proposed to various degrees by their adherents to be universal, unaffected by human vicissitudes, and unambiguous. None the less, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1963: 85) argues:

the various religious traditions of the world do in fact differ among themselves in the degree to which each presents itself as an organized and systematized entity. If this be so, then one of them may well be the most entity-like. One could suggest that Islam, it so happens, is that one.

We cite Smith at length because, among historians of religion concerned with comparative religious traditions, he recognizes the potential for misleading reification. He argues (1963:

84) that “the various religious traditions are different ... not only in detail but in basic orientation. Each is unique.” If the term “religion” has any utility at all, it is in the family resemblances between and within various world religious traditions. Smith’s caution against reifying religious forms of social action coincides with that of the social sciences. Max Weber (1968: 399) despaired of defining “religion” and confined himself, as we do, to studying “the conditions and effects of a particular type of social action”. Likewise, in characterising religion as a “cultural system”, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973 [orig. 1966]: 90) self-consciously sought to delineate a paradigm for certain types of social action rather than provide a definition. Smith (1963: 194–5) goes so far as to suggest that “religion” as a noun is distractingly ambiguous and is best retained only in its adjectival form.

Even if it is accepted that Islam is the most “entity-like” of the world religions, its internal diversity is compelling. To acknowledge this, however, is not to detract from the claim of transcendental unity. Eternal religious truths, like other beliefs, are perceived, understood, and transmitted by persons historically situated in “imagined” communities, who knowingly or inadvertently contribute to the reconfiguration or reinterpretation of these verities, even as their fixed and unchanging natures are affirmed. In fact, when Muslim discourse and practice are considered in the social contexts in which they are produced, the problem of reification is avoided, as is, at the same time, the inadvertent propensity to render representations of Muslim belief and experience parochial. Islam can be seen as the lives of its adherents at the same time as it is divine revelation; and it can be seen as doctrinally complex and evolutionary at the same time that it is seen as a discernibly unique tradition of discourse.

Some social scientists seek to avoid the problem of how to study Islam altogether by asserting that the very act of studying it creates a spurious “object” of study and deflects attention from underlying social, economic, and political processes. Yet the study of religion remains critically important for the modern social sciences. Even Marxism can be shown to have profound roots in the Judaeo-Christian tradition (West 1987: 240–2). It would make as much sense to avoid studying nationalism and ideas of “nation” because to do so would be to make of them an object, as do carriers of particular senses of national identity. In both cases, the “subjective experiences, ideas, and purposes of the individuals concerned” (Weber 1968: 399) form the necessary point of departure for understanding the underlying senses of imagined community.

The examination of travel in Muslim communities offers the opportunity to address the complexity of issues such as these. Acknowledging a debt to Smith’s writing on religious traditions in general, we suggest that posing smaller questions of religious traditions is in order. Instead of asking “What is Islam?” or “What is Christianity?”, it would be more useful to look at specific kinds of practice and action, such as travel, which constitute religious traditions and inform the religious imagination. The “smaller” questions that we have posed aim at assessing the motives and interests imputed to travel and to its effects and resultant identities. These questions include enquiry into how “authoritative” doctrine emerges, and indeed into how ideas of “authority” and “domination” shift over time and across cultures; a sharper focus upon what is meant by “centre” and “periphery”; and an awareness both that

the idea of Muslim community varies according to scale and that these varying communities interact with one another. As a corollary, clearly what is required is collaborative and cross-disciplinary research of a kind that has been all too rare in the study of Islam and which this volume strives to offer.

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[1] A settlement of the ikhwan, or “brotherhood”, in the Najd of central Arabia was specifically called a hijra (Habib 1978).

[2] The popularity of the centre and periphery idea owes much to the sociology of Shils (1975), whose influential articles in the 1950s and 1960s on the subject are most readily available in the collection cited here. For an influential political science perspective, see Deutsch (1966: 188).

[3] See, for example, the entire issue of Archipel, 29 (1985).

[4] On the issue of the caliphate, see, inter alia, Public Record Office (London), FO371/10015, EN214/7624/91; FO371/10016, E9975/7624/91; FO371/11920, W3227/2249/28; F0371/ 15283, E6046/1205/65; and the Manchester Guardian, 13 March 1924.

[5] This image was suggested to us by Michael Schatzberg.

[6] In a later book-length study, Turner (1978) was one of the first anthropologists to explore the broader significance of pilgrimage as a general phenomenon. But even this work primarily emphasises the presumed psychological effects upon the individual pilgrims connected to and changed by “the center out there” and their relation to local societies, and pays less attention to their altered sense of “home” when they return to their society of origin. Roff (1985: 86) offers a similar critique.

[7] For examples of earlier colonial scholarship, generally see the Revue du Monde Musulmane and the Revue Indigene.

[8] Consider, for example, the influential characterisation of culture as:

an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.

(Geertz 1973 [orig. 1966]: 89)

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* Part One: Doctrines of travel

** Chapter Two: The obligation to migrate: the doctrine of hijra in Islamic law

Muhammad Khalid Masud

*** Introduction

On 22 March 1987 three young men approached Allama Ihsan Ilahi Zaheer.[9] They wanted to discuss with him the meaning of a Qur’anic verse about hijra,[10] and argued that the situation in Pakistan was worsening. They specifically argued that the Family Laws Ordinance governed the personal lives of Muslims instead of Shari‘a law,[11] so that the political environment was not conducive to the practice and propagation of Islam. The youths argued that under these circumstances, according to the Qur’anic verse, there were only two options available to Pakistani Muslims: either to declare Pakistan dar al-harb (an enemy territory) and wage jihad against it until it is restored to dar al-Islam; or to leave Pakistan altogether.

The Allama disagreed with them and explained that they held an extremist view. He emphatically refuted their arguments, but the young men kept arguing and departed unsatisfied. The Allama was very much perturbed and expressed his anxiety over rising extremism among the Muslim youth (Najmi 1987: a). On 23 March, a day later, a bomb exploded at a public meeting which Allama Zaheer was addressing. He received serious injuries and later died of his wounds.

There may not be any connection between the bomb explosion and the three youths, and their extremist views are not typical of Pakistani youth. None the less, I cite the incidents to illustrate that some Muslim youth, albeit extremists, still believe that hijra (the physical movement away from unbelief) is an essential expression of Muslim identity. Similar trends are apparent in other parts of the Muslim world: for example, Jama‘at al-Muslimin (The League of Muslims) in Egypt were nicknamed by their opponents Jama‘at al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra (The Society of Excommunication and Emigration) because of their emphasis on hijra (Kepel 1985: 77).

This chapter traces how the doctrine of hijra took shape. Any generalisation about the historical development of this doctrine is difficult because no systematic studies of it exist. Moreover, although references to hijra are quite frequent in the fatawa literature, which consists of responses to specific questions, they are scattered throughout the regular books of Islamic law rather than grouped together under the heading of emigration.

In view of these difficulties I propose first to present an account of context, describing the particular events in the history of Islam which gave rise to thinking on hijra. Next, I deal with doctrinal foundations - i.e. the written texts on which doctrinal discussions about hijra are based. Finally, I consider challenges and responses to the doctrine occasioned by historical developments that have encouraged the doctrine’s reinterpretation or reconstruction by Muslim jurists. These developments include the revolt of the Khawarij (AD 657),[12] the occupation by non-Muslims of Muslim lands and western colonialism, Muslim migration to non-Muslim countries, and the rise of Muslim nation-states.

After an analysis of the period of civil wars (the first fitna, AD 656–61, and the second fitna, AD 683–92), this chapter discusses developments in Indo-Pakistani and Nigerian Muslim societies, two Muslim societies with which the present writer has been professionally concerned. Moreover, this choice provides an opportunity to study the formulation and development of the doctrine of hijra in two different legal contexts and interpretive frameworks — Hanafi in the case of Pakistan and Maliki in the case of Nigeria.

*** Context

Hijra, an Arabic term which literally means “to abandon”, “to break ties with someone” (such as a bond of kinship or other personal association), or “to migrate” (Watt 1971: 366), refers primarily to the Prophet Muhammad’s migration from Mecca to Medina in AD 622. It is also discussed with reference to the migration of a group of Muslims from Mecca to Abyssinia in AD 615–22. Although the hijra to Abyssinia was voluntary and limited in scope, the hijra to Medina was obligatory and involved almost the entire Muslim community. No Muslim was supposed to stay behind in Mecca. Exemption was allowed only to the “weak” — women, children, and the sick — and those who could not afford to migrate. Staying behind in Mecca was also allowed after the pact of Hudaybiyya (AD 628–30). While there was no pact between the king of Abyssinia and Muslims, the migration to Medina was preceded by pacts (bay‘at al-harb/hijra, the pact of war or emigration) between the Prophet and the people of Medina who swore allegiance to protect Muslims and to wage jihad against their enemies (Ibn Hisham 1963: II, 303).

A significant fact in the events of the hijra to Abyssinia in AD 615–22 was that women’s participation in migration was equally prominent. The two group migrations to Abyssinia were family migrations, including both women and children. The migration to Medina was preceded by two pacts concluded in AD 620 and AD 621 between Muslims of Mecca and Medina. As already mentioned, the second pact was called “the pact of war”. The first was named “the pact of women” not only because women took part in this pact, but also because the first person to swear allegiance to this pact was a woman named ‘Afra’ (Ibn Hisham 1963: II, 293). The Qur’an refers to this pact in 60: 12 (sura 60, verse 12).[13]

The second pact was a pact of protection and war and included among its signatories Umm ‘Amara and Umm Mani‘, who participated in it along with men. There are stories of families moving together during the actual migration from Mecca to Medina (Ibn Hisham 1963: II, 319–20). The first person to migrate was Abu Salma, whom the Meccans did not allow to migrate with his family. His wife later travelled alone to join him. The second migrant, ‘Amir b. Rabi‘a, succeeded in migrating to Medina along with his wife (Ibn Hisham 1963: II, 321–4).

After the migration all ties, including “blood” relationships, were broken with both non-Muslims and Muslims who refused to migrate. Instead, a new bond of brotherhood (mu’akhat) between muhajirs (migrants) and ansars (inhabitants of Medina — generally supporters or local hosts) was established, which entitled them even to inherit from one another (al-Tabari 1958: 199). Hijra thus meant to abandon one’s property and relations in order to support the nascent community of Muslims in Medina. Refusal to perform hijra meant to weaken the Muslim cause and to lend support (wala’ or muwalat) to their enemies. Hence in early Islam, non-migrants were not

allowed to inherit from Muslims in Medina, not were they entitled to any share in the spoils of war (ghanima). The right of inheritance between blood relations among Muslims was later restored, although non-Muslim relations were still disallowed from inheritance (Qur’an, 8: 75).

*** Doctrinal foundations

The textual sources, the Qur’an and hadith (pl. ahadith; texts relating to the sayings of the Prophet), abound with references to the events of the original hijra and to injunctions given in its context.

The word hijra has been used in the Qur’an to mean “to reject” (23: 69), “to shun” (74: 5), “to depart” (19: 46) and “to banish” (4: 34). The shared meaning in all these usages may be deduced to be a distancing — physical or otherwise — usually from evil and disbelief. The derivative forms hajara (59: 9; 2: 218; 3: 195) and muhajir (9: 100, 117; 33: 6; 59: 8; 60:10; 8: 72) mean “to migrate”. Most verses employing the derivative form hajaru (“they migrated”) are often paired with jahadu (“they waged war”) and thus imply a close association of hijra with jihad.

It is not possible here to survey the implications of all the Qur’anic passages. For the purpose of our discussion we refer only to the two verses most often cited in debates concerning hijra:

Those who believed and left their homes [hajaru] and strove [jahadu] with their wealth and their lives for the cause of Allah, and those who took them in and helped them [nasaru], these are protecting friends of one another. And those who believed but did not leave their homes, you have no bond [walaya] with them till they leave their homes, but, if they seek help from you in the matter of religion, then it is your duty to help them except against a people with whom you have a treaty [mithaq].

(Qur’an, 8: 72)

Lo! as for those whom the angels take [in death] while they wrong [zalimi] themselves, the angels will ask: “In what were ye engaged?” They will say: “We were oppressed [mustad‘afin] in the land”. [The angels] will say: “Was not Allah’s earth spacious that you could have migrated therein?” As for such, their habitation will be hell, an evil journey’s end. Except the feeble [mustad‘afin] among men, and the women and the children, who are unable to devise a plan and are not shown a way. As

for such, it may be that Allah will pardon them — Who so migrateth for the cause of Allah will find much refuge and abundance [of bounties] in the earth.

(Qur’an, 4: 97–100)

From the Qur’anic texts the following significant points about hijra can be inferred: (1) It was an obligation of physical movement towards self-definition in the nascent Muslim society. Refusal to migrate meant exclusion from the society; (2) hijra was closely associated with jihad; and (3) hijra established a bond of relationship among Muslims, particularly with the ansar.

Among several hadiths on the subject of hijra, the following offers parallels to the famous five pillars of Islam:

I convey the following five commandments given me by God: attention (sam‘), obedience (ta‘a), migration (hijra), struggle (jihad), and organisation (jama‘a).

(Ibn Hanbal, n.d.: 130)

There are numerous hadiths prescribing hijra as an obligation. However, the hadith literature adds a new dimension to the Qur’anic injunction. It also refers to situations where hijra is no longer obligatory. For example, the Prophet is reported to have said: la hijrata ba‘d al-fathi, “no migration was required after the conquest” (al-Bukhari 1971: 190). None the less, there are hadith texts according to which hijra continues to be an obligation (Abu Da’ud 1933: 234).

Abu Sulayman Hamid b. Muhammad Khattabi al-Busti (AD 931-96/8), a scholar of hadith, reconciled this difference of opinion and argued that hijra was actually meant to support and strengthen dar al-Islam in its nascent days. After the conquests dar al-Islam was so strong and established that migration was no longer required. The hijra would be required again only and whenever the conditions so demanded (Ibn Hajar 1959: VI, 378).

Ibn Khaldun (AD 1332–1406) explained these texts by saying that hijra meant migration to join the Prophet Muhammad. Hijra might have continued to be an obligation after the conquest of Mecca, but it was definitely not required after the death of the Prophet (Ibn Khaldun 1958: I, 256).

Abu’l-Fadl Ahmad b. ‘Ali Ibn Hajar [al-‘Asqalani] (d. AD 1449), a later hadith scholar, analysed in detail this debate and showed that a number of the companions of the Prophet, including Ibn ‘Abbas (d. AD 687), and his contemporaries Ta’us, Mujashi‘, Ibn Jurayj, ‘Ata’ and ‘A’isha, perceived hijra only as migration from Mecca to Medina. Hence, after Mecca was conquered no hijra was required (Ibn Hajar 1959: VI, 378).

Thus, even as early as the formative period, we see a refinement in the formulation of the doctrine. During AD 622–8, the hijra from Mecca to Medina was obligatory in terms of expressing one’s Muslim identity. Migration also meant weakening Mecca and strengthening Medina. Only persons unable to migrate (al-mustad‘afin) were allowed to stay in Mecca. The situation changed in AD 630 when Mecca joined dar al-Islam. After AD 630, the statement that hijra was no longer required from Mecca raised the question of whether hijra only meant migration from Mecca to Medina. Could it be generalised to state that migration from the outside to dar al-Islam was obligatory?

The answer is not simple, because the hijra to Abyssinia was not

to dar al-Islam. The Hudaybiyya pact allowed Muslims to stay in Mecca, and the Prophet did not require the bedouin to migrate to Medina. A general rule was therefore derived that even after the conquest of Mecca, such situations as the following could make hijra relevant again: (1) dar al-Islam turns into dar al-kufr; or (2) a resident of a territory outside dar al-Islam embraces Islam.

Is hijra obligatory in these situations? An answer to this question also involves other issues, such as (i) how dar al-Islam turns into dar al’kufr, and (ii) the legal status of a Muslim who does not migrate. Indeed, these and other questions helped refine the doctrine. It should be emphasised that even the early textual formulations of doctrine are closely related to the actual political and social contexts. Subsequent interpretations similarly demonstrate a dynamic interaction between text and social, economic, and political conditions.

*** Challenges and responses

**** The revolt of the Khawarij

Civil wars among Muslims erupted quite early during the period of the first caliphs (AD 632–61). The rebels defined their position within the Islamic framework and hence had to justify their war with opposing Muslim groups — most often the ruling groups in the centre — in terms of jihad. It was therefore necessary to strengthen their camp by asking their followers to migrate from enemy territories.

Foremost among these dissenters were the Khawarij,[14] who considered the commission of major sins as kufr (unbelief). They rebelled against the Caliph ‘Ali and subsequently against the Umayyids (AD 661–750). Their support was largely among the nomads. The Khawarij were probably the first Muslim group to define political dissent in theological terms, thus generating scholarly controversies on different issues.

In order to justify their jihad and hijra, the Khawarij raised the question of the original status of territory. According to them, all territories were dar al-kufr until they were brought into the fold of Islam. A territory could turn again into dar al-kufr if its rulers denied the sovereignty of Allah, or committed a major sin, whereby they became kafirs. In these circumstances, hijra from such a territory and jihad against it become obligatory. The Khawarij, Azariqa,[15] and Sufriyya[16] all held these general views. Yet, whereas most of the Khawarij declared their opponents mushriks (polytheists), the Ibadiyya[17] adopted a more moderate view. They

believed that their enemies among the people who prayed in the same direction were kafirs, and that marriage and inheritance with them were allowed.

The Ibadiyya did not term all the territories outside their own camps as dar al-kufr, but the camp of the sultan was certainly so. According to the Ibadiyya, inability to migrate was not an excuse but a condition that one should strive to remove. The ‘Awniyya[18] explained that when the ruler committed kufr, his subjects also became unbelievers. They believed that hijra and jihad were interrelated, and broke ties with those who migrated in order to avoid jihad (al-Ash‘ari 1950: I, 162–79; al-Shahristani 1899: I, 170–84).

**** The responses

The views of the Mu‘tazila oscillated between the positions of the Khawarij and the Ibadiyya. Jubba’i (d. AD 916), a Mu‘tazili leader, expounded the view that as long as it was possible to stay in a territory without being forced to agree or to commit acts of unbelief, the territory was dar al-iman (the land of faith). However, according to him, this condition did not prevail in Baghdad (al-Ash‘ari 1950: II, 137).

The Shi‘a, who opposed the Umayyid and ‘Abbasid (AD 750–1258) regimes, did not take the extreme position of the Khawarij. Their position varied according to circumstances. Some Shi‘a took a middle position and defined the territory as dar al-hudna (the land of peace), from which migration was not obligatory. Others, particularly the Zaydis, called it dar al-kufr (the land of unbelief) (al-Ash‘ari 1950: II, 137).

The majority of the Muslims who favoured the status quo disagreed with these extreme views of kufr and hijra. They took a moderate position and referred to a hadith which explained the various levels of iman. The hadith recommended that one should strive to remove evil with hand or tongue depending upon his ability. If one is unable to do either, one should at least distance oneself from evil in one’s heart. This, however, was the weakest level of iman (Muslim 1954: I, 69). The majority view was that the higher levels called for jihad and that jihad was a fard kifaya (a collective duty) not required of each and every Muslim, and not to be undertaken individually. Hijra, according to this majority view, was a jihad-related obligation. The only hijra that could be performed individually was withdrawal in the heart. Such interiorisation of hijra in the esoteric sense was popularised by the Sufis.

Abu’l-Qasim al-Qushayri (d. AD 1074) defined hijra as “extracting oneself from the desires of the soul to the shade of His

closeness” (al-Qushayri n.d.: I, 51). He explained that complete hijra meant “abandoning the soul by not attending to its desires and then migrating from the land of rights to the land of submission to God’s will” (al-Qushayri n.d.: II, 335).

The Sufi commentators of the Qur’an usually explain that the obligation of physical migration was repealed. The only hijra required was spiritual. Maybudi (d. AD 1125) pointed out that there were three types of hijra: (1) that of ahl al-dunya, migration of “people of the world” for the purpose of trade; (2) that of the zahidin, the ascetics’ migration towards the hereafter by performing all religious rituals and spiritual contemplations; and (3) that of the ‘arifin, the mystics’ migration from the veils of self to the heart, and from the heart to the soul, and, ultimately, to the Beloved (Maybudi AH 1338: II, 662). The Sufi Najm al-Din Kubra (d. AD 1225) defined hijra as migration from the land of human beings to the presence of Allah (al-Bursawi 1911: II, 272).

The Sufi interiorisation of the doctrine was a reaction to adverse social and political conditions. They faced a stark choice: either support an unjust ruling group or, like the

Khawarij, revolt against it. In these circumstances, the Sufis took the position of withdrawal. The jurists also did not collectively adopt the extreme position. They perceived that the supremacy of the shari‘a could be maintained only if there was less interference by the rulers in the interpretation of law. They were not in favour of the shari‘a being interpreted by governmental institutions.

This view of law developing independently of government started to take shape during the Umayyid period and crystallised during the early ‘Abbasid period when attempts were made by the caliphs to take the right of legislation into their own hands (Schacht 1966: 55). The jurists, however, did not want to challenge the political supremacy of the rulers because that would create disunity and political chaos. Hence, they generally supported the political status quo and favoured allegiance to rulers as long as they did not interfere in their right to interpret the shari‘a.

Jurists therefore defined dar al-kufr as a vague and amorphous category. Usually all the territories bordering dar al-Islam were dar al-kufr, against which the rulers were urged to wage jihad at least once a year (Khalil 1916: 73). Such a definition, however, did not operate during the Prophet’s period.

The bedouin around Medina and Mecca were never obliged to migrate to Medina. Instead of the bay‘at al-hijra (pledge to migrate), they pledged to join jihad against the unbelievers. The Muslim population in this early period was divided into three categories: muhajir, ansar and a‘rab (bedouin) (al-Tabari 1958: 14–78).

In those days the a‘rab and muhajir were opposite terms. The a‘rab were allowed a share in the spoils of war but not in other revenues. Donner (1981: 79) explains that early Muslims adopted hijra as a policy of “sedentarisation” in order to gain dominance by subordinating nomadic groups to a sedentary elite. It is difficult to say if there was a uniform policy for all the nomads, but we do know that it was during the Umayyid period, largely because the Khawarij were supported by nomads, that nomadism was considered the equivalent of returning to the pre-Islamic order. In view of the civil wars during this period, settlement was naturally stressed: the nomads, not under direct control of the centre, could provide refuge and protection to rebels. This Umayyid policy differed from preceding and later policies towards nomadism. [19]

Muhammad Idris al-Shafi‘i (d. AD 820), the founder of the Shafi‘i school of law, particularly referred to the case of the bedouin to argue that hijra was not obligatory for all because the Prophet permitted the bedouin not to migrate if they did not so desire. Shafi‘i argued further that hijra became an obligation only after the declaration of

jihad, and then only upon those who had the ability to do so (al-Shafi‘i 1903: IV, 84). According to al-Shafi‘i, therefore, a Muslim could stay in dar al-kufr, even in dar al-harb, as long as he was free to practise his religion.

**** The Maliki formulation and jihadist challenge

The majority of the Maliki jurists agreed with Shafi‘i that hijra was not an obligation after Mecca was conquered. Al-Maziri (d. AD 1141) argued that staying behind in dar al-kufr with a legitimate excuse generally, or for the propagation of Islam specifically, was allowed and did not affect the rights of a Muslim. Even the judgements by a qadi appointed by a non-Muslim were valid and executable (Wansharisi 1981: I, 100). Abu’l Hasan al-Manufi al-Maliki (d. AD 1531) similarly held that the hijra was not required after Hudaybiyya (al-Maliki n.d.: II, 5). Ibn al-‘Arabi (d. AD 1148) argued for the continuity of obligation but subjected hijra to a detailed analysis none the less. He argued that there were six situations of migration. Hijra was obligatory from territories of unbelief, heresy and injustice, or where unlawfulness prevails. Hijra was allowed but not obligatory from lands of physical persecution, lands of disease, and lands of financial insecurity (Ibn al-‘Arabi 1972: I, 486).

The Jihadist movement in the eighteenth century criticised the popular definition of dar al-Islam as a country ruled by Muslims. Shehu ‘Uthman dan Fodio (AD 1754–1817) was the foremost among

those leaders who developed a detailed restatement of this doctrine. His formulation is discussed elsewhere in detail (Masud 1986), but can be summarised as it relates to the present argument.

Shehu’s restatement of the doctrine of hijra was prompted by the actual historical circumstances in which he was forced to fight against the syncretism, injustice, and corruption of the Hebe Muslim rulers. He had to justify his jihad and migration against the criticism of Muslim jurists who supported the ruling regimes and who challenged Shehu’s jihad against Muslim rulers.

Shehu’s restatement rested on his argument from the original tradition of the Qur’an, hadith, and Maliki fiqh. The main points of his doctrine were the continuity of the obligation of migration, the close relationship of jihad with hijra, and the need for a redefinition of dar al-Islam.

Shehu agreed with the Khawarij on most questions of hijra, but he disagreed with their considering the commission of a major sin as kufr. He did not, however, accept the rulers' nominal adherence to Islam. In fact, he defined kufr as, first, their observance of pagan practices, and, second, their support of pagans against Muslims. Shehu succeeded in establishing a dar al-Islam in Nigeria that continued to flourish until the British occupied it in 1903.

Shehu's formulation had a far-reaching impact on other jihadist movements in West Africa. For example, his doctrine was cited as authority by the amir of Massina in his debate with Shaykh 'Umar al-Futi in 1855–64 (Willis 1979: 179). His doctrine also influenced the formulation of doctrines by Amir 'Abd al-Qadir in Algeria, Ma' al-'Aynayn al-Qalqami in Mauritania and Muhammad 'Abdullah Hasan in Somalia (Martin 1976: 33), and it continued to influence the Nigerian response to British hegemony.

**** Non-Muslim occupation and colonial rule

The questions of dar al-Islam and hijra arose again after the British occupation of India and Nigeria. Attahiru, the last sultan of the Sokoto Caliphate, resorted to Shehu's formulation of hijra when faced with the British invasion from 1900 onward. When Kano was also taken, Attahiru chose to perform hijra in order to rally his forces against the British. He called his followers to hijra and, in the words of a British journalist:

each time he passed through the people were told to follow him to Mecca, otherwise they would become Kaffiri and as a result half of the population of every town tied up their bundles and joined in his train.

(cited in Clarke 1982: 195)

Attahiru finally encamped at Burmi where he and his followers valiantly fought their battle against the British.

Attahiru was killed and thus the British conquest of Nigeria was complete by 1903. After Attahiru's death, Maliki scholars returned to the formulation that hijra was not required. They accepted British rule, arguing that so long as Muslims had freedom to practise their religious duties, the land continued to be dar al-Islam (Savi 1971: II, 291).

The situation was different in India, where the Hanafi formulation prevailed. The Hanafi formulation of the doctrine of hijra differs from the Maliki formulation on two points. First, Hanafis argue that it is not correct to claim that succession among migrants to Medina in AD 622 was practised on the basis of hijra, nor that this Qur'anic injunction was abrogated later in order to restore succession on the basis of "blood" affinity. They maintain that succession was always based on "blood" relationships. Migration was important only to the extent that those "blood" relations who did not migrate did not qualify for succession. Brotherhood between muhajirs and ansars had economic advantages, but it was not the only ground for inheritance (Jassas 1916: II, 241).

Second, Hanafis stress the territorial factor of dar al-Islam. Their disagreement with claims of succession on the basis of migration is in fact also based on consideration of territory. A Muslim who did not migrate to dar al-Islam was disallowed from inheriting property there because it would mean transfer of property from dar al-Islam to dar al-harb. Similarly, even the spoils of war were not granted legal title until they were actually transferred to dar al-Islam.

Thus Hanafi doctrine is largely based on ideas of territory. A person is treated according to the territory where he is ('Alamgiri 1932: III, 423). Consequently, a Muslim who does not migrate from dar al-harb, although a Muslim, is to be governed by the rules of dar al-harb. This is why the Hanafis allow transactions by Muslims in dar al-harb that are not allowed in dar al-Islam.

Due to these considerations, according to Hanafis, dar al-Islam changes into dar al-harb if the following three conditions obtain: (1) the laws of disbelievers gain supremacy and no law of Islam can be executed; (2) the Muslim and non-Muslim populations are no longer governed by the original pacts that they enjoyed before the non-Muslim occupation; and (3) the land in question is adjacent to the territory of dar al-harb such that there is no land of Islam between them ('Alamgiri 1932: III, 415). Analysing these views in detail, Wahba al-Zuhayli, a modern Muslim jurist, concludes that Hanafis believe in the application of law on a territorial basis, while Malikis and others apply it on a personal basis (al-Zuhayli 1962[?]: 175).

Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz (1904: 16–17) was asked frequently whether British India was dar al-harb. He said that it was, but disallowed all of the implications of his declaration. India was dar al-harb because the laws of the shari'a were not supreme. He did not, however, allow the usury transactions that Hanafis allow in dar al-harb. He dismissed as political expediences the freedom allowed by the British to observe Friday services, religious feasts, and the calls to prayer, and the permission to slaughter cows and observe other personal laws. When Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz was asked why he did not call for hijra

from dar al-harb, he replied that the hijra required, as a necessary condition, possession of the means to migrate; it was allowed only if the means were available

(al-Qannuji 1985: 238). Yet Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi organised hijra and jihad to restore India’s status of dar al-Islam. According to William Hunter, the 1857 Muslim revolt against the British was a continuation of Sayyid Ahmad’s movement of hijra (Hunter 1964: 3).

However, the Hanafi majority view has been that if Friday and the religious holidays can be observed, the land is dar al-Islam. The non-Muslim rulers can appoint Muslim governors and judges whose orders would be Islamically valid (Isma’il 1985: 231). Other scholars — such as Karamat ‘Ali Jawnpuri, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and Nadhir Husayn Muhaddith al-Dihlawi — similarly termed British India dar al-Islam.

An important event was the 1920 hijra from India to Afghanistan after the declaration of India as dar al-harb. From a recent analysis of this movement (Qureshi 1979), it is clear that the movement did not possess a traditional doctrinal basis. It was based on the fatawa of Mawlana ‘Abd al-Bari Farangi Mahli (1828) and Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (1824). As I have explained. Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz did not call for hijra, and ‘Abd al-Bari maintained that he did not consider hijra mandatory. Scholars belonging to the Deoband and Barelwi schools — such as Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, ‘Abdur Ra‘uf Danapuri, Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi, and Pir Mihr ‘Ali Shah — advocated the refrain from hijra (Mahmud 1986: 72, 258–69). It was mainly Abu’l Kalam Azad’s writings that provided the theoretical and intellectual basis for this movement (Azad n.d.: 31–2). His was in fact a restatement of the doctrine similar to that made by Shehu ‘Uthman dan Fodio.

Abu’l Kalam Azad was joined by Muhammad and Shawkat ‘Ali, leaders of the Khilafat movement, and many other public leaders. Thousands of Muslims, in fact, responded to the call for hijra and many thousands actually began their journey of migration to Afghanistan. Qureshi points out that the Afghani elite also encouraged the movement but only for their own political ends (Qureshi 1979: 45). The result proved disastrous for Muslims. Afghanistan did not prove to be dar al-Islam for these muhajirin who had volunteered to move there after disposing of all their possessions. Hundreds died on the way to and back from Afghanistan; others returned to India destitute and frustrated.

It is clear that the hijra movement of 1920 was not supported by the established ‘ulama’, who had traditional training. The movement, on the contrary, was led and supported by scholars who were not traditionally trained. In fact, they

were scholars like Abu’l Kalam Azad whom the traditional men of learning never recognised as religious scholars (Mushir 1974: 25). Other scholars in the movement came from the Ahl al-Hadith school, which refused adherence to the traditional four Muslim legal schools. Further, the leaders of the movement came from the western-educated class, such as the Ali brothers. It is important to note that whereas the traditionally trained ‘ulama’, whether in Nigeria, India, Pakistan, or Indonesia (Van Dijk 1981), generally favoured the status quo, self-trained scholars led the new Islamic political movements.

It seems that the people who raised the question of dar al-harb and asked opinions of scholars like Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz were probably interested in this issue in order to avail themselves of the exemptions from the application of Islamic law that Hanafis allow to Muslims in dar al-harb. This is probably why the questions referred mainly to money transactions based on riba (usury). Muslims were discouraged from military jihad against the British by the military superiority of the colonial powers, Muslim defeat at their hands in Plessey (1757) and Burmi (1903), and the subsequent ruthless repression. The only form of jihad available to them was tark mawalat (withdrawal or non-cooperation). Jihad and hijra both required means which the Muslims lacked. Moreover, the general British policy of non-interference in religious matters suited the conception of dar al-Islam of traditional ‘ulama’.

During the late nineteenth and twentieth century, the spread of education, growth of political consciousness, and increase in the means of communication made it easier for Muslim religious leaders to learn more about political conditions in developed countries. They compared these conditions with the restrictions prevalent in colonised territories, so that dissatisfaction grew with the status quo. At the same time, leadership came not from traditional scholars and landowners, but from Muslims who had been educated in the west and from reformers.

Traditional scholars and landowners favoured the status quo, however, and the new leadership therefore looked to the masses for support against the British. The most powerful medium against the

colonial power was religion, which could eliminate fear and inspire commitment. Religion was not the only factor that could unite the masses against the colonial rulers, but it was the weakest point of the colonial system. The new leadership, although not deeply entrenched in the traditional religious sciences, revived and invoked such religious issues as hijra as a rallying point for political advantage.

**** Hijra to non-Muslim countries

A new dimension of hijra emerged during the nineteenth century. For reasons of higher education, training, and employment, Muslims travelled to non-Muslim lands and stayed there for longer periods. In some cases they migrated in order to settle. This was altogether a new type of hijra; its motives and objectives were different.

As mentioned earlier, scholars like Ibn al-‘Arabi permitted hijra from a land of disease and financial insecurity to a better place (Ibn al-‘Arabi 1972: I, 486), and based their argument on Qur’anic verse (4: 100). Others allowed hijra to non-Muslim lands for the purpose of propagation of Islam. They based their argument on the legal view that Muslims must remain in dar al-kufr in order to propagate its reconversion. An illustration is the discussion contained in a recent treatise, Hukm al-iqama bi-bilad kufr wa-bayan wujubiha fi-ba‘d al-ahwal [Legal View of Staying in the Lands of Unbelief and the Explanation of Why It Has Been Obligatory in Certain Circumstances], relating the question of whether residence in non-Muslim countries can be said to be obligatory.[20] The author states that in 1985 some Algerian students met him in Mecca and asked whether staying in European countries and America was allowed. The students claimed that the position of scholars was not clear, and they particularly referred to a recent fatwa which prohibited such a stay (‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Siddiq 1985: 6).

The author of the treatise discusses the problem at length and concludes that remaining in Europe and America for the purposes of education and employment is not only allowed but is often obligatory. His main arguments include the following: education and training in modern science and technology are obligatory for the progress of Muslim societies, since otherwise they would remain dependent on developed countries (‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Siddiq 1985: 12–13); the Qur’an and hadith enjoin Muslims to seek knowledge and livelihood all over the globe; and the reason for migration from dar al-kufr and for the prohibition from entering it, as given in Islamic law, is the apprehension that the person, property, and/or

religion of a Muslim are not safe in these territories, yet today there is no such fear. Indeed, the conditions for the practice and propagation of one’s religion are better in Europe and America than in most Muslim countries (‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Siddiq 1985: 30, 45–50). He argues, finally, that western countries which have made pacts and treaties with Muslim ones are no longer dar al-kufr (‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Siddiq 1985: 51). The most distinguished scholars of Islamic law in the Middle East — such as Muhammad b. Ahmad Abu Zahra (1898–1974), ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Awda (d. AD 1954), and Wahba al-Zuhayli — have offered similar interpretations of the doctrine of hijra (Abu Zahra n.d.: 55; ‘Awda 1959: I, 275; al-Zuhayli 1962[?]: 149).

**** Nation states

Muslims re-emerged after independence from colonial rule divided into a number of nation-states. During the colonial period Muslim romanticism visualised the Muslim world as a single, monolithic and sovereign polity. Now there are a large number of Muslim communities without sovereignty. Are they part of the Muslim world? Should the Muslim world regard them as distant enclaves in foreign lands and therefore help them? Or should they be considered permanently situated under non-Muslim jurisdiction?

What should these Muslim communities do? Should they migrate to Muslim countries? Should they continue struggling to achieve liberation and sovereignty? Should their objectives be the achievement of civil and cultural rights within a non-Muslim polity?

It is clear that the emerging Muslim world is not the dar al-Islam of medieval times. It consists of nation-states looking after their own national interests. Unlike the situation that prevailed in the medieval dar al-Islam, a Muslim cannot freely travel, migrate, or settle in any Muslim country today. Some of these countries are secular; others have reformed religious and personal laws along western lines. The non-Muslim populations in these Muslim countries have been participating equally in the struggle for freedom, independence, and progress, and thus are not conquered people to be forced to accept the status of a protected minority (dhimmis). The doctrine of hijra consequently faces new challenges.

In early Islamic history, the formulation of the doctrines of hijra was interconnected with the definition of dar al-Islam and kufr. However, the issues posed by the framing of these doctrines varied. In the early period, the question was: from where to where must one migrate? Although this question had a different meaning for dissident political groups, it continued to be asked during the

medieval period about Muslims not living in dar al-Islam. For Muslims living within dar al-Islam the question was: from where must Muslims not migrate? Whereas in the early period dar al-kufr defined hijra, in the medieval period hijra defined dar al-Islam. Any movement of migration from a certain territory meant that it was no longer considered dar al-Islam - at least, not by the migrants.

The question of hijra became prominent again during the thirteenth century when Christians in the west and Tartars in the east occupied Muslim lands. The question was now posed differently: must one migrate from a territory that once was dar al-Islam? Categories between dar al-Islam and dar al-kufr were developed to answer the question, and these

categories proved to be useful during the colonial period between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

With the rise of nation-states and a secular world-view, the definition of dar al-Islam has become increasingly problematic. In this context, the definition of hijra in terms of movement from dar al-kufr becomes irrelevant. One must ask not only from where must one migrate, but also to where? Several modern scholars (e.g. al-Zuhayli 1962: 159; Abu Zahra n.d.: 55) seem to have redefined dar al-Islam and searched for new categories of territory (dar) from the point of view of hijra.

Dar al-Islam and related dar categories are now being defined more frequently with reference to the question: from where does one not need to migrate? Answers to this question have produced categories such as dar al-'ahd (the land of pact), dar al-sulh (the land of truce), and dar al-aman (the land of peace), in which a Muslim's freedom to practise his religion is protected by covenant. It is significant that the frame of reference for this apparently new interpretation is still the early tradition of hijra. This particular movement of hijra - migration to a non-Muslim land — is alluded to as the Abyssinian model, referring to the earliest hijra by Muslims to Abyssinia, a Christian country. It is also justified with reference to the Hudaybiyya model, whereby Muslims were not required to migrate from Mecca — at that time still a non-Muslim land — because of a pact between it and Medina. These interpretations seem appropriate to the world of nation-states because citizens are protected by pacts between them.

*** Conclusion

This discussion is intended to be exploratory rather than definitive, but several points emerge. First, it should be noted that hijra,

which appears as one of the essential obligations in early Islam and is often discussed at length in hadith, tafsir, fiqh, fatawa, and Sufi literature, did not earn sufficient prominence in the later classification of fiqh or kalam subjects to deserve treatment as a subject in itself.

Second there is a distinction, although often blurred, between the Hanafi and other schools in the debates about hijra. While the Hanafis tend to define the status of a person living in dar al-harb and the transformation of dar al-Islam into dar al-harb in terms of territory, the other legal schools do not. It can be argued that among the Hanafis there

was a trend towards a territorial definition of law, in contradistinction to others who adhered to a personal definition. Other legal schools considered a Muslim living in dar al-harb to be still subject to Islamic law, but, in contrast, the Hanafis were not in favour of applying Islamic law to Muslims in enemy territories. This distinction would have developed had it not been for the exemption from the application of certain Islamic laws to non-Muslims living in dar al-Islam - an exception that probably grew out of the principle of freedom of religion.

Third, the formulation of the doctrine at various historical junctures shows the discursive nature of intellectual arguments in the Muslim tradition. Jurists constantly go back to texts — often the same ones — interpreting and reinterpreting them in order to justify the opinions shaped by earlier social, economic, and political conditions. The extreme views, which in the case of hijra invariably rely on Khawarij interpretations, are taken by political dissenters.

Finally, it should be noted that although one might expect a written text as a frame of reference to prove restrictive on subsequent interpretations, the doctrine of hijra has, on the contrary, been quite adaptable to varying political contexts. The same texts have been interpreted to justify widely different views.

The reason for this flexibility lies perhaps in the acceptability of these interpretations more than in the interpretability of the doctrine itself. There is something which we may call a “semantics of expectation” on the part of society. Words acquire new meanings according to these expectations. The shifts of meaning of hijra — from movement itself to settlement, from physical movement to spiritual and mental withdrawal, and from movement to Muslim territory to residence in Western countries for the purpose of propagating Islam — are examples of this semantics of expectation.

The calls for the establishment of dar al-Islam, sometimes without call for physical hijra, have curiously been made not by the traditional scholars, but by a new type of Muslim intellectual,

self-trained and lacking formal education in the traditional schools of jurisprudence. These new intellectuals have either graduated from western-style schools and universities or have been intellectually nourished on western literature. Because of their modern world views, these intellectuals are more acceptable to urban, educated Muslims than their traditional counterparts, who still attract a primarily rural and “superstitious” clientele. These new intellectuals, for the simple reason that they are not hindered by the complexities of traditional legal thought, have the freedom of selecting more eclectically from tradition and justifying their views directly from the Qur’an and hadith. They often earn instant popularity because of reference to the “sources”, but, since their interpretations do not form a continuity with tradition, their impact is often partial and ephemeral. The new

intellectuals are therefore continually compelled to search for dramatic, and often extremist, solutions.

[9] Allama Ihsan Ilahi Zaheer (1940–87), born at Sialkot in a religious family, pursued traditional religious studies at Gujranwala and graduated from Jami‘a Salafiyya in Faisalabad in 1960. After completing his studies at Medina University, he returned to Pakistan where he obtained MA degrees in Urdu, Persian, History, and Philosophy from Punjab University and an LL B from Karachi University. From 1966 he was khatib of Jami‘a Masjid Ahl al-Hadith in Lahore. He edited various religious journals, published his own monthly magazine, Tarjuman Ahl al-Hadith, and wrote about fifteen books, most of them in Arabic. Towards the end of his life he became active in politics. He was the Nazim-i-A‘la of Jam‘iyyat Ahl al-Hadith whose public meeting he was addressing on 23 March 1987, when a bomb exploded and seriously wounded him. He died on 30 March at the Saudi Military Hospital in Riyadh (Islamic Studies 1987: 230).

[10] The news story does not specify the Qur’anic verse. It only states that the young men referred to the verse in sura 4 that bade Prophet Muhammad to migrate. They might be referring to verse 97, which is mentioned in my main discussion.

[11] Reforms such as the registration of marriages and restrictions on polygamy were introduced by the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1962, despite severe protests by the ‘ulama’.

[12] Dates in this chapter have been adopted from Hodgson (1974).

[13] Numbers of the verses of the Qur’an as well as the English translation are from Pickthall (1953).

[14] Khawarij: The earliest sect in Islam which rebelled against ‘Ali (AD 656–61) because of his compromise with the Umayyids after the Battle of Siffin (AD 657). They revolted and fought against both the Umayyids and the ‘Abbasids.

[15] A group of Khawarij named after Nafi‘ b. al-Azraq (d. AD 685).

[16] A group of Khawarij named after Zyad b. Asfar whom they followed. They opposed the Azariqa and Ibadiyya and held more moderate views.

[17] A group of Khawarij who followed ‘Abdullah b. Ibad. They rebelled against Marwan b. Muhammad (d. AD 744), the Umayyad caliph.

[18] A group of Khawarij who, according to al-Shahristani, held that when the Imam committed an act of disbelief, his subjects also became disbelievers.

[19] It appears that Donner has developed the argument restrospectively and explains the situation in early Islam in the perspective of‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa’ud’s (AD 1880–1953) policy to encourage bedouin to effect hijra from the nomadic to sedentary life in order to create the ikhwan, a para-military force which he used agains the Sharifians of Hijaz. Each settlement was called a hijra.

[20] This author, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Muhammad b. al-Siddiq, belongs to a family of scholars in Tangier. I have not been able to find much information on him. An autobiography of his elder brother (b. 1909), ‘Abdullah b. al-Siddiq, makes occasional references to him as “my brother, the ‘Allama, the Muhaddith” (e.g. ‘Abdullah al-Siddiq 1985: 3). ‘Abd al-‘Aziz is also mentioned as one of his students (‘Abdullah al-Siddiq 1985: 8).

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** Chapter Three: The search for knowledge in medieval Muslim societies: a comparative approach

Sam I. Gellens

Anas b. Malik reported that the Prophet said: Those who go out in search of knowledge will be in the path of God until they return.

(al-Tirmidhi, Sunan, 39: 2)

This chapter suggests how three medieval Islamic societies might be studied within a comparative historical framework. To do so, we have selected a prominent feature of everyday life, the rihla or talab al-‘ilm (travel for the sake of acquiring religious knowledge), which was common to medieval Muslims throughout dar al-Islam. Talab al-‘ilm, given its deep roots in the Islamic tradition, its popularity, and its ability to facilitate movement and exchange among Islamic societies, demonstrates the virtues of the comparative method in studying Islamic history. Its study reveals both universally shared sentiments and the strength of local ties as possibly no other societal trait could.

In an essay on the comparative history of European societies. Marc Bloch (1967 [orig. 1928]: 47) wrote that one use of the comparative method is:

to make a parallel study of societies that are at once neighbouring and contemporary, exercising a constant mutual influence, exposed throughout their development to the action of the same broad causes just because they are close and contemporaneous, and owing their existence to a common origin.

Though Bloch restricted his analysis to Europe, his formulation makes eminent sense for several reasons when applied to medieval Islam.[21]

First, there is the vast physical expanse of dar al-Islam, a broad complex of peoples, geographies, and political structures that owes its existence and inspiration, in a fundamental sense, to a specific time and place: seventh-century Arabia. The Prophet Muhammad, the Qur’anic revelation, the Arabic language, and the cities of Mecca and Medina acted then as now as historical referents which bestowed a kinship on all Muslims regardless of birthplace or domicile. No matter how distant from Arabia, all medieval Islamic societies could claim a share in this common origin, this common Muslim heritage focused on the natal centre of Islam.

The dispersal of the Arabs and Arabic into the former Byzantine and Sasanid territories and beyond, the acceleration of the pace of conversion in the late third/ninth century, and the multiple influences and contributions of such newly Islamised peoples as the Iranians, Turks, and Berbers created a world civilisation extending from the Atlantic to the Oxus. Out of this vortex developed a multiplicity of local centres for traditional Muslim learning that did not, however, rob the Islamic world of its essential unity. Indeed, one of the most compelling aspects of Islamic history is the continuing dialogue among Muslims over the relative merits of local attachments versus perceived universal sentiments and obligations.

This civilisation — really a network of variegated societies united by their commitment to the shari‘a — was one which in the fullest sense owed its vibrancy to constant movement. Travel in all its myriad forms — pilgrimage, trade, scholarship, adventure — expanded the mental and physical limits of the Muslim world, and preserved and nourished the various contacts that Muslims perennially maintained with one another. As Ross Dunn (1986: 5–6) has noted in his recent study of the renowned Muslim traveller, Ibn Battuta, Marco Polo visited China as a stranger and alien, whereas his Muslim counterpart compiled a rihla on the basis of distant journeys to lands either wholly or to some degree Muslim. Ibn Battuta may not have known the local languages of the places he visited, but he did know the cultural language of Muslims and hence felt at home.

Travel in its broadest definition ensured the unity of the Muslim community, but likewise encouraged appreciation of one’s home. Spain, Egypt, and Iran were medieval Islamic societies each with a distinct character. Yet each region was part of a larger civilisational whole. These societies, to paraphrase Bloch’s formulation, were neighbouring and contemporary, reciprocally influential, and subject to developments in religious learning, politics, trade, and warfare that were generally common to dar al-Islam. Travel bound them together and simultaneously stimulated the appearance of their local and regional identities. It is within the confines of this dialectic that we find the utility of the travel concept for the comparative study of medieval Muslim societies.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-3.jpg][Figure 3.1 Majnun at the Ka‘ba with his father and other pilgrims. This miniature, taken from the Khamseh of Nizami, is later Herat/Timurid work of 898/1492-3. (British Library Ms. ADD.25900F. 114B. Used with permission.)]]

Travel as a meritorious activity is endowed with an ancient pedigree in the Muslim tradition. A rich vocabulary of words related in one way or another to travel is found in the Qur’an and the hadith. Sura Quraysh, 106: 2, refers to the rihla (the sole mention of the term in the Qur’an) in connection with the special accomplishments of the tribe of Quraysh and how much they owe their succes to God’s providence. The Qur’an intends us to understand here that the Quraysh above all, with their talents for “journeys south and north” (presumably meaning to Yemen and Syria), should accept God’s

commands. Thus, embedded deep in Muslim consciousness is an identification of travel with pious activity, an appreciation that achievement in such endeavour is a sign of divine approval and munificence.

As an organising principle for comparative analysis, only travel for the sake of religious scholarship specifically concerns us here. Initially, we must consider the problem of terminology. In the period under consideration in this chapter (four — fifth AH/tenth — eleventh AD centuries), the expressions rihla (travel) and talab al-‘ilm (seeking knowledge) could almost be used interchangeably. Throughout the Spanish tabaqat literature,[22] the two are often linked together, and when they are not they bear the same general meaning (travelling to seek religious knowledge). There are references to the rihla as hajj, but it is the former usage that is dominant. It is not until the late sixth AH/twelfth AD century that the two terms diverge. Rihla becomes identified primarily with the experience of the hajj — the examples of Ibn Jubayr and Ibn Battuta come immediately to mind — while talab al-‘ilm retains its original meaning.[23] This change may reflect the institutionalisation of the madrasa system in place of the formerly more individualised, orally-oriented relationships which prevailed between students and teachers in the early medieval centuries of Islamic history. Thus, Ibn Battuta usually looks for buildings — i.e. colleges of Islamic law and Sufi convents — rather than the solitary but renowned scholar here and there on his itinerary. The bulk of the references in the hadith literature are to talab al-‘ilm and not rihla. It is evident then that talab al-‘ilm, as a concept describing a specific aspect of movement and exchange among Muslims, is the more precise and accurate of the two terms.

The hadith literature reminds the believer that the search for knowledge is intimately tied to the physical act of travel. In this regard, several themes recur in the principal hadith collections: teachers and the learned as the only valuable human beings; the high merit of seeking and spreading knowledge; travelling in order to gather it; and the possession of knowledge as a sign of grace which reduces distinctions of birth and rank among Muslims.

Provided it was done for the right reasons, travel in the classical Muslim conception, to use Paul Fussell’s (1980: 39) words, “was conceived to be like study and its fruits were considered to be the adornment of the mind and the formation of the traveller”.

The best-known hadith on the subject — i.e. “The seeking of knowledge is a fard incumbent upon every Muslim” — is coupled in the collection of Ibn Majah (Sunan, I, no. 224) with the admonition that “He who places knowledge with those with whom it does not belong is like he who gives jewellery, pearls, and gold to pigs”. This report elevates talab al-‘ilm to the status ofa ritual obligation and stresses the care one must take in disseminating knowledge.[24] In his

Muwatta (1951, II: 1002), Malik b. Anas transmits a hadith from the pre-Islamic hero, Luqman, who advises his son: “Oh my boy, sit with the learned (‘ulama’) and mingle with them on your knees. For just as God gives life to people’s hearts with the light of wisdom, so he enlivens the dead earth with the downpour of the heavens”. The ideal company for a Muslim is the learned, for they represent a life-giving (and sustaining) force within the community. If indeed they are the best company, we could assume from this hadith that the believer should seek the presence of the ‘ulama’ wherever they are; hence the importance of travel for the sake of attaining knowledge.

Recognised as a Companion by some, Abu al-Darda’ was a younger contemporary of the Prophet and an authority on the Qur’an who served as a qadi in Damascus and died there in AH 32/AD 652–3 (Jeffery 1960: 113–14). On one occasion, a class he was giving in the mosque of Damascus was interrupted by a man from Medina who had come to ascertain the validity of a Prophetic hadith which Abu al-Darda’ had transmitted. The latter asked the man whether he had brought merchandise or anything else with him. When the man gave a negative reply, Abu al-Darda’ responded with the following:

He who follows a road seeking knowledge, God will make the path to heaven easy for him. And the angels will place their wings so as to aid the seeker of knowledge. And all in heaven and on earth, even the snake in the water, will seek forgiveness from such a person. The merit of the learned man over the worshipper is like the merit of the moon over the rest of the stars. The ‘ulama’ are the heritage of the prophets. The latter did not bequeath dinars and dirhams. Rather they left behind knowledge. He who takes it should do so with an abundance of good fortune.

(Ibn Majah, 1972: I, hadith no. 223)

The message here is obvious: God views with great favour those who pursue talab al-‘ilm to the point that such activity facilitates entry into heaven. Worship (meaning prayer) undoubtedly brings the believer closer to God, but it is the learned one who enjoys an even more special relationship with Allah. It is the man from Medina who travelled to Damascus seeking to verify a hadith who is unstintingly praised, and we may assume that this adulation would apply to all Muslims who would travel for the same or similar reasons.

Given the intense interest in travel for the sake of scholarship in the hadith literature, it is no wonder that it became a normative feature of medieval Muslim education, at least until the sixth AH/twelfth AD century. Though local and regional traditions were always influential in shaping religious and intellectual life, medieval Muslims really knew no boundaries in their desire to master the subjects which comprised the canonical syllabus of learning: among others, they included the Qur’an, hadith, tafsir

(commentary on the Qur’an), and qira’a (correct recitation of the Qur’an). Scholarly peregrinations were frequent and often long, in terms of both time and distance.

A man could study in twenty different cities with as many different teachers in each and return home yearning for yet another trip. A representative example is the Cordoban shaykh who went east in AH 330/AD 941–2 at the age of fourteen (Ibn al-Faradi 1966: biography no. 1360). During his trip, he followed an extensive itinerary that included Mecca, Medina, Jidda, Yemen (Sana‘a, Zabid, Aden), Fustat, Jerusalem, Gaza, Ashkelon, Tiberias, Damascus, Tripoli, Beirut, Caesaria, Ramla, Farama, Alexandria, and Qulzum. This tidal flow of scholars and scholarship across the Islamic lands eventually established the primacy of certain cities and regions as learning centres.

A shifting hierarchy of learning centres emerged. Depending on political and economic conditions, different cities in different periods could vie for pre-eminence in this regard. Whereas, for example, Baghdad set the standard in the third-early fourth AH/ninth-early tenth AD centuries, it was Cairo under the Fatimids and Nishapur in the succeeding two centuries which attracted Muslim scholars. This hierarchy could also depend to a lesser degree merely upon opportunity — for instance, a scholar might opt for one city as opposed to another because it was closer to his place of origin or had a sufficient number of well-known divines residing in it. But it is evident from our sources that travelling scholars were exceedingly well-informed. They knew where the leading scholars lived and acted accordingly. A scholarly traveller of the type discussed

eagerly contacted local ‘ulama’ wherever he went, but he always knew where he would be most rewarded.

Although more research needs to be done on its exact nature, rihla/talab al-‘ilm deserves its status as a unifying theme of medieval Islamic history. For Muslims who undertook it, it was an experience to be relished in a variety of contexts. Yet rihla/talab al-‘ilm also contributed, as already noted, to regionalism and localism. Why is this so? First, the powerful forces that were generated — perhaps as early as the second century after the conquests — blended the ancient traditions of the Near East, transmitted by converts to Islam, with those of the Arab settlers. This blending produced new Muslim communities, each proud of its distinctive heritage, both old and new. The special qualities or merits (fada’il) assigned to Mecca and Medina in the Qur’an and the hadith literature established a precedent and a paradigm for newly-constituted Muslim communities. Mecca, of course, possessed both a privileged pre-Islamic status and a central place in Muslim tradition. This duality of distinction was copied and reproduced — initially perhaps in Egypt — by other Muslim societies, and gave birth to a literary genre called fada’il, which bred cultural competition among cities in particular.

Second, there was the psychology of the traveller himself. For example, a scholar who left Cordoba or Seville to perform the hajj and study with the learned men of North Africa and Egypt did not do so as a peripheral malcontent. He was usually at least a man of solid middle-class background and some local intellectual renown, and one fully imbued with the values of his native land. He marvelled at the sights that he saw in Mecca, cherished the memory of classes that he attended in Fez or Damascus, yet returned home still convinced that the homesickness he experienced was genuine and that no other land surpassed the merits of al-Andalus.

Perhaps all of this conforms to the three stages of Joseph Campbell's myth of the hero (quoted in Fussell 1980: 208): the setting out and separation from the familiar; the trials of initiation and adventure; and the return and re-integration into society. As our hypothetical Spanish scholar passed through these stages, he was reminded of both his citizenship in an international community of Muslims and his ties to his region and city in Spain. Unlike Fussell's British travellers of the modern inter-war period, most Muslim travellers returned home thankful to be there, and their re-integration was often a measure of how successfully the travel-for-study experience reinforced local identity and pride.

Spain, Egypt, and Khurasan are three examples of intellectual centres with strong local identities. Each contributed to and participated in the rihla/talab al-'ilm network. A Muslim in search of religious knowledge could find a warm reception in each region which would cement his ties to the international Muslim community of which he was a member. But he would also encounter that strength of local sentiment which we have described, as the following examples suggest.

Al-Subki (d. AH 771/AD 1369–70), the compiler of the most important biographical collection on the Shafi'i law school, tells us ofa shaykh (d. AH 463/AD 1070–1) from a town near Baghdad who, wavering between a trip to Cairo or Nishapur, received the following advice:

If you go to Cairo, you will go to only one man [Ibn al-Nahhas]. Ifhe escapes you, your trip will be ruined. But if you go to Nishapur, there you will find a group of scholars. If one should elude you, you may obtain the help of one from among the rest.

(al Subki 1964 IV, 30)

Needless to say, the man opted for Nishapur.

Egypt also had its adherents. In the late fourth AH/tenth AD century, the geographer, al-Muqaddasi (1906: 197), extolled the virtues of Fatimid Cairo. He declared it vastly superior

to Baghdad, Damascus, and Nishapur in many respects, his most important comment for our purposes being that it was the habitat or breeding ground (ma‘dan) of the ‘ulama’. Naturally we find echoes of this rivalry between cities and regions in the fada’il literature. Drawing in part on legends surrounding Egypt’s pre-Islamic history, ‘Umar b. Muhammad al-Kindi (1971: 45), the son of the famous Egyptian historian (Abu ‘Umar Muhammad, d. AH 350/AD 961–2), could claim:

Wise people agree that the people of the world strive to travel to Egypt and seek to make a living there. But the people of Egypt do not seek to make a living in any other country, and do not travel anywhere — even if there were a wall separating Egypt and the countries of the world, so much is available in Egypt that its people would have no need of them.

Suffice it to say that on the Egyptian side of that wall was a sufficient and vibrant network of scholars.

Muslim rulers were also drawn into the competition spawned by the rihla. The fourth AH/tenth AD century was the height of Spanish Umayyid power and visits by Spanish Maliki scholars to Egypt. In his invaluable guidebook to Cairo’s tombs and cemeteries, Ibn al-Zayyat (d. AH 814/AD 1411–12) reports that the Caliph ‘Abd al-Rahman

III al-Nasir regularly sent 10,000 dinars for the maintenance of Maliki fuqaha’ in Fustat. Not to be outdone, the Egyptian ruler Abu al-Misk Kafur ordered that 20,000 dinars be distributed among the Shafi‘is (1907: 190–1).

In sum, these examples should remind us of the close links between rihla/talab al-‘ilm and fada’il as key ingredients in medieval Muslim self-definition. As noted, travel for the sake of study was a process which could emphasise universal traits common to all Muslims. For the scholar, it meant the exchange of ideas, books, and even addresses of teachers in distant cities; for the merchant, goods, services, and an awareness of new business methods and perhaps even technological innovations in manufacturing and agriculture; and for everyone, the experience of seeing other lands. If we accept Dunn’s assertion that the rihla was above all “an account of a journey (or journeys) to Mecca”, then the hajj was of course the most supremely universal trait of all (Dunn 1986: 310).

The frequency with which medieval Muslims pursued talab al-‘ilm is an excellent indicator of their self-image and how much the rihla concept owed to the exigencies of time and place. Looking at Egypt first, we find that the term rihla itself rarely appears in biographies of Egyptian ‘ulama’. Primary sources for Egypt in our period (fourth-fifth AH/tenth-eleventh AD centuries) are limited to the abbreviated biographical work of Ibn al-Tahhan (d. AH 416/AD 1025–6) and the

obituary list of Ibn al-Habbal (d. AH 482/AD 1089–90). But even from these materials we have the distinct impression that Egyptians felt that they were self-sufficient with regard to learning. Egypt's most celebrated early historian and first known compiler of a biographical dictionary devoted exclusively to Egyptians, Ibn Yunus al-Sadafi (d. AH 347/AD 957–8), never left Egypt. Yet his reputation as an 'alim was unquestioned and we find his unfortunately lost biographical work frequently quoted by Muslim authors.

As al-Kindi's observation reminds us, the Pharaonic view of Egypt as the centre of the universe became part of the cultural heritage of Islam in Egypt. As a centre for Islamic studies, Egypt did not match the initial rate of development that Iraq enjoyed. But, by the fourth AH/tenth AD century, it was a much-respected regional entrepot of learning. Its capital, Fustat (now Cairo), was a magnet for Muslims from all over the Mediterranean. Egyptians themselves saw little reason to seek knowledge elsewhere. The scarcity of Egyptians in the lists of ghuraba' (foreign scholars) in Spanish, Iraqi, and Persian biographical works underlines this attitude. Fustat was a teeming, sophisticated way-station, reception

centre, and seat of learning for those making rihlas. But the rihla as a self-defining concept in Egyptian Muslim life seems to have played a minor role.

Turning to Spain, we find the exact opposite of Egypt. The rihla was the central feature of Spanish Muslim intellectual life. We are blessed with a rich biographical literature for Spain (Ibn al-Faradi, Ibn Bashkuwal, al-Dabbi, and Ibn al-Abbar) which is both local and primary in nature. The several thousand biographies in these collections trenchantly document the significance of rihla/talab al-'ilm for Spanish Muslims.

Initially, we should note the role of geography. Located at the western limit of the medieval Islamic world, it is very natural that travel for the sake of study would achieve its most impressive development in Spain. With the possible exception of their co-religionists in Sicily, Spanish Muslims had more contact with Christians and Christendom than any other region of dar al-Islam. Muslims, although constituting the dominant culture, ruled a large Christian subject population and, whatever the state of religious and political antagonisms, maintained economic relations with the Christian lands of northern Spain.

Far more crucial is the fact that from the late fifth AH/eleventh AD century, Muslim Spain was increasingly threatened by a militant crusading movement, fervently Spanish Catholic in orientation. Spanish Muslims had every reason to seek spiritual refreshment in areas where Islam was the majority culture. Egyptians could really afford, so to speak, to remain at home, whereas for Spaniards, rihla/talab al-'ilm truly meant the survival of Islam as a coherent, shari'a-based way of life. What began as

“refreshment” conferring social benefit in the third AH/ninth AD century gradually became an unavoidable necessity by the sixth AH/twelfth AD, given the changing political and military conditions in medieval Spain and the increasing emigration of the corps of Maliki ‘ulama’ to North Africa and Egypt. Embattled both physically and mentally, Spanish Muslims looked to other communities, the Maghrib in particular, for intellectual succour.

Our sources do not explicitly indicate that Spanish Muslims clearly perceived themselves as peripheral or marginal. However, given their distance from the early centres of Muslim scholarship, it is reasonable to assume that during the second-early fourth AH/eighth-early tenth AD centuries they would look eastward for appropriate models of learning in hadith. We may find a parallel in the early medieval Jewish communities of Spain, North Africa, Egypt, and the Franco-German region. These communities were initially dependent to one degree or another upon famous yeshivot

(academies) of Iraq. So too were the Muslims of Spain, Tunisia, and Egypt upon their counterpart centres of learning in Iraq. Whereas the study of fiqh developed locally in Spain (inspired no doubt by the development of Maliki fiqh in North Africa) from an early date, hadith did not, hence the relatively substantial percentage of biographies of Muslims who went east to immerse themselves in that field. If a sense of intellectual periphery (Spain) and of centre(s) (Iraq and increasingly Egypt and Tunisia) did exist, it certainly was not something about which Spanish Muslims wrote. However, the biographies provide evidence of a perception of periphery that cannot be denied — at least as far as hadith study is concerned. On the other hand, this attitude was exaggerated and intensified by the political turmoil which prevailed among Spanish Muslims and by the accelerating advance of the Reconquista in the early sixth AH/twelfth AD century.

None the less, we should not assume that talab al-‘ilm achieved acceptance as a fard in al-Andalus, despite the gravity of the situation. We referred earlier to the Prophetic hadith on the subject of talab al-‘ilm as a fard. This hadith was hotly debated throughout the medieval Muslim world. For evidence of this, we need look no further than the Spaniard Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr’s (d. AH 464/AD 1071–2) Jami‘ bayan al-‘ilm wa-fadluhu (The Exposition and Excellence of Knowledge). The author was the most famous hadith specialist of his time in Spain and North Africa and achieved his reputation without every having studied outside of Cordoba!

Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr devotes the first nine pages of his work to the question of whether or not talab al-‘ilm is a fard. As we read his presentation of the opinions of various early scholars, we realise that there was no consensus on the legal status of travel for the sake of study. For example, when asked about the problem, Malik b. Anas says: “How admirable is talab al-‘ilm! As to its being a fard,

no”. And in a different transmission, he answers: “No. But it means seeking from a person that which one can put to good use in his religious faith” (Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 1975: 5). There is no doubt about the crucial importance of talab al-‘ilm, but every doubt concerning its status as a ritual obligation. At best, the authorities quoted by Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr are ambivalent, their commentary occasionally cryptic.

Talab al-‘ilm may have come to represent a fard in a de facto sense, a way of dealing with an increasingly insecure and disturbing political, social, and intellectual reality for Spanish Muslims. It is likely that it reinforced both communal feeling within Spain and the bonds which Spanish Muslims maintained with their co-religionists in other regions. As such, talab al-‘ilm was the Andalusian method

of expressing how their peripheral Islamic society related to the more central heartlands of the umma, especially after the fall of Toledo (AH 478/AD 1085–6) and the steady progress of the Reconquista.

However, what one brought back, rather than the original motivation for going, could have been a decisive factor here. The physical search for religious knowledge was both an adventure and a religious duty. The ‘ulama’ were, of course, not the only Muslims who undertook journeys, but the overwhelming testimony of the biographical literature shows that they were by far the most likely to do so, given their needs and vocations. The search for religious knowledge also conferred distinction. Those who completed the journey returned home not only with an expanded religious knowledge, but also — and perhaps more importantly — with the experience of other lands and other Muslims, which heightened their appreciation of their native land. The sections specifically set aside for foreign-born scholars in the biographical collections show a “diaspora” of Spanish and other Muslims who never returned home. The majority did return, however, to the merit of both themselves and the cities and regions which they had left. Undoubtedly, their perceptions of centre and periphery changed in the course of their travels; that is to say, the cultural enrichment and expansion of the periphery blurred the distinctions which had of necessity existed formerly between it and the centre.

The Spanish biographies yield a variety of characteristics that enable us to profile rihla/talab al-‘ilm as it was understood in al-Andalus. First, it was the most important aspect of Spanish learning. The concept permeates the language of the Spanish biographical dictionaries. The experience was a multi-faceted intellectual endeavour, with neither hadith nor fiqh always enjoying primacy. It occupied a very special position in Spain in that those who travelled (ahl al-rihla) represented a distinct category of individuals. These men were heavily urbanised, ethnically heterogeneous, and solidly middle class in vocation and social outlook. They were drawn from the corps of Maliki fuqaha’, or jurists, which socially and politically stood between khassa (upper class or elite) and ‘amma

(the “masses” or lower classes) in Muslim Spain (Benaboud 1980–1: 5–45). They were objects of praise but also had advantages of a practical nature in the sense that public offices such as the post of qadi were reserved for them by the ruler and his high officials. A famous teacher’s reputation increased when he made a trip and, in addition, returned with a new or rare text previously unknown in Spain.

People of all ages engaged in rihla/talab al-‘ilm, although those

between the ages of 20 and 50 appear most often in the tabaqat. Trips were often family-oriented. Learning began at home and one’s renown was based on the intellectual foundation initially passed on within the extended family unit. Sons (and occasionally daughters) accompanied fathers and often then made a trip of their own, usually in the company of a brother, cousin, or close friend. We should add here that these customs were not peculiarly Spanish. Muslims the world over pursued study for the same reasons and in the same manner, whether they lived in Cordoba, Cairo, or Nishapur.

In Muslim Spain, many travelled for the sake of study. In Egypt, by contrast, it would appear that a minority among the corps of ‘ulama’ did so. Khurasan, through the example of its great city of Nishapur, occupies a unique intermediate position between al-Andalus and Egypt. In the fourth AH /tenth-eleventh AD centuries, Nishapur was a wealthy and powerful urban entity under the successive rule of the Samanids, Ghaznavids, and Saljuqs. A strategic nexus on the trade routes to China and India, Nishapur was home to an affluent and influential network of ‘ulama’ families who, during our period, controlled political activity within their city. They are known to us through the Ta’rikh Nisabur by al-Hakim al-Nisaburi (d. AH 405/AD 1015–16) and its continuation by ‘Abd al-Ghafir al-Farisi (d. AH 529/AD 1135–6). The several thousand Arabic biographies in these works provide us with a very different perspective on medieval rihla/talab al-‘ilm.

Unlike the Egyptians, people from Nishapur did not stay home. But the nature of their travels seems to have been different from that of their Spanish peers. Spanish Muslims travelled all over al-Andalus. Likewise, Nishapuris journeyed the length and breadth of Khurasan and Iraq and Central Asia too. What is striking is the contrast in linguistic usage between the Spanish and Nishapur biographical notices. Very rare is the phrase lahu rihlatun or the verb rahala itself. Instead, we see the verbs kharaja and qadama frequently. Talab al-‘ilm, of course, is a major concern but not in an explicit manner. For example, there is the following except from the biography of Nasr b. al-Hasan b. al-Qasim al-Shashi (d. AH487/AD 1094–5):

He went to Nishapur as a young man on business ... he went to lands west of Nishapur (bilad al-gharb) ... and God blessed him with his acquisitions and

commercial activities to the point that he had an abundance of wealth ... then he returned to Nishapur and made his home there.

(Frye 1965: 127)

Obviously, there is plenty of movement and exchange here and we should add that this example is not untypical of the Nishapur biographies. We find important information as well in this biography on the man’s training in hadith study. Travel for the purpose of study is present but it somehow does not convey the intensity present in the Spanish sources.

Though subject to periodic political upheaval and economic dislocation, Nishapur and its Perso-Islamic culture area were never even remotely threatened by the likes of a Christian Reconquista (although the initially pagan Mongols devastated Khurasan in a manner that Christian knights never did in Spain). In our period, however, it was almost wholly Muslim — confident, prosperous, and self-assured. Nishapur scholars sought knowledge, particularly in the realm of hadith, as readily as their Spanish counterparts, but perhaps without that urgent sense of “mission”, which may account for the Spanish preoccupation with rihla/talab al-‘ilm. Travel for the sake of knowledge was possibly routine for the ‘ulama’ of Nishapur. It was taken for granted in a way that it was not in Spain, hence its elevation to such a lofty status among Spanish Muslims.

Spain, Egypt, and Khurasan all embraced the ideology, which was the basis of travel for the sake of study. But, for a variety of reasons, they experienced it differently. In Spain, it was a primary aspect of one’s identity as an ‘alim and reflected the country’s peculiar status on the periphery of the Islamic world. For the Egyptians, it was just the opposite. They too respected the concept but felt little obliged to pursue it. With Nishapur and, in general, the Iranian/Central Asian culture region that looked towards not the Mediterranean but China and India, we encounter a corps of scholars who rarely used the “key term” itself but did engage in the process to which it was applied. They circulated within a “local” network and, to a greater degree than their Spanish and Egyptian peers, used the status conferred by their education effectively to influence and sometimes to dictate the political affairs of their cities.

In using this particular comparative approach, we have returned not to an “essentialist” or “reified” view of Islam or being Muslim. Instead, we have utilised rihla/talab al-‘ilm as a means of comprehending how one activity fundamental to early medieval Islamic education was understood in three distinct Islamic societies so distant in time and place from our own.

[21] The periodisation of medieval Islamic history remains a subject of debate. For the purposes of this paper, the approximate chronological boundaries are AH 236-545/AD 850–1150. It was during these centuries that the distinct characteristics of the fluid network of religious learning studied here developed and flourished.

[22] Tabaqat literally means “classes” or “generations”. It is a label for one of the most characteristic genres of historical writing in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish — the biographical dictionary. Usually arranged alphabetically, the tabaqat collections deal with all manner of individuals (such as caliphs, poets, and saints), but here we refer exclusively to those collections devoted to religious scholars (‘ulama’).

[23] It is interesting to note that in Morocco after the tenth/ sixteenth century, the rihla shifts from association with the hajj to travel only within Morocco.

[24] Though the question of talab al-‘ilm as a fard (ritual obligation) is discussed on p. 60, it is worth noting at this point that an ‘alim’s status did not depend on the journeys that he pursued in order to acquire learning. The problems of which characteristics defined an ‘alim has generated substantial debate in recent years. Knowledge of hadith above all was a quality which certainly distinguished an ‘alim. But loyalty, status, reputation, and responsibility figured prominently as well. Making a rihla did of course enhance one’s status and reputation but sanction for it was a local/ regional matter. The need for and value of it depended upon time and place. Thus it is difficult to be precise about the criteria for an ‘alim’s status. As Richard Bulliet (1972) and Roy Mottahedeh (1980) have shown, access to religious learning was largely unrestricted and open to talent. There was an egalitarian sense to the process, yet this did not preclude the influence of inherited distinction and wealth. In the case of Nishapur, what mattered was not who learned but who taught. Moreover, there were identities and affiliations — membership in urban socio-political factions and Sufi brotherhoods, or ethnic bonds — which could co-exist with or even supersede one’s being an ‘alim. These identities varied considerably over time and place. Bulliet’s “patricians of Nishapur” had no counterpa in Egypt, although the Egyptian ‘ulama’ possessed a cohesion which was encouraged by the country’s geographic, economic, and intellectual significance in the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries.

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* Part Two: Travel accounts

** Chapter Four: The ambivalence of rihla: community integration and self-definition in Moroccan travel accounts, 1300–1800

Abderrahmane El Moudden

Travel (rihla) in Muslim culture is often valued for its integrating effects: the pilgrimage (hajj) leads the pilgrim to Mecca and Medina, and the search for knowledge (talab al‘ilm) leads the student to one of the esteemed places of Islamic teaching, such as Medina, Cairo, or Fez. In all these cases, travel brings individuals and groups to centres and unites them with the wider community of the faithful (umma). This chapter considers the consequences of such travel for developing a sense of locality. Did rihla serve only to unite the faithful or did it

also give to travellers a sense of local consciousness? I suggest that rihla is ambivalent: through it the traveller becomes more closely linked to the idea of the Muslim community as a whole, but at the same time learns what is specific to his own people and culture.

*** Rihla

Rihla, in the form of actual travel and travel accounts, was one of the main features of Muslim culture in the western part of dar al-Islam (realm of Islam). Since the early Islamic centuries, learned people ventured to the eastern lands of Islam, specifically to the Hijaz, seeking advanced learning in religious matters and spiritual fulfilment.[25] Rihla was particularly linked with the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, the fifth pillar of Islam. The travel was so long and risky that it was worthwhile for the literate to make written records of it which serve as useful guides for future pilgrims.

Rihla literature flourished in North Africa, especially in Morocco (Turki 1979) from the sixteenth century onwards. Muhammad al-Manuni (1983: 186–92), a leading Moroccan archivist, divides rihla accounts for the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries into three types:

1 Rihla within Morocco, in which the traveller did not go beyond one region or, at the very most, the whole area of what is currently Morocco.

2 Rihla hijaziyya, travel to the Hijaz. This form of rihla resulted in oral or written comprehensive reports on the travel and on the various aspects of the pilgrimage.

3 Rihla sifariyya, including embassies and missions, in which the writer reported on his travels in foreign lands. From the seventeenth century onward, Morocco sent missions to Christian European governments, including France, Spain, and Britain, as well as to Muslim rulers. The most significant embassy travel accounts are those written by ambassadors to the Porte, the Ottoman central government, at Istanbul. These envoys, on their way to accomplish their diplomatic mission or on returning, often performed the hajj — thus explaining why many sifariyya rihlas are also hijaziyya ones. An example is al-Zayyani (d. AH 1249/AD 1834) in the late eighteenth century (al-Zayyani 1967).

Travels to the Hijaz were certainly the most important type of Moroccan movement abroad prior to modern times (Lewis 1971: 37–8). Not only were they the most frequent, but they

were also the most comprehensive: the hijaziyya type could include the two other kinds of movement. Many pilgrims needed to travel within Morocco before starting the “real” travel towards the east. They needed to do so in order to join the pilgrimage caravan, which used to gather in specific cities before proceeding to the Hijaz, or in order to visit some of the more famous saints’ shrines for the sake of safety en route in this world and greater rewards in the next (Brunel 1955: 77, 112). The path of pilgrims was rarely direct; it needed to be circuitous to enable them to visit most of the sacred spots on their way (Raphael 1973: 14). Moreover, journeys to the Hijaz were important because they often brought back new ideas or even initiated broad changes in the Maghrib. Examples include the Almoravid and Almohad revolutions in the eleventh and twelfth centuries AD and the introduction of Wahhabi ideas in the early nineteenth century AD (al-Iraqi 1984: 125–54).

Rihla in both its aspects, hijaziyya and sifariyya, had two elements. By accomplishing rihla, Moroccan travellers shared experiences with various components of the umma. At the same time, they were able to understand their difference through experiencing numerous comparisons. To show this characteristic of rihla, I will rely mostly on hijaziyya accounts because this kind of travel was a more comprehensive undertaking. However, the sifariyya accounts are also relevant to developing a conscious sense of difference. In some cases, the diplomatic and somewhat secular goal of the travel was clearly perceived and expressed, and the sensitivity to differences, especially political ones, may have even been stronger and clearer in these texts than in the hijaziyya ones. However, this distinction should not be overdrawn.

*** Rihla, umma, and consciousness of identity

Taking part in rihla altered consciousness of the umma. There was frequent travel for military, commercial, intellectual, and religious reasons since the early centuries of Islam (see Gellens, Chapter 3 of this volume). Travellers, scholars, and merchants participated in extending the sense of frontiers of the umma through their activities. Rihla accounts illustrated for local readers and listeners the extent of the Islamic community, and thus created “an integrated, growing, self-replenishing network of cultural communication” (Dunn 1986: 10). This network of cultural communication operated, however, in politically fragmented and socially localised contexts. The case of Morocco is significant in this respect.

Three dimensions characterise Moroccan society prior to the colonial era. On the socio-economic level, most Moroccans lived in small- or medium-sized tribal and village communities. Interaction within these local communities was intense and movement outside of them primarily involved a few seasonal workers or itinerant shepherds (Montagne 1930; Berque 1955).

Politically, the rural areas were more or less linked to the central government, the makhzan, which was basically well established in the cities and in the plains surrounding them. In order to function adequately, the central government had to be a travelling institution: the sultans used to settle part of the year in Fez, in the north, and the rest of it in Marrakesh, in the south (Nordman 1980–1: 123–52). Members of the local elites were often ordered to join the sultan in one of these capitals and, in this way, experienced some of the variety of Morocco's lands and people. Rarely, however, did their experiences range beyond the areas of the ruler's peregrinations (El Moudden 1983: 141–5). This

administrative and military movement is noticeable in traditional sources at least since the eleventh century in the time of the Almoravid dynasty. Although the geographical extent of the Almoravid and Almohad states encompassed all North Africa and Muslim Spain, it was not until the sixteenth century, with the rise of the Sa'adi dynasty, that Morocco emerged as a distinct political unit more or less possessing its current political boundaries.

Finally, in intellectual and religious matters, religious intellectuals

(faqihs) constituted a network cross-cutting Morocco's social and economic fragmentation. This elite of religious intellectuals also constituted an important link between Morocco and the rest of the Muslim world. Since they were among those who were likely to have travelled outside their local areas or regions, in their own localities they were the ones possessing a concrete idea of what the umma was like and able to convey this idea to others. A Moroccan from the south-western region of the Sus, Ahmad bin Ali al-Jazuli (d. AH 1197/AD 1782–3), epitomises the different directions of such a network. Al-Jabarti, the late eighteenth century Egyptian historian, wrote in his biography of al-Jazuli:

He studied with us under the direction of my father, with the participation of Sidi Muhammad and Sidi Abu Bakr, the two sons of Shaykh al-Tawdi bin Suda [a leading scholar of eighteenth-century Fez], when they accompanied their father, that year, on the hajj; and with the participation of Shaykh Salim al-Qayrawani [probably from Qayrawan, Tunisia] (al-Jabarti n.d.: I, 571–2)

This example shows that whether sitting at some corner of al-Azhar in Egypt or al-Qarawiyyin in Morocco, taking part in religious learning still provided an important opportunity for Moroccans from different regions in the late eighteenth century to unite. In this case, al-Jazuli, who was from the Sus in the south of Morocco, encountered at al-Azhar students from Fez (the sons of Bin Suda), others from Tunisia (al-Qayrawani) and still others from Egypt (al-Jabarti). Such encounters occurred frequently and symbolised the network of cultural communication linking men of learning throughout the umma. Although al-Jazuli never made it back home, a majority of travellers must have returned to their point of origin with their knowledge and experience, and shared these with their fellow

tribesmen or townsmen. As a consequence, awareness of the areas outside the realm of Islam was often due to them (Dunn 1986).

These three spheres of practice and perception in Moroccan society — the socio-economic, political and intellectual, and religious — are clear in traditional sources at least from the sixteenth century onward (al-Nasiri 1954–6: VI, 100). How were these three spheres interconnected?

Imagine al-Tamgruti, the Moroccan ambassador to Istanbul in the late sixteenth century, first in his local environment of Tamgrut, a famous zawiya (a religious brotherhood or lodge), located south of the High Atlas mountains on the northern fringe of the Sahara. In terms of society and local economy, he might have been taking care of his palm groves between prayer times, negotiating and sharing the costs of repairing a saguia (irrigation canal), or leading a delegation of members of his village to argue with the members of a village downstream about water rights and shares. Politically, on specific occasions, such as major religious feasts, he might have been ordered to come to wherever the sultan’s capital was at that moment. At the intellectual level, he would certainly have met at the capital faqihs from other cities and regions of Morocco. He would undoubtedly have talked with recent hajjs (customary Moroccan form for hajjis, or pilgrims) about their adventures and encounters in the east and about the news from other Muslim lands.

Such an imbrication of the three levels in one personal experience was usual, particularly in the case of learned people, even though the majority of the rest of Moroccans experienced only their immediate environs. In such a socio-cultural environment, travel in its various forms constituted an important means of social, political, and religious integration.

Rihla to the Hijaz was especially important. More than an opportunity for Moroccans to accomplish a long and enriching, though risky, voyage,[26] it also provided a lasting personal experience. This is probably one of the reasons for the flourishing of the hijaziyya accounts in comparison to the other types of rihla accounts.[27]

For many centuries, the pilgrimage caravan was the most important, if not the only means of travel to the Holy Lands.

On their way, Moroccan pilgrims were forced to cross the majority of Arab Muslim lands. This fact alone gives the Moroccan travels a complexity that is reflected in the texts and colours the perception of sacred space and time. Religiously significant dates punctuate the days and months of the journey, as do shrines and important holy centres along the way; they frame the whole narration. The rihla of al-‘Ayyashi substantiates such an

observation: at every stage of his two-year-long travel, he visited shrines and met learned people (al-‘Ayyashi AH 1316: I-II; Kopf 1960: 785).

Two very important annual caravans left Morocco for the Hijaz cities — one from Fez, and the other from Sijilmassa, located in the south-east. Rihla texts indicate that travellers could quit the caravan in northern or south-eastern Morocco and rejoin it at one of its important stops during the journey — Tripoli, Alexandria, Cairo, Mecca, or Medina. Between each of these stages, the travellers recorded the name and condition of numerous stops of lesser importance.

For each of these stopping points, the rihla texts give more or less

detailed descriptions of ecology, wells, sweet or salt water, hot or cold weather, and the ease and safety of the route. The descriptions also focus on some of the economic possibilities of each region and record the kind of trade that the pilgrims may have transacted there. Much attention is paid to the inhabitants’ customs as well as to the religious and educational situation. Of course, throughout his text, the traveller kept close records on the most important men, scholars, and saints whom he met in each region, and on various scholarly or belles-lettres activities in which he happened to participate. It is for this reason that the rihla texts are usually encyclopaedic in character. Among other fields, they cover the religious sciences, history, biographies, and literature. Moreover, for modern scholars, they are a kind of documentary treasure, full of material of geographical, ethnographic, and even technological interest.

The medieval traveller was not, however, an aloof observer, detached from the matter of his depictions. He was often involved in the situation described and the rihla text must also be seen as an autobiography.[28] Yet it is not always constituted only by first-hand experience. When the traveller felt a shortage of interesting records about some point of his journey, he drew upon texts to fill the gap (Dunn 1986: 313; Morsy 1983).[29]

Through these various aspects, rihla texts testify that the journey to the Hijaz was an important means of integration of Moroccan pilgrims with the wider Muslim community. Moroccan travellers never felt completely foreign towards the inhabitants of the various pilgrimage itineraries. There was no great linguistic handicap for them, at least among the Muslim communities of the southern Mediterranean.[30] Indeed, on their way to the hajj, Moroccans sometimes felt so much at home that they considered it quite legitimate to try to impose their views of what they thought to be the right religious behaviour. Al-Jabarti recorded an incident of the sort for the year AH 1110/AD 1696, under the significant heading of “the Maghribi event”:

The Maghribi people of Tunis and Fez, who were accompanying the cloth cover that was to be brought to the Ka‘ba, in a procession through the central area of Cairo, tried to prevent whoever was smoking, along their way, from doing so ... This led to a conflict between them and the people of the bazaar of Cairo. The pasha arrested most of them, and consequently they missed the pilgrimage. Some of them died in prison, the others were released later.

(al-Jabarti n.d.: I, 51)

This incident shows that an exaggerated feeling of being at home was not always without complication. It is nevertheless interesting to note that the pilgrims, and specifically the learned people among them, moved easily throughout large areas of the Muslim world.

The example of Ibn Battuta (d. AH 1368) illustrates this basic point. Departing from his native Tangier in northern Morocco, he covered no less than 73,000 miles during his almost thirty-year career. While of course not constantly on the move — he settled long enough in one locale to marry and have a family (Damascus), or to reach positions of authority in the local ruling establishment (India and China) — he was far from isolated. Rather, in India, for example, he was able to meet old acquaintances from Damascus and even Granada. As Dunn says:

the scholarly class of the Islamic world was an extraordinarily mobile group. In the Maghrib of the later Middle Period the learned, like modern conference hopping academics, circulated incessantly from one city and country to another, studying with renowned professors, leading diplomatic missions, taking up posts in mosques and royal chanceries.

(Dunn 1986: 3, 68; quotation at 24)

As a major factor of individual mobility in pre-modern Muslim societies, the pilgrimage in itself was a complex phenomenon that enabled its participants to share most of everyday life with co-religionists. This journey was not only a religious enterprise, but, because of its length (15–18 months in normal travel, but quite possibly longer as in the cases of al-‘Ayyashi and Ibn Battuta), the pilgrims also observed and experienced common practices. For instance, in most of the important stages of the journey, Moroccan pilgrims converted their merchandise or slaves into cash, and purchased the different commodities that they needed for the journey, such as food and animals for transportation. For this reason, many rihla texts are in the form of market guides, advising future pilgrims about the best way to carry on advantageous trade on the way to the Hijaz (Zemmama 1984: 114–24). These guides, incidentally, show how business and pilgimage were so intimately connected that it is hard to detemine which one inspired the other.

At the main stages of the journey — Tripoli, Cairo, Mecca, and Medina — the pilgrims stopped for longer periods than they did at secondary places. There they were able to go to libraries, buy books, attend classes at al-Azhar in Cairo, or give lectures at the Prophet's mosque and shrine in Medina. They could also participate, as al-'Ayyashi did (Zemmama 1983: 156–68), in the great religious debates of the time.

Some Moroccan travellers or pilgrims preferred to settle permanently at one point of their journey. Al-Jabarti noted in his chronicles many cases of learned Moroccans who, after their return from the Hijaz, decided to stay in Cairo (n.d.: I, 327, 383, 572). One of them deserves particular attention because he could be seen as an example of how Moroccan travellers considered themselves as members of the larger Muslim community, even in the late eighteenth century — by which time Morocco had been an autonomous political unit for at least 200 years. Ahmad bin 'Ali al-Jazuli al-Susi, previously mentioned, first sought religious learning in his country. In AH 1182/AD 1768 he went on the pilgrimage and, on his way back, stayed in Cairo where, for a period, he studied at al-Azhar. Then he resumed his travels, going this time to the Rum, the central part of the Ottoman Empire. He participated there in a jihad (holy war), learned Turkish and was offered a high position in the capital. But, as was expected of a genuine faqih, he declined the invitation and returned to Egypt where he married and settled until he died in AH 1197/AD 1782–3 (al-Jabarti n.d.: I, 571–2). Through this example one can see how, in general, the hajj and the rihla were major ways for Moroccan travellers to realise their connections with other parts of the Muslim world.

One may wonder what impact the rihla accounts had on the rest of the people, who either did not go on the pilgrimage or, if they did, were unable to write a record of it. In fact, the pilgrims found a ready audience among those who could read. Among the illiterate, many listened to their long and frequently repeated oral reports. In effect, these travel accounts gave people who had never had the opportunity of leaving their native locality a chance to imagine a wider horizon. At the same time, however, they may have imparted something of the sense of difference from fellow Muslims that the travellers themselves experienced.

*** Al-'Ayyashi and his travels to the Hijaz: of differences and similarities

Abu Salim 'Abdullah al-'Ayyashi (AH 1037/AD 1628 to AH 1090/AD 1679) was a well-known seventeenth-century Moroccan traveller and scholar. Born in a small village in the eastern High Atlas mountains, his father was the head of the local zawiya. Al-'Ayyashi travelled to Fez to acquire the orthodox religious sciences, then went to Tamgrut to be initiated into one of the most active Sufi orders in Morocco at that time, the Nasiriyya (Hammoudi 1980: 615–41). Like many other Moroccan scholars, he soon felt the need to deepen his knowledge in eastern lands. He travelled three times to the Hijaz — in 1649, 1653, and 1661 — and stayed for long periods in Mecca and Medina, as well as Jerusalem

and Cairo. Everywhere, he participated actively in theological debates, both learning and teaching. His feelings and observations are incorporated into his two-volume rihla text, Ma’ al-Mawa’id [Tables Water].[31]

The title of this text signifies that the author intended it to be useful for the ‘ulama’ in Morocco and elsewhere as well. Although he focused heavily on theological subjects, he was also a keen observer of contemporary life. His text is full of precise comments on many aspects of the social, economic, and political mores of the peoples he met along the way to the Hijaz. Autobiographical information is also scattered throughout the text. Indeed, during his three travel periods, al-‘Ayyashi accumulated experiences and knowledge that helped him to constitute a more relative image of himself and his country. As a consequence, his judgements were neither absolutely negative nor completely positive towards such people of the eastern Muslim world as the Egyptians. While criticising some aspects of their lives, he did not omit, of course, to praise some of the positive sides. What remained constant was his sensitivity to differences.

Many of these differences he found insignificant, and treated them much as a tourist would in viewing an exotic scene. Some of them were of great significance, because he understood through them how his customs and even religious rituals differed from those that he was witnessing. While he felt neutral towards, or was even pleased, by the former, he was sometimes frankly embarrassed by the latter.

In Egypt, for example, al-‘Ayyashi was struck by the enormous population of Cairo as well as the Nile Valley in general. Its crowded markets and people hurrying in the streets contrasted with what he was accustomed to in the High Atlas region (AH 1316/AD 1898–9: I, 121–2). This was more or less the impression of many previous Moroccan travellers, such as al-‘Abdari and Ibn Battuta. Al-‘Ayyashi also noticed differences in food habits: for example, drinking coffee was a general and useful habit in Egypt, and it sufficed to make a guest content, but the same was not true for Morocco, where guests expected large meals (1898–9: I, 132–3). He also noted the great attention shown to mosques in Egypt in comparison to the relative neglect accorded to those of Morocco. In general, through his acquaintance with Egypt, he revealed an acute consciousness of the anarchy of Morocco in the 1660s and 1670s due to rivalries between local principalities (1898–9: I, 152).

However, al-‘Ayyashi could not help commenting on the negative

characteristics of fellow Muslims. The Egyptians, suffering from lack of pride, endured arbitrary government from the Mamluks without reaction or rebellion (1898–9: I, 121–1). He also disapproved of how Islam had been bureaucratised and corruption was tolerated in Ottoman Medina. He generalised:

All judiciary offices in eastern lands, whether in Egypt, Syria or the Hijaz, are acquired in return for money. Governors sell the offices of imam (prayer leader), khatib (sermoniser), muezzin (caller to prayer), qadi Gudge) ... to whoever offers best, without considering whether he has or not any competence for the office. This results in enormous dangers for Muslims and Islam. Concerning the office of judge, we have not heard, in all eastern lands, of a qadi whose judgements rely on the shari'a (sacred law). Their judgements depend on bribery, and a verdict may change many times during the same day in relation to the more or less great amount of the bribe.

(1898–9: I, 128)

Al-'Ayyashi related the case of such a qadi who wanted to apply the shari'a to the affairs of prominent men in Medina, but ended by being assassinated. He concluded: "One can only complain to God" (1898–9: I, 289).

Different ways of organising everyday life were especially disconcerting:

The teachers' custom in Medina is to vacation on Tuesdays and Fridays and classes meet on the other days, contrary to our custom of vacationing on Thursdays and Fridays in Morocco. When I was teaching in the Haram [Medina], they forced me to teach on Thursdays. It was hard for me because it was different from what we were accustomed to ... I asked them and insisted upon replacing Thursdays with Tuesdays, but they obstinately refused. I was forced to follow their custom.

(1898–9: I, 289)

Al-'Ayyashi could only console himself by reciting a verse of poetry: "If you come to a land in which all people are blind/ Close your eye, even if you have only one eye!"

The differences noted by al-'Ayyashi include prayer ritual. In the Maliki school of law, Muslims let their arms down while standing in prayer, whereas, in the other schools, worshippers fold their arms on their chests. But this latter custom soon spread to eastern lands including those where the Maliki school had influence. It widely came to be assumed that only heretical people (rafidi) let their arms down. Al-'Ayyashi noted the ironic case of a western

Maliki accused, in a Syrian village, of being heretical for precisely that reason, even though his accusers were Maliki themselves (1989–9: I, 292).

Often comparisons are realised through a theological challenge. It was customary for western Maliki faqihs to become involved in debates about the hadith (Prophet's traditions), and many of them like to report that they found their antagonists' knowledge weak. True to this tradition, al-'Ayyashi reported how in Jerusalem he outwitted an Egyptian Hanafi scholar, who was believed to be very learned (1898–9: II, 321–2).

In some paragraphs, al-'Ayyashi generalised his comparisons:

Nomads of Darb, Hijaz, Tihama and Najd are the most ignorant and tough people among Arabs. Only few of them care about prayers or Ramadan. Common people, Arabs and Berbers, in our Morocco, are faqihs in comparison to them. In Morocco, no one, however ignorant he might be, and even if illiterate, would be ignorant about how to do his prayers.

(al-'Ayyashi 1898–9: I, 313)

Here we meet the subjective aspect of comparison. When al-'Ayyashi decided to stay in Mecca for a long period, he justified it by saying that Mecca was the homeland for all the faithful. But, in the last pages of his rihla account, he showed just how deeply he was longing to return home: his thirty-month stay abroad seemed as if it had been a whole century (1898–9: II, 418). Within the umma, therefore, al-'Ayyashi felt closer identification to his own country and people, for the things that differentiated him from eastern peoples were exactly those that linked him to his compatriots in Morocco.

*** Al-Tamgruti and his rihla to Istanbul: competition over the umma

If we look at another Moroccan, but of the sixteenth century, we will find similar sentiments. I have avoided choosing the text of another eighteenth-century traveller for two reasons: first, the chronological development of the themes in rihla literature is not my principal concern here; second, by the eighteenth century, Morocco and the Ottoman Empire had reached a kind of modus vivendi and rihla texts were less interested in expressing difference and competition.

The text of Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali al-Tamgruti is one of the earliest accounts of Moroccan-Ottoman relations in the late sixteenth century, when competition over legitimacy within the

umma was still intense. Reading through Kitab al-Nafha al-Miskiyya fi’l-Sifara

al-Turkiyya [The Book of the Musky Breeze of the Embassy to Turkey] serves to indicate his reactions to the numerous aspects and events of his travel to Istanbul in 1589–90. He travelled there as the ambassador of the Sa‘di Sultan Ahmad al-Mansur (ruled 1578–1603) to the Ottoman Sultan Murad III (ruled 1574–95).

H. de Castries stated in his introduction to the French translation of the Nafha that little is known about al-Tamgruti outside of what we can infer from his own rihla account (al-Tamgruti/de Castries 1929: iv). Born about 1560 in Tamgrut, he died in 1594 or 1595 in Marrakesh. He belonged to the region in which the Sa‘di dynasty originated and might thus have been expected to be unconditionally faithful to Sultan al-Mansur.

Al-Tamgruti provided us with an interesting insight into the relations between his family and the Sa‘di dynasty when he wrote (1929: 45) that his late brother, Sidi Muhammad, had been sent as ambassador to the Ottoman lands before him. We can infer from this detail that al-Tamgruti’s family was in charge ofan inherited office that involved diplomacy between Morocco and Istanbul. At any rate, we can safely assume that al-Tamgruti was acquainted with Ottoman affairs well before his mission, especially through his brother’s accounts (1929: 45). The knowledge of the Ottoman provinces, Istanbul, and Ottoman society and state that is contained in his travel account did not therefore depend on first-hand experience alone, but was representative of what was known of the Ottomans among prominent families of the Sa‘di regime.

Al-Tamgruti said nothing of the real purpose of his official mission. Were the contents of the mission top secret? Or were oral reports on such matters more common? We simply do not know why al-Tamgruti’s account is silent here, but on other matters, such as itineraries and cities that he visited, he was prolix. He said of Istanbul: “In this city, there are so many people, craftsmen, properties, commodities, stores, and books that the traveller is struck by their number, which only God could count and know” (al-Tamgruti n.d.: 94; al-Tamgruti/de Castries 1929: 54). The size of the city and the variety of its activities were so unlike what he had known and so fascinated him that his colourful descriptions remind us of modern cartes postales of Istanbul.

The author’s general reaction to the Ottomans alternated between fascination and rejection. Al-Tamgruti was fascinated by the strength and power of the empire; after all, the Ottoman sultan was the most important Muslim ruler, able to oppose and fight the Christians. The same fascination could be noticed in his sensitivity to the language spoken by the Turks: in many places, he made specific comments on the rules of Turkish grammar (al-Tamgruti 1929: 85, 99, 103).

At the same time, al-Tamgruti clearly recognised his difference from the Ottomans, particularly in matters of law. Yet, surprisingly for a faqih, he did not record the name of any scholar during his six-month stay in Istanbul. He only wrote: “we attended the seminars of scholars who were in Istanbul and we learned many things from them” (al-Tamgruti/de Castries 1929: 68). It is possible that, as a Maliki, he was reluctant to detail the Hanafi school and its scholars, as he had done for the Maliki scholars of Tunis.

Speaking of the fiqh (jurisprudence) taught in Istanbul, he merely concluded: “they teach their law” (fiqhuhum).

On the political level, he expressed his rejection of the style of Ottoman rule much more clearly. When he was still on his way to Istanbul, he witnessed a rebellion among the Arab tribes in the countryside of Tripoli (al-Tamgruti/de Castries 1929: 31–4; Hess 1978: 113–14), which afforded him the opportunity to record Ottoman practices:

As a matter of fact, the Turks had oppressed the inhabitants of Tripolitania very much. They had devastated the country with cruelty, depriving people of part of their lands and houses and ransacking their wealth. They had been so unrespectful to Muslim women that, if they liked a girl, be she the daughter of a notable or of a prominent man, no one could have prevented them from [marrying] her. It was impossible to marry her to someone else.

(al-Tamgruti/de Castries 1929: 32–3)

As a consequence, many of the North African Arabs, from Egypt to Ifriqia (Tunisia), were turning their eyes towards the ruling dynasty in Morocco:

We have noticed among them an extraordinary willingness to being ruled by the sharifs, our lords. They want to share peace, equity, mercy and benefits that the Maghribis [Moroccans] enjoy thanks to [the sharifs].

(al-Tamgruti/de Castries 1929: 33)

We should not forget that it was a member of the Sa‘di regime who was speaking; a laudatory style would not have been unexpected. Nevertheless, these paragraphs go further and make a substantial claim for the Moroccan dynasty: because the sharifs were, or proclaimed themselves to be, descendants of the Prophet, they were the true

caliphs. This is clearly shown in the text when al-Tamgruti contrived to speak of the Ottoman sultan and the Sa‘di sultan in the same sentence:

The [Ottoman] sultan gave us his response to the credentials of the caliph, our lord sultan, sharif Ahmad al-Hasani. And in order to thank him, he gave us magnificent presents for him.

(al-Tamgruti/de Castries 1929: 68)

Over many Islamic centuries, travellers, pilgrims, scholars, and ambassadors felt themselves linked to the wider community of Muslims. While this trend continued of course, at the western edge of the umma from the sixteenth century onward, historical trends favoured the more conscious expression of a distinct identity for Morocco: Moroccans became more aware of being at an extreme frontier of the Islamic world and of the need to resist the Iberian offensives. They also became increasingly aware of being the only area outside of Ottoman rule in the south Mediterranean Muslim world. Travellers and travel accounts refer, from then on with greater frequency, to a more precise and self-conscious geographical, socio-cultural, and political homeland. While noting that they shared many characteristics with fellow Muslims throughout the broad community, therefore, writers such as al-‘Ayyashi and al-Tamgruti discovered other characteristics that they did not share and that distanced themselves from the umma. Rihla as text and as actual travel contributed to making both similarities and differences manifest, and left a sense of ambivalence that complicated what might have been assumed to be a natural identification with the umma.

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[25] There is, often, a chapter on the rihla li-talab al-‘ilm (travel in search of knowledge) in Prophetic traditions. See, for example, Abu Dawud, Sunan, III, 317, tradition no. 3641.

[26] Risks ranged from the danger of being assaulted by bandits, to exposure to plague, desert, and sea.

[27] Al-Manuni gives twenty-two titles of texts concerning the period 1660–1790: two of them are sifariyya texts, three cover travel within the country, and seventeen are hijaziyya texts.

[28] Very often most of the biographical evidence available about the traveller is contained in his rihla account. This was the case of Ibn Battuta and al-Tamgruti.

[29] This vice, however, seems to be common to travel accounts in other cultures. See Morsy (1983).

[30] It is worth noticing that such a feeling is still at work today. In a recent interview, Faqih al-Basri, one of the most radical leaders of the opposition to the Moroccan monarchy during the last twenty-five years, answered a question in these words:

Question: “Le pays a du vous manquer ... ?”

Reponse: “Bien sur le Maroc me manque ... J’etais loin de mon village, de mes racines, mais j’evoluais dans une partie plus vaste que j’ai appris a decouvrir et a aimer ... le croyant est partout chez lui en terre d’Islam.”

(See Jeune Afrique, 15 July 1987, no. 1384, p. 24)

[31] Al-‘Ayyashi’s rihla is only partially translated into French: Berbrugger 1846 and Motylinksi 1900.

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** Chapter Five: The pilgrimage remembered: South Asian accounts of the hajj

Barbara D. Metcalf

The pilgrimage to Mecca is unquestionably one of the great phenomena in the history of Muslim peoples. It has largely been studied from the perspectives of medieval travel and learning, of modern administrative issues and of topics in the religious study of rituals.[32] These studies provide a context for yet another approach, that of eliciting meaning in the pilgrimage, examining not only uniformities in the experience of Muslims but differences over time. The accounts written by pilgrims themselves invite an analysis of individual experience against the background of the social and political world in which they were produced. They are accounts of journeys that are at once inner and outer; and they are guides for us, both to changing patterns of religious sensibilities and to a world in technological, social, and political transition.

The South Asian accounts[33] take shape initially in the period of British rule, a period of complex and extensive re-definition of Islam and of community life; they continue, since 1947, in an Islamic republic and in a secular state where Muslims live as a minority. Nowadays, they are written in a world where Islamic values and Muslim identity seem increasingly significant. The hajj accounts produced in all these contexts show us important dimensions of Islam as a modern religion, of modes of self-presentation, and of Muslim social and corporate life as recounted in distinctive individual lives.

*** The scope of the accounts

The accounts of the hajj written by South Asians take many forms: travelogues, journals, letters, and guides.[34] They describe to different degrees and in different ways experiences of travel, judgements of other people and cultures, the meanings of the hajj and other central symbols of Muslim religious life, and — in so doing — offer self-representations of the pilgrim authors themselves. The authors include some well known figures: major religious thinkers like Maulana Siddiq Hassan Khan Bhopali (1872), the poet Shefta (1841), the Begum of Bhopal (1870), and the Nawwab of Rampur (1872), and, in this century, literary figures from ‘Abdu’l-Majid Daryabadi (1929) to Shorish Kashmiri (1967) as well as statesmen like Muhammad Zafrullah Khan (1967). A very substantial number of writers are from families touched by the institutions that emerged under British rule: they are well-born, literate in Urdu, of families with some mix of connections to government service, professions, and land.[35] But some are not from this type of background. Khwaja Hasan Nizami, himself scion of an illustrious Sufi family and a public figure in the first decades of this century, introduced, for example, the memoir of a craftsman, one Mistri Chiraghu‘d-din Pasruri (1926), insisting on its usefulness and telling the reader that it was pointless to object to its Urdu — on the grounds that the author was, after all, from the Punjab! A handful of accounts have been written by women, from the wife of an army captain in Madras (Saba Mustafa 1979) to a former school principal from Lahore (Zainab Kakakhail 1976). Recently the well-known writer

Imdad Sabiri has published the first of what promises to be a multi-volume series of collections of hajj accounts preserved in the records of his family. The accounts thus offer a very concrete and specific subject presented by a relatively wide range of observers over a considerable period of time.

Perhaps surprisingly, however, the accounts are concentrated in the years of British rule and after. Despite the splendid travelogues written in Arabic in the centuries after the ‘Abbasids, there does not seem to be a continuous genre of travel writing in Muslim societies generally. In the Indian sub-continent, even travellers to the holy places of Mecca and Medina did not write about their travels before the late eighteenth century, except in so far as they recorded visions or wrote treatises while there.[36] In 1787, one Maulana Rafi‘u’d-din Muradabadi (1961 edn), a disciple of the great hadith scholar and reformer of Delhi, Shah Wali’u’llah, performed the hajj and later set down a record of his trip; his is generally taken by later Indian writers as the first such account to have been written from the Indian sub-continent. Only a few pilgrims were to do likewise for the next hundred years. Between 1870 and 1950, however, the pace quickens when several dozen published their accounts. Since then, ever more people have written accounts, probably as many in the last four decades as in the eight decades before.[37] Many more, of course, wrote unpublished letters and accounts, known only to family and friends. Written accounts of the hajj thus seem a modern phenomenon. They share the

impulse and context of other writing that emerges in this period, including travel accounts that range as far as Europe.[38]

*** The hajj accounts as a modern genre

The impulse to write is clearly related to the changes engendered by British domination and western technology, including the printing press, which permitted easy dissemination of writings, and new modes of transport, which permitted easier travel. Writers were discovering new worlds as they were discovering, or creating, new ways of thinking about themselves. The first two Indian Muslims to leave accounts of their trips to Europe, for example, were each from areas of intensive contact with the British in the late eighteenth century, Bengal and Oudh respectively. The traveller from Oudh, Mirza Abu Talib Khan, was a revenue official for the East India Company and wrote — at least in part — with a European audience in mind.[39] The hajj accounts share important characteristics with other new forms of modern literature which are, for example, increasingly conceived as occasions for constituting a persona, a representation ofa self that focuses on individual experiences, perceptions, and feelings, much like the autobiographies that began at the same time. Authors began to present themselves not only as observers but as active participants in what they describe: the hajji and not the hajj takes centre stage.

Many accounts take on characteristics, if not the shape, of novels, including dramatic vignettes of episodes with directly quoted conversations. Some abandon what one might call the built-in pattern ofa pilgrimage account — beginning with the departure, climaxing in arrival at the destined goal, and, on occasion, describing the journey home — in order to structure their story by some other principle.[40] In recent decades many of the most popular accounts have been written by literary figures. Thus the novelist Mumtaz Mufti in his opening apologia makes clear that he is writing neither an entertainment nor a religious treatise, but simply the life story (ap biti) of an “unknown, ignorant, but sincere pilgrim” (not a hajji but a za’ir); he opens with a series of compelling vignettes that show what propelled him, as a sometime secular leftist, to undertake the journey (Mumtaz Mufti 1975: 10).

Studies of Persian and South-east Asian travel literature, including hajj literature, suggest, broadly speaking, a similar pattern. Fragner (1979) finds the earliest Persian memoirs for the nineteenth century to be in fact travel accounts; only in the twentieth century does he find autobiography and what he calls attention to one’s “development and fate” (Werdegang und

Schicksal) as characteristic of either travelogues or memoirs. Matheson and Milner (1984) analysing five Malay texts, identify as one theme an increased emphasis on personal experience in the most recent texts.

The hajj accounts turn out not to be an isolated genre, a continuation of a static medieval form, but rather a genre that develops in ways broadly similar to the modern novel and autobiography. The accounts should be read, moreover, in the context of modern biographies, particularly the biographies of the Prophet Muhammad, a subject that has seen a virtual explosion from the late nineteenth century on. The representation of the central personal symbol of the faith has been increasingly emphasized as Muslim cultures have focused more on issues of individuality and personhood. This emphasis is evident not only in biography and poetry, but in a reformist emphasis on the hadith of the Prophet, and in increased celebration of devotional practices related to the Prophet’s birthday (mawlud). Since the hajj to Mecca often included pilgrimage to the Prophet’s grave in Medina, the accounts themselves may include reflections on the Prophet as well.]10] The accounts should be read as part of an enduring yet shifting constellation of three poles: changes in society generally, changes in concepts of individuality, and changes in the interpretation of central religious symbols, of which two, the hajj and the Prophet, are relevant here.[41]

The hajj does not decline in modern times. In contrast to European Christian pilgrimage, it is rarely called into question. It is a canonical duty, an unalloyed good; it is always better to go. Christian pilgrimage to Jerusalem or saints’ shrines is always problematic, even in centuries when such practices flourished. Similarly suspect can be Muslim pilgrimage to saints’ tombs whose devotees, from Morocco to Senegal to

Baluchistan, may even identify a visit to a shrine as equivalent to the hajj.[42] What questioning there has been of the hajj has not been associated with modern change but with some streams of Sufi mysticism that deplore external duties with no focus on inner purification.[43]

There is, not surprisingly, lively cynicism about a practice so revered. The hajj can be seen as a cover for worldly greed — contacts for smuggling — or honour. But far from diminution, modern decades have seen the hajj grow, not only from South Asia but from all Muslim societies, until today the annual pilgrimage numbers up to two million. As McDonnell (this volume) shows, modern currents of reform have in fact encouraged the hajj and modern transportation has facilitated it. Far from being seen as an alternative to ethical duties or piety, Islamic rituals like the hajj have been seen in periods of reform as essential to both.[44]

By the nineteenth century in Europe, however, travel accounts had little to do with pilgrimage. The image remained as metaphor, for pilgrimage had in fact often given way to exploration and quest.[45] The romantic quest, our most persistent mode of literary travel, made of pilgrimage a new image of a journey into the self, with the antagonist neither the exterior temptation of the Middle Ages nor the external nature of writers like Defoe; it was, instead, identity and selfhood that gave the challenge (Howard 1980: 8). We now take for granted that travel, removing a person from local identities and ties, familiar languages and people, and placing him amid different ways of living and thinking will force at least the sensitive and thoughtful to reassess exactly who they are. As S. Naipaul puts it: “All travel is a form of gradual self-extinction” (1984: 65).[46]

The hajj, however, even if it partakes of adventure, practical account, or inner exploration, remains a pilgrimage in the specific sense of the visitation of the Ka‘ba at Mecca under prescribed circumstances as an essential duty of an able Muslim. “Hajj” is not a metaphor as “pilgrimage” is in English; even if used as a vehicle for a personal quest, the hajj in fact remains and is the structure for whatever experience the hajji creates. That experience, filtered by distance and literary conventions, becomes the remembered hajj of the written account and, for its readers, part of a shared understanding of religious symbols, self-expression, and interpretation of peoples and places.

*** Perspectives on the hajj

Travel accounts in general are richly revealing because they at once purport to describe an objective reality yet in fact reveal the cultural world through which the traveller filters what he sees. Sometimes it is possible to identify some central implicit set of issues that shapes an entire account.[47] Perhaps surprisingly in writings on a core religious ritual, many travellers in late nineteenth-century British India, for example, wrote with a range of imperial

issues close to the surface of their perceptions. Thus Mirza ‘Irfan ‘Ali Beg (1895–6) explicitly wrote to provide useful information and describe interesting events for the Anjuman-i Islamiyya, a voluntary association of Muslims — presumably well-born and educated urban professionals, landlords, government servants, and traders — with whom he was associated. Like many hajjis, he wanted, presumably in all sincerity, to pass on the blessings of a journey like his and to make such a journey easier for those who

would follow. At the same time, however, as a deputy collector in the eastern United Provinces, as high a civil servant as any Indian in the imperial bureaucracy, he was clearly a person who had internalised British concerns for governance and had an identity as a British subject and functionary. He knew English, his tastes were English (from cricket to tea) — and he knew how a government ought to behave.

For him, the significant group in his journey was “Indian Muslim”, a category of increasing salience in the social and political context of his day, and one that takes on new meaning for him in the course of his travels. He looks for Indian Muslims and in a foreign context takes pride in what is special about them. He rejoices in their piety, describing, for example, their unceasing circumambulations and barefoot journeys to Medina. He remarks on their generosity in endowing hospices, gardens, and mosques. In the Haramayn and en route, he readily takes on the role of civic leader — whether acting as examiner at the Indian-founded Madrasa-yi Saulatiyya in Mecca or meeting the pilgrim protectors in Bombay and Jidda to ascertain their role. At every point he reflects on the way in which government should act to provide order, protection, comfort, and cleanliness. He speaks to the imperial government of their responsibilities and addresses himself as well, in the Hijaz, to the Turks. The plight of the poor Indian Muslim — vulnerable, abused, and cheated — is his overwhelming concern. Two years after publishing his Urdu account, ‘Irfan ‘Ali personally translated and revised his journal in English, adding a table of each occasion when he found the situation amiss — his main goal being to influence the government of India to act responsibly to project their Muslim subjects on hajj.

There is more in his account than this. There are also his deep bonds with his friends, his kindness to his servant, his ready response to a holy and learned man he comes to know in Mecca, his cosmopolitan interest in touring, and his congenial relationships with non-Muslims as well as Muslims. However, his particular political perspective is central, and it is enhanced and made public by the very act of writing. Other writers in this period have a somewhat similar experience in the hajj and its recording, notably the Begum of Bhopal who so internalised the British ideals of an “improving” ruler — committed to cultivating good character and installing drains — that she urged the Turks to withdraw and leave the running of the holy places to her (Sikander Begum 1870: 140–1)!

Some of the accounts are shaped by a specific religious orientation. Muhammad Ma‘shuq ‘Ali (1909), for example, described his

experience as a disciple of the great Sufi, Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi. His hajj followed residence at the hospice of this saint and was part of the training in ritual fidelity and personal formation that was set for him. Other accounts (for example Abu’l-nur Muhammad 1960) argue a sectarian perspective and use the hajj as a platform for asserting its validity. Yet others are essentially scientific — written like government gazetteers to review history, local customs, the educational system, and the organization of the government (for example, Hasanu’d-din 1935). In each case, to present the hajj is to present a certain kind of self.

Many of the accounts in recent decades are explorations of the self in a more specific sense, looking to the great communal ritual as an occasion to test a person’s place in relation to nothing less than Islam itself and to the Muslim umma. Somewhat like the quest for meaning, for authenticity, outside of one’s own culture — such as we know in some forms of modern European or American travel — self-described secularists embark on the hajj to test themselves, to experience faith vicariously, perhaps in some sense to participate in that faith themselves (Cohen 1979). Thus ‘Abdu’llah Malik (late 1970s) explicitly calls himself a tahzibi Muslim — a cultural Muslim — who goes on hajj reluctantly: and sets out looking over his own shoulder as he learns, he says, a new vocabulary. He struggles to find an intellectual equivalence for his Communism and Islam. He finds himself ever more emotionally involved, but thanks to the structure of the travel narrative, in contrast to a more sustained kind of essay writing, he can savour a thought or emotion (“My eyes were moist and I wept — quite apart from what my beliefs were and what they weren’t”), then just move on. Indeed, the formal structure of the travel account, it has been argued, makes it particularly appealing to a certain kind of modern personality which prefers not to resolve but to sample and explore (Bridgeman 1986). Malik calls his account Hadis-i dil, the testimony of the heart and not of the canonical scripture. One characteristic of the self-conscious intellectual, playing off connection and lack of connection, is to find ways to assert his difference from those around him. One sometime secular leftist, for example, whose story I heard orally in 1985, made a point that in contrast to most hajjis who — as they are told over and over is normal — feel fear in Mecca but love in Medina, his experience was the reverse.

Whether as part ofa re-identification with Islamic symbols or not, recent accounts tend to take as their central theme what one writer (Zainab Kakakhail 1976: 6–7), explaining her list of favourite accounts, calls “matters of the heart” and “inner experiences”. The freshness of hajj accounts, she explains, rests not only

in their documenting actual changes to benefit the reader, but in their showing “the singular and unique experiences”, the individual heart and gaze, that refract the beauty of the Ka‘ba — in every case in a distinctive way. For her, given her emphasis on feeling, it is not surprising that she draws her vocabulary for central religious symbols — God, Unity, the Ka‘ba — from Sufism, distinguishing the hajj from other duties which are ethical in purpose and seeing the pilgrimage “alone as a matter of the heart”, “easing the

pain of separation”, its customs those of the world of passionate longing (‘ishq).

Zainab Kakakhail’s account is not alone in using such language. In the past however, the Sufi tradition was expressed by the insertion of couplets into the ongoing prose account. Indeed, to be able to quote aptly the Persian or Persianate Urdu couplets of the Sufi tradition has long been the mark of a refined and educated person in this culture. The recent accounts seem to demonstrate a convergence of what had been two levels of discourse: a prose discourse focused on external events; and a poetic discourse of passion, longing, and separation offered without comment and not claimed as one’s own speech. Now the poetic language is appropriated as one’s own.[48] As the content changes, the rhetoric and forms of the accounts change as well. If we take the accounts from the late eighteenth century on, they clearly become a continuing genre, building on each other, shaping each other. Do they develop in certain directions as possibilities of the form are simply played out?

Howard (1980), in his study of the pre-Chaucerian accounts of the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, shows how certain “built-in” possibilities of the pilgrimage genre — in that case, irony above all — do develop over time. Do the accounts shape their own landscape, so that the traveller sees through lenses honed through literature? Fussell (1980), in the case of British travellers to the continent, has particularly shown how reading creates the experience of travel; Kabbani (1985) has argued the significance of the European discourse of Orientalism, including travel accounts, in precluding a traveller like V.S. Naipaul from even seeing the Muslim countries which he purports to describe. Writers also learn from those who have gone before, at least in part, the form they must give their account, a form that changes over time — for example, from the conventional self-deprecation in Zardar’s account described on p. 93, to the now obligatory trope of denying that one ever intended to write at all.

Much that is in the accounts is, of course, implicit. Some aspects of the world of writers can be elicited by focusing on the audience, explicit or implied, in the accounts. The writers, while telling their stories, pursue conversations whether consciously or not, of which their written words form largely one side. Sometimes they present, in effect, a response to questions they know would be asked, sometimes they assert the kind of person they want to be known to be — in contrast to some alternative kind of person — sometimes they declare by their assessments and emphases a position in ongoing controversies of a religious or political nature. Sometimes they may not even be conscious that they are writing to a range of concerns, expressed in their societies and internalised in their psyches, shaping the experience which they create as they write.

*** Visual representations in the texts

One way to elicit these themes is to look not only at the words but also at the physical presentation of the texts.[49] One need go no further than the title pages, for example, to see the increased tendency to make the author's experience central and to present each account as distinctive. Figure 5.1 juxtaposes two title pages, on the left that of Zardar Khan (1873) published by the great Hindu Kayasth of Lucknow, Nawwal Kishur. Zardar shared with Nawwal Kishur the Persianate culture of the well-born, often, as in Zardar's case, typical of people employed by the government or a prince. Zardar's book was conventionally entitled Safarnama-yi haramain [A Travelogue to the Two Sanctuaries]. Its lack of colour, its floral border, the medallion for the title, and the inscribed panels top and bottom present the immediately familiar cover of innumerable publications of the day. The top panel replicates in words the balance and symmetry of the page, setting out in the elegant calligraphic style, nastaliq, a two-part rhyming invocation, in Persian, that sets the tone of humility common to publications of the day: "With the help of the Maker of the man [makin] and the place [makan] and the aid of the Shaper of the land [zamin] and the age [zaman]". The author's name does not even appear on the cover, but only in the midst of the formulaic phrases of self-described abjection set out on the opening page.

The jacket on the right appeared some hundred years later (Mumtaz Mufti 1975), a three-colour design, with the one-word title, Labaik ("I am here", the call of the hajji in Arabic as he enters Mecca). The background, yellow-green, significantly deepens to dark green, the Islamic colour par excellence, as field for the black Ka'ba centered at the top. The title is written in a swinging free form so that the first letter, lam, points to the shrine and the elongated final kaf encircles it: the calligraphy thus recalls drawings of the plan of the Ka'ba like those in Figure 5.3. The author's name, Mumtaz Mufti, is boldly written in the loop formed by the downward stroke of the same letter; the name is written at an upright angle that identifies it not with Persian but with the Arabic of the Qur'an and the larger Muslim world. The jacket makes the book look like a novel, and indeed the friend who first mentioned this account to me thought that it was just that — a logical assumption given the poetic title and the reputation of the author as a literary figure.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-5.jpg][Figure 5.1 Book covers. (Left) Muhammad Zardar Khan (1873) Safarnama-yi Haramain; (right) Mumtaz Mufti (1975) Labaik.][d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-4.jpg]]

Like a novel, the goal of this account, and many recent ones, is to convey an immediacy of experience. Over and over, the successful accounts written in recent decades are praised for their making the hajj vivid and present before the reader's eye; the reader identifies with the writer and vicariously lives his experience. Readers' letters prefaced to the publication of Muhammad Riza Ansari's account (1965) for example, praise it for being a veritable cinema and avow that the reader feels he has made the hajj himself. The text itself serves as the hajj. Here Labaik, the title, says, "I

am present” and its calligraphy circumambulates the Ka‘ba just as the author’s words will effect the hajj for the person about to read.

Drawings of monuments similarly suggest significant transitions. Early drawings published in the accounts show balance and patterning (reminiscent of Zardar’s title page) and may incorporate miraculous elements presumed visible once or expected to appear in a time to come. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show drawings published in Zardar’s 1873 account. Figure 5.2, left, shows his drawing of the site of the miracle of the splitting of the moon, with the split moon also visible; Figure 5.3 shows the Aqra mosque in Jerusalem as well as the pool of Kausar, the bridge, the balance, and the throne of God, all associated with the Day of Judgement, which is expected to begin in that place. He thus includes both visible and invisible reality. Figure 5.3, left, is a drawing of the Sacred Mosque (1880) depicted in a characteristic medieval style, seen from above with the side walls flattened out (Wazir Husain Khan 1880–1). Drawings like this are very schematic and patterned, almost mandala-like in their focus on the centre. The drawing on the right eschews formality for realism, drawing an accurate ground plan of the mosque without attention to walls, domes, and doors, and distinguishing by slashed lines what did not seem of interest before: the distinction between the old building and new additions (Sultan Da’ud 1963). The early author shows himself as part of a long historic and aesthetic tradition; the modern author gives us accuracy and new information.

The charming drawing in Figure 5.4 records the climactic event of the hajj, “the standing” at ‘Arafat (‘Abdu’r-rahim 1915). The simple line drawing and design recall the block prints of northern Indian textiles, as do the sketches of the ladies, who all wear saris. The repetitive camels, tents, and mounted pilgrims form a strong line across the bottom, the Turkish artillery in their modern military uniforms balance the two sides, and the hills provide the top frame for the central focus — the gathering, preaching, and prayer on the sacred hill. An account written in more recent decades would probably include an aerial photograph, rather than a balanced and patterned drawing of this sort.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-6.jpg][Figure 5.2 Drawings of sacred places and symbols. (Muhammad Zardar Khan (1873) Safarnama-yi Haramain.)]]

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-7.jpg][Figure 5.3 Floor plans of the Ka‘ba. (Left) Wazir Husain Khan (1880) Wakilu’l-ghuraba; (right) Sultan Da‘ud (1963) Safarnama-yi hijaz.]]

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-8.jpg][Figure 5.4 Mount ‘Arafat. (‘Abdu’r-rahim (1915) Safarnama-yi rahimi.)]]

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-9.jpg][Figure 5.5 Photographs of authors. (Left) Ghulamu’l-Husnain (1935) Safarnama; (right) Saba Mustafa (1979) Paharon ke daman men.]]

Finally, Figure 5.5 offers two photographs of authors. Not many authors provide photographs, perhaps fearing to offend the sensibilities of those who find photographs suspect or who might think the author vain. But even from the limited number of photographs available, the contrasts are again suggestive of the increasing tendency to focus on what is individualistic. The photograph on the left shows a venerable figure dressed in ihram (Ghu’lamu’l-husnain 1935); the second, a wonder-struck woman, wife of a Madrasi army officer (Saba Mustafa 1979). Her photograph is meant to communicate the personal emotional quality of the hajj - the theme that her text as a whole is meant to demonstrate. The earlier photograph, in contrast, is as much a generic representation of a hajji as a photograph can possibly be.

*** Conclusion

Travel to Mecca is travel of a very particular kind. To go to Mecca is to go home, to return to one’s ruhani watn.[50] To go to Mecca is to perform an act of unquestioned value. Not only is the goal clear, but the place, in contrast to the destinations of some kinds of travel, is thoroughly known by vast resources of the culture in story and devotional song — now reinforced by techniques of reproduction and communication that make the Holy Places ever present.[51] Moreover, the journey moves on the invisible lines which believers create by every prayer, posture at sleep, and burial in the grave; on the day the hajjis perform the ritual sacrifice, fellow Muslims everywhere perform their sacrifice and all are linked world-wide in celebration of the feast. By undertaking the hajj, the pilgrim in principle affirms his individual responsibility for obedience to God and claims his place among the community of faithful people. However much the pilgrim seeks in his experience and in his writing to explore a unique and self-conscious self — the theme, as suggested, of many of the recent accounts — his undertaking must be in some tension to the normative programme of the hajj, and of all of mainstream Islam, to hone himself to the prophetic model,

the person of the Prophet Muhammad, in whose footsteps on this occasion he can literally walk.

Such a context suggests that we have more than a simple mirroring of European individualism explored in alien settings as we trace changing patterns of self-representation in the hajj accounts. If a person is “finding himself” he is doing so in a crowd, following a ritual programme of dress and behaviour meant precisely to obliterate the markers that make a believer distinct by class, race, or region. The accounts, even if

imitative of European travel writing and made salient by the socio-political change engendered by European technology and domination, are written in the context of interaction with the core tradition of Islam.

All this would be true of any Muslim account. Those from South Asia share their own characteristics — characteristics rooted in the peculiarly plural character of Indian cultures and in the long experience of colonial rule. That rule provided a range of alternative values, so that indigenous cultures became self-conscious and, in Geertz's (1968) phrase, oppositional. At the same time, the very idiom of British rule encouraged religious identities in a plural society. These experiences shape all forms of self-statement by South Asian Muslims, but accounts focused on such central symbols as those represented by the hajj present themes particularly suggestive of the specific issue of how being Muslim has been experienced and conceived. A Muslim identity has not been the only one significant to those we label South Asian Muslims, but it has, assuredly, been an important one. In the accounts we see something of the shifting content of that identity as well as its relation to competing and complementary strands — of occupation, moral formation, spiritual quest, gender, and territoriality. The texts let us hear people speak, telling us, in a wide variety of ways, what kind of people they are and how they think of Islam, the places they go to, and the people they meet.

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[32] For an excellent introduction to these topics, see Lewis (1971). On administrative issues, see Long (1979) and Roff (1975, 1982). On the hajj as ritual see Roff (1985); von Grunebaum (1951); and Partin (1967).

[33] As will be clear in the discussion that follows, by South Asian I limit myself primarily to those written mostly in Urdu, a few in Persian, a handful written in or translated into English.

[34] I currently have in hand, or have made use of, almost 150 accounts. I have found these accounts in London (British Library, India Office Library), Lahore (Dayal Singh Trust Library, Oriental College Library, Punjab Public Library, and Punjab University Library), Islamabad

(Islamic Research Institute [IRI]), and the libraries of the University of California. I am grateful to the staffs of all these libraries and to Dr Muhammad Khalid Masud of the IRI for their generous help. I have also acquired books in shops in Lahore and Delhi as well as an excellent collection of accounts from old book shops in Hyderabad, India, thanks to the skilled help of Dr Gail Minault. Dr Michael Fisher kindly provided an account by a Keralite; Dr Francis Robinson, one by a Farangi Mahali. I have not yet had an opportunity to consult libraries in India where many more accounts are presumably to be found.

[35] This “sharif culture” is evoked for the late nineteenth century in Lelyveld (1979), Chapter 2.

[36] See Pearson (1986, 1987a, 1987b). Pearson suggests that as many as 10,000 pilgrims a year may have undertaken the hajj during the period of Mughal rule. The best-known example of early writing about experiences in the Hijaz is that of Shah Wali’u’llah (1730), the Fuyuz al-haramain, a collection of his visions.

[37] This assumes that those I have identified are in proportion to the total written.

[38] I am grateful to Dr J.P.S. Uberoi for reminding me of this and for presiding over a lively session on my work at the Sociological Research Colloquium, University of Delhi, on 11 December 1987.

[39] The writers are Sheikh I‘tisam al-Din from Bengal and Mirza Abu Talib Khan from Lucknow as noted in Lewis (1982).

[40] Howard (1980), analysing the pilgrimage literature of pre-Chaucerian unknown pilgrims to Jerusalem, argues that the inclusion of the return journey — exemplified by a monks account that touchingly ends with his welcome by the monastery dog — specifically points to an account that focuses on personal experience more than on the externals of the journey.

[41] For excellent material on the whole range of expressions related to the Prophet in the modern period, see Schimmel (1985).

[42] See Brown (1975) for a discussion of eleventh- and twelfth-century AD changes in social structure, as communities became less coherent and intense; in relationships; and in conceptions of the supernatural “as an upward extension of the individual”. Colin Morris (1972) delineates a new focus on inwardness in the twelfth century AD as shown in sermons describing personal experience, lyric poetry, ritual injunctions to confession with a focus on

intention, and more personal portraits. New social roles and a new focus on personal relationships were the context for new interpretations of religious symbols, including a focus on the sufferings of Christ and devotion to him and a new conception of the Virgin. See also Bynum (1982). Other periods have, of course, seen this complex interplay in changes in society, religious symbols, and self, but this period is one that has been particularly well studied.

[43] This is the case for the visit to Touba on the part of the Mourides of Senegal as it is for Demah on the part of Javanese. It is apparently the case also for the shrine of the Merinid sultan Abu Yusuf (AD 1258–86) in Rabat where tradition holds that seven circuits of the passageway around the mihrab gives merit equivalent to the trip to Mecca (Ellingham and McVeigh 1985). The contemporary Zikri sect of the Baluch, studied by Dr Akbar S. Ahmed, identify a local pilgrimage shrine in Makran with similar merit.

[44] Thus the eighteenth-century Punjabi poet Bulhe Shah, celebrating the love of Hir for Ranjha, the type of the soul’s love for God, sang:

The hajji go to Mecca, world by world,

My Ranjhu is Mecca for me.....

The hajji is within

The ghazi is within.....

I have become a fool.

The hajjis go to Mecca.

We must go to Takht-i mir [the birthplace of Ranjha].

This is the road to Mecca.

(Provided by Dr Denys Matringe, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, June 1986)

In his poem, Bulhe Shah recalls themes that go back at least to Junaid (d. AH 298/AD 919) in insisting on an inner component to the external trip.

[45] For the “reformational” quality of Islamic ritual, see Graham (1983).

[46] This was true whether for well-known figures like Byron or a traveller like Mrs Fanny Parks (1850) who travelled in India in the 1820s and 1830s. When Mrs Parks returned to London she concluded her two volumes by hanging up, she wrote, her long staff and stripping the scallop shell from her hat — the medieval emblems of the pilgrim to the shrine of Santiago in Compostella (2: 496).

[47] Naipaul begins his published account of a trip by recalling these opening words of his notebook: “All journeys begin in the same way. All travel is a form of gradual self-extinction.”

[48] In studying European travelogues to Latin America, Roberto Gonzalez-Echevarria (1987) is able to identify what he calls a shifting “hegemonic discourse”, so that travellers in one era, for example, will speak to legalistic concerns and use a legalistic vocabulary, travellers of another period will shape their account by science.

[49] For an analysis of the interplay of these two levels of diction in another context, see Abu-Lughod (1986).

[50] I am grateful to Dr Catherine Asher for pointing this out to me and for ably helping me with her art historian’s eye, to reflect on the visual materials presented here.

[51] This is the phrase used by Gilani Kamran (1978). His is one of the few scholarly works that surveys the Urdu hajj accounts, and I have benefited from it as from the personal helpfulness of Professor Kamran.

[52] Today the climax of the hajj is transmitted by television satellite and watched live throughout the world. Calendars and art of all kinds make the image of the holy shrine the most familiar distant building of many Muslims. Pakistan television, like the television of many countries, transmits special programmes during the hajj season, including a six-part mini-series, which I viewed in 1985, to prepare intending pilgrims for their trip.

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* Part Three: Pilgrims and migrants

** Chapter Six: Patterns of Muslim pilgrimage from Malaysia, 1885–1985

Mary Byrne McDonnell

*** Scale

Over the past hundred years, dramatic change in the scale, conduct, and composition of the Malay hajj has occurred. Over time, these transformations have modified how Malay pilgrims have experienced the hajj. In the 1880s, an average of 2,500 Muslims from the Malay States performed the hajj annually. This number doubled by the 1920s, and, since the mid-1960s, it has risen to 9,130 — an increase of approximately 400 per cent. The most dramatic increase has been since 1970. In 1982, approximately 25,000 pilgrims from Malaysia participated in the hajj.

Significant dips in this general trend can be attributed to major world events, while minor fluctuations have normally been related to internal economic factors.[52]

The growth in the numbers of pilgrims cannot simply be due to population growth. Although it is impossible to determine the percentage of pilgrims within the Malay Muslim population at any given point, the average numbers of pilgrims in relation to the total Muslim population would appear to indicate that the increase in pilgrimage numbers is due to population growth. However, if we examine Malay pilgrims as a percentage of the Muslim population of hajj age (35+ years), it becomes clear that the percentage performing the hajj is increasing at a faster rate than the hajj-age segment of the Muslim population.

With respect to world-wide pilgrimage attendance, trends in Malaysia appear to be representative. In the early 1900s, 80–90,000 pilgrims annually performed the hajj, with more than 800,000 performing the hajj today. Hajj attendance has steadily increased since the 1950s, when it averaged 100,000, and has made major strides following the 1973 oil embargo, which heightened Saudi Arabian prestige. Indeed, an augmented position in the world of nations has enhanced the Saudi position in the eyes of Muslims. It can be argued that this heightened prestige has enabled Muslims to

feel safer and more secure in the Saudi ability to manage the hajj, and has enhanced the perception that there is a single centre. Funds from oil have also allowed pilgrimage to be better managed at the Saudi end, lending reality to the pilgrims' sense that a more powerful country can afford better protection and facilities.

The number of overseas pilgrims has also increased.[53] It rarely reached 100,000 before the Second World War. Today, more than 300,000 overseas pilgrims perform the hajj yearly. Malaysian pilgrims have formed 7.4 per cent of the total of overseas pilgrims. Indonesians have formed 15.2 per cent, and Indians 20 per cent before the creation of Pakistan, and 10 per cent since 1947. Although real numbers of pilgrims from Indonesia and India and their percentages of the overseas pilgrims are greater than Malaysia's, we know that their Muslim populations are also substantially greater. If we examine the above percentages of overseas pilgrims in relation to the respective Muslim populations of Malaysia, Indonesia, and India, we discover that Malaysia has sent twelve times as many pilgrims from its Muslim population as Indonesia, and ten times as many pilgrims as India before 1947. Since then, Malaysia has sent fourteen times as many pilgrims as has India.

*** Conduct

Since the 1880s, the conduct of the hajj from Malaysia has been completely altered. From initial control by British colonial officials with only a peripheral interest in it, the hajj from Malaysia has come to be the sole concern of large numbers of highly-trained Muslim managers in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. Because hajj management was previously tied up with the stability of the British Malayan colonial government, its main concerns were with the health of pilgrims and the possibility of their acquiring ideas subversive to the empire while in the Hijaz. Today pilgrimage is managed as a tool of national economic development and nation-building within Malaysia. From an initially haphazard group of directives, pilgrimage management progressed in the colonial period to a system attached to merchant shipping and police intelligence,[54] a system with little impact once British ships docked in Jidda. Today, however, the regulatory system encompasses every aspect — from the decision to perform the hajj, through the entire journey, to return to the point of origin. The Malaysian government agency, Lembaga Urusan dan Tabong Haji (LUTH) [The Pilgrimage Management and Savings Corporation], regulates when Malaysians go, how they may go, and how much money they may take. It organises such practical matters as registration, visas, passports, transportation, and medical and welfare care (LUTH Annual Reports 1971–82).

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-10.jpg][Figure 6.1 The architects intended the design of the headquarters building for LUTH (the Pilgrims' Management and Savings Corporation), Kuala Lumpur, to suggest that saving for the pilgrimage can also serve to channel funds into local enterprises "lawful of Islam". (Photography courtesy of LUTH, Kuala Lumpur.)]]

Thus, in recent years, the pilgrim's experience in practical terms has been substantially altered. Until the early 1930s, the hajj was a physically unsafe, insecure, unsanitary journey of long duration, in cramped and squalid conditions. By the end of the decade conditions had been upgraded substantially, and the journey was more organised, safer, and easier — especially in those areas amenable to Malayan governmental control such as shipping. However, little could be done to improve medical and sanitation conditions within Saudi Arabia or to mitigate extortions by mutawwifs (shaykhs who act as agents for pilgrims).

Transportation, welfare, and medical facilities have now been vastly improved, and the time and scope of the journey have been greatly reduced. Problems remain but these are relatively minor. The modern pilgrim travels in comfort by air, is supervised by Malay officials throughout the journey, and returned home promptly one month after departure.

In statistical terms, these improvements are mirrored by vast reductions in death and destitution figures. Destitution was never particularly high for Malays, who were long considered an affluent element of the hajj population. In the 1880s, the destitution rate for pilgrims was about 0.85 per cent. Since the Second World War, destitution is claimed to have been completely eradicated through increasingly severe

government measures to restrict pilgrimage to those who are financially able to make the journey without jeopardising their own, or their families', financial security. Death rates have also declined dramatically since statistics first became available in the 1920s. At that time, rates fluctuated widely, peaking at roughly 13 per cent. By the 1950s, highs reached only 8.8 per cent. In the past fifteen years, the highest rate has been 3.7 per cent, and rates more often range between 1.5 per cent and 2 per cent.

Founded in 1969 as a division of the Ministry of National and Rural Development, LUTH has shown marked success in its welfare, financial, and developmental goals. It has particularly mobilised savings in the rural areas. Savings in kind, as opposed to cash, have greatly decreased, and selling land and other items to participate in the hajj has become a thing of the past. In addition, LUTH, through a policy of erecting large and prominent buildings in each district to underscore its solidity and prestige (and that of the hajj), has given visible proof that Muslim Malay needs are being addressed at the national political level. LUTH is thus playing a role in "Islamising" the peasantry and altering their perception of economic change.

*** Composition

An analysis of who participates in the pilgrimage is important for understanding the hajj as an agent of personal social mobility and change within Malay society.

In the past century, the social groups participating in the hajj have varied. In 1900, a typical pilgrim was a wealthy member of the traditional elite,[55] male, and elderly. By the 1920s, newly monied but not financially stable elderly peasants made up the bulk of pilgrims, with the increasing involvement of students and the emerging middle-class intelligentsia and elite. These trends were exaggerated in the next decades as the three groups — the traditional religious and secular elite; petty bureaucrats and their student sons; and elderly pensioners and peasants — became more clearly definable. In addition, women and younger students increasingly made the journey, as did pilgrims from urban centres. Within individual Malay states, rural areas experiencing rapid development appear to have sent the most pilgrims, whereas the poorest areas, least involved in economic and social change, continued to send the fewest pilgrims. There began to be evidence of urban pilgrims. The beginnings of a shift from the predominance of rural pilgrims to that of urban pilgrims reflected the general shift of the middle class from a rural to an urban setting — the son of a penghulu (lesser Malay chief or district level state bureaucrat) or a farmer, for example, who became a teacher or bureaucrat in the capital. In the process, rural middle-class expectations and symbols of legitimacy moved to the cities as well.

After the Second World War, these trends continued, and entire families began to be identified as middle class through the title hajji. As Malay power shifted to an urban setting, the hajj increasingly became urbanised. Indeed, as costs rose,

the hajj became prohibitive for all but those whose participation in the cash economy was already substantial.

Since the 1960s, pilgrims have become equally rural and urban and predominantly middle class, middle aged, and relatively affluent. Most have ancestors who were involved in the hajj, and it is most popular among the new bureaucratic elite. It is a journey undertaken with spare funds and spare time, and, following its completion, there is no return to poverty as in previous years.

Half of the pilgrims today are women. Before the 1920s, there is no reference to women performing the hajj, but in the late 1930s,

the numbers of women began to rise as it became more common for the peasant elite to take their entire families. A few wealthy women, having outlived their husbands, seemed to have performed the hajj on their own. By the mid-1940s, there are far more references to women performing the hajj. Some had undertaken the journey previously, while a number were widows whose husbands had previously gone to Mecca; most were the daughters of hajjis. These women tended to be younger than their male counterparts, and were largely from Kelantan. In the post-war period, as more families undertook the journey, the number of women increased, and it became popular for pregnant women to perform the hajj in the company of their husbands. In 1960, male and female participation drew even. Since then, female participation has markedly increased, exceeding male participation by 5 to 6 per cent. Only in Selangor are there still more male bakal haji (Malay term for an individual preparing to perform hajj).

*** Intellectual change

From the last decades of the nineteenth century until the second decade of the twentieth, the pilgrim spent long months in travel and often years in Arabia. He had a great deal of interaction with the Jawah (members of the Malayo-Polynesian language group resident in Mecca) community, and with teachers from among them and from a variety of Arab countries. He also had time for prayer, study, and induction into Sufism, generally choosing the Naqshbandi tariqa (order or brotherhood).

It is likely that he had been influenced by the Islamic revival then evident in Cairo and Mecca, through direct exposure, friends made on the journey, or literature disseminated from Singapore. Even had he remained for the minimum period in the Hijaz, he would have been exposed to the Islamic revival at work in Arabia — the revolutionary result of pan-Islamic and modernist trends — and to Wahhabi teachings. When combined with exposure to the hundreds of thousands of Muslims gathered together from all over the world and to anti-

imperial propaganda, the Malay pilgrim may well have resolved to engage in further involvement in tariqas,[56] and co-operation with the vernacular-speaking, educated elite once he returned home. In turn, the enhanced status and influence of hajjis within the local community enabled these new ideas to gain wider validity and dissemination at the village level.

By the 1920s, the average stay was about six months and it was becoming more common for pilgrims to reside in Mecca permanently after retirement. Contact with the Jawah was strong,

exposing the pilgrim to much of the political and intellectual turmoil that marked these years. Between 1919 and 1923, the troops of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, extending their hold throughout Arabia, left only Mecca and Jidda to their rivals. Yet even in these settings Wahhabi religious influence was gaining ascendance. A pilgrim would have been keenly aware of the new Wahhabi restrictions on his worship and actions in Medina, and to some extent in Mecca, and of the intensifying violence and extortion associated with venturing outside of Jidda.

From the Malay pilgrim’s contacts with the Jawah community, his Malay-speaking mutawwif, and his mosque teachers, he would have learned of the growing anti-colonial and pan-Islamic movements in other Muslim countries and of Islamic modernist and reformist ideas. He may also have heard something of the increasing discontent of the Muslim peoples under western domination and of western ideas of democracy and self-determination (Roff 1974: 32–90).

In the period 1924 to 1945, both the number of Jawah and their contact with Malay pilgrims increased. Annual Pilgrimage Reports by Malayan colonial officers often noted the large number of pilgrims who yearly choose to remain several seasons or to retire permanently in Mecca. The stable Jawah population hovered between 500 and 600. Intellectual trends in the Hijaz, such as anti-colonialism and Wahhabism, were in general an intensification of those evident in earlier years, heightened by newly-won Saudi control of the Hijaz and by Wahhabi dominance.

Pilgrims had different levels of involvement with their surroundings during the hajj. The casual pilgrim would have had far less involvement in the issues of the day than an intellectual or a member of the traditional elite, interested in mixing with the leadership of Saudi society. Someone such as Hajji Abdul Karim,[57] the leader of Kampong Jawa, a village near Klang in the Malay State of Selangor, who remained to study in Mecca for several years, would have become far more involved with these intellectual trends than those remaining for only six months.

Since the end of the Second World War, the length of the hajj journey has shortened. Time and contact have been gradually reduced, so that the pilgrimage is now a controlled, four-week, packaged journey. The Jawah have decreased and cannot be augmented by new arrivals due to modern Saudi immigration restrictions. At the same time, there has been an expanded predisposition among Malay pilgrims to absorb the symbols, feelings, and ideas prevalent in Arabia. Pilgrims have been previously exposed to the beliefs held by the centre through the media and are

re-exposed through such vehicles as the annual pilgrimage address given by the reigning Saudi king and through identification with the larger Muslim community of which they are keenly aware, even if involvement can be only superficial. In the pre-independence period, Malay nationalism was especially important and had certain affinities with Arab nationalism. Today, in Saudi Arabia, the pilgrim is confronted by a powerful Muslim state — conservative, moderate, modern, and opposed to radical tendencies within Islam. Although the bakal haji does not study in Saudi Arabia, he studies before the hajj and already understands a great deal about the centre of the Muslim world through the media. What is transferred now is a predisposition to be a good Muslim by emulating Saudi Arabian orthopraxy and Saudi Arabian political moderation.

*** External change

Before the late 1930s, the length of the journey, the advanced age of the pilgrims, and the extreme physical deprivations and hardships encountered allowed the returned pilgrim to bear little resemblance to the man who had departed. He was physically and financially exhausted and often returned home to a life spent in dependence on family and neighbours — if he returned home at all. This pilgrim had saved all his life for this journey and often accomplished it by selling his land or his home. In expectation of death, or at least of a lengthy absence followed by change significant enough to preclude return to his former life, the pilgrim paid his debts, settled old scores, and put his worldly affairs in order. Pilgrimage was often undertaken at particular life junctures — after finishing school, before marriage, upon retirement, or with the approach of death. Before departure, he consulted a bomoh (traditional Malay medical practitioner or curer) to determine an auspicious day and time for departure, gave a khenduri (communal meal) to bid goodbye to his friends and to pray for a safe journey, and, relatively confident that these would keep him from harm, did not look back as he left his home. A large crowd accompanied him to the wharf.

The returning pilgrim was severely changed. He was likely to be dressed in new Arab garments, and his physical appearance altered by the privations of his lengthy absence. He would have been addressed with the prestigious and respectful title of hajji or even shaykh (if he had purchased a license to recruit pilgrims). As the new hajjis — who had formed powerful bonds through shared experience under

strained circumstances — made their farewells to one another, they would have addressed each other by their new

Arab names, giving the waiting crowd of relatives further reason to wonder whether these were in fact the same people seen off a year earlier. Back in the village, the pilgrim would have been welcomed home by a khenduri and honours. If he had sold his land to finance the journey, he would now have to live on charity or become an itinerant religious wise man, communally supported by virtue of his new status.

In succeeding years, the Saudi Arabian and Malayan governments have worked to reduce the time spent on the hajj, to improve its conditions, to circumscribe movement within Saudi Arabia and contact with non-Malays, and to lessen the financial hardships associated with the journey. Today, the pilgrim leaves his old life only briefly and returns physically and financially unchanged. The physical changes engendered earlier as outward symbols of internal change no longer exist. He saves through LUTH and rarely sells anything to make the journey. He has also received no new concrete knowledge and has little chance to absorb alien experiences or enjoy prolonged contact with Muslims from different backgounds. He is isolated among Malays and significantly buffered from the alien environment.

None the less, his preparations today are more elaborate. He attends pre-hajj classes, and performs extra prayers and fasts. Registration procedures force him to begin thinking about and planning for the journey a year in advance. New and elaborate travel wardrobes are sewn. As departure nears, a khenduri is arranged at which friends and relatives often give monetary gifts, and weeks are spent visiting friends in neighbouring towns. While preparations are lengthy and elaborate, they no longer include putting one’s worldly affairs in order in anticipation of death. Rituals associated with long and unsafe journeys are rarely performed and consultations with a bomoh are less usual for the average pilgrim. However, the mystical associations with Mecca is still evident, even among well-educated, modern, urban-dwellers.[58]

As in the past, a large crowd gathers to see the pilgrim off. On his return, a brief four weeks later, he wears Arab clothing, may have a beard, and often bears a new Arab name. Hajji is today an official form of address and is inevitably adopted as part of the individual’s formal name. A woman’s head is usually covered once she has become a hajja. Although returned pilgrims may later revert to Malay dress, a small beard for men and a head covering for women may be retained. These remain as external signs, although physical, financial, and intellectual changes have greatly lessened in recent times. In a society where it is increasingly important, politically and psychologically, to be identified as a good Muslim, these outward symbols of having been on the hajj and achieved religious status are increasingly desirable. The pilgrim is seen as the dispenser of berkat (blessings) and is feted and visited for several

weeks on return. Although many more persons in a locale have performed the hajj than was previously the case, hajjis still receive great respect, even though outward manifestations of this often depend on the individual pilgrim’s socio-economic status.

*** Internal change

Perhaps the most elusive aspect of this transformation is inner, personal change, which was assumed by others to result from the journey and entailed more than the respect or admiration attributable to association with an elite activity. That it was assumed an individual became internally holy and religious and somehow a better person is clear from his elevation within society, not just as a more worldly person who had travelled beyond the village confines, but as a wise and holy person, sanctified by his experience, and therefore possessed of both the duty and the power to influence the thinking and deeds of other villagers.

Of the period before 1920 we have little indication of how the individual felt as a result of his experience, and no sense of his expectations. There were intimations that a person may have undertaken the hajj in thanksgiving, especially following an illness. Hajj was also associated with atonement, a linkage strong enough to have been transformed into legal precedent and accepted by British courts. To sentence a criminal to perform the hajj was seen to serve the same rehabilitary purposes as a prison term.[59] Moreover, we are told by observers such as Hurgronje (1931) that pilgrims are emotionally affected by such sights as the Masjid al-Haram. Written accounts of the hajj presented the experience in terms of an outward experience and of kerajaan (symbolic nationhood or kingdom), not in terms of personal, inner change. However, unanalysed emotionalism was recorded, as was association with magic and berkat.

By the mid-1920s, there began to be evidence of the internal transformations associated with the hajj that the individual had undergone — partly because this was the first period to produce detailed, first-hand accounts of the pilgrimage process. We learn that the hajj was associated with both real and symbolic death, and real and symbolic rebirth. Hj. Abdul Majid bin Zainuddin, the first Malay Pilgrimage Officer (MPO) who served from 1924 to 1939, attested to the auspiciousness of death in the Holy Land while in a state free from sin as a result of the pilgrimage rituals (see Abdul Majid 1926).

The pilgrim prepared himself as if he expected to die, and performed rituals marking important junctures in the Malay life cycle. His journey cleansed him of the sins of his old life and prepared him for a reformed life — accounting perhaps for his acceptance as wise and holy upon his return.

By the late 1930s, and increasingly following the Second World War, pilgrims seem to have become concerned with the prestige they would gain from the journey. Harun Aminurrashid, a prominent nationalist and teacher at the Sultan Idris College, in his hajj account (Matheson and Milner 1985: 25–6), is clearly concerned “for the status gained within Malay society by undertaking [the] hajj”, and with the title “Hajji” or “al-Haj”. Hajj is seen as a symbol of “Muslimness” and “Malayness”, which were becoming increasingly inseparable, but he also describes it as an interior experience. Internal expectations of change appear to be associated with social mobility, cultural and political identity, prestige, and a sense of belonging.

The analysis of data from a survey, combined with in-depth interviews that I conducted between 1981 and 1984, has allowed internal expectations and transformations to be better apprehended for a wider range of pilgrims.[60] The hajj seems no longer to represent simply an external juncture in a pilgrim’s life. It is not undertaken at any particular time relative to the human life cycle. However, it appears increasingly to be related to an internal spiritual juncture that occurs at a point when a variety of social, political, and personal pressures make the individual susceptible to government encouragement of a journey that would reaffirm cultural identity. Interviews indicate that people have very definite expectations with respect to internal and external changes in their lives as a result of undertaking the hajj. In general, they expect to be closer to Allah, to be more knowledgeable about Islam, to be a better person, and to be honoured within their community upon their return. They feel the journey will free them from vices and negative emotions (impatience, jealousy, hatred), help them to be less materialistic and pray better, and enable them to give a better example to the community. The status that will accrue to them is also important, as evidenced by the high interest that they show in the outward symbols of their inwardly-altered condition, such as: the title “Hajji”; Arab clothing; facial hair; and change of name. In essence, hajjis expect to be perceived by others as better Muslims, to behave as such, and, in fact, to be better Muslims.

Pilgrims also discuss an intense feeling of belonging to a community of Muslims. The communal bond developed during the journey is still strong, although perhaps it is now perceived more in relation to the Malay community. Because the hajj is performed within an almost wholly Malay context, shepherded and buffered by Malay officials, it is seen as a shared national experience as well as a religious one.

*** Personal change: motivation, mobility, and Muslim self-identity

The fact that, in some basic sense, individuals conceive of the notion to perform the hajj because they are enjoined to do so by Qur’anic prescription (22: 91) does not explain why some individuals choose to do so and some do not (see Eickelman and Piscatori, Chapter 1 of this volume). It does not explain why even those not enjoined to perform the hajj (individuals who are financially or physically unable to endure the journey) often feel compelled to embark, or why pilgrimage to Mecca is particularly

popular among the groups described during certain historical periods. It offers few clues as to why individuals choose to perform the hajj at a particular time in their lives. Motivational patterns are involved with both “ability” and “desire”, and increasingly with government manipulation of these factors.

In the decision to perform the hajj, ability must coincide with desire. In the nineteenth century, this desire was fostered by contact with Singapore — the archipelago’s focal point for Islamic intellectual activity and information disseminated from the Middle East — by a growing cultural insecurity in response to increased alien immigration; by the general expansion of colonial domination over Malay life; and by the possibility of upward mobility upon return from the hajj. Desire, economic ability, and increased opportunity would generally have been present in a man who already enjoyed some status in the community and wished now to add religious status to his financial, educational, or political status in order to legitimise it. In effect, the hajj made those already respected and part of the power structure respected in a new way.

As vernacular education increased, Islamic modernism gained a wider audience, including a dissatisfied new elite, which, though having emerged from the upper levels of the peasantry, and newly monied, was unable to put its new skills to work in jobs commensurate with its new status. In these circumstances, the hajj acted as both a step in the search for increased social mobility and a form of rebellion in response to the cultural threat posed by foreign domination and alien immigration. Indeed, the importance of Islam and of the hajj as a symbol of “Muslimness” was growing as a sign of Malay power and Malay cultural identity.

For the traditional elite, the hajj continued to reaffirm traditional

status in the early decades of the twentieth century. For the peasant who undertook the hajj, his status was increased in a rural setting. His short-term economic position may have suffered, however, as he generally sold his land before the journey and returned penniless. For the new intellectuals, whose desire to undertake the hajj and to increase their status was affected by expanded educational opportunities provided by the colonial government without matching opportunity, and by an increasing threat to an intensified Malay-Muslim identity, the hajj was coming to symbolise and affirm middle-class status.

By the mid-1920s, students returned to a new range of jobs as a result of skills acquired abroad and of their newfound aura of Muslim orthodoxy. Many who went to the Middle East for education joined, upon their return, Islamic reformist or modernist groups (Roff 1974: 56–90). They became part of Malaya’s Middle-Eastern-educated intelligentsia, for whom the search for identity was involved with pressures associated with Malay nationalism. Those who, through education and jobs, were already part of the emerging middle class were

legitimised by the hajj experience within an expanding setting as the scope of Malay power broadened. For the first time, elderly pensioners and peasants were able to perform the hajj en masse, the former owing partly to governmental subsidy. These grants were not numerous and were provided on a case-by-case basis to individuals deemed “deserving” via a screening process. Criteria changed over the life of the system, which began in 1921 and seems to have continued through the 1950s. It was initially a state, rather than a national, system and was generally confined to employees of the individual state and, later, of the national government. Beneficiaries of this system, and of the general economic prosperity of the period, returned to an enhanced status within village life, and participated in the formation of a Malay economic middle class.

The post-war, pre-independence years saw a wider scope for personal mobility after performance of the hajj. This was due to the wider involvement of Malays in government, growing nationalist aspirations, and the expansion of both the secular and religious bureaucracies in response to the need for Malays to widen their role within “the Contract” — the multi-party, multi-racial agreement that led to Malaysia’s independence from Britain in 1957. Evolution towards independence increased the power and prestige associated with religion and the role of Islam in society, and of hajjis in particular, as Malay participation in government intensified. The association of wealth and the prestige connected with religion began to take on new importance as a way not only of becoming middle class, but as a means of validating that achievement. It became possible to achieve upper-class status through political and economic power rather than birthright, if that power was validated by its linkage with sources of traditional prestige — religion and the Islamic centre — and thus seemed moral. Pilgrimage legitimised wealth and, while they had been associated for centuries elsewhere (see El Moudden, Chapter 4 of this volume), religion, commerce, industry, and politics now seemed to go hand in hand in Malaysia as well.

Since the 1960s, the hajj has continued to provide traditional rural social mobility. In addition, it provides access to power for the bureaucratic middle-class elite, especially for those whose economic and educational prestige is already intact. While government workers are by no means the majority of bakal haji, pilgrims are well and increasingly represented in the top echelons of the civil service. In the 1980s, not only is it popular for top echelon bureaucrats in government and public corporations to perform the hajj, but it is increasingly popular for their immediate juniors — having seen the Director-General or Minister, on his return from Mecca, placing “Hajji” or “al-Haj” on his office-door nameplate — to perform the hajj themselves. The hajj performance by top government officials during political crises at home is also becoming increasingly common.

While it is difficult to tell whether individuals perform the hajj to achieve power or whether people rise to power who have gone on the hajj, or who are of the type to have the predisposition to go, it is evident that the hajj has become a part of the national power configuration. In recent years, the ruling Malay party, the United Malay Nationalist Organisation (UMNO) has accepted that the hajj, as a symbol

of orthopraxy, must be encouraged if it, and the government, are to succeed within the Malay community. The hajj is particularly encouraged in order to stem dakwah-type fundamentalism, and in begrudging recognition of the powerful pressures and forces at work in modern Malaysian society that have allowed the dakwah movement to prosper (Nagata 1984). As the secular elite that inherited independence a quarter of a century ago is being transformed to meet these new political and personal challenges, seeming to be a better Muslim has become synonymous with being a better Malay and citizen. “Muslimness” and “Malayness” have become intimately connected now, whereas, in the 1880s, Islam was but one element in a traditional Malay prestige system.

Given that the hajj has become fashionable among the secular, urban, middle class — who are coming to see Islam, prestige, and

upward mobility as going hand in hand — we see that an individual can view himself as a member of several groups at once. He can be Malay, Muslim, and a PhD. He can perhaps remain attached to certain concepts associated with his animist past while being a competent, well-educated lawyer or politician. These simultaneous identities may not exist in any hierarchy. Rather, ideas, decisions, and reactions may depend on which identity is predominantly operative in a given situation. The identities appear, moreover, to co-exist without being perceived by the individual as contradictory.

*** Social change: becoming “more” Muslim

In the late nineteenth century, growing numbers of more orthopraxic Muslims, exposed to modernist ideas, and the increasing influence of these prestigious persons over community life, planted the seeds of later political, economic, and religious changes. The vehicles for dissemination of these currents of intellectual change were: the intellectual life of Cairo initially (and of Mecca after 1882); the Jawah community; the pilgrims, students, teachers, and tariqa shaykhs; and the Islamic community of Singapore. The growing desire to perform the hajj led to economic change through the greater involvement of peasants in the colonial cash economy in order to acquire the ready cash for a journey bound up with prestige and upward social mobility.

By the early decades of the twentieth century, the transformation within the traditional elite from a secular to an increasingly Islamic orientation — which was just beginning in the pre-1910 period — continued to be evident. A certain politicisation of this newly orthopraxic elite emerged as secular power was usurped by the colonial government, and, in this context, the hajj became involved in the growth of Malay nationalism. In economic terms, the hajj was involved in the evolution — just discernible in this period — of both a Malay-Muslim middle class and its intellectual leadership. The former rose from the

ranks of the newly cash-conscious peasantry, and the latter from among the newly educated young members of the traditional upper strata of peasant society.

Between the late 1920s and the Second World War, the hajj was involved with legitimising the traditional elite, creating a new economic middle class from among the peasantry, and legitimising the growing and discontented elite of this emerging Malay-Muslim middle class. The hajj also altered the fabric of Malay society by raising its orthopraxic component as increased proportions of the Muslim population performed it in the Wahhabi and reformist atmosphere of this decade. In this climate, the hajj began to create a more uniform Islamic dimension to Malay identity.

As nationalism matured, roughly in the period between the 1920s and independence in 1957, there appeared to be a strong relationship between time spent at the Muslim centre and social and political discontent upon return. Currently, contact with the centre seems to lead, on return, to dissatisfaction with one’s own personal, interior, spiritual life, but not with the larger social and political world. This may be because the Malaysian government encourages interaction with the centre and is perceived (largely through LUTH) as having concern for the well-being and needs of Muslims. Moreover, because the centre is non-revivalist, the centre and the periphery espouse a similar view of Islam at present. The dakwah revivalist movement is thus not viewed by the average Malay hajji as being representative of the view at the centre and deserving of emulation. The political and social discontent manifested in the dakwah movement clearly does not appear to be related to contact with the Hijaz.

The journey to the centre is creating increasing numbers of orthopraxic individuals who are concerned with being better Muslims within the context of a common interpretation of Islam currently acceptable to the guardians of the centre — i.e. the Saudi royal family — and the federal government of Malaysia. A “more” Muslim society is evolving, a society determined to perceive itself as increasingly Muslim and to behave in what is commonly identified as a “good” Muslim manner. In the process, however, this society has become more susceptible to manipulation and control through a commonly approved Islamic idiom.

[53] This chapter is about patterns. The sources from which the patterns have been deduced vary over the hundred year period covered by the inquiry. Materials were collected and analysed over a three-year period using a variety of methodologies including archival research in London and Kuala Lumpur, in-depth interviews in two carefully chosen villages in the Malaysian states of Kelantan and Selangor and survey research. Written sources included both primary and secondary materials such as British and Malaysian government records and files, published memoirs and texts, and unpublished theses and papers.

For the earliest periods discussed, information about pilgrims and pilgrimage can be found primarily in published memoirs and eyewitness accounts, in the records of the British Foreign and Colonial Offices, especially CO273 (1869–1912), FO685 (1859–1887), FO368 (1909–1918), and in the reports of British Consuls stationed at Jidda.

By the late 1920s, indigenous Malayan sources become richer and much information can be found in the reports of the Malayan Pilgrimage Officer; the annual administrative reports for the Federated and Unfederated Malay States (FMS and UFMS); federal and state establishment lists; the ordinances and legal codes of the straits settlements, the FMS, the UFMS, and the individual Malay States; the federal and state census reports; and the state and district level records of Kelantan and Selangor. FO686 (1917–1925), FO905 (1934–1947), FO371 (1906–1950), and CO727 (1922–1923) remain helpful. Written sources for the past twenty years come mostly from the files and records of the Malaysian pilgrimage regulatory organisation, Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji, from articles in the indigenous press and from the annual reports of officials involved with regulating pilgrimage. Personal interviews (1981–4) and a survey conducted in 1981 (see note 9) account for much of the descriptive material in the most recent period and provide the basis for analysis, particularly concerning questions of pilgrimage composition and of personal and social change.

[54] The term “overseas pilgrims” is commonly used to define pilgrims not from the Islamic “heartlands”. It may sometimes have meant pilgrims arriving at Jidda by sea. The term is used throughout the relevant historical literature. In 1981, the figure for overseas pilgrims was 322,621 according to LUTH statistics.

[55] In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European interest in the conduct of the hajj centred on health concerns. In the decade between 1910 and 1923, some colonial officials viewed sanitation problems in the Hijaz and on shipboard as the main reason for regulating the Muslim pilgrimage. Others were concerned that anti-colonial, nationalist stirrings in the Middle East would be transmitted to the colonies. This tendency to equate pilgrims with anti-colonial subversion was less strong in Malaya than in Indonesia or India. Nevertheless, the first Malay Pilgrimage Officer, assigned in 1924, was under the direction of the Political Intelligence Bureau of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Police Department of the Federated Malay States. Ten duties were outlined for him — with intelligence gathering while in the Hijaz being far down on the list. His appointment called attention to the relationship between the hajj, Islamic orthodoxy, and political discontent.

[56] The term “traditional elite” refers to those who governed Malay society prior to and (under supervision) during the colonial era. Sometimes, although not necessarily, members of this group were involved in the diverse federal bureaucratic structures. The term is still common today. It includes members of the various royal families, their staffs, and retainers, kathis, penghulus, and magistrates. It also includes individuals who have received various royal titles such as “Dato” and “Tan Sri”.

[57] There is strong evidence that tariqa induction was especially popular for pilgrims from the Malay archipelago. A nineteenth-century observer provides lengthy discussion of this and of the complex interconnections between tariqa shaykhs in Mecca, their representatives in the East Indies, Jawah members of the brotherhoods and pilgrims in both Mecca and after their return home (see Hurgronje 1931: 215–92). The emotional bonds established during the pilgrimage journey fostered a feeling of oneness with Islam and of identification with the greater Muslim world. Tariqa induction and participation upon return home provided a means of continued communion with the Muslim centre. In addition it appealed to Malay Muslims whose personal Islam found roots in a syncretic past. There is also much evidence that tariqas played an important role in the development of the Kaum Muda Islamic reformist movement, which in turn played an important role in the early development of Malay nationalism (Roff 1974: 56–60).

[58] Ketua Kampong (village headman), Hajji Abdul Karim bin Hajj M. Noor of Kampong Jawa, Selangor, performed hajj in 1927 and remained to study. While residing at Kampong Jawa, in the home of one of his daughters, I interviewed Hajji Karim on this topic on numerous occasions between August and December 1981.

[59] Evidence of this is generally anecdotal. It is important to understand that modern, sophisticated, educated Malaysians continue to recognise a variety of spiritual and mystical occurrences. Illustrative examples are common in daily life. As noted in note 5, Islam in Malaysia is tied up with both indigenous and Sufi mysticism, the latter often carried directly from Mecca via the hajj. Despite LUTH efforts to eradicate the practice and to divorce the Malay interpretation of Islam from “pre-Islamic, animist” beliefs, both peasants and university lecturers occasionally consult bomohs before departure on the hajj. Previously, consultation with a bomoh was considered normal and acceptable. It is now officially frowned upon and occurs less frequently. Stories of individuals undergoing mystical transformations which produce tangible economic consequences following the hajj are not uncommon. In addition, there is a strong association between Mecca, the hajj as the reference point for entrance into the world of Mecca, and the importation into Malaysia of toyols, a type of spirit believed to come to Malaysia via the hajj. This spirit is thought to produce economic prosperity for its owner. Belief in this spirit is as strong among educated urban dwellers as among villagers.

[60] By the second decade of the twentieth century, requests to proceed to Mecca, in lieu of serving a jail term, were so numerous that they began to be refused on the grounds that too many criminals were avoiding prison punishment, preferring the journey to Mecca to atone for their social transgressions: K473/14; BAK “M” 64/19. BAK refers to the files of the British Advisor to Kelantan which are available at the Arkib Negara, Kuala Lumpur. There are also numerous examples of this association in current daily life. Political figures released from prison will head for Mecca to become reborn in the eyes of their constituencies. The same is

true of individuals who somehow fall from political grace. Some people may perform hajj or ‘umra following an accident or illness or other misfortune. For example, former Foreign Minister Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie undertook the journey following the January 1982 crash of his private plane in which he was the sole survivor. The crash took place amidst rumours of improper behaviour which threatened to ruin the minister’s political career. Public opinion considered his journey to Mecca as an appropriate element in his political rehabilitation and, despite the controversy surrounding the crash, he was renamed to his cabinet position following the April 1982 elections.

[61] The survey was conducted at the Kelantan and Selangor airports as pilgrims departed for the 1981 hajj. My hope was to obtain information on pilgrims’ socio-economic backgrounds, feelings, expectations, fears and desires with respect to the pilgrimage experience. The information was intended to supplement archival and in-depth interview data. Statistically appropriate quantities were chosen, given the numbers of 1981 pilgrims registered for the hajj from these states. The total sample contained approximately 1,400 pilgrims. Kelantan and Selangor were chosen as opposite ends of the rural-urban scale, and as extreme representations of divergent colonial experiences within British Malaya. In addition, Kelantan has historically sent large numbers of pilgrims and has been the centre of Partai Islam politics in Malaysia and of the dakwah Islamic revival in recent decades.

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** Chapter Seven: The hijra from Russia and the Balkans: the process of self-definition in the late Ottoman state

Kemal H. Karpat

*** Introduction

This chapter deals with the identity change among those Muslims living in an area that corresponds more or less to the Ottoman territories in the Balkans, Caucasus, Anatolia,

northern Iraq, and Syria. In these regions, the most significant change in social identity in the last decades of the Ottoman empire was defined by the migration, self-defined as hijra, which originated in European areas of the empire and had as its destination the Ottoman provinces of Asia. This migration may be regarded as a continuous process that extended over a period of roughly sixty-five years from approximately 1850 to 1914. Intensive mass movements of the European Muslim population occurred in the period 1862–5 and again in 1878 in the face of coercive measures by Russia and Bulgaria. Both before and after these periods of mass exodus, smaller groups moved steadily from Slavic lands towards Anatolia.

The “Muslim” identity of these populations consisted outwardly of certain objective symbols and acts such as names and rituals, through which an individual related himself to a group or community that called itself Muslim. The actual active practice of the faith did not appear to be necessary for one to consider himself Muslim, nor was it a precondition for his acceptance by his Muslim group. For the average Muslims in the groups I have studied, the besmele (Arabic, bismallah, ritual invocation of God’s name) and kelime-i shehadet (Arabic, shahada, profession of the faith), if seemingly sincere and expressing serious commitment to the faith, were considered sufficient proof of one’s identity as a Muslim. (Of course, fasting during Ramadan and the observance of other Muslim rites were additional proofs.)

It will be my contention, first, that at the place of origin the migrants tended to identify themselves with Islam in terms of social behaviour and ritual rather than in terms of a political system;

second, that the process of migration transformed this relatively passive communal Muslim identity into a more dynamic political consciousness by enlarging its geographic and ideological scope; and, third, that the process of migration not only changed the original communal Muslim identity of the migrants but also helped to politicise the identity of Muslims in the areas to which they went.

*** The historical migrations: a brief sketch

Migrations into the Ottoman state began at the time of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 1783. Muslims began to leave their ancestral homes largely because they desired to live under the authority of a Muslim ruler rather than under the Russian Orthodox Czar, but there were compelling economic reasons as well. As the Russian presence in Crimea increased, Muslim peasants became the tenants of new Russian landlords, who tried to maximise their income by bearing hard on the cultivators. The peasants and, eventually, the Muslim aristocrats, who had served in the Czar’s administration until their places were taken by Russians, found salvation in emigration. Emigration intensified after the wars of 1806–12 and

1829, especially after the Crimean war of 1853–6, since the Muslims had supported the Ottoman and allied armies in the hope of regaining their old autonomy and independence. After 1812, the Russian authorities, caught in the political-religious fervour of orthodoxy, increasingly sought to rid themselves of the Muslim population by encouraging or forcing emigration (Karpat 1984–5). The last gasp of this policy came as late as 1944, when the entire Muslim population of Crimea, including Communists and partisans who fought the Germans in 1941–3, were forcibly uprooted and sent to central Asia.

A major wave of emigration from the Caucasus — which reached its peak after 1862 — began after the anti-Russian resistance of the Muridists led by Shaykh Shamil was finally crushed in 1859. This Caucasian migration, which continued well into the twentieth century, is sometimes referred to as the Cherkes, or Circassian, migration, but it actually involved a great variety of groups that were ethnically and linguistically unrelated to each other.

The last large wave of migrants came from the Balkans after the Turco-Russian war of 1877–8 and the Balkan war of 1912–13. The Muslim population of the Balkans, which was a majority in many areas, was parcelled among various new non-Muslim nation-states in the area as these were broken off from the empire, and in each case the Muslims were immediately encouraged or forced to emigrate. Serbia had begun expelling the Muslims after it acquired

a degree of autonomy in 1815; Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania followed in 1878, 1892, and 1913 respectively.

Albania declared its independence in 1912 in order to avoid being incorporated into Serbia, which had already seized most of Macedonia and its huge Muslim population, consisting of Albanians in Kosovo and Turks in Uskup (Skopje).

The total number of people immigrating into the Ottoman Empire between 1860 and 1914 was approximately five to seven million. The Ottoman statistics indicate that the total population of the country rose by about 40 per cent in the period 1860–78 and by about 10 per cent to almost the end of the century. As the Ottoman birth rate during this period was barely 1.2 per cent, the conclusion that the growth of population was due chiefly to immigration is inescapable (Karpat 1985).

Behind these migrations, in addition to the political-historical causes already cited, lay another reason: the practice of hijra itself. As Masud shows in Chapter 2 of this volume, the concept of hijra has exercised a profound influence on Muslim thought and practice over the centuries. It is thus not surprising that it became an intrinsic part of the Ottoman intellectual heritage. But the special position of the Ottoman sultan as the caliph of all the Muslims — the idea of a universal caliphate was politically revived in the

nineteenth century — and the insertion of a clause in various treaties signed with Russia and the Hapsburgs, allowing Muslims in those territories to declare allegiance to the caliph in their Friday prayers, greatly enhanced the position of the Ottoman Empire as a centre and a haven open to all Muslims. This principle was given new meaning in the late 1880s, when the sultan was persuaded to declare the empire open to all Muslims who wanted to migrate and settle there. In sum, the Muslims living on the periphery of the empire, who were faced by threats to their cultural existence and material welfare, sought salvation by moving closer to the centre — whose attraction and importance had risen in proportion to the weakness of the periphery.

It should be noted, however, that more than one centre was envisaged. Although Muslims of Russia and the Balkans preferred Ottoman lands for historical, political, and religious reasons, the empire was not always the final destination for all Muslims. The religious elites — notably from central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus — brought the hijra to its natural conclusion by migrating to, and settling in, Mecca and Medina where many of their descendants, although “Arabised”, survive as a distinct group today. It is essential to point out, however, that for the Muslims of central Asia the hajj was considered somewhat incomplete without

a stop, sometimes for years, in Istanbul. The multi-sided cultural and political significance of this “second-tier hajj” deserves a full study.

*** The migrants

The migrants were extraordinarily diverse in social, ethno-linguistic, and historical background. The Crimeans spoke their own Turkic (Tatar) dialect, as did two or three of the groups from the Caucasus, and this dialect was divided into several sub-dialects. The Caucasian groups — the Cherkes, Chechen, Abkhazians, and Georgians, among others — who were not racially or linguistically related to Turks, spoke a variety of languages. The bulk of the immigrants from the Balkans were ethnic Turks and spoke the Rumilian dialect, but among the Balkan migrants there were also large groups of Slavic-speaking Bosnians, Herzegovinians, Montenegrins, and Pomaks. Many Cretan Muslims spoke Greek, and the Albanians their own tongue.

Most of them, however, shared two characteristics. The first was a tribal background. In their place of origin the Caucasian migrants had lived under the authority of tribal chiefs and feudal lords. Only in Daghestan had the fundamentalist, egalitarian, anti-Russian movement of Gazi Molla and Shaykh Shamil, known as Muridism, created a degree of unity and a sense of Muslim identity that superseded tribal loyalties and identities. This was possible because of the struggle against the common enemy, the Russians. The same sort of tribal affiliation prevailed also in most of the rural areas of Crimea, although here the Khanate had fostered a degree of political awareness and Islam had been accepted much earlier than in the

Caucasus, so that the various groups felt a high degree of religious and, to a lesser extent, political identification. Moreover, the Crimeans included a highly developed merchant group linked to the old aristocracy and inhabiting the coastal areas; with them tribal affiliations were weak, while among the peasants in the interior, tribal loyalties were strong. The Slavic-speaking Bosnians in the rural areas were under the authority of their own feudal lords, who had bitterly fought the Ottoman centralisation policy in the 1840s in order to preserve their autonomy. Many of these feudal lords had, at the time the province was conquered in 1463, accepted Islam as the new faith; it supposedly was close to their native faith of Bogomilism, a mixture of Christianity, paganism, and Manicheism. In doing so, they hoped to preserve their land holdings and ethnic identity. The Albanians and Montenegrins had preserved their old tribal mores,

although these were considerably weakened over the centuries under the joint impact of Islam and Ottoman political culture.

The groups that had developed a degree of political-ethnic consciousness prior to their conversion to Islam tended to maintain it after conversion. This was notably true in the case of the Muslim Slavs, especially the Bosnians, who had their own kingdom prior to its conquest by Mehmet II in 1463. The Albanians, the oldest people in the region, who had lived under various rulers and feudal lords, also maintained a degree of ethnic consciousness. The sense of ethnic identity of the non-Turkic groups in the Balkans was expressed, prior to migration, in a negative manner: they insisted that they were Muslims but not Osmanlis (Turks), but this sense of separateness appeared not to have had any political significance. It is essential to stress the fact that, except for the Crimeans, none of these groups identified itself with a Muslim political state of its own prior to migration. Among the Crimeans, the memory of independent statehood had become blurred during Ottoman rule, despite the fact that their aristocracy and the ruling dynasty preserved a sense of historical continuity. Thus, it may be stated that before their migration into the heartlands of the Ottoman state, most of these Muslims identified themselves with their tribe and ethnic groups, while Islam provided principally a norm for social behaviour and secondarily an identity source.

The situation in sections of the Caucasus was different, however. There, Islam was the most important source of identity change prior to migration — mainly due to particular socio-economic and political forces at work. Initially, the highly diversified tribal society of the north-east, known as Daghistan desired to preserve its traditional social organisation, which ranged from democratically self-governing communities to feudal lordships and slave trading. Muridism, which started late in the eighteenth century, was initially a conservative resistance force against Russian occupation but soon changed its ideological content. It became a Sunni fundamentalist Islamic movement for social justice that called for the liberation of the peasants from feudal servitude and the elimination of old, barbaric traditions. Transformed rapidly into a populist mass movement, it was joined later by the beys of Circassia and other feudal lords, who decided that the Muridists could better serve their interests than the Russian occupiers. The Muridists were instrumental in converting many animist tribes to Islam and in sharpening the Islamic consciousness of the

adherents to a degree hardly known elsewhere in the Islamic world, notably under the leadership of Shaykh Shamil in the period 1834 to 1859.

In the Caucasus, therefore, Islam became a rallying point for political mobilisation and a militant movement that helped it become rooted as a religion. In this, it was immeasurably aided by the Naqshbandi tarikat (Arabic, tariqa, brotherhood or order), the dominant Sufi order in the Caucasus. Its worldly, politically militant attitude was to a great extent conditioned by the events in the Caucasus, for most of the Muridist leaders, including Shaykh Shamil, were Naqshbandis. Indeed, Caucasian migrants were in good measure responsible for strengthening the Naqshbandi movement in the Ottoman state and in Turkey.

For the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the Balkans, despite the fact that most of them were living on the border of the Islamic world facing a hostile European-Christian world, Islam remained apolitical until they were uprooted. Their passive cultural-religious consciousness was easily converted to a dynamic Muslim identity when the circumstances required; however, in general, until the migration occurred, the Islamic identity of these Muslims was reflected largely in non-political rites and social practices.

The second common characteristic shared by the migrants was the Ottoman political culture.[61] This culture was Islamic in origin, but in practice it aimed at creating a social and political order in accordance with the ethnic and religious realities of the entire population of the realm. It began to evolve as early as the fifteenth century when Sultans Mehmed II (AD 1451–81) and Suleyman the Lawgiver (AD 1520–66) laid the foundation for it through a variety of kanunnames, or edicts issued by the ruler and not forming part of the shari‘a or revealed Islamic law, which in fact made up the Ottoman Constitution. Theoretically, the kanunname was bound to conform to Islam; in practice, deviations necessitated by practical consideration were possible. The §eyhulislam (Arabic, Shaykh al-Islam, paramount religious official at court), who was appointed by the sultan, seldom refrained from issuing a fetva (Arabic fatwa, religious-legal opinion) approving the government’s decisions; thus formal conformity to Islam in tradition was achieved. The Ottoman courts and legal system were both Islamic and “secular” — in the sense that they could adapt themselves to social, economic, and political changes outside the realm of religion but without appearing to do so. The Muslim courts were spread throughout the country and generally enforced the rules of the shari‘a, which together with the kanunnames thus produced a degree of uniformity in family affairs, contracts, and other civic matters. This brought about a collective mode of social behaviour among Ottoman Muslims.

The central administrative system also contributed to the development of the Ottoman political culture, with secular overtones as necessitated by local interests. The sultan’s authority was well represented by the officials appointed by and working at the discretion of

the central government in Istanbul. The field administrators, such as the beylerbeys and sanjak beys, were appointed by the central authority and had at their disposal fairly large contingents of Janissaries, whom they used to maintain the authority and enforce the decisions of the central government. The appointment of natives to various local administrative positions and the granting of a degree of de facto administrative autonomy (as was the case in the Arab provinces) was commonplace. But all of these local appointments were formally sanctioned by the central government, although they were often in reality an expression of local interests and preferences.

Most of the migrants were from regions in which the Ottoman central government had enforced a relatively uniform judicial and administrative system and philosophy of state, society, rights, and obligations.[62] The result was a political culture that was in essence a secular political culture legitimised through Islam, but — for that very reason — capable of adaptation to and evolution into new patterns, including territorial statehood. Muslims — especially in the Balkans, the Crimea, the coastal areas of the western Caucasus, northern Iraq, and Syria — reflected this Ottoman political culture in the similarities of their social behaviour patterns, and in the fact that the elites of the migrant groups were predisposed to accept the decisions of the central authority.

*** Conditions favouring a change of identity

The initial Ottoman policy towards immigation was devoid of ideological significance, as indicated by the statutes of the immigration offices. The early Muslim muhajir (migrant) had been accepted as part of a general sense of Islamic duty, but also because of the traditional Ottoman practice of granting asylum to anyone, Muslim or non-Muslim, requesting it.

By 1880, however, the government’s policy towards immigration had taken a definite ideological bias in favour of Muslims. The old policy was officially changed in 1887 after the office of the §eyhulislam wrote to the incumbent Sultan Abdulhamid II that the lives of Muslims under foreign rule had become intolerable and that every Muslim wishing to live in an Islamic country should be allowed to immigrate. Implicit in this recommendation was the suggestion that the Muslims wishing to enter the Ottoman realm be given priority over non-Muslims (Karpat 1981). It is symbolic that the office charged with overseeing immigration matters was renamed at this date the Muhacirin-i Islamiye Komisyonu Alisi (High Islamic Immigration Commission) and was placed directly under the sultan-caliph. One of the consequences of this change of policy was that by 1901 the mass settlement of non-Muslims in Palestine was prohibited. The Jews, in particular, while allowed to immigrate and settle in Ottoman lands, were expressly prohibited from settling en masse in Palestine as they wished to do.[63]

The reforms began chiefly with Sultan Mahmud II (1808–39), entered a new phase in the Tanzimat era (1839–76), and, finally, took an entirely different course after 1876 under Abdulhamid II.[64] Under Abdulhamid II (1876–1909), the reforms became self-consciously Islamic in character, due in good measure to the changes brought about by the migrations. Indeed, it was the migration of the Muslims from the periphery of the Muslim world that forced him to adopt his so-called “Islamic” policy, and to follow a political course different from that of his predecessors. This policy, promoted often as Ottomanism, actually represented a new concept of state, nationhood, territory, and Islamic identity, and had little in common with the classical Islamic ideas of state, government, and territory.[65] That Abdulhamid’s policy of building a unitary Islamic national territorial state was backed by a large part of the ‘ulama’ shows that even the most orthodox Muslim scholars would accept a change of political identity as long as it was carried out within the cultural perimeters of Islam and was enforced in accordance with its methods, especially when the survival of the Muslim society as an independent entity was at stake.

*** The migration process as a catalyst for identity change

The causes that triggered the migration were instrumental in preparing the migrants for a change of identity. Basically, all of the emigres acted because of threats, implied or overt, to their lives and property.

The ill-armed Caucasian rebels resisting the Russian army were mercilessly massacred or uprooted. British consular statistics place the number of Caucasian deaths — many from starvation and disease — at over half a million (Pinson 1972: 71–85; Voennyj Sbornik 1884: 158–96).[66] The Caucasians remaining in their ancestral homes were given the opportunity to convert to Christianity and settle in the easily controllable plains of Kuban; later they were asked to serve in the Czarist army, raising the possibility that they might be forced to fight other Muslims. Many, as a consequence, migrated to Ottoman lands in the period 1862–5.

In 1878, about a million Muslims were forced out of the area which is now known as Bulgaria and Romania, by the Russian army and Bulgarian armed bands, which, according to British embassy reports, also killed some 300,000 Muslims. Russia wanted to establish a national Bulgarian client-state and sought by brutal force to turn the Orthodox Christians into a dominant majority. These migrants lost all their land, houses, and even personal belongings. Very few received any indemnity for these losses, although, in the case of the refugees from Bulgaria, some were allowed to go back and sell part of their property at derisory prices. Thus, the migrants who belonged to the upper classes found themselves as poor and destitute as the humblest citizen of the community.

This forceful action was given wide coverage throughout the Ottoman state by the newly emerging press. The reports in hand indicate that one of the most widely discussed topics

among the pilgrims at Mecca after the 1860s was the fate of Muslims in the European Christian lands. Thus, the citizens in the heartland also were made increasingly aware of their own Muslim identity, and this in turn had an effect on the way they received the immigrants. Following the well-established Qur'anic obligation to provide shelter and help to the muhajirs (see Masud, Chapter 2 of this volume), the migrants were sheltered and fed for months, and even years, in private homes. In many areas the local Muslims helped build homes for the newcomers. Although there were unpleasant clashes, caused by the warlike attitude of the Cherkes tribes as much as by negative reaction towards the migrants, these were the exception. The manner in which they were welcomed by the Muslim population of their new home further solidified the migrants' Muslim consciousness and eventually facilitated their integration into the society.

In itself, the act of mass migration, which was experienced in common by both the lowest- and the highest-ranking Muslims of the communities, helped to increase the sense of Muslim communal solidarity and to bring down those social barriers that had separated the migrants in their original homes. Not only did attitudes of mind undergo transformation; concrete changes in their economic and social conditions resulted in greater equality as well. The leadership position of the traditional chiefs was eroded when migration deprived them of the economic and political power that had bolstered alignments in the old hierarchies. Occasionally, the attempt was made to re-establish the traditional social system in the new home, but, as will be explained later, the settlement policies of the Ottoman government made the re-establishment of the migrants' traditional power structure difficult, if not impossible. For individuals with latent leadership ability, the migration was to some extent a liberation from the constraints of the social and cultural mores and from the hierarchy of authority prevailing at the place of origin. For individuals with personality characteristics conducive to innovation and the easy acceptance of socio-political change, the migration provided an opportunity for self-affirmation. The overwhelming need to survive and adapt to new places and conditions of settlement called for vision and initiative, and the individuals with those personality characteristics rose to positions of leadership.

This argument is supported by data showing changes in social structure and leadership cadres among the Crimean migrants established in Dobruca following the Crimean war of 1853–6. At the bottom of the social scale among these Crimeans were the Nogay, who had maintained a tribal form of organisation and leadership and were involved in agriculture on the Crimean plateau. The upper class, which had lived in the cities along the Crimean coast and were better educated, continued after migration to regard the Nogay as inferior and attempted to monopolise the positions of power in Dobruca. However, the Nogay, who were no longer willing to remain a permanent under-class, protested vehemently (in protest a group of them even returned to Russia), forcing the Ottoman government to accord at least symbolic recognition of their equality by giving them medals and salaries as it did to other Crimean leaders (Karpat 1984–5). After Dobruca was ceded to Romania in 1878, the social differences among the Nogay, Yaliboy, Kerish, and other Crimean groups vanished as they all amalgamated into one single Muslim-Tartar group in an effort to preserve their Muslim identity. To this day Romania classifies its 60,000 Muslims as Turks and Tartars.

Ifa tribe or village emigrated en masse and then was resettled as such in a geographical, cultural, economic, and political environment very similar to the place of origin, it was possible that the old social structure, including the leadership, might survive to hinder identity change. However, the Ottoman government took steps to prevent this. It already had long experience with the settlement of tribes in the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries, and had established a pattern designed to facilitate integration. The tribal confederations, notably the Caucasians, were divided into several groups and settled in different places. Many tribal and communal chiefs were given special incentives to encourage them not to continue to assert their leadership: some were enrolled in the army with officer ranking, while others, along with the religious heads, were encouraged to settle in cities. The leaders of the settled and well-established communities from the Caucasus and the Balkans preferred, in any case, to settle in the cities.

The effect of this policy was that the immigrant elites were rapidly incorporated into the body of the Ottoman elites and thus became part of the establishment, while their former constituents, free of the burden of loyalty and obedience to the old leaders, could adapt themselves to their new environments as they saw fit. The immigrant elites and their offspring played a major role not only in helping to define and shape the emerging Muslim-Ottoman identity but also in promoting successfully the acceptance of this new identity among those they formerly led. Furthermore, the new leadership cadres that arose in the settled communities also came to play a major part in this transformation, as they sought in a conscious fashion to identify themselves and their communities with the values and the political goals and aspirations of their new motherland.

Those of the old leadership who did not settle so easily into new roles as integrated members of the Ottoman establishment found that despite their best efforts they were, in the new conditions, unable to maintain themselves in their traditional positions of power vis-a-vis their fellow migrants. Many of those who, in former times, would have placed the interests of themselves and their own social group above those of the community as a whole, now became the advocates for the entire community. They hoped by identifying themselves more intimately with the larger group to maintain their leadership positions, and to gain influence in government circles by virtue of their position. However, as it seemed obvious that these former chiefs, now far away in the urban areas, were bent mainly on perpetuating the old order and their own ascriptive privileges, they were soon replaced by new leaders who were better able to articulate the needs and aspirations of a people seeking to cope with a changed geographic and social environment. The first generation of these new communal leaders maintained contact with the old chiefs, but the second and succeeding generations defined their position and role in accordance with the conditions prevailing in the community rather than in accordance with the advice of the elders. They soon began to define their identity in terms of the new Ottoman-Muslim constituency promoted by the sultan-caliph.

*** Pan-Islamism and identity change

Pan-Islamism, actually Islamism (islamcilik) in the Ottoman state can be considered as a grass-roots fundamentalist movement seeking socio-political accommodation in Islamic terms.[67] It was, to a rather large extent, a by-product of the mass nineteenth-century immigration, which brought with it into the Ottoman realm many of the different religious ideologies of Muslims on the fringes of the disintegrating empire. The movement played a vital role in the change of identity of both newcomers and old residents of the Asian provinces of the Ottoman state.

The press of the 1860s and, especially, of the 1870s expressed a deep dissatisfaction with the condition of economic and political affairs in the Ottoman state. Thousands of workers in the traditional textile industry had been left unemployed when cheap cloth from England and France flooded Ottoman markets after 1840: unemployment among craftsmen rose to approximately 70 per cent. Muslim merchants and small landowners in the countryside, dominated and exploited by the European economic interests via the local Christian commercial intermediaries, shared the discontent of the peasants and workers (Issawi 1966; Pamuk 1987). The government was accused of being unable to stop the country’s territorial disintegration or uphold Muslim rights. These accusations became far more widespread and vehement — encompassing now the discontent of the upper classes and religious establishment — after the debacle of the 1877–8 war with Russia. The millions of destitute Muslim immigrants pouring in from the Balkans and the Caucasus (Istanbul alone received about 200,000 refugees in 1878) further increased the general apprehension. It was about this time, moreover, that various obscure princes and sultans from Asia and Africa, threatened with occupation by the European powers, wrote to Sultans Abdulaziz (AD 1861–76) and Abdulhamid II asking for protection and offering allegiance in exchange. These factors appeared to foreshadow the development of pan-Islamism as an international movement, but despite European fears, this kind of movement failed to materialise.

The Islamic current that did emerge manifested itself in the form of grassroots demands — from both low-level religious leaders and laymen — for Islamic unity and action to assure the survival of the state as a Muslim entity and to better the lives of the faithful. The existing administration was considered to be both incompetent and so corrupted by the European-style reforms of the Tanzimat that it was unwilling to follow a truly Islamic path. The refugees gave their full support to this movement, in the hope that a revitalised Ottoman government would reconquer the European territories and they would be able to return to their homes. This hope was soon dashed, however, as Sultan Abdulhamid refused outright to enter on a policy of reconquest.

The central idea of the Islamic populist-fundamentalist movement was that the Ottoman Muslims were a millet — a nation — deserving ofa land of their own where a Muslim way of life under Muslim rule would prevail (Lewis and Braude 1982). Whereas in the past the term millet was applied only to non-Muslim communities, now even the sultan began to refer to the Muslims as “my nation” (benim milletim). The fundamentalists regarded the remaining Ottoman territory as the land wherein the expectations of this Muslim nation could be fulfilled; territory therefore appeared as an indispensable condition for Muslim survival. The literati of the movement

attempted to prove that Anatolia was the predestined homeland of the Muslim Turks by associating it with such mythical heroes as Ayub al-Ansari (who died at the Arab siege of Constantinople), Mehmet II (the conqueror of Istanbul), and the present sultan himself. Thus the idea of a multi-religious, multiethnic nation unified under the doctrine of “Ottomanism” (as enunciated by the Tanzimat reformers), was turned back on itself by the fundamentalists and became a concept of a homogeneous Muslim nation occupying its own territory — i.e. the “motherland”. Although the Islamists, principally the high ‘ulama’, theoretically rejected this concept as undermining the unity of, and allegiance to, the umma, it was adopted as basic to the preservation of their Muslim culture and religion.

The fundamentalist movement included a large number of immigrants, among whom were the leaders and members of both Sunni and non-Sunni tarikats. These tarikats had strong popular bases, and many were instrumental in the perpetuation of egalitarian populist ideas: e.g. the Bedreddinis of Serres; the Qizilbash of Deliorman and Dobruca; and the Naqshbandis and Muridists of the north Caucasus. Traumatised by their experiences as refugees, they were anxious to know how such a fate could befall them, and they found the answer in the incompetence of their top leaders. What was needed was an uncorrupted, authentic Muslim leader who would dedicate himself to the fulfilment of Islamic ideals.

Some appear to have been willing to take violent action against the government. In 1878, for example, Ali Suavi, the publisher of the journal, Ulum (Sciences), together with about a hundred followers — mostly refugees from the Balkans — landed on the pier of the palace of Sultan Murat V at Ciragan with the intention of bringing him back to the throne, then occupied by Abdulhamid II.

Suavi was associated with many dervishes, or popular preachers. He had studied in Europe, was married to an Englishwoman, and, for a period, was the head of the Galatasray, the French school established in Istanbul in 1868. But he was also known to preach in the mosques against European imperialism and the deterioration of the Islamic way of life, and was thus an outstanding forerunner of contemporary Muslim fundamentalism. He apparently wanted to replace Abdulhamid because of his authoritarian policies, his failure to back the Muslim guerrillas fighting the Russians and Bulgarians in the Rodoppe mountains, and his readiness to cede Muslim lands to the infidel. Although Suavi was killed in the action, his followers arrested, and 178,000 refugees living in Istanbul exiled to Anatolia ostensibly to preclude further trouble, the event was extraordinary in that it marked the first time that a group of civilians, rather than a military cabal, had attempted to overthrow a ruling sultan.

The migrants generally accelerated social differentiation in the fundamentalist movement and gave it a class dimension. After the forced mass emigrations from the Caucasus and the Balkans, during which both rich and poor were uprooted from their homes, there still remained large Muslim groups: in the north-eastern section of what is now Bulgaria; in

Dobruca; in Bosnia; in parts of the Caucasus; and in Crimea. After the Balkan war of 1912–13, these Muslims also began gradually to migrate in order to avoid the fate of their co-religionists, and were encouraged to do so by the national states of Bulgaria and Romania, which allowed them to sell their properties and carry part of the proceeds with them to Turkey. Consequently, a large number of beys and other notables, many of whom had owned large tracts of land, carried considerable capital with them to Istanbul. These relatively well-to-do immigrants bought properties, mostly in cities, and became part of the Ottoman urban elite. Many of them invested their capital in commercial and small industrial enterprises, and thus enlarged the emerging urban entrepreneurial class by adding to it a Muslim dimension.

Included among the new Muslim commercial class were aristocratic families and learned ‘ulama’ — from the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Crimea — as well as military officers, some of whom had served in the Czarist armies. Some of these had received a European type of education in their original homes or had studied in European universities, but also joined the Islamist movement. Islam had become, in fact, the chief identity symbol and focus of political allegiance. Two examples illustrate this point. A Muslim member of the ruling dynasty of Montenegro, who enjoyed great popularity at the royal court and owned extensive tracts of land, abandoned all of these and came to live in Istanbul on a small pension provided by the government. The English consul, who reported the incident in great detail, but who of course must not be regarded as an unimpeachable source, observed that, to this Slav aristocrat, the upholding of his faith was dearer than all his riches and titles.[68] The second example is that of General Musa (Kondukov), a Chechen who had reached a very high position in the Czarist army. Eventually, under the pretext of joining a survey commission, he came into the Ottoman state, where he stayed and assumed the command of an army corps. He then fought the Russians in the Caucasus. There are hundreds of similar examples of Muslims from Russia and the Balkans who preferred, even at the cost of privilege and rank, to live as citizens of a Muslim state.

*** Abdulhamid’s synthesis: the change of identity

Sultan Abdulhamid’s first priority, when he came to the throne in 1876, was the maintenance of the six-centuries-old dynasty, and his second was the maintenance of the Ottoman state and territory. His third priority was to strengthen the Islamic creed in whatever way was necessary to assure the mutual survival of dynasty, state, and faith.[69] Through trial and error, an “Islamic policy” gradually emerged.

Proroguing the Parliament and the Constitution in 1878, he sought to silence opposition to the administration at a time when popular dissatisfaction with the government and support for the populist-fundamentalist movement were growing. The populist-fundamentalists did not in fact pose a direct challenge to the throne because they were too heterogeneous and lacked a well-articulated ideology and strong leadership. But Ottoman sultans had always harboured fears of the popular tarikats, and tried to neutralise them by bribes

or even imprisonment. Abdulhamid rather hoped to win the support of the Muslim masses by co-opting leaders of the Sunni orthodox fraternities, or tarikats, of Syria and Iraq — such as the Qadiri and Rafai, which had a mass following.

Although Abdulhamid espoused the Islamist views prevailing initially among the upper classes — which placed emphasis on orthodox Islam and established institutions such as the caliphate, and which were at variance with the views of the populist-fundamentalists — the French occupation of Tunisia (1881) and the British seizure of Egypt (1882) inspired a general change of opinion. Now, after 1882, the leaders of orthodox Islam came closer to adopting the militant, radical anti-European spirit

prevailing among the fundamentalists, and the ideological differences between grassroots Islamic fundamentalism and the state-supported Islamic orthodoxy of the upper-class groups seems to have declined. The two streams converged, in fact, into a distinct consciousness that both sides were part of a single Muslim nation. The sultan, becoming the active champion of this consolidated Islamic nationality, eventually emphasised his role as caliph, although not before the issue had been extensively debated in the press and several religious leaders had urged him to do so for the sake of Muslim unity and survival.

A perfunctory look at the textbooks used in Ottoman primary schools after 1880 shows that these were written primarily to foster a sense of Ottoman-Muslim identity in the pupils. It is not surprising that the Greek Orthodox and Armenian patriarchs in 1897 protested against the obligatory use of these textbooks, which extolled the virtues of Ottoman history and glorified its achievements. The two Christian prelates wished to teach only the history of their own ethnic groups, but their protest went unheeded. In order to develop the concept of the Ottoman-Muslim nation, the government was willing to use all the devices at its disposal — many borrowed from Europe. The elementary schools, which expanded rapidly though not extensively into the countryside during the reign of Abdulhamid, assiduously cultivated the idea of a Muslim-Ottoman citizen. That this was bound to develop in these pupils a political identity different from that of their predecessors was evident.

Abdulhamid was soon to incur the opposition of westernised intellectuals, and even some religious officials, for his timid foreign policy and autocratic manner of governing, and was eventually overthrown in 1908–9. But his Islamic policy produced lasting results. Indeed, it is symbolic that many of the founders of the secret association that came to be known as the “Young Turks” and that produced the revolution of 1908 were medical students who were ethnically non-Turks from the peripheral regions of the state. The founder of modern Turkey, Ataturk himself, who was instrumental in the abolition of the sultanate and the caliphate, was an immigrant from Salonica, as were some of the parents of his two successors as president. Moreover, in the rise of Turkish nationalism, Yusuf Akcura and Huseyinzade Ali (from Kazan and Azerbaijan in Russia respectively) and other immigrants, played key roles. Because Abdulhamid managed for most of his reign not to become embroiled in international wars (except for the short but victorious war of 1897 against Greece), he was

able to devote himself to the promotion of this Islamic policy and to amalgamate the various elements of the population into a synthesis that was the new Ottoman-Muslim nation, existing on its own territory and demanding impersonal bonds of loyalty.

*** Conclusion

The migrations and the circumstances that produced them have been shown to be the catalyst for the transformation of the religious and cultural identity of the immigrants into a dynamic new political identity linked to the new concept of a Muslim territorial state. The migrations also triggered changes in the social and occupational structure, demography, settlement patterns, and land tenure system of the Ottoman state. The migrants were well integrated throughout Muslim-Ottoman society — from the lower classes to the elite classes — and were active participants in its affairs at a time when constitutional changes were being made and a European-type market economy adopted.

In order to achieve internal cohesion, Sultan Abdulhamid II used his position as caliph to contain and control populist fundamentalism, and to integrate it with the more orthodox Islamist ideology of the elites. Eventually, this policy also achieved the ideological and cultural amalgamation of the migrants and large segments of the Muslim middle and upper classes — including the Arabs of the urban areas of Syria and northern Iraq — into a relatively cohesive political and social unit that was the new Ottoman Muslim nation.

The individual Muslim citizens gradually came to identify themselves with the new entity, formed of different tribes and ethnic groups but having Islam as its binding ideology and Turkish as its language of administration and communication. This was the territorial state, the motherland, the vatan, to which, ideally, all Muslims would pledge allegiance and loyalty. The survival and welfare of the motherland took precedence over those of the sultan. Moreover, the idea that certain conditions within the motherland could be improved so as to strengthen the nation and make life better for the Muslims gained acceptance. Thus, the Muslims now looked upon the vatan not only as an arena in which to cultivate virtue and prepare himself for the next world, but also as a place in which to fulfil worldly aspirations. The idea of active participation in political and social affairs espoused by the Naqshbandis was, in fact, an outgrowth of this new worldly outlook. This acceptance of change and material improvement in one’s existence — or “modernisation”, as it was often called — was implicit in Abdulhamid’s Islamic policy.

This new Ottoman-Muslim nation, the results of a dialectical process to which the various elements of the society contributed, had an inner strength that vigorously resisted the forces which, after 1908, pulled it apart: new ethnic nationalisms; the anti-imperial nationalism promoted by the Young Turks; and the threatening military might of the west. Modern Turkey inherited the vital core of this state, and its transformation from a monarchical regime to a

republic was but the logical and ultimate result of the interplay of the forces that had earlier transformed the traditional Ottoman state itself.

*** A personal postscript

Many of the themes that have emerged in this discussion are reflected in my own personal experience of a later period. I was born in Dobruca — a province located between the lower Danube and the Black Sea — in a Muslim-Turkish community that had been part of the Ottoman state from the fourteenth century until 1878, when it was incorporated into Romania. The community, adapting well to the non-Muslim regime, maintained its Islamic communal socio-cultural identity. Although the community consisted of Turks, Tartars, Lazzes, and Kurds, among others, the ethnic differences among the members of these groups were generally superseded by their overall consciousness of themselves as Muslims. Yet there was a striking lack of political consciousness within the Muslim community, which appeared interested mainly in maintaining its cultural, religious, and social customs and mores rather than in securing a distinct legal-political or constitutional recognition of its religious status.

The notables and the religious leaders — the efendis, qadis, and muftis — were even more lacking in Muslim political consciousness than the ordinary members of the community. Most of these rose to prominence during Romanian rule after 1878 as the representatives of the community. They clung tenaciously to their Muslim denomination (which had secured them their position) while also serving the Romanian administration (whose policies often worked to the detriment of the basic principles of their faith). Individuals in the community — usually younger people with some education, the very poor (who felt stifled as a minority with low class status), or the old ‘ulama’ (who did not want to compromise their faith) — looked upon emigration as the only logical way out of their predicament. Those with education had limited opportunity for career advancement, while the poor felt that they were discriminated against and exploited economically by the Romanian officials and the elites of their own community.

Turkey was regarded by both groups as the only country in the world with which they had a cultural affiliation and historical ties, and which offered them hope for social advancement and material betterment. The stories of the secularism and anti-Islamic policies of Ataturk were dismissed by Muslims of all ranks because of the expectation that the basic Islamic identity of the country could not be abandoned, and that the material progress and increased well-being attributed partly to his reforms would compensate for the loss of religious zeal. This was the situation that prevailed in the 1930s, the days of my childhood in Dobruca.

I grew up as a Turkish-speaking Muslim in a community consisting of Muslims of various ethnic origins, and non-Muslim Romanians and Bulgarians. I spoke perfect Romanian and many assumed it likely that I would be assimilated sooner or later into the culture of the dominant Romanian majority. However, I found that my early Islamic education within the family had instilled values that distinguished me from both the Romanians and the subservient Muslim communal leaders: my sense of loyalty to family and friends set me apart from the former and my sense of equality from the latter. It was in these circumstances that my Turkish identity acquired a new meaning, since it provided me with a solution to my personal problems, which had been created by the encounter of different cultures and political systems. The Turkey of Ataturk, cleansed of religious bigotry, appeared as a haven where my aspirations to attend a university (the graduates ofmy school in Romania were deprived of this right) could be fulfilled and my identity would no longer excite the derision of my compatriots. From then onwards, even as my interest in Romanian literature and social life remained alive, I began to feel a keenness in being Turkish in addition to being a Muslim, and began to defend and identify myself with everything I considered Turkish. I finally came to the conclusion that it is not possible to live in two worlds with two cultures and decided, on my own, at the age of 18, to emigrate to my “real” country — only to discover that my Turkish identity was different from that of the natives.

I went to Turkey in the 1940s, and, from the very beginning, I was struck by unsuspected differences of identity, that separated both my Muslim community in Dobruca from that in Turkey, and from me as an individual (coming from a different Turkish-Muslim environment) from the natives. I did not feel these differences in the observance of Islamic rites or in any lack of Islamic self-consciousness (which, despite secularism, paradoxically enough was far more intense in Turkey than in Dobruca). Only years later did I realise that what had struck me as being different was the predominance among the Turks of Turkey ofa special type of political-national consciousness that stemmed basically from Islam — different opinions notwithstanding — while the consciousness of the Muslims of Dobruca was communal and apolitical, or passive. Living in a state of their own that was Muslim in character but also national, the Turks of Turkey had a political consciousness that derived its strength from the fact that they identified themselves with a national territory. In my community in Dobruca, by way of contrast, the territorial identification was conspicuously absent from the Muslim identity. The community had only limited historical memory, possessed no consciousness of its territorial dimensions, and had no political aspirations as Muslims.

Almost all of the Dobrucan immigrants living in Turkey, while fondly remembering their birthplace and often expressing a profound nostalgia for it, became politically identified with Turkey and what it stood for. To the best of my knowledge, out of the 45,000 to 50,000 Dobrucans who went to Turkey in the period 1934–8, only two or three families returned to Romania. In Ottoman times, peregrination between Anatolia, Thrace, and Dobruca was common, and amounted to a mere change of place rather than of identity. But the migrants of the 1930s remained in Turkey because it gave them a political future and because the Kemalist regime began an intensive programme of Turkification. The overwhelming majority of destitute immigrants also knew that they would not be welcome if they returned to their old country. But, above all, the immigrants felt that their traditional cultural and religious identity was no longer in danger, even though some were aware that the government’s view

of Islam in the 1930s was substantially different from that of the populace. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was only when I migrated for the second time — from Turkey to America — that I was able to put my experiences in Dobruca and in Turkey into perspective.

[62] The term “Ottoman” as it appears in the western and Turkish literature originated in the nineteenth century despite the state’s official title — Devlet-i Ali-i Osmani, “the exalted state of Osman”. For five centuries this title was patrimonial, whereas the term in the nineteenth century came to mean a territorial state and body of citizens inhabiting the Ottoman homeland.

[63] A great variety of books was issued by Ottoman statesmen and thinkers from the fifteenth century onwards on the subjects of the social order, authority, and the duties of subjects. One can cite among them, for instance, Tursun Bey and Kinalizade Ala’i (AD 1510–72). None of their works is translated into English. Kinalizade’s work, Ahlak-i Ala’i was translated into modern Turkish in the Tercuman collection, Istanbul c. 1970-. Kogibey’s famous risale of the seventeenth century also belongs to this category of books.

[64] See the proceedings of a conference on the “Jews in the Ottoman Empire”, to be published by Brandeis University. See also Karpat 1985.

[65] Migration matters were placed initially under the General Commission for Migration Administration (Idare-i Umumiye-i Muhacirun Komisyonu) established in 1860. Later in the 1880s, as mentioned, the new enlarged commission was headed by the sultan.

[66] Although the only land border recognised by medieval jurisprudence was between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, as early as the fifteenth century the Ottoman thinker Kinalizade Ala’i pointed out in his Ahlak-i Ala’i that the “order of the world” (nizam-i alem) was an arena surrounded by the “walls of state” as part of the cycle necessary for the existence of justice — the key ingredient in the “order of the world”. The area between the “walls of state” would be considered the territory of the state.

[67] These reports are scattered in various collections found in the Public Record Office, London. The FO 78 and 424 collections, covering the period from 1860 and 1880, are particularly relevant. The British government also published several reports on the

Circassians. See, for instance, the report presented to the House of Commons, Accounts and Papers (1864), vol. 63. See also Karpat 1985.

[68] This section draws on my paper presented to the biennial conference on Ottoman and pre-Ottoman Studies, Cuenca, Spain, July 1981, and material obtained from various archival sources which is being amalgamated into a monograph.

[69] On Montenegrins and Bosnians, see FO 424, vol. 72, no. 333 and vol. 89, no. 52; see also dispatches in the Archives of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Idare, vol. 269.

[70] There is a rich literature in Turkish and European languages on Abdulhamid II, much of which is subjective. The best insight into his thinking is offered by his memoirs published in French and Turkish. The first memoirs, found initially by Ibnulemin Mahmut Kemal in the sultan's private collection in the Ildiz Palace, consist of brief notes related to various issues which came up during his reign. These were published along with new found notes as Abdulhamit'in Hatira Defteri [Abdulhamid's Notebook of Memoirs]. The second series of memoirs was written after Abdulhamid was ousted in 1909 and, though defensive in tone, appears to represent a reasonable general view of his opinion on a number of key issues, including Islamism: Siyasi Hatiratim [My Political Memoirs]. The 5th edition (1987) comprises new additions which do not significantly alter the content of previous editions. The memoirs were also published in French.

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** Chapter Eight: Shifting centres and emergent identities: Turkey and Germany in the lives of Turkish Gastarbeiter

Ruth Mandel

<quote>

“For the expatriot, reality is always someplace else”

(Ariel Dorfman, Chilean writer and sometime expatriot)

</quote>

*** Introduction

This chapter addresses the cultural expressions of movement in the migration of Turkish workers to West Germany. It suggests that physical movement entails a variety of types of exchange, which in turn contribute to the dynamics of social mobility. Making these relationships explicit sheds light on the dynamics informing social and cultural transformations.[70]

The particular transformations dealt with here bear on the formation and reformulation of migrant identity in the light of concepts and orientations towards centres and peripheries. The centre dealt with in this chapter in some ways follows the notion of centre discussed by Edward Shils. Shils's centre is ideological in nature, and can be understood as representing the institutions of a dominant order. The centre that I am concerned with is geographically located, but also finds salience in the realm of individual perception. This centredness is articulated in terms of a geographic core which becomes, in effect, a metaphor for an ideological core around which one's identity revolves. Eickelman and Piscatori (see Chapter 1 of this volume) discuss the notion of centres in relation to the complexity of Islamic symbols and affiliations. They make the important observation that the notion of centre must be understood in the plural, in order fully to grasp the complexity of a hierarchy of centres. Furthermore, alternate hierarchies not only exist simultaneously, but, as with all social and ideological structures, remain subject to historical change. The introductory chapter of this volume also calls into question "the straightforward distinction between centre and periphery". The material presented here echoes these concerns by illustrating how the relevant centre

and periphery of the migrants undergo fundamental transformations in relation to each other.

The past quarter-century has witnessed a migratory movement unprecedented in Turkish history and irreversible in its consequences. Close to two million Turks currently reside in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin, with significant numbers scattered throughout the rest of western Europe. West Germany, commonly joked about as Turkey's sixty-eighth province — Turkey has sixty-seven administrative provinces — has entered into the consciousness even of non-migrant Turks in Turkey. An awareness of the Turkish experience in Germany has penetrated the modern-day folklore, popular songs, literature, television, film, popular newspapers, and the daily and annual life-cycles of many Turks. In some respects, the diaspora has ironically assumed the authority of a legitimate and even desirable "centre" in contrast to an increasingly "peripheral" Turkey. This chapter proposes, first, to explore how the central point of reference is shifting by examining the types of

personal encounters between Turkish migrants and Turks who stayed at home; and second, to understand how the relations between the past and present identities of the migrants are shaping a new, emergent identity — one no longer oriented towards a concrete centre, but increasingly towards a necessarily elusive “other place”.

To understand the historical, political, and emotional resonance of this migration, we must first analyse such categories as gurbet and gurbetqi. The gurbetqi — one who lives in exile, diaspora, or away from the homeland — lives in a state of gurbet. It is a relative term, one that might describe the state of those living in Frankfurt, as well as Turks living in Istanbul, who feel that their primary identification is with their natal village rather than the city. The emergent literature and musical genres produced by Turkish artists in western Europe, although addressing this relatively recent phenomenon, actually draw upon a long tradition of exile and gurbet experiences. Throughout history, Turks have known many types of exile and migration. Thus, there is an established paradigm for the cultural structuring of contemporary labour migration. Under current conditions, however, the concentric circles marking distance or proximity from the original centre have expanded, encompassing a new dimension: Alamanya, or Germany.

Despite the Turks’ familiarity with migration and life in gurbet in the past, the German episode marks both a greater distance from the original centre and a transformation of the relationship to the centre itself. Moreover, West Germany, as a “centre” for Turks, threatens to break away from earlier Turkish centres and to establish itself

as a rival, alternative one. This seems to be particularly true for Turks of the so-called “second generation” in West Germany.

The changing relations between core and periphery are highlighted in several contexts. One context is the annual summer izin, the holiday in Turkey undertaken by the gurbetci. Another context is the experience of the “second generation” (German: die zweite Generation; Turkish: ikinci kugik), which can be seen as the repository, or even the creator, of the inherent contradiction between centre and periphery. This generation, often described in melodramatic terms as “caught between two cultures but part of neither”, constructs its identity in a social field where the “myth of the final return” serves as a guiding orientation, to be negotiated amidst a host of contradictions.

A third and final consideration is the effect which migration to Germany has had upon explicitly religious beliefs and practices, both for the dominant Sunni majority and the Alevi minority — which in Turkey comprise perhaps 20 per cent of the total population. In particular, the Alevis have significantly changed their modes of self-expression. I look at how Alevi identity and community is differentially constructed in the West German “diaspora”

and in Turkey; and how, as a by-product of this particular migration and specific social context, Alevi identity has come to be redefined in relation to the dominant Sunni majority.

*** Izin and izinli (taking leave)

Turkey looms large in the social life of Turks who work in West Germany. For example, Turkish politics not only are discussed, but are often engaged in more actively than in Turkey. At home, Turks prefer to watch Turkish video films on their VCRs rather than the German television programmes which they must struggle to understand because of language barriers.[71] Most socialising is carried out with other Turks[72] in private homes, mosques, public restaurants, and coffee houses (the exclusive domain of men), and on structured occasions such as the large parties frequently held in rented halls to celebrate engagements, weddings, and circumcisions. In nice weather, picnics in several parks in particular are so popular that Germans have nicknamed a couple of parks “Turkish meadow”. At many of these gatherings the theme of travel to Turkey dominates the conversation. Both the kesin donu§ (permanent return, repatriation) and the izin (return, the summer vacation) provide grist for endless discussion. Past trips are compared and future trips are the subject of speculation. The discussions focus on both the actual trip itself and on the state of things in Turkey. The

topics discussed include the following: whose car did not make the trip; who was turned back at the Turkish border for what infraction; which side roads are best for avoiding the worst traffic; which alternate frontier crossings have the shortest lines or the most easily bribed customs agents; the European goods most desired by relatives back in Turkey, and how unschooled these relatives are in the real costs of such items; and which travel agents can be trusted to arrange legitimate charter flights. Conversations also include: horror stories of departures from obscure airports, train stations, and bus depots; experiences of those who have recently returned as well as whose investment went bankrupt; who took back his German wife to the village; possible real estate investments; how Turkish compatriots back home try to cheat vacationing migrants; how to smuggle valuable contraband; the devaluation of the Turkish lira; and comparative stories about the relative strengths of different sorts of patronage invoked to weed through the endless, Kafkaesque Turkish bureaucracy.

A great deal of thought, planning, shopping, and arrangements go into the extensive preparations for the trips to Turkey. Much of the preparation is grounded in past experience — what was and was not efficacious on the last trip. Yet the impending journey is also idealised: fantasies are spun, elaborately weaving the texture of the summer to come. Migrants discuss what they will do, eat, see, to whom they will give gifts, which seaside resort they will visit, at what local shrine they will sacrifice a lamb, how they envisage the parties where they will sing, dance, and drink, and how they will add to their new house. Clearly, the ideas of past and future trips to Turkey motivate the physical and psychological energies of migrants while they are gurbetgi in Germany. This focus upon trips

to Turkey should not be surprising, since the sorrow, isolation, and difficulties associated with the state of gurbet cry out to be assuaged. Although the migrants live and work in Europe for eleven months of the year, they do so in order to be able to “really live” during the twelfth month. This attitude is a critical aspect of the Turkish guestworkers’ identity as migrants rather than immigrants: they believe that they are temporary residents and not permanent immigrants, even when appearances seem to indicate the contrary.

The status of Gastarbeiter in Germany contrasts with that of foreign workers in other European countries. In Sweden, foreign workers are called “immigrants” and are granted many more rights of political participation; for example, they are allowed to vote in local elections. Moreover, the processes and criteria for naturalisation differ from country to country.

This migrant identity is highlighted in both subjective and objective definitions. The vast majority of Turks in Europe see themselves as temporary denizens who came for a few years and were unfortunately waylaid by any number of things (such as indebtedness or family problems) but who “will soon be returning to Turkey — for good”. The migrants’ self-definition is consistent overall with the appellation bewstowed on them by Germans — Gastarbeiter. Germans and Turks know that to be a guest is to be temporary, and to be a worker is to fulfil, acknowledge, and legitimise only one dimension of “personness”. The Turks know painfully well their narrowly delimited status which is shaped daily in colloquial language and behaviour. Therefore, an “immigrant Gastarbeiter” would be an oxymoron. Negotiating this paradox on a daily basis surely increases the desire to identify with a place other than the one that refuses legally and socially to accept them, even if it has long since managed to do so while turning a blind eye. Thus the image of Turkey in Gastarbeiter consciousness is a bright one; now distant, now fleetingly close, but always the legitimising, defining referent of their absence.

This idealised view of Turkey infuses the preparations for the annual holiday return trip with a mystique. As migrants prepare for the return to Turkey, they often complain about the huge expenditure that they feel obliged to make. A relatively secure worker’s family, only moderately in debt, might spend up to DM 5,000 (equivalent to US$3,000 in 1987) for summer preparations, including replenishing the family’s wardrobe and filling requests of all sorts — from sports shoes to electronic appliances and silk headscarves. In fact, it has become so costly to return for a summer vacation that some families I met claimed that they could not afford it more frequently than once every several years. They went instead to Spain or elsewhere in Europe where they could ultimately spend far less than they would by returning to their own houses in Turkey.

The long, hot, and uncomfortable trip to Turkey by car is fraught with difficulties, hassles, and often day-long delays at international frontiers. In addition, it becomes an aggressive,

competitive race amongst the tens of thousands of Turkish drivers. In spite of this, as they leave western Europe behind and approach the Balkans — signalling the proximity to Turkey — the travellers' spirits lift and expectations mount. The stresses associated with driving worsen as they go along the roads through the Balkans, but moods lighten in direct proportion to the distance from western Europe. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria feel familiar to Turks, who are aware of the close historical connections between these countries

and their own.[73] The travellers note the similarity of the Balkans — people, food, architecture, ambience, and landscape — to Turkey. They also express great pleasure each time they manage to speak a bit of Turkish with Serbs, Albanians, or Bulgarians along the way, while being amused by the accents.[74]

The marked difference that can be discerned once the Turks leave German-speaking lands behind them is felt and expressed in terms of a burden having been lifted — in their words "nihayet, Almanya'dan kurtulduk!" (at last, we're rid of, freed from, Germany!). Sometimes "Gavuristan" is substituted for Almanya, Germany becoming the "land of the infidels". In addition, Turks feel a comfortable ease and relaxation with the local people, something that rarely occurs when they are Gastarbeiter. Here, in the Balkans, they are foreigners, but not as foreign as they are in Germany; they still are "other" vis-a-vis the Balkan populations, but, to apply Arjun Appadurai's phrase slightly out of context, "it has always been true that some others are more other than others" (Appadurai 1986: 357).

The emotional pitch heightens as the returnees approach Kapikule, Europe's largest international frontier station, at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Inevitably, a long line awaits the weary, anxious returnees. It is the first shock of many to come; the next will most certainly be the obstacle course at the checkpoints, manned by a series of surly civil servants who provide a baffling set of foils and hurdles which seem to be designed to impede a smooth homecoming. Some of the returnees find themselves caught in a bureaucratic nightmare. They may be informed that their car's papers are out of order, they might be found with contraband (perhaps unknown to them), or they may have neglected to update a visa. Finally, assuming a family of returnees passes relatively unhindered through the checkpoints, they still may face another 24 hours of driving before setting sight on their natal village, for many of the migrants come from south-east Anatolia, not far from the Syrian border.

Once the initial excitement of homecoming begins to wane, the izinli returnees find that the privileged treatment which they have received — as esteemed, long-lost relatives — evolves into something quite different: they have become, willy-nilly, Alamancilar — German-ish, or German-like. Implicitly derogatory in its markedness, in its explicit differentiation from a non-emigrant Turk, the label bears witness to a combination of difference, lack of acceptance, and rejection. It is a distancing mechanism, expressing the ambivalence contained in the same outstretched arms which

greet the returning vacationers, and accept the prestigious gifts, but which also keep them at a socially safe distance. A poem, written by an anonymous Turk in Germany, succinctly expresses this identity conundrum:

Yabancilar derler bize burada

Alamancilar derler bize orada

Anadolum biz kalmigiz arada

Bagrimiza hanger vurma ne olur

Here they call us strangers, foreigners,

There, they call us German-like.

Oh, my Anatolia, we’re caught in between,

Just don’t stab us through the heart.

Their stay in Germany is thought to have fundamentally changed the Gastarbeiter, rendering them unlike the compatriots left behind. Exposure to luxuries is believed to have spoiled them and they might now have become accustomed to running water, bathing facilities, automobiles, punctuality, business-like relations with people, efficiency, and cleanliness of a western sort. These attributes are expected of the returnees, and the relatives and neighbours back in the village often respond with defensively apologetic tones. Eventually the novelty of returning and being home wears thin. As frequent comparisons are made with Germany (e.g. “in Germany it’s cleaner; more efficient; more modern; the civil servants actually work and are honest”), annoyance and tensions rise in the daily interactions with friends and relatives. Hierarchically, the izinli often find themselves having advanced a notch upwards. By virtue of their extended residence in the “First World”,[75] the returnees are expected to take on the role of providers, patrons, and philanthropists, as well as to be exhibitionists, financially successful, and “Europeanised”. As such, they are effectively barred from returning to their former identities and relationships.

The symbolic efficacy of objects in the process of constructing and reconstructing personal relations is of paramount importance during the izin vacation return. The awareness of the expectations of their compatriots back in Turkey exerts a strong pressure on the migrants, and, accordingly, there are many ways in which the Gastarbeiter attempt to fulfil these expectations. For example, they might drive to Turkey in a new car every summer, thus reinforcing the image of the foreign, rich uncle. The poor relations back in the Anatolian village, or in the gecekondu shanty town, sufficiently impressed with the great wealth, only see what is conspicuously consumable. They have no idea about debts, bank loans, hours worked

overtime, unhealthy living conditions, or the social stigma shading the lives of the supposedly wealthy relatives abroad. The demands placed upon the returnees have undergone a rapid and steep inflation.

In the village house of one izinli returnee family, I watched a steady stream of neighbours trickle in, ostensibly to pay their respects and welcome them back to the village. Elderly widows seemed especially eager to stop by for tea; a few came back to read the Qur'an to the family. In each case the visitors left with a gift of some sort, either a German trinket, a scarf, or some cash in Deutschmarks. On the day of the emotionally charged festival of Kurban Bayrami (Feast of the Sacrifice), this family sacrificed three lambs: one for the elderly, sickly grandmother; one for her returned daughter, who was guilt-ridden for "abandoning" an invalid parent; and one for the car and the journey. Blood from this latter sacrifice was smeared on the front of the car. Some of the meat from this animal was brought back illegally to Berlin for neighbours and friends unable to make the journey.

As Alamancilar (i.e. German-like) the izinli returnees suffer from disorientation. Some are convinced that the physical ailments that afflict them in northern Europe can be cured with a trip to Turkey.[76] They have returned home to drink the water, feel the sun, and breathe the air. They have come home to reaffirm their Turkishness, yet they find themselves unaccepted as "normal" Turks. They have become irrevocably marked by virtue of their extended absence from Turkey. Feeling misunderstood and less than appreciated by their compatriots in Turkey, they seek others like themselves. On quite a few occasions in Turkey, I saw individuals and families travel considerable distances to visit friends whom they had made in Germany. With each other they were able to relax, tell jokes in German, and compare experiences. They could relate to one another without the constraints of material and social expectations and obligations demanded by an uncomfortable hierarchy.

The social asymmetry to which the Alamancilar return is a newly forged structure, one not yet free of burdensome scaffolding. The returnees enter a defined set of social relations in which extensive expectations, primarily financial, are foisted upon them. In order to maintain the prestige that they feel is rightfully theirs by virtue of long, arduous years lived in gurbet, toiling to improve the family's lot, they must live up to

the role of spendthrifts and benefactors. This is clearly not without serious consequences, essentially reproducing the necessary conditions for extended residence in gurbet. On the one hand, their “Turkishness” marginalises the migrants in the German context; on the other, the markedness of being Alamancilar in Turkey, the inability to merge back into the Turkish

mainstream, entraps Turkish Gastarbeiter in a circular quest for an increasingly elusive identity. More and more often, the returnees look northward, turning to the symbols, persons, and identifications associated with their lives in Germany in order to find comfort and meaning.

*** The second generation: disorientations

The disorientation of returning migrants proves disillusioning and disappointing because their expectations based on past, often romanticised memories remain unrealised. Their children’s experience of Turkey is slightly different, however, since many of the children, although born in Turkey, have lived there only as small children and are unschooled in its history and norms, geography and civics, military and civil servants, and codes of gender segregation. Though many of them grow up in closed, ghetto-like enclaves in West German cities, they still are often unprepared for what they find when they return. For example, a girl who in Stuttgart is accustomed to travel alone to school or work on public transportation may suddenly find herself shamed and embarrassed for leaving her family’s village house without a male relative to escort her. Alternatively, parents who are protective of their daughters in Germany, and unwilling to allow them much liberty, may give them free rein to socialise with other young people once they are in the safety of their natal village. In one Anatolian village where the Turkoman population was sedentarised two generations ago and approximately 25 per cent of the population now lives in Germany, it is common to see teenage girls and boys openly socialising in the streets, riding motorcycles together, and holding unchaperoned dances until early morning hours. This situation — which is admittedly rather exceptional — contrasted sharply with a town not ten kilometres away, where even a middle-aged, respected, married woman (to say nothing of an unmarried girl), reluctant to expose herself to any unnecessary public scrutiny, will send a 6-year-old neighbour boy to the local oven to buy her bread.

Predictably, young people who return experience painful and disturbing cognitive and behavioural dissonance. For instance, a 15-year-old boy related how shocked he was when he was beaten by male relatives of female schoolmates with whom he had been seen chatting. Teenagers have a particularly difficult time adapting to the mores and rigid hierarchical system prevalent in Turkish schools. They are punished for infractions unknowingly committed — such as not wearing their prescribed uniform properly, leaving a hand in a pocket when a teacher walks into the room instead of standing to attention, or using the informal sen (“tu”) form of address with a teacher instead of the mandatory siz (“vous”). Older girls complain of being ostracised, since their

peers assume they are not virgins by virtue of their connections with Germany — a land associated with infidels, immorality, and promiscuity.

Whereas their parents have many and specific expectations of Turkey, the children's notions are few and vague. Most of the second-generation children in Germany can recite by rote: "We are in gurbet; we will soon be returning to Turkey, things are better for us in Turkey, we are foreigners here, and it is always best to live in the father/motherland, the vatan". Even children whose concrete memories of the vatan are hazy at best, grow up hearing these collocations constantly, and repeat them. Yet despite the lip service acknowledging their exiled existence, they have been socialised in Germany, albeit as Turks. For them, Turkey is a distant memory, almost a myth. Increasingly, Turkey is acquiring the status of a vacation land for them, the holiday spot which it is for the thousands of Germans who travel there each year.

In the past several years, many izinli returnees have altered the itineraries of their summer visits, and now include holiday villages and resorts on Turkey's spectacular Aegean and Mediterranean coasts. Some of the financially more secure Gastarbeiter, after completing retirement homes for themselves in villages, towns, or cities, have invested in holiday homes. Therefore, migrants — and their children — come to see an added dimension of Turkey, and see it now as a spot for amusement, fun, vacationing, and spending money. Many have never travelled within Turkey before, for the concept of izin only meant seeing and spending time with relatives. A vacation in the European sense has until recently been an alien concept for them. With the advent of their new European- or German-style vacations, they are in effect beginning to appropriate the German concepts of time, work, place, and leisure. Since vacation time is peripheral to the work year, it follows that the place of vacation is marginal to the work-place, which assumes centrality in the lives of workers.

*** Migration and Islam

In recent years, the so-called "Islamic revival" has come under scrutiny in western Europe. Public and private monies are being allocated in order to identify the extent, types, and nature of what is commonly misperceived as a monolithic, nascent, European Islam. For the Turks, well-entrenched networks sustain and regulate the international movement of personnel through whom

often competing Turkish and Islamic identities are fostered and kept alive abroad. A bilateral agreement permits the Turkish Ministry of Education to send Turkish teachers to the Federal Republic of Germany to teach public-school courses in Turkish history, culture, and civics. (Turks already living abroad also teach.) These teachers have generally tended to be staunch supporters of the military regime and Kemalism. By definition, they are laicists.[77] A lively competition for control of the indoctrination and education processes of the second

generation has thus ensued, compounded in 1987 by a major scandal that broke in Turkey. Saudi Arabian money was linked to key officials in the Turkish government, specifically intended to support the export of religious education to West Germany.[78]

Indeed, many Turks in West Germany were already observant Muslims in Turkey prior to their migration. For many, however, it is the foreign, Christian, and German context that provides the initial catalyst for active involvement in religious organisations and worship. One interpretation of this increased identification with Muslim symbols and organisations is that the popularity of Islamic groups and identifications is a form of resistance against prevailing norms of an alien society, a society commonly perceived of as dangerous, infidel, and immoral. In this view, the migrants' distance from Turkey and their feeling of marginality — not only with regard to Turkey but also to mainstream German society — provide the context for these newfound religious sentiments, which might not have been relevant had the migrants remained with the mainstream in Turkey.

Questions of legality, power, and authority also enter into the picture, if we consider that a great deal of the organisational, preaching, and educational modes that are widespread in West Germany would be clearly illegal in Turkey.[79] For Turkish Sunnis in West Germany, the distance from Turkey ensures freedom from legal constraints, while Turkish Alevis also find in the diaspora an environment conducive to expressing their Alevi identity free from what they perceive as the pressures of a Sunni-dominant, repressive, hegemonic order in Turkey. Thus, embedded in the process of the dual marginalisation — both from Turkish and German societies — of migrant Turkish Alevis and Sunnis are the seeds from which may be observed the blooming of alternative expressions of "reimagined" (Anderson 1983) Islamic identities.

Turks in western Europe take great care to prevent the moral contamination that they believe threatens them, particularly in the form of haram (forbidden) meat — i.e. pork. The Islamic dietary laws, nearly forgotten in Turkey, have moved to the forefront of concerns in gurbet. Clever entrepreneurs have used the fear of haram to their advantage, and have had great success with their helal industries, which sell everything from helal sausage to helal bread. The explicit association which many Turks make between pork consumption and promiscuity lends still greater fervour to the conspicuous avoidance of German food, restaurants, grocery stores, and butchers.[80] In a country such as Germany, where pork products are an important dietary staple, the adamant Turkish avoidance of pork is sometimes interpreted negatively by German natives as a type of social and cultural rejection, a refusal to integrate and to accept prevailing norms.

Moreover, the overt anti-Muslim sentiment prevalent among Germans is, naturally, resented by religiously observant Turks. This sentiment is manifested in a variety of ways — from the forcible removal of girls' headscarves by public-school teachers, to public mockery or ridicule, to the various strategies employed to oppose and undermine Qur'anic schools. The kopftuch (headscarf) debate continues as a heated issue, more among

Germans than Turks. Many Germans feel offended by seeing Turkish women and girls with their heads covered. Ironically, the left (particularly feminists) and the right have united in their categorical opposition to the wearing of scarves. Though articulated and rationalised differently — it is variously described as “ugly”, “backward”, “un-German”, “sticking out”, or symbolic of sexist, patriarchal dominance and repression — the message is the same. In a self-consciously blatant Christian society, albeit dually denominational, it is not surprising that non-Christians may react by feeling unaccepted and marginalised (see Mandel, 1989). [81]

Although Turkish parents (particularly Sunni) commonly feel threatened by the encompassing Christian, permissive society and its potentially corrupting influence on their children, the reactions of the second-generation children can take different forms. For some, years of intensive indoctrination at Qur’an schools and the mosque outweigh other forces and influences. But teenage girls in particular often respond to the religious resistance of their parents with a counter-resistance of their own. For instance, as soon as they are out of sight of their own homes, they may shed the “Islamic” garments that their fathers force them to wear, and adorn themselves at school with make-up, fashionable mini-skirts, and the like.

In interviews with repatriated migrants in Turkey, I was told a number of times by informants that it was in Germany that they became religious; only there did they begin wearing ba§ ortusu (the headscarf) and attending mosque. Many Sunni informants also

related how they met their first Alevi in Germany. Anti-Alevi prejudices migrate along with the Sunni Gastarbeiter, and although in some instances these prejudices may be overcome by direct contact, these are generally thought of as exceptions and are not applicable to the general group. The deeply ingrained Sunni beliefs about the alleged immorality, ritualised incestuous practices, and impure nature of the Alevis determine a significant dimension of patterns of differentiation and affiliation within the Turkish community. This is most evident in the marriage partners chosen by second-generation young people, who rarely marry outside sectarian boundaries.

For centuries in Turkey the Alevis have been the underdogs, often perceived as a fifth column in the Ottoman Empire, as they occasionally sided with the Shi‘i Safavis.[82] In Republican times, Alevis have had more than their share of massacres, oppression, and deportations. This extends to the present day, when to identify oneself as an Alevi is an unambiguous identification with the political left — a difficult and dangerous position since the 1980 military coup d’etat. The problems that the Alevis face in Turkey are reflected in their disproportionate over-representation in the migrant diaspora. Moreover, the tense, repressive state of martial law in several largely Alevi and Kurdish provinces in eastern Anatolia makes itself felt in the lower incidence of repatriation of Alevis to Turkey compared with Sunni migrants.

Within and between Alevi communities various patterns of movement among members of holy lineages have long been an expected way of life. The itinerant holy man, the pir or dede (spiritual leader, descended from a holy lineage) typically wandered much of the year, travelling from one group of his talip followers to the next, and leading ayin-i cems (the secret communal AleviBektasi ritual of solidarity and “collective effervescence”, involving song, music, and dervish trance dancing, as well as a reenactment of the martyrdoms of ‘Ali and Huseyin [Arabic, Husayn]). In addition, the pir can legitimately demand tribute from the talip, which may assume many forms. Historically, we know that the pir served as the locus of intra- and inter-regional communication and was at key times a crucial link in political networks. Often a central figure in opposition movements, he was able to rally followers due to his legitimacy and success as a pir, and to convey information.

In the context of contemporary migration, this practice of the itinerant priest, travelling to Alevi communities to conduct the ayin-i cem and collect tributes, is maintained, transformed, and might even become the locus of serious intra-Alevi tension and controversy. Elsewhere I have written about an Alevi-Bekta§i cem in West Berlin that fell apart in its final moments (Mandel 1986). In that case, the schism ostensibly stemmed from a disagreement between most of the participants and the officiating dede over the appropriateness of a particular song’s inclusion at the end of the cem. The dede, who had been flown in from Ankara, wanted to forbid the song, written by Pir Sultan Abdal, on the grounds that it was “political”.[83] For the majority of the Alevis there, already alienated from the dede for what they felt to be other offensive behaviour, this was the final, backbreaking straw, inciting the minor rebellion that followed.

Migrant Alevis have in many ways successfully reversed their hierarchically subordinate position to the Sunni Turks. They point to what they see as their more “democratic, tolerant, and progressive” stance. While steadfast in their “Aleviness”, they identify with and admire many aspects of West German society that the Sunnis interpret as threatening. Modelling themselves on certain German, western modes, they pride themselves on how modern they are, as opposed to the “backward” Sunnis. They point to the village clothing which many Sunni women wear, such as their flowing §alvar pants and headscarves. Also, the Alevi practice of not attending mosque, perhaps along with some of the aspects of the practice of taqiyya (dissimulation) which characterise them, together serve to raise their status in the eyes of Germans. Finally, Alevis tend to be more politically engaged in leftist politics than Sunnis, and through such activities have greater contact with Germans. Though still peripheral with respect to Sunnis, the Alevis might be slightly less marginal (i.e. more integrated) than Sunnis with respect to mainstream German society.

The Alevis, in their consistently heterodox (from the Sunni perspective) stance, have always been inherently “political”, even though it was not until the 1970s that the Alevis consciously began to identify themselves as a group, and organise themselves as a formal political party — now outlawed (Mardin 1980: 186–7). Today in western Europe several Alevi groups conceive of themselves in explicitly political — and national — terms. Perhaps the most extreme, a group calling itself “Kizil Yol” (or Red Path), advocates the founding of “Alevistan” (or a nation of Alevis). Taking its model from the struggles of Kurdish separatists for the establishment ofan independent Kurdistan, these followers of the Red Path are criticised by some on the grounds that Alevilik (Aleviness) is a religion, not a nationality. Most Alevis would surely not support this nationalist expression of Alevilik, and Kizil Yol is far from representative. None the less, the notion of “Alevistan” is compelling, for it suggests the emergence in the diaspora of a

consciously discrete identity (here influenced by the discourse of western nationalisms) which gravitates around a fantastic centre.

While the Alevis abroad are doubly marginal with respect to both Germans and Sunni Turks, their relative position vis-a-vis Sunnis has undergone a transformation. In West Germany, the reference point of Sunni dominance becomes less and less relevant. Alevis, who had defined themselves primarily in opposition to Sunnis, and always in reference to them, have in some respects gradually replaced the latter with Germans in the process of identity construction. Furthermore, Alevis in Germany have the freedom to adopt a more inward, communal orientation, unfettered by past political and social constraints.

*** Displaced centres, emerging identities

Among other things, this chapter has shown how the experience of migration affects different articulations of Islam among expatriate Turks. Not only do Alevis and Sunnis confront the foreign context in very different ways, but their relations to each other are undergoing a transformation in the light of their respective interactions with German society. To a large extent, the separate Sunni and Alevi value systems and histories are reproduced in the second generation, reflecting the different patterns of socialisation in each group. These different patterns of socialisation influence the overall future orientations of Sunni and Alevi youth towards Turkey and Germany.

Migrant parents soften the daily blows of gurbet by telling stories to their children, painting for them the contours and shades of a land that they will never see since it does not exist apart from in their stories. They sweeten the bitter present with the elusive saccharin future, which is, to be sure, a revisionist, romanticised projection of a past. A vicious circle of sorts reflects the migratory cycle itself and eventually results in a situation in which the centre finds itself wherever the migrant is not, be it Turkey or Germany. No given locus can be the totalising centre for long. The migrant’s marginality in both Turkey

and Germany precludes his or her full identification with either place. This displacement is exacerbated by the fact that in either place migrants partially define themselves in relation to the values and symbols of the other locale, which are ubiquitous even in its absence.

The izin vacation trip to Turkey is the event that crystallises this conundrum. In the idealisation of Turkey and in the drive there, the crescendo of a southward identification builds up, only to be foiled by the anti-climatic reception in the homeland. From the

vantage point of Turkey, Germany then becomes the salient place of reference — that is, until the trip back. Thus, an undercurrent of disaffection and dissatisfaction informs the migrant's experience.

Ultimately, the annual izin trip home neither provides an opportunity for collective solidarity with compatriots, nor offers an infusion of the stuff that reinforces identity. Rather, it furthers the alienation resulting from the absence of an attainable centre in the lives of Gastarbeiter. In a twist to Benedict Anderson's call for a rethinking of our tendency to reify nations and nationalisms in our act of imagining them (Anderson 1985), here it seems that the Alamancilar have been imagined by their compatriots back home, objectified and distanced by the latters' expectations and projections. Yet the annual circular choreography that patterns the migrants' lives contributes to reproducing the Alamanci identity of marginality. Thus, as Gastarbeiter in Germany they cannot escape their Turkishness, and, conversely, they become Alamancilar ("German-like") in Turkey, where they had hoped to be Turks.

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I would like to acknowledge the valuable suggestions and editing generously offered by Mariane Ferme during the writing of this chapter. Also I would like to thank Robert Dankoff for his advice in the Turkish translations. The remaining faults or errors remain, of course, my responsibility.

[71] This chapter is based on research data gathered in Turkey, West Germany, and West Berlin. Between the years 1980 and 1986, I spent over two years in Turkey and eighteen months in the Federal Republic of Germany, conducting research as a participant observer on several aspects of the migration cycle.

[72] With the exception of one forty-minute programme, called “Turkiye Mektubu” (“Turkey Letter”), broadcast each fortnight as part of a Second-Channel weekly programme, “Nachbarn in Europa” (“Neighbours in Europe”), there have been no Turkish television programmes in West Germany. On the rare occasions when Turkish movies are shown on television, they, too, are out of linguistic reach of most Turks, since they are dubbed into German rather than sub-titled. It is the exceptional Turkish migrant family that does not have a VCR, and the Turkish video industry abroad is booming; West Berlin boasts perhaps seventy Turkish video shops. However, the recent introduction of cable television may change the viewing habits of Turkish families, and there is now a nightly Turkish cable-radio broadcast from Cologne.

Not only is most socialising carried out with other Turks, but preferably with Turks who, if not relatives, identify with the same region of the country, speak the same language (many of the migrants speak one of two Kurdish languages), and affiliate with the same expression of Islam — be it Sunni, Alevi, or one of the many tarikats (religious orders) active in Germany.

[73] Due to recent unfortunate incidents affecting the Turkish minority in Bulgaria (ostensibly of an anti-Muslim nature), some Turks have felt apprehensive about driving through the country. However, the apprehension was not serious enough to warrant any change of plans. No one with whom I spoke was willing to opt for the alternate route through Turkey’s adversarial NATO ally, Greece, despite the fact that the road through northern Greek Macedonia and Thrace passes through the heartland of Greece’s Turkish minority.

[74] Turkish still serves as a lingua franca in many parts of the Balkans that were under Ottoman rule.

[75] I use this term with reservations, following Carl Pletch’s criticism of the three-world theory. However, in the present case the informants themselves perceive Turkey as backward and underdeveloped in contrast with the west, which is always the point of reference. Their perception of the hierarchical relations is expressed as an unambiguous Eurocentricity.

[76] A new field of medicine, Gastarbeiterkrankheit, has emerged in West Germany. In western Europe, Turks claim to experience physical and emotional ailments never known before migration — a complex series of what we would call psychosomatic and psychological illnesses (see, for example, Edinsel 1984).

[77] Not all European host countries follow West Germany’s example. The Netherlands, for instance, has had altercations with Turkey over this issue, since Holland refuses to admit Turkish textbooks and teachers into its school system. Instead, in an effort to address the

migrant situation, Holland has commissioned its own, custom-tailored texts, which are taught by resident Turks. The Dutch object to the pedagogic content and level in the material from Turkey, and claim that through the official books and teachers sent from Milli Egitim (the Ministry of Education), Turkey is merely exporting political propaganda with which the Dutch government does not wish to be associated. West Berlin commissioned and has recently instituted a new, controversial set of Turkish textbooks for grades 1 through 8. They were written and illustrated by Turkish intellectuals residing in West Berlin and contain a great deal of literature and references that are banned in Turkey.

[78] Not unrelated are findings that trace massive amounts of presumed Saudi money entering Turkey via Germany to support popular religious orders in Turkey whose social, economic, and educational networks operate by means of an elaborate patronage system. Some sociologists in Turkey have been conducting research on the links and functioning of this sophisticated and highly efficacious patronage system.

[79] For example, the maps and pictures decorating the walls of a well-established Qur’anic school in West Berlin are of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman sultans; none represents the Turkish Republic or Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Much of the preaching that takes place in mosques in Germany is of an explicitly political nature, prohibited in Turkey.

[80] I became aware of this after having been asked by Turks on numerous occasions if I ate pork. The intensity of their concern led me to pursue the issue, and in many cases the act of eating pork or abstinence therefrom served as the demarcation line between acceptance as one of “us” and rejection of “them”. The way it is often phrased, “domuz kiskanmaz” (“pigs are not jealous”) euphemistically signifies that pigs are promiscuous animals, not monogamous, and that therefore those who partake of pork also become promiscuous, shameful, lacking in honour and virtue. It is the moral extension of “you are what you eat”.

[81] A parallel battle is raging in Turkey conducted by Muslims who would like to see the wearing of the headscarf legalised in the schools (it has been banned since the time of Ataturk). This issue has become highly politicised and has been the source of intense strife, strikes, and protests. A scandal involving the former prime minister’s brother revolved around bribe money paid to women university students if they agreed to wear the scarf.

[82] The Alevis are not a homogeneous, monolithic group. They fall into at least four different language groups — Turkish, Arabic, Zaza, and Kurmangi. The latter two are Iranian and Kurdish languages. In western Anatolia most Alevis are formerly transhumant Turkoman; many in the east call themselves Kurds, or are labelled Kurdish by others.

[83] Pir Sultan Abdal, a sixteenth-century pir, is revered today as an Alevi folk hero. The eloquent, mystical, politically charged poetry and music he wrote, in the semah dervish style, has been kept alive by Alevis since his death. Considered a threat to the Ottoman regime, he died by hanging in 1560 during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent. The power of the songs has not diminished through the centuries, as the Berlin cem incident made clear.

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* Part Four: Saints, scholars, and travel

** Chapter Nine: Pedigrees and paradigms: scholarly credentials among the Dyula of the northern Ivory Coast

Robert Launay

The Hijaz in particular and the Arabic-speaking Middle East in general have always constituted points of reference for Dyula Muslims.[84] At the most basic level, Arabic is the obligatory language of prayer and the hajj an obligation for those who have the means to peform it. Not only the Qur’an but the vast majority of commentaries, legal texts of reference, and personal prayers are written in classical Arabic — an entirely foreign, quintessential^ written language, totally unrelated to the Manding language spoken by the Dyula. The ability to read and to write Arabic were necessary conditions for accession to the status of karamogo, or “scholar”. Travel for the purposes of study was a common means of acquiring knowledge of Arabic as a language and of written texts.

Indeed, the Dyula of the northern Ivory Coast have always valued travel positively. The word dyula also means “trader”. Formerly the Dyula, as a Muslim minority living amongst “pagan” Senufo, enjoyed an ethnic monopoly over various sectors of both intra-regional and long-distance trade. For individuals involved in commerce, travel was an integral part of the process of making a living. As for religious learning, it was by no means remarkable for younger scholars to travel outside their home communities to pursue their education with more knowledgeable or prestigious teachers. Likewise, scholars from established centres of learning travelled to smaller or more distant communities where they might outshine potential rivals and establish a firm and profitable local reputation.

It is hazardous, however, to make an a priori assumption that travel and study in the Arabic-speaking Middle East was the most prestigious form of travel — for study or for the dissemination of ideas. Just as Dyula traders were anxious to maintain control, if not a monopoly, over access to trade goods, so Dyula scholars were concerned to maintain control over access to knowledge — the equivalent of goods in the spiritual and intellectual realms.

Knowledge, in this sense, is not simply that which one knows. More crucially, it is the authority with which one speaks or writes. Such authority depends in part on what one has studied and with whom. Claims to superior knowledge, on the grounds that one has studied directly in the Middle East, may constitute a challenge to the authority of local traditions of scholarship. In the last resort, the exercise of intellectual authority is just as much a question of legitimacy as the exercise of political authority. Like political authority, one can attempt to monopolise it, but the success of such attempts depends — even more than in politics — on the attitudes of one's constituency.

The authority of scholars ultimately derives from their expertise in religious matters. The scholar's role in Dyula communities thus hinges first of all on notions of what Islam is and what it means to call oneself a Muslim. Since the nineteenth century, these notions have changed in important ways, and even in the nineteenth century were subject to debate. Controversies about the legitimacy of locally-trained as opposed to foreign-trained scholars are also controversies about different conceptions of Islam and of "being Muslim". In order to evaluate and understand these controversies, it is necessary to establish an historical baseline, albeit a tentative one.

*** The Suwarian tradition among the Dyula

Until the mid-twentieth century, Islam among the Dyula was predicated on the notion that all Dyula were Muslim and that, locally, most others (particularly Senufo) were bamana, "pagans". Supra-locally, the Dyula were in regular contact with other West African Muslim communities, usually Manding-speakers like themselves. Local Dyula were divided into two hereditary categories: tun tigi and mory. Tun tigi were associated in principle with warfare and with the exercise of political power. Adolescent males were initiated into lo societies, involving masquerading and blood sacrifices (jo) to various spirits. Tun tigi were not expected to abstain from alcoholic beverages, to fast throughout the month of Ramadan, or even to pray regularly five times a day. Mory, on the other hand, were expected to conform with reasonable diligence to the strictures of the shari'a, and adolescent males often received at least rudimentary instruction in reading and writing Arabic. Ideally, the occupations of mory were trade and scholarship rather than warfare and politics. These categories, it must be stressed, were hereditary; they applied to entire clan wards (kabilas) and not to individuals. Individuals could and did engage in occupations that were more typically associated with the opposite category. Religious practices might also vary on an individual level, at least among

the tun tigi; since all Dyula were Muslims, it was meritorious, but hardly obligatory, for individual tun tigi to emulate mory standards of piety.

The common religious identity of all Dyula, mory and tun tigi, was most fully expressed in certain rituals: the slaughter of sheep on Tabaski, the annual sacrifice during the month of the hajj; singing and dancing during Ramadan and on donba (the Prophet's birthday); and the manner of observing various life-crisis rituals — naming, weddings, and funerals. Performing these rituals on the required occasions in the proper manner was one central feature of "being Muslim", although the authority for performing them in this manner did not necessarily rest in the prescriptions of written religious texts. On the other hand, outward signs of piety — prayer, fasting, abstaining from alcohol and from blood sacrifices — were not in and of themselves hallmarks of a Muslim identity. At one level, such manifestations of piety were typical only of mory, and not of all Dyula Muslims, although at another level they represented an ideal standard of behaviour which all Muslims might choose to emulate. Scholars were responsible for establishing these standards of piety — obligatory in principle for all mory and to some extent ideal for tun tigi. Their command of Arabic provided them with access to the written texts, which furnished the necessary guidelines for behaviour. They were also expected to set a personal example of piety for others to follow.

There was a tendency for scholarship to be a hereditary occupation. Whole clan wards, or a section of a large clan ward, might specialise in scholarship in any given community. In this way, each village tended to have a few, usually quite small, specialised scholarly families. None the less, any Muslim man might choose at any time to pursue his studies at an advanced level and accede eventually to the status of karamogo.

Both the extent of a person's religious learning and the degree to which he was expected to demonstrate this learning in his own pious behaviour corresponded ideally to the circumstances of his birth — as a tun tigi or mory (i.e. a member of a scholarly lineage or not). However, accession to the status of scholar involved the conferring of a second pedigree, intellectual rather than hereditary. This isnad was very much like a genealogy. The Dyula words for teacher and pupil are karamogo fa and karamogo den, literally "scholar father" and "scholar child". The authority of a scholar ultimately derives from his possession of such a pedigree, which places him in a line of teachers and pupils. If one examines any

such isnad, one notices that the line of teachers extends literally all the way to God, the ultimate source of knowledge and moral authority. Beneath God, a number of angels are also listed as teacher and pupil before this knowledge is transmitted to humankind in the person of the Prophet. The name of Malik ibn Anas (AD 715–95) is also on

every such list among the Dyula, as they all belong to the Maliki school of jurisprudence. More important, the Dyula isnads all converge on the name of al-Hajj Salim Suware, who lived in the fifteenth century.[85] The line of transmission from Malik to al-Hajj Salim is clearly abbreviated, as it contains only six names, including two identifiable ninth-century scholars: ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Qasim of Cairo and ‘Abd al-Salam Sahnun of Qayrawan (Wilks 1968). The convergence of isnads on the person of al-Hajj Salim is by no means a peculiarity of the Dyula of the northern Ivory Coast; his influence was so decisive, in a belt that runs from Guinea (Hunter 1977; Sanneh 1979) to northern Ghana (Wilks 1968), that it is perfectly reasonable to speak in terms of a “Suwarian tradition”[86] in West African Islamic scholarship.

This widespread convergence of isnads conveys a symbolic message about the nature of knowledge and the authority derived from its possession. God and the angels are the ultimate source of knowledge and moral authority. However, in terms of “this-worldly” geography, knowledge stems first and foremost from the Hijaz (from the Prophet to Imam Malik), then derivatively from Arabic-speaking northern Africa (Cairo, Qayrawan), and finally from the person of al-Hajj Salim, before diverging into various lines. In short, if the Arabic-speaking world is the ultimate earthly source of knowledge, access to this knowledge is mediated by a regional tradition of scholarship; it is not acquired directly at, or closer to, its source.

The Haidara scholars of Kadioha and Boron are a case in point. The Haidara are universally acknowledged in the region as sharifs, direct descendants of the Prophet. A putative Middle Eastern origin is not at all unusual among the Dyula. Various clans privately claim descent from one companion or another of the Prophet, admittedly without providing any genealogical evidence, or have oral traditions about the dealings of their “ancestor” with the Prophet, and how in one way or another they were loyal Muslims from the very beginning. Such claims symbolically anchor the clans in space (the Hijaz) and time (the Prophet’s lifetime), but they are not socially relevant for regulating inter-clan relationships. Unlike such stories, the Haidara claim falls into the domain of common knowledge. Even so, the Haidara isnads also converge on al-Hajj Salim; although they can effectively claim a direct hereditary link to the Prophet, their intellectual pedigree, like that of everyone else, hails from West Africa and from al-Hajj Salim.

Al-Hajj Salim’s scholarly activity was centred on the town of Jagha in western Sudan, but his influence was greatest along the southern fringes of the Manding trade network, and corresponds to the period of the disintegration of the old Malian empire. This was a region in which such Manding-speaking Muslims as the Dyula lived as a minority among various groups of “unbelievers”. The tradition of scholarship founded by al-Hajj Salim stressed the religious co-existence of these two categories — Muslims and unbelievers — with the attendant separation of religion and politics. No active attempts were made to proselytise unbelievers, and militant jihad was avoided. It would be a serious misconception to label this tradition as “pacifist”, however. Warfare, whether with Muslims or unbelievers, remained a distinct possibility. Rather, the Suwarian approach was neatly mirrored in the Dyula distinction between the hereditary categories of tun tigi

and mory, those whose business was ideally warfare and politics and those whose business was ideally religious scholarship. Relations between the Dyula and their “pagan” neighbours might range from open hostility to active alliance, but in no case was religion a deciding issue. The Suwarian tradition not only fostered the development of relatively peaceful co-existence between Muslim minorities and their neighbours, but also sanctioned the existence of different hereditary categories within the Muslim community itself — making outward piety an obligation for some Muslims (especially scholars themselves), but only an ideal for others.

*** The first challenge: militant jihad

In short, the Suwarian tradition incorporated a number of basic distinctions between politics and religion, hereditary and intellectual pedigrees, the Hijaz as the ultimate source of knowledge and moral authority and a local tradition of scholarship. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, comparable traditions of Islam and Islamic scholarship were subjected to challenges in much of West Africa in the form of militant jihad movements. Several of these movements attempted to draw their legitimacy from direct study in the Hijaz as opposed to local scholarly traditions. ‘Uthman dan Fodio’s teacher, Jibril ibn Umar, studied in the Hijaz (Hiskett 1973), as did al-Hajj Umar Tall (Robinson 1985). It would be far too simplistic to explain the jihad movements exclusively in terms of the diffusion of ideas from the Middle East to West Africa. The hajj itself, especially combined with study in the Hijaz or elsewhere

in the Middle East, constituted a different principle of legitimacy, an alternative source of intellectual and moral authority. Under certain circumstances, it could be explicitly opposed to the authority of local scholarly traditions.

The hajj has always been a powerful Islamic symbol among the Dyula. Until recently, the journey itself was exceedingly long, hazardous, and difficult. Indeed, I know of no individual at all from the Korhogo region who successfully completed the journey before the twentieth century. On the other hand, I was shown a manuscript list of various illustrious Manding scholars who had accomplished the hajj. Twelve scholars are cited in all, hailing from various communities in Mali and particularly in Guinea and the western Ivory Coast. Not surprisingly, al-Hajj Salim Suware headed the list. This list hearkens back to a sort of “golden age” of Islamic scholarship in the region, when scholars were in direct contact with the Hijaz and when the Suwarian tradition itself came into being. After this era, the hajj became an ideal rather than a reality. For example, the Cisse of Kadioha relate that their ancestor, Mammadu, left his native town of Bakongo in Guinea to undertake the hajj. Along the way, he stopped in the village of Kadioha, where he was finally persuaded to abandon his pilgrimage and to settle instead. Whether or not the story is true, the ancestor is remembered for his piety, not because he accomplished the hajj, but rather because of his intention to perform the journey. The hajj, situated in the distant past or in terms of intentions rather than

accomplishment, constituted a symbolic link between the Dyula and the ultimate source of their faith, much as did the claims of various clans to descent from companions of the Prophet. But it did not necessarily represent an alternative source of moral authority.

This is not to say that the hajj was never used as a challenge to the authority of the Suwarian tradition. The career of al-Hajj Mahmud Karantaw among the Kantossi of the Volta Basin, to the east of Korhogo, provides an interesting example.[87] The Kantossi, like the Dyula, were a Muslim minority of Mande origin living in the midst of “unbelievers”. Mahmud studied with local teachers and was trained in the Suwarian tradition before undertaking the pilgrimage. During his journey, he stopped to study in Syria with a Qadiri teacher, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahim, who persuaded him to undertake a jihad on his return. This jihad against neighbouring “pagans” was launched in the mid-nineteenth century. Al-Hajj Mahmud attracted some support, both among his fellow Kantossi and in the nearby town of Wa, a major centre of Muslim learning in the region (Ivor Wilks, personal communication). With this army, he was able to conquer some of the surrounding area and to found the polity of Wahabu. However, Muslims in the area were strongly divided over support for the jihad, with the majority opposing Islamic militancy and favouring the maintenance of friendly relations with neighbouring “pagans” — whether on moral, political, or commercial grounds. Ultimately, the movement was a very limited success, and Wahabu was limited to a small cluster of villages.

Al-Hajj Mahmud’s movement demonstrates, first of all, that peoples like Dyula belonging to the Suwarian tradition were aware of and not always impervious to the jihad movements that swept through much of West Africa. Second, like a number of other jihad leaders, al-Hajj Mahmud sought legitimacy through a direct appeal to study in the Arabic-speaking world, effectively attempting to supersede the mediating role of local scholarly traditions. Finally, this attempt, though not entirely a failure, did not win the support of the vast majority of local Muslims, both scholars and ordinary believers, who continued to affirm their loyalty to the Suwarian tradition. Such loyalty was hardly surprising. Not only were they outnumbered ten to one by their “pagan” neighbours, but they were also more heavily involved in local as opposed to long-distance trade, and they relied on their Senufo neighbours both as customers for their wares and as suppliers of food for purchase in the market place. A jihad movement would have been a dangerous gamble, calling into question their relations of co-operation with their neighbours, which the Suwarian tradition legitimised. However, the Dyula were well aware, not only of the existence of jihad movements, but also of the religious issues involved in either supporting or opposing them. The absence of such movements in the Korhogo region cannot be taken as a sign of inertia, of an unquestioning respect for the force of religious tradition, but rather as a deliberate confirmation of the principle that religious authority, though it might stem ultimately from the Hijaz, was to be mediated by established local lines of scholarship rather than by a direct appeal to contemporary teachings in the Arabic-speaking world.

*** The second challenge: the “Wahhabi” movement

The imposition of French colonial rule was to lay the groundwork for the redefinition of what it meant to be Muslim among the Dyula. Consequently, they had new grounds for calling the Suwarian tradition into question. French rule in and of itself did not constitute a major problem within the Suwarian tradition.

Before the colonial period, the Dyula had accommodated themselves quite well to being ruled by non-Muslims. Given the principle of the separation of politics and religion, it was expected that scholars would profess outward loyalty to whatever regime was in place, although other individuals were free to support or to oppose it as they saw fit. Rather, the social, political, and economic changes that ultimately accompanied French rule were to transform society and consequently the place of scholars within it. In the first place, the pax colonia abolished pre-colonial patterns of warfare and rendered the warrior functions of the tun tigi obsolete. At the same time, it opened new avenues for trade in the south of the Ivory Coast — not only for the Dyula but also for other trading groups, who were often better able to exploit these new possibilities. Dyula from Korhogo began to migrate in substantial numbers to the south — where kola nuts (a major trade good) were grown, and where there was a ready market for livestock, cloth, and other commodities. At the same time, the village of Korhogo was chosen as the major administrative centre for the entire northern region of the Ivory Coast, eventually attracting a stream of migrants in its own right. The development of rail and motor transport, by revolutionising patterns of African trade, marginalised the strategic importance of communities along trade routes in favour of those situated directly near centres of production or consumption, and also concentrated trade in the hands of large-scale traders. In the towns of the south, the Dyula immediately found themselves in direct contact — and in competition — with Muslim traders from elsewhere. As a plantation economy developed in the south, the north, and Korhogo in particular, became important as a source of both migrant labour and staple foods. Korhogo began to attract ever more substantial numbers of immigrants, mainly Senufo from outlying areas but also individuals from neighbouring countries, many of them Muslim and often Manding-speakers like the Dyula.

By the middle of the twentieth century, the Dyula of Koko, descendants of the original Dyula inhabitants of the town, found that their situation had altered radically in a number of respects. First of all, they had lost all pretensions to a monopoly over trade in the region. Second, they were no longer in a position to assimilate new Muslim immigrants to Korhogo, as they had in the past. While they retained the “ownership” of the town’s Friday mosque, they no longer enjoyed a monopoly over Islam. Formerly, trade, Muslim identity, and membership in the Koko Dyula community all coincided in Korhogo. Now, these three features became dissociated. A Muslim identity remained a pre-condition for entering the sector of local trade. However, the relationship between trade and Islam changed in a crucial if not immediately obvious manner. In the past, Muslims, defined in terms of their Dyula ethnic identity, had monopolised trade. Now, non-Muslims could enter the trade sector by converting to Islam. Growing numbers of Senufo “pagans”, beginning with the chief of Korhogo himself, converted to Islam, especially within town.

These conversions were partly responsible for changing the symbols of Muslim identity in Korhogo. In the past, a Muslim was one who belonged to a Muslim community and affirmed this identity by participating in the performance of communal rituals on Muslim calendar holidays and at the time of life crises. Now, new converts might adopt Islam individually without renouncing their membership in communities which also included unbelievers. Their newfound Muslim identity was most conveniently expressed through the adoption of outward forms of piety — praying, fasting, etc. — once typical of Dyula mory but not of tun tigi. Such forms of piety were recognisable signs ofan Islamic identity anywhere, outside as well as within the region. Consequently, Dyula tun tigi were increasingly attracted to mory forms of piety. Their former role as “warriors” was obsolete. Initiation into the lo societies constituted a drain on the time and financial resources of younger men — who, during and just after the Second World War, refused en masse to participate. The lo societies were abandoned, and the tun tigi/mory distinction ceased to be socially salient. Calendrical and life-crisis rituals continued to be of importance, but they ceased in and of themselves to constitute the signs of Muslim identity — giving way to observances which were more globally identifiable as “Muslim”.

The immediate consequence of this shift was to reinforce the leadership role of scholars in the Dyula community. Their personal behaviour was expected to set a standard, not only for the mory, but for the entire community. They were responsible for explaining to the entire community the kinds of behaviour that were proper or improper, forbidden, or enjoined. The guidelines which they set had to be acceptable, not only to Dyula Muslims but to Muslims from other communities as well. Before the Second World War, the public preaching of homilies was not a major activity of scholars, and was usually left to students. Now, karamogos - the younger ones at first — began to deliver sermons on a regular basis, as part of the ceremonials associated with Muslim calendar holidays as well as funerals. The sermons found ready and avid audiences, admittedly because they were a form of entertainment, but also, as one friend of mine explained, because Islam is a complex matter and it is the ordinary believer’s responsibility to make himself aware of the rules so that he may observe them properly.

In the short run, this new found “shari‘a-mindedness”, to use Hodgson’s (1974) term, provided Dyula scholars with more moral authority in the community than ever before. In the longer run, however, it provided a basis for challenging, rather than reinforcing, the legitimacy of scholars trained in the Suwarian tradition. Islam among the Dyula had formerly been predicated on the notion that different kinds of religious behaviour were appropriate for different categories of persons: tun tigi, mory, and karamogos. By the 1950s, a single standard of piety was held to apply, not only to all Dyula but effectively to all Muslims. Once the principle is established that all Muslims throughout the world ought to conform to the same norms of piety, perceived discrepancies appear as problematic. Indeed, if there is a universal standard of piety, the status of a local tradition of scholarship is effectively altered. Islamic knowledge has universal applications, and there ceases to be any a priori reason why a local pedigree, anchored in the Suwarian tradition, is necessarily preferable to any other.

Discrepancies are only a problem if they are perceived as such. However, the pax colonia, by favouring the freer movement of individuals from place to place, broadened the contact of Dyula with other Muslims (though the Dyula, as traders, were never isolated from such contacts) and increased the likelihood that individuals might perceive discrepancies of various kinds. In particular, it became easier to accomplish the hajj, though as long as the pilgrimage remained an overland journey, it remained long and hazardous. Few individuals from Korhogo actually undertook such a journey. It involved leaving one's family for years on end and finding odd jobs from place to place along the way in order to pay for each leg of the trip. Those who made the trip are remembered as having accomplished something remarkable, but not for returning with new ideas, new conceptions of Islam, or "being Muslim". However, the very fact that such journeys were actually made was itself significant. Al-Hajj ceased to be a title which was applied only to names on a list going back to the remote past, but became a contemporary reality. The journey to the Middle East and to the Hijaz — to the ultimate source of religious knowledge and authority — was no longer an ideal which for all intents and purposes was almost unrealisable, but a real possibility, even if beyond the means of most.

While the overland hajj did not have a direct intellectual impact on Islam among the Dyula of Korhogo in the first half of the twentieth century, it did for other West African Muslim communities with whom they were in touch. Towards the end of the Second World War, when the Dyula of Korhogo were in the process of

abandoning the lo societies, a number of Manding-speaking pilgrims returned from the hajj with a different set of ideas. After a prolonged sojourn in the Hijaz and the Arabic-speaking world, al-Hajj Tiekoro Kamagate returned to Bouake, the second largest town in the Ivory Coast, and began to preach against various practices associated with the Suwarian tradition. Roughly at the same time, a small cadre of young hajjis from Guinea and the Gambia — notably al-Hajj Kabine Kaba and al-Hajj Muhammad Fode — returned from several years of study at al-Azhar in Cairo, where they had chosen to remain as students on their return from the Hijaz. During their stay, they were exposed to the reformist ideas of Muhammad 'Abduh and his disciples. On their return, most members of this group ultimately chose to settle in Bamako, a more central and cosmopolitan location than their home communities. These individuals in Bouake and Bamako were disparagingly labelled "Wahhabis" by the French colonial authorities, who took a dim view of their activities.[88]

In both towns, they directly challenged the authority of established scholars. First of all, they criticised the formalism of the Sunni legal schools, and attacked the Sufi orders. Although Sufism is a relatively peripheral feature of Islam among the Dyula, most karamogos belong to the Qadiriyya or the Tijaniyya. The Hajjis denounced all forms of saint worship as illegitimately positing the existence of intermediaries between God and the ordinary believer. Like Sufism, saint worship is not a central feature of the Suwarian tradition, but the tombs of certain founders of scholarly lines are considered legitimate

objects of veneration. By challenging this notion, they called into question the legitimacy of such lines of scholarly authority, and, by implication, the intellectual pedigrees of Dyula scholars. They attacked all forms of magic as illegitimate: for example, the manufacture of written amulets — which constituted a part of the earnings of scholars. Last but not least, they denounced aspects of life-crisis and calendrical rituals, particularly the distribution of prestations — called saraka (“charitable donations”) by Suwarian scholars and their followers. These, the Wahhabis argued, did not constitute charity at all and so conferred no religious merit.

The Wahhabi criticism went considerably further than the challenge of nineteenth-century jihad movements. Adherents of jihad movements had appealed directly to the sources of knowledge in the Hijaz and the Middle East, without necessary recourse to the scholarly tradition of al-Hajj Salim Suware. The Wahhabis argued that such a direct appeal was not only possible but necessary, that the Suwarian tradition as a whole was corrupted and characterised

by bid‘a (“innovation”). It is not hard to understand why the French colonial authorities were openly hostile to the movement. They had, after long years of suspicion (Triaud 1974), come to terms with and accepted the Suwarian tradition. The Suwarian distinction between “religion” and “politics” encouraged Muslim scholars to come to a modus vivendi with the French, and even at times to proffer active declarations of support. Having reached the conclusion that established Muslim scholars were their allies, the French were alarmed about direct attacks on their legitimacy. Worst of all, the direct appeal to the Middle East as a source of knowledge and authority laid open the gates for the spread of pan-Islamic (and anti-French) nationalism, which, given the climate of emerging African nationalism at the time, was the last thing the French wanted to see. Indeed, some scholars have stressed the link between the Wahhabis and the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA), the major nationalist party in West Africa.[89] However, although most Wahhabis were sympathisers, if not militants, of the RDA, both movements chose to distance themselves from one another. In Bamako, some of the wealthiest and most prominent Wahhabis chose to support the French (Amselle 1977); on the other hand, RDA support for the Wahhabis would have alienated Muslims loyal to the Suwarian tradition, many of whom also gravitated to the RDA. Despite French fears, the Wahhabiyya in West Africa was never a proto- or even a pro-nationalist movement in religious garb. The Wahhabi leadership took no official stance against the French but concentrated their attacks on local scholarly traditions.

This Wahhabi attack split Muslim communities throughout Ivory Coast and Mali. There were anti-Wahhabi riots in Bamako in 1957, and scuffles in Sikasso — just across the border from Korhogo. In communities with a large Wahhabi presence, including Bouake in Ivory Coast, control over the main mosque was a major issue, and the secession of the Wahhabis a frequent outcome. In general, the Wahhabis symbolically expressed their separation from the masses who continued to follow the lead of Suwarian scholars. The Wahhabis made a point of praying with their arms crossed instead of outstretched in the Maliki fashion. They also embarked on a programme of educational reform, establishing religious schools of their

own. Such schools were partly modelled on western forms of secular education, with separate classrooms and an emphasis on language instruction as opposed to rote memorisation. Such schools were intended as an alternative not only to traditional Qur'anic instruction but also to the rapidly expanding state-run secular school system which Wahhabis — and also many anti-Wahhabi Muslims — accused of undermining Islamic values.

Korhogo avoided the violent clashes between Wahhabis and their opponents that plagued other West African communities. None the less, the town was by no means isolated from the split between Wahhabis and Suwarian loyalties. The Wahhabis succeeded in making a few converts among the Dyula of Koko — notably among those living in Bouake — but also several who remained in Korhogo. In 1972–3, I was repeatedly witness to impassioned anti-Wahhabi arguments. Supporters of the Suwarian tradition of scholarship were on the defensive, eager to castigate their opponents as dangerous and ignorant innovators. Naturally, local scholars were all militantly anti-Wahhabi, as their own credentials were at stake. However, anti-Wahhabi sentiments were by no means limited to scholars; in this matter, they had the firm backing of the vast majority of Koko's Dyula community.

At stake was the relationship of Islam — of being Muslim — to community identity. The Suwarian tradition had not only tolerated but legitimised distinctions of status within the Dyula Muslim community. In the past, tun tigi and mory were allowed two different standards of religious behaviour. While this no longer held true, communal Muslim rituals gave expression, not only to ethnicity, to membership in neighbourhood or village communities, but also to clan ward membership, elder or junior status, and even to slave or free origins. The Wahhabis, on the other hand, denied the religious importance of such distinctions. For them, there were only "pure" Muslims — themselves — and ignorant Muslims. For this very reason, others perceived their behaviour as a form of exclusiveness. Implicitly or explicitly, the Wahhabis constituted a new kind of community, distinct from traditional bases. The Dyula stereotype of typical Wahhabis was of wealthy merchants, often relatively recent converts to Islam: Senufo for example, but also groups of traditional "caste" status like the Kooroko (Amselle 1977), or even slaves. In short, the Wahhabis were particularly successful in recruiting converts from among those groups and individuals who, during the initial years of the pax colonia, had moved into such new towns as Bouake or Bamako, converted to Islam, and wrested trade monopolies from groups such as the Dyula. They represented, in effect, the nouveaux riches among Manding-speaking Muslim traders. The danger remained, however, that they might also woo away the loyalties of successful merchants from communities such as Koko, who might be tempted to throw in their lot with wealthy colleagues of heterogeneous origins rather than acknowledge their obligations to less prosperous kin and neighbours.

Within the Suwarian tradition, intellectual pedigrees and hereditary statuses, while they were kept distinct, were nevertheless closely related. Access to knowledge was mediated by one's place in a locally anchored line of scholarly transmission; one's identity as a Muslim was mediated by one's hereditary membership of a local Muslim community. The Wahhabis denied the legitimacy of both of these criteria. Knowledge and moral authority came directly

from al-Azhar and the Hijaz; indeed, some Wahhabis have recently begun veiling their women, a practice unknown until now in the Korhogo region. True Muslims are to be known not from their birth, but rather from their behaviour which sets them apart from the mass of ignorant believers.

In 1972–3, although the Wahhabis made few converts in Koko, they attracted a number of sympathisers and seemed to be gaining ground in the community. When I returned some twelve years later, I found to my surprise that the issue had ceased to become controversial. To be sure, individuals were willing, in response to my questions, to list the multifarious errors into which the Wahhabis had fallen, but no one bothered to raise the subject on his own. The Wahhabi presence in the town as a whole was actually more conspicuous than before, if only because one could not help noticing the presence of women (even in small numbers) wearing the veil. However, among the Dyula of Koko, Wahhabi influence was on the decline. The example of one prominent Wahhabi — a prosperous trader living in Bouake — may demonstrate why. By 1984, he had acceded to the headship of a section of a large clan ward, and was now a prominent elder. As such, he was responsible for organising life-crisis rituals such as weddings and funerals, involving himself in the distribution of saraka prestations, and inviting scholars to preach sermons — the very kinds of activities that the Wahhabis vocally condemned. Though a Wahhabi, he was respected and well liked in Koko; the price he had to pay was public behaviour that flagrantly contradicted his Wahhabi ideas. Ultimately, the exclusiveness and dogmatic rigidity of the Wahhabis precluded their winning many converts in Koko. One could not simultaneously behave like a Wahhabi and like a prominent elder. Risking mild ridicule, one could privately hold Wahhabi beliefs and publicly behave like everyone else. Hard-line Wahhabis, uncompromising in their behaviour, were not tolerated in Koko. Such a stance would cut one off from one’s kin, and no one I knew from Koko was prepared to go to such lengths. On the other hand, the kind of compromises necessary to remain simultaneously a Wahhabi and an active member of the Koko Dyula community tended in the long run to discourage further conversions.

*** The third challenge: the new literacy

Paradoxically, whereas the Wahhabis themselves continued to be rejected by the Koko Dyula community, many of the ideas central to their conception of Islamic reform have become increasingly attractive. More than anything else, the spread of western-style secular education has been indirectly responsible, but western education came very late to Koko. The northern Ivory Coast — far removed from the capital and particularly impervious to missionary influence — had always lagged considerably behind the rest of the country. Only after the Second World War did any children from Koko attend western schools, and only because they were recruited by force. Such force quickly ceased to be necessary, as it became clear that western-educated youths had access to relatively lucrative salaried employment, but the north continued for a long time to lag far behind the Ivory Coast as a whole. As late as 1963, a survey of the Korhogo region indicated that only 17 per cent of

school-age children were enrolled in primary school (SEDES 1965: 1, 60). As a result, the first generation of educated males in Koko are only now in their fifties. They are old enough to be considered elders, though not senior elders, but a few are quite wealthy, and others relatively well-to-do, giving them a far greater influence than their age would normally merit. Partly as a result of their example and their influence, the number of educated — among women as well as men — has increased steadily, although the employment prospects for the educated have proportionally diminished at an even faster rate.

The spread of western education has altered Dyula perceptions of Arabic literacy. The Suwarian tradition of scholarship stressed rote learning. Texts, beginning with suras from the Qur'an, were memorised. The written word functioned partly as an aid to memory, as a means of assuring that texts were properly learned, and as a corrective to faulty recall. Even among karamogos, knowing a text meant in the first place knowing it by heart, as well as understanding the meaning of particular words and passages. I was constantly impressed by the facility with which scholars could reproduce Arabic texts from memory, rather than relying on the books in their libraries.[90] It must not be forgotten that the Suwarian tradition developed at a time when copying was the only means of procuring a text, when paper was a scarce and valuable commodity, and when libraries were highly perishable. Nowadays, when printed books in Arabic are readily available in the marketplace, human memory is not the only means of storing knowledge. Western education furnished another model for acquiring literacy. Of

course, western education also involved considerable amounts of rote learning, but children were from the very beginning introduced to the alphabet, to the meanings of specific words, and to basic principles of grammar. French, moreover, was also a spoken language in Korhogo, and could be used to communicate not only with French administrators but with Africans from other parts of the Ivory Coast. In the Suwarian tradition, the first use to which reading was put was the recitation of texts; in secular education, reading allowed the literate both to speak French and to understand various kinds of written texts at their disposal.

One of the first actions of the Wahhabis in Bamako had been to establish Arabic schools modelled to some extent on the western secular school system — not a surprising idea from individuals trained at al-Azhar and fluently literate in Arabic. The idea of a madrasa — a school which taught Arabic literacy in the same way as French — did not remain a Wahhabi monopoly. Such schools constituted an alternative to a purely secular education. The idea spread late to Korhogo, precisely because of Korhogo's lag in the field of western education, but in 1971 the first such school, the Ecole Franco-Arabe, was founded in town. The purpose of the school was to educate children, both in the standard, primary-school curriculum — French, mathematics, history, etc. — and in the Arabic language and Islam. Pupils were prepared for the primary-school certificate as a means of entry to modern employment, but in a way that would reinforce rather than conflict with religious values. However, such schools were not officially recognised by the government, and thus could not furnish an official transcript, required for admission to secondary school. Initially, this discouraged most parents from enrolling their children, but as employment prospects for secondary-school leavers became more bleak the benefits of such a combined

system of education seemed more attractive. The Ecole Franco-Arabe has not only survived, but has spawned a host of imitators in Korhogo. In 1973, it was common to pass groups of boys sitting outside, reciting texts from writing boards under the watchful eye of an adolescent, poised over their head with a rod ever ready to strike the pupil whose memory faltered. By 1984, two scholars from Koko had opened their own madrasas, complete with schoolrooms, blackboards, and French-as well as Arabic-language instructors, and the old system of Qur'anic education was virtually defunct in town.

The hope of such students and their parents is that they may pursue their education in the Arabic-speaking world. Various Arab countries offer scholarships to such students from time to time. The head of the Ecole Franco-Arabe keeps in constant touch with

various embassies in the capital, hoping each year to extract promises for a few reserved slots. In 1985, for instance, he was offered three scholarships from Egypt, and graduates from that year's class were urged to travel to the capital in order to take a competitive examination to determine who would go. In past years, I was told, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, various Gulf emirates, and even Syria offered scholarships. (Admittedly, the Syrian case was a fiasco, since almost no parents were willing to send their children. This reluctance may have stemmed from the fact that Lebanese traders, who are either Christians or Shi'i Muslims, used to be known as "Syrians". As a result, African parents may have felt that "Syria" was hardly the place to procure a worthy Sunni Muslim education.) The winners of such scholarships might even obtain a university education in the Arab world, either in religion or in some secular subject. One could never be sure in any particular year which countries, if any, might offer scholarships, but as long as some pupils were chosen from time to time the hope remained.

I do not know what has happened to individuals from Korhogo who left for study in the Middle East, as this is such a recent development. However, other communities in the Ivory Coast — most notably Abidjan and Bouake — as well as in other African countries, began sending students rather earlier. Such students, if they do not return with a marketable technical skill, are prime candidates to teach in the new madrasas. They have first-hand experience of classroom teaching in Arabic, and they have achieved a considerable degree of fluency in spoken as well as written Arabic. Those who study in Saudi Arabia have a particular advantage, as the Saudi government has apparently been interested in underwriting some of the costs of such madrasas. According to the director of the Ecole Franco-Arabe, two Saudi teachers were originally sent to a school in Bouake, but they suffered from severe culture shock and had to be recalled. Since then, the Saudi government has preferred to pay the salaries of African-born teachers, trained in Saudi Arabia, as a form of assistance. One such teacher, a young man from Sierra Leone, was on the staff of the Ecole Franco-Arabe in 1985.

Aside from classroom teaching, individuals trained in the Arab world may choose to become full-fledged Islamic scholars. One such young man passed through Koko in 1985 and

delivered a sermon. Local Dyula, particularly those educated in French, were impressed. It was pointed out to me that he could pronounce Arabic in the way that Arabs do (the mass media have familiarised Dyula with “Arab” Arabic pronunciation), and not with the heavy

accent of locally trained scholars. He read texts fluently out loud (rather than reciting them from memory) and could comment readily on the meanings of different words, glossing them in Dyula with greater ease, in the opinion of his audience, than could local scholars.

Locally-trained and foreign-trained scholars thus possess two distinct styles of Arabic literacy. For Suwarian scholars, knowledge is first and foremost memorised knowledge of a relatively standardised corpus of texts; as one of them commented to me quite explicitly, “It’s what’s in my head, not in my library, that counts”. Foreign-trained scholars have a conception of knowledge that more closely resembles western notions. Knowledge consists in large measure in the ease with which information can be retrieved from written texts, as well as the fluency with which individuals can write and speak — as well as read and understand — Arabic. Literacy, in short, is a skill rather than a mastery of a relatively fixed body of texts. For western-educated Muslims, study in the Middle East is valued for the new style of Arabic literacy to which it gives direct access.

Fluency in Arabic, however, is not the only quality that attracts the western-educated to this new generation of Arab-trained scholars. Among students in the secular school system, there is a revival of interest in Islam, associated with the emergence of the Association des Eleves et Etudiants Musulmans de la Cote d’Ivoire (AEEMCI) — the Muslim Students’ Association of the Ivory Coast. The AEEMCI is officially recognised, and indeed partly funded, by the national government. It broadcasts a popular weekly programme on state-run television, and organises study sessions for students, as well as an annual national conference. Indeed, the conference was held in Korhogo in 1985, and was heavily attended by local residents as well as by delegates from around the country. Significantly, the association has links with the Arabic-speaking world and with Africans trained there. For example, the director of the Ecole Franco-Arabe in Korhogo is active in the local chapter, and the guest speakers chosen for its television show are frequently young scholars trained in the Middle East. The association and its Arab-trained scholars represent, like the Wahhabiyya, a “reformist” style of Islam. It preaches above all an Islamic morality — against drugs, alcohol, delinquency, prostitution, and premarital sex, stressing the importance of prayer, fasting, and the hajj. In itself, such moralising does not conflict with the Suwarian tradition of scholarship; local scholars preach on much the same issues. The difference lies in what the AEEMCI and the Arab-trained scholars choose to ignore and, in subtle ways, to devalidate — i.e. those

rituals, typical of local Islamic traditions, which are associated with life crises and Muslim calendar holidays.

This devalidation — one television show, for example, warned against overly ostentatious funerals — is consistent with the attitudes of a younger generation of western-educated Dyula Muslims. Unlike the first generation of school graduates, they are not assured of lucrative employment. Many of them can hope for a reasonably cosy living, but hardly for senior appointments in the foreseeable future. They are neither old enough nor wealthy enough to have much voice in local community affairs, but many of them are (or can aspire to be) prosperous enough to attract demands from their kin, particularly on such occasions as funerals and weddings. Their attitude towards such rituals can be summed up by a comment made privately to me by a young military technician during his grandmother's funeral: "Qapue le fric" ("It stinks of cash"). These young educated Muslims feel attached in important ways to their home communities, but in other respects wish to distance themselves, and feel unconcerned by many local goings-on. The Suwarian tradition, which places great emphasis on the importance and obligations (monetary and otherwise) of community membership, is associated in their minds with the heavy demands that the home community makes on them. The kind of Muslim identity advocated by the AEEMCI still permits them to express their solidarity with their home communities — Islam is after all a minority religion in the Ivory Coast — without making the same kind of demands on their resources.

Like the Wahhabiyya, the AEEMCI and the younger Arab-trained scholars thus constitute an ideological alternative to the local scholarly tradition. However, unlike the Wahhabis, the AEEMCI rigorously avoids confrontation. On the contrary, individuals active in the AEEMCI make every attempt to maintain cordial relations with locally-trained scholars: for example, inviting them to the graduation ceremonies at the Ecole Franco-Arabe. This policy is dictated in the first instance by the national government, which underwrites some of the association's expenses and without whose co-operation a weekly television show would be unthinkable. Indeed, the government is quite willing to foster the association's co-operation with conservative Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and in this way counteract the possible appeal of the "radical" ideology of states such as Libya or Iran. However, the association's conciliatory stance towards local scholars is not simply dictated by the state. Unlike the Wahhabiyya, the association does not reject Maliki "formalism" nor does it seek to distinguish itself doctrinally from the Suwarian scholars. The differences

are primarily those of style and emphasis. This allows the association to seek the support of local scholars for some of its goals, and gives scholars no legitimate grounds for denouncing its activities. Ordinary Muslims are thus not faced with choosing definitively between local scholars trained in the Suwarian tradition and Arab-trained scholars associated with the AEEMCI.

Individual preferences for one or the other group are not the subject of controversy and consequently do not split the Muslim community. Paradoxically, this peaceful co-existence of two scholarly styles is the greatest threat yet to the survival of the Suwarian tradition. More and more Muslims now own television; a novelty in Koko in 1973, they are now a common sight, even in relatively poor households, and villages in the north are beginning to receive electricity, which will permit villages to own their own sets. The younger Arab-trained

scholars’ access to television is a considerable boost to their prestige. Their new style of literacy in Arabic is intuitively perceived as superior — not only by Muslims with western secular education but also by those educated in the madrasas. The fact that the Arab-trained scholars distance themselves morally from the practice of ostentatious prestations during life-crisis rituals without denouncing such practices vocally attracts younger Muslims — particularly educated Muslims living away from their home communities, who privately resent the demands on their resources that such practices entail but do not wish to make a public stand against them that might alienate their older kinsmen.

In short, the spread of new forms of education — in both French and Arabic — have led to a certain disenchantment with the Suwarian tradition and its scholars. To possess an isnad that traces one’s intellectual pedigree directly back to al-Hajj Salim Suware is no longer a sine qua non for being acknowledged a Muslim scholar, since training in the Middle East now constitutes a universally accepted alternative. This is not to say that the Suwarian tradition is defunct. Karamogos are still being trained in the Suwarian tradition, although these are usually older men, villagers, or scions of locally established scholarly families. However, as more and more generations of educated Dyula Muslims accede to elderhood, it seems likely that the Suwarian tradition, once the only legitimate scholarly tradition in the region, will become more marginal.

*** Conclusion

The Hijaz, and, more generally, the Arabic-speaking world, have always constituted a source of origins for the Dyula: origins conceived both in terms of heredity (when different clans trace their

origins to the Hijaz during the Prophet’s lifetime) and in terms of the transmission of knowledge and moral authority (as expressed in isnads). Until the twentieth century, these origins were largely situated far away in space and time. Appeal to these origins was mediated by the presence of local scholarly lines of transmission of knowledge. This principle of mediation, and legitimacy which it conferred on local scholars, was always subject to possible challenge — to the notion that it was possible to acquire knowledge directly from its geographical source and thus to short-circuit the Suwarian pedigrees. Such challenges have occurred in three sets of circumstances: in the mid-nineteenth century, with the rise of militant jihad movements; after the Second World War, with the emergence of the Wahhabi movement; and in the past decade, in the form of an Islamic revival among educated Muslim youth. These instances were not accidental. Individuals did not simply happen to study in the Middle East and then attempt to bring back new ideas to their home communities. Until relatively recently, the trip itself was a formidable one, and even now is by no means easy. Study in the Middle East represented a quest for an alternative and superior source of knowledge, and consequently an implicit, if not explicit, calling into question of the local scholarly tradition.

These challenges all revolve around the issue of legitimacy — of the respective moral authority of a direct as opposed to a mediated appeal to the original sources of knowledge. The question of whether direct study in the Middle East does or does not supersede the authority of local lines of transmission is ultimately decided in the home community by individuals who for the most part are not themselves scholars. The fact that such issues have repeatedly split local communities, often violently, suggests that a great deal more is at stake than the reputations of individual scholars trained in one tradition or another. For this very reason, such challenges are not made lightly, and the circumstances in which they occur are highly significant. In each case, the underlying issue was the nature of the Muslim community itself. The jihad movements called into question the status of Muslim communities as minorities living in the midst of unbelievers. The Suwarian tradition held that different hereditary categories of persons might legitimately observe different religious practices. While it might be meritorious for anyone to emulate "shari'a-minded" standards of behaviour, only certain hereditary categories of individuals were under an obligation to do so. Unbelievers, provided they were not apostates and did not interfere with the religious practices of Muslims, were not necessarily to be fought, much less converted. In this way, Suwarian scholars legitimised patterns of relations between Muslim minorities and their

"pagan" neighbours; proponents of jihad, on the other hand, dictated that such relationships be jeopardised. Such movements advocated the creation of a new political and economic, as well as religious order. In communities such as Koko, where most individuals stood to benefit from the status quo, such ideas were not received with a great deal of enthusiasm.

By the end of the Second World War, the nature of the Muslim community in Korhogo had changed substantially. For reasons which lay largely outside the control of the Koko Dyula community, "Muslim" had ceased to be a hereditary category. Korhogo was full of new converts, both from within and outside the region. However, the Koko Dyula community continued to exist as such, and membership in it or in its constituent parts was continually expressed through rituals presided over by local scholars, who thereby implicitly asserted its legitimate existence in Muslim terms. Wahhabi leaders, invoking both their experience of the hajj and their training at al-Azhar, denied the legitimacy of both the Suwarian tradition, and, more crucially, of traditionally constituted communities within the larger community of Islam. They denied the salience of ethnic, local, slave, or caste origins in favour of the distinction between a truly Islamic community and the mass of believers who remained in ignorance, and mingled — in their eyes — Islamic and extra-Islamic practices. Dyula were effectively asked to choose between loyalty to their home community or to the new community of Wahhabi believers. Confronted with such a radical choice, the vast majority were unwilling to renounce their membership in their local communities, and Wahhabi influence was limited.

The growth of western secular education was again to alter the nature of the community and to provide the basis for yet another challenge to the authority of traditional religious leadership. A new social category is in the process of emerging, consisting of young

educated men (and increasingly women), often living outside their home communities, relatively well-to-do but hardly wealthy. These individuals are subjected to demands from their relatives, often in the context of life-crisis rituals which express both community membership and the status of individuals within it. While these demands are often resented, such persons are not financially or socially well enough off to wish to sever themselves from their kinfolk. Their situation differs from that of the Wahhabis in one crucial respect. Wahhabis are mainly merchants, involved in a sector largely dominated by Muslims, and so they can reasonably aspire to the constitution of a new, largely mercantile, Muslim community. The western-educated, on the other hand, find themselves in a category dominated by non-Muslims from other parts of the Ivory Coast, and so cannot express their social identity — i.e. class position — in religious terms. They can, however, look to younger Arab-trained scholars — individuals of their own age-category — for religious leadership.

These scholars and their followers are careful not to contest the authority of older local scholars or of the community rituals over which they preside, but they emphasise those aspects of Islam which stress the universal nature of the community of believers as opposed to those which implicitly validate traditional social categories. In this way, recourse to the Middle East as a direct source of knowledge and moral authority does not constitute a radical challenge to the Suwarian tradition of mediated knowledge, but rather poses itself as an alternative. However, for these very reasons, Suwarian scholars are left with no grounds for objection, nor can members of their home communities accuse their younger, educated kinsmen of wishing unequivocally to renege on their obligations.

Underlying these three sets of challenges to the Suwarian tradition of scholarship is a single issue: does Islam recognise, and by implication legitimise, hereditary social distinctions of any kind? The Suwarian tradition has always acknowledged the salience of hereditary categories — initially in the form of differences in religious practice, more recently in the modified recognition that it accords to community rituals. Within this tradition, isnads, while they are never assimilated to genealogies, perform an analogous function: scholars are attached to a local line of transmission of knowledge in the same way that ordinary believers are attached to local ethnic, political, and kin units. The appeal to direct, unmediated contact with the Hijaz — or, more generally, with the Arabic-speaking world — provides a model for a different kind of Muslim community that in principle ignores all hereditary distinctions and focuses exclusively on religious practice as the criterion for inclusion in the Muslim community. Study in the Middle East frees the aspirant scholar from dependence on the local religious elite in the same way that newly-constituted Muslim communities liberate their adherents from dependence on hereditary chiefs and clan elders. The Suwarian emphasis on the principle of heredity was attractive to the vast majority in the Korhogo region when the Dyula constituted the sole Muslim community — enjoying various economic, political, and social monopolies. With the erosion of these monopolies, however, control lay increasingly outside the community, and this emphasis on hereditary principles appealed less and less to those individuals who were relatively successful, but whose age or social origins relegated them to a subordinate position in traditional terms. Those who found new sources of wealth, power, or prestige were also attracted to sources of knowledge and moral authority which, in a sense, were also new (in that they lay outside the local community). Moreover, as they were geographically located at the wellsprings of religious

knowledge, these new sources of authority simultaneously enjoyed the aura of venerability — of a return to tradition rather than a departure from it.

In short, the spread of influence from the Middle East to West African Muslims like the Dyula has not simply been a question of diffusion, ofa radiating outwards from a “centre”. Rather, it has been part of a quest by groups and individuals for a set of religious principles which might call into question the importance of locally-anchored, hereditary, social distinctions, and might ultimately reevaluate the relationship between the local Muslim community and the global community of Muslims. Such quests have led individuals to seek knowledge outside their home communities, specifically in the Arabic-speaking world. Of equal importance is the fact that others in their communities have, for the same reasons, looked to these foreign-trained scholars for leadership.

[84] This paper is based on research carried out in and around the neighbourhood of Koko in the town of Korhogo, the largest in the northern Ivory Coast, in 1972–3 and in 1984–5. The second trip to the field was funded by both the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Science Foundation. Except where othewise specified, observations in this paper about the “Dyula” refer specifically to those Dyula living in Koko quarter. For a detailed account of the Dyula of Koko, see Launay 1982.

[85] Sanneh (1979) argues for an earlier, thirteenth-century date for al-Hajj Salim Suware.

[86] The phrase was used by Ivor Wilks, to whom I am heavily indebted for his discussion of al-Hajj Salim and the Suwarian tradition.

[87] For the career of al-Hajj Mahmud Karantaw, see Levtzion (1968: 147–51) and Hiskett (1985: 168–70).

[88] For a history of the “Wahhabi” movement in West Africa, see Kaba 1974.

[89] For example, see Kaba (1974). Hiskett (1985: 290) goes so far as to label them “the religious wing of the Rassemblement Democratique Africain in West Africa”.

[90] On the role of rote memorisation in other traditions of Islamic learning, see Eickelman (1985) and Santerre (1973).

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** Chapter Ten: Between Cairo and the Algerian Kabylia: the Rahmaniyya tariqa, 1715–1800

Julia A. Clancy-Smith

*** Introduction

The organised Sufism of the Islamic religious orders turuq (singular: tariqa) often had its origins in the travels of individuals driven by an intensely personal desire to acquire knowledge and to fulfil religious duties. The emergence of the Algerian Rahmaniyya order in the last quarter of the eighteenth century illustrates how the perigrinations of one man, in this case Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, contributed to the restructuring of socio-religious bonds in a particular Muslim community as well as the reaffirmation of ties between that community and the wider Islamic ecumene. Thus, a study of the activities of such an individual joins three strands in historiography: biography; world history; and the sociological and social historical study of mass movements aiming at religious renewal and reform. Together, these approaches can isolate the types of social transformations that constitute sea changes in any society, Muslim or otherwise.

At some time in the 1760s or 1770s, the kinds of popular expressions of piety that frequently signal the rise of a new saint or mystic began to occur in the Kabylia of north-eastern Algeria. Crowds gathered, miracles were proclaimed, and religious savants from other areas travelled to the Jurjura mountains to hear the preaching of a hajji and ‘alim (Muslim scholar) who had recently returned from the eastern Arab world. By 1777 Sufi zawiyas (religious lodges) had been created in the region, pilgrimages were organised, and local religious notables or disciples were authorised to

assume certain functions within the tariqa (Sa‘adallah 1981: 1, 514–16; al-Hifnawi 1982: 457–60). At the same time, a cult of saints had already coalesced around the figure of Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman, whose intercession was sought by the faithful because of his baraka (supernatural blessing) and ability to work miracles (Rinn 1884). Several features of this cult and the emerging Sufi network were

viewed with alarm by political and religious authorities in the capital of the Turkish regency of Algiers, in particular the institution of the ziyara or pilgrimage. Even the saint’s death did not necessarily remove the perceived threat. Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s burial and the popular ceremonials tied to his qubba (shrine) triggered more struggles to control the privileged places (and remains) associated with extraordinary beings.

The emerging cult in honour of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman and the elaboration of a new tariqa (brotherhood) were interrelated. Both of these were the product of earlier phases in Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s life, before he became a saint or the founder of a new Maghribi Sufi order, and thus a menace to entrenched elites in his own country. Before examining the political nature of the ziyara in Turkish Algeria, a brief summary of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman’s life demonstrates one dimension of movement in Islamic societies — the connection between travel for pious purposes and socio-religious mobility. This in turn will help to explain how popular cults develop and why a conflict erupted over Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s earthly remains in AD 1793–4.

Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman’s career was divided between the urbane, erudite world of the Cairene ‘ulama’, extensive missionary activity in dar al-Islam, and the Berber Kabylia with its tribal social structure. Through his efforts at tajdid (religious reform and renewal), and those of other like-minded Sufi scholars, the purified and the popular were recombined to produce what some scholars have called a neo-Sufi revival — “Sufism reformed on orthodox lines and interpreted in an activist sense” (Rahman 1979: 206; Voll 1982: 37–8). The Berber saint is thus representative of a whole class of energetic, itinerant Sufis and scholars whose activities in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries more closely linked distant parts of the Muslim world. This created the conditions of “critical mass” which led to populist movements of reform and renewal in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (Voll 1980, 1982; Martin 1976).

Nothing in Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman’s family background predisposed him to a career that brought him within the inner circle of leading Egyptian ‘ulama’ and Sufis. In fact, the inhabitants of the Kabylia were not generally among those Maghribi groups that lingered for years in established communities in the Mashriq (Raymond 1959). Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman’s missionary activities, his attainment of spiritual perfection, and his advanced education (acquired in Cairo) transformed a local talib (religious student or scholar) into a member of the Muslim elite. Thus, the matrix of the saint cult and

Sufi order associated with Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman during his lifetime and after his death lay as much in Cairo and the Haramayn (the holy cities of Mecca and

Medina) — and elsewhere in dar al-Islam - as in his native Kabylia.

*** From the Maghrib to the Mashriq

Muhammad ibn ‘Abdal-Rahman al-Azhari Abu Qabrayn was born sometime between 1715 and 1729 into the Ait Isma‘il tribe of the Qashtula. This large confederacy was located at the margins of central government authority in the Kabylia, a mountainous area in the Algerian Tell that is heavily forested and densely populated. Its inhabitants are mainly Berbers or Arabised Berbers.

Independent, enterprising, and rebellious, the Kabyles maintained their traditional political and administrative institutions under Turkish rule. Before the French conquest, the region was composed of semi-autonomous village republics, estimated at some 1,400 settlements (Hanoteau and Letourneux 1872–3; Daumas 1853).

Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman was from a locally prominent family claiming descent from the Prophet through Morocco’s Idrisi shurafa’ (descendants of the Prophet). His father, a scholar of somewhat modest stature, sent his son to a nearby zawiya, controlled by another saintly lineage, for religious instruction. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman then studied at the Great Mosque in Algiers prior to his departure for the Mashriq around 1739 or 1740 to perform the hajj and complete his education. After a period of time in the Hijaz, he settled in Egypt to acquire advanced learning at the Azhar mosque-university in Cairo, then the undisputed centre of Islamic learning. There the aspiring Berber scholar immersed himself in both jurisprudence and the mystical sciences (Rinn 1884; Giacobetti 1946).

Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s sojourn in the east lasted almost three decades. During that time he studied with a number of leading Muslim scholars. The most important and influential was Muhammad ibn Salim al-Hifnawi (1689-1767/8), the leader of the Egyptian Khalwatiyya and rector of al-Azhar from 1758 until 1767 (Bannerth 1964: 1–74). Shaykh al-Hifnawi was a charismatic Sufi leader who, like many of his contemporaries, was not only in touch with developments throughout the Muslim world, but was also aware of the political inroads made by European powers into dar al-Islam. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman eventually became one of Hifnawi’s favoured students and closest associates (Martin 1972; de Jong 1978).

At some point, Shaykh al-Hifnawi ordered his Algerian disciple

to travel to Dar Fur in the eastern Sudan to instruct the ruler there. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman’s instructions were to teach Khalwatiyya doctrines in the Sudan and to “render service to humanity” (al-Niyal 1965: 337). He spent some six years in Dar Fur, where his efforts met with success, and may have subsequently travelled as far as India to preach. Some writers mention Turkey and the Hijaz as sites of his missionary activity as well (Andre 1956; Haas 1943). Upon his return to Egypt, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman was again instructed by Shaykh al-Hifnawi to embark upon more travels; this time he was to travel to the Maghrib to proselytise. Before the disciple left Cairo, al-Hifnawi conferred upon Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman the khirqa, a ritual garment signifying the attainment of spiritual perfection

(al-Hifnawi 1982). It was with great reluctance that the Algerian Sufi and ‘alim left his master’s side; he was not to see him again.

The fact that al-Hifnawi ordered Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman to propagate the Khalwatiyya doctrines in Algeria is significant. Although Algeria, unlike Dar Fur at the time, was decidedly not a frontier region of Islam, the coastal region of the province of Oran was still occupied by the Spanish, who only abandoned their presidio in 1792. Moreover, because Egypt and the Ottoman Regency of Algiers were alike in terms of the oppressed condition of their local populations under Turkish rule, al-Hifnawi may have regarded Algeria as suitable territory for neo-Sufi reforming activities (Julien 1964, 1970).

After an absence of nearly thirty years, the Berber shaykh and his family returned to the Jurjura at some time between AH 1177-83/AD 1763–70 (Rinn 1884; Delpech 1874). By the 1770s a school and zawiya were in existence among the Ait Isma‘il. From this outpost, Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman taught, performed miracles, and initiated the Kabyles into the tariqa. Before long, it commanded a substantial following. News of his teachings and of the new ideas brought back from the Mashriq soon spread beyond the Jurjura, and attracted learned men from Algiers, Constantine, and Bougie to the Kabylia to hear him preach (al-Hifnawi 1982; Sa‘adallah 1981). The founder of the important Tijaniyya order was first initiated into the Khalwatiyya way by Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman himself, perhaps during Ahmad al-Tijani’s journey from Fez to Mecca via northern Algeria in 1772–3 (Martin 1972: 303). Diplomas conferred by Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman in the 1770s upon local religious notables in the region indicate that the brotherhood was in full expansion less than a decade after his return from the east. By the 1790s, the Khalwatiyya-Rahmaniyya zawiya in the Jurjura had evolved into a prestigious centre of learning (Delpech 1874).

While the tariqa was being established in the Kabylia, its Sufi membership grew steadily elsewhere in Algeria. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman’s reputation as a savant

and saint soon spread among urban notables in eastern Algeria. At some time in the late 1770s, Muhammad Bash Tarzi, a member of an eminent religious family from Constantine, travelled to the Jurjura zawiya to hear Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman’s words. Impressed by Bash Tarzi’s erudition and virtue, and perhaps by his family’s prominence, Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman made him a Sufi muqaddam (representative), and enjoined him to proselytise in his native city to combat the “worldliness of its inhabitants” (Cherbonneau 1852: 517). Bash Tarzi’s affiliation with the Rahmaniyya worked to increase his clan’s fortunes and clientele, in addition to aiding greatly the expansion of the nascent tariqa in eastern Algeria and in north-western Tunisia. Particularly in the Biskra and Awras regions, the rise of local religious families to regional importance can be directly traced to their membership in the Rahmaniyya in this period (Clancy-Smith 1988: 41–3). Thus, the prestige of certain families became tied to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman’s own rising status; indeed, the two were intimately connected.

Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s order encountered little, if any, opposition in Constantine, either from Maliki and Hanafi officials or from secular families of ancient notoriety. Perhaps these religious notables did not view the emerging Rahmaniyya tariqa as a threat precisely because they were so firmly embedded in the city’s social fabric (Vaysettes 1869; Mercier 1903; Nouschi 1955, 1961). However, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman’s activities aroused considerable enmity among some high-ranking ‘ulama’ and local maraboutic lineages in other parts of Algeria. The antipathy of saintly clans to Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s reforms is revealing. The expanding Sufi order posed an unambiguous challenge to vested interests, particularly since it drew rural clients away from maraboutic leaders. This eroded their prestige, authority, and material resources, which were measured by popular followings and expressed in the idiom of the ziyara (Rinn 1884; Robin 1901). The annual or periodic ziyara to local saintly figures was both a visit which reaffirmed ties of religious patronage and an occasion for various sorts of exchanges (symbolic and material), since an offering was invariably made to the marabout for his intercession or blessing.

Early in the 1790s, Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman began publicly to preach Khalwatiyya doctrines in Algiers, an activity that soon encountered opposition from some ‘ulama’. Although denounced as a heretic, he was found innocent and allowed to continue

preaching. In the aftermath, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman established a Khalwatiyya-Rahmaniyya zawiya - not in the heart of Algiers but in the adjoining suburb of al-Hamma (Margoliouth 1924; Rinn 1884). He possibly chose this spot to temper any lingering hostility on the part of the city’s ‘ulama’ and to distance himself from the central government. As will be seen, however, the political centre would subsequently seek to appropriate the populist movement associated with the Berber saint to its own ends.

Roughly six months prior to his death, Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman journeyed back to his native Kabylia to resolve the critical matter of his successor. The saint-founder did not select any of

his countrymen to succeed him. Instead, he named his closest disciple and spiritual son, Sidi al-Hajj ‘Ali ibn ‘Isa, originally from the Sus in Morocco, to lead the Rahmaniyya after AH 1208/AD 1793–4, the year most generally accepted for Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s death. Sidi ‘Ali, who inherited his Sufi master’s baraka and the administration of the order’s hubus (waqf or religious endowment) properties, directed the zawiya in the Jurjura for some forty years without opposition (Rinn 1884; Depont and Coppolani 1897).

Towards the end of Sidi ‘Ali’s tenure in office, the French army landed in Algeria, causing the precipitous collapse of Turkish rule. During the two decades or more of military pacification following the 1830 invasion, membership in the Rahmaniyya appears to have increased. By the last decade of the nineteenth century, the tariqa commanded the largest popular following of any single Muslim brotherhood in Algeria and had important branches in Tunisia, the Sahara, and the Ottoman regency of Tripoli (Depont and Coppolani 1897).

*** Religious and political centres and peripheries

The issue of the “why” of Rahmaniyya growth is related to the issue of the “how” of its grass-roots mobilisation. The spiritual lessons composed by Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman were evidently very popular. Moreover, his lessons distinguished the North African order from its eastern Khalwatiyya parent. Part of the Rahmaniyya’s ordinary ritual were the so-called “seven dreams”, inspired by the Prophet’s appearance to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman on seven different occasions. In the dialogue between the saint and the Prophet, the brotherhood’s orthodoxy is affirmed by Muhammad, and Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman’s virtues are enumerated for the edification of the faithful. The recitation of these seven dreams appears to have become part of popular lore and was recited during weekly Sufi meetings, rural religious festivals, and pilgrimages (Rinn 1884: 466–71).

Ritualised, collective visits to the shrines of saints and Sufis not only held forth the promise of supernatural favours, but were also important social events. They brought participants a large measure of emotional and psychological comfort, and, like the annual hajj to the Haramayn, local pilgrimages served commercial purposes since they frequently occurred within the context of mawsims or rural markets and fairs. Moreover, saints’ tombs and zawiyas were considered haram — sacred spaces whose inviolability was normally respected by Muslim rulers (Trumelet 1881, 1892; Dermenghem 1954). As such, they provided asylum for those fleeing tax collectors, political repression, or tribal vendettas. Later, under the colonial order, collective pilgrimages to saintly intercessors sometimes were the prelude to revolt or a forum for passive resistance to foreign rule, a fact recognised by French authorities who attempted to limit or even prohibit the ziyara in Algeria (Boyer 1977; Ageron 1968).

In Rahmaniyya doctrine, the founder-saint's blessings were not limited only to members of the order; a visit to his zawiya sufficed to channel grace to the supplicant (Giacobetti 1946). For this reason, the Rahmaniyya can be characterised as an inclusive organisation because adepts were permitted to belong to other turuq concurrently, and non-affiliates could receive spiritual rewards. This contrasts with the Tijaniyya which was more exclusive in terms of membership. This may have limited the Tijaniyya's appeal to specific social "classes" and prevented it from becoming the mass association that the Rahmaniyya did in eastern Algeria (Abun-Nasr 1965).

This popular appeal initially inspired official hostility to Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Rahman towards the end of his life, and specific objection would have been made had he espoused Wahhabi doctrines. We know that the Kabyle scholar had spent time in the Hijaz during the middle of the eighteenth century and was a contemporary of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, the puritanical Najdi reformer. However, according to Sa'adallah, there was little, if any, Wahhabi influence in Rahmaniyya doctrine (1981: 1, 516). Thus, other explanations must be sought for the elite's distrust of the new saint and Sufi from the Kabylia.

Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Rahman was not only an outsider to Algiers by virtue of his village-maraboutie origins, but also as a Berber. He was thus regarded with disdain by the predominantly Arab and Arabo-Turkish 'ulama', who, out of social prejudice, did not mix with the Kabyles (Valensi 1969: 52). In addition, his

substantial popular following was undoubtedly viewed as a menace by both the religious and the political notables of the capital, whose interests were intimately intertwined. Moreover, in contrast to the situation in Constantine, the 'ulama' of Algiers occupied a much more precarious niche vis-a-vis secular political authorities. Above all, he probably antagonised the traditional men of religion, or part of them, by espousing "novel" ideas learned in Cairo — although the Egyptian Khalwatiyya's insistence upon the strict observance of the Qur'an and the sunna would scarcely seem heterodox (Rinn 1884). Perhaps working in his favour was the fact that the city's majlis and 'ulama' were divided into warring camps, with the Malikis pitted against the Hanafis (Boyer 1963). On the other hand, envenomed relations among religious factions may have provoked charges of heresy in the first place, with one group attempting to outmanoeuvre the other by making Sidi 'Abd al-Rahman's preachings into a cause celebre.

The role played by Turkish officials in the incident was characteristically equivocal. Some writers state that Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman was cleared of the charges of heterodoxy after the authorities intervened on his behalf (Margoliouth 1924). News of the saint's internment in Algiers had sparked violent demonstrations in the Kabylia, and the government sought to appease the bellicose Kabyles who were upset by the persecution of their countryman. Other sources maintain that central authorities induced the majlis to level charges against Sidi 'Abd al-Rahman because his nascent movement threatened to group

around the semi-independent Qashtula tribal dissidents situated at the margins of state control (Rinn 1884; Doutte 1900). In all probability, both interpretations are accurate since these kinds of strategies were traditionally employed by the Turkish regime to rule Algeria (Boyer 1966). Here it can be posited that opposition by secular, ruling elites to Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman was based more upon the saint cult associated with him rather than the establishment of a new Sufi tariqa. Yet the clumsy meddling from political authorities, seeking to dampen popular fervour attached to the Kabyle holy man, had the opposite effect.

What did not transpire in the period immediately after the saint’s release in Algiers was as significant as what actually occurred. Given Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s following in both the capital and the Kabylia, one might have expected a showdown between the saint and his detractors. Nevertheless, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman chose not to capitalise upon his victory, either by forcing concessions from the authorities or by forming a party of militant resistance to Turkish rule. Instead, leaving the city for the countryside, he returned to the Jurjura mountains and his zawiya there.

*** The man with two tombs

Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s death in 1793–4 placed him once more at the heart of a controversy which demonstrates the intersection between the social meaning of sainthood in the Maghribi context and the interests of the state. Public rituals, whether rural or urban, in veneration of holy persons might pose a threat to public order. Particularly worrisome were the festivals connected with the ziyara, or pilgrimage, which gave expression to collective beliefs about baraka, regarded as most potent in the vicinity of the saint’s tomb (Doutte 1900).

While all the European accounts and some of the Arabic versions mention the tug-of-war that erupted over Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s corpse, there are two slightly different interpretations of the primary motives behind the theft. De Neveu and Trumelet portray the struggle, which ultimately resulted in two bodies and two tombs, as a purely devotional clash — two groups of spiritual clients desiring to possess what remained of the great Sufi and saint (de Neveu 1845; Trumelet 1892). However, among others, Depont and Coppolani (1897) and Rinn (1884) attribute a leading role to the central government, which seems plausible in the light of what happened earlier. Obviously, the two versions are not mutually exclusive; rather, the motives of secular authorities and tariqa brothers were different in inspiration.

Upon learning of Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s death in the Jurjura, the authorities in Algiers became alarmed at the prospect of his burial in the Kabyle centre. This would attract large crowds of pilgrims to the shrine seeking divine favours through the saint’s intercession, something which could spark rebellion in an unruly population only imperfectly governed by

the political centre. Several authors suggest that Turkish officials, out of “diplomatic” concerns, encouraged Rahmaniyya adepts in Algiers to visit the Kabylia with the express purpose of repatriating the deceased to the capital by whatever means (Depont and Coppolani 1897; Gouvian and Gouvian 1920). Rinn (1884: 455) explicitly states that the government sought to end popular pilgrimages based in the Jurjura through the tactic of body-snatching.

Three days after Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s death, his followers in Algiers learned of the event; particularly distressing was the fact that his tomb was a considerable distance from al-Hamma. Realising that neither pleas nor force would convince the Jurjura populations to relinquish the saintly remains of their spiritual mentor, the adepts in Algiers decided to employ a ruse. Three clandestine groups of Rahmaniyya brothers from Algiers went to

the region, determined to steal the recently entombed corpse of Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman from its resting place. One group hid near the tomb; the other two sought to distract the Kabyles by joining with them in mourning the departed master. The plan succeeded. The mourners from Algiers kept the Kabyles sufficiently off-guard, while the others opened Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s tomb, placed his corpse upon a mule and transported the stolen saintly goods under cover of darkness to the capital (de Neveu 1845).

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-11.jpg][Figure 10. 1 Shrines are also important among the Shi‘a. A Turkish postcard (c. 1980) depicting the carrying of a coffin to a shrine associated with the mosque in Kufa, southern Iraq. The main inscription in Arabic, which is translated into Turkish on the reverse side of the card, reads, “There is no youth equal to ‘Ali and no sword equal to Dhu al-Fiqar [‘Ali’s sword]”. (From the collection of Lois G. Beck.)]]

At daybreak, news that the stones and earth covering the burial site had been disturbed reached the assembled mourners; a bitter quarrel immediately erupted between the remaining Rahmaniyya brothers from Algiers and the Kabyles. As might be expected, the Kabyles suspected the outsiders and reproached them for their untoward behaviour. Seeking to exonerate themselves, the visitors

from Algiers suggested that they inspect Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s tomb. The corpse was still in the qubba, much to the relief of the Kabyles and the astonishment of the others; a miracle was in the making (de Neveu 1845; al-Hifnawi 1982).

In the meantime, the third group had reached the capital, and soon arranged for Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s burial in the al-Hamma zawiya. The struggle over the saint’s body was only resolved when each side proclaimed a miracle. The disputed corpse had been reduplicated, and both shrines — one in Algiers, the other in the Jurjura — contained the

baraka-producing remains. The news of the miracle spread rapidly throughout the Kabylia and elsewhere. The title Abu Qabrayn (“the man with two tombs”) was immediately bestowed upon Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman by his followers, who from that day forth never invoked him without affixing the sobriquet to his name (Rinn 1884). The faithful explained this miracle by saying that the Almighty had reproduced the saint’s remains to prevent further conflict between brothers of the same tariqa (de Neveu 1845). Thus, a peculiar sort of miraculous movement was attributed to Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman in order to maintain religious cohesion and avoid dissension. It was, moreover, in the political self-interest of the Kabyles to promote the legend because it raised one of their countrymen to “national” religious stature (Rinn 1884: 456).

Because of the remarkable duplication of the Berber saint’s body, the reigning dey, Hasan, had a magnificent mausoleum and a mosque built for Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman at al-Hamma, with much pomp and circumstance. Not content with the erection of a building, surmounted by a long, pious inscription extolling Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s virtues, Hasan Dey made arrangements for his own burial beside the wali (saint) (de Neveu 1845; Colin 1901). Like many of his Muslim (and Christian) counterparts, the dey was striving to bring the rural cult of a saint as well as the organisational matrix of a ramified Sufi order into the city. There he hoped to exercise more effective control over popular religious sensibilities, and obtain spiritual benefits from the company of the “very special dead” (Brown 1981: 69).

The memorial inscription of the al-Hamma shrine is revealing as well. The dedication recalled Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman’s participation in “holy war, the great and small jihad”. The reader was told that whoever performed the ziyara to his shrine would find happiness in this world, and salvation in the next (Rinn 1884: 456). Thus, the individual supplicant’s redemption was assured by physical presence at the tomb-shrine, something requiring spatial movement, and by the saint’s spiritual odyssey between two

worlds, itself paralleled and confirmed by his body’s miraculous doubling.

Twice a year a great pilgrimage was held in veneration of Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman, attracting the pious from all over Algeria and as far away as Morocco. The pilgrims reaffirmed their ties to the Rahmaniyya order as well as imploring the founder-saint for his blessings and intercessions in matters pertaining to this world and the next. While these pilgrimages took place at both of the saint’s tombs, the Jurjura shrine was popularly regarded as the more authentic of the two; its physical remoteness from Turkish authorities made it all the more attractive (Trumelet 1892).

The French conquest of Algeria in 1830 naturally increased the popularity of the mother zawiya in the Jurjura precisely because of its distance from the infidel’s

contaminating presence, which was much greater in the al-Hamma suburb of Algiers. Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, a large cemetery had grown up around the al-Hamma qubba; each Friday, women gathered there for weekly visits to the deceased, and enjoyed the shade offered by the garden of olive, pistachio, and Barbary fig trees (Trumelet 1892). The zawiya in the Jurjura was closed in 1857 and again in 1871 after anti-French insurrections inspired and led by Rahmaniyya shaykhs. Despite — or because of — colonial restrictions upon the pilgrimage, the two tombs of Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman remained the object of veneration even as late as 1900. Mawsims, organised by Rahmaniyya centres in the south of Algeria, continued until the eve of independence (Rinn 1884; Depont and Coppolani 1897; Andre 1956; Despois 1957).

*** Conclusions

Clusters of relationships, sacred and profane, tend to converge around holy persons, whether living or dead. The cult of saints is socially constructed and reconstructed over time and space, resulting in new and multiple centres of piety and devotion — or “new saint maps” to borrow Alex Weingrod’s (Chapter 11 of this volume) expression. The same is true of the growth of new Sufi turuq. In the case of the Rahmaniyya, the system of rituals organised in veneration of Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman engendered the Sufi order that emerged in late eighteenth-century Algeria during a time of troubles.

The tariqa established by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman brought social order and the promise of salvation to urban elites, city masses, and rural peoples in North Africa. Yet only after years spent in Cairo or in missionary activities far afield in dar al-Islam

did he acquire the knowledge, spiritual perfection, and individual piety that made him a cult figure by popular acclaim in his own land. The birth of the new saint and Sufi in Algeria was produced and confirmed by the movement of various groups, popular and learned, to his side after the 1760s or 1770s. The social recognition of his personal piety and learning, together with his earlier eastern travels, thus transformed him from a rustic scholar of unpretentious social origins to a leading member of the Muslim elite and Sufi establishment.

Islamic saints and mystics shared with their Christian counterparts the task of “joining heaven and earth” (Brown 1981: 1). Rather than belonging either to the “learned” tradition or to the “popular”, the Berber holy man combined both traditions in his work and teachings. The emergence of Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s cult and the tariqa bearing his name demonstrate the complex interplay between particularistic expressions of belief in the village or tribe and the universal dimensions of Islam as a world religion.

Movement for Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, moreover, did not end with the grave. A conflict between state authorities and the very special dead resulted in a man with two tombs. Political elites have always and everywhere sought to appropriate religious symbols, rituals, and movements to their own ends. But the story of Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman and the Rahmaniyya shows how the masses exercise a kind of popular sovereignty over public expressions of belief. The Turkish regime’s effort to organise a counter-cult around a stolen corpse and a state-sponsored tomb did not entirely succeed. The Kabyles fended off the attempt to expropriate their saint by collaborating in a miracle and by withholding their patronage of the al-Hamma shrine, located near the political centre.

Finally, in the work initiated by neo-Sufi reformers like Sidi ‘Abd al-Rahman, can we detect any evidence of an “important temporal shift in cultural understandings”, to use Eickelman’s phrase (1976: 20)? Affiliation with the expanding Rahmaniyya order meant that a somewhat parochial group of provincial holy men or saintly lineages became religious leaders, attracting followers from much wider areas by the end of the eighteenth century and the early decades of the nineteenth century. Their social and cultural horizons were no longer circumscribed by the modest outposts of Islam in the countryside that their ancestors had controlled for generations. This was true both in the Kabylia and elsewhere in Algeria and Tunisia, particularly in the pre-Sahara and Sahara.

The older ideology of maraboutism, which harked back to the Moroccan Sus or the mar aboutic diaspora of centuries earlier, was thus overlaid by another ideology. Cosmopolitan neo-Sufism, with its profound commitment to renewal and reform, especially through instruction, was oriented more towards the eastern Muslim world — above all, Cairo and Mecca and Medina. The Muslim East has always been important to the religious life of the Maghrib’s inhabitants. Nevertheless, the elaboration of brotherhoods, like the Rahmaniyya, suggests a vital shift in the relative cultural emphasis given to various sources of socio-spiritual legitimacy, although not a total break with the past.

This shift, I suggest, occurred at some time in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and appears to have continued unabated until approximately the middle of the nineteenth century, when the apparatus of French domination in northern Algeria was more or less firmly in place. Colonial authorities and institutions, whether wittingly or unwittingly, imposed forms of social and political control over Algeria’s Muslim population which gradually worked to reduce the extra-local nature of the Sufi turuq and the trans-regional relationships upon which those orders depended.

As far as eastern Algeria — the seat of Rahmaniyya influence — was concerned, a series of colonial laws was enacted from 1850 onwards. These laws restricted public gatherings and the movements of Muslims, particularly for purposes of religion. Many of these measures were the direct consequence of anti-French insurrections, often backed by Sufi or saintly leaders, and of France’s discovery of the existence of the Muslim turuq and their significance to Algerian society (Ageron 1968, 1979; Clancy-Smith 1989). The North

African orders depended to a large degree upon the free movement of leaders and clients to maintain followings, religious centres, revenues, and contacts with notables in other parts of the Maghrib and Mashriq. From roughly the middle of the nineteenth century, these intricate social and religious networks were increasingly prey to obstacles imposed by the colonial order. By the end of that century, many Sufi leaders and other members of the Algerian religious establishment had emigrated, been exiled, or were transformed into pillars of the regime, thus effectively ending the trajectory of the neo-Sufi movement of a century earlier. Other sorts of sea changes were in the making.

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** Chapter Eleven: Saints and shrines, politics, and culture: a Morocco-Israel comparison

Alex Weingrod

Emigration and immigration movements provide rare opportunities to examine changes in the making. Social scientists can sometimes observe and trace the small, incremental acts that are the stuff from which larger-scale trends and processes subsequently grow. This chapter concentrates upon one such series of acts: the mass migration of Jews from North Africa to Israel, and particularly the ways in which new North African Jewish saints and shrines have been created in the fertile soil of the Holy Land. Compressed within a brief span of years, this latter process is packed with irony, volatility, and paradox. It is one of those occasional “ripe events” that invites a clearer glimpse into the dynamics of culture.

*** The problem: explaining the message

Each year since the early 1960s, late in the spring season, large crowds gather to take part in the pilgrimage to the grave of a new Jewish saint (or zaddik) — Rabbi Chayim Chouri. This pilgrimage takes place in the municipal cemetery of the city of

Beersheba, located in Israel’s southern (or Negev) region. By any reckoning, it is an extraordinary “multivocal” event, of which only the bare outline can be described here.

Rabbi Chouri was born in 1885 in the Tunisian island of Jerba, and was for many years the chief rabbi of Gabes. He was a popular figure within the relatively small Tunisian Jewish community: throughout a long and productive life he sponsored the publication of many religious texts, revived community activities, and, not least, successfully guided the Jews of this rural region when the Germans invaded Tunisia during the Second World War. Following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, and with the emigration of most of the Tunisian-Jewish community to Israel, Rabbi Chouri left for Israel in 1955, joining his wife and children

in the town of Beersheba. Soon thereafter, in 1957, he died at the age of 72. He was buried in a simple grave in a corner of the Beersheba cemetery.

As is customary among Jews, the following year on the anniversary of his death, members of the Chouri family and a small band of friends gathered beside his grave; several spoke briefly recollecting their rabbi, and the eldest son recited the memorial kaddish prayer. There was nothing unusual about this family ceremony; a year later it was repeated with a slightly larger number of participants. However, in the years following, this small family gathering grew enormously and became transformed into a great pilgrimage. By the early 1960s, hundreds and soon thousands of persons gathered at the cemetery on the occasion of Rabbi Chouri’s hillula, or memorial celebration. They crowded around the rabbi’s grave; lit candles and recited prayers; spread themselves across the cemetery with its graves and memorial stones in order to eat and drink the traditional meal, visit with friends, sing and dance — all in an outpouring of spontaneous gaiety and thundering power.

This tradition of a yearly pilgrimage has gained in popularity over the years, so that by the 1980s as many as 15–20,000 people gather annually to celebrate the event. Rabbi Chouri has become a saint, or zaddik, and many of the thousands who crowd around his grave pray for his intercession in matters relating to their health, good fortune, or problems of love and business. Tales are told and retold that celebrate the rabbi’s miraculous powers — how he appeared in dreams and offered direction and guidance to the ill, or how in time of war and peril he mysteriously presented himself to soldiers and guided them to safety. Within a brief span of approximately twenty years, Rabbi Chayim Chouri has been transformed from being a relatively obscure Tunisian rabbi to becoming the “saint of Beersheba”.

Although Rabbi Chouri was Tunisian, many of the celebrants in his hillula — as in many others — are Moroccan Jews who have, in effect, adopted the new zaddik as their own. In a recent article, Harvey Goldberg (1983: 68) makes the

point that, in Morocco, the Jewish zaddikim were a close parallel “to the elaborate culture of maraboutism characterizing Moroccan Islam”. Goldberg goes on to say (1983: 68) that the widespread belief in the powers of saints in fact served as a “conceptual bridge which allowed Jews and Muslims to communicate ... Jews and Muslims could enter into social exchange because of a shared set of notions and symbols defining the mundane and supernatural worlds”. The point is well-taken: one can see a kind of semiotic message of commonality in which the saints were markers in a discourse between the Moroccan Jewish minority and the Moroccan Muslim majority. But here lies the puzzle: if, in Morocco, the traditions of the zaddik and hillula were expressions of common understandings, then what meanings are being conveyed by new Jewish saints and memorial celebrations in Israel, where the majority of Jews are secular in orientation and disapproving of merriment and feasting in the cemetery and of the reputed magical powers of old rabbis and their graves? Why do tens of thousands of Moroccan and Tunisian Jews, now living in Israel, flock to these festive events?

*** Historical background: zaddikim in Morocco

In order to understand the growing popularity of these celebrations within their new and different Israeli setting we must first consider the historical context. Fortunately, recent studies of the Maghrib, referring both to Muslims and Jews and to the relationships between them, are in many respects comprehensive, authoritative, and detailed.[91] Comparatively small communities of Jews were for hundreds of years distributed throughout North Africa: Jews commonly resided in their own separate quarters (millah) in the principal cities and towns, and in the extensive rural areas they lived in their own small hamlets or were concentrated in a corner of Berber and Arab settlements (Eickelman 1983; Goldberg 1983; Shokeid 1985b). As was the case everywhere throughout the Muslim world, the Jews were defined as belonging to the political-legal category of dhimmi, or non-Muslim “protected people”. As dhimmis they were permitted to live alongside Muslims and to maintain their own internal community organisation. At the same time, they were required to pay special taxes to the reigning power, faced numerous social and economic restrictions, and were especially vulnerable to periodic plunder and physical attack (Chouraqui 1952; Lewis 1985). Although the overall fortunes of the Jews improved considerably under French rule, during the period of the

Protectorate they were in a separate (unequal) political and social category and typically maintained their distinctive minority identity (Abitbol 1986: 12–13). It should nevertheless be emphasised that, however inferior and peripheral they were to the society’s centre, the Jewish minority was tightly knit within the local social, economic, and political landscapes. For example, in rural regions (both Berber and Arab) the Jews supplied the tribesman as traders or artisans and were bound to them as their clients, and they also entered into wide-ranging economic and other exchanges with the town-based Arab elites and merchant families (Eickelman 1983; Geertz et al. 1979; Rosen 1984).

In addition, Arabs and Jews throughout the Maghrib also shared a broad array of common cultural features (Geertz et al. 1979; Goldberg 1983). To cite several examples from among many, they spoke the same language and dialects, seem to have shared sets of understandings regarding how society was to be organised, and drew upon similar beliefs and practices. This latter point is documented by the prevalence and importance for both Arabs and Jews of saints, their holy shrines, and the frequent pilgrimages made to them. Belief in the miraculous power of saints and holy men (walis), as well as the tradition of making a pilgrimage (ziyara) to their presumed grave or some other physical marker, has a wide distribution practically everywhere among Muslim populations throughout the Middle East and North Africa (Eickelman 1976; Goldziher 1971). Indeed, these practices are undoubtedly ancient and pre-Islamic, and they were shared by the numerous tribal or religiously-defined groups that spread throughout this large region. Within Islam, which itself originated from a composite of different religious orientations and world views, the belief in the miraculous power of saints is linked (although certainly not identical) with Sufism — that more mystical, emotional current of Muslim thought and practice.

As Islam evolved in the Maghrib, it developed a special emphasis upon saints and their powers, both spiritual and temporal. Maraboutism was, as Geertz and others have shown, a major motif and generating power within Moroccan Islam (Geertz 1968; Westermarck 1926). Eickelman's study of a Moroccan pilgrimage centre clearly summarises its main contours.

The most striking feature of North African Islam is the presence of marabouts ... They are persons, living or dead, to whom is attributed a special relation towards God which makes them particularly well-placed to serve as intermediaries with the supernatural and to communicate God's grace (baraka) to their clients. On the basis of this conception, marabouts in the past have played key religious, political and economic roles in North African society, particularly in Morocco ... A concrete indication of this is the proliferation of maraboutic shrines throughout the Maghreb ... In Morocco's rural areas, one rarely loses sight of the squat, whitewashed, and — in the case of the more popular ones — domed maraboutic shrines. In towns, more lavish shrines with green-tiled roofs are often found.

(Eickelman 1976: 71)

The themes underscored here — the marabout's baraka, his role as intermediary, the proliferation of shrines — are basic elements in the pattern. The shrines served as pilgrimage points, and the more important among them grew into pilgrimage centres: the believers came there often to pray for the saint's intercession in various problems of daily living, and during the yearly festival dedicated to the saint (musim) entire groups made the pilgrimage to the holy shrine, where they received the blessing of the living saint. A few of these pilgrimage centres grew into small towns, replete with a market, numerous shrines, a religious lodge (zawiya), and

various accommodations for pilgrims (Eickelman 1976). To be sure, the belief in saints was frequently attacked by the more orthodox Muslim theologians — yet, for many North African Muslims, maraboutism continued to be a vital part of their religious belief system.

There is, finally, another important dimension to maraboutism: in the Moroccan Muslim tradition baraka might be passed continuously along the generations, and saintly lineages played crucial political as well as ritual roles. In fact, the marabouts were frequently at the centre of local and regional political intrigue, and the long-lasting Moroccan pattern of periodic conflict between the central authorities, or makhzan, and the peripheral but powerful Berber tribes typically focused upon the ambitions of the living saints (Eickelman 1976; Gellner 1969, 1981).

Given this context of ideas and practices, it is not at all surprising that the traditions of saints (zaddik) and pilgrimages (hillula) were also extremely powerful among the Jewish minority. Deshen locates the genesis of the zaddik in the spiritual setting of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century kabbalists of Safad and other Palestinian towns; among these Jewish mystics the tradition of prayer at the graves of rabbis and sages apparently began to take root (Deshen 1977). Grave sites became holy, powerful places — shrines — and the legendary Talmudic sages and rabbis who were buried there took the form of the zaddik — a pious, righteous man, and, ultimately, a saint. Moreover, a tradition developed of making a pilgrimage to the grave of the saint on the anniversary of his death. These periodic gatherings were known as hillulot, or memorial celebrations. Deshen describes the process in the following terms:

The hillulot originally focused upon the death of especially pious men, a death that was seen to be a mystical union between the soul of the deceased and the God-head ... According to popular thought the belief developed that the zaddik (saint) in

whose memory the celebration was held would intervene with God on behalf of his followers. Accordingly, persons who suffered from physical or mental illnesses might undertake a pilgrimage to the site of the zaddik in the hope and belief that their suffering would be lessened.

(Deshen 1977: 110–11)

The rabbinic authorities typically condemned and sought to discourage these enthusiastic outpourings, but they continued to have widespread popular support, even spreading from Palestine to the other small Jewish communities located throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

These traditions found a particularly sympathetic, not to say, luxuriant, environment in the Maghrib. What Ben-Ami, the Israeli folklorist who has done the major documentary work on zaddikim in Morocco, calls “saint veneration”, can be found throughout the North African Jewish communities (1984: 4). Indeed, his compendium of Moroccan Jewish zaddikim lists more than 600 saints and their shrines, including dozens that were equally claimed and revered by both Muslims and Jews. Virtually each Jewish community had its “own” zaddik, and in some places several local saints and shrines were worshipped. The zaddikim were typically deceased Moroccan rabbis, although, in other cases, the shrine and the zaddik were named after Palestinian rabbis who had visited North Africa and died there. In still other instances the shrine was named after a famed rabbi; the best known case is the Moroccan shrine of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, the Palestinian sage who was the reputed author of the Zohar — a book of mystical-religious teaching. These shrines were often located within the Jewish cemetery, although in some instances “they were not in the cemetery proper, but in a special spot, for example, a cave, at some distance from it” (Goldberg 1983: 65). A zaddik’s grave was usually covered by a simple roof in order “to distinguish it from other graves”, but these decorations were nowhere as elaborate as among the tombs of famed marabouts. The fact that these shrines were located within the Jewish cemetery is itself important: Goldberg (1983: 65) suggests that, symbolically at least, the Jews were in this way making a “claim to exercise rights in the territory on an equal basis with that of the Muslims”.

In addition, a number of the shrines became particularly famous, and these periodically attracted large crowds of pilgrims from various parts of the country; the best example is the grave of Rabbi David u’Moshe, located near Agouim in the High Atlas. Thus, as Ben-Ami (1984: 219) shows, not only were the graves of zaddikim

to be found in practically every Jewish community, there was also a kind of hierarchy of saints in which certain of them attained regional and almost national levels of importance.

In common with the Muslim marabout, the Jewish zaddik also possessed baraka, or grace and holy power. The zaddik was believed to be able to act as an intermediary with God — prayer at the shrine and vows (neder) might result in the positive outcome desired by the supplicant. Beyond prayers, the true mark of a zaddik was his ability to perform miracles — heal the sick, bring about good fortune in love and business, cure barrenness in women or provide male offspring, and, in addition, protect the weak exposed Jewish communities from their enemies. As Stillman (1982: 496) points out, however, there also were important differences between zaddik and marabout — for example, the miraculous acts attributed to the latter were often “of a more spectacular kind”. With notable exceptions, moreover, there were no families or lineages of Jewish zaddikim; on the contrary, the saint was typically recognised after his death, and his descendants were not necessarily involved with his shrine. In comparison, the marabouts seem to have played much more active and critical political roles than did the zaddikim.

Believers and persons in despair or need visited the zaddik’s grave throughout the year. However, the yearly hillula, performed on the anniversary of the saint’s death, typically brought together a large popular outpouring of persons. Based upon his Israeli informants’ recollections of hillulot in Morocco, Goldberg describes these celebrations in the following terms:

Descriptions of the local pilgrimages stressed how they involved the whole community. “Men, women and children” went, it was frequently said. It was commonly stated that everyone participated equally, “rich and poor alike”. The pilgrimage involved visiting the grave, lighting candles, and slaughtering animals (cattle or sheep), after which the meal would be served. The meal might take place in the cemetery, or just outside it. Sometimes, after the visit to the cemetery, the meal would be organized in the village proper. Descriptions of the eating patterns also stressed equality; everyone was given the same size or kind of portion ... Even allowing for an idealization of the equality that characterized these gatherings, it is unmistakable that they were Durkheimian high points in the celebration of communal life.

(Goldberg 1983: 67)

In keeping with their fundamentally different social and political positions, the green-tiled Muslim maraboutic shrines shone across the countryside, whereas the graves of the Jewish zaddikim were simpler and plain. Yet, as has been shown, there was also a broad range of overlap in belief and practice between the Muslim and Jewish traditions. Finally, even though the French colonial presence produced a series of rapid changes — migration to the central cities, the spread of French language and culture, growing secularisation — traditions of the zaddik and his hillula remained vibrant, so much so that new Jewish saints continued to emerge during the 1930s and 1940s (Ben-Ami 1984: 225).

*** The zaddik in the Israeli setting

While small numbers of North African Jews had immigrated to Israel prior to 1948, the establishment of Israel precipitated what ultimately became a virtual transfer of population. This immigration characteristically developed in several waves and ripples — a great initial movement to Israel in the period between 1948 and 1956, then a pause, followed by smaller waves later in the 1950s and mid-1960s. In the process, probably as many as 200,000 Jews left such ancient Jewish communities as Fez and Jerba, as well as such newer urban population centres as Casablanca and Tripoli, and began making a new life in Israel. Numerous studies have shown that their Israeli experience during the first decade or two was at best “bittersweet”, and often plainly bitter (Bar Yosef 1959: 249; Weingrod 1965: 39–40). In common with other immigrants then flocking to Israel, the North Africans needed to learn new occupations and skills, a new language and cultural styles, as well as adapt to

what was for many a new, centralised, western political-administrative system. Their high hopes and optimistic dreams were frequently dashed by the harsh realities of life in their new, relatively poor country. Moreover, many North African Jews found themselves dispatched by government planners to new development towns and agricultural villages (moshavim) then being built in the outlying northern and southern zones of Israel. This is an important point: new towns such as Beth Shean and Kiryat Shmonah in the north, or Dimona and Kiryat Gat in the south, were mainly composed of North African — primarily Moroccan — immigrants.

It was a difficult, frustrating experience, and the Moroccans in particular soon acquired a reputation for being hot-headed and aggressive; they were angered not only by the meagre conditions of daily life but also (and perhaps mainly) by the fact that the society's dominant social roles were monopolised by Ashkenazi Jews, the European-born (or bred) Israelis, and that they were expected to conform to the cultural norms espoused by this elite group (Marx 1976: 24; Shokeid 1985b: 281; Weingrod 1965: 40). The pressures for cultural assimilation and divesting one's self of previous beliefs and traditions were extremely powerful. The Moroccans also resented the discrimination and prejudice that were often levelled against them (a study of a mixed housing estate in the mid-1950s showed that the Moroccans were the least liked group). Not surprisingly, the two major incidents of rioting among Jews — the demonstrations in Wadi Salib in 1958 and the Israel Black Panther protests of the early 1970s — primarily involved Moroccan youngsters who protested violently against the dominant Jewish society and culture.

These were critical, formative features in the experience of many North African immigrants. But there were additional elements that became no less significant. Gradually, many of the immigrants mastered the new skills that had been thrust upon them: they became more fluent in Hebrew and at home in their new surroundings, and in common with other Israelis their living standard climbed steadily upwards. Although memories of prejudice remained close to the surface, the newer generation of youngsters appeared to be more confidently attached to their society. For example, together with other Israelis they fought in several wars, and, as further evidence of their newfound, upwardly-mobile status, a significant proportion married members of other Jewish ethnic groups (Peres 1985). Now entrenched in certain portions of the country, they have become the "veterans", instructing newer groups into the mysteries of life in Israel.

Partly as a consequence of these processes, during the 1970s a new ideology of ethnic pluralism began to typify the Israeli cultural outlook. The previous pressure to conform to European cultural norms lessened (or, putting it differently, the Ashkenazic hegemony weakened), while ethnic cultural differences were pronounced legitimate and even celebrated. The most vivid example of this shift was the late-1960s re-creation of the mimuna festival, a minor Moroccan Jewish festivity that has rapidly been elevated into an Israeli national holiday (Goldberg 1978: 75; Weingrod 1979: 63). The Israeli mimuna festival is fundamentally secular — its designers have successfully combined the old-country traditions of a springtime gathering that included family outings, feasting, and communal gaiety, with new Israeli political and cultural motifs. Significantly,

this Moroccan event became the model for other Jewish ethnic groups — the Kurds, Persians, Georgians, and others — who have subsequently organised their own Israeli ethnic festivals (Goldstein 1985).

Needless to say, ethnic politics began to thrive in this new cultural climate. The recent prominence of North African (mainly Moroccan) political leaders has been striking: several hold important positions at the national levels of government, and, what is more, the “North African caucus” in the Israeli Parliament includes more than twenty members (of a total of 120) who are themselves divided between the different, competing political parties. In these and other ways, Moroccan and Tunisian Jews have become markedly more integrated within Israeli society.

Following this brief review, we can now ask: What factors explain the emergence in Israel of new Jewish saints and pilgrimages? How can we account for the phenomenal growth of Rabbi Chouri’s hulula? What “message” is being sent by the thousands who gather yearly to celebrate in the Beersheba cemetery?

Several previous interpretations of the newfound popularity of the hillulot have been suggested. For example, Ben-Ami takes the view that it was to be expected that Moroccan Jews would adopt or create new saints in Israel. He believes that since the zaddikim were so vital an element in their religious traditions in Morocco, they were bound to revive these beliefs in the new, fertile climate of the Holy Land (Ben-Ami 1981: 302). He goes on to suggest that this process unfolded in three steps. At first, during the initial period of mass immigration (the early 1950s), Moroccan Jews sometimes made trips to several already established shrines, such as the Cave of the Prophet Elijah near Haifa. Later, in the second stage (the early 1960s), small celebrations in memory of famous North African saints were held in private homes and in synagogues. During the third stage (the mid-1960s), several new hillulot began to take “place on a national scale, and to this people came from all over the country” (Ben-Ami 1981: 303). To cite a different explanation, Deshen (1977: 120) has proposed a somewhat more complex set of reasons. Viewing these pilgrimages in the broader religious context of an overall trend towards secularisation, he argues that their popularity stems from the fact that “they are especially suited to the needs and problems of persons who have lost a large measure of their traditional culture and social moorings”. The revival of the hillulot is, according to this view, a response to a major cultural change or crisis in identity.

Both of these explanations have a certain logic and power. However, I want to propose a different avenue of analysis, one that focuses more squarely upon the political and cultural processes described previously.

The point can be stated as follows: Rabbi Chouri’s hillula and others like it are, among other things, statements of a new North

African, and particularly Moroccan, presence in Israel. This is a statement of the possibility of cultural difference or separation: in sharp contrast with the previous Moroccan context, the message sent by the new saints and their pilgrimages is the legitimacy in Israel of a separate, different, cultural and political organisation. Indeed, if, as Goldberg suggests in the passage cited earlier, the Jewish cemetery and its shrines were a symbolic statement of the Jews' equal claim to legitimacy in Morocco, then how much more emphatically (and successfully) this is stated by Moroccan Jewish saints buried in Israeli cemeteries. The message that emanates from the municipal cemetery in Beersheba is not "how much we are like other Israelis", but rather, "since we are Israelis we can also celebrate publicly according to our own particular traditions".

What attracts thousands of Moroccan and Tunisian Israelis to this hillula is that it is an occasion for them to celebrate publicly on their own terms: this is "their holiday", commemorating "their Rabbi", and it is performed in a grand style according to "their own traditions". This is a powerful motivation: it is now possible for them, Israelis all, to assemble and celebrate the anniversary of the death of a Tunisian zaddik. They gather together normally and proudly with no hint of crisis in their social or cultural identity of belonging. This is a true sea change, although it is the result of a gradual process. As was emphasised previously, North African Jews have had a series of difficult experiences as immigrants in Israel. Looking back, they can point to the harsh, trying years when they were declasse, thrust into outlying places where they were somehow expected to manage. At the same time, however, they can also proudly claim to have become adjusted and even to have mastered their new Israeli environment, and — at least for some — to have climbed upward on the socio-political and economic ladder.

The movement from a kind of self-hate to a newer "ethnic pride" is an important facet of this process. Indeed, it helps to explain why, following Ben-Ami, it was only in recent years that the hillulot were publicly celebrated on a massive scale. The Israeli emphasis upon "immigrant absorption" and against separate cultural organisation had previously stigmatised ethnic cultural as well as political organisation, and it was only later — as in the case of Rabbi Chouri — that these and other festivities attracted ever-widening audiences. This is the "other side" to social mobility and heightened social integration: as these immigrants became more accustomed to life in Israel and more adept at moving upwards in the society, they also gained the confidence and strength enabling them to organise their own public festivals. The emergence of ethnic

celebrations is therefore not a sign of the failure to assimilate, but the reverse: large public events such as Rabbi Chouri's hillula are legitimate because the participants have become more thoroughly absorbed within their new milieu.

*** Saints, politics, and culture in contemporary Israel

Attention has thus far been given to new saints and pilgrimages as a focus for ethnic group revival and mobilisation. There is, of course, an array of other topics arising from the emergence of new zaddikim in Israel. Some of these issues can best be understood by continuing the Morocco-Israel comparison, whereas others are better analysed within the particular contexts of contemporary Israeli society. What they have in common, as we shall soon see, is a certain paradoxical, unexpected quality.

Before turning directly to these topics, however, it is necessary to get a better sense of the scope of the process itself. Rabbi Chouri is not, of course, an isolated case: a new “saint map” replete with yearly festivities is rapidly being engraved upon the landscape. During the past twenty or so years pilgrimages have been initiated or greatly enlarged to a series of old and new holy shrines (Ben-Ami 1981: 301–2). These older shrines include the giant pilgrimage to the grave of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, located near Safad, that yearly draws upwards of 150,000 participants; or the hillula of Honi Hameagel, a Talmudic sage whose grave near the northern town of Hatzor has also become a local pilgrimage site. Two new shrines are especially fascinating. Within a Safad neighbourhood, a Moroccan immigrant developed a new shrine devoted to the famous Moroccan zaddik, Rabbi David u’Moshe: in this case the zaddik is believed to have been mysteriously transported from the Moroccan Atlas to his new shrine in northern Israel, where thousands of believers now light candles and pray for the saint’s intervention in matters of health or good fortune (Bilu 1987).

Another case of a new saint is that of Rabbi Israel Abouhatzeira, or, as he is popularly known, the Baba Sali. In certain respects this zaddik is similar to Rabbi Chouri. Like Rabbi Chouri, he too was a contemporary rabbi (in this case Moroccan) who has become a zaddik. Rabbi Abouhatzeira was a member of the most distinguished Moroccan Jewish rabbinnic family and famed for his erudition and healing powers; his home and yeshiva, or religious seminary, near the southern town of Netivoth, drew crowds of believers who came to him for his counsel and blessing. Indeed, the Baba Sali had already become a zaddik during his lifetime, and it was therefore not surprising that following his death (at the age of

94) his grave immediately became a holy shrine. He is undoubtedly the most famous of the new zaddikim, and his photograph — icon-like — can now be seen hanging in countless homes and shops spread throughout Israel.

Needless to say, the sites on this new “saint map” are primarily frequented by North African Jews: the periodic hillulot draw large crowds of older and younger Moroccans and Tunisians who expend considerable time and substantial resources in taking part in these festive occasions. To be sure, the giant celebration to the grave of Bar Yochai also includes thousands of Ashkenazic religious zealots, and the Baba Sali also attracted

followers from within this group. None the less, North African Jews have given the major impetus to this saintly revival.

One of the striking features of both the new and older shrines is that they are situated in outlying marginal zones: while the majority of Israel's population resides in three large central urban areas — in and around Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa — saints and pilgrimages are centred in peripheral small towns in the north and south, places like Hatzor in the Galilee or Netivoth in the Negev.[92] How can this be explained?

Several interpretations may be suggested. First, these peripheral areas are precisely the places to which large numbers of North African immigrants were directed when they first arrived in Israel, and, as was pointed out previously, these zones continue to have a large Moroccan-Israeli population. This somewhat skewed population concentration is a major reason why the new zaddikim and their shrines have developed there: the new saints, all of whom are of North African provenance, thrive close-by to their followers and believers. Second, as suggested in a recent article (Ben-Ari and Bilu, 1987), the new shrines are an expression of the immigrants' growing ties and attachments to their new locale. Ben-Ari and Bilu (like Ben-Ami) also emphasise the fact that new zaddikim are a recent trend, and argue that this is a part of the process through which "the residents' sense of belonging to the locality acquires a wider meaning".

A third reason may also be suggested. For a variety of reasons saints typically are to be found in more remote, peripheral areas. This was certainly the Moroccan pattern (true for both Moroccan Muslims and Jews), and it also extends to saints' shrines and pilgrimages in other civilisations (Brown 1981: 43; Gellner 1981). If anything, saints seem to thrive away from the more refined, cosmopolitan, urban centres. It is not that urban residents are less prone to search for saintly inspiration or do not have a need for saintly intermediaries — an unlikely hypothesis — but rather that urban-based religious theologians tend to oppose or denigrate the worship of saints. To a considerable degree this has been the case in Israel, where the religious authorities have tended to oppose or frown upon the "discovery" of new zaddikim.[93] This helps to explain why, for example, new zaddikim have thus far not emerged among the substantial North African populations that reside in or around Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The greater likelihood is for shrines to develop in rural areas, and for town and city residents to undertake pilgrimages to these distant locales.

Beyond their physical location, the process of new saint formation is closely tied to a number of recent Israeli political and cultural currents. If, as was pointed out previously, there were no families or lineages of "living zaddikim" among Jews in Morocco, this may be changing in the new Israeli environment. There appears to be emerging, to some extent at least, a Moroccan — Israeli version of "maraboutism".

This development has to do with “religion” and “politics”, and the curious ways in which they sometimes intersect in contemporary Israel. Two of the famed new zaddikim - Rabbi Chouri and the Baba Sali — can serve as cases in point. To begin with, family members and close kin of both of these saints have lately plunged into politics: one of Rabbi Chouri’s grandsons is a rambunctious member of the Beersheba City Council, and one of the zaddik’s sons was mentioned as a candidate for election to the Israeli Parliament (or Knesset) on a new, mainly North African religious political party list. Similarly, the Baba Sali’s son and erstwhile “spiritual heir”, himself a controversial personality, has also become involved in local and national politics, and one of his cousins is Knesset member. Thus it would appear that the saintly mantle and its baraka are not far removed from political party as well as personal ambition and power.

There has also been a rapid expansion of activities around both of these new zaddikim. Several years ago an already existing small Beersheba yeshiva was named after Rabbi Chouri: located in a modest building, the yeshiva has become the centre of activities designed to spread the Rabbi’s fame. A small core of devoted followers (including one of the Rabbi’s sons) take the leading roles in these endeavours. Like other religious seminaries, the Chouri yeshiva receives government financial support, and private supporters and believers have also contributed to its activities. Thus, in effect, the new zaddik’s charisma and following has produced a linkage with a state-sponsored religious institution that, as a consequence, has resources placed at its disposal.

A similar process has been under way at Netivoth, the “home”

of the Baba Sali, but there the institution-building is on a more lavish scale and the resources are considerable. The saint’s tomb was elaborately built and decorated in a style reminiscent of the Maghrib: this large, domed shrine stands by itself, separated from and dominating the town cemetery. A continual stream of pilgrims go there throughout the year, and during the saint’s hillula the crowds are enormous — often numbering well over 50,000 participants. In addition, a large yeshiva - named after the zaddik - is located in the town, and it serves as the focus for the various activities that celebrate the saint’s memory and miraculous works. In fact, the local town council has considered changing the town’s name from “Netivoth” to “Netivoth Israel”, in orer to connect itself even more closely with the saint, Rabbi Israel Abouhatzeira. This small town — a failure as an Israeli development town — may yet prosper as the centre for the ever-expanding activities being promoted in the name of the Baba Sali. It is, indeed, becoming a pilgrimage centre in which the zaddik’s son plays the role of the “living saint”.

There is, finally, still another way in which the new zaddikim have become linked with Israeli politics and culture. The recent attention given to saints and pilgrimages can also be seen as part of a deeper political and cultural trend. To be more specific, what

Ben-Ami (1984) calls “saint veneration” is related to broader movements in which significant minorities within Israeli society have become more fundamentalist in outlook, nationalist in ideology, and supportive of right-wing political parties (Cohen 1983). These trends have undoubtedly become more pronounced during the past two decades; indeed, it is fair to state that within the same or overlapping populations a certain mystical religious orientation seems to have grown together with, or close to, what can properly be labelled as right-wing political nationalism. This is a distinctly frothy, unstable mix, and at certain moments it has swung in curious, unexpected directions. Zaddikim and hillulot have at times been directly interwoven with these currents; for example, some of the pilgrimages provide occasions in which rabbinic figures and right-of-centre political leaders appear together before crowds of believers, and during election campaigns the image of a holy shrine may be flashed upon the television screen. Beyond these particular occasions, the growing popularity of these celebrations has encouraged a certain nationalist — religious sensibility that has grown more pervasive and influential.

*** Comparisons and conclusions

The short-spanned, volatile bursts of energy that have been described in this chapter point to a number of broader conclusions. The lines of analysis have flowed mainly around belief and ideology, on the one hand, and power and practice, on the other. The theoretical problem is to understand how they are connected — in other words, how culture and politics become intertwined within the particular realities of migration and immigration.

These topics can be seen comparatively: certainly, the examples are reduced to miniature, but they help to illustrate the issues. Of relevance here is Abner Cohen’s analysis of the origins and explosive growth of a West Indian carnival in Notting Hill in London. The context and actors studied — West Indian immigrants seeking to find their way in contemporary London — have a great many parallels with Moroccan immigrants in Israel and the emergence of new saints and pilgrimages. Cohen shows how, in a brief span of years, a local interest in organising an “English country fayre” became transformed into a giant Trinidadian-styled carnival replete with steel bands, calypso tunes, and street performances — all set within a working-class section of contemporary London (Cohen 1980, 1982). Political energies were set loose in this event, and so too was creative artistry in organisation, music, and pageantry; at one level, the carnival, like the hillula, is a prime example of an ethnic renewal ceremony as thousands of West Indians parade through London streets.

The second example is drawn from the Muslim world — or to be more specific, from Muslims presently engaged in building new lives in a number of western European countries. Turkish Gastarbeiter in Germany and Belgium, or Moroccans in France and Holland, are the obvious parallels. Away from their homes “temporarily” (meaning for lengthy, extended periods of time) in what has fast become a Muslim diaspora, these new immigrant minorities are also fashioning novel cultural designs. Ruth Mandel’s chapter in this volume suggests

some of the cultural-cum-political dimensions of this process. Her depiction of the changes taking place among the Turkish Alevis is particularly apt. A minority group within Sunni Turkey, the Alevis seem to have taken a prominent role within some of the Gastarbeiter communities — where, among other things, their distinctive religious rituals (ayin-i cem) take on new substance as rival political factions contest over group leadership. Thus, in common with the Beersheba cemetery and London's Notting Hill, new cultural performances designed by Turks in Berlin or Berne also become formats for rapid cultural creativity.

Finally, there is a more general conclusion to be drawn. Abner Cohen's previously cited studies present a useful starting point. Cohen's main theoretical conclusion is that "politics" (as represented in his research by ambitious leaders or in social class conflicts) and "culture" (expressed by steel bands and a syncretic religion) are not properly reducible to one another: each has a different internal dynamic, follows along different tracks, and consequently may merge or interact with the other in ways that are unpredictable and often paradoxical. The processes traced in this study underscore and strengthen this conclusion. For example, the spontaneous, essentially naive fashion in which new saints and shrines become popularised is only subsequently understood to be linked with the emergence of radical political ideologies. To cite another example, a saintly presence leads, with snowball-like speed, to the development of a religious seminary, schools, and streams of pilgrims and other resources — all of which suggests an Israeli version of a Moroccan shrine-centre. There is, in brief, a kind of "ricochet effect" in which action in one corner of the system will have implications elsewhere.

What this also means is that complex relationships exist between culture and politics which, at least in retrospect, appear to be systematic. This conclusion may not be surprising, but it is intriguing none the less. When they do intersect — while the "ricocheting" takes place — political and cultural currents build a nurturant, supportive set of beliefs and understandings. Hence, once religious nationalist ideologies emerge, they dovetail with belief in the efficacy of saintly powers. This statement is, of course, a version of Weberian theories concerning the relationship between politics and religion, or elites and ideologies. That theory continues to provide useful perspectives upon these endlessly engaging topics.

[91] During the last two decades in particular, North Africa has been a focus for a series of excellent anthropological studies. In regard to relationships between Muslims and Jews, see in particular Abitbol (1986); Rosen (1972); Geertz et al. (1979); and Udovitch and Valensi (1984).

[92] An exception is the shrine and hillula celebrated in memory of Bu-Shaif, a Libyan Jewish female saint. The synagogue built in her memory, which is the site of the pilgrimage, is located in a village close to the large Tel Aviv urban area. The

hillula attracts crowds of several thousand persons, most of whom apparently are Libyan Jews.

[93] The issues are complex: the official rabbinate mainly seems to ignore the shrines and hillulot, although some of the North African rabbis in Israel are present on these occasions. The exception is the Baba Sali, where religious dignitaries join other “celebrities” in a public demonstration of participation.

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** Chapter Twelve: Ziyaret: Gender, movement, and exchange in a Turkish community

Nancy Tapper

This chapter describes the beliefs and practices associated with the notion of ziyaret (Arabic, ziyara) in a single Muslim community, that of Egirdir, a provincial town in south-western Turkey. My account is thus tied to a specific ethnographic context. I have incorporated a number of Turkish terms in my text, not only because I feel that readers should consider how key terms have been translated, but also because these terms are in fact widely known and used in the Muslim Middle East and thus can be used to locate my argument cross-culturally. I have also limited my investigation in a second way. The semantic range of the notion of ziyaret is considerable and raises many interesting problems. However, I have chosen to address specifically only two related questions of comparative interest: Why are Muslim women, more often than Muslim men, concerned with the shrine visits known as ziyaret? Why are such women’s ziyaret activities often disparaged by men?

In Egirdir, and indeed elsewhere in the Muslim Middle East, ziyaret forms a single category denoting shrines, pilgrimages to shrines, and formal visits in a variety of social contexts. However, I suggest that an understanding of the notion of ziyaret depends on several related assumptions.

First, a study of categories of movement, such as ziyaret, should be concerned not just with the form of movement per se, but with the content of the exchanges and communication which that movement facilitates. Thus, how does the movement associated with ziyaret organise interactions both between individuals and between human beings and supernatural entities — greeting rituals, prayers, vows and sacrifices whose returns are material, and spiritual blessings? I suggest that such interactions are structured by the pervasive notion of respect (saygi; hurmet), a key to understanding the meaning of ziyaret in Turkish society and probably elsewhere. In the broadest sense, then, ziyaret is voluntary movement for the purpose of paying respect, implicitly to a person or shrine whose authority is thereby acknowledged. Legitimate authority for Muslims is primarily religious, or religiously sanctioned, hence the pervasive religious connotation of ziyaret.

Second, I consider that an understanding of the constructions of practised Islam, which include notions such as ziyaret, depends upon understanding local standards of orthodoxy and heterodoxy as they are defined and sanctioned by the religious and political establishments. For instance, in the past, the town of Egirdir and its environment were felt to be permeated with a sanctity that derived from the shrines (ziyaret) of the many saints (evliya) who were buried there. Many of these sites were destroyed in the zealous secular Republicanism of the 1930s and 1940s and contemporary Turkish Islam continues to devalue the role of saints and to become increasingly mosque-centred. Thus in Egirdir today, the status of the notion of ziyaret as applied to saints and shrines is ambiguous: the religious and political establishment, and indeed virtually all men, scorn shrine visits and consider that faith in the power of the saints is unnecessary and inappropriate.

Third, I suggest that ziyaret also derives meaning from its contrasting relations with other categories of movement (hareket) or journey (yolculuk, seyahat, sefer). Some of these have specifically religious connotations, such as the prescribed hajj (Turkish, hac) or pilgrimage to Mecca; others, such as picnics (piknik) with their paradisical associations, are ambiguous; yet other categories of movement have no explicit religious connotations but are intimately associated with gender constructs, as is the case of the non-purposive movement associated with going for a stroll (gezi), a male prerogative par excellence.

Finally, in academic studies of Muslim societies, men’s ideals, beliefs, and actions have usually been privileged above those of women; typically, this bias confirms and reinforces the bias against women that is intrinsic to Muslim cultural traditions themselves. If questions of gender are to be investigated, it is essential to analyse a notion such as ziyaret that has a prominent place in practised Islam, and to consider implicit behaviours that are associated with it. Thus, in this chapter, I examine the relation between movement, gender, and the indigenous notion of ziyaret in terms of two analytic categories. One concerns those occasions when women and men move outside the home together, and the other when women without men leave the domestic setting. As we shall see, gender differences are relatively unmarked and women and men participate more or less equally in those occasions associated with the first category, whereas the women’s activities of the second category differentiate women from men and reinforce constructions of female inferiority.

*** Egirdir[94]

Egirdir is a market and administrative centre for a region of some forty villages. The town itself has a population of about 9,000 — brought to a total of over 12,000 by two substantial national institutions, the army commando school and an orthopaedic hospital. The town lies on the shores of a large lake, and fishing still brings in a proportion of the income, but

nowadays the economy of the town is based on the international export of locally grown apples. All Egirdir families own orchard land outside the town, and all have benefited to some degree from the apple boom.

In general terms, most townspeople are both committed Republicans and committed Muslims. However, in spite of their self-image as a uniformly “middle-class” community, large differences in wealth are now emerging and there are distinct strata in the town based on differences in socio-economic status and life-style. As we shall see, there is a relation between these “classes” and their differing emphases on Islamic or Republican values, and concepts of gender. In particular, the relationship is suggestive of the meaning that movement and ziyaret have in women’s lives: all women of the town are involved in ziyaret visits to senior kin, while usually only women from the more “traditional”[95] households are involved in ziyaret visits to shrines. Although this difference is important to my argument, it should not obscure our understanding of the even greater similarities in the situation of all townswomen when compared to that of men.

*** Respect and authority

In Egirdir, and indeed in Turkey generally, the concept of respect (saygi; hurmet) is of key importance in the ordering of all social relations.[96] Most importantly, the Turks believe that respect for God should guide the actions and belief of all Muslims. Relations between Turkish citizens and the state are also constructed in terms of respect — as are relations between young and old, women and men, the ill-informed and the educated. Indeed, the generic concept of respect, buttressed by a comprehensive social etiquette and a complex symbolic idiom related to bodily control and stasis as opposed to movement, is used to create hierarchies of authority in all areas of social life.

Respectful behaviour in all contexts is associated with religious merit (sevab), God’s blessing, and reward for piety and meritorious action. Relations of respect are derived by analogy from the respect due from man to God. The analogy is developed in the context of

gender in terms of an elaborate theological anthropology which associates men with greater, and women with less, reason (akil) and control of their animal souls (nefs). Women, in order to merit God’s promise of salvation, must overcome, through discipline and control, the impediments associated with their carnal nature.

These ideas create a fundamental difference between the sexes in the scope that they have for independent voluntary action and movement outside the household. Within certain broad limits, a man is free to determine his own actions within the community, and the respect he is accorded as a manly adult is directly related to his autonomy. By contrast, a woman’s

autonomy is limited and she is expected to be circumspect in all her actions, particularly those which take her outside the home. Indeed, only the respect accorded to age qualifies women’s inferiority to men: men as well as women have an obligation to respect women who are older than themselves, though this is not in fact associated with a greater freedom of movement outside the home for older women.

Women, as well as men, accept their ascribed statuses and the comprehensive hierarchy of authority and control with which they are associated. Yet, to the outsider, the question arises, how do women, who are defined as intrinsically inferior, come to terms with their inferiority? What elements are there in their characterisation and practice of Islam which continue to foster their religious commitment and perhaps offer them compensations or consolation for their subservient position? And, finally, how do women reconcile their temporal disabilties with their potential equality with men in paradise? In what follows I suggest that the complex relation between the ideology of respect and the notion of ziyaret serves both to constrain and to facilitate movement and exchange among women, thus allowing women certain areas of action while ultimately reinforcing the ideology of the passive subordination of women to men.

*** Women and movement

Egirdir women see themselves as confined to their homes by considerations of propriety and by domestic duties, and they greatly value opportunities for movement outside. Older women remember that not so long ago women never went anywhere except to visit their neighbours, so that bayram (or ‘Id) visits and trips to local shrines (all ziyaret), and the women’s picnics, were very special indeed. Although both women and men agree that attitudes towards movement changed, and became more open (aqik) during the 1950s — when people realised they could actually leave the town

— in practice, the changes have been limited with regard to women’s movements. Women can now shop in the town, and they travel to wedding receptions in Isparta (the provincial capital) and elsewhere by hired coach — either with their husbands or in groups of men and women — but neither these nor other types of movement are undertaken without the express permission of the men of the households in which they live. The contrast between the openness of men’s actions, and the closed (kapali) behaviour required of women remains relevant, and the formal occasions for movement continue to be of considerable importance to women.

Today, those occasions which women consider to be the most important opportunities for movement can be divided into two categories. Each category includes a major type of ritual movement, which the townspeople describe in terms of the concept of ziyaret. The first of these analytical categories includes women

and men acting together as quasi-equals to pay ziyaret visits to senior relatives; the second category includes single-sex groups of women who visit local shrines (ziyaret). Members of all families in the town are involved in the rituals of the first category, whereas usually only the women of more “traditional” families are involved in the range of activities included in the second.

More generally, the first category concerns the celebration of most of the important religious and secular festivals. These require movement to and from sacred spots or respected individuals. In Egirdir, these activities involve women and men ofa family travelling or visiting together and enjoin their companionship and good-natured attitudes of mutual respect.

Predominantly, such occasions comprise the following: the hajj and the little pilgrimages (Turkish, umre hac) to Mecca; family visits to senior kin and to family graves, on §eker Bayrami at the end of the Ramazan (Arabic, Ramadan), the month of fasting, and on Kurban Bayrami, the Feast of Sacrifice; and family picnics on occasions such as the third day of §eker Bayrami, the festival of Hidrellez, and the civic festivals of Children’s Bayram and Youth and Sport Bayram.[97] These occasions allow women significant opportunities for movement in the company of men and are positive in their various associations: they are occasions of explicit joy and thanksgiving. Their symbolism is associated both with the notion of sacrifice and its reward — a blessing (sevab) — and with greeting gestures of respect which are reciprocated with sweets and material gifts.

The second category includes those occasions when women alone may leave their houses in the company of other women. Such occasions comprise women’s participation in the formal visiting or reception days (kabul gunu), mevlud recitals, ziyaret visits to shrines, the celebration of fulfilment of vows (adak); and the women’s picnic, Kadin Pazari, at the end of the harvest period.[98] These occasions offer women particular opportunities to create movement symbolically, by signalling changes of personal status and marking their individual wishes and needs, particularly through the idiom of cooking. However, these types of occasion are considered by many local men and members of the local religious establishment to be of a dubious nature. Men typically dismiss this kind of movement outside of the home as trivial or superstitious, while women themselves are divided in their attitudes.

Women who accept “traditional” gender constructions relating to their work, domestic identity, and relations with men are also those who are most involved in those occasions in which women leave their homes in the company of other women. Others, who subscribe to what they see as more “modern” ideas about gender relations — including, in theory at least, a degree of autonomy and freedom of individual movement — generally ignore the opportunities that these occasions offer, and participate with enthusiasm only in the institution of formal reception day visiting. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, there seems to be

an inverse relation between certain “modern” gender constructs and women’s interest in, and actual movements outside, the home. Moreover, when “modern” women do meet in the single-sex gatherings of reception days, they often represent the status of their husbands and families and express little of themselves as individuals in their own right. By contrast, the more “traditional” opportunities that women have for movement on their own allow them a degree of autonomous action in settings where they can create and confirm their individuality vis-a-vis both other women and God.

*** Joyful celebrations and the movements of men and women

**** The hajj

Both the hajj and the “little” pilgrimages — in the past and today — provide the most important opportunities for men and older women to travel outside Turkey.[99] Though perhaps only twenty or thirty individuals from the town participate in the pilgimages annually, they have included members of all families in the town. The hajj journey is widely celebrated, both during the Feast of Sacrifice when the hajjis (Turkish, hacis) themselves make their sacrifice at Mina, and on their return.

Whole families (never men alone) may travel to Konya to greet their returning kinsfolk, the hajjis. As the coach caravan approaches

the town, townspeople throng to greet the pilgrims and join them in prayers in the main mosque, after which they are led home by close kin, friends, and neighbours. A goat is then sacrificed at their door, and the merit (sevab) of the vow which has been fulfilled is shared by all the well-wishers, who are invited to a special meal that ends with the eating of great dishes of sweets and the distribution of presents from Mecca.

Whereas men may make the pilgrimage alone, women must be accompanied by a male member of their family — ideally husbands and wives make the pilgrimage together. Although it is difficult to establish the extent to which this changes the conjugal relationship, women hajjis care greatly about the close friendships generated by the pilgrimage, including friendships between women and men, and they hope to make the “little” pilgrimage perhaps several times again.

Ziyarets and religious bayrams

There are considerable structural similarities in the rituals associated with the two most important religious festivals celebrated in Egirdir: §eker Bayrami at the end of the fast of Ramazan; and Kurban Bayrami, the Feast of Sacrifice. But their differences allow the former to be used as a model for ziyaret visiting and the latter as a model for relations created through sacrifice.

Early in the morning of the first day after Ramazan, when the men return from prayers at the main mosque, they are greeted by their children who are given money and sweets in return for a respectful kiss on the hand. Mothers are greeted next, and then each family, clothed in new garments, begins the round of bayram visiting, or ziyaret: first, to the household of the husband's parents, then to those of the wife, and then to all other kinspeople of the senior generation. Each visit begins with greetings, and juniors kiss the hands of the senior persons of the household who, in return, bless those who have greeted them. The guests are served coffee, sweets, and a plate of baklava. The occasion is usually very formal; conversation is perfunctory and as a new family group of guests arrives, earlier visitors depart. Each family may make ten or more such visits before mid-afternoon. Then the adults, if they have not done so the day before, may visit the cemetery — usually the only occasion when women may do so — and pay respect to their dead kinsfolk through prayer and readings of the Yasin sure (Arabic, sura, chapter) of the Qur'an.

On the second day of §eker Bayrami, the ziyaret visits continue — this time families of senior kin visit more junior and collateral

kin and neighbours — while on the third day each family organises a picnic meal at some local beauty spot, almost invariably one with a spring. For the three days, each nuclear family becomes a ritual unit: together they walk through the streets to pay respect to kinspeople and neighbours and together they join in the fun and relaxation of the picnic. Bayram visits are said to remind people of their roots and the value of respect; the appropriateness of these reminders is confirmed in the pleasure that family members share on the third day.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-james-piscatori-muslim-travel-11.jpg][Figure 12.1 For pilgrims, domestic space becomes intricately linked to the Ka'ba, as suggested by this hajj mural on a house wall in Imbaba, Cairo. (From Juan E. Campo [1987] 'Shrines and Talismans: Domestic Islam in the Pilgrimage Paintings of Egypt', Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 55, no. 2, p. 292. Line drawing by Allan Grapard. Used with permission of the author and publisher.)]]

The Feast of Sacrifice also begins with men's morning prayers in the mosque, after which a man returns home and performs the animal sacrifice that commemorates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son, Isma'il, as an expression of his complete submission to God's

will. A portion of this meat is used to provide a festive meal for members of the family itself. Then, after they have eaten, the family again makes ziyaret visits, whose structure is very similar to the ziyaret visits at the end of Ramazan.

**** Family picnics

I have already mentioned the family picnics held at the end of Ramazan, whose timing, of course, depends on the Islamic lunar calendar. There are, however, other occasions when family picnics occur in association with the annual solar cycle. Of these, the most important are those associated with the festival of Hidrellez, on the 6th of May, when the Prophet Hizir is expected to visit the world. In the past, this was an especially important time for in-laws or families who had just arranged an engagement between them. They would share in the food preparations and visit a local spring (often one with a nearby shrine) for a picnic and recital of the mevlud poem commemorating the life of the Prophet Muhammad. Although the explicitly religious associations of this day are now tenuous, family picnics at Hidrellez continue to be a highlight of the spring season. Equally, two national holidays in the same season — Children's Bayram (23 April) and Youth and Sport Bayram (19 May) — have also become, probably only relatively recently, occasions for family picnics.

Picnics in all these contexts have explicitly paradisical associations for the townspeople. Springs are known as "the eyes of the world". The setting of green trees, meadows, and cold, clear flowing water is linked to an atmosphere of informality and good-natured fun, when women and men stroll (gezi) together and may join in traditional games and competitions. Even the picnic meals, although often lavish, are deemed by women to be effortless by comparison with the elaborate, oven-baked dishes of everyday fare and, uniquely, they involve both men and women in food preparation.

Though neither women nor men mention it, it is nevertheless clear to the outsider that these joyous occasions — the pilgrimages, Bayram ziyarets, and family picnics — share a common characteristic: all involve expressions of practical gender equality. As we have seen, the ideology of respect informs participation in both the pilgrimage and the bayram greeting rituals in which women and men, equally, are given their due respect as hajjis or senior relatives. Equally, women and men can recognise and reward such respect on the part of their juniors — who may also be both women and men. The case of family picnics is rather different, for the essence of the picnic ritual as a whole is not hierarchical but egalitarian; yet the consequences, from the point of view of women, are similar. On picnics, gender distinctions are relatively unmarked and the women and men ofa family are all more or less equal participants. Moreover, in all of these contexts, practised gender equality — through the ritual associations with the sacred centres of Mecca, the family, and springs, and through the idiom of sacrifice — offers women and men together a chance to experience a little of heaven on earth; it also confirms that all

Muslims are equal before God and that women, as well as men, may achieve salvation after death.

The multivocality of the rituals on these occasions, and the variety of ways in which they support a construction of gender equality, could be explored much further, but the data I have presented suggests the ways in which they differ from the second category of occasions when women, without men, may move outside of the domestic domain.

**** Women’s journeys alone

Women may leave their homes to join other women in four contexts: domestic visits to other households on formal reception days; mevlud recitals; ziyaret visits to shrines; and women’s picnics.

**** Visiting days and mevlud recitals

These two kinds of women’s gatherings have been described at length elsewhere (see Tapper 1983; Tapper and Tapper 1987a), and I will only summarise their main characteristics here. In Tapper (1983), I treated them as a contrasting set. They are similar in the

way that they mobilise women’s networks and in the extent to which they are disparaged and dismissed by men; they differ, however, in the ambiance that they create.

Visiting or reception days (kabul gunu) are a type of formal visiting among women which has come relatively recently to Egirdir. They are associated particularly with younger, educated, married women and the women of more affluent “secular” households, among whom such formal visiting is directly related to the ideals of individuality and consumer capitalism fostered by the Turkish state. Formal visiting is by invitation and is reciprocal, and the visiting circles thus created may meet regularly in the afternoons at the houses of the various participants. The ambiance of these gatherings, while ostensibly companionable, is often highly competitive. The hostess displays the cleanliness of the house, and its luxury goods, in much the same way as she displays her own gracious manners, good dress sense, and domestic skills in producing elaborate savouries and cakes. The structure of reception-day gatherings thus depends on the perception of equality among women participants, but their content is about inequality among wives.

Structurally, women’s participation in mevlud recitals is comparable to their involvement in formal visiting days, since invited women meet in private homes for this

religious service. By contrast to visiting days, however, the stucture of mevluds accepts differentiation among women as wives, while the content of mevluds — as intense religious experiences that focus on birth and motherhood — is about the equality of women.

Each mevlud is a commemoration of the life of the Prophet Muhammad in prayers, hymns, and the recital of the mevlud poem itself. Mevlud recitals are sponsored by women as intercessionary rituals held to gain religious merit (sevab) for the souls of the family's dead. Indeed, mevluds are regarded as presents for the souls of the dead, while those who participate in the services are themselves believed to gain merit (sevab) from their gifts. The sense of female solidarity, and the special relation between women of the congregation and the Prophet and the Islamic promise of salvation, are particularly evident in the more "traditional" mevluds — those in which women most commonly participate, and which are sponsored and preferred by those women who accept what are felt to be more "traditional" gender constructions.

However, some women, whose education, economic, and/or marital status links them closely to the secular ideals of the Turkish Republic, do not seek the opportunities for self-expression or consolation and support offered by the elaborate, "traditional" women's mevluds. Such women (often those who participate in formal reception-day circles) are most likely to sponsor mevluds that replicate the short, unemotional mevluds held by and for men (cf. Tapper and Tapper 1987a: 82).

The variation between different types of mevluds sponsored by women is particularly revealing of three things: the effect of more "modern" notions of gender on female solidarity; the import of the contrast between formal visiting days and mevlud gatherings; and the distaste that some more "modern" women express for the various kinds of exclusively female activities included in the second category of movement that I have distinguished. Only women who accept the more "traditional" ideas of gender participate regularly in the other activities in this category.

[100]

Ziyaret visits to shrines

The saints whose shrines remain to be visited are seen as active personalities (zat), to whom respect is due because of the greater respect which they showed to God. Miracle stories tell of the saints' extraordinary qualities and it is believed

that they have the power not only to punish disrespect but also to make positive interventions in the world of the living.

Most women say a fixed liturgy of Qur’anic prayers whenever they pass one of the town shrines, and in this (and in the regular prayers they utter when passing a graveyard) they show themselves to be more conscious than men of the sacred geography of the town and the opportunities for religious contact that it provides. Though men may on occasion visit shrines with the women of their own family, they do not visit shrines on their own; single-sex shrine visiting is an activity exclusively reserved for women. In general, men treat the women’s shrine ziyarets as verging on heresy and they invariably describe them in terms of the women’s desire for children. Women, by contrast, insist that the fundamental intention of their visits is to show respect, and only secondly will a saint be asked to intercede with God in response to a vow (adak).

Individual women may sometimes visit one of the remaining house-shrines in the town. Such visits are essentially private, as is the sorrow or heartache which the vows made on such visits seek to relieve. However, when women speak of ziyaret visits, they usually refer to the relaxed occasions when they visit a shrine with a group of kinswomen, friends, and neighbours. The shrines that are visited in this way are most often those on the periphery of the town and the walk there provides women with one of the few opportunities

for strolling (gezi) by themselves — an occupation usually held to be appropriate only for men.

At the shrine a woman will vow that, should her request be fulfilled, she will make a return gift: she may undertake to say special prayers, make some charitable offering, or sponsor a mevlud service. Most often however, she may undertake to cook and share “hot” foods especially associated with religious merit (sevab); it is said in such contexts that food, like the rags and strings attached to shrines, “ties up the prayers”. Thus, if the woman’s request has been substantial, she may hold a special service known as a “vow prayer” (adak duasi). She will invite a few of her closest kin and friends to her home at a time when there are likely to be no men in the house. Then one of the women, or a woman religious teacher (hoca), will read the Yasin sure of the

Qur’an seven times while all the other women, in total silence, will take turns stirring a pot of irmik helvasi, a sweet pudding associated with all traditional formal meals. Together the women then eat a substantial meal followed by the helva (Arabic, hilwa).

In their ziyaret visits to shrines women have a considerable degree of autonomy — to choose their company, to manage the outing, and to construct a personal relationship with God via the saint. Women in Egirdir, as elsewhere, are not allowed to take a creature’s life. However, the substitution of a cooked, vegetable food offering in lieu of an animal sacrifice — which is the usual idiom of thanksgiving — makes it possible for women to perform the complete ritual sequence of a shrine visit without recourse to men. This kind of substitution is imitated on other occasions when women alone seek to adjust their own or their families’ ritual condition.

**** Women’s picnics

In the past in Egirdir, women’s picnics were important events of the annual cycle, which had their counterparts in single-sex parties for men, in the winter and at Hidrellez. Although the most important of the women’s picnics, Sekibag, which was held in early May, ceased to be observed some two decades ago, it remains a model for the one women’s picnic, Kadin Pazari, which continues to be celebrated today.

Kadin Pazari was, in the past, a three-day celebration held each autumn. Groups of women left their orchard homes together to meet on the first day at the river outlet of the lake, then on the next at a nearby spring, and on the third at a yet larger spring which was also the site of the autumn food market where women would buy great quantities of meat, vegetables, and fruit to be preserved for the coming winter. On the third day, young betrothed girls were given new clothes by women of their fiance’s family, and other young girls and young married women dressed in their most up-to-date clothes. The women ate, sang, danced, played traditional games, and took the opportunity to explore — strolling along the surrounding lanes and clambering up nearby hillsides.

Today, although the need to buy foodstuffs for winter preserves has largely passed, a single day of Kadin Pazari, held on a Sunday at the large market-site by the largest of the springs outside town, continues. Though new brides are no longer dressed at the picnic spot, women no longer dance, and men are no longer so rigorously excluded (newly married couples now may come together), the women’s picnic day remains an impressive event. Hundreds of women, in groups of ten or fifteen, don smart clothes and prepare elaborate picnic dishes. The effort and display is for the picnickers themselves, an indulgence the women thoroughly enjoy. The picnickers stroll around the stalls and young and old alike will join traditional running games that demand cunning and swiftness of foot. The day comes to an end with a scramble to catch the last buses back to town before night falls.

Traditionally, the women’s picnics were a celebration of female sexuality and fertility and of the friendship, solidarity, and support among women, both kin and affines, young and old. The Kadin Pazari outing continues to create and confirm the women’s sense of identity and

worth as women, while its timing and watery associations link it explicitly to general notions of fertility and abundance.

*** Ziyaret, gender, movement, and exchange

I have distinguished for analysis two categories of occasions which afford women valuable opportunities to move outside their domestic environment. This analytic division of opportunities for movement according to the criterion of gender offers insights into the relationship of gender and religion. Among these, perhaps the most important is a recognition of the extent to which, through opportunities for movement, women's inherent subordination to men in the Islamic tradition is modified and alleviated.

Women's and men's ziyaret visits on the occasions of the two major Islamic festivals make them more or less equal in their subordination to senior kinfolk. By the same token, gender equality is a dominant message of those other ritual occasions (such as the hajj and family picnics) when women leave their households in the company of men.

By contrast, when women make ziyaret visits to shrines, they travel alone outside the household. On these occasions which, according to men, only confirm the gender stereotypes of women's inferiority, women are none the less able to construct an identity for themselves as women that is validated by the supernatural context in which it occurs. The possibility that women may have a relationship with the supernatural which is unmediated by men and unlike the other kinds of relationship that women and men have in common, such as that based on daily prayer, is most clearly seen in the women's visits to shrines, but it is also an important aspect of

the women's mevlud services and their annual picnic. However, there still remain contrasting attitudes between more or less "modern" and "traditional" women to formal visiting days and mevlud recitals. Those "modern" women who, in theory if not in practice, reject gender constructions which entail women's subordination to men also devalue and dismiss those occasions when women may separate themselves from men and emphasise their shared, positive identity as women per se and as women vis-a-vis God.

From the Egirdir material, is it possible to construct a more general hypothesis concerning the relation between gender and movement in the Islamic tradition? It seems possible that women's institutionalised movements outside their homes are everywhere likely to be construed, by women at least, in a positive way. However, the extent and frequency of such movements, and the degree to which they are emphasised in any particular society, vary

considerably. It is this variation which requires explanation. I suggest that, in part at least, the answer may lie in differing ideological constructions of relations between the sexes.

If women and men subscribe to the idea that the sexes are different in kind and that men are superior to women (as is the case in the more or less “traditional” notions of gender in Egirdir), women’s theoretical equality with men as Muslims becomes paradoxical and problematic, particularly for the women themselves. However, in so far as certain occasions for movement allow women to act as men’s equals, and others validate special dimensions of women’s nature, the paradox is partially obscured and partially denied.

If, on the other hand, women and men subscribe to the idea that the sexes are different in kind but essentially complementary in nature, or that the sexes are of similar human natures (both emphases occur in the more “modern” constructions of gender relations in Egirdir), then men’s and women’s equality as Muslims is not an issue. In these cases, women are likely to make journeys

outside the house as men’s equals, but there is little need for them to move in single-sex groups to recreate a special religious identity for themselves. Ziyaret visits to shrines, and other single-sex gatherings that have no counterpart in the activities of men, are likely to play little part in women’s lives.

In my discussion of the notion of ziyaret, among many possible themes, I have concentrated on the differences between those occasions when women and men travel together outside the household and when women travel alone. As we have seen, these latter occasions are often much valued by women, not least because of the opportunities that they offer to create personal identities by contrast with each other and with supernatural entities that are independent of their ascribed domestic circumstances. Such women’s movements, including reception-day visiting and picnicking activities on the one hand and women’s religious services and shrine visits on the other, would hardly seem to constitute a threat to men’s practical dominance of women’s lives. Yet these occasions when women travel and meet in single-sex groups are often disparaged and discouraged by men and by the religious establishment. Following Parry’s elegant discussion of theories of reciprocity (1986), I shall argue that the content of the women’s exchanges on these occasions may explain why they are derided by men with such dismissive hostility.

Parry makes a clear distinction between two extreme ideologies of reciprocity, which, he suggests, define each other. The first is the ideology of the “pure gift” given to a supernatural entity as part of a quest for salvation. The second, and related, ideology is that associated with the self-interest of market exchange. Here nothing is ventured without the expectation of at least an equivalent return. Parry suggests that the notion of the “pure gift” is stressed particularly in the traditions of the ancient literate civilisations of Europe and Asia and that it contrasts with the kind of reciprocity involved in market relations. He writes: “the

ideology of the ‘pure gift’ is most likely to arise in highly differentiated societies with an advanced division of labour ... and a significant commercial sector” (Parry 1986: 467). The “pure gift” is defined as what market relations are not: “altruistic, moral and loaded with emotion” (Parry 1986: 466).

Though he does not use Islamic material, there can be no doubt that Parry’s insights are as relevant to the Islamic tradition as they are to other world religious traditions of the Indian sub-continent and Europe. More specifically, the Turkish material that I have presented seems particularly fertile ground for exploring the implications of his ideas with regard to the concept of ziyaret

and women’s movement (cf. Betteridge 1980; 1985).

Richard Tapper and I have described in detail elsewhere (1987b) how in Egirdir the paired ideologies of modern Turkish Islam and Republicanism are, each in its own sphere, highly valued orthodoxies, supported by the religious establishment and the state respectively. In practice, they also govern all aspects of the townspeoples’ lives. Within each of these ideologies, we find notions of both “pure gift” (the stress on self-sacrifice and subservience of the individual) and “market mentality” (calculations of personal merit and advancement and the values of consumer capitalism) combined.

With respect to both ideologies it is clear that women suffer particular disadvantages compared with men. Women cannot participate as men do in the “pure gift” economy of salvation — as expressed in public prayers, in military service, and in the notions of sacrifice which inform the concept of responsibility in religious and civic contexts. Nor do women have the same facility of access or degree of control over political and economic resources: they are thus excluded from many forms of charitable work and achievement in the market economy. In all these various secular and religious contexts, gender constructions preclude women’s full participation; their involvement in the range of valued activities is vicarious and dependent on or mediated by men. In this way, the relationship of women to the dominant ideologies and culture of the town is clearly secondary to that of men.

When women are involved in travel outside the home in the company of other women, however, the rituals of reciprocity in which they engage have a quite distinct character and are unlike those of men. The women’s exchanges are not expressions of the extreme ideological forms of the “pure gift” or the market. Rather, they combine muted elements of both: social and temporal aspects of the exchanges are emphasised in what amounts to a give-and-take kind of reciprocity in which offerings are made for favours (cf. Parry 1986: 462).

I shall illustrate this by two quite different examples. First, in the case of women’s vows made at ziyaret shrines, although the women insist that the intention (niyet) is of paramount importance, the vow that they make is a contingent promise — an “offering for a boon” not a “pure gift”. Second, by way of thanksgiving should the vow be fulfilled, the women, who cannot themselves follow the model of Abraham and sacrifice a beast, perform an act which is “superstitious” (because it is not validated by establishment traditions), and cook helva to be shared and eaten among themselves. Equally, the self-defined “modern” women, who reject

most single-sex activities in favour of secular definitions of their equality with men, nevertheless meet for formal receptions days. When they do, it is not as full participants in the market economy, but as conspicuous consumers whose consumption, and thus relative social power, derive from their dependent relationship upon the men of their household.

The social and psychological compensations which women gain in their contacts with other women outside the home can be considerable, not least because the women’s own activities form systems of exchange that modify elements of the two dominant ideologies of reciprocity while at the same time avoiding the logical disjunction of the two. Ironically, precisely because the women’s activities blur the kinds of exchanges which are well-defined and prestigious in terms of orthodox religion or the Turkish state, women confirm, to men and themselves, their distance from the sources of both supernatural and secular power. In each case the exchanges associated with women’s movements outside the home become a further expression of women’s marginality and dubious orthodoxy, while their inferior gender status becomes a self-fulfilling ideology in itself.

*** Acknowledgements

Following the Social Science Research Council conference on Movement and Exchange in Muslim Societies, a draft of this chapter was presented at the Middle East Center, University of Pennsylvania, and at the 1987 Middle East Studies Association meeting in Baltimore. I would like to thank my colleagues on those occasions, including Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, for their helpful comments and suggestions.

[94] Anthropological fieldwork in Turkey was done over a period of fifteen months between 1980 and 1984 and was sponsored by the Social Science Research Council (UK), Project HR 7410. The fieldwork was done jointly with Richard Tapper, whom I thank for his incisive comments on the present paper. Further discussion of the Turkish ethnography can be found in Tapper (1983, 1985) and in Tapper and Tapper (1987a, 1987b).

[95] The townspeople themselves use the contrasting notions of “tradition” and “modernity” to classify many aspects of social organisation and structure, as well as to characterise the life-style and degree of religious commitment of various Egirdirli families. The indigenous use of these ideas is explored in detail with respect to wedding customs in Tapper (1985 and unpublished manuscript).

[96] The two words, which are often used synonymously, convey notions of esteem, thoughtfulness, consideration, honour, reverence, and veneration (cf. Redhouse 1968: 498, 990; cf. also Beeman’s (1986) discussion of ta‘arof and ziarat kardan in Iran.

[97] In the past this category would also have included the great collective migration of all the families of the town to their orchard houses at harvest time in September.

[98] Traditionally, this category would also have included the three other women’s “picnics”: the first in early spring; the second — and most important — in May (Sekibag); and a third in late autumn. However, such past occasions, which the townspeople now term piknik, were not known by a single generic term but rather by their special local names.

[99] Military service, traditionally and today, obliges local men to leave the town, but such service has always been compulsory. In the past, local men were also involved in seasonal labour migration to the provinces of the Aegean coast. Today, in spite of the importance of labour migration from Turkey to Arab countries and Western Europe, very few men from Egirdir are involved in this process.

[100] See also the detailed account of women’s shrine visits in Turkey given by Olson (1987 and forthcoming).

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** [Back Matter]

*** Annotated bibliography of related studies

Martin’s (1987) “Muslim Pilgrimage” provides an excellent concise introduction to the topic. The articles “Hadjdj” and “Hidjra” in both editions of the Encylcopaedia of Islam (1st edn, 1913–38; 2nd edn, 1960-EI²) remain useful, but narrowly interpret their respective topics. Thus the EI² article on the hajj (pp. 31–8) is divided into sections on the pre-Islamic era, the origins of the Muslim hajj, the stages in the hajj to Mecca, ‘Arafat, and Mina, and general notes on the hajj in modern times. All but the last section of the article primarily update the treatment of the topic in the earlier edition. W. Montgomery Watt’s EI² article on the hijra (pp. 366–7) deals exclusively with the topic in seventh-century Arabia.

Metcalf (Chapter 5 of this volume) provides an accessible guide to hajj accounts written by pilgrims from the Indian sub-continent. Matheson and Milner (1984), whose work in part inspired Metcalf’s, deal with South-east Asian texts. Esin (1963) offers a particularly sensitive, beautifully illustrated account of the hajj. Abdul-Rauf (1978) also provides an extensive bibliography. Iranian novelist Al-e Ahmed’s (1985) day-to-day account of his pilgrimage will dispel the notion that this genre of literature is only devotional.

On the medieval rihla, Dunn’s (1986) account of the great Muslim traveller Ibn Battuta (1304–68) is both comprehensive and entertaining. The chapters by Gellens and El Moudden (Chapters 3 and 4 of this volume), dealing with the medieval and late medieval periods, are usefully complemented by Harvey (1988) on the role of the hajj among Muslims in Spain under Christian domination. His discussion of the religious leadership provided by women merits particular attention. Much work remains to be done in understanding the roles of movement and travel in the religious imagination in medieval Muslim societies. Studies such as those of Gellens, El Moudden, and Harvey suggest that the topic is beginning to receive appropriate attention. For the modern period, the account

of the rihlas of Muhammad Rashid Rida’ (1865–1935) to the Hijaz as well as to Europe indicates the importance of travel for learning in the modern period and suggests how it led to the development of modernist Islam (Rida’ 1971).

Of the numerous nineteenth-century European accounts of the pilgrimage, two merit particular attention. Burton (1964 [orig. 1893]) is self-important but never dull and conveys much useful information. Snouck Hurgronje (1931 [orig. 1888–9]) provides an unusual

ethnographic account of Mecca with important information on the organisation of the pilgrimage. Muslim accounts are particularly fascinating for this period because European economic and political domination had an increasing influence upon the conduct of the pilgrimage itself (McDonnell, Chapter 6 of this volume) and upon the hajj accounts as a literary genre (Metcalf, this volume). Bezzaz (1982–3) analyses the perils of the pilgrimage from nineteenth-century Morocco, based upon contemporary Moroccan accounts and early efforts by Morocco's rulers to curtail the exploitation of pilgrims. Gallagher (1983) describes how "health" considerations provided a rationale for the growing regulation of the pilgrimage by European powers. For the twentieth century, Zainuddin (1978), the first Malaysian Pilgrimage Control Officer for Malaysia, provides valuable insights into growing governmental control of the pilgrimage, a trend perhaps even intensified in the post-colonial era. The fact that he was also a Special Branch officer suggests the political significance imputed to the hajj by colonial authorities.

Among contemporary studies of the pilgrimage, Birks (1978; also see Naqar 1972), one of the first studies by a social scientist to cross disciplinary lines in the study of the hajj, focuses upon the present-day overland pilgrimage routes from West Africa. Long (1979), who describes the practical organisation of the contemporary pilgrimage, is now complemented by the ongoing studies of the Hajj Research Centre in Jidda. The first volume of the Centre's Hajj Studies, co-edited by Ziauddin Sardar and M.A. Zaki Badawi, appeared in 1978. A related bibliography (Sardar 1982), dealing with the hajj in all its aspects, includes dissertations and unpublished studies conducted by the Hajj Research Centre itself. Kramer (1987), who provides abundant references, reviews current efforts to politicise the hajj.

For the purposes of this volume, the chapter by Peters (1986) on "The pilgrimage network' (pp. 27–59) is especially relevant. His concern is to "translate" the "high tradition of ideology and institutions" of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam in Jerusalem and Mecca "into the earthly vernacular of places, buildings, and streets,

of buying and selling, and finding bed and board" (p. ix), including discussions of the linkages between primary and secondary religious centres and shrines, and between sacred and secular (particularly mercantile) activities. Roff (1985) outlines the theoretical implications of studies of the hajj.

Although Turner (1973; also Turner and Turner 1978) deals only incidentally with the Muslim pilgrimage, his account is useful for comparative purposes and is a point of critical reference for later studies (e.g. Bowman 1988). Also useful for comparison are Werbner (1977), who deals with regional shrines and visits (ziyaras) in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies, and Abeles (1988), who describes a secular counterpart to pilgrimage with a "religious dimension".

Recent studies of the pilgrimage, as Werbner (in Bowman 1988: 22) and others note, place emphasis on how “the pilgrimage experience is effectively a construct of the people using it rather than something that itself gives form”. In this regard, Maeda (1975) represents an early empirical study of the consequences of undertaking the pilgrimage for social status in the pilgrim’s home community in Malaysia. In a more recent study, Campo (1987) explores the multiple levels of significance of the hajj for Egyptian pilgrims. He analyses the murals commissioned to decorate the facades of the homes and shops of returned pilgrims. Campo argues that these murals are collective enterprises that reflect the expectations of the pilgrim, his family, and neighbours. Campo (1987: 293) argues that the iconography and epigraphy of the murals are highly structured forms of expression, “like that of certain types of myth, epic, poetry, and ritual”. They demonstrate a complex relationship between the two “homes” of the pilgrim — Mecca and his dwelling of origin. Unlike the “discursive” formulations of Islam of both rulers and militant opposition groups, hajj murals “testify to a concern for linking mundane domestic space and its realm of familial values with Islamically formulated definitions of sacred power and space” (Campo 1987: 302; 1990). A more recent essay by Campo (forthcoming) examines “the interrelationships between political authority, ritual, and spatial order in the context of the history of Islam”, showing how pilgrimage rituals “embody and validate configurations of power, of dominance and submission”.

If Campo deals with the links between domestic space and the pilgrimage to Mecca, Peters (1986) and others suggest the equally intricate links between the pilgrimage to Mecca and regional shrines. Algar (1971) is useful as a case study. He writes: “The convergence of the pilgrimage routes at the Ka‘ba mirrors the meeting of the Sufi paths at that central point — haqiqat - to which

they all lead” (Algar 1971: 197). Eickelman (1976) discusses a regional Moroccan shrine, and elsewhere (1989: 288–304) provides key references to discussions of Sufi orders and shrines throughout the Muslim Middle East. Shinar (1980) discusses the politics, rivalry, and shifting audiences of North African regional religious leaders during the colonial era, and Stillman (1982) compares Jewish and Muslim shrines and saints in North Africa.

The classical points of reference for doctrinal thought on emigration (hijra) are the early years of Islam and medieval Islamic jurisprudence (Masud, this volume). Contemporary interpretations of hijra show a range of variation. Some activists (e.g. Faruqi 1985) go so far as to say that the only legitimate reason for Muslims to remain in the west is the call to Islam (da‘wa), proselytisation. The fact that the Egyptian extremist organisation responsible for the assassination of Sadat was called, at least by those hostile to it, the “Society of Excommunication and Emigration” (hijra) has inspired chronicles of religious extremism linked loosely to the concept (for Egypt, see Hammuda 1987). The exposition of hijra by ‘Uthman dan Fodio (1978) in the early nineteenth century, available in English, provides a complex discussion of the relationship between hijra and jihad and also offers insight into the relationship between the doctrine and the reformist movement that he inspired. In

Wahhabi doctrine, the notion applies to the settlement of bedouin and their formation into a military force to achieve Wahhabi goals (Habib 1978).

Ferre (1985) focuses upon how migration and travel influence proselytisation in various historical epochs, while Oded (1986) deals with modern migration to the Arab “centre” from Africa for educational purposes. Qureshi (1979) deals with the Khilafat movement (1918–24) in British India, in which between 10,000 to 60,000 Indian Muslims, in spite of adverse economic and political realities, were encouraged by their leaders to interpret doctrine literally and emigrate to Afghanistan in 1920.

Until quite recently, studies of migration in the social sciences, however valuable in other respects, have tended to neglect its implications for religious experience (e.g. Bourgey, Gorokhoff, Nancy et al 1985; Owen 1985; Seccombe 1985; Serageldin et al. 1984; Weiner 1985). However, Ahmed (1986) presents a case study of a contemporary religious movement in Pakistan primarily associated with Pakistani workers returned from the Arabian Peninsula. Some Muslims point ironically to the fact that Muslims in western countries, freed from the political restraints of their countries of origin, can be more creative and open in religious expression and practice. “Western” countries increasingly serve

both as a meeting place for Muslim activists from throughout the Muslim world and as the primary residence of an increasing number of Muslims. Whatever one’s literary (and political) judgement on the merits of Rushdie (1988), he is surely accurate in depicting his novel as “an attempt to write about migration, its stresses and transformations, from the point of view of migrants from the Indian sub-continent to Britain” (Rushdie 1989). As one commentator wrote:

Just as the immigrant speaks his new language with an accent, his vision will acquire an accent. It seems that a different light, a different color, has been cast on everything he has known before ... So the immigrant’s task is to struggle for some kind of peaceful coexistence between the old value system and the new one.

(Modaressi 1989)

If Rushdie’s experience indicates the strength, and limits, of the immigrant’s experience in challenging and shaping the religious imagination, more standard academic accounts indicate the significance of the experience of migration for the religious imagination, a situation increasingly recognised by Muslim activists (see Hijra 1986). By early in the next century, current projections indicate that adherents to Islam will constitute, after Christianity, the second largest religious grouping in the United States (Haddad and Lummis 1987: 3). Studies by Kepel (1987), Kepel and Leveau (1987), Alia (1989), and the French

polling organisation IFOP (1989) — the first public opinion polls of Muslims in France — are particularly effective in tracing the changing religious sensibilities and practices of France's Muslim communities, which as of 1987 comprised between 2.5 and 3 million persons. For Islam in Europe as a whole, the essays in Gerholm and Lithman (1988) and by Halliday (1989) offer a useful point of departure. Elsewhere, Fisher (1986) deals with immigration to towns in West Africa.

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*** Glossary[101]

adhan (A) Muslim call to prayer.

akil (T from the Arabic ‘aql) reason, reasoning, intelligence.

alamanci, almanci (T) Turkish worker in Germany; lit. “Germanish/like”.

alamanya (T) Germany.

‘alim (A, pl. ‘ulama’) learned man; in particular one learned in Islamic legal and religious studies.

‘allama (A) honorific title for a learned person.

alman (T) German.

‘amma (A) the “masses”.

anavatan (T) mother country, homeland.

ansar (A, sing, nasir) supporters; companions of the Prophet Muhammed who accompanied him from Mecca to Medina.

‘arab (A) Arabs; bedouin.

‘arffin (sing, ‘arif) (A) mystics.

aym-i cem, cem (T) Central Asian communal ritual, led by pir or dede. Both men and women participate.

bakal haji (Malay) a person preparing to perform the hajj.

baraka (A) supernatural blessing; quality of divine grace; abundance.

bay‘a (A) pact, pledge.

bay‘at al-hijra (A) the pledge to emigrate.

bay’at al-nisa ’ (A) the women’s pledge.

bayram (T) religious or national holiday or festivity.

begum (Urdu) lady, queen, title used for Mughal women.

berkat (Malay, from the Arabic baraka) blessing.

bey (T) Turkish military title for official in charge of a beylik or Ottoman administrative division.

bomoh (Malay) traditional Malay medical man or practitioner or curer.

cennet (T, from the Arabic janna) paradise, heaven.

communitas sense of community or fellowship.

dakwah (Malay, from the Arabic da‘wa) call, propagation; a generic term for Islamic missionary activity in Malaysia and elsewhere.

dar al-‘ahd (A) the land of the pact; dar al-aman (A) “the land of peace”; dar al-harb (A) the “land of war”, enemy territory; dar al-hudna (A) the “land of peace”; dar al-iman (A) the “land of faith”; dar al-Islam (A) the “land of Islam”, the Islamic World; dar al-kufr (A) the “land of disbelief”; dar al-sulh (A) the land of “settlement” or truce.

dato, datok (Malay) honorific title granted by the king.

dede (T) Alevi holy man; also grandfather, shaykh of a dervish order.

dey (T) Turkish or Algerian Ottoman military title, generally an office superior to that held by a bey.

dhimmi (A) non-Muslim “protected” person.

dinar (A) unit of currency.

dirham (A) unit of currency.

dunya (T, from the Arabic dunya) world (bu dunya this world, obur dunya other world).

ehl al-dunya (T, from the Arabic ahl al-dunya) worldly people.

evliya (T sing., from Arabic plural awliya’) Muslim saint or saintlike person.

fada’il (A, sing, fadila) merits or special qualities of people or places.

faqih (A, pl. fuquha) Islamic legal scholar; jurist.

fard(A, pl. fara’id) fundamental Muslim obligation.

fard kifaya (A) collective duty in Islam.

fatawa (A, sing, fatwa) formal legal opinions or advice issued by a recognised Muslim scholar.

fiqh (A) Muslim jurisprudence.

Gastarbeiter (German) “guestworker”.

gavur (T) infidel, unbeliever.

gavuristan (T) land of infidels.

gecekondu (T) lit. “built at night”; shanty or squatter towns.

gezi (T) stroll, excursion, outing.

ghamma (A) spoils of war.

ghuraba ’ (A, sing, gharib) foreigners or non-natives.

gurbet (T) exile, state of being away from home.

gurbetqi (T) one who is in gurbet.

hadith (A, pl. ahadith) reported words of the Prophet Muhammad, based on the authority of a chain of reliable transmitters.

hajj (A) (T hac, Malay haj) the Meccan pilgrimage, and the rites

there; hajj, hajji, hajja, one who has performed the pilgrimage.

hanafi (A) one of the four major “schools” of Sunni legal doctrines; the official school of the Ottoman Empire.

haqiqa (A) reality; mystical truth.

haram (A) forbidden.

haramayn (A) the two sacred places of Mecca and Medina.

hareket (T, from the Arabic haraka) movement, act, deed.

harman (T) heap of grain; colloq. threshing place.

Hidrellez (T) 6 May, the 40th day after the spring equinox, often thought to be the beginning of summer; associated with legends of the prophets Hizir and Ilyas (Elias).

helal (T, from the Arabic halal) approved.

Hijaz (A) the Arabian province which includes Mecca and Medina.

hijra (Urdu hijrat) migration.

hillula (H and A) festival for a Jewish saint.

Hizir (T, from the Arabic al-Khidr) legendary prophet who attained immortality by drinking from the water of life.

hosaf (T) cold drink of stewed fruit.

hubus in North Africa, a religious bequest, synonymous with waqf.

hurmet (T, from the Arabic hurma) respect, honour, sacredness.

ibctdai (A, sing, ibctda) ritual duties, including ablutions, prayer, almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca, reading the Qur’an, and recollection of God.

‘id (A) festival; id al-Adha, Feast of Sacrifice (during hajj), ‘id al-Fitr, festival marking the end of the fasting month.

ihram (A) seamless garment worn by pilgrims in Mecca.

ikinci ku§ak (T) second generation (foreign children born or raised in Germany).

imam (A) prayer leader.

isnad (A) the chain of transmitters of authentic tradition (hadith).

izin (T) leave, permission, consent.

izinli (T) one who is on leave.

jamaa‘a (A) organisation.

jawa (A) members of the Malayo-Polynesian language group resident in Mecca.

jihad (A) striving, effort; jihad f sabil Allah, striving in the way of God, if necessary, war in this cause.

Ka‘ba (A) the square building in the sanctuary in Mecca which contains the Black Stone and is the focus of the hajj.

kabulgunu (T) women’s formal visiting or reception days.

kadinpazari (T) women’s autumn picnics.

kafir (A, pl. kuffar) unbeliever in the Islamic revelation.

kalam (A) scholastics.

kampong (Malay) village.

kapali (T) covered, closed.

karamogo (Manding) a scholar, a person learned in the Islamic faith and qualified to teach at an advanced level.

kathi (Malay, from the Arabic qadi) religious magistrate.

kerajaan (Malay) government, symbolic nationhood or kingdom.

kesin donu§ (T) permanent return (to Turkey from Germany), repatriation.

ketua (Malay) a village headman.

kharaja (A) to go out.

khassa (A) elite, distinguished.

khatib (A) preacher, the person who delivers the Friday sermon (khutba) at the noon prayer of assembly.

khenduri (Malay) a village headman.

khirqa (A) a ritual garment symbolising a Sufi follower’s obedience to the rule of his tariqa; the tattered woollen mantle of the Sufi worn to symbolise poverty.

kufr (A) disbelief.

kurban (T) sacrifice; Kurban Bayrami (T, Arabic ‘Id al Adha) feast of sacrifice.

kutsal (T) sacred, holy.

lahu rihlatun (A) lit. “he made a journey”; typical sentence in the biography of an ‘alim.

lira unit of currency.

lo (Manding) initiation societies among the Dyula.

ma‘dan (A) greenhouse, place where things are grown.

madrasa (A) school, often associated with a mosque.

mahdi (A) the expected, divinely guided leader.

mahshasha (A) a cafe or popular urban gathering place.

makhzan (A) in North Africa, the central government of the tribes in its service.

maliki (A) one of the four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence, predominant in North Africa.

masjid (A) mosque.

mawsim, musim (A) “season” for a celebration; in North Africa, a rural or tribal fair, often held under the auspices of a patron saint.

mevlud (T, from the Arabic mawlid) a religious service commemorating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad.

milla (A and P; millet T) religious community or, in some contemporary contexts, “people” or “nation”.

misbaha (A) a rosary.

mory (Manding) a hereditary category of Dyula Muslims who were expected to conform religiously to the strictures of the shari‘a.

mu’akhat (A) brotherhood.

muezzin (A, mu’adhdhin) prayer-caller.

mufti (A) a jurisconsult; an issuer of fatwa.

muhajir (A, pl. muhajirun) emigrant, Meccans who emigrated to Medina in the early period of Islam.

muhtar (T, from the Arabic mukhtar) headman.

muqaddam (A) a circle or sectional leader in a Sufi order; in North Africa, a Sufi representative capable of formally initiating followers into a tariqa.

murabit (A) often rendered in French as “marabout”; a person living or dead believed to enjoy a special relationship with God which enables him or her to channel God’s graces or blessings.

mushrik (A) believer in more than one God.

mustad’afn (A) weak, oppressed.

mutawwif (A) pilgrims’ guide in Mecca.

muwalat (A) friendship.

namaz (T) prayer ritual.

nasta‘liq (A) the distinctive writing style for Urdu and Persian.

nefs (T) from the Arabic nafs) personality, soul, flesh, and bodily desires.

niyet (T, from the Arabic niya) intention, formal resolve to perform a religious act.

penghulu (Malay) traditional title for a lesser chief; district-level state bureaucrat.

piknik (T, from the English) picnic.

pir (T) Alevi holy man, from a holy lineage; leader of a dervish order.

qadama (A) to reach, arrive, get to.

qadi (A) Muslim judge, magistrate.

Qadiriyya (A) a Sufi order, tracing its origins to ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166). Qadiri, an adherent of the order.

qanun (A) law; state law.

qira’a (A) recitation of the Qur’an.

qubba (A) a dome; a domed building or memorial shrine.

rafidi (A) member of a heretical group.

Ramadan (A) Islamic month of fasting.

riba (A) usurious interest.

rihla (A) travel, often for religious knowledge; rihla hijazyya (A), the pilgrimage trip, travel account of the pilgrimage; rihla sifariyya (A), travel account of, for instance, an embassy mission.

riwaq (A) cloisters around a court; living quarters, dormitories, and workrooms of the students of al-Azhar University in Cairo.

sam‘ (A) attention.

saraka (Manding, from the Arabic sadaqa) voluntary charity; among the Dyula refers to a variety of prestations, including those obligatory prestations made during life-cycle rituals.

§art (T) condition; stipulation.

saygi (T) respect, esteem, consideration.

sefer (T, from the Arabic safar) journey, voyage, travel.

§eker Bayrami (T, Arabic ‘Id al-Fitr) the feast following Ramadan.

sevap, sevab (T) religious merit acquired by good action.

seyahat (T, from the Arabic sayaha) journey, trip, expedition.

shari‘a (A) the laws and practices of Islam, “the straight path”.

sharif (pl. shurafa, ashraf) someone who is distinguished or highborn; Turkish provincial ruler; descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.

shaykh (A) a tribal leader, scholar, or elderly man.

silsila (A) “chain”; lineage, chain of spiritual descent.

Sufi (A) Muslim mystic.

Sufism Islamic mysticism.

sunnet (T) ritual circumcision; more broadly, from the Arabic sunna, the practices derived from the Prophet Muhammad’s example.

Sunni (A) a Muslim who belongs to the majority Muslim community (as distinct from the Shi’a) which accepts the authority and validity of the actions of the early Muslim community and its jurists.

sura (A, T sure) a chapter of the Qur’an.

surgun (T) deportation.

tabaqat (A) lit. “classes” or “generations”; Islamic biographical literature.

Tabaski (West African) annual festival, involving the slaughter of sheep, coinciding with the hajj season.

ta‘a (A) obedience.

tafsir (A) Qur’anic commentary.

tajdid (A) religious reform and renewal.

talab al-‘ilm (A) the seeking of religious knowledge, mainly through travel.

talib (A) a (religious) student or scholar; talip (T) followers or clients of a holy man, e.g. dede or pir.

taqiyya (A) dissimulation of one’s religion (in the face of a perceived threat).

tariqa (A, pl. turuq, T tarikat) Sufi brotherhood or order.

tasawwuf (A) Islamic mysticism; Sufism; the Sufi way of life.

tek (T) single, singleness.

Tijaniyya (A) a North African Sufi order.

toyol (Malay) a type of spirit believed to come from Malaysia via the hajj.

tun tigi (Manding) hereditary category of Dyula Muslims who participated in lo initiation society rituals and who were not expected to conform rigorously to the strictures of the shari‘a; see also mory.

umma (A) the Islamic community.

‘umra (A), umre hac (T) “minor” pilgrimage to Mecca at any time of year. Often understood in Turkey as a commemorative pilgrimage made after the hajj.

vatan (T, from the Arabic watan) fatherland, homeland.

Wahhabiyya (A) an Islamic reform movement founded in the Arabian Peninsula by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century. More properly known as al-Muwahhidun, or “the Unitarians”; Wahhabi, a follower of this movement. Also used loosely to denote a strict fundamentalist.

wali (A) saint.

yerli (T) native, indigenous.

yeshivot (Hebrew, sing, yeshiva) Jewish schools of higher religious instruction and learning.

yolculuk (T) travel, journey.

zaddik (H, from the Arabic sadiq) Jewish saint.

zahidin (A) ascetics.

za ’ir (A) a visitor; a pilgrim who visits a shrine.

zat (T, from the Arabic dhat) personality, individual essence or substance.

zawiya (A) shrine, usually associated with a saint’s tomb.

ziyara (A, T ziyaret) a visit or voluntary pilgrimage; a shrine.

Zweite Generation (German) second generation.

[101] Abbreviations: (A) = Arabic; (T) = Turkish; (P) = Persian.

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Dale F. Eickelman

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** Preface

THIS IS A BOOK about how to think about “Muslim politics.” A vast amount of literature exists on Islam and politics, and from different perspectives we ourselves have contributed to it. Drawing on that literature, we seek to clarify the meanings of such concepts as tradition, authority, ethnicity, protest, and symbolic space that are inescapably part of the professional inheritance of our disciplines—anthropology and political science—but which often recede into the background of ethnographic or political case studies.

It is thus not a book about the Islamic revival, nor is it a handbook to the politics of individual Muslim societies, much less to the politics of the Middle East. Rather, this book is intended to pose questions about the nature of one kind of politics—similar to but not synonymous with what Michael Mann (1986) calls “ideological politics”—in a variety of regional settings. In the elaboration of such a broadly comparative essay, conventional wisdom will inevitably appear suspect; and fixed, paradigmatic ways of thinking, misleading if not also dangerous.

The term “Muslim politics” is not meant to imply a concentration on self-ascribed religious authorities. The traditionally educated scholars Culama) clearly play a role, but so, too, do lay intellectuals, mothers, government leaders, and musicians. They are the protagonists of the Muslim political drama, not merely because they share normative codes but because they invoke the symbols of those codes to reconfigure the boundaries of civic debate and public life. It is these symbolic politics that account for why political actions and choices are recognizably Muslim, and in this sense “Islam” makes a difference in configuring the politics of a broad swath of the world.

Yet doctrine, it will be apparent, is of secondary importance. Muslim politics is not predetermined by a template of ideas; it is influenced by a number of factors, which, while including scripturally defined precepts, also include national identities, economic circumstances, and social status. The politics we seek to elucidate possesses a similar profile and parallel functions among both Sunnis and Shi’a, and it follows that the presumption of an engrained sectarian divergence obscures the workings of complex, but common, processes.

Also unhelpful are the customary dichotomies of social analysis— public and private, internal and external, high and low politics. Our intention is not to subvert common sense but to indicate the ways in which such unnuanced sets of contrasting markers deter awareness of the constant interpenetration of social and political networks in the Muslim world. The multiple roles of women may be hidden under the rubric “private,” much as transnational concerns over the condition of a Muslim minority may be minimized in viewing the matter as “internal” to one society.

Much of what follows will appear familiar, and in the recognition of the similarity of form and process that Muslim politics shares with other religious traditions, Islam’s putative uniqueness may be diminished. Islam is neither especially religio-political, nor particularly hostile to ethnic and cultural variations. It is neither unprecedentedly revolutionary, nor abnormally resistant to nationalism. Such demystification of Islam will simultaneously afford —for both academics and policymakers—more subtle understandings of Muslim politics and less alarmist views of an “Islamic threat.”

Any book that draws upon materials in Arabic, Bangla, Malay, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu, among other languages, poses considerable problems of transliteration, especially as we must incorporate colloquial as well as literary usages. With as much consistency as possible, we use the system for consonants adopted by the International Journal of Middle East Studies for Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. Diacritics are omitted, but we use ^e to represent the ‘ayn, as in da’wa, and ’ to represent the hamza, as in Qur’an. We drop the terminal hamza from words such as ‘ulama. The plural of words in languages that have “broken” plurals is formed by adding an “s” to the singular, except in cases such as ‘ulama, in which the transliterated plural form has become standard. When

persons or writers are known to have a preferred spelling of their name in a European language, we generally use this form.

We are grateful to a number of people who have helped us with the preparation and production of this book. Christine Eickelman, Deborah Hodges, and Moorhead Wright commented on all or parts of the manuscript. Tamara Chalabi, Sophie Claudet, Jeneen DiBenedetto, Jane Langdell, and Riva Richmond were our assistants at various points in the past several years and facilitated our research and the preparation of the manuscript. Nancy Fenton provided efficient cartographic assistance, and Lesley Yorke copyedited the manuscript with unusual care and sensitivity. Brigadier Malcolm Dennison, Her Majesty's Lord Lieutenant of Orkney, offered us an exceptional working environment on several occasions, access to an impressive personal library, and steady encouragement.

We are also happy to acknowledge the generosity of the Claire Garber Goodman Fund for the Anthropological Study of Human Culture at Dartmouth College. This grant made it possible for coauthors to bridge the distance between New England and Wales. The Vice-Principal's Research Fund of the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, provided further travel assistance.

** 1. What is Muslim Politics?

IN FRANCE in 1989, a controversy erupted over female students wearing the traditional Muslim headscarf in public schools. Five girls who insisted on wearing them were barred from attending classes. "By nature," the school principal argued, "the scarf was a sign of proselytism and exercised pressure on other Moslem girls who did not wear scarves" (Cody 1989; David 1992). By law, public schooling in France has been secular since 1905, yet the families of the girls argued that their beliefs made the practice of "Islamic" dress obligatory. After nationwide public controversy, the Conseil d'État (Council of State), the country's highest administrative body, resolved that headscarves could be worn as long as there was no pressure exercised on other students to do so. Each school could decide whether the wearing of the headscarf was disruptive. But the government was so concerned about the larger question of Muslim integration into French life that— in part as a result of this incident —it formally, though perhaps only outwardly, adjusted state policy by creating pertinent public agencies. In 1989, it formed the Conseil de Réflexion sur l'Islam en France (Advisory Council on Islam in France), and in March 1990 it created a separate committee to combat racism.[1]

Many French saw the wearing of the headscarf as a direct challenge to French national values, and so the controversy continued to simmer. In November 1993, eight months after a change of government, the principal of a primary school in the eastern French town of Nantua suspended four Muslim girls of Turkish and Moroccan origin for wearing headscarves. The local Turkish imam, who had only arrived from Germany two weeks previously and did not speak French, declared that “God’s law takes precedence over French law” (Guigon 1993). The Ministry of the Interior deported the imam, and Le Monde reported that the “silent majority” of moderate Turks in Nantua and neighboring towns, where they constituted 25 percent of the population, were “pleased” with the expulsion because it would ease local tensions (Guigon 1993). On September 10, 1994, the French Minister of National Education, François Bayrou, sharpened the controversy in a circular instructing school officials to ban distinctly religious clothing (Bayrou 1994). By early November, however, the vice-president of the Conseil d’État responded that the September circular from the Minister of Education had no legal force, so that school directors could continue, as the Conseil advised in 1989, “to make their own decisions” (“Express politique” 1994).[2] According to one poll, 86 percent of French were against authorizing wearing of the headscarf at schools. Nonetheless, the Conseil d’État upheld the right of students to do so. In late 1993, a conservative government, antagonistic to the idea of multiculturalism and concerned about integration of Muslims into French life, encouraged school authorities to adopt restrictive dress codes that would ban the headscarf in schools.

Similarly in Egypt, veiling has taken on political significance. Although Egypt is a state with a Muslim majority that has led Muslim opinion worldwide, in the late 1980s, the Egyptian authorities came to regard veiling as an act of defiance against the largely secular ideology that they wished to promote. Accordingly, they barred Muslim women with veils or headscarves from university precincts. In the mid-1990s, officials at some Egyptian universities continued to ban female students and professors from wearing niqab, which covers all of a woman’s body, including her face. Defending use of the veil, some religious leaders answered that forcing women to unveil weakens them and leads to immorality (‹Isa 1992; see also, Hedges 1993). It is worth recalling that Egyptian women were legally obliged to unveil in 1923, although the law has rarely been enforced (Guindi 1981; Ayubi 1991:241).

Both the French and Egyptian examples illustrate “Muslim politics.” Veiling is not inherently a political act, but, rather it becomes one when it is transformed into a public symbol. A dialectical relationship between individuals and the government assures this production. Women don the veil for a variety of reasons and in spite of the government’s desires, and the government’s responses to the veiling further ensure that it is no longer a private, inconsequential act. A symbol has been created and now is integral to the identity and aspirations of groups of like-minded individuals as well as to the self-defined mission of the authorities. These examples, then, are political in part because they involve challenges to the limits of state authority but also because they involve a contest over people’s understandings of and wishes for social order. The examples are Muslim because they relate to a widely shared, although not doctrinally

defined, tradition of ideas and practice. As we shall see throughout this book, the forms of political contest and discourse as well as the meanings of traditions vary widely, but a constant across the Muslim world is the invocation of ideas and symbols, which Muslims in different contexts identify as “Islamic,” in support of their organized claims and counterclaims.

Muslims everywhere, both in Muslim majority countries and elsewhere, are so increasingly aware of their global presence that individuals and groups in Europe, North America, Russia, and elsewhere have a heightened consciousness of forming part of a world community and use this awareness to amplify their voice and political strength (see fig. 1). At times some Muslims resort to violence to advance their goals, as the November 1979 attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the 1981 assassination of Egypt’s President Sadat indicate. Such groups in Egypt and Algeria, in particular, have continued to threaten state officials, intellectuals, journalists, and foreigners with kidnapping or assassination in the hope of forcing governments to make strategic concessions. Yet other Muslim groups in such countries as Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, and Malaysia call for democratization, thus indicating that Muslims can use existing political systems to reflect their political views and pressure governments to reform.

Rulers, for their part, routinely invoke Islamic imagery and ideas to legitimize their rule and to defend themselves against Muslim critics. At the time of the French invasion of Egypt in 1798, Napoleon attempted to use Islamic symbolism to win indigenous support for his rule. Although the effort was unsuccessful in the end, it was not for lack of enthusiasm. His proclamation to the people of Egypt began with the standard Muslim invocation of “God, the Merciful, the Compassionate,” and he went on to say: “I worship God (may He be exalted) far more than the Mamlukes do, and respect His Prophet and Glorious Quran ... [T]he French also are sincere Muslims” (cited in Hourani 1970:30). Nearly two centuries later, shortly after the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, King Hussein (b. 1935, r. 1953–) addressed the Jordanian parliament. After describing U.S. plans to break up Iraq into spheres of influence, he told the deputies that “if they wanted to honor him they should call him Sharif Hussein,” a title which stressed both his descent from the Prophet and his great-grandfather’s commitment to Arab unity and protection of Islam’s holy places (Layne 1994:26–27, 37).

*** Imagining Politics

Muslim politics involves the competition and contest over both the interpretation of symbols and control of the institutions, formal and informal, that produce and sustain them. The interpretation of symbols is played out against the background of an underlying framework that, while subject to contextualized nuances, is common to Muslims throughout the world. Evolving doctrinal considerations, it should be noted, are only one factor among many that contribute to the creation of this framework. A political system, whether in the Muslim world or elsewhere, inevitably involves the management of competing, even clashing, interests. Indeed, the authoritative allocation of resources and the demarcation of boundaries are

integral to the political process, but are not the whole of it. “Who gets what, when and how” (Lasswell [1935] 1965:3) and the division between political and nonpolitical spheres of activity are only part of the larger equation. They make sense only when the dichotomizations common to political analysis— “high” and “low” politics, “public” and “private”—are qualified by a recognition of the interpenetrating networks that evolve in the social and political life of Muslims (compare Mann 1986:1–33). For example, as Chapter 4 will argue, because the family is so valued in the Muslim world, it is not surprising that, even among those not in the elite, economic and social relations are often organized around it. The religious and moral meanings invested in the family also provide a standard by which individuals may assess whether their governments and other social groups fit into the larger moral, and Islamic, order.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-2.png][Fig. 1. Although the Middle East is commonly considered as the “center” of the Muslim world, nearly half the world’s Muslims live in Southeast Asia. Their political significance, like that of Muslims in Europe and North America, is rapidly growing.]]

There is a tendency to put the struggle for power at the heart of politics (Morgenthau 1961:27, 39). Political scientists have long conceptualized power in this way, but a major tradition in anthropology has also seen the “command of organized force” or, in “stateless” societies, “a distribution of the command of force” as central to politics (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:14–15; compare Caton 1987). But politics, including in the Muslim world, is not simply concerned with established authority compelling obedience. As other theorists have argued, politics may have as much, if not more, to do with bargaining among several forces or contending groups as with compulsion. Gibbins (1989: 5–6) points out that conservative philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Oakeshott conceptualize politics, at least implicitly, as public negotiation over the rules and discourse that morally bind the community together.

Even game and collective goods theories, influenced by the contributions of both strategists and economists, appear at first to reaffirm the need for a coercive political apparatus, but in the end, they place structured, high-stakes negotiation at the core of politics. Without the restraining and punitive hand of the state, they argue that individuals or groups are likely to remain “free riders,” concerned only with their own self-interest. Coercion is thus necessary to induce cooperation. Yet, what passes for coercion is really an urgent attempt by political authorities to persuade the citizen to forego selfishness, with the promise that everyone else will be required to make a similar sacrifice (Stein 1990:32–36).[3] Although game and collective goods theories can be faulted for placing too great an emphasis on the rationality of members of society, they illuminate how political authorities must cajole and bargain, as well as suppress and punish.

Societies, whether European industrial democracies, Third World developing countries, or bedouin tribal communities, are comprised of an often complex balance of forces. These

forces may take the form of political parties and labor unions, or of military and professional associations, ethnic and religious minorities, and prominent families. While it is true that the highest decision-making body—a parliament, oligarchic elite, ruling junta, or tribal council—often imposes its will and enforces decisions on subordinates, the use of force may sometimes be counterproductive, risking greater instability than is already present. For the sake of collective order, authorities must often mediate differences among various groups in society. They may even find themselves in the position of needing to negotiate social, economic, or political policy with ostensibly subordinate groups (see Soysal 1994).

The French response to the headscarf dispute indicates the shortcomings of assuming that politics can be reduced to the use of legitimate force or the allocation of material "interests." Had the government in 1989 defined the wearing of the headscarf as a challenge to the legal principle of secular education, it would have run the risk of precipitating a major domestic crisis. Muslims constitute over 5 percent (some 4 million persons) of France's population (Chirac 1995; also see Kepel 1987:13). They do not constitute a cohesive political bloc, and the majority of French Muslims did not support demands for the wearing of the headscarf at school. However, the demands of a vocal minority precipitated a political problem for the majority of Muslims in France as well as for the state. Some Muslims saw this debate as the catalyst for the vigorous enforcement of French immigration policies that followed. French policymakers, moreover, saw their response to the headscarf issue as potentially threatening France's relations with some Muslim states: A ban could have affected adversely France's international relations. At home, the government's response brought about a confrontation with a significant number of French Muslims, and it may have intensified debates, fostered by right-wing nationalists such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, as to whether Muslims can be fully integrated into French society.

The fact that the succeeding French government took a more confrontational approach in 1993 does not mean that the fear of adverse reaction, at home and abroad, was without substance. Rather, Muslim protest, including violent protest, at what are regarded as officially tolerated inequities and injustices has not been absent in France, and all governments have had to recognize the limits of confrontation. In Turkey, Indonesia, Britain, and Germany, authorities have reacted very differently to the politically and religiously charged issue of wearing headscarves or veils. In each of these cases, the outcome has usually been a face-saving compromise and an absence of "definitive" rulings to forestall direct challenges to the limits of state authority. In all cases, the headscarf issue exemplifies the struggle to control and interpret symbols integral to Muslim politics.

Political interests, whether of the state or other groups, can never be defined as solely material. As Max Weber points out, socially defined values play an important role in formulating the identities and goals of individuals and collectivities: "As a separate structure, a political community can be said to exist only if, and in so far as, a community constitutes more than an 'economic group'; or, in other words, in so far as it possesses value systems ordering matters other than the directly economic disposition of goods and services" (Weber 1968:902). These values, constitutive of a political community, are expressed in symbolic forms.

Symbols are signs that point to values, and often—although not always—these symbols are expressed in language. Sometimes they are expressed in images as well as language. The interconnection of values, symbols, and languages has a powerful effect: “Jointly shared symbolic expressions which are articulated through languages are the means of socialization and create a social bond between individuals and groups, since the roles and social relations available in society are transmitted through language” (Pekonen 1989:132).

The idea of politics as centered on power relations and “interests” alone clearly does not take account of cooperative relations among individuals in a society or between societies that are based on what they think is right, just, or religiously ordained (Cerny 1990: 17–18). Kyösti Pekonen’s definition of politics as “a struggle about people’s imaginations” (Pekonen 1989:132) is a corrective to some conventional thinking. More broadly, politics can be conceived as competition and struggle over the meanings of symbols (for example, Geertz 1973:193–233) and control of the institutions that define and articulate social values. As Immanuel Wallerstein argues, power resides not only in the possession of economic resources but also “in the control of cultural institutions” (Wallerstein 1983:34). Politics as Leviathan is thus transformed into politics as symbol maker.

In this regard, David Easton’s (1965:50) definition of politics as “the authoritative allocation of values” is unhelpful because the qualifier “authoritative” overstates the extent to which a consensus on values exists, and “allocation” overstates the degree to which consensus is maintained from above. Clive Kessler’s analysis of politics in Malaysia illustrates how values are not simply allocated and how state control of symbolic power is not always unchallenged. Values and symbols acquire focal political significance in ways that are not always predictable: “The symbolic is not a residual dimension of purportedly real politics; still less is it an insubstantial screen upon which real issues are cast in pale and passive form. The symbolic is real politics, articulated in a special and often most powerful way” (Kessler 1978:244–45).

Symbolism in politics may reduce spatial separations or emphasize temporal connections. In September 1993, Palestinians in Khartoum who were connected with Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya), the Palestine-based Islamic resistance movement, protested against the accord between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel over the Gaza strip and Jericho. Their protest, in a main public square, centered around a scale model of Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. This symbolism affirmed that any agreement had to take into account the views of Palestinians in the diaspora, such as themselves, and had to be based on the liberation of all Palestinian land, including Jerusalem (BBC SWB ME/1796 MED/6, September 17, 1993). On December 16, 1994, the seventh anniversary of the founding of Hamas, members of the group in Gaza, which several months earlier had kidnapped an Israeli soldier, reenacted before a crowd of thousands the Israeli raid in which the hostage was killed. The public performance, which dramatized the threat of further action, visibly reaffirmed the continuity of the struggle.

The cult that is rapidly developing around the tomb of Ayatullah Khomeini in Iran illustrates how symbolic politics “become real.” After Khomeini’s death on June 3, 1989, Iranians and other Shi‹i Muslims began to regard his tomb at the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery south of Tehran as a place of pilgrimage (ziyara) nearly equal in importance to the tombs of the twelve Shi‹i Imams. According to the Islamic Republic News Agency (“Frenzy of Grief”, 1990), “more than eight million” pilgrims from South Asia, the Soviet Union, and Iran assembled at the cemetery in 1990 on the first anniversary of the Ayatullah’s death. In addition to the traditional expressions of mourning, pilgrims shouted political slogans such as “Death to America” (marg bar Amrika). They also used the occasion to acclaim Khomeini’s successor, Ayatullah ‹Ali Khamene›i (b. 1940), the “guide” (mawlay) of the revolution .

Visits to the tomb had become so popular by the second anniversary of Khomeini’s death that the occasion was transformed into a national political rally.[4] Iran’s president, ‹Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (b. 1934), invoked Khomeini’s calls for Islamic unity and warned Iranians that the achievements of the revolution would be endangered if they became politically divided. Ayatullah Khamene›i, for his part, addressed foreign-policy aspects of the Islamic movement (BBC SWB, ME/1090/A10, June 5, 1991, and ME/1091/A4, June 6, 1991). He indicated that he was in ill health but “could not stop myself from being with you on such a day and in such a gathering.” In September 1993, Ayatollah Khomeini’s son, Ahmad, used the occasion of a Revolutionary Guards ceremony at his father’s tomb to denounce the “shameful treachery” of the Israeli-PLO accord (BBC SWB ME/1796 MED/18, September 17, 1993). The tomb has been invested with such central political significance that, contrary to what might have seemed appropriate in light of the late Khomeini’s asceticism, green Italian marble now adorns it.[5]

As this example suggests, the symbolic component of politics is especially significant because it can be used as an instrument of persuasion as well as coercion. Bargaining models of politics suggest that persuasion, rather than force, is increasingly considered to be the basis of politics. Steven C. Caton makes this point in the context of Middle Eastern tribal settings: “[W]hen one examines the ethnographic record to determine what it is that Middle Eastern tribesmen are doing in political acts, one finds that they are talking to each other probably more than they are fighting ... with the consequent or attendant belief that the basis of power is persuasion rather than the exercise of force” (1987:89; emphasis in original).

*** The Language of Politics

In the case of Muslim societies, like others, persuasion is largely an act of speech, and the symbolic and persuasive dimension to politics has become virtually synonymous with the politics of language. It is now commonplace to argue that language is a social and political practice, and that the way we use language is intimately related to how we construct

communal identities and promote and defend our aspirations (for example, Shapiro 1984:8; Habermas 1981:397). Never neutral in itself, language may be used to affirm or reaffirm hierarchies of power. In the world of psychiatric care, for example, psychiatrists grow “angry,” but patients become “aggressive”; nurses “daydream,” but the hospitalized “withdraw” (Edelman 1984:49). Language may also be used to subvert existing hierarchies, as when Margaret Thatcher, both in opposition and in office, undermined the postwar social welfare consensus in Britain by identifying “freedom” and “efficiency” with the free market; the public sector was “tyrannical” and “inefficient” (Kellner 1988). Finally, language can take on unintended meanings, leading to unforeseen consequences. For example, the concept of “people’s democracies” in the former Eastern bloc was a thinly disguised attempt to endow a form of legitimacy on dynastic and oneparty tyrannies. Yet, as conditions changed, the concept had the ironic effect of legitimizing the revolutionaries who brought down the old order.

In the case of the Muslim world, rulers such as Sadat in Egypt and Hassan II (b. 1929, r. 1961–) in Morocco have legitimized the existing political hierarchy by referring to themselves as “the President-Believer” (al-ra›is al-mu›min) and the “commander of the faithful” (amir al-mu›minin) respectively. Conversely, critics of those in power can help to delegitimize established authorities by denouncing them as “infidel” (kafir) or “ignorant [of Islam]” (jahil). Muslim activist groups in Egypt, for instance, have pronounced Egypt the “land of unbelief” (dar al-kufr) because of the “un-Islamic” ways of the government and society. Finally, as noted above, language can evade the control of those who use it and take on unanticipated connotations. When, for example, the Kuwaiti royal family sought to validate its rule by endorsing the tribal and Islamic idea of “consultation” (shura), it encouraged expectations of participatory politics. Yet the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1976 and 1986 and the postponement of elections in the immediate wake of the 1990–91 Gulf crisis frustrated these expectations and cast the regime in a harsh and critical light.

It is not an exaggeration to say, as have several scholars (for example, Vatin 1982:221–50), that “Islam” constitutes the language of politics in the Muslim world. Although multiple interpretations can exist, Islam is a relatively stable type of expression and thus constitutes a discursive but culturally specific genre of politics (Bakhtin 1981:47; compare Bayart 1991:64). As the examples cited above indicate, the Islamic vocabulary contains words of undoubted political resonance, and a review of their historical development helps to explain their durable attraction (for example, Lewis 1988). Yet it would be misleading to conclude that the political language of Islam is simply composed of terms used in a predictable manner or to see these terms as possessing uniform relevance to political and social action. Rather, Islamic political language requires a broader conceptualization.

If, as we have just indicated, Islam may be thought to constitute the language of politics, there is also a “politics of language” in the Islamic world that must be taken into account (Piscatori 1990:771–74). This added perspective points to the variable usage of language, suggesting that the utility of Islamic terminology to both rulers and opponents is enhanced in times of upheaval and stress. It also depicts an Islamic language that is more

than simply a vocabulary. In addition to socially defined words, this language is made up of both symbols and mediators—those who modify and rework the symbols in specific circumstances and for particular purposes (compare Habermas 1981:54, 70– 72, 95–96; Derrida 1974). ‹Ali Shari‹ati (1933–77) captures this point:

The language of religion, and particularly the language of the Semitic religions, in whose prophets we believe, is a symbolical language. By this we mean a language which expresses meaning through images and symbols—the most excellent and exalted of all the languages that men have ever evolved.... A simple and straightforward language, one deprived of all symbol and image, may be easier for purposes of instruction, but it has no permanence. (Shari‹ati 1979:71)

The mediators of the language of Muslim politics include traditional, madrasa-educated religious intellectuals and the increasingly prominent “new” religious intellectuals who have emerged from modern state or secular schooling, as is the case for most Muslim activists, or who have had experience with both styles of education. Shari‹ati himself exemplifies the mixing of educational styles.[6]

Saddam Hussein’s invocation of Islamic symbolism and terminology in the Gulf crisis of 1990–91 is instructive. As leader of the Arab Ba‹th Socialist Party, with its commitment to secularism and Arab socialism and its policy of repression of Islamic groups in Iraq, Saddam would have been expected to frame his appeals for support in the language of anti-imperialism rather than Islam. Yet he pointedly referred to the “infidels” of the West arrayed against him and called for jihad (holy war) to combat them. His audience was aware of his poor Islamic credentials, and there is little evidence to suggest that the invocation of such concepts automatically aroused sympathy or instinctively rallied support for him.

In fact, there was considerable feeling in much of the Muslim world that Saddam was, at best, an opportunist and, at worst, a hypocrite. However, when Western troops went to Saudi Arabia, Saddam found a receptive audience for his anti-Western and anti-Saudi rhetoric. Words such as jihad do not automatically engender social and political action, but they acquire specific meanings in the context in which they are applied. The context in this case was that “infidel” troops on Arabian soil had exposed the Saudi monarch, the “Servant of the Two Holy Places” (khadim al-haramayn), to the charge that he was consorting with the infidels and, by extension, with their “natural” allies, the Israelis. The linkages among the House of Sa‹ud, the United States, and Israel are graphically represented in figure 2, the cover of Saffah al-Sa‹udiyya [The bloodletter of Saudi Arabia] (al-Nafi‹ 1993), a multi-colored representation of a bloody dagger, with an American flag on its handle, suspended over a map of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian peninsula. A benignly smiling King Fahd (b. 1920, r. 1982–) hovers over the map, sporting a Star of David in his ‹iqal, the rope-like band that holds his headcloth (ghutra) in place.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-18.jpg][Fig. 2. Anti-Saudi caricatures, often sponsored by Iranian and Iraqi groups, were common prior to the 1990–91 Gulf war, but they proliferated thereafter. This is the cover of a 1993 anti-Saudi book.]]

Saddam received a sympathetic hearing when he asked why his troops should withdraw from Arab land when the Israelis continued to occupy Palestine, including Jerusalem. It was seen partly as a matter of justice, but Muslim interest in Jerusalem was also at work. Islamic tradition holds that the Prophet Muhammad was transported to Jerusalem in a “night journey” (al-isra›), and in a second journey (mi-raj), he ascended to heaven where, at the throne of Allah, he learned the proper manner of prayer. The al-Aqsa mosque, mentioned in the Qur›an (17:1), and the Dome of the Rock commemorate this special relationship between the Prophet and Jerusalem. After Mecca and Medina, it is the third holiest city of Islam, and Palestine has become one of Islam’s holy lands.

Saddam was able to draw a link between the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the supposed Western occupation of Saudi Arabia, the land containing the holy cities of Mecca and Medina where the Prophet lived and died: “Oh, Arabs, oh, Muslims and believers everywhere, this is your day to rise and defend Mecca, which is captured by the spears of the Americans and the Zionists.... Keep the foreigner away from your holy shrines” (cited in Brinkley 1990:14). The call fell on receptive ears, partly because of the unpopularity of the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, which, to many less wealthy Muslims, appeared corrupt and arrogant. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which was agitating for greater influence in the Jordanian political system, in February 1991 called on Muslims “to purge the holy land of Palestine and Najd and Hijaz [provinces of Saudi Arabia] from the Zionists and imperialists” (Milton-Edwards 1991b:98).

The rhyming slogans used in Moroccan street demonstrations, moreover, revealed popular sentiment against Saudi Arabia and the perceived linkage between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Referring to the Saudi monarch and his guardianship of the Ka‹ba, the shrine in Mecca that is the focal point of the hajj (pilgrimage), one crowd chant was “Fahd, Fahd, ya humar, ba‹ti l-Ka-ba bil-dular” [Fahd, Fahd, O donkey, you sold the Ka‹ba for a dollar]. Another slogan, invoking Iraqi missile names that possessed religious and historical resonance, affirmed that Jews and the Saudi dynasty were the common enemy: “Al--Abbas li-lyahud, wa-l-Husayn li-s-Sa‹ud” [The ‹Abbas (missile) to the Jews, and the Husayn to the (house of) Sa‹ud]. Even among Muslims in China, some believed that the dispatch of Western troops was the latest sign of the Saudi regime’s un-Islamic character (Gladney 1994b:686).

When Saddam said that the Saudis, by allowing Western troops on their soil, were effectively in league with the Israelis, he drew together powerfully related symbols of Muslim politics: the sanctity of the two Muslim holy lands of Arabia and Palestine and Saddam, the new Saladin, as the restorer of Islamic rule over these sacred places.[7] Many Muslims responded

to Iraqi rhetoric in part because the direct intrusion of Western forces to Arabia seemed threatening to Islam. They also responded because their affiliation with institutions and groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and other voluntary religious associations, helped to articulate and heighten the potency of the symbolism at a time when their governments were often constrained to adopt ambiguously pro-Western positions.

As the second Gulf War suggests, Muslim politics becomes incomprehensible if the symbolism and shared assumptions of Muslims are disregarded. There is an implicit consciousness of common notions— an underlying framework of language, ideas, and values which, while not always self-evident or explicitly expressed, becomes apparent when the shared assumptions are violated or attacked. A striking feature of the Rushdie affair, in which Ayatullah Khomeini condemned a British novelist to death in 1989 for having written a "blasphemous" novel, was the near unanimity of outrage at the perceived defamation of the Prophet among Muslims of widely varying backgrounds and political opinion. Similarly, as we have pointed out, state authorities in Algeria, Indonesia, Turkey, China, Egypt, France, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere have inadvertently stimulated Muslim self-consciousness by disregarding sensitivity on issues such as marriage rites and the use of headscarves in public.

*** Doctrine and Political Action

Doctrine plays a part in such reactions but is not decisive by itself. When we say that politics is "Muslim," we do not mean to imply that doctrine invariably motivates action. Indeed, there are two reasons why the relationship between doctrine and practice is more complicated. First, the permanence of doctrine itself is a conceptual fiction. Established religious hierarchies, wishing to promote their own interests as "defenders of the faith," suggest that divinely inspired or sanctioned principles are by nature fixed and universally applicable. However, like all religious traditions, Islamic principles must be constantly reinterpreted. The result is a flexibility of ideas and divergence over time and space. As Brinkley Messick says of the distinction between the divinely ordained shari-a and interpretations of it: "In this gap between divine plan and human understanding [lies] the perennially fertile space of critique, the locus of an entire politics located in the idiom of the shari‹a" (1993:17).

The Islamic notion of zakat (almsgiving) is an example. There is little agreement other than using it for humanitarian or charitable purposes: The Qur›an encourages Muslims to spend their mal (wealth) "out of love for Him, for your kin, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask, and for the ransom of slaves" (2:177). Some Muslims argue that it is a voluntary act of faith; others argue that it is obligatory. Some contend that it is to be collected by the central government, as in Pakistan, where it was instituted along with the Islamic punishments of flogging and the amputation of limbs to bolster the regime's legitimacy through its commitment to "Islamization" (Novossyolov 1993). Islamic associations such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

sometimes levy zakat on their members (Mitchell 1969:275). An indication of the degree to which doctrine is malleable is the specific political use of zakat in a resolution of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (1981:699). It endorses the collection of zakat to support the work of the Palestine Liberation Organization, rather than, for example, to support Palestinian widows, orphans, and refugees as might be expected. In the West Bank, Hamas receives money from zakat committees to support its poorer members and social welfare activities. The expenditures strengthen support for the movement (Milton-Edwards 1991a:278).

Similarly, doctrine proves to be flexible in the case of waqfs (pious endowments). The protests of some ‹ulama notwithstanding, the Pakistani state, like many governments elsewhere, has appropriated to itself the administration of the endowments, thereby enhancing its identification with Islam. It effectively creates a state monopoly over the doctrine and its interpretation (Malik 1990).

Doctrinal change, like all change, is complex and is often tied to rearrangements in political structures (see Cerny 1990:4). Moreover, actors always have alternative political visions available and the need to articulate them. An important component, therefore, of understanding politics is the recognition of the ways in which these different, oppositional visions alter or replace currently dominant and authoritative ones. Assertions that credos, beliefs, or traditions are timeless and immemorial should not obscure the fact that they are subject to constant modification and change.

The second reason why the relationship between doctrine and practice is complex is that doctrinal prescriptions are but one factor in motivating social action (see Eickelman and Piscatori 1990:6–15). As traditional Muslim theorists maintain, ideas such as zakat and jihad play a role in inspiring social and political conduct. However, considerations such as family, ethnicity, class, gender, and bureaucratic access can be equally important. Doctrine enjoins the pilgrimage to Mecca on all believers able to do so, but believers are just as likely to fulfill this obligation because of the opportunity to improve their social status, commercial possibilities, or, in the case of Saddam Hussein, political influence.

*** Setting Boundaries

In the process of articulating symbolic politics, various forces seek to draw lines between public and private, government and civil society, obligatory and forbidden, moral and immoral. The drawing of boundaries is part of the political process, whether it involves the demarcation of decision-making units in society and the enforceable rules for resolving jurisdictional disputes among them (compare Deutsch 1966:254–55), or demarcation of areas open to state control over the production of dominant values and those that are not. Indeed, a political system has often been thought to reflect a relatively stable and

hierarchical consensus on boundary setting, but in fact challenges to this consensus and the desire to shift boundaries have always been present (Eisenstadt 1986:30–31). Immigration, for example, is a political question because it involves drawing lines around “the club” of a society or nation-state, with membership in the club a necessary component of political success. Yet, as the Muslim migration to western Europe and the rise of neofascist movements there indicate, these lines are increasingly contested because of the growing mobility of peoples and the diminished social welfare capabilities of governments.

While conservatives and neoconservatives find support for their views on limiting immigration in demarcational politics, liberals also view politics as the drawing of necessary boundaries between areas of activity, for instance, separating military from civil authority. The blurring of lines produces uncertainty and opportunities for abuse of power, whereas boundary setting is a guarantee of liberty: The state “has a special influence, for it is the agent of separation and the defender ... of the social map. It is not so much a night watchman protecting individuals from coercion and physical assault as it is the builder and guardian of the walls, protecting churches, universities, families, and so on from tyrannical interference” (Walzer 1984:327; compare Walzer 1983).

Boundary setting is important, though not exclusively so, in Muslim politics. Political scientists have often focused on the state’s role in setting down markers, but an examination of Muslim politics indicates that this “top-down” view is distorting. Boundaries can also be set by religious authorities, Islamist protest movements, and kin groups, among others. For instance, the religious authorities (‹ulama) in Egypt vigorously protested against President Sadat’s effort in 1979 to liberalize family law and women’s marital rights because they saw this as an intrusion on their authority. Similarly, Indonesia’s usually compliant ‹ulama, who have accepted pançasila, the secular national ideology, reacted strongly to the government’s attempt to implement a marriage law that would have departed significantly from Islamic family law. In the early 1990s, Muslim activist groups in Algeria were locked in a struggle with the socialist and secular government over the limits of state control of society: Should the government build state-run schools and mosques, or should it distribute the funds to various Muslim associations so they could build and maintain their own institutions?

In revolutionary Iran, disputes over boundaries have been endemic. The Majlis-i Shura-ye Islami (National Assembly) and Council of Guardians have competed with each other to set the legislative agenda, and each has warily regarded the power of the supreme faqih (literally “jurisprudent,” or leader of the revolution). The issue of land reform has proven particularly contentious. Leading Shi‹i clerics, themselves often landowners, have tended to uphold the sanctity of private property, while younger mullahs and radical groups have agitated for large-scale expropriation and redistribution of lands. A land reform measure, which was approved by the Revolutionary Council in April 1980 and which required the breakup of a large number of estates, met with a fierce opposition. As a result, Ayatullah Khomeini halted the redistribution of these lands in October 1980. Cognizant of the depth of this dispute, the then-speaker of the Majlis, Hashemi Rafsanjani, himself a supporter of land reform because he felt that it would

stabilize the social order, sought Ayatullah Khomeini's guidance in October 1981. Preferring ambiguity to favoring one faction over another in this dispute, Khomeini failed to intervene decisively. Two bills were introduced, both purportedly representing his intentions. Although an Agrarian Reform Law favorable to landlords was finally approved in December 1982, even this was rejected in January 1983 by the Council of Guardians, which is composed of senior religious scholars and which unanimously ruled that the proposed law violated "the principles of the sharia" (Schirazi 1993:204; see also, Baktiari in press).

Pressed again by Rafsanjani in early 1983, Ayatullah Khomeini suggested that if the Majlis wished to impress upon the Council of Guardians the urgency of reform measures, it should approve them by a twothirds majority. The parliament proceeded to pass laws on privately owned urban land and landlord-tenant relations by such a majority, but not before it had taken some of the Council's reservations into consideration. For its part, the Council "continued to regard itself as the final authority on questions of Islamic law—a position upheld by the constitution, affirmed repeatedly by Khomeini himself, and conceded on several occasions by the speaker of parliament (Bakhash 1985:19; see also, Bakhash 1990). A land redistribution bill was narrowly approved in October 1986, and the fact that it was allowed to stand indicates a relative shift in favor of factions that were demanding greater and faster change (Baktiari in press). But this dispute, as with others over banking, taxation, and cultural issues, remained unresolved, and the Ayatullah was eventually impelled to create a new institution, the High Council for the Discernment of Interests, which was ostensibly to act as his eyes and ears and resolve disagreements over fundamental issues that would endanger the revolution (Schirazi 1993:171–232).

The Council did not end the legislative confusion, however. As a letter to Khomeini signed by more than ninety Majlis deputies in late 1988 makes clear, there was ambiguity concerning its proper place in the system. The Majlis feared that the Council was becoming a rival legislative body that would "cause the proliferation of numerous contradictions in the laws of the country," thereby stimulating systemic instability. Khomeini's response was characteristically Delphic: telling the deputies they were "absolutely right," but noting that because of the prolonged war with Iraq (September 1980–August 1988), "the interests of Islam and the system [had] necessitated that the blind knots of law be speedily unraveled for the benefit of the people and Islam" (Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], NES-88–237, December 9, 1988, pp. 42–43). That Khomeini did not provide concrete guidance for the future only guaranteed that much of Iranian politics would center on the definition of institutional boundaries.

Muslim politics, like politics everywhere, thus involves a contest over the extent of state control—locating the boundaries of legitimate state and nonstate activity or what has been unhelpfully termed the "public" and "private." But, as Chapter 3 will argue, boundaries are also negotiated between and among nonstate actors, such as those between the religious scholars and mystical (Sufi) shaykhs. Moreover, as Chapter 4 will suggest, the boundaries between public and private are constantly shifting; family concerns can also have a "public" dimension. A notable consequence of this more diffuse process of boundary

setting, in which various individuals and groups compete to represent the claims of Muslims, is the fragmentation of authority that we will discuss in Chapter 5.

The need to place Muslim politics into multiple and shifting contexts thus becomes apparent. Like power, symbolism and language—integral components of politics—“must be located within a nexus of social and cultural relationships” (Grillo 1989:21). This need for contextualization applies to all politics, and in this respect, Muslim politics is not unique. As we have argued, neither can it be said to be unique because of any singular determination of doctrine.

The distinctiveness of Muslim politics may be said to lie rather in the specific, if evolving, values, symbols, ideas, and traditions that constitute “Islam.” These include notions of social justice and communal solidarity that have been inspired by the founding texts of Islam such as the Qur›an and the sayings (hadiths) of the Prophet. They may also include a sense of obligation to authority that has been informed as much by social practice as by Qur›anic injunction, the practices of mystical orders (tariqas), and the established schools (madhhabs) of Islamic law. Such ideas and values, as expressed through symbols and language, constitute an image of the ideal Muslim society. Precisely because the symbolism and the language are inherently flexible and even ambiguous, one Muslim’s image can be another’s “counter-image” (Kessler 1990:15). Just as those not habituated to the marketplace may have a moral ambivalence toward the “unapologetic jockeying” for material advantage that occurs in it (Geertz 1979:221), many Muslims—as the adherents of other religions regard their own faith—may prefer to think of Islam as fixed in form and content, yet implicitly, even if grudgingly, accept that its interpretations change over time. Increasingly, in the venture of Islam, Muslim politics constitutes the field on which an intricate pattern of cooperation and contest over form, practice, and interpretation takes place.

** 2. The Invention of Tradition in Muslim Politics

FROM THE MID-1950s the conventional wisdom was that Middle Eastern societies faced a stark choice—“Mecca or mechanization” (Lerner 1964:405; see also, Berger 1964, 1970:719–20, 724–27)—a phrase that epitomized modernization theory as applied to Middle Eastern and Muslim societies. The concepts underlying the phrase also governed “real world” political decisions. The late Shah of Iran was only one of many leaders of Muslim societies who tried to delegitimize the role of Islam in politics by identifying religion with the past and backwardness. Ayatullah Khomeini (1902–89) provided a measure of how other Muslim leaders reject this dichotomization:

The claim that Islam is against modern (technical) innovations is the same claim made by the deposed Mohammad Riza Pahlevi that these people [Islamic revolutionaries] want to travel with four-legged animals, and this is nothing but an idiotic accusation. For, if by

manifestations of civilization it is meant technical innovations, new products, new inventions, and advanced industrial techniques which aid in the progress of mankind, then never has Islam, or any other monotheist religion, opposed their adoption. On the contrary, Islam and the Holy Qur›an emphasize science and industry. (Khomeini [1983] n.d.:22)[8]

This unhesitant affirmation of Islam's compatibility with modernization seems even more striking, given the Western media's depiction of the Ayatullah in particular and the Iranian revolution in general as reactionary and even "medieval." The idea that Islam is a hindrance to the process of development also owes its currency to the persistence of modernization theory.

*** The "Modernization" of Muslim Societies

There have been various manifestations of modernization theory, the single most important social theory to influence both academic and policy approaches to the Third World from the 1950s to the late 1970s.

So pervasive was the impact of its early or "classical" formulation that it fashioned the aid and development policies of the industrialized Western states and such international institutions as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Common to all variations of this theory was the assumption that complex economic structure and political development proceed in tandem. In one influential formulation, "The forces of technological change and cultural diffusion are driving political systems in certain directions, which seem discernible and susceptible to analysis in terms of increasing levels of development" (Almond and Powell 1966:301).

Economic specialization, it was argued, leads to political institutionalization; and the displacement of traditional, usually landed, elites by urban middle classes leads to the emergence of centralized commercial, bureaucratic, and educational structures. According to this formulation of modernization theory, superstition wanes and religion recedes from a role in public life. The religious establishment comes to be seen as resistant to change. As the civic order becomes secularized, "rational" conduct becomes the norm, and this leads to greater political participation or, at the least, political stability.[9]

The secular bias of modernization theory had its specific echo in analyses of the Islamic world. In the early 1960s, modernization theorists saw the Muslim world as facing an unpalatable choice: either a "neo-Islamic totalitarianism" intent on "resurrecting the past," or a "reformist Islam" that would open "the sluice gates and [be] swamped by the deluge" (Halpern 1963:129). This intensely negative view of the possibilities of evolution in Muslim societies betrayed an inherent preference for such militantly secularizing reformers as Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) and the Pahlavi shahs of Iran, Reza Shah

(1878–1944) and his son, Muhammad Reza Shah (1919–80). In the 1970s, assumptions about Islam's role in the development process continued to be similarly unnuanced: "In an industrializing nation, the gap between political and religious authority ... becomes progressively greater," whereas "Islamic influence and control are strongest when maintaining the status quo in a backward community" (Bill and Leiden 1979:69).[10]

The inherent defects of modernization theory have been well documented (for example, Higgott 1983; Binder 1986), and its limitations have become equally apparent in analyses of the Muslim world (Binder 1988:76–84; Hudson 1980:5–10). The fundamental difficulty with the theory lay in the sharp contrast between two artificial constructs, "modernity" and "tradition," and the consequent misunderstanding of the entrenched social functions of tradition. As Black observes, "If one thinks of modernization as the integration or the reintegration of societies on the basis of new principles, one must also think of it as involving the disintegration of traditional societies (1966:27)." "Modernity" was seen as an "enlargement of human freedoms" and an "enhancement of the range of choices" as people began to "take charge" of themselves (Madan 1987:748). Tradition is thus devalued as implying contrary values. It is also seen as so inimical to modernization that its displacement often gives rise to violence and a political instability, "strewn with wrecks and skeletons" (Black 1966:27–28, 164–65). Since the 1980s, several modernization theorists have come to accept that positing a sharp division between tradition and modernity oversimplifies a complex process of interaction in which religion and tradition coexist with economic development and the needs of a modern society (for example, Weiner and Huntington 1987).

In many ways, Marxist-Leninist theories of development and modernization theories evolved similarly. Just as the 1979 Iranian revolution helped to trigger a rethinking of modernization theory in the West, it had similar repercussions in the Soviet Union, where scholars and policymakers worked largely in isolation from their Western counterparts.[11] The Islamic revolution in Iran and the rise of Islamic political activism as a force in world politics could not be explained by conventional Soviet frameworks. Soviet thinking was conditioned by the Marxist-Leninist assumptions that religion belonged to an ideational superstructure that was destined to disappear with the social and economic formations that supported it. As Mikhail Piotrovsky of the Hermitage, St. Petersburg, commented in 1990, "Twenty years ago we considered religious beliefs to be dying. Now we are reaping the harvest of this neglect" (cited in Eickelman and Pasha 1991:632).

Many Marxian (those broadly influenced by Marxist traditions), socialist, and leftist writers, however, persist in seeing politics in the Middle East and elsewhere as governed by a "neopatriarchal" petit bourgeoisie defined by and supportive of traditional values. The neopatriarchal elite, in such a view, stands in contrast to a bourgeois elite intent on modernization and a proletarian elite committed to revolution (Sharabi 1988:8–9). The problem is thought to lie with cultural schizophrenia, yet the oversimplified dichotomization of tradition and modernity is again evident:

The neopatriarchal ruling classes and states of the Middle East are Janusfaced because they look both backwards and forwards, towards tradition and modernity. They are dualistic because they are neither totally developmentalist nor completely pre-capitalist and pre-industrial. This is why no Middle Eastern country has produced manufactures on the level of South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines or Thailand ... and why there is so much oscillation and vacillation in the region, especially over the woman question. (Moghadam 1991:206)

Hisham Sharabi presents a subtle discussion of patriarchal and neopatriarchal societies, which develop in several stages and which consist of a number of types of social formation. Neopatriarchy is a “dependent, nonmodern socioeconomic structure” that “represents the quintessentially underdeveloped society” (Sharabi 1988:6–7). Although he argues that neopatriarchy will not be replaced “all at once” by “development” or “modernization,” he implicitly affirms a dichotomous approach. He refers to modernity as “a break with traditional (mythical) ways of understanding reality in favor of new (scientific) modes of thought” (1988:10), and he concludes with the hope that Arab society will “overcome its innermost disease, patriarchy, and ... become modern.... The coming of modernity, secular democracy, and libertarian socialism” would displace “the neopatriarchical status quo” (1988:155).

In contrast to the assumptions of early modernization theory and Marxist-inspired theories, tradition is often a profound vehicle for evolutionary and revolutionary change. In contemporary European usage, tradition implies procedures handed down from the past, not amenable to conscious modification, and resistant to “modernity.” In the view of one Western scholar writing in the early 1960s, tradition does little to help the Muslim to “cope with the modern world that threatens his undoing.” In fact, “to be traditional ... is to remain unrelated to modern political choices” (Halpern 1963:114–15). As we have indicated, many Middle Easterners, especially those educated in the West or influenced by Western values, also accept this pejorative notion of tradition. To them, the label “traditional” (taqlidi) implies being chained to the past and unwilling to participate in debates concerning the reform of existing social and political institutions.

Yet, as newer modernization studies have argued (So 1990:85–87), tradition need not be construed in negative terms only. Traditional family and religious networks may in fact facilitate development, and social and political changes are often made possible because they are cast in terms of the traditional framework (see Findley 1992:149). “Entrepreneurial familism” and nepotism, for example, have contributed to Hong Kong’s economic success (Wong 1988:170–71). Although it has been argued that Islam does not aid the process of modernization (Bill and Leiden 1984:67), to construct a claim that changes are Islamic is to render them legitimate and acceptable. By defending changes as in keeping with the “essence” of Islam, reformers deflate criticism that their changes run counter to the basic values of society. Likewise, by tying reforms to the fundamental responsibility of Muslims to obey God and those in authority, as enjoined in the Qur›an (for example, 4:59), they encourage the belief that innovative regulations are obligatory.

Emendations and additions to a purportedly invariant and complete Islamic law (shari-a) have occurred throughout Islamic history, particularly since the mid–nineteenth century. Muslim jurists have rigorously maintained the pious fiction that there can be no change in divinely revealed law, even as they have exercised their independent judgment (ijtihad) to create a kind of de facto legislation.[12] For instance, the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms—the Tanzimat of 1839–76— including the Commercial Code of 1850, gave the Ottomans criminal and commercial regulations similar to those found in Europe. The Majalla of 1870, the codification of laws inspired by one of the main Islamic legal traditions, the Hanafi school of law, provided for the greater degree of regularity required in complex economic transactions, including trade with non-Muslim powers. In the twentieth century, laws governing awqaf (religious endowments), which were promulgated in Egypt (1946), Lebanon (1947), and Syria (1949), attempted to remedy the situation created by endowments that put productive land out of use and that could be designed, under the pretext of religious philanthropy, to deprive an individual’s heirs of property to which they would normally be entitled.

Even in such a reputedly conservative country as Saudi Arabia, legal reforms routinely occur, often made possible by an invocation of the “public interest” (maslaha ‹amma) as an overriding Islamic concern. To give but one example, the Social Insurance Law of 1970 is a notable departure from the classical laws of inheritance in the case of a deceased worker: Inheritors of his governmentally guaranteed insurance would now be principally his wife and children and not simply—as might be expected—male agnatic relatives (see Piscatori 1986:122–24).

So common has this social legislation become in Saudi Arabia that King Fahd opened the Jurisprudence Academy of the Organization of the Islamic Conference with a ringing defense of ijtihad as a means to find new solutions to the problems of the age:

Such Ijtihad must be validated by the Ulema [‹ulama, men of learning] after due research in and consideration of old and new jurisprudence. In this regard, the call for the establishment of [this academy] reflects an imperative need at this stage of development of the Muslim Ummah [umma, Islamic community]. Indeed, it provides the truly Islamic response to questions raised by the challenges of modern life. This requires the pooling of efforts by jurists, scholars, sages and thinkers throughout the Muslim World with a view to seeking answers to the questions posed by the challenges of our time, based on the reality of our tolerant Shariah. (Fahd 1983:5)

In so arguing, Fahd has subtly blended a reaffirmation of the need for independent reasoning with an endorsement of the role played by Muslim intellectuals and thinkers who do not belong to the cadre of traditionally educated religious authorities.

If the invocation of the traditional framework facilitates incremental change, even revolutionary action is often justified by appeal to precedent. The Sudanese Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad (1844–85), gained considerable popular support by asserting that his strategy and daily round of activities corresponded on a day-to-day basis with what the Prophet Muhammad did in seventh-century Arabia. Such claims of an exact replication of the past are extreme, and contemporary political conduct relies on more subtle invocations of past values and practice.

A more recent case in point is the development of constitutionalism in Iran. At the time of the Constitutional Revolution (1905–11), Shaykh Fadlallah Nuri (1842–1909) objected to the idea of a written constitution, in part because it presumed to guarantee equality, which could not exist between the free man and the slave, husband and wife, Muslim and infidel, the healthy and ill. He also found the idea of a constitution unacceptable because it provided for a legislative body, which would infringe on divinely revealed law (Nuri 1982: 292–96). For him, a written constitution fell outside the acceptable Islamic framework.

Ayatullah Khomeini, although he expressed admiration for Shaykh Nuri, was nevertheless instrumental in formulating the 1979 constitution of the Islamic Republic. Notions of the limitations on the powers of government and of the central role of the people, such as expressed by Mehdi Bazargan (1905–95; r. 1979), his first prime minister, would have been known to him: “[T]he Holy Book affirms that any kind of government or vicegerency should stem from the people, and that they themselves should, having chosen and stated their preference for the kind of government in question, be the motivating force behind its enforcement and control” (Bazargan 1979:30).[13]

The preamble of the constitution, incorporating the idea that Muslims form a community based on submission to the will of God, says that the government “is a crystallization of political idealism based on religious community and concord which provide its organization—which through the process of ideological transformation turns its path toward the final goal (movement toward God).” Although the authors of the constitution thus directly affirm its Islamic credentials, they combine ideas of submission and participation. On the one hand, “the purpose of sovereignty is to make people grow toward the divine order,” while on the other, the constitution provides for “participation ... in order to perfect every person.”

The substantive clauses of the constitution display the coexistence of these two contrasting notions of sovereignty. They affirm the traditional concept of the absolute sovereignty of Allah (Principles 2 and 56), while accommodating the very different idea of popular sovereignty in conceding the people’s right to determine their own “destiny” (Principle 3:8) and allowing for occasional referenda (Principle 59) and a popularly elected assembly (Principle 62) (Iran 1980).[14]

*** The Blurring of Tradition and Modernity

Muslims and non-Muslims alike tend to take at face value the ideological claim by some Muslims that the key elements of Islamic tradition are fixed. Indeed, the idea of tradition is profoundly conditioned by the central role played by both founding texts and Prophetic example. Just as Muslims consider the Qur›an, the direct word of God, to be immutable, the hadith (sayings) and actions of the Prophet Muhammad are regarded as a template for action in the present.

All traditions are created, however, through shared practice, and they can be profoundly and consciously modified and manipulated under the guise of a return to a more legitimate earlier practice. Of even more significance, changed economic and political conditions can profoundly alter the meaning and significance of ideas, movements, social and personal identities, and institutional arrangements, without the proponents of these ideas being fully aware of the nature of the change. From Indonesia to Morocco, communities and regions assume that there is an Islamically defined continuity to their ways of doing things.

Politics, as we have shown, is intimately connected with the process of symbolic production. But, because symbols are general and ambiguous rather than specific, they simultaneously provide a link with the past and room for change (Scarritt 1972: 29). The effects of what might be called “postmodernization” can be mitigated by both this rootedness and flexibility. Since values take on symbolic form, the parameters of the culture appear to remain intact while the renewal and transformation of values are in fact taking place. Thus, the constancy of traditions and shared myths is affirmed, even while changes of belief and value are underway and traditions are reinvented (Barthes 1957:41–46; Samuel and Thompson 1990:14). In the case of the United States, for example, the reassuring mythology of the Constitution holds that it is amended only rarely. In practice, however, it is reinterpreted almost daily by myriad judicial, administrative, and legislative decisions.

In the case of Islam as well, there is scope for change, and several Islamic traditions can be found. Since the late 1970s, the Iranian Shi‹a, for whom dialogue and debate at all levels of religious awareness have always played a major role, have become conspicuously multinational. Even within Iran, the multiple languages of the Shi‹a—Persian, Azeri, Kurdish, and Arabic (both as the first acquired language for some Iranians and as a prerequisite for higher religious studies)—encourage awareness of multiple perspectives of ethics, politics, and interpretations of the past. The pilgrimage to Mecca; visits to the shrines of Shi‹i martyrs; and the rituals of birth, marriage, circumcision, and death, in exile or abroad, all give rise to a reinterpreted sense of history and what is “essential” to belief and practice (Fischer and Abedi 1990).

The sense of history and the past is never politically neutral. Edward Shils (1981:185) distinguishes between the pasts of occurred events and the “much more plastic” perceived past. Actually, because the line between occurred and perceived pasts depends upon the construction, dissemination, and acceptance of authoritative historical narratives, the past of

occurred events exists mostly as a pool of resources which can be drawn upon in traditional and modern settings to sanction present practice. In effect, the line between occurred and perceived events is inherently blurred because the process of creating tradition is both conscious and explicit, and unconscious and implicit.

The invention of tradition is the “process of formalization and ritualization, characterized by reference to the past” (Hobsbawm 1983:4–5). Invented traditions can emerge from the shared practices of extended families, neighborhoods, and tribes; they can develop more formally (as in court etiquette or merchant guilds); or they can be bureaucratically initiated and codified. Less attention has been given to a critical awareness of how such traditions—claims as to what is “really” Islamic, for example—are affected by political and economic circumstances and changing modes of transmission. Modes of transmission encompass oral, unwritten traditions passed on by local authorities as well as traditions learned from state-controlled television and official texts such as schoolbooks.

The invention of tradition occurs in all times and places, but, as Hobsbawm indicates, “We should expect it to occur more frequently when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys” older social patterns or produces “new ones to which they were not applicable (1983:5).” In contrast to the assumptions of both nineteenth-century liberal thought and mid–twentieth-century modernization theory, he points out that traditions are formalized in “modern” as well as “traditional” societies, again reminding us that the sharp contrast between traditional and modern is misleading.

**** From Caliphate to Islamic State

Nowhere does the tendency to justify present innovation by past practice show more clearly than in recent arguments on the nature of the Islamic state. This debate did not occur in a vacuum: It crystallized in the early twentieth century as Muslims sought an alternative to the doctrine of the caliphate in the declining Ottoman Empire (Enayat 1982:69).

The Ottoman caliphate, which had its origins in the late fourteenth century, was formally abolished by republican Turkey in 1924. At the height of Ottoman power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the title and the concept of caliphate were not greatly stressed. But when invoked, the caliphs’ claim to authority rested on their assertion that, by the will of God, they were the most effective defenders of Islam. In succeeding to the caliphate (khilafa), they had thus assumed all the powers of Muhammad except prophecy.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as the Empire declined under increasing internal pressure and external challenges from the West, the Ottomans reinvented the caliphal tradition. In the eighteenth century, a legend developed that the last ‹Abbasid caliph in Cairo had transferred the office of caliph to the Ottomans in the early sixteenth century, thus legitimizing an unbroken succession from the time of the Prophet (Inalcik 1970:320–23). “There were obvious political reasons why Ottoman sultans of the age of decline reformulated and appropriated the classical theory of the caliphate” (Inalcik 1970:320).

The idea of the Islamic state in the twentieth century emerged as a similar reinvention of tradition. The most common word for state in Arabic, dawla, appeared as early as the mid–eighth century, when it referred to the dynastic rule of the ‹Abbasids (Lewis 1988:36; Ayalon 1987:81–82). In the twentieth century, the term was transformed into al-dawla al-islamiyya (the Islamic state), to which Muslims aspire. Like the earlier theory of the caliphate, justification for the Islamic state centers on upholding the shari-a (Islamic law).

Arab Muslim intellectuals played a major role in this process. The concept of the Islamic state was promoted as the functional equivalent of the caliphate. Abu-l-Hasan al-Mawardi’s (991–1058) treatise on the caliphate, Kitab al-ahkam al-sultaniyya [The principles of government] (1960), is regarded as the archetypal Sunni treatment of the subject. He argues that a caliph is necessary to uphold the shari-a and implement its principles; he used this argument to sustain the authority of ‹Abbasid rule in the face of attacks by local warlords in Iraq and Egypt who also claimed to be “rightful” rulers of the entire Islamic world (Watt 1968:101–2) (see fig. 3).

The Egyptian reformer, Rashid Rida (1865–1935), was an important link between classical theories of the caliphate, such as al-Mawardi’s, and twentieth-century notions of the Islamic state. Rida, harkening back to the “golden age” of Islamic governance and drawing on a wellestablished point of view in Muslim historiography, distinguished between the ideal caliphate of the first four successors to the Prophet Muhammad and the actual caliphate, which was obliged to compromise with tyrants and became tyrannical itself. Rida (1934:57–65) argued that the men of learning (‹ulama), who were charged with the responsibility for maintaining the shari-a, became corrupted through compromise with temporal authority (sulta) and consequently often lent themselves to the support of tyrants.

Rida recognized the impossibility of reviving the caliphate as the sole source of spiritual authority, but he saw the transfer of its function to the Islamic state as a practical alternative. The terms he used to describe the Islamic state, including “the government of the caliphate” (hukumat al-khilafa) and the “Islamic caliphate” (al-khilafa al-Islamiyya), stress the linkages between the theory of the caliphate and that of the Islamic state (Enayat 1982:77). In retrospect, Rida’s thought was ambiguous and paradoxical; Rosenthal goes so far as to consider his basic position “utopian and romantic”

(1965:83–85). Nonetheless, he delineated the issues common to later proponents of the Islamic state and formulated the “tradition” that this state incorporates notions of popular sovereignty and human legislation (Enayat 1982:77).[15]

Olivier Roy characterizes as “inanity” the attempt to concretize the “illusion” of the Islamic state. He bases this judgment on the intellectual bankruptcy of contemporary Islamists in facing the challenges of modern societies. He argues that they have no solutions to the dominant problems of the day—“misery, rootlessness, the crisis of values and identities, the collapse of educational systems, North-South antagonism, and the problem of the integration of immigrants in host societies” (1992:43).

Nonetheless, the invention of the tradition of the Islamic state is profoundly affecting the political processes of Muslim societies everywhere and qualifying public policy debates in them. In Egypt, critics of the regime, who range from the relatively accommodationist Muslim Brotherhood to the more uncompromising network of “Islamic Associations” (Jama‹at Islamiyya), have wondered how Egypt could presume to be Islamic if the shari-a remained only a source of law rather than its principal or sole source. The dominant Islamic group of Algeria, the Front Islamique du Salut (the Islamic Salvation Front [FIS]), participated in the December 1991 parliamentary elections and called for the transformation of the Popular and Democratic Republic of Algeria—to give the country its full formal name—to an Islamic state. The success of FIS in the first round of elections prompted the resignation of the president and precipitated a political crisis that brought the intervention of a military intensely hostile to the demands of FIS and similar groups. In the Central Asian republic of Tajikistan, the Islamic Renaissance Party, which has branches in other Central Asian republics and in Russia, became so popular after the collapse of the Soviet Union that many were concerned that Tajikistan would become the region’s first Islamic republic (Rashid 1991b).

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-5.png][Fig. 3. The caliphate, like control over the holy places of the Arabian peninsula, implies a geographical center and territorial cohesiveness to the Muslim world. This vision is increasingly displaced by a multiplicity of political centers. Indeed, a Mecca-centric view of the world distorts the contest over Muslim politics that includes what was once thought of as “peripheral” China, Indonesia, Africa, and America.]]

The concept of the Islamic state has become so central to Muslim discourse that it has shaped the symbolic politics of Nigeria and Indonesia. In Nigeria, the government’s application in 1986 for full membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the intergovernmental organization of Muslim states, precipitated riots and political protests. Muslim activists supported the application to the OIC in the hope that it would encourage the Islamization of Nigeria’s Muslim population, while Christian leaders feared that membership in the OIC would imply movement toward an Islamic state and the undermining of Nigeria’s secular pluralism (Gambari 1990:307–10). Similar sensitivities about the

development of an Islamic state have been present in Indonesia and are the result of a long history of dispute over the nature of the state in a multisectarian society with a preponderant Muslim majority (estimated at 90 percent). Although the government is officially committed to secularism and pluralism, as represented in the official ideology, the pançasila (the “five principles”), demands for an Islamic state fueled the Dar-ul Islam revolt in West Java (1948–62) and have remained high on the political agenda (Horikoshi 1975).

**** The Islamic “Golden Age”

In the view of its Muslim advocates, the Islamic state is justified by reference to the early years of Islam. They argue that the Islamic state first became an issue with the death of the Prophet. In the Prophet’s lifetime, writes one modernist, “sanctions were entirely moral, and [bore] no relation to conventional methods of state coercion” (el-Affendi 1991:21). In this view, allegiance to the Islamic state was voluntary during the Prophet’s lifetime. After his death, however, “a coercive political authority seemed indispensable.” Although the issue of leadership was resolved with “reasonable unanimity,” other issues soon led to civil war and the collapse of the “idealist state” (1991: 22–26).

Contemporary Muslims regard the period of the Prophet’s first four successors, the “rightly guided caliphs” (al-khulafa al-rashidun), as one in which there was little divergence between ideals and reality. Of these four, however, only the first, Abu Bakr (r. 632–34), died a natural death. ‹Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–44) was assassinated by a Christian slave of the governor of Basra. The third, ‹Uthman ibn ‹Affan (r. 644–56), was killed and his house pillaged by rebels who regarded his rule as tyrannical. And the last of the four, ‹Ali ibn Abi Talib (r. 656–61), the Prophet’s son-in-law, was killed on his way to the mosque at a time when the Islamic community was increasingly rent by dissension.

The invocation of a golden age is especially prevalent in the thinking of Muslims whose principal aim is to certify Islam’s compatibility with the universal “goods” promised by the modern age: science, democracy, social justice, and human rights. These intellectuals, whether they call themselves modernist reformers or religious activists, have found invocation of the golden age a useful instrument with which to argue the need for reform within Muslim societies. In effect, even if the era of the rightly guided caliphs had not been preeminent in its moral instructiveness, they would have had to invent such a paradigm in order to highlight the present state of affairs and provide an unimpeachable standard by which to judge and condemn it. The early community of the Prophet and his four immediate successors was invested with the moral qualities so conspicuously missing in the subsequent centuries when bida‹ (unworthy innovations) set in. This degradation was thought to be especially evident during Umayyad (661–750) and ‹Abbasid (750–1258) rule.

The school of thought that emerged in the late nineteenth century and became known as the Salafiyya (from salaf, the ancestors of Islam) illustrates this tendency to find inspiration in the early Muslim community. One of its most important exponents, Muhammad ‹Abduh (1849–1905), argued, for example, that Muslim neglect of the common good in legal matters and rulers' emphasis on obedience above justice engendered intellectual confusion, legal stagnation, political corruption, and the decline of Islam (‹Abduh [1925] 1978:104–23). Muslim activists continue to echo this refrain in the late twentieth century.

Sadiq al-Mahdi (b. 1936; r. 1966–67, 1986–87, 1988–89), a former prime minister of Sudan and great-grandson of the Sudanese mahdi who led the nineteenth-century revolt against the British (1881–98), finds the age of the rightly guided caliphs exemplary because of their direct contact with the Prophet and the purity of the early community's faith. On the basis of his interpretation of the early Muslim community, al-Mahdi argues that "Islam produced political principles such as freedom, justice, equality, [and] the necessity of government for the people." The modern democratic order has evolved to resemble these ideas, but Muslims must seek to recapture today the essence of their own tradition "produced fifteen centuries ago" (al-Mahdi

1990:197).

Al-Mahdi's argument reminds us that political theory in the Muslim world is most concretely expressed through the representation of historical tradition. The formalization of the "golden age" tradition thus functions to provide both a powerful indictment of the waywardness of modern Muslim societies and a blueprint for action. Tradition acts, in effect, both to legitimize criticism of the status quo and to facilitate revolutionary as well as incremental changes.

**** The "Call" (Da‹wa) to Islam

The transformation that is occurring in the concept and practice of da-wa indicates how the reworking of basic Islamic concepts involves not only state elites and intellectuals but also the masses. Change is initiated from the apex of society, as it were, but also from the base. Da-wa is mentioned in the Qur›an (14:46) as God's "call" to human society to find in Islam the true religion. The term has developed over the centuries into an explicit ideology of proselytism. Never dissociated from the political and social contexts of Muslims, da-wa has been used to propagate the specific claims of dynasties such as the ‹Abbasids and sects such as the Isma‹ilis. Under the latter, in fact, the term became virtually synonymous with propaganda, and Isma‹ili missionaries (du-a) of the Cairo-based Fatimid dynasty (969–1171) became accomplished at recruiting followers to both a religious doctrine and political affiliation. Education was central

to all conceptualizations of da-wa. Whether formally at court, as with the Fatimids (Canard 1965:169), or in informal circles of scholars, Muslims as well as nonMuslims acquired through missionary work an understanding of the living faith—how to recite the Qur›an, apply the shari-a, and conduct the affairs of everyday life in an Islamic spirit.

Today this tradition of da-wa has begun to be reformulated in a subtle but important way. Education remains central, and even the pattern of politicization has recurred. For example, one of the main Shi‹i groups in Iraq opposed to the rule of Saddam Hussein (b.1937) bears the name Hizb al-Da‹wa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Call party), and one of the chief instruments for the dissemination of Libyan religious and political ideas is the Jam‹iyyat al-Da‹wa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Call Society). Yet the tradition of da-wa is also being redefined to include the idea of social welfare activism—free medical clinics, soup kitchens for the poor, subsidized housing, and other forms of mutual assistance which often substitute for ineffective or nonexistent government services. The explicit linkage with the "prior" tradition is the assertion that Muslims, obliged to follow God's call, must respond to the Qur›anic duty to create balance (mizan) and justice (‹adl, qist) in the affairs of men (16:90 and 58:25). Since Islam involves a total way of life, Muslims would abdicate their responsibility if they failed to redress social injustices and economic inequalities.

The influential Lebanese Shi‹i religious figure, Musa al-Sadr (1928– disappeared 1978), promoted a new kind of Shi‹i activism that included, among other things, the establishment of a vocational training center in Tyre, al-Mu›assa, which is still in operation (Ajami 1986:111). Hizbullah, the "party of God," has also developed an extensive social welfare system in Lebanon that involves educational, agricultural, medical, and housing assistance. In Beirut's Bir al-‹Abid quarter, it has run a supermarket cooperative, selling produce below retail costs (see Chipaux 1988; also see Piscatori 1989:30), but, more importantly, it also provides scholarships, runs health clinics, and subsidizes housing for the needy. In the United States, the American Muslim Council (1992) emphasizes the need to develop "social service institutions," and the Jama‹at Nasr al-Islam (Society for the Victory of Islam) in northern Nigeria operates health clinics and an "aid group" that functions much like the Red Cross. In Jordan, the Islamic Hospital in Amman is highly valued. In Malaysia, ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia), the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, talks of the need for "Islamic outreach," and Darul Arqam has operated a public health clinic as well as farms and factories for the production of halal ("permitted") food, toothpaste, and soap (Anwar 1987:37). Such social welfare activities strengthen the communitarian basis of Islamic groups at the same time as they serve the groups' power-seeking strategies.

Ashfaq Ahmad, a member of the Islamic Society of Papua New Guinea, has captured the deliberateness with which this reformulation of da-wa tradition is occurring:

Da‹wah work must be supplemented with the social, cultural, and economic development of the country. A substantial amount of funds should be allocated to be spent in these countries for health, education, and better living conditions for the people living there in the form of grants, aids or loans.... The spirit of service and brotherhood should inculcate and permeate all the activities of development, so that people may appreciate the difference between this work and colonialism. (1981: 29).

Those who carry out these practices of da-wa—missionaries, health workers, educators, and engineers—may not consciously intend to transform tradition, but their activities contribute as much to the process of transformation as the formal discourse of Muslim intellectuals.

*** The Objectification of Muslim Consciousness

As we have seen, tradition is a subtle and elastic concept. It sometimes refers to the unwritten shared understandings of small-scale, relatively isolated communities, which change as they are passed from generation to generation, although these changes are hard to perceive because of the lack of fixed records of “the way things were.” Tradition can also refer to the shared understandings of extended family groups or households. The concept also encompasses major elements of world religious traditions, such as the four recognized Sunni “schools” (madhhabs) of Islamic jurisprudence. All these senses of tradition are subject to considerable flexibility as they are sustained and recreated in various social and historical contexts, ranging from the intimacies of family life to the conduct of state affairs. Notwithstanding the powerful metaphor of the great Muslim thinker Abu Hamid Muhammad alGhazali (1058–1111; n.d.:14) that the “glass” of traditional faith, once broken, cannot be mended, the view of tradition that we have presented suggests that the substance and form of tradition are flexible and subject to reinvention.

Rather than conceive of tradition and modernity as sharply dichotomous, broad-banded distinctions, it is useful to narrow our focus to the processes by which many aspects of social and political life become subject to conscious reflection, discussion, and debate. A concrete example will illustrate this point. In a provincial capital of the Sultanate of Oman in 1979, one of the authors slept in the guest room (sabla) of a major tribal leader. An hour before sunrise, the other guests, all Omanis, rose to perform their ablutions for their morning prayers. The author fell back asleep and failed to respond to a later “wake up” call. The tribal leader was summoned and asked the author whether he was sick. The author explained later that he prayed in a different way and so did not proceed to ablutions and prayers. He subsequently learned from a young Omani that it was taken for granted that the author, an Arabic-speaker who was aware of local etiquette, would follow all local practices. Omani Ibadis of the northern interior knew of course of other Muslim and non-Muslim traditions, but they were marginal to their social and moral imagination.

In the same community several years later, a much more conscious sense of tradition had begun to emerge, inspired by the growing cohort of young Omanis who had received a secondary or postsecondary school education and who, with the increasing ease of transportation and the expansion of networks of youth met through schooling, military service, and employment, began to question what it meant to be a Muslim. As one of Oman's first generation of village schoolteachers observed of the northern Oman interior, "People here do not know Islam; they pray and sacrifice, but they do not know why" (interview, Nizwa region, March 9, 1988).

Before the mid-1970s, such a consciously critical statement would have been almost incomprehensible in most of the towns and villages of Oman. It would not have occurred to most people that their practice of the faith could be brought into question. By the late 1980s, however, such questioning had become common, and what we call "objectification" had reached into all parts of the Muslim world.

Objectification is the process by which basic questions come to the fore in the consciousness of large numbers of believers: "What is my religion?" "Why is it important to my life?" and "How do my beliefs guide my conduct?" Objectification does not presuppose the notion that religion is a uniform or monolithic entity (although it is precisely that for some thinkers). These explicit, widely shared, and "objective" questions are modern queries that increasingly shape the discourse and practice of Muslims in all social classes, even as some legitimize their actions and beliefs by asserting that they advocate a return to purportedly authentic traditions. Objectification is thus transclass, and religion has become a self-contained system that its believers can describe, characterize, and distinguish from other belief systems.

Since Iran's Islamic revolution, many of Tehran's Friday sermons illustrate this tendency to present Islam as an abstract system of ideas that can be distinguished from other such systems. In these sermons, leading religious authorities explain policies, problems, and events of the week to much wider audiences than those of the Shah's time, despite the state's control over mass communications. In a sermon in June 1991, Ayatullah Muhammad Yazdi, head of the Iranian judiciary, reiterated a common theme in warning his listeners against "American-style Islam." This he defined as a "monopoly in certain types of individual worship and slogans, having nothing to do with political issues, not discussing world events, possessing some simple rituals and disregarding others.... One should be very careful [because] the danger of an American-style Islam, that is, one that says that the government has nothing to do with Islam, is far greater than that of weapons" (BBC SWB, ME/1106/A1–2, June 24, 1991).

Ayatullah Yazdi's characterization of "American-style Islam" illustrates the "objectification" of the Islamic tradition. So, however, does the "politicized" Islam which he implicitly advocates as more "authentic." Because these sermons often refer to published sources and provide arguments that invoke recognizable authorities, the implication is that the audience is

familiar with texts and the principles of citation. Not all in the audience can follow such arguments in detail, but they recognize the forms of authority. This form of argument may be even more important for religious leaders not primarily identified with traditional learning. For example, Siddiq Fadhil, one of the leaders of ABIM in Malaysia, “is not readily accepted as an ‹alim (religious scholar) by the older generation of Malays and those from the rural areas, [but] his regular and deliberate resort to quotations from the Qur›an and Sunnah in his speeches has tended to promote his image as a leader in the eyes of many Muslims” (Mutalib 1990:76)

The process we call objectification is not unique to Islam. Hefner (1985:246–65; 1987) describes it in ethnographic detail as it occurs among both Hindus and Muslims in the Tengger highlands of eastern Java, and Madan (1987) describes the implications of objectification for religion and politics in India.[16] Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1963:85), however, argues that Muslims are more likely than participants of other religious traditions to present Islam “as an organized and systematized entity.” From this perspective, “being Muslim” acquires more political significance in the modern world than participation in other religious traditions because of the self-conscious identification of believers with their religious tradition.

In assessing the implications of this heightened self-consciousness— of the systematization and explicitness of religious tradition—for political conduct, our primary focus is on how, in the late twentieth century and in certain contexts, Islam has become objectified in the consciousness of many Muslims. Three facets of objectification are noteworthy. First, distinctive to the modern era is that discourse and debate about Muslim tradition involves people on a mass scale. It also necessarily involves an awareness of other Muslim and non-Muslim traditions. Just as the sixteenth-century Christian Reformation has been aptly called “the daughter of printing” because printing made possible a broader dissemination of ideas, mass education and mass communication in the modern world facilitate an awareness of the new and unconventional. In changing the style and scale of possible discourse, they reconfigure the nature of religious thought and action and encourage debate over meaning.

Mass education and mass communication are important in all contemporary world religions. However, the full effects of mass education, especially higher education, are just beginning to be felt in much of the Muslim world. In the Middle East, for example, mass education is a relatively recent phenomenon. In Egypt, mass primary education began in earnest only after the 1952 revolution. It was another fifteen to twenty years before large numbers of students completed the advanced cycles of state-sponsored education. The timing of educational expansion varies for other parts of the Muslim world. Major educational expansion in Morocco, for instance, began in the late 1950s; it began in the early 1970s for Arabian peninsula countries such as Oman and Yemen. In Oman, a mere 32 students completed the complete cycle of secondary education by 1975–76, although this number had risen to 13,500 by 1987–88. Only in the late 1980s did a critical mass of people with postsecondary education, capable of sustaining an expanded internal market for newspapers, periodicals, and books, begin to emerge.[17]

A complementary measure of change is book production on a larger scale. As of 1982, the Arab world produced 40 books per million inhabitants, far below the world average of 162 titles per million. Although more recent figures are unavailable, there are signs that this gap is rapidly closing (Sabat 1989:18). In countries such as Morocco, a demand for “quality” books in Arabic has developed since the mid-1980s (Albin 1990).

At the same time, however, the most rapid growth for the printed word is in what Gonzalez-Quijano (1994) calls “Islamic books,” inexpensive, attractively printed texts, accessible to a readership that lacks the literary skills of the educated cadres of an earlier era. The written form often evokes the breezy style of colloquial diction. The covers take advantage of modern printing technologies and, as a result, are both readily accessible and eye-catching. In one example, a Saudi pamphlet has a curious cover that shows a bright red ball plunging into a well in an otherwise parched desert (fig. 4). The text explains that democracy, which is “creeping” (tatasarrub) into the Muslim world, is incompatible with Islam because Islam offers governance by the Creator (al-khaliq), as understood by a properly instructed religious elite, whereas democracy, a non-Arabic term, necessarily implies rule by the created (al-makhluqin), in which unbelievers and the ignorant have an equal say in governance and usurp God’s rule (al-Sharif 1992/1412:16–18). In many parts of the Muslim world, including North Africa, this style of argument is regarded with amusement by many, but it also offers an accessible style of argument for many recent beneficiaries of mass education.

In Ilorin, Nigeria, there has been a proliferation of Islamic educational institutions, helping to stimulate a market for Arabic publications. The formal educational sector consists of Western-style schools, encouraged by the British colonialists; modern style Arabic-language schools in which Islamic and modern subjects are taught; and “traditional” schools devoted to Islamic learning. These are not mutually exclusive forms of education, for students are typically exposed to more

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-6.png][Fig. 4. Unoriginal in argument, Muhammad Shakir alSharif’s The Truth about Democracy (1992) nonetheless addresses a theme that concerns many religiously minded Muslims. Its low price and wide distribution give it a significant audience.]]

than one kind of school. In the late 1970s and 1980s, possibly 75 percent of students in the formal educational sector—involving increasing numbers of girls—were enrolled in Islamic schools. Arabic has thus emerged as a popular educational and literary medium. Of particular importance has been the influence of shaykhs such as Adam al-Iluri (1916–92), who, with his influential school near Lagos and his Arabic writings, stimulated both awareness and discussion of Arabic publications among the public (Reichmuth1993).

Like modern mass communications, mass higher education and publishing contribute to objectification by inculcating pervasive “habits of thought” (Bourdieu 1988, 1989). They do so by transforming religious beliefs into a conscious system, broadening the scope of religious authority, and redrawing the boundaries of political community. The objectification of Islam means that religious beliefs and practices are increasingly seen as systems (minhaj) to be distinguished from nonreligious ones. When activist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb (1906–66) write of Islam as a minhaj, they imply more than “system” or “program,” the translations commonly given. The term can also imply that something has been made open, manifest, and clear. For Qutb, as for other activists, it is not sufficient simply to “be” Muslim and to follow Muslim practices. One must reflect upon Islam and articulate it. When activists declare that they are engaged in the “Islamization” of their society, the sense of thinking of religious beliefs as an objective system becomes explicit. Thus “the Muslims” (al-muslimun) is a term used by Moroccans since the 1980s to refer to activists who say that they wish society to live exclusively by Islamic precepts. Irony is far from absent in the term, since all but about 20,000 of Morocco’s 26 million citizens are Muslim.

Another indication of the systematization of Islam is the growing popularity of catechisms among Muslims. For example, the influential Egyptian preacher Muhammad Sha‹rawi (n.d.) has compiled a catechism-like primer of thirty pages on questions involving women’s acts of faith, social relations, and the Islamic laws that regulate them. Similarly, A‹usht (ca. 1982) provides the Ibadiyya of Algeria, Zanzibar, and Oman with a description of the “essential” tenets of Ibadi doctrine, history, and principles. One use of such tracts is to explain doctrinal tenets to other Muslims. Omani students in the United States are provided with pamphlets in English (such as “Who Are the Ibadhis?”) for this purpose (al-Khalili 1988; see also, Eickelman 1989b:4–5). Such catechisms assume that their users are familiar with the subject headings and indexes that format the information.

In the case of the Nurculuk movement, which began in Turkey early in this century and today has followers in Germany, California, and elsewhere, the teachings of its founder, Saïd Nurcî (1873–1960)—originally written and passed on by hand because of Turkish government hostility—have been collected in pamphlets with titles such as The Miracles of Muhammad (1985a), Belief and Man (1985b), and Resurrection and the Hereafter (1985c). These pamphlets have “the function of explaining, in accordance with the understanding of the age, the truths of the Qur›an” (1985d). Nurcî insists that books, not people, “have waged a battle against unbelief” (Nurcî in Mardin 1989:4). As these pamphlets demonstrate, the formalized textual transmission of ideas is especially valued as a way to advance approved understandings of Islam. Other examples of this genre include Hamidullah (1959), intended as a “correspondence course on Islam” and available in several languages, and Soymen (1979), available in Turkish and English as a “manual” for Muslims. Pilgrimage manuals, another popular literary form throughout the Muslim world, similarly indicate a growing systematization of the ways in which belief is expressed (see Metcalf 1990).

A second facet of objectification is that authoritative religious discourse, once the monopoly of religious scholars who have mastered recognized religious texts, is replaced by direct and broader access to the printed word: More and more Muslims take it upon themselves to interpret the textual sources, classical or modern, of Islam. This transformation was implicitly recognized in King Fahd's statement, cited earlier, that points to the broad spectrum of permissible interpreters of Islamic law in the modern period. Hasan al-Turabi (b. 1930), Sorbonneeducated leader of the Muslim Brothers in the Sudan and a former attorney-general, has made the point more forcefully: "Because all knowledge is divine and religious, a chemist, an engineer, an economist, or a jurist are all ‹ulama›" (1983:245). Turabi is implicitly building on an Islamic tradition that affirms the authority over the faithful of those who possess religious knowledge (‹ilm). One saying (hadith) of the Prophet found in al-Tirmidhi's compilation is that "the superiority of the learned man over the worshipper (al--abid) is like the superiority of the full moon over the stars" or like the Prophet's authority over the least of his followers (cited in Asad [1961] 1980:86–87).

Although the possession of religious knowledge continues to have similar political consequences, religious activists in Egypt, the West Bank, Central Asia, Indonesia, and elsewhere are more likely to be the products of mass higher education than of such traditional educational institutions as the madrasa, or mosque school. Indeed, Muslim activist discourse, like that of Morocco's Abd Assalam Yassine (b. 1928), assumes a familiarity with the language of Marxist and other "Western" discourses against which it confidently reacts (1981). Likewise, Sayyid Qutb's book, Ma-alim fi-l-tariq [Signposts] (1981), written by a nontraditional intellectual and said to be the most widely read book among younger Muslims worldwide, would never have had the impact it has had without the spread of mass education and the access to analytical and exegetical texts that education provides.

Third, and finally, following directly from our point concerning the implications of direct access to the printed word, objectification reconfigures the symbolic production of Muslim politics. An objectified Islam has come to seem so natural and the impact of Islam on mass politics so clear that the question of who speaks for an objectified Islam becomes central to Muslim politics. Whereas the ‹ulama and the state have often made mutually beneficial accommodations to each other, the relationships between them and the newer Muslim leaders have become unpredictable. Who could have predicted in 1990 that a fortyyear-old mechanic in Tajikistan, Muhammad Sharif Hikmat Zade, would become the leader, two years later, of a transnational political movement in Central Asia and Russia, the Islamic Renaissance party?

In effect, the state, the ‹ulama, and the "new" religious intellectuals all compete to gain ascendancy as the arbiters of Islamic practice. The political implications of this process were evident in nineteenth-century India, where the multiplication of printed texts, at first controlled by the ‹ulama, "struck right at the heart of person-to-person transmission of knowledge; it struck right at the heart of Islamic authority" (Robinson 1993:239). Print at first enabled the ‹ulama to expand their influence in public

affairs because they sponsored and controlled religious publications. Yet the ironic consequence of printing was to reduce the authority of the ‹ulama in the long run because of the rapidly increasing number of educated persons and the shift to more accessible vernacular languages (Robinson 1993:245). Similarly, the educational reforms that unfolded in the Tanzimat period in the Ottoman Empire brought about profound changes in the content and methods of transmission of knowledge. Education had previously been tied to the Islamic sciences and was transmitted from person to person. Textbooks, dictionaries, manuals, and encyclopedias supplemented, if they did not displace, the direct authority of the teacher. The results of this process became apparent in the 1890s, with the first generation to emerge from the reformed schools of the Tanzimat:

Speculation and projection of information culled from books opened up a Pandora’s box roughly similar to that which had informed early modern criticism of the text of the Bible in Europe. But even more was afoot: young officials preparing plans for new institutions were now propelled into a realm of abstract possibilities which was beginning to seem much more real than the conglomerate of rickety frame houses, crumbling public buildings and venal officials from which they started. (Mardin

1989:120)

In the last third of the twentieth century, this process of educational and social change has been intensified by mass higher education and mass communications and has created “Islamists,” that is, Muslims whose consciousness has been objectified in the ways we have described and who are committed to implementing their vision of Islam as a corrective to current “un-Islamic” practices. This commitment implies a certain measure of protest, demonstrated in a variety of ways, against the prevailing political and social status quo and establishments. The term “Islamists” (al-islamiyyun) is used by Muslim activists, such as Lebanon’s Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (b. 1935), to refer to adherents of “the Islamic movement” (al-haraka al-Islamiyya) (for example Fadlallah 1990:238–40), and Tunisia’s Rashid al-Ghannouchi (b. 1942), for whom it contextually implies ideologically motivated Muslims (al-Ghannouchi 1992:47).[18] Islamist authority to remake the world derives from a self-confident appropriation of what they believe to be “tradition.” The rules of the game—whether or not they were ever unambiguous—are thus certainly complex and uncertain now. The stakes are high, and it is to this Muslim competition over what we call sacred authority that we now turn.

** 3. Sacred Authority in Contemporary Muslim Societies

*** The Linkage of Religion and Politics

MOST DISCUSSIONS of Islam and politics assume that “Islam” makes no distinction between the religious and political realms. Western scholarship—and, to a significant extent, Muslim scholarship—emphasizes the inseparability of the two by comparing Muslim with Christian political thought. Although the metaphor changed in early and medieval Christian writings, the idea of a separation of powers remained constant: God’s and Caesar’s due, the pope’s and emperor’s swords, the ecclesiastical sun and imperial moon. In Islamic thought, in contrast, the frame of reference has been the indivisibility of the whole: din wa-dawla, “religion and state.”

This view of indivisibility finds support in more than forty references in the Qur’an to the need to obey “God, His Prophet, and those of authority among you” (for instance, 4:59). It also builds on the example of the Prophet, at once a spiritual leader and the head of a political community. As we have discussed, the defense of the institution of the caliphate was also predicated on the belief that religious and political power needed to be combined in one office, thereby allowing the shari’a to be implemented and the community of Muslims protected.

A careful reading of the historical record indicates that politics and religion became separable not long after the death of the Prophet and the establishment of dynastic rule. It has been argued that the bifurcation of the legal system over time, with shari’a courts operating alongside the diwan al-mazalim (board of grievances), “came close to the notion of a division between secular and religious courts”; the institutions represented two different authorities, that of God and the ruler (Coulson 1964:128–29). Some date the separation of functions and institutions to the Turkish Seljuk dynasty, which took virtual control in the ‘Abbasid capital of Baghdad in the mid-eleventh century (Lewis 1979:169–70) or to the Buwayhid intervention in Baghdad in 945, which “terminated the Abbasid caliphs’ dual role as the temporal and spiritual leader of the Islamic nation” (Ahmed 1985:18). Others argue that this functional separation had taken place by the ninth century, with the establishment of schools of law and the emergence of an interpreting class—the ‘ulama—who possessed semiautonomous sources of financial and political support.

Lapidus (1975:383) argues that opposition was particularly significant to the rule of the Caliph al-Ma’mun (813—33), who insisted that all Muslims adhere to the Mu’tazali theological movement. Opposition centered around the Hanbali school of law, which qualified caliphal claims to absolute power by emphasizing the availability of the Qur’an and Prophetic traditions (hadith) to every believer. Although the Han-balis remained loyal to the ‘Abbasid state, they devalued the caliph’s presumption of a monopoly on the basis of religious legitimacy. “The growth of religious loyalty to hadith and the long struggle over doctrine and authority had crystallized a conception of the umma of Muslims as a community founded upon loyalty to religious principles.... Henceforth, the Caliphate was no longer the sole identifying symbol or the sole organizing institution, even for those Muslims who had been most closely identified with it” (Lapidus 1975:383). While the ^culama continued to cooperate with the political authorities, the religious sphere acquired its own identity, institutions, and discourse. In effect, a

religious establishment emerged as a complement—and sometimes as a rival—to the political establishment.

Many Arab historians perceive a major division between the rule of the rightly-guided caliphs and that of their successors (see, for example, Ibn Khaldun 1967:1:418–23). Mulk (royal authority, or kingship), implying dynastic rule, came to be seen as a deviation from the purity of the caliphate. This view implicitly acknowledges that a cleavage between religion and political rule began when the Umayyad dynasty came to power in 661. In the case of Muhammad's first four successors, "No mention was made of royal authority, because royal authority was suspected of being worthless, and because at that time it was the prerogative of unbelievers and enemies of Islam" (Ibn Khaldun 1967:1:418).

One can argue that the division of spiritual and temporal powers occurred even earlier—on the death of the Prophet in 632. The caliphate was merely a temporal institution since religious succession to Muhammad, the "seal of the Prophets," was impossible. The caliph held political and military powers, and while it was true that he could serve as an Imam during prayers and deliver the khutba or sermon, other Muslims were also able to do so. "The caliph's relation to religion was merely that of a guardian. He defended the faith just as any European emperor was supposed to do, suppressed heresies, warred against unbelievers, and extended the boundaries of Dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam), in the performance of all of which he employed the power of his secular arm" (Hitti 1953:185).

In the Shi'i world, the Imamate—the institutional apex of authority—is assumed to possess both religious and political powers. But the view that the Imamate is ineluctably a religio-political office developed only gradually, largely in response to repeated failures to exercise power. Despite the common insistence that the Imams descended in an unbroken line from 'Ali and Husayn, it is likely that at least two Imams were not recognized as having this status in their lifetimes. Moreover, although they aspired to rule, in fact they failed to capture the caliphate. Political failure inspired maximal religious justification, and there was a growing recognition that the spiritual powers of the Imamate were more important than its temporal rule.

In the Ithna 'Ashari ("Twelver") tradition, the dominant Shi'i tradition, hopes of Shi'i rule were decisively abandoned by the death of the eleventh Imam, al-Hasan al-'Askari (845–73), and his position accordingly acquired superhuman, divinely appointed qualities in the late ninth and tenth centuries. The Imamate emerged as the "proof" (hujja) for mankind in the ninth century and it was soon considered immune from sin, and, only slightly later, from error as well (Halm 1991:29, 45–46). A full-blown rationale for Imamate authority thus developed over time and was applied retroactively.

Following the occultation (ghayba) of the last Imam in 941, the question of who represents him intensely complicated the Shi'i theory of religio-political rule. The 'ulama positioned themselves as the heirs and defenders of the Imamate, but political rule largely came to be viewed as illegitimate in the absence of the Imam. The state was thus essentially an invalid institution as long as the Imam was not himself present to rule. Not until the advent of the Islamic revolution, which, as we have seen in Chapter 2, redefined the nature of the Islamic state, were the 'ulama anything more than the guardians of the religious traditions, the moral critics of the regime, or, perhaps more often, the legitimizers of secular rule.

**** Politicizing Religion

As common as the concept of din wa-dawla is, there are significant variations in its interpretation. Ayatullah Khomeini felt so strongly that the 'ulama had abdicated their responsibilities in the shah's period that he constantly inveighed against apoliticism and disinterest. Opposition to the Saudi monarchy, which has espoused the need for acquiescence to prevailing political authority, strengthened the Ayatullah's antipathy toward those who would not engage fully in the political fray. As Khomeini wrote in his will: "As for [those] who consider Islam separate from government and politics, it must be said to these ignoramuses that the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet contain more rules regarding government and politics than in other matters" (Khomeini [1983] n.d.:22).

Although Khomeini had pronounced views, his thinking evolved throughout his lifetime and ended in what many regard as an extraordinary, even heterodox, position. His 1941 book, Kashf al-asrar [The discovery of secrets], juxtaposed virtuous Islamic government with the sorry state that obtained in nominally Muslim societies but conceded that "bad government is better than no government" (cited in Fischer 1980:152). Although some kings were morally corrupt, the institution of kingship is permissible. Moreover, "we do not say that government should be in the hands of the faqih [jurist]; rather we say that government must be run in accordance with God's law ... and it is not feasible except with the supervision of the religious leaders" (cited in Fischer 1980:152).

Khomeini's opposition to the shah intensified after the reforms in property ownership, education, and women's rights during the White Revolution of 1961–63 angered a significant portion of the 'ulama. He emerged as the indisputable leader of the June 1963 uprising against the reforms and, as a consequence, was sent into exile. While in the Shi'i shrine city of Najaf in Iraq, and partly as a result of his interaction with two politically active scholars, Musa al-Sadr and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (d. 1980), among others, Khomeini began to formulate a more assertive theory of Islamic government that put the fuqaha (sing., faqih) at the center of power. Revising the ideas of Shaykh Murtada Ansari (d. 1864) on the Umi ted wilaya (guardianship) of the 'ulama, Khomeini (cited in Enayat 1983:163) argued that "wilaya consists of government and administration of the state and the implementation of the laws

of the sacred path.” But this responsibility cannot be entrusted to kings. Islamic government requires a governor who knows the shari’a—the sole law—and is just. The Shi’i Imams possessed these qualities, and since their occultation, wilaya has fallen collectively to the fuqaha. The inexorable logic of this approach, of course, casts the most learned and just of the jurists in the position of supreme power. “Guardianship of the jurist” (vilayat-i faqih) thus becomes the imperative of Islamic government, and the obligation to obey it is essential.

Toward the end of his life, Khomeini’s theory became even more extensive. Faced with a constitutional deadlock in which the majority of the Majlis, or national assembly, and the supervisory Council of Guardians could not agree on certain legislation, he was asked by President ‘Ali Khamene’i to comment on the president’s interpretation of the limitations on the power of the supreme faqih. Khomeini asserted that Khamene’i had been wrong to say that the government could exercise power “only within the bounds of divine statutes.” Because the need for Islamic government is absolute, it—and, by extension, the ruler—possesses nearly absolute power.

<quote>

I should state that the government which is a part of the absolute viceregency of the Prophet of God ... is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting and hajj.... The ruler can close down mosques if need be, or can even demolish a mosque which is a source of harm.... The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any Shari’ah agreements which it has concluded with the people when those agreements are contrary to the interests of the country or of Islam. It can also prevent any devotional or non-devotional affair if it is opposed to the interests of Islam and for so long as it is so. The government can prevent hajj, which is one of the important divine obligations, on a temporary basis, in cases when it is contrary to the interests of the Islamic country. (BBC SWB 0043, A/7, January 8, 1988)

</quote>

Doubtless with an eye to the critics of the Majlis who had formulated their criticism in Islamic terms, Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani seized on the Ayatullah’s pronouncement: “It is an immense injustice to Islam if it cannot demonstrate its power on essential issues of the state” (BBC SWB 0043, A/8, January 8,1988). Suitably chastened, President Khamene’i now noted the Ayatullah’s wisdom in creating a thirteen-member assembly, the High Council for the Discernment of Interests, to break the legislative impasse. Because Khomeini had delegated his powers of supreme faqih to this new body, it could determine the interests of the state: “And what it deems to be the interests of the regime is then an Islamic and religious decree. Why? Because the preservation of the regime depends on it, or the preservation of social welfare depends on it, or the preservation of security and order depends on it” (BBC SWB 0087, A/3, February 29, 1988).

Inverting the commonly held assumption that the purpose of the Islamic state is to preserve and protect the shari’a, Khomeini thus declared that the regime is empowered to curtail provisions of the shari’a in order to protect the regime. President Khamene’i baldly summarized the argument: “The preservation of the Islamic regime is a theological order, the preservation of the Islamic Republic is a tenet of jurisprudence” (BBC SWB 0087, A/3, February 29, .1988). Another leading religious figure, Ayatullah Ni’matullah Salihi-Najafabadi, contributes to the doctrinal controversy by arguing that the vilayat-i faqih is based on a social contract between the people and the faqih and incorporates the principle of majority rule (Moussavi 1992).

Prior to the Islamic revolution, the highest recognized level of religious leadership was the marja’-i taqlid (“source of emulation”). Ayatullah Muhammad ‘Ali Araki, the last of the generally recognized marfa’s, died in December 1994, following the deaths of Ayatullah Abu’l-Qasim al-Khu’i in mid-1992 and Ayatullah Muhammad Reza Golpayegani in late 1993. The cumulative effect of these deaths was to throw the Shi’i world into confusion over how to choose a successor or successors. Consistent with the maximalist view of the Islamic state that the Iranians have promoted since 1988, elements within the Iranian government appeared to nominate the supreme leader of the revolution, Ayatullah Khamene’i, to this position. Others suggested that his erudition was not of sufficient distinction to merit this status, and the followers of Ayatullah Khu’i have suggested that while the Iranian government has a special place in the deliberative process, the traditional colleges of Shi’i learning, particularly Najaf, must not be marginalized (“The Future of the Maija’iyya” 1994). These reevaluations of the powers of the faqih, Islamic government, and the marja^c</sup>-i taqlid indicate once again that doctrine is never fixed and that it may evolve in surprising directions—directions that many would regard as heretical.

**** Functional Division of Religion and Politics

By way of distinct contrast, others believe that too great an involvement with politics may mislead or corrupt the believers. For example, the Tablighi Jama’at, a significant movement of reform that originated in South Asia but now has worldwide influence, believes that the separation of religion and politics is necessary in the short term. It implicitly criticizes the quest for political power in which other Muslim groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are engaged. As God’s vicegerent (khalifa), men are given the earth to govern but are not worthy to do so until they can govern themselves. In effect, therefore, they must eschew politics until they prove themselves worthy of being political (generally, see Masud 1995).

Taking this further, some argue that Islam is only ritual and that politics must be separated from religion. An early example of this was seen in the military opposition to the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Nasir (1180–1225). The military leaders argued:

<quote>

If the caliph is the Imam, then his constant occupation must be prayer, since prayer is the foundation of the faith and the best of deeds. His preeminence in this respect and the fact that he serves as an example for the people is sufficient for him. This is the true sovereignty; the influence of the caliph in the affairs of government is senseless; they should be entrusted to sultans (recorded by the Persian historian Ravandi [al-Ra-wandi], cited in Lewis 1988:47–48).

</quote>

Reflecting the obvious desire to ward off religiously based opposition, contemporary leaders, including Jordan's King Hussein and the Algerian government, prefer to emphasize the spiritual nature of Islam and caution against mixing religion and politics. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Tun Hussein bin Onn (1922—90, r. 1976–81) warned against allowing "religion to be made a political tool" (Mutalib 1990: 147). In announcing the creation of a Ministry of Religious Affairs in March 1992, Tunisian president Ben 'Ali (b. 1936; r. 1987-) spoke of religion as "an element of unity and amity" that must remain "above political considerations" as it guides all Tunisians to "do good deeds and to shun evil, sin, and transgression" (BBC SWB 1322, A/ll, March 6,1992). Explicitly adopting a tenet of Christian political thought, King Hassan of Morocco denounced Islamic "fundamentalism" (al-usuliyya) as "religious deviation" (al-shudhudh al-dini) and spoke disparagingly of its adherents, who have placed themselves outside Islam by their political manipulation of religion: "We should resort to what the Christians say: render unto God that which is God's and unto Caesar (Hiraql) that which is Caesar's" (Hassan II 1993:8).

Unlike Hassan II, Iraq's President Saddam Hussein does not bear the title amir al-mid minin (commander of the faithful), but his views on mixing religion and politics are similar:

<quote>

For the sake of religion, we should not name ourselves clergymen or mix religion and the state's performance of its duties.... If we in Iraq were to use politics in a religious framework, we would become a team within a certain religion or teams within religions and sects. Then we would be dividing the Iraqi people. The same thing would happen in Egypt. Therefore, we must first separate religion from politics and then avoid being sectarian. (FBIS, NES-87-127, July 2, 1987, p. K4)

</quote>

Although the political expedience of this line of thought is obvious, some writers have invested the separation of religion and politics with doctrinal significance. 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966), a shaykh of al-Azhar mosque-university in Cairo, ignited an

explosive controversy in 1925 when his book, al-Islam wa-usul al-hukm (Islam and the roots of government) suggested that the religious and administrative powers of the Prophet were separate. Muhammad's governance of the Muslim community at Medina was not part of his Prophetic mission, and his successors, the caliphs, succeeded only to temporal power.

Although 'Abd al-Raziq was made to stand trial before his colleagues (Henderson 1925; Egypt 1925) and was ultimately removed from his teaching position, this line of argument has persisted. The Pakistani writer Qamaruddin Khan, for example, has proposed that the political theory of Islam does not arise from the Qur'an but from circumstances and that the state is neither divinely sanctioned nor strictly necessary as a social institution. The Muslim "constitution" is flexible and should not have become the rigid and intellectually indefensible institution it has become as a means to defend the political status quo in Muslim societies. Khan argues that Muslims need to understand that there is nothing preordained about the intimate admixture of religion and politics:

<quote>

The claim that Islam is a harmonious blend of religion and politics is a modem slogan, of which no trace can be found in the past history of Islam. The very term, "Islamic State," was never used in the theory or practice of Muslim political science, before the twentieth century. Also if the first thirty years of Islam were excepted, the historical conduct of Muslim states could hardly be distinguished from that of other states in world history. (1982:74)

</quote>

The modernist Fazlur Rahman believes that the injection of politics into the religious sphere has been deleterious. He argues that Islamic precepts should govern politics, but what has occurred instead is the exploitation of Islamic concepts and organizations by political groups and elites. The result has been "sheer demagoguery" rather than morally inspired politics. "The slogan Tn Islam religion and politics are inseparable' is employed to dupe the common man into accepting that, instead of politics or the state serving the long-range objectives of Islam, Islam should come to serve the immediate and myopic objectives of party politics" (1982:140).

The Indonesian intellectual Nurcholish Madjid (b. 1939) has argued that Islam does not require an Islamic state (negara Islam) and that "secularization" (sekularisasi)—the process of distinguishing the divinely ordained from what has been devised by humans—is essential. In his early writings, he argued that any separation of religion and state would unacceptably mean that "God has no right to administer worldly affairs" (cited in Hassan 1982:24) and would thus be a deviation from the principle of tawhid (the oneness of God). But since 1970 his thinking, influenced by the ideas of Harvey Cox and Robert Bellah, has evolved, with tawhid becoming the very reason for secularization: "Islam itself, if examined

truthfully, was begun with a process of secularization. Indeed, the principle of Tauhid represents the starting point for a much larger secularization" (cited in Hefner 1993:6; see also Hassan 1982:92–93). While Madjid acknowledges that many understand "secularism" when they read "secularization" and that such misunderstandings are to be regretted (Madjid 1995), he is committed to the view that the Muslim community will benefit from an Unambiguous distinction between matters which are transcendental and those which are temporal. In so desacralizing human activities, the umma will be liberated of the hold of traditionalism and will be open to progress and a future based on rationality and the modern sciences.

Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, an Egyptian professor denied tenure at the University of Cairo for his supposedly un-Islamic views, has elaborated a sophisticated indictment of the deleterious political ramifications of ascribing to oneself the definitive right to interpret sacred texts. In Naqd al-khitab al-dini (A critique of religious discourse), he argues, despite obvious differences between the official religious establishment and oppositional Islamists, that their religious discourse is remarkably similar in its claim to represent holy writ. In invoking textual authority to justify what in effect is their interpretative license, their reasoning becomes circular and closed, denying others a similar right to interpretation. Al-Azhar 'idama thus proclaim the Islamists of al-Jama'at al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Associations) as beyond the pale of orthodoxy, and the Islamists similarly anathematize both the 'ulama and the secular elite, thereby polarizing and subverting the political life of society (Abu Zayd 1992).

Muhammad Sa'id al-Ashmawi, a prominent Egyptian judge and writer, argues that many of the past failures of Islamic history have been due to the very mixture (khilf) of religion and politics. An examination of the bases of Islamic law in his view reveals that the Qur'an contains relatively few direct legal commands, and the attempts of the "fundamentalists" to prescribe action in every sphere, justified as required by the shari'a, is self-aggrandizing. This presumptuousness inevitably leads to distortions of Islam and limitations on individual liberties. The first sentence of his al-Islam al-siyasi (Political Islam) emphatically throws down the challenge to dogmatic Islamists and is daring in its certitude: "Allah intended that Islam be a religion, [whereas] people (al-nas) understood it to mean politics" (al-Ashmawi 1987:7; see also al-Ashmawi 1990).

The Libyan leader, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi (b. 1942, r. 1969-) incurred the wrath of many Muslims in Libya and throughout the world and such groups as the Muslim Brotherhood for his revision of the Muslim calendar, his radical criticism of the tradition of the Prophet (sunna), and his harsh treatment of the 'ulama (Davis 1987:56). He has not been adverse to manipulating Islamic traditions and discourse to justify his policies and extend his own influence. Yet, he has also endorsed the view that religion and state are separate realms which, when combined, become dangerous: "Prophecy has nothing to do with politics or the state.... [W]hen we deal with politics the supernatural becomes irrelevant.... [T]he political factor and all that is related to it is a subjective problem

facing the human communities on this planet—a problem they have the right to resolve the way they deem fit" (al-Qadhdhafi 1985).

In Indonesia, the Nahdatul Ulama ("the Revival of the 'Ulama") party (NU) eschewed a direct political role from its inception in 1926. It preferred to emphasize the social welfare duties of Muslims. Although it joined other Muslim groups in 1973 to form the United Development party, NU—which has some thirty million followers— returned to its apolitical stance when it chose Abdurraham Wahid (b. 1940) its leader in 1984. Committed to the idea of a pluralist, democratic, and nonsectarian Indonesia, Wahid has vigorously argued that religion and politics are separate, and that Islam does not incorporate any notion of state: "Islam should be implemented as social ethics and mores, not laws. We have to protect the national view, not the Islam view" (cited in Schwarz 1992a; also see Schwarz 1992b; Wahid 1995). This apolitical stand appeared to be reinforced at NU's twentyninth national conference in December 1994, when Wahid was reelected as leader.

An extension of this argument, although it is held by a minority, holds that religious thought, by its very nature, is obscurantist. Religious scholars, in particular, take upon themselves the role of defending tradition, but in fact they utilize it as a means to power and control. Sadiq al-'Azm, a Syrian philosopher who has written on Immanuel Kant, has trenchantly criticized the prevailing ideological straightjackets and deceptions of the modern age, whether these be Arab nationalism (1968) or religion (1982). In his view, "fundamentalism"— Christian or Islamic—is based on a "principled rigidity" (1993b:91), and while it is possible that fundamentalists will adapt to the needs of the modern world, this will mark the triumph of secular reason: "In the longer run the resulting socio-historical secular reality will inevitably burst through the mystical shell of Islam" (1993b:97). Although the manner of argumentation is markedly different, Aziz al-Azmeh, a professor of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter, similarly undermines the assumption of an indivisibility of religion and politics. Rather than making secularism the antithesis of Islam, he questions the dichotomy and points to the possibility of an "Islamic secularism" (1993).

It is evident that Muslims hold a variety of opinions on the relationship between religion and politics. Yet, despite both the intellectual diversity and the early history of Islam, the assumption of "Caesero-papism," the indivisibility of the two realms, persists in the study of Islam. This is the case for some Western writers (for example, Endress 1988:32; Watt 1980:29) and for Muslim writers who advocate particular interpretations of Islam. The view that Islam is indistinguishably religious and political is found in the writings of Khurshid Ahmad (1976:36–37), Muhammad Asad (1980:2–6), Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (1986:258–62), Rashid al-Ghannouchi (1993:51), Abu-1 A'la al-Mawdudi (1976:17–18; 1986:68–69), and Hasan al-Turabi (1983: 241–42; 1987).

The presupposition of the union of religion and politics, din wa-dawla, is unhelpful for three reasons, however. First, it exaggerates the uniqueness of Muslim politics. Religion is obviously central to the political life of peoples around the world, not simply to

Muslims. The Moral Majority in the United States, “base ecclesiastical communities” and advocates of liberation theology in Latin America, Archbishop Desmond Tutu in South Africa, Pope John Paul II in Poland and eastern Europe, Sikh activists in India, Buddhist monks in Burma or Vietnam—these are a few of the practitioners of “religious politics” at work throughout the world who sometimes assert the indivisibility of religion and politics. Indeed, issues such as abortion, racism, political and economic refuge, and nuclear war have prompted religious groups to take a direct stand on policy issues and to seek to inject divine injunctions into all levels of the political process. In this regard, although the issues have not always been the same, the Muslim political process is not radically different from that of other societies.

Second, the emphasis on din wa-dawla inadvertently perpetuates “Orientalist” assumptions that Muslim politics, unlike other politics, are not guided by rational, interest-based calculations. Part of the reason lies in the general preference in the social sciences for the rational actor, which, as discussed in Chapter 2, tends to make religion a nonrational—if not an emotional and irrational—factor. But an Orientalist scholarship that emphasizes differences between “East” and “West” and often projects stereotypes has not been averse to accepting nonrational religion as the defining characteristic of Muslim political and social life. In effect, therefore, because of the omnipresence of religion, Muslims are thought to be passionate, uncontrollable, intransigent, and impossible to negotiate with. As Yehoshafat Harkabi, a former chief of Israeli military intelligence, has observed, “Islam doesn’t recognize coexistence as a basic doctrine. Coexistence goes against Islam’s sense of world order” (cited in Gelb 1992).

Third, the din wa-daivla assumption contributes to the view that Muslim politics is a seamless web, indistinguishable in its parts because of the natural and mutual interpenetration of religion and politics. Because Islam is thought to incorporate all aspects of life and because everything is thus assumed to be political, political structures are underestimated. Like all political communities, Muslim societies have distinguishable, though overlapping, structures. The mosque, madrasa (Islamic school), and majlis al-shura (consultative assembly), as well as the bureaucracy charged with regulating religious matters and professional associations, such as women’s lawyers’ groups, are institutions with shared but identifiable functions related to one set of religious beliefs and practices. They are the components of “sacred authority.”

*** Authority and the Interpretation of Symbols

Consistent with the argument developed in Chapter 1, our criticism of the din wa-dawla argument is built on a view of politics as the contest over the interpretation of symbols and as the setting of and negotiation over boundaries between spheres of social activity and institutions. Standard assumptions that religion and politics are inseparable or that religion and politics must be separated tell us little about how religious politics function.

The key to understanding the intricate and intersecting relationships between religion and politics lies, rather, in the nature of authority.

“Sacred authority” as a concept may appear to reaffirm the indivisibility of religion and politics—the conventional wisdom that has been questioned in this discussion. But our use of the term makes two fundamental assumptions:

1. Sacred authority is one kind of authority among others. It is not predicated on the indivisibility of religion and politics because not all authority is based on religion. Indeed, we are talking about a specific type of authority, one which remains distinct from authority based on control of, say, the military (leading to what some call the “praetorian state”) or the intelligence and security apparatuses—what has in the Middle East been called the mukhabarat (security police) state (see, for example, Wenner 1993:179). Our analysis, by way of contrast, is not exclusively preoccupied with the “Islamic state,” nor does it assume that religious authority is all-encompassing.

2. Sacred authority does not, by the same token, assume that religion and politics are completely independent spheres of activity. They are separable spheres that intersect and overlap according to context. The interaction occurs when groups or states vie to manipulate religious language and symbolism to induce or compel obedience to their wishes.

To have authority, like power, is “to be able to make a difference to the world” (Lukes 1986:5), but the two cannot be simply equivalent to each other. Whether authority is based on “the institutionalization of the normative order” (Parsons [1963] 1986:113) or “respect” (Arendt [1969] 1986:65), crucial to its meaning is its recognition as legitimate, whereas this recognition is not essential in the case of power. To answer the basic question of why does authority exist, the complex relationship between the carriers and followers of authority must be considered, and three interconnected levels of analysis are apparent— ideological, locational, and functional:

· •Ideological. Without wishing to predicate the argument on an abstract and unverifiable state of nature, as is common in political philosophy, we recognize that authority is invested in individuals and institutions because they are thought to incorporate and exemplify the moral order. In part, authorities are given authority because they appear to embody cherished values and represent the symbolic reference points of society, including sacred texts (Eickelman 1985:58–71; Messick 1993). Yet it is also clear that deference or acquiescence, the voluntary investiture of authority, is only part of the story. Those bearing authority transform themselves over time into “natural” leaders and, through the manipulation of the symbols of society and the invocation of tradition, they make claims of obedience and obligation on others. Authority inheres in those who are considered to have justifiable control over a society’s symbolic production, and with enhanced and

routinized elaboration of this control, leaders can compel obedience but usually prefer to encourage it (compare Mann 1986:22–24).

· Locational. In the case of the Muslim world, where values and symbols revolve around people's engrained belief in a transcendent yet immediate presence, the institutionalization of sacred authority entails multiple individuals and groups which hope to speak for the divine presence. These may be religious scholars, Islamist movements, the religious bureaucracy of the state, Sufi shaykhs, or traditional leaders such as village headmen or healers. Because symbols are ambiguous by nature and subject to widely differing interpretation, they are manipulable by these contenders for authority—thus promoting the fragmentation of authority. As elsewhere, the contention in Muslim societies over control or "appropriation" of symbols is intense, and authority is in part defined by one's position relative to competitors.

· Functional. Authorities also derive their prestige and influence from the performance of a number of functions. Endowed with symbolic capital, they are looked to for guidance and thus are expected to delimit and defend the "proper" place of Islamic discourse and practice. However, the logic of their role is somewhat circular. They draw boundaries because they have authority, and doing so further confirms their authority. Moreover, given the multiple centers of power in a society—whether expressly concerned with Islamic matters or not—authorities are esteemed because they mediate among the various poles. Illustrative of this are the 'ulama, who help to break through bureaucratic obfuscation and rigidity to secure housing or other social benefits for their "clients."

The bearers of sacred authority, including but not limited to the 'ulama, may not only serve as go-betweens but also represent specific social and economic interests. Sufi shaykhs in the African countryside often represent the interests of the peasantry, for instance, and the 'ulama in countries such as Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia often defend the interests of the bazaar or suq merchants, while Islamist groups may represent the interests of disenchanted and relatively nonmobile middle-class professionals. But values and interests are not radically divorced from each other, and, of course, values can be interests and interests can be valued. Interests are doubtless important in any political order, including the Islamic world, but they do not remain value-free or detached from the larger understandings that the political order engenders.

The interconnection of these ideas is evident even in societies where Muslims are a minority. In the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region of Northwest China, local authorities guardedly tolerate the new emphasis among Hui Muslims on performing "correct" Islamic rituals, often spearheaded by Sufi orders such as the Khufiyya. They see this emphasis on ritual as socially and politically conservative. Yet they fear that the next stage of this religious revitalization may be "fanaticism." Hui Muslims do not differentiate between their ethnic and

religious identities, whereas state authorities seek to maintain a sharp distinction between them out of fear that religious activities may contribute to political destabilization. This dispute between state authorities and community religious leaders over the exclusion of the “religious” from the “political” domains is clearly expressed in the words of a local Communist party official in Yinchuan: “The Hui are allowed to maintain their ethnic customs that are influenced by Islamic traditions, but religion and ethnicity are two separate matters and should not be confused” (Gladney 1992a:97; see also Gladney 1991:132). In effect, state and local Sufi leaders contest the limits of sacred authority.

The case of Mayotte, a village of the Comoros Islands in East Africa, suggests that boundary questions are just as relevant to societies that have experienced less revolutionary change. Michael Lambek demonstrates that local religious officials (fundis) derive their immense authority from their knowledge of Islamic texts and a reputation for personal integrity. Yet they do not possess automatic political authority. Villagers appear willing to accord a senior religious man great respect and to follow his prescriptions in personal affairs and ritual, but they consider his intervention in a village dispute improper. The “partial disconnection of religion and politics” is the result. “Villagers believe that the fundis create and uphold the morality of the community by being fundis; once , they engage in partisan politics they threaten the very nature of morality itself” (Lambek 1990:34).

Fundis see it differently, however, believing that the moral universe encompasses land or tax disputes and even the programs of political parties. This disagreement over where morality ends and politics begins—or, to put the point somewhat differently, over what constitutes the nature of morality in a Muslim society and who creates and controls it—is intensely political.

**** Contesting Sacred Authority: Saudi Arabia

The Muslim politics of Saudi Arabia has also invoked questions about the changing nature of sacred authority there. At one level of interpretation, Saudi Arabia appears to be a near-perfect example of the indivisibility of religion and politics. In the mid-eighteenth century, Muhammad al-Sa^cud (r. 1745–65) was a local prince (amir) and Muhammad ibn ^cAbd al-Wahhab (1703–87) a zealous but unsuccessful puritanical reformer until they concluded a mutually advantageous alliance. The alliance propelled the Saudis to control of most of the Arabian peninsula and solidified “Wahhabism” as a major reform movement in modern Muslim history.[19] In the present period, the symbiotic relationship continues between the political and religious establishments: The monarchy needs the cooperation and approbation of the ‘ulama to enhance its legitimacy, while the ‘ulama need royal support and patronage to maintain their privileges and, to a lesser extent, to wield influence over policy making.

On another level of interpretation, a subtle contest over boundaries has taken place between the ruling family and religious officials. The monarchical elite has often circumvented the ‘ulama by relying on royal decrees (nizams), rather than fatawa, to make administrative, economic, and social changes. Although religious judges (qadis) retain substantial latitude in the judicial system, the king has often invoked his sovereign prerogative to mitigate the impact of shari’a court decisions.

The ‘ulama, for their part, have focused opposition on certain policies to force the regime to cede ground. For example, the Saudi government issued a decree in November 1950 that imposed an income tax on everyone in the kingdom, both Saudis and non-Saudis. The purpose was to increase the revenues of the state, primarily from the profits of the Arabian American Oil Company, but the ‘ulama objected to a tax on Saudi citizens because it would detract from the Muslim obligation to give alms {zakat). As a consequence, the revised royal decree of June 1951 deleted the income tax obligation on Saudis (CEDEFS 1967).[20][21]

In March 1992, King Fahd announced a series of administrative changes, which, because of their sweeping and unparalleled character, amounted to a constitutional package for the kingdom. Several of his predecessors had proclaimed their intention to reform the system by creating a consultative assembly, but they proved reluctant to command it (Piscatori 1983a:68–69). The regime appeared to have weathered the shocks of Nasserist pan-Arabism in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the rapid increase in oil-generated wealth in the 1970s, the Iranian revolution and the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in the late 1970s, and the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. But the climate turned unfavorable early in the 1990s, partly as a result of the cumulative effects of rapid economic growth and the expansion of the educational system and partly as a result of the direct threat to the regime posed by the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

This invasion brought matters within Saudi Arabia to the boiling point. Middle-class elements regarded a regime that required hundreds of thousands of foreign troops to defend it as weak and narrowly based, while religious elements viewed it as tainted by intimate association with infidels. Both elements have pressed for reforms in a number of publicly circulated petitions or “advice” (nasihas). For example, a letter signed by forty-three merchants and professionals in December 1990 demanded greater accountability and called on the king to create consultative assemblies on both the national and local levels, to allow women greater freedom, and to curb the power of the “religious police” {al-mutawwa’uri).

A petition signed by eighteen Saudi religious leaders on May 18, 1991, called for the creation of a consultative council {majlis al-shura). Their concern was both to enhance the Islamic bases of the political system and to limit the influence of the more secular-minded among the middle classes. The religious scholars suggested, for example, that the

assembly’s members be selected on the basis of their “competence”—presumably in Islamic matters—and not on the basis of their social status or gender. They also called for the Islamization of the economy, media, military, and foreign policy (Haeri 1991). Reflecting the regime’s unease, senior ‘ulama denounced the public manner in which the demands were made; advice, they said, should not be divisive, and gratitude is owed the rulers for the stability and prosperity they have provided (BBC SWB, ME/1090, A/6-7, June 5, 1991).

Concerned about the general disquiet, the king maneuvered between the various factions when he promulgated the systemic reforms of 1992. His speech to the nation was a ringing reaffirmation of the religious nature of the state: The kingdom had been founded “on a clear programme of politics” that could be summarized by “belief and shari’a” (Fahd 1992). In the Basic Law of Governance (al-nizam al-asasi), the government was also careful to reiterate the Islamic basis of the state. According to the text of this law (Saudi Arabia 1992), it does not constitute a constitution (dustur) because only the Qur’an and the sunna of the Prophet are the true constitution of a Muslim society (Article 1). The political system is a monarchy (Article 5), but government “derives its authority (sultathu) from the Book of God Almighty and the sunna of His Prophet” (Article 7). Moreover, “the state protects the credo of Islam; it-implements its shari’a; it orders people to do right and avoid evil; it fulfills the duty of the call (da’wa) to God” (Article 23).

These provisions appeal to the religiously inclined elements of society, but the regime was also aware that many Saudis were irritated at the entrenched position of the ‘idama. As a result, the Basic Law of Governance incorporates provisions that qualify their traditional position in Saudi society. It requires that fatawa be based on the Qur’an and the sunna (Article 45) and that shari’a court decisions be similarly based on the principal sources of Islam as well as on “statutes issued by the ruler [waly al-amr}” that are consistent with those sources (Article 48). Perhaps the most important provisions, however, limit the de facto powers of the religious police. “No one shall be arrested, imprisoned or have their actions restricted. except in accordance with the provisions of the law” (Article 36), and, more importantly, “The home is sacrosanct [hurmatan] and shall not be entered without the permisssion of the owner or be searched except in cases specified by statute (al-nizam)” (Article 37).

The Saudi regime therefore walks a tightrope between competing claimants on the system. Despite the all-encompassing rhetoric in the Basic Law of Governance about the Islamic nature of the state, the regime has endeavored to delineate boundaries between its authority and those of the religious leaders and, to a lesser extent, the educated professional classes. Yet problems persist. In September 1992, over one hundred Saudi professionals and ‘ulama signed a memorandum bluntly calling for an end to corruption in royal and governmental circles and termination of the alliance with the United States. On May 3, 1993, a human rights group was formed in Riyadh by four university professors, a civil servant, and two lawyers; it was supported by a small number

of’ulama. Careful to invoke the traditional framework of shari’a in its name—Lajnat al-Difa’ ‘an al-Huquq al-Shar’iyya (Committe for the Defense of Legitimate Rights)—and calling for greater implementation of Islamic law (shari’a), the committee was openly critical of the Saudi goverment (see, for example, “Lajnat al-Difa’ ‘an al-huquq al-shar’iyya” 1993; New Saudi Rights 1993.

One religious scholar in the group, Shaykh ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jibrin, had joined other ‘ulama in July 1992 in criticizing the regime for allowing torture and other abuses, in violation of Islamic law. The Minister of the Interior, Prince Nayf ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, insisted that “governed by our Muslim beliefs, we in the Kingdom respect human rights more than any other state or society in the world” (BBC SWB 1690, A/9, May 17, 1993). Yet this assurance did not prevent the group’s proscription or the continued arrests of critics and dissidents. On May 12, 1993, the government secured a fatwa from the twenty-one members of the Hay’at Kubar al-‘Ulama (Council of Grand ‘Ulama), saying that the formation of the committee was unjustified because the kingdom, by God’s grace, was already ruled by Islamic law and that Saudis were able to redress grievances through the shari’a courts and other bodies (“Lajnat al-Difa’ ‘an al-huquq al-shar’iyya” 1993:7; see also, Walker 1993). In September 1994, 110 critics of the regime—including two religious scholars, Salman al-‘Uda and Safar al-Hawali—were arrested. One year earlier the king had asked the Council of Grand ‘Ulama to investigate and confront the dissident ‘ulama, but they had refused to recant their views. According to the regime, it was necessary to act before civil disorder (fitna) became entrenched, and the government resolved to act against those who interfered with the “destiny of the country” (muqaddarat al-bilad) and the “sanctities” (muqaddasat) of Muslims (“al-Sa’udiyya” 1994:4). Therefore, since the second Gulf war, the contest over the state’s hitherto relatively unchallenged monopoly on sacred authority has become intense.

**** Images in the Contest over Authority

In a less subtle way than the Saudis, Saddam Hussein has appropriated the symbols of Islam to bolster his rule. During the Iran-Iraq war, he ordered the construction of a massive new monument to celebrate Iraq’s inevitable victory over the Iranians and Saddam’s heroic leadership (see fig. 5). The monument depicts two giant hands holding crossed blades that represent the sword of Qadisiyya, symbolic of the battle in 637 in which Arab Muslim forces defeated Iran and brought it into the Islamic realm. The official invitation to the monument’s dedication in August 1989 left no doubt as to the connection between the divinely inspired leadership of seventh-century Muslims and that of Saddam Hussein which the monument is meant to suggest: “The ground bursts open and from it springs the arm that represents power and determination, carrying the sword of Qadisiyya. It is the arm of the Leader-President, Saddam Hussein himself (God preserve and watch over him) enlarged forty times” (al-Khalil 1991:2).

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-7.png][Fig. 5. The Qadisivya Monument, Baghdad.]]

Faced with signficant Shi’i opposition to his secular and repressive rule, Saddam has also invoked specifically Shi’i symbolism to legitimize his position, despite his 1987 pronouncement, cited earlier in this chapter, that religion and politics should remain separate. Although he hails from the Sunni town of Tikrit, north of Baghdad, and has long been a committed member of the secular Ba’thist party, he has commissioned posters of himself riding a white stallion. White is a sign of purity, and the white horse is a familiar image associated with the Imam Husayn, martyred in the fields of Karbala in 680, who became the quintessential Shi’i hero (al-Khalil 1991:11, 14). In Karbala itself, a shrine city of immense spiritual signficance to Shi’a throughout the world, Saddam’s giant portrait stands next to the silver door to the tomb of the Imam ‘Abbas, and a nearby banner proclaims that “The visitors to the holy shrine in Karbala ask God to preserve Saddam Hussein.” The shrine of the Imam Husayn also sports a banner asking visitors to “embrace and thank the President for taking care of the holy shrine” (Cockbum 1992:13).

Other common ways for Muslim political leaders to assert their religious credentials and to affirm their sacred authority is undertaking the hajj and the public performance of prayer. With an eye to Indonesia’s 1992 legislative elections, President Suharto (b. 1921) made a highly publicized pilgrimage in 1991. Similarly, President Hafiz al-Asad (b. 1920) of Syria, concerned that his ‘Alawi background would make him appear heterodox to the country’s Sunni majority, prayed in public with King Faysal (ca. 1904–75), the devout king of Saudi Arabia. Both Syrian and other Arab media featured extensive coverage of the event. In 1973, al-Asad also obtained a fatwa from the head of the Higher Shi’i Council in Lebanon, the influential Imam Musa al-Sadr, declaring that the ‘Alawis constituted a branch of Shi’i Islam (Seale 1990:173).

Like states, religious actors often manipulate symbols to enhance their struggle with governments over who speaks for Islam. One group opposed to the Saudi and other Gulf monarchies, for example, employed a logo on its publications suggesting that it, rather than the House of Sa’ud represents Islam (see fig. 6). The logo features the Ka’ba, the focal point of the pilgrimage in Mecca, from which arises a globe and a rifle in a clenched fist. Underneath is the name of the group, Munazzamat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi-l-Jazira al-‘Arabiyya (Organization of the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula), and above the picture is the Qur’anic phrase referring to the Prophet’s injunctions to his followers to proceed against Tabuk: “Go forth lightly and heavily [equipped] and strive with your wealth and persons in the cause of God” (9:41).

In Egypt, many Islamists have attacked the pyramids, Egypt's paramount national symbol, as a celebration of the pre-Islamic "era of ignorance" (jahiliyya)? They find inspiration for their views in the Qur'an, which memorializes the Pharaoh as "arrogant" (istakbar) and "insolent [junudahu] in the land beyond reason [bi-ghayr al-haqq]" (28:39; see also 22:38; 69:24). Similarly, commenting on the Qur'anic story of Moses' confrontation with Pharaoh, Sayyid Qutb made Pharaonic rule the template for tyranny and implied that a courageous confrontation with tyrants (tawaghit)—those who had usurped God's power—was needed today (Qutb 1985:3:1330–31). Some activists go so far as to demand that the pyramids be razed (Walker 1992), seeing them as an offensive representation of a moral order that was destined to perish with the advent of Islamic revelation. For these Muslims, the identity of the state is compromised by the pyramids because the state, in celebrating Egypt's archaeological heritage, appears to support the ideals of the jahiliyya. Despite the sensitivities of the activists, the government, intent on promoting the special place of Egypt in the Arab and Mediterranean worlds, has deployed Pharaonic and even Greek images—Nefertiti, the pyramids, a Greek amphitheather—on bank notes and stamps (Sivan 1990a:1007). It is not surprising, therefore, that, immediately after Sadat's assassination, the assassin linked the un-Islamic nature of the modern state with the jahili society prior to the seventh century: "I am Khalid Islambuli; I killed Pharaoh, and I am not afraid of death" (Kepel 1984:184).

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-8.png][Fig. 6. Opposition groups appropriate Islamic imagery and Qur'anic verses to legitimize their causes. Logo of the Islamic Revolutionary Organization in the Arabian Peninsula.]]

Roy Mottahedeh has written of the outrage Iranians felt at the imprisonment by the shah's security apparatus of one young mullah (a junior religious authority) who wore the black turban of the sayyid, a descendant of the Prophet. Upon the mullah's release from detention, he was warmly greeted by the congregation of his mosque, one of whom summarized the general and politicized feeling: "It's not right, a learned sayyed like you in prison." With conscious irony, the mullah replied, "On the contrary, it's my heritage as a sayyed" (Mottahedeh 1985:265).

Symbols may also be manipulated in the contest among various nonstate Muslim groups. For example, from 1975 to 1990, Lebanon was locked in a devastating civil war, often thought to have pitted an entrenched Christian elite against a dissatisfied Muslim majority. Yet many divisions existed within the Muslim ranks, as they do within Christian ranks. Among the Shi'a, in particular, a relatively accommodationist group, Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya (AMAL, the Lebanese Resistance Battalions) and a less compromising movement influenced by Iran, Hizbullah, have been bitter opponents. Both movements manipulate Islamic symbols. As figure 7 shows, the AMAL painting of a tree whose branches indicate the names of "martyrs" to the cause invokes an Islamic symbolism of shahada (martyrdom). The logo attached to many Hizbullah publications (fig. 8) depicts the arm of Husayn holding an automatic rifle, a Qur'an, and a globe arising from the Arabic words denoting "party of God." Over this is the Qur'anic verse, "For truly the party of God will be

the victors” (58:22), and beneath it, “The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon.” The effect of this representation is to suggest the divinely ordained and universal nature of the movement’s struggle and to link it with the successes of the Iranian revolution, thus distinguishing it from other groups in Lebanon in order to affirm its superior claim to sacred authority.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-9.png][Fig. 7. The words underneath this AMAL-inspired tree of martyrs, painted on the side of a house on the road to Sur (Tyre), indicate that it is nourished by the blood-soaked “land of the south”—Israeli-occupied south Lebanon.]]

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-10.png][Fig. 8. “For truly the Party of God will be the victors.” Hizbullah logo, Lebanon.]]

*** Networks of Authority

The preceding discussion makes clear that no one group in Muslim societies possesses a “monopoly on the management of the sacred”(Kane 1992:9). Kings, presidents, military officers, bureaucrats (dealing specifically with religious issues and otherwise), ‘ulama, Sufi shaykhs, and nontraditionally educated intellectuals are all competitors for sacred authority. To complicate matters further, several or all may exercise authority simultaneously—one individual’s sacred authority is not exclusive of another’s. We describe below several themes common to all of them.

First, all Muslim leaders are conditioned by the modern world, and distinctions between “fundamentalists,” “traditionalists,” and “modernists” are misleading if they ignore the common ground on which they all stand. Very real differences in type of education, social position, and ideology exist among them, but none has remained unaffected by the normative and technological changes that have swept the world in this century. Chapter 2 demonstrated how the constitution of revolutionary Iran acknowledges the contemporary emphasis on popular sovereignty while reaffirming the traditional, and formerly exclusive, principle of divine sovereignty. From the perspective of analyzing Muslim politics, judgments as to whether the coexistence of these two ideas is contrived or valid are less helpful than noting the tendency to invent and reinvent tradition.

Political change is complex and differs according to political ideas and the need to persuade others to share them and their associated organizational structures. Actors always have available the vision of alternative “imagined” communities. An important component of understanding politics consists of recognizing how these alternative visions alter or replace currently dominant and authoritative ones. The fact that proponents of credos, beliefs, or ideologies may assert that their values and visions are timeless and immemorial should not

obscure the fact that they are subject to constant modification and change. Muslims assert their continuity with the past while coming to terms with a modern intellectual terrain.

As Chapter 5 will explain, Muslims use modern technology for their own purposes. That this is so is obvious and would be unexceptional but for the entrenched characterizations of "fundamentalists" as committed to a virtually unchanged Islamic law (Heritage Foundation 1984:4) or intent on creating "priestly theocracies" that would be at once "fanatical" and out of touch (Reagan 1990:409). Similar ideas also prevail among the secular Arab left. Samir Amin, for example, has declared that "rationalism [and] fundamentalism constitute two states of mind irreducible to one another, incapable of integration" (1990:184). In terms of ideas and technology, Muslims are not living in a reconstructed past, nor are they turning the clock back. As Ahmad Moussalli writes, "although [Islamic] fundamentalism appears conservative, it is actually a progressive program" that demonstrates an "understanding of science as well as its impact on the structure of society and its values" (1992:9).

Second, objectified understandings of Islamic beliefs and practices have irrevocably transformed Muslim relations to sacred authority. Of crucial importance in this process has been a "democratization" of the political process of Islam and the development of a standardized language inculcated by mass higher education, the mass media, travel, and labor migration.

Throughout this century, Muslim intellectuals have articulated a powerful indictment of the un-Islamic nature of their societies. This censure is predicated on a belief that existing authorities—political rulers and their allies, the 'ulama—have failed in their guidance of Muslims and that each Muslim has the right to direct access to and interpretation of scripture. To justify this view, writers frequently invoke the Qur'anic phrase (50:16) that God is closer to man than his jugular vein; priestly intermediaries are not required. 'Ali Shari'ati spoke disparagingly of the idea of an official clergy as "long-bearded demagogues." He said that a clergy should not exist in Islam, and he specifically criticized Iran, where the religious scholar Calim) has a higher status than persons "accomplished" (fazil) in such subjects as the Qur'an, Islamic history, and the Prophet's biography (sira). In his view, Iran's 'ulama were "second-class scholars" who have erroneously claimed hereditary and "monopolistic" powers (Shari'ati 1979:41,115—16). Habib Boulares, a former Tunisian cabinet minister, distinguishes between "the power of the 'ulama" and the "'ulama of power." The latter, in his view, inhabit the unprincipled world of compromise and have abdicated their responsibility to speak truth to established authority: "The tragedy of the Muslim world is that this religious hierarchy prefers the flickering light of the candle to the blazing flame of the spirit" (1990:69).

In southwest Nigeria, Muhammad Jumat Imam (1896–1960), proclaimed himself the "Mahdi-Messiah" in December 1941 and proceeded to construct a new movement. It has assumed the style of a Sufi tariqa (religious order), including a shrine for its founder that

has become the focal point for regional pilgrimage. Imam nominated himself as the preeminent religious authority, regarding others as lacking a knowledge of English and Arabic, which he possessed. “That such a view met with the support of many is an indication of how both the expansion of Western education and the improvements in Islamic education ... were altering the traditional criteria for leadership” (Clarke 1988:159). The spread of British colonial education, with its access to employment in the colonial government, had begun to influence profoundly Islamic education by the 1930s. Through the establishment of Islamic educational organizations such as the Ansar ud-Deen (Companions of the Religion) and the Islamic Reformation Society in the 1930s, not only were new educational forms introduced but acquisition of this kind of education also became a standard of authority rivaling seniority and virtuous character (Clarke 1988:159–63).

Third, the combined effect of criticism of the religious status quo and the belief that sacred texts are directly apprehensible has been a potent challenge to exclusivist ideas of authority, resulting in a fragmentation of sacred authority. Like Martin Luther at the Diet of Worms (1521), Muslim writers have “claimed to be attached to the authority of the Word of God alone and ... in public asserted the relative unimportance of all who claimed to come between God and the believer’s conscience” (Lienhard 1989:96). This has led to an opening up of the political process and heightened competition for the mantle of authority.

As with the peasants’ revolt (1524–25) in the wake of Luther’s dissent, the effect at times has been a rejection of the infidel state and its apparatus. Members of al-Jama’at al-Islamiyya have proclaimed Egypt the land of unbelief, and Shaykh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman (b. 1938), has lashed out at ‘ulama who appeased the government and allowed such un-Islamic practices as the drinking of alcohol, adultery, and gambling (R. Ahmad 1991:150, 160–74). The ‘ulama have been clearly forced on the defensive, declaring publicly that they act only on behalf of “true Islam” (al-Islam al-sahih), seeking to combat the errors of both those who are “ignorant” (jahilin) of Islam and those who reject it altogether (see, for example, al-Ghazali 1989:1). Since Muslims need to create a more Islamic society, they argue, it is “madness” (hamaqa) to fight over furniture before the house has been rebuilt (al-Ghazali 1989:2).

Part of the explanation for this political struggle lies in the process of objectification discussed in Chapter 2 and noted above. Because Muslims around the world possess an intensified awareness of Islamic ideas and practices, they are more assertive in their judgments of what constitutes proper Islamic conduct and who is a true believer. Ironically, from the perspective of governments whose Islamic credentials are often found wanting, the educational system they foster has been pivotal in developing this new consciousness.

The impact of modern mass education is pervasive. Students are taught about the unity of Muslim thought and practice in a set national curriculum that includes Islamic studies as one subject among many. Instead of sitting at the feet of a recognized master of traditional

learning, an impersonal relationship between students and teachers, who have become employees of the state, is stressed. Even while teaching that Islam permeates all aspects of life, the formal principles of Islamic doctrine and practice are compartmentalized and made an object of study. The traditionally educated religious authorities sometimes adapt to this form of education, but some resist it.

As an example of how intricate the basis of contemporary Islamic authority has become, the training of one qadi (religious judge) in the Malaysian state of Kedah combined traditional Islamic learning with a modem-style university education. Born into a family of religious scholars, Syeikh Marzuki received six years of primary education at his father's school, and then he attended the Islamic college in Alor Star and a Middle Eastern university. Informally given the title of shaykh in recognition of his training in the Middle East, Marzuki joined the religious bureaucracy, the Department of Religious Affairs, and eventually became a district Islamic judge. In short, he derived his authority from competence in both traditional and modern Islamic learning and the formal patronage of the state (Hassan 1993).

The beneficiaries of modern mass education are often less willing to collaborate with the state system that made their education possible in the first place. Many are attracted to Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood (in Egypt, Jordan, and the Sudan), Tunisia's Hizb al-Nahda (the Renaissance party, formerly the Mouvement de Tendance Islamique (MTI) in Tunisia), FIS in Algeria, ABIM in Malaysia, or the "Muslim Parliament" created in Great Britain in January 1992. These groups are led by "new" intellectuals, who have usually not received a traditional religious education. They include the Nahda's Rashid al-Ghannouchi, a secondary school teacher; FIS's 'Abbasi Madani (b. 1931), who has a doctorate in education from the University of London; and the Muslim Parliament's Kalim Siddiqui (b. 1931), a former subeditor of The Guardian in London.[22] The groups and their leaders have become self-conscious Islamic actors who inevitably compete for authority with other self-proclaimed Islamic actors—especially the 'ulama and, increasingly, the state.

Sufi groups as well are never apolitical. They challenge the 'ulama's exclusive control over religious knowledge and sometimes challenge the state's self-ascribed right to speak for Islam. This constitutes part of the fragmentation of sacred authority in Muslim societies. But, as we indicate throughout this book, dichotomized understandings—in this instance, Sufi shaykhs versus 'ulama—are distorting. It is often the case that eminent members of the 'ulama, even as they uphold the standards of orthodoxy, participate in Sufi movements. A celebrated example is the Sudanese Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad. He was not only a religious scholar but also the founder of a religious order in which his descendants have continued to play a major role. Thus "the Mahdi himself was hard to classify in [a] Sufi-ulama dichotomy" (el-Affendi 1992:40).

In some contemporary societies, such as parts of West Africa and Central Asia, Sufi orders have increasingly taken on a pronounced political role. These orders—and opposition to them—contribute to the fragmentation of authority (Abduvakhitov 1993:80–81; Launay 1992:86–88; O'Brien 1988). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Sufi orders throughout the Muslim world were seen as potential templates for transregional political action threatening colonial rule. French colonial authorities were concerned that the orders could be used by the Ottomans and rival colonial powers to weaken French rule in the Maghrib and sub-Saharan Africa. In practice, the authority of Sufi religious leaders was less than total, as indicated by the fact that many individuals belonged to more than one order and only a few orders required that their members join no other. As a whole, however, the hierarchies of dominance established by Sufi tariqas formed a pervasive and popularly understood organizational framework in some countries, including Morocco and Afghanistan. In Morocco, for example, the language and organizational structure of the protonationalists of the 1930s was adapted from religious orders (Rezette 1955).

In contemporary West Africa, the role of the Muridiyya in Senegal in organizing economic production and framing political action from the colonial era to the present is well known (O'Brien 1971,1975). Elsewhere, the influence of Sufi orders is more subtle but no less pervasive. As Launay (1992:179–95) writes, the basic hierarchical structure of orders such as the Qadiriyya, which spread throughout the region from the eighteenth century onward, and the Tijaniyya, which dates from the nineteenth century, requires a formal initiation, implying acceptance of the authority of a shaykh (religious teacher and leader) and one's own role as murid (pupil). This hierarchical link can be extended to transcend the life of the shaykh and to include more disciples than oneself. Although the authority of the shaykh lasts, in principle, throughout his lifetime, his knowledge and baraka (grace) become institutionalized and thus serve to attract and guide followers long after his death. The success of this institutionalization owes much as well to the funding that the more prestigious Sufi orders often receive from wealthy traders and industrialists, who, like philanthropists elsewhere, acquire social prestige from their charitable donations (see, for example, Tahir 1975:28, 83, 159, 165–71).

The hierarchy inherent in all Sufi orders implies that they have some degree of centralization, although a number of orders—such as Egypt's Muridiyya order—are more centralized than others. It also means that when Sufi orders lend their support to political movements or goals, as they have done on occasion, they can be highly effective (see fig. 9). The multiplicity of movements, however, means that if one order lends its support to a party or group or opposes government policy, rival orders can be manipulated to oppose it. This was clearly the case in the Sudan when President Numayri (b. 1930; r. 1969–85) exploited Khatmiyya suspicions of the Mahdiyya to bolster his rule (Cudsi 1983:52–53).

In Algeria, pilgrimages to saints' shrines and festivals associated with them were banned by the Algerian government from 1962 until 1989. The shrines and the maraboutic cults associated with them were popularly seen as symbols of refuge from government oppression. In 1989, following widespread antigovernment demonstrations and suggesting an awareness of the potency of symbolic politics, local authorities dropped the ban, in part

to counter the popularity of FIS. FIS activists, like the earlier Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia, saw the shrines (and their networks of supporters) as potential rivals and destroyed many of them as a way of “purifying” Algeria (Goytisolo 1994). Thus, the competition over sacred authority is not just between religious movements and the state but among Muslim activists as well.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-11.png][Fig. 9. Sufi orders in Egypt and elsewhere, long considered apolitical, are increasingly seen as part of a wider political resurgence. Procession of the Rifa’iyya order on the Prophet’s birthday, Cairo, 1987.]]

Even where Sufi orders are seen as weak or politically peripheral, as in Burkino Faso and the Ivory Coast, the rivalry among types and styles of authority is politically significant. At the end of World War II, Manding-speaking pilgrims returning from the hajj began to preach against local religious traditions. Exposed to reformist thought, they challenged the authority of established scholars and denounced saint worship as well as the tombs of the founders of leading scholarly families. Derided as “Wahhabis” because of their links with Saudi Arabia, they nonetheless acquired a significant following.

French colonial authorities were hostile to the “Wahhabi” movement, especially because the established local religious scholars accepted a distinction between “religion” and “politics” of which they approved and did not challenge French colonial rule. Thus, although the threat to the traditionalist ‘ulama was direct, the French interpreted the Wahhabi attack against the local ‘ulama and the appeal to Middle Eastern-trained ones instead as an indirect threat to their rule. Some saw a link between the Wahhabis and the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA, the African Democratic Assembly), the major West African nationalist party. Although most Wahhabis were “sympathizers, if not militants,” of the RDA, they distanced themselves from formal support (Launay 1992:86–88). Nevertheless, the organizational structure of the local Wahhabi movement and its ability to claim transregional religious legitimacy was seen as a significant political threat to both the religious and the political establishments.

Whether from the perspective of state or nonstate actors, therefore, belief and practice in the Muslim world are now expressed in public and often in unanticipated forms. Social categories sometimes overlap and common interests may be discerned, but the competition over sacred authority increasingly pits governments, ‘ulama, Islamist groups, and Sufi shaykhs against each other.

Fourth, the contenders for Islamic authority have been predominantly male, but women are not entirely excluded. ‘Ulama and preachers of sermons (khatibs) are exclusively men in both Sunni and Shi’i traditions, but women in some regions play influential roles in Sufi movements. From the early days of Islam, female mystics, who were ascetic, celibate, and often slaves or former slaves, were prominent. Like Rabi’a al-‘Adawiyya

(717–80)—“the first true saint of Islam” (Schimmel 1975:42–60; also see L. Ahmed 1992:96–98)—many of these mystics were thought to produce miracles (karamat) and were invested with intercessionary, saintly qualities. As with their male equivalents, many of their tombs became places of pilgrimage. The shrine of Sayyida Nafisa in Cairo is a notable example, but smaller shrines, from which men are often excluded, are found in Anatolia, Iran, North Africa, and South Asia. Mary (Maryam), the mother of Jesus, figures in Sufi poetry as an exemplar of the individual incandescent with divine enlightenment, and her supposed tomb near Selquk (Ephesus) in Turkey attracts pilgrims (Schimmel 1975:426—35; Elias 1988).

Women mystics have also had defined social roles and contributed to the communal organization of Sufism. In Aleppo, there were seven “convents” (khanaqas or ribats) between 1150 and 1250, at which women congregated to pursue their spiritual mission. Wealthy women, such as Bibi Fatima in the Sind in the early eleventh century or the daughter of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in the eighteenth century, became patrons of convents and endowed them with food and money. In Ottoman Turkey, the Bektashiyya order accepted women as equal adepts who joined men at ceremonies and meals.

In the northern Caucasus after the Russian revolution—principally Daghestan and the Chechen Ingush Republic—women’s groups arose in affiliation with the Qadiriyya and, to a lesser extent, the Naqshban-diyya.[23] In Central Asia, small offshoots of the Yasawiyya have had women’s sections with female spiritual leaders (Benningsen and Wim-bush 1985:67–69).

In the case of Africa, “Even though women are refused access to the principal functions or public places of worship, nothing prevents them from having baraka [grace], worshipping saints, or becoming agents of a particular marabout [person thought to possess baraka and able to transmit it]” (Coulon 1988:116). Women often play significant roles in religious education, as in the schools associated with the Niassene Tijaniyya of Senegal, and, at times, in propagating the activities of religious orders. Many become involved in organizing women’s groups associated with the tariqas. Moreover, as with the Muridiyya in Senegal, even if women have no formal position in a religious order, their prestige and status are guaranteed by their inheritance, equal to that of their brothers, of their father’s baraka: “Women not only possess baraka, they also consume it; and they perpetuate it” (Coulon 1988:121).

In some cases, women have acquired their own disciples. In Mamluk Egypt, convents had shaykhas (female shaykhs) who served as prayer leaders, and in

Sind in South Asia, women became faqiras (Sufi mendicants) and murshidas (spiritual guides) (Schimmel 1975:432–33). Moreover, the Qadiriyya in Malawi was established between 1920 and 1930 through the activities of a shaykha.

In Senegal, Sokhna Magat Diop, eldest daughter of a Muridiyya leader, succeeded her father and led a branch of the brotherhood for decades. Although she did not officiate at mosques or at marriages, she was regarded as possessing “the normal powers of a khalifa [leader of a brotherhood branch]” (Coulon 1988:130). In southwestern Nigeria, the junior wife of the founder of the Mahdiyyat accompanied him as he traveled throughout the region promoting his message, which included the doctrine that—contrary to local practice—women were allowed to attend mosque prayers and were not required to veil. God, he said, had indicated that his wife, Shaykha Mahdi, was to serve as lieutenant and to succeed him. She did so, although not with universal approval (Clarke 1988:158, 164, 171–72). In the western Sudan and West Africa since at least the sixteenth century, women have become religious scholars (fakis [faqihs]), established their own religious schools (khalwas), and initiated new members into the orders (al-Kar-sani 1993:137).

As these examples indicate and Chapter 4 will elaborate, women participate, albeit to a limited extent, in the contest over authority. In Pakistan, for example, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (b. 1953) became a major participant in the public debate over what constitutes an Islamic order. Because she opposed a constitutional amendment that would make the Qur’an and the sunna the supreme law of the land and criticized the shari’a courts, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Abdus Sattar Niazi, proclaimed her an infidel (kafir) and “liable for the death penalty.” Bhutto replied that she believed in the Qur’an and the tradition of the Prophet, but “the law of God should not be subordinate to that framed by hand-picked individuals of the shari’a court” (“Nearer, my God” 1992:38). In this contest over boundaries, a woman politician was transformed into a symbol for those who wished to extend the control of the religious establishment and those who wished to curtail it.

Muslim women have also become “new” intellectuals and activists involved with such groups as the Muslim Sisters in Egypt. Zaynab al-Ghazali (b. 1917) is an influential writer in the tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood, and her writings are avidly followed by both men and women (see, for example, al-Ghazali 1992). When the Brotherhood reorganized in 1959–69, after a period of repression under Nasser, the major leaders of the movement regularly met in al-Ghazali’s home (Ayubi 1991:136)—a sign of the enormous respect in which she was held. Maryam Jameelah (b. 1934), an American convert to Islam who has resided for decades in Pakistan, is a prolific author on a wide range of Muslim topics (see, for example, Jameelah 1980,1982b, 1982c) with a broad international readership.

The Lower House of the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain has 24 women among its 155 members, and of its four deputy speakers, two are women. The parliament was created to deal with such issues as education, job discrimination, the availability of social and medical services, and personal status (Siddiqui 1993; “Eighth Session” 1994)— issues of prime interest to women. One deputy speaker, Adeela Rashid, affirms that the role of women in the parliament will be assertive: “The chauvinism in Islam happened because women were not educated—only men knew the laws. But now we know our rights given to us by Islam and we’re not going to be satisified with anything less” (Rabinovitch 1992). Indeed, the other woman deputy speaker, Zainab Ali, suggests that a specifically Muslim path for women is required: “We must not allow British society to influence our Islamic identity. Assimilation is not the right way: the model handed on by Western women is not acceptable to Muslim women” (“Western Women” 1992). It is clear that women are thus able to use Muslim institutions, including the Muslim Women’s Institute affiliated with the Muslim Parliament, to advance their own agendas. It is ironic, how ever, to note that, although assimilation appears undesirable, the conscious imitation of British traditions is pronounced —“Parliament” with its speaker, deputy speakers, and committee structure; and the “Women’s Institute,” a common feature of British life (see fig. 10).

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-12.png][Fig. 10. Opening of the Muslim Parliament in Great Britain, May 1992. Muslim institutions in Europe and North America often consciously build on existing political traditions in these societies.]]

Women also participate in religious authority in less obvious, but no less important, ways. Female teachers are influential in inculcating, and perhaps subtly subverting, Islamic traditions in such women’s religious schools and colleges as Maktab-i Zahra in Shiraz, the women’s

division of al-Azhar university in Cairo, and the women’s faculties at Saudi universities.

Women are more likely than men to engage in shrine visits and occasions such as the Turkish mevlild, the celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad. In these activities, they establish “an intimate link” with the Prophet. The effect of this perceived spiritual and emotive intimacy is enhanced solidarity with other women as well as the acquisition of authority—over children, other women, and, to a certain extent, over husbands and other male family members. As Nancy and Richard Tapper (1987:83) explain, until recently, the state in Republican Turkey has constrained men’s religious expression by limiting them to enacting “state-established orthodoxy.” Women’s activities, in contrast, have been relatively unregulated because of their “inferior status vis-a-vis past and present religious establishments.” The political consequence is that women acquire sacred authority: Women “preserve a domain of religious enthusiasm, reworking old forms as symbolic

vehicles for defining relations between women and men, man and God, the local community and the state" (Tapper and Tapper 1987:83, 86).

The nexus between women and sacred authority is thus firm, even though it has been overshadowed by the preponderance of male authorities. The relationship is also subtle, and considerations of family and kinship are integral—and are likely to become more important—to a conceptualization of Muslim politics that avoids the stereotypical division of "public" and "private" domains.

** 4. The "firmest Tie"

AND THE TIES THAT BIND: THE POLITICS OF FAMILY AND ETHNICITY

| I | N NORTHERN NIGERIA, a young Hausa-speaking woman, Ladi Adamu, obtained the most votes in the 1987 local government elections in Kano state (fig. 11). To the obvious discomfort of the political establishment (masculine and older), she became one of the 350 councilors in the state. Only one other councilor was a woman. Many Nigerians were incredulous that Adamu's husband would permit such a departure from a woman's characteristic role and assumed, as Ladi Adamu explained, "that a woman who speaks out must not follow tradition and must be a prostitute." While Adamu insisted that no contradiction existed between her official duties and family obligations, she was conscious of the paradox that her unprecedented conduct created and took care to frame her words and actions in conventional, deferential terms: "My mission is to emancipate women. Men cannot block my path because I follow all the religious injunctions in dress and behavior." She appeared in public only with a headscarf, and her campaign poster showed her in Fulani dress, holding a newborn daughter whose feet were dyed in henna. Explaining that this presentation conveyed that she was "a respectable married woman" (Brooke 1988), Adamu implicitly understood that the manipulation of conventional symbols endows legitimacy, especially in a changing society.

In Nigeria and throughout the Muslim world, periods of rapid economic and political transformation give new meanings to shared social understandings and tradition. Among these understandings, which evolve over time and acquire ideological meanings in the thinking of both Muslims and non-Muslims, are the controversial and emotionally charged issues of family, gender, and ethnicity. The Muslim family and the role of the woman as mother is offered as the ideal of social solidarity in many Islamic self-representations, whereas Western—

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-13.png][Fig. 11. This 1988 photograph of Ladi Adamu, one of the first female local government councillors in northern Nigeria, displays a headscarf, Fulani]]

dress, and her newborn daughter, whose feet are dyed with henna. These elements suggest that her role of politician is compatible with that of a respectable married woman.

and some Muslim—feminist writers view the Muslim family as the embodiment of repression. These symbolic understandings contribute to the negotiation of boundaries in a moral universe, which, as we suggested in Chapter 1, is integral to Muslim politics. For Muslims, the boundaries are drawn between the good family and the corrupted one; for feminists, between the empowered woman and the subjugated one. Little is neutral in these moral debates, and they form part of the complexity of Muslim politics.

At particular issue is the utility of drawing a line between “public” and “private.” The former is conventionally thought to be the realm of politics, a realm dominated by formal institutions and men; the latter, the realm of the nonpolitical, is dominated by family and particularist identities in which women have their greatest scope for activity. However, the line between these realms cannot be so clearly drawn, and, as many have suggested, the public-private distinction is a subject of contention (see, for example, Philips 1991:92–119; Nicholson 1992; Rogers 1975).[24]

The relationship among politics, family, and ethnicity, moreover, is not fixed. In the Arab/Persian Gulf, for example, it appears self-evident that family identity determines political power. The Al Sa‹ud and Al Khalifa control the financial and symbolic resources of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain respectively. But to describe the role of such forces as family and kinship in terms of the “genes of politics” (Bill and Springborg 1990:85–136) is to assume that their influence is unidirectional. Rather than assume that family and kinship determine politics, political power may also construct family, kinship, and ethnicity, as the Bosnian case illustrates. Bosnian Muslimness is largely the result of competing Serbian and Croat nationalisms and such externally defined notions of ethnicity as those offered by the European Union and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

Our point of departure is the concept of “elementary” identity used by sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). Avoiding any implication that the term referred to the primitive or primordial, he regarded kinship and religion as the irreducible elements for social organization and the creation of shared categories of thought in less differentiated societies,

such as those of the Australian aborigines. In more complex, multireligious and multiethnic societies, educational systems performed this role (Durkheim 1977; Cherkaoui 1976; Bourdieu 1988). While accepting the crucial role that mass education has played in transforming societies throughout the Muslim world, we hold that kinship, family, and ethnicity retain crucial influence in all societies.

Consistent with the discussion of modernization in Chapter 2, therefore, these elements of personal and collective identity—the ties that bind—have not been diminished by processes of social, political, and economic change. Rather, they persist and, in multiple ways, interact with Islam—the "firmest tie" (Qur›an 2:256; 31:22). Indeed, the Qur›an offers the view that kinship and Islamic loyalties operate on several levels. Family obligations and loyalty to one's parents and kin are morally sanctioned (e.g., 4:36), yet loyalty to the community of believers—the "brotherhood" (ikhwa)—united in submission to the one God, must take clear precedence (for example, 9:71, 49:10). The story of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son Isma‹il, and of Isma‹il's willingness to be sacrificed, carries resonance: The father-son relationship, while undeniably strong, was subordinated to God's wishes. In the end, a merciful God "ransomed him" (fadaynahu) and the family was spiritually transformed (37:99–111).

*** The Politics of Family

**** The Family as Microcosm of the Moral Order

Societies worldwide invest the family with sacred significance and base other interpersonal relationships, including community and political obligations, on its model. The family is a primary unit for ritual observance as well as an influential site of religious and secular education and the transmission of religious and worldly knowledge from one generation to the next (Hardacre 1993:129–40). It serves as a locus for developing notions of trust, authority, and responsibility. In short, the family—and its primary expression in domestic space, the household—is frequently taken as a microcosm of the desired moral order: "When husband and wife take up to live together as a family, they in fact lay the foundation of culture and civilization" (al-Mawdudi 1982:84). The competition and struggle over the meaning and centrality of the family thus inevitably loom large in what we call Muslim politics.

The 1979 Iranian constitution makes the political role of the family explicit in Principle 10, which states that the family is "the fundamental unit of the Islamic society" (Iran 1980:190). In many societies, phrases such as "father of the nation" or "elder brother" indicate how the metaphor of family pervades political life and is used to legitimize individual political leaders and by extension the political institutions with which they are identified (Schatzberg 1988:71–73). In his message celebrating the 1993 peace agreement, Yasser Arafat called on his "family and beloved people," his "brothers and sisters," to show unity in supporting the

accord (BBC SWB ME/1798 MED/7, September 20, 1993). King Hussein of Jordan is one of many leaders who refers to himself and is often referred to as the father of his national “family” (al-Dustur editorial, in FBIS-NES-93–217, November 12, 1993, p. 48).

President Suharto of Indonesia is often referred to as Papa Bangsa (“father of the people”). Likewise, the basic unit of many Islamist groups is the “family” (usra), and the leaders monitor their members until convinced they are fully committed to the movement (Drayf

1992:238).

The idea of the family is so central that only with difficulty do societies alter its conventional images and public forms. What James Scott (1992) calls the “public transcript” of the family role of women, and women as mothers—the stereotypes of what families are supposed to stand for—is often regarded as “ground zero” for society. Pressures to change the official and often legally endorsed view of families and family roles are often regarded with great suspicion. This is in part, as we have noted, because the family provides a powerful idiom for expressing core national and religious values (see, for example, Doumato 1992).

Until at least the nineteenth century in the West, the family was a common economic enterprise, and marriage in the Middle Ages was contracted not between principals but between households. The major family concerns were with survival and the transmission of property rights, not with nurture or shared sentiment (Bourdieu 1976). Since the late nineteenth century, however, a shift of major proportions has occurred in various parts of the world, including the Muslim world, to viewing the family—in particular the nuclear, middle-class family—as providing a safe haven from the harsh world. The family provides a domestic space in which emotion can be expressed, and support—between siblings, genders, and generations—can be taken for granted (Schneider and Smith 1973). Some writers have gone so far as to suggest that the nuclear family was particularly suitable to the needs of an industrial society (Parsons and Bales 1955), although others, including Elizabeth Bott ([1955] 1971), who studied working-class districts in London in the 1950s, discovered that over a century of industrialization and the dislocations of World War II left complex networks of extended families intact.

The defenders of traditional values often feel threatened, even shocked, by public acknowledgment of the ways in which social practice deviates from their ideal of the family. As a result, in the United States and Europe, many conservatives advocate a return to “basic values.” This is an explicit component of the Conservative platform in Britain. Conservatives thus place the family at the center of a political ideology that is intended to justify their own claim to power. In Muslim societies, as in Western ones, it is difficult to talk about changes in family values because the “family” means many things and has different political connotations.

**** The Political Meanings of Family

The implicit contrast between the politics of “traditional” societies, presumably dominated by family concerns, and the politics of the “developed” world is particularly distorting. Such a contrast ignores or understates the influence exerted by extended families in “modern” societies. Prominent examples include the Kennedys and Roosevelts in American politics, nomenklatura families in the former Soviet Union and its successor states, and the Churchills and Macmillans in Britain. Some scholars suggest that in the case of the Muslim world, the importance that family networks play is conditioned by the nature of the political system and the extent of the governmental sector’s intrusion into the economy and society (see, for example, R. Springborg 1982:243–44; Denoeux 1993:17–18). Yet, in the sense that family members in Western as well as Muslim societies follow one another in the civil service, politics, or the military, the assumption that families play a important role uniquely in Muslim societies is undermined.

As in all societies, ideas of kinship and family are not fixed but are modified in response to different situations. They are understood in the context of complementary, locally held notions of patronage, neighborliness, friendship, and ties of work and school (see Eickelman 1989a:151–78). It is only to be expected, therefore, that no one idea of family and kinship describes Muslim societies from the southern Philippines to Tajikistan, Pakistan to Morocco, Germany to Canada. The “Muslim family” is an abstract category, which, like the subject of women and Islam, “has for a long time been dominated by ahistorical accounts of the main tenets of Muslim religion and their implications” (Kandiyoti 1991:1).

In light of variations throughout the Muslim world, it is clear that the family does not possess uniform political significance. “The centrality of the family in Islam” is often assumed (see, for example, Esposito 1982:x). Indeed, Muslims—like Christians, Jews, Hindus, and Buddhists, among others—routinely affirm the great value they attach to family. Yet the political roles of the family depend on such other factors as gender, ethnicity, economics, and nationalism.

Family and kinship relations play salient political roles, but these relations are not unique to Muslim societies. Family leaders, government elites, and religious officials may promote marriages between members of different families as a means of enhancing or defending their political and social status, of gaining property and other wealth, or of extending business contacts and networks. Family networks facilitate survival where “society is fluid and political institutions unstable.” In Latin America, for example, the family network of elites “was not some relic of Iberian traditions; it was a protection racket. Without a firm institutional fabric, individual members were exposed and individual enterprise was hazardous” (Carr 1985:515). The same can be said for nonelite families.

While the ability to manipulate marriages for political ends may be limited by other factors such as race and descent, such alliances often affect the social, economic, and political status quo to such an extent that they become matters of state concern. In Saudi Arabia, the foundation of the state and much of its continuing legitimacy rests on a calculated marital alliance between the Al Sa‹ud, local amirs (princes), and what is now called the Al Shaykh—the descendants of the eighteenthcentury Islamic reformer Muhammad ibn ‹Abd al-Wahhab. In Morocco, marriages between families of senior military officers and leading merchant families are so sensitive that officers are expected to seek approval from the palace. In revolutionary Libya, the “people’s committees,” which in principle govern the country, are overlaid on a complex web of tribal alliances and intermarriage, so that national leaders operate through governmental cadres, tribes, and extended families, a combination of “meritocracy and gerontocracy” (Davis 1987:71–72). Most cadres try to sustain ties with friends in Tripoli so they can bypass or counterbalance, when necessary, the formal governmental apparatus, and marriage is a key means of securing such ties.

In Syria, ‹ulama families have intermarried in the recent past with urban trader and artisan families, and their surnames—such as al‹Attar (“perfumist”) and al-Tunji (“goldsmith”)—often reflect these unions (Batatu 1982:15). In Iran, families of the higher religious officials, the “sources of imitation” (maraji--i taqlid), have intermarried. Ayatullah Muhammad Husayn Burujirdi (d. 1961), for instance, was able to find five prior maraji‹ in his family genealogy, and the Shirazis, a prominent religious family, have had influential religious leaders in various branches of their extended family. In the period immediately prior to the Islamic revolution, all seven “sources of imitation” shared common family connections. Several of these key religious families have also intermarried with the political and economic elites, including bazaris, the military, and professionals (Fischer 1980:88–97). The effect of this interweaving of family networks is to solidify and extend political influence.

Marriages become “a means by which political and economic conflict and competition in the wider society are negotiated and managed” (N. Tapper 1991:xv, 91–93). A Moroccan example suggests how these strategies change over time. In the early 1940s, a young religious scholar from a Berber-speaking town, the deputy to his elder brother, who served as Islamic court judge (qadi) for the region, married the daughter of the region’s French-appointed native chief (qa›id). This was a marriage which attenuated tension between the chief, appointed from outside the region, and the judge’s family, influential in local politics. The marriages of both brothers forged alliances among provincial notables.

After Morocco’s independence in 1956, the older brother was appointed to the first Constitutional Council and in 1963 became a member of the first parliament. His younger brother was appointed qadi in a provincial center elsewhere in Morocco. In the 1960s—we emphasize the dates because familial strategies change over time—his oldest daughter married a schoolteacher from the same town, who eventually became a senior Ministry of Education official. His eldest son also married into a local family. Both these marriages solidified the judge’s standing in the town to which he was appointed.

In contrast, the marriages and alliances of the judge's younger children, which took place in the 1970s and 1980s, reflected postindependence Morocco's changed economic and political circumstances. A son who completed secondary school in the early 1970s (when few Moroccans went to university) secured a post in Casablanca through family connections in the provincial town where he grew up; he met his wife at his workplace, not through family ties. He later became a key administrator in a leading Casablanca holding company. A third son was selected for schooling with Morocco's crown prince; he now holds a position of considerable responsibility in an important ministry in Rabat and serves in the prince's inner circle of advisors. A fourth son, a secondary schoolteacher, lives in the same provincial town as the father (who retired from his judgeship in the early 1970s) and is active in local politics. In an earlier generation, each of these marriages would have had a calculated strategic significance. These more recent marriages show greater flexibility but indicate a range of connections that further collective family interests in both governmental and private, regional and national, spheres of influence.

Although this Moroccan example is modest and unspectacular, a similar pattern prevails in Iraq, where key positions in the regime and control of major sectors of the economy are linked to intermarriages with Saddam Hussein and ties formed in his village of origin, al-Tikrit. So sensitive has the public acknowledgment of these ties become that the Iraqi government has banned the use of names (such as al-Tikriti) which identify villages of origin. In Syria as well, the ‹Alawis, the sect to which President Hafiz al-Asad belongs, wield influence disproportionate to their demographic strength. Although conflict and tensions have occurred among the Tikritis in Iraq and the ‹Alawis in Syria and remain a source of instability, family and ethnic networks are intertwined with formal structures of power and patronage in both Ba‹thist regimes.

Similarly, in Malaysia, family relationships and marriage alliances have pronounced political implications. This is as true of Malay business elites as it is of local and national political elites. Family relationships create a moral system whereby responsibility for one's close kin is both automatic and expected: "Consanguinity as defined by Malay tradition and Islam creates broad social ties within which people should observe basic moral tenets" (Idris 1991:13). At the level of national politics during the premiership of Tun Abdul Razak (1922–76), a core group within the cabinet consisted of individuals of "high status parentage" from two families from the states of Pahang and Johore (Idris 1991:28). The Minister of Culture, Youth, and Sports was married to the Prime Minister's sister, while the Prime Minister was married to a daughter of the fomer president of the Senate. His other daughter was married to the Minister of Education. These marriages not only created family alliances but also helped to facilitate interstate connections within the Malaysian federation. In addition, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Education were also related by marriage: The sister of the Minister of Education was married to an army general whose sister was in turn married to the Deputy Prime Minister. Malay observers did not find it surprising, therefore, that this particular general was promoted over his colleagues (Idris 1991:26).

The instrumental significance that may be ascribed to the family in Muslim politics reveals only part of the story, however. Families constitute ideological clusters that carry meanings and values ascribed to them by both family members and those external to the family. The rationale of the Saudi regime is that the Sa‹ud family, as custodian of the holy places of Mecca and Medina, must constitute an exemplary Muslim family, standing at the apex of aggregations of families that collectively comprise Saudi society. It is precisely because of this royal self-representation that critics of the regime often focus their attempts to delegitimize it on alleged improprieties in the family life of the House of Sa‹ud, such as corruption and illicit sexual activities (see, for example, ‹Abduh 1990:31–36; also Jadhakhan 1992:esp. 24–38).

Parallel to a pattern seen in Western societies, the family has become the ground on which ideological battles are waged. Questions frequently heard in the religious and political discourse of Western societies include: Do the conditions of modern economic life and social mobility require adjustments in the ideal of the nuclear household in which mothers raise children while fathers earn the family income? What are proper gender relations within the household, and who does the housework and raises the children? How can poor and dysfunctional families cope, and what are the implications for society of increasing numbers of illegitimate children? Is society undermined by the recognition of homosexual rights? In the face of significant economic and social challenges, must the family unit be reaffirmed as the repository of morality in a world that has become increasingly morally diffuse and relative?

Islamists have responded to such questions much like Christian, Jewish, or other “fundamentalists” have done: Social changes that weaken “family values” are deplored and resisted. The social reality, however, is not as clear as these Islamists present. On the one hand, there has been a shift among elites and the emerging middle class from households composed of extended families—that is, more than one conjugal family and more than one generation of married couples—to separate households for each married couple or polygamous marriage. This trend has been documented for Istanbul since the late nineteenth century (Duben and Behar 1991), for Morocco since the late 1930s (Eickelman 1989a), and for the Arabian peninsula since the 1970s (alThakeb 1985; Eickelman 1991).

On the other hand, whatever patterns of formal authority households present to the outside world, household decisions emerge through internal negotiation, disagreement, conflict, and bargaining. Decisions to marry, to build a house or establish a separate household, to take in a relative, to hire a servant, or to move are seldom made by a single individual within a household. Not all household members have an equal voice, but it would be rare for a single family member to be responsible for a decision, even if the public “face” of a household might impute absolute authority to its male head (Laslett 1984:368–74). Indeed, studies of the Arab Gulf suggest that women seek out their mothers for information and advice, and a significant number of brothers and sisters rely on one another in addition to their fathers (Dhaher 1981:28–29). Moreover, the trend toward nuclear households is partially mitigated by the simultaneous tendency for extended families to live in the same neighborhood

(Eickelman 1989a:154–70) and to rely on each other for business contacts and various kinds of financial and social support.[25]

*** Women in the Muslim Political Imagination

If the family is inherently politicized, it follows that the status of women and questions of gender are also politically contentious. Islamist representations of Western and Westernized women are often unflattering, suggesting that woman's emancipation "is actually a disguised form of exploitation of her body, deprivation of her honour, and degradation of her soul" (Doi 1989:10).[26] Yet, although Islamic discussions of cultural authenticity often present the West as the morally inferior "Other," such discussions mask the real target of moral censure—local elites and their Westernized practices or ethnically distinct groups and their "deviant" conduct. Islamist discourses on women that uphold the authenticity of tradition thus seek to draw boundaries not only between the Muslim and non-Muslim community but also between the "true" guardians of community and the "internal Other" (Kandiyoti 1991:7–8).

**** Veiling

As we indicated at the outset, perhaps no issue so inflames discussions of gender relations in Islam as that of the veil (hijab) and veiling (ihtijab). From Malaysia to Morocco, the choice of dress for Muslim women, both married and unmarried, is a complex political statement (see Hoffman-Ladd 1987; Taarji 1991). In some societies it is a matter of personal choice; in others it is virtually prescribed by government, social convention, or peer pressure. In Sufi orders such as the Bektashiyya in the Balkans, it has been customary for women attending meetings with men not to veil (Norris 1993:95), but even in supposedly secular societies such as Turkey, some women wear a headscarf while attending religious ceremonies and Islamist women regularly wear the veil. As we indicated in Chapter 1, Muslim girls in both France and Egypt—although the proportion in the respective cases varies markedly—have turned to wearing the headscarf in the classroom. In cases where veiling is prescribed socially or officially, the decision to do so or not involves status. Veiling is also politically ambiguous, involving competition, not simply among groups and institutions within the state but also among international human rights organizations, minority rights groups, and nongovernmental funding agencies. For example, the social agendas, whether implicit or explicit, of a Western developmental agency and a Gulf da-wa organization would not necessarily be the same.

Arlene MacLeod writes of working women in Cairo, whom she describes as "lower middle class." By veiling, she means the adoption of the headscarf and "modest," ankle-length dresses, not the complete covering of the face (although some women do so even in Cairo). She argues that women's presence in the workforce and in public places in Egypt is not new in itself. Most lower middle-class working women in Cairo have rural origins, and in rural

areas, up to two-thirds of a woman’s time is spent in agricultural labor outside the house (1991:50). In Cairo and its suburbs, women, benefiting from the publicsector employment opportunities created in the Nasser era, engage in low-paying, routine clerical work. Many of them say they would quit their jobs if they could, but they need the income to support their families.

In the late 1970s, the adoption of “Islamic” dress was confined to Islamist students on university campuses. By the 1980s, however, a significant number of lower middle-class women had also adopted Islamic garb (MacLeod 1991:113). This had little to do with re-Islamization—their faith remained strong and unquestioned—but Islamic dress conveyed the social message that a woman could hold a job in the government bureaucracy or in a bank without abandoning her roles of wife and mother. Wearing hijab showed respect for the boundaries of a well-ordered, moral society without inhibiting social change. Veiling is thus a means for women to assert some control over the ambiguous moral situation created by new economic and social pressures (MacLeod 1991:139–41; Hijab 1988:53–55). Moreover, by blurring distinctions between lower middle-class dress and the expensive and unaffordable “Western” clothes of wealthier Egyptians, “Islamic” dress—often subsidized by Islamic groups—becomes a means of asserting respectability in difficult economic circumstances (MacLeod 1991:98–113, 133). Because of its affordability, Islamic dress empowers lower middle-class women and thus enhances their claims to status in society.

In the Muslim politics of Algeria as well, the veil has been transformed into a symbol of contention. As in Egypt, women in popular urban quarters have increasingly adopted Islamic dress, although in Algeria more than in Egypt, Islamists frequently back verbal persuasion with threats of violence. A number of secular modernists attack this trend by asserting that Islamists wish to subjugate women and remove legal rights accorded them in recent decades (Boudjedra 1992:74–87). Muslim activists (including veiled women), on the other hand, argue that only through the full implementation of Islamic norms and precepts will women be fully liberated (Aniba 1991:257; Lemu 1978:30). This debate has come to the fore with the political ascendancy of FIS and other Islamist groups.

**** Contesting Gender Boundaries

Women are thus central to the larger political and moral imaginaton, essential to the upholding of civic order and virtue. For Islamists, a woman’s role as mother—producing, nurturing, and educating children—is crucial. In response to a government request in July 1985, Kuwait’s Committee for Qur›anic Interpretations and Legislation recommended against allowing women voting rights, saying that “the nature of election processes befits men, who are endowed with ability and expertise. It is not permissible that women recommend or nominate other women or men” for public posts, such as membership in Parliament. The decree contended that women could exercise indirect influence within their families on their husbands and male relatives. The decree concluded that “Islam does not permit women to

forfeit their basic commitments” of bearing and rearing children (Associated Press 1985). Women do, however, vote in Kuwait’s neighborhood cooperative societies (jama-at ta‹awuniyya) without, apparently, forfeiting their “basic commitments.”

In Bangladesh, despite entrenched notions of female segregation (parda [purdah]), the number of women who head households and work outside the home, particularly in rural areas, is growing. Figures are difficult to obtain, but one indication of the increasing trend is that in 1982 women headed 16.5 percent of rural and 6.9 percent of urban households. There seems little doubt that this pattern has continued (Islam 1991:1), and because of increasing poverty and tension between the landed and landless, extended families have been less able to support these women. The formation of women’s cooperatives, which provide loans and training in jute craftwork, has encouraged the mobility of the poorest women, while in the past it has also tended to reinforce the class and gender domination of well-off men (Rosario 1992:106–19). But agencies such as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the Grameen Bank, and international nongovernmental organizations have assisted more women from diverse backgrounds to become self-reliant. By upsetting traditional economic relations and in sending their children to BRAC-run schools, they have thus directly challenged the power of village leaders, including the ‹ulama, who have had defined influence in educational matters. One consequence of this crossing of conventional boundaries has been a proliferation of fatwas against women who have been denounced as “impure” (“A Religious Backlash” 1994). At stake is the integrity of the traditional moral and political economy: “Bengali notions of honour, shame and purity are important not only to maintain a sexual hierarchy but to maintain group boundaries, status structures, distribution of power—the overall structure of domination” (Rosario 1992:179).

Women Islamist intellectuals and activists often contribute to the defense of traditional female roles. Maryam Jameelah, who has been closely associated with the Jama‹at-i Islami in Pakistan, wrote: “Although I believe that every woman should be educated [to] the fullest sense of her intellectual capacities, I certainly question the advantages of taking women out of the home (particularly those with young children) to compete in business offices and factories with men and substituting nurseries and kindergartens for a home upbringing” (Jameelah [1969] 1982a:17). Zaynab al-Ghazali, a leader of the Egyptian Muslim Sisters, an organization closely allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, argues that women may be educated, but their primary duties are as wife and mother. She also argues that society is harmed if mothers do not remain at home until their children mature (Hoffman 1985).

It is precisely because women are placed at the center of civic order that the contest over family legislation has so often become a matter of high politics.[27] In Pakistan, for example, the controversy over Islamization has focused on such matters as women’s rights in divorce, inheritance, and legal testimony, and sections of the conservative religious establishment have been pitted against the Women’s Action Forum and women’s professional associations in attempting to reform shari-a-based family law. One political organization of ‹ulama, Jamiyat Ulama-i Pakistan (Society of Pakistani ‹Ulama), has made family law issues central to its program. In the early 1980s, the government of Zia ul-Haq (r.

1977–88) proposed several reforms that were opposed by educated professional women as restrictive and un-Islamic. One key reform was the qanun-i shahadat, the law of evidence, which would have equated the testimony of two female witnesses to that of one male. Women were also to be excluded from cases involving the hudud (Qur›anically prescribed punishments) (Weiss 1986). Moreover, fierce debate has ensued over whether the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 should be repealed. It has irritated many Islamists because of its relatively liberal provisions on women's rights in marriage and divorce (Patel 1986:91).

Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi, influenced by his sister, Princess Ashraf, promulgated Iran's Family Protection Act of 1967, which strengthened women's rights, especially those involving marriage. This act was technically repealed and recast in even more liberal terms in 1975, yet by then it had become a focal point of opposition. Ayatullah Khomeini targeted it as symptomatic of the regime's decadence, and soon after he came to power it was suspended (Keddie 1981:179– 80, 240, 266). Ironically, some of the reforms first proposed by the shah have been reintroduced by the Islamic Republic since 1991—a reinvigorated family planning program, state-sponsored prenuptial contracts that give women the right to initiate divorce proceedings, and greater opportunities in the workplace and in higher education.

In the period from 1915 to 1916, the Sudan became the first country after Ottoman Turkey to allow women to institute judicial proceedings for divorce. After Sudanese independence in 1956, shari-a and civil court judges were at first exclusively male, but in 1970 a woman, Najwa Kamal Farid, was appointed to the shari-a court, followed by three others in 1973 and 1974, with more women in the civil courts.[28] Despite the amalgamation of the civil and shari-a courts in 1980, coups, and Islamization programs, women remain in the Sudanese judiciary, principally hearing cases in the appeals courts. In part due to pressures from the Sudanese women's movement, liberalizing reforms were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s allowing women the right to contract for themselves in marriage (1960), increasing maintenance (nafaqa) payments, and liberalizing the law regarding divorce because of cruelty (Fluehr-Lobban 1987:50, 100–102, 138, 278). Sudan's first Permanent Constitution, adopted in 1973, also granted equal protection to men and women, as well as equal protection for adherents of Christianity and other "heavenly" religions (Fluehr-Lobban 1990:618). Although the Permanent Constitution has never been formally rescinded, Sudan's radical Islamization beginning in 1983 rendered many of its provisions moot.[29] Nonetheless, in January 1990, six months after an Islamist military government seized power in the midst of civil war, it convened a Conference on the Role of Women in National Salvation. This conference resulted in a 1991 code of personal status that, although only minimally innovative, reaffirmed women's increased authority in marriage and other improvements of women's status (Fluehr-Lobban 1994:133–35).

In Morocco, women work in both the state and the nonstate sector and are strongly represented in higher education. In an August 1992 speech, King Hassan, after encouraging women to participate in the municipal and parliamentary elections, said: "I have understood and listened to your complaints concerning the Mudawwana" (the 1958 shari-a-based legal code that is the basis for Moroccan laws regarding

marriage, family, and inheritance). It was within his powers, he said, to change this code, and he invited women to write to him and to a judicial committee entrusted with revising it. In spite of the promises of change contained in the king's speech and the fact that a process of wider consultation was set into motion, the alterations appeared to some Moroccan legal specialists as insignificant ("Recevant" 1993; Mayer 1993:93–105).

Perhaps because family law is one of the most conservative of all institutional spheres, the changes that have occurred in it have met with more resistance than major transformations in other spheres of activity that affect women throughout the Muslim world. Education is a pertinent example. To be sure, the gap between men's and women's education has grown in some places, such as among Afghans after the Communist coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in 1979. Reacting to the needs of the resistance as well as the government's mandatory literacy campaign for both men and women, which appeared to many an unwarranted intrusion into private lives, the number of schools, and specifically the number of female students, declined significantly. Moreover, among the 2.8 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, of whom 75 percent were women and children, girls constituted only about 7 percent of the total student population in primary and about 3 percent in secondary schools (Majrooh 1989:89–92). Although there continues to be a gap between women's and men's access to higher education in virtually all Muslim societies, this gap is closing in wealthier countries, and in others it has narrowed dramatically in recent years (Eickelman 1989a:198–200).[30]

In Iran as of 1994, 30 percent of government employees were women, and 40 percent of university students were women, up from 12 percent in 1978 (Ghazi 1994). In the past few decades, women have thus made significant, but uneven, strides in access to education and health care, and to participation in the labor force. Women also increasingly participate in formal and informal political processes, whether these involve organizing community relations with the occupying forces during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, transforming the rural economy in Bangladesh, campaigning for elections in Turkey, or demonstrating against the ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia. In Iran, Faezah Hashemi, the eldest daughter of President Rafsanjani, acted as a spokesperson for Iran's women's movement during Women's Week in 1994 (Ghazi 1994).

Hasan al-Turabi claims that women in the Sudan "have played a more important role in the [National Islamic Front] than men recently" in all aspects of the party, in Parliament, and as ministers and judges. "Segregation of women is definitely not a part of Islam" (al-Turabi 1992:58). Observers may dispute his depiction of the improved situation of women in the Sudan, but it is clear that women elsewhere in the Muslim world—Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Malaysia, Turkey, Bangladesh, and Pakistan—do hold political office. In the case of Pakistan, Turkey, and Bangladesh, they have served as prime ministers.

The emergence of Muslim women into positions of formal political responsibility is occurring in spite of one interpretation of Muslim tradition that argues that women cannot lead an

Islamic state. Abu-l A‹la al-Mawdudi of Pakistan (1903–79) insisted that the head of an Islamic state must be male. He invoked a hadith that he rendered as a “nation would not prosper which hands over the reins of its government to a woman” (al-Mawdudi 1983:60). This hadith, found in alBukhari’s collection (n.d.:228), refers to the ascension of Khosrow’s daughter to the Persian throne in the pre-Islamic era. It is more accurately translated as “A people who entrust their affairs to a woman will not prosper.” Al-Mawdudi’s translation, supporting his conclusion that only male rulers are legitimate in an Islamic state, thus conveys a particular ideological construction.

Because of views such as al-Mawdudi’s, even women who are successful in acquiring formal political roles are careful to portray themselves in ways that suggest they are not radically challenging traditional gender roles. Benazir Bhutto, a member of one of Pakistan’s leading political families and at times its prime minister, has avoided photographs that depict her shaking the hands of men in public, and for some time she has preferred to appear in photographs which emphasize her roles as daughter and mother, notwithstanding the bitter political struggle that erupted into a violent clash between her supporters and those of her mother in early 1994 (Kamm 1994).[31] In Jordan’s 1993 parliamentary elections, Toujan Faysal became the first elected woman in the lower house, while two women were appointed to the senate. Faysal, a former television journalist, was defeated in the parliamentary elections of 1989, when the Islamists vociferously opposed her and accused her of apostasy. After her 1993 victory, Faysal said, “The Islamists fear me because I can fight them from the inside. I know the Qur›an as well as they do.” Yet in public and in photographs, as was seen in the example of Ladi Adamu in Nigeria, Faysal takes care to emphasize her role as mother (Ramadan 1993).

**** Women’s “Place” and Public Life

A key dimension of Muslim politics is the contest over the meanings attached to “women” as a symbol. The underlying belief, common to all ideological formations, is that women must remain “in their place” for political and social harmony to prevail. Unlike social conservatives, liberals and feminists, however, believe that women can remain “in their place” and still have roles equal to men in all spheres of activity. Throughout Islamic history, they point out, women have exercised considerable political influence, sometimes as rulers (Mernissi 1990; Peirce 1993). Analyses that assume that women have simply played subordinate roles thus need to be challenged. Indeed, some Muslims have argued that “no hope is possible for Muslim societies without the positive participation of women, whose full rights have been assured by religion” (Elmandjra 1992:172–73). Others argue that the Qur›an “illustrates explicitly the correlation between the female and bearing children,” but it does not describe the “psychological and cultural perceptions of ‘mothering’” as “essential created characteristics of the female” (Wadud-Muhsin 1992:22). Wadud-Muhsin argues that the liberation of women began with the Prophet’s message in seventh-century Arabia and did not end at his death, and that God spoke equally to men and women. “If a woman was not a judge (qadiya) during the Prophet’s lifetime or did not attain a political position, this does not mean that she was forbidden from doing so for all time” (Shahrur 1992:593, 596). Such arguments jettison the centuries of legal interpretation developed by

male Islamic scholars and suggest that Qur›anic texts must be interpreted in each generation (Wadud-Muhsin 1992:12; Shahrur 1992:44).

Notwithstanding the support that these reformist interpretations have acquired, a more prevalent view, echoed throughout the centuries of Islamic history, argues that the just Islamic society exists in a delicate balance (mizan) or complementarity of genders. “Nature has made men and women different, adapted to different natural functions, and capable of different duties in life.... Thus cooking, laundering, shopping, washing-up are the responsibility of one person” (Tabandeh 1970:40–41). As the wife of Iranian President Rafsanjani, Effat Marashi, said of her domestic relationship: “The entire responsibility of the children and house rests upon my shoulders,” leaving her husband free to fight “for the cause of Allah” (“Tales of Love” 1993).

If women do not adhere to this moral order, society runs the risk of degenerating into fitna, a term which means temptation or, more importantly, rebellion, social dissension, or disorder. A saying of the Prophet, which appears to have been codified between the late eighth and the early ninth century, holds that there is “no fitna more harmful to men than women” (cited in Spellberg 1991: 51). Women are so potentially powerful that they are required to submit to their husbands,[32] segregate themselves from men to whom they are not immediately related, and restrain themselves, lest the pattern of gender relations, which is at the core of a properly ordered society, be overturned. One Sufi order in Turkey, the Aczmendis, decrees that women cannot be present at a dervish lodge because “it is forbidden for women to be in a place where men are present” (Yilmaz 1994). In Nigeria, Ibraheem Sulaiman, a “new” Muslim intellectual, writes of the role of women in the Sokoto caliphate, which prevailed in West Africa from 1817 to 1837 and represents for him the ideal Islamic state: “In so far as women are seen by most men as symbolizing the ultimate in joy and comfort, women could play a key role in stemming the tide of social decay, or accelerating it. In fact, society as a whole is, in the ultimate sense, saved by the self-restraint and moral discipline which women display” (Sulaiman 1987:130).

The view that women’s assertiveness may be tantamount to fitna is consistent with the elaboration of a public-private dichotomy in which the role of women is restricted to the private, nonpolitical realm. However, the public-private dichotomy is misleading for several reasons (compare Philips 1991:119). First, women may play strong, even central, roles in modern society provided that they work through men. Even in Saudi Arabia, women operate in finance, banking, and transnational charitable organizations, often facilitated by their male relatives, and can teach and practice medicine. Consistent with his view that Islam is inherently political, Ayatullah Khomeini commemorated the role of women in the Iranian revolution, while reaffirming traditional male-female relationships: “They confronted a despot with a clenched fist while holding their child in their other arm, thus ensuring the success of our revolution” (Khomeini 1988:6). In Indonesia, the Lembaga Konsultasi & Bantuan Hukum Untuk Wanita & Keluarga (LKBHUWK, the Institute for Consultation and Legal Aid for Women and Families) in Jakarta is committed to stimulating “the legal awareness [of women] of [their] social rights and duties” and to obtaining for them “equal opportunities in the areas of education and employment.” Although Muslim “women have

the equal status and position as men, both spiritually, intellectually, socially, as well as morally," they are not to "forget their predestinational status as wom[e]n"(Yamin 1984:7–11; compare LKBHUWK n.d.). The Institute of course is careful to seek the approval of the ‹ulama—its sponsors include the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the Assembly of Indonesian ‹Ulama), and its office is located in a mosque.

Second, through complex social networks of their own, women may entertain friends and kin and thereby cement social ties and serve as channels of information and communication. In times of social tension, these channels of communication may help to resolve disputes. In the Iranian village of Aliabad in 1978–79, for example, women acted to defuse a difficult situation: "Because women could be seen as somewhat removed from a conflict and because they had lower status, they were used as messengers or intermediaries in delicate sociopolitical negotiations" (Hegland 1991:222). The consequence of women acting in such roles is that the political goals of the father or husband may be advanced.

In addition, women's contribution to achieving the goals of the extended family is salient. In the case of Oman, women and men jointly further the aspirations of their family clusters (hayyan) in maintaining and extending claims to status, property, and education (C. Eickelman 1984:80–111). Extended families thus provide women with access to authority, and, in this regard, family/nonfamily distinctions are more useful than private/public ones.

Finally, some social institutions erode distinctions between the private and public. The diwaniyya in the Arab Gulf, a regular, informal gathering of relatives, professionals, members of the same religious group, workmates, or those sharing political goals, is not limited to extended families. A wide range of topics is usually discussed, such as sports, literature, and cars, and political discourse certainly does not dominate. But because they constitute the arena for nonstate activity and discussion, interlocking networks of diwaniyyas form the backbone of civil society. Male and female diwaniyyas have existed side by side (although male ones have predominated in the past), but with women increasingly educated (and to higher levels) and their greater participation in roles outside the household, women's diwaniyyas have become more common. A few diwaniyyas now include both men and women. In the parliamentary elections of 1992, the Kuwait Democratic Forum, which advocated greater rights for women, helped to break down gender divisions by inviting two women to speak in a predominantly male diwaniyya setting.

Although the barriers between men and women in a society such as that of Kuwait remain formidable, "the diwaniyya is the means by which the public space enters the home" (Tétreault 1993: 280), and it thus qualifies the idea of a public-private dichotomization corresponding to male-female relations. Neither public nor private can adequately describe its complex functions. The term diwaniyya is limited to the northern Gulf

states, but such social and discussion circles are also common elsewhere, including in Iran, where they are simply called “circles” (dawras).

The social picture, as we can see, is far from settled. Precisely because of this uncertainty, the family, and the role of women in it, is invested with diverse ideological meanings. The regime, established religious authorities, and counterregime Islamists all claim to be the defender of family integrity and of the roles and rights of women in an Islamic society. In so doing, each makes the ideas of family and women pivotal to contemporary Muslim politics.

*** Ethnicity

Similar to the ways in which family and women have become subject to explicit ideological contention, ethnicity, another “elementary” identity, is controversial and carries various political meanings. The controversy is sometimes compounded by an explicit linkage between gender and ethnicity. In a village in Selangor in Malaysia, a young religious student who had studied at al-Azhar in Cairo delivered a sermon in 1979 that drew a connection between the defense of women’s traditional domestic and family roles and the promotion of Malay ethnicity. He said that the problems affecting Malays, such as drug use and the intrusions of television, had at their root new social roles that took women outside their traditional duties. Wage labor was particularly objectionable because it exploited women and encouraged baser instincts. “This call for strengthening of the Malay race required women to adhere to a stricter, Islamic version of male authority and of women’s roles as mothers and wives” (Ong 1990:268).

As with family and gender, however, ethnicity influences political events, but ethnic relations are themselves shaped by political and other considerations. Here, too, the relationship between Muslim politics and “the ties that bind” is reciprocal. Many Muslims argue that the ties of Islamic community created through common submission to God supersede those of ethnicity and kinship. As the Qur›an says, God distinguishes believers only by their piety: “The most honored among you is the most pious (atqakum)” (49:13). The idea that Islam and ethnicity are antithetical and antagonistic also appears in the thinking of Islamists such as Egypt’s Sayyid Qutb, who consigns ethnicity, tribalism, and nationalism to the category of the jahiliyya. In using this term, which originally referred to the pre-Islamic “age of ignorance,” he powerfully criticizes the validity of particularist ties (Qutb 1981:159).

Western social scientists have also politicized ethnicity, by which most mean “the way individuals and groups characterize themselves on the basis of their language, race, place of origin, shared culture, values, and history” (Banuazizi and Weiner 1986:2–3). Ethnicity is often thought to be a matter of birth because of the notion of shared descent. The “liberal expectancy” was that ideas of the territorial state and nationalism would displace ties of kinship and ethnicity as the sources of political community. Marxists assumed that

“proletarian internationalism” would displace ethnicity and that class would determine identity (Moynihan 1993:27–28). Common to all views is the transformation of ethnicity into an ideology.

Ethnicity is an enduring social and political force, constructed and reconstructed as circumstances and contexts change. Yet, ironically, the post-Soviet world order has given rise to virulent ethnonationalisms that remind us that political boundaries are not fixed. Rather than simply determining the nature of political organization, as “tribe” was thought to determine politics in some societies, ethnicity is formulated in relation to diverse political and social forces. “External” opposition—the opposition of one social group to others—is paramount among them. To take a familiar non-Muslim example, African “tribes” were created in the context of colonial rule. One scholar went so far as to say, “The Luyia people came into existence between approximately 1935 and 1945.... It was clearly due to the reaction of younger and more educated men to the exigencies of the colonial situation” (Southall 1970:34). This objectification of the tribe—in which both colonial authorities and politically active Luyia colluded—has its parallel in the objectification of ethnicities in Muslim societies. The formation of identity is sometimes inadvertent, however. Elsewhere in Africa, for example, Sufi religious orders—formally intended to advance universal Islamic identities—have at times promoted the rise of ethnic consciousness. This has been the case with the Muridiyya and the rise of Wolof ethnicity in Senegal (Launay 1992:237).

<right>

In Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen, the Gulf states, and Jordan’s East

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Bank, notions of ethnicity and tribalism are virtually indistinguishable. They are usually framed in terms of genealogy, although claims of tribal descent are better thought of as invented traditions (discussed in Chapter 2), rather than as historically verifiable accounts. Indeed, the fact that peoples and groups can change tribal and ethnic affiliations under certain conditions indicates the flexibility of these supposedly fixed identities. The Kwatzba, for example, left their original tribal grouping to join the Rwala, located in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Although this move did not fit into the existing Rwala genealogy, tribal history has been reformulated to include them as part of the larger tribal confederation (Lancaster 1981:24–25). In another example, the Al Sa‹ud, a house (bayt) of the Masalikh subdivision of the Awlad ‹Ali tribe of the ‹Anayza confederation, have at times been invested with a political and national role. As the Al Murra in the Empty Quarter said at the time of King Faysal (d. 1975): Al Murra Al Faysal, “Murra people [are] Faysal people.” They distinguished between the dawla (state), by which they meant the bureaucracy, and the hukuma (government), by which they meant the Al Sa‹ud, whom they regarded as the “rightful leaders of the Islamic nation” (Cole 1975:109). [33]

In a similar manner, groups such as the Sindhi- (and Arabic-) speaking Shi‹i Liwatiyya of coastal Oman have also claimed Arab descent, explaining their “temporary” loss of Arabic (and tribal identity) by centuries of residence on the Indian subcontinent. With India’s independence in 1947, the Liwatiyya in Oman were given the choice of becoming Indians or Omanis. Most chose Omani nationality, recognizing the precariousness of their position if they chose Indian nationality but resided outside of India. Once this choice was made, Liwati intellectuals began to “discover” Arab antecedents and one produced a manuscript purporting to document these Arab origins. In addition to the Liwatiyya, ex-slaves (Arabic, khuddam) attached to tribes and ruling families throughout the Arabian peninsula and other groups lacking tribal descent have traditionally had an inferior social status, as shown by occupation and the lack of intermarriage with other groups, but modern economic conditions are rapidly eroding these distinctions. To some Arabs in the peninsula, visible African features may imply descent from slaves, but it may also indicate descent from earlier ruling families that possessed slave concubines.

As with the Liwatiyya example, contemporary Arab identity suggests that ethnic claims need to be placed in historical context. Many Arabs assert that they are a “race,” although for centuries populations have mixed and intermarried throughout the Arab world. Despite the claims that first appeared in the nineteenth century that the Arabs constituted a nation, although divided politically, Arabs still maintain that they are unified in language and culture. Many regional dialects of Arabic, however, are mutually unintelligible. Arabs from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states understand colloquial Moroccan Arabic only with difficulty, and vice versa. The spread of mass higher education throughout the region since midcentury has facilitated communication among Arabs from different regions through “modern standard” Arabic, which is modeled on classroom and the broadcast media. Still, major differences of dialect and situational identity remain. One is not just Muslim in the Middle East, but also Arab, Berber, Nubian, Circassian, or Kurd.

The ways in which Muslim identities are shaped and reshaped are strikingly illustrated in the case of Bosnia. Throughout the Balkans, Sufi orders like the Bektashiyya, the Khalwatiyya, the Naqshbandiyya, and the Qadiriyya provided significant frameworks for religious identity from the sixteenth through the early twentieth centuries (Norris 1993:82–137; compare Popovic 1986). In the period of the Titoist Yugolsav state (ca. 1945–91), religious identity and nationality were legally separate, although in practice, Catholic Bosnians were officially Croatians and Orthodox Bosnians were Serbs. Until 1961, individuals could register only as Serbian, Croatian, or undeclared. With the 1961 census, however, Muslims were allowed to register as Muslims for the first time. In the Bosnian constitution of 1963, they were accorded the status of an ethnic “nationality” (nacija), and in 1964 the Communist party in Bosnia “declared explicitly that Muslims had the right of selfdetermination” (Lockwood 1975:27). State and party action helped to formalize Muslim identity as an ethnic one. Later events sharpened the Bosnian dimension of this ethnicity. By the mid-1980s, two contradictory trends had emerged. One was a renewed emphasis on common Muslim practices—distinctive dress for women, more public celebration of religious festivals such as Ramadan, participation in the pilgrimage, and election of the first non-Bosnian religious leader for all Yugoslavia (ra›is al--ulama). The

other trend, following the rise of antiAlbanian sentiment, was the incipient distinction between Bosnian and non-Bosnian Muslims (Sorabji 1988, 1993).

The collapse of the Yugoslav state and the advent of civil war in 1992 added a further defining dimension. Partly as a result of ethnic designations formulated by the European community and partly as the result of support from Muslims elsewhere in the world, the identification “Bosnian Muslim” was solidified. The transformation of a Muslim identity in Bosnia into a Bosnian Muslim ethnicity was thus in large measure due to an “architecture” of external groups and pressures (Berman and Lonsdale 1992:330–32).

The phrase “Muslim ethnicity” may appear to conflate two separable kinds of identity, yet our use of the term is deliberate. The Malaysian constitution (Article 160:2), for instance, specifies that Malays are Muslims (see Mutalib 1990:2, 9, 31). In other cases in which the constitutional order is not so clearly prescriptive or has not yet been defined— as in Bosnia and, as we shall argue, in Pakistan—identities and selfdesignations have been transformed as circumstances have changed, sometimes dramatically. Anti-Muslim sentiment may heighten a sense of Muslim identity, but this at first may not be synonymous with an ethnic identity. Yet, as events unfold, religious and ethnic attachments may begin to converge. A Muslim ethnicity may emerge.

The transformations of identity that occurred among Pakistani Muslims suggest that a divergence of religious and ethnic ties may also occur. In prepartition India, Muslim intellectuals such as Muhammad ‹Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) accented an Islamic identity to distinguish themselves from the Hindu majority. Pakistan, a romanticized “land of the pure,” would demarcate the boundaries of an Islamic realm juxtaposed to secular India. After partition in 1947, however, “Muslim ethnicity ... outlived its original purpose” (Alavi 1986:43), with Jinnah, now the father of the nation (Quaid-i-Azam, “the Great Leader”), openly articulating his secularist suspicions of an Islamic state or particularist identities. Punjabis became the dominant ethnicity in Pakistan, while Sindhis, Baluchis, Pathans, and Bengalis pressed their claims as well. In the particular case of Bengali Muslim society, “the weaknesses of a[n elitist] religious identity which provided at best an unsatisfactory basis for an incomplete cohesion in society” led to the creation in 1971 of Bangladesh as a “nation state on the basis of a separate linguistic-cultural identity” (R. Ahmed [1981] 1988:xi–xii).

Although Pakistan’s official ideology encourages the preeminence of Islamic identity, ethnic and tribal identities continue to be a major force in national politics. In November 1991, a friend of Benazir Bhutto was raped by a gang that, the victim said, was sent by the son-in-law of the president. Bhutto claimed that the motivation for the rape was political intimidation directed at her, and she and various women’s groups demanded that Islamic justice be applied. State institutions proved irresolute in dealing with what quickly became a major public scandal, however. Although families usually conceal the “shame” of rape, in this case the victim’s father and her supporters turned to a convocation of the family’s tribal

leaders (jirga) to elicit support in pressing her case to the authorities (Pitchford 1991; Rashid 1991a; Hussain 1992).

Ethnicities are thus also constructed in part by an “internal architecture” of rivalries within collectivities (Berman and Lonsdale 1992: 346– 50), but it would be a mistake to draw too sharp a distinction between “internal” and “external” factors. In the case of the Kurds in northern Iraq, clan divisions organized around traditional leaders (aghas) such as Mustafa al-Barazani (1903–79) provided one framework for loyalties and alliances. Another was provided by younger, urban professional leaders such as Jalal Talabani. These social cleavages crystallized into political parties, but the ostensible ideological differences between the parties—called at various times the Kurdish Democratic party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—were more apparent than real. Often internal Kurdish rivalries eclipsed Kurdish opposition to the Ba‹thist (and therefore Arab nationalist) government in Baghdad. In addition to the internal social rivalries, external sponsors such as Iran, Syria, the United States, Israel, and the Iraqi government exploited the differences among Kurdish factions and helped to create rival senses of Kurdish nationalism. The picture is further complicated by many Kurds, especially migrants and the educated, who identify themselves as Arabs (or, in the cases of Kurds in neighboring Turkey and Iran, as Turks or Persians). Others stress their identity as Muslims, as opposed to secular Kurdish nationalists (Van Bruinessen 1992a:54).

This process by which a Muslim ethnicity is affected by internal rivalries is clear in the case of the southern Philippines, where Moro nationalism has been in an uneasy alliance with Islamic identity. Muslim Moros constitute 4 to 7 percent of the population of the Philippines, but they are divided into three major and ten minor ethnolinguistic groups. Of the twenty-two provinces of the southern Philippines, where most Muslims live, they constitute a majority in only five. Although some Muslim notables argue that the Muslims of the Philippines have worked toward autonomy since the Spanish colonial era, most historians note that rivalries among the various traditional Muslim rulers largely coincided with a peaceful coexistence with the Spanish. During the period of U.S. colonial rule (1898–1946), however, common schooling for the sons of Muslim notables (datus), which paradoxically introduced notions of Islamic tradition and history, fostered an early sense of self-awareness as Muslims (McKenna 1993). This identity became intensified in the early 1950s, when notables assumed control of American war-damage payments. These elites, promoting their own authority, channeled much of the money into mosque construction, which encouraged a heightened religious identity but not an overtly politicized one.

Moro nationalism, based on a common Muslim identity, began to emerge out of the several local, ethnolinguistic identities in the region. This “Moro-ness”was given concrete expression with the imposition of martial law in September 1972, partly in response to a separatist rebellion in the south. Strengthened Muslim identity occurred as an indirect result of transnational Muslim connections, which provided Filipino Muslims with work opportunities in the Middle East, where they acquired some knowledge of Arabic, formal training in Islamic studies, and financial assistance. From 1955 through 1970, the government of Egypt provided more than two hundred scholarships for Moros, many from datu

families, to study the religious sciences. These students began to return to the southern Philippines in the 1960s. Gradually, they acquired wider political and religious roles, and by the 1980s they had become firmly linked to the separatist movement (McKenna 1993). Many members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) central committee “were recruited from among Moro students who were studying in various Arab universities at the time” (Che Man 1990:128). The consolidation of the separatist movement also coincided with material support from the Libyan government.

Members of the traditional elite, disadvantaged as a result of the central government’s land reform and modernization program and partly educated in the Middle East, stressed the idea that Moros were fighting for the cause of Islam. Thus a Moro-Muslim identity was promoted, and the major groups used Islamic symbolism to recruit and mobilize followers. The MNLF emphasized the obligation to participate in both the Islamic jihad and bangsa (identifying with one’s ancestors). The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), for its part, declared that “the ideology of the MILF is La illaha illa Allah Muhammad rasul Allah (‘There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah’)” (Che Man 1990:88). This language indicates the importance of symbolic notions such as jihad and the shahada (the declaration of faith) to Muslim politics. Here, Islamist groups, rather than the state or religious authorities, constitute the institutions that control symbolic production and its articulation.

Despite the accent on a Muslim-Moro identity in the Philippines, significant family differences account for the formation of separate nationalist groups. The MNLF (formed in 1969) represented more secular and nontraditional tendencies, although it also contained elements of the traditional religious leadership and aristocracy. Many of its leading cadres received military training in Malaysia. In contrast, the leadership of the MILF (formed in March 1984) was dominated by the religiously educated, many of whom had become increasingly discontented with what they regarded as the leftist agenda of the MNLF.

The general population has remained divided by class, subgroup, language, and territory, such as the divisions between the Tausug and Sama in one area of the south. These divisions and rivalries complicate the search for an all-encompassing Moro-Muslim ethnicity (McKenna 1993; Horvatich 1993:35). All subscribe to the idea that Islam constitutes a vital component of their identity, and followers are aware of being “discriminated against as Muslims” (Che Man 1990: 89). There is, however, substantial disagreement over the degree of Islamization of the nationalist movement, the desirability of autonomy within the Filipino state or independence from it, and the extent of reliance on external patrons.

As the politicization of Islamic identity in the Philippines suggests, the instrumental importance of Muslim ethnicities may increase in situations where Muslims constitute a minority. Governments, for example, may use ethnicity to advance foreign policy goals. In China, the government allows Muslims to participate in the pilgrimage to Mecca as a way of currying favor with Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia and of securing construction and

military contracts. The government also seeks to present a favorable image of its treatment of Chinese Muslims by refurbishing Muslim shrines, mosques, and religious buildings and by encouraging the visits of foreign Muslim delegations to such institutions as the China Islamic Association in Beijing (Piscatori 1987).

Ethnic groups within a society may also use ethnicity in their competition for status and entitlements. The population of the Hui and nine other officially recognized Muslim groups increased by an average of 30 to 40 percent between 1982 and 1990, as opposed to a mere 10 percent increase for the dominant Han population (Gladney 1994c:186). These officially recognized minority groups have used their Muslim “nationality” (minzu) to press their claims for greater recognition of Muslim rites and legal practices from the Communist government in Beijing. For example, Muslims are permitted to marry at age eighteen, whereas the age for Han Chinese women is twenty-five and for men, twenty-eight. Muslims are also exempt from government pressure to cremate the dead. In addition, they receive time off from work for religious festivals, and some workplaces provide separate eating facilities (Dreyer 1982–1983:52–53).

In 1989, the publication of a book that discussed the sexual customs of Muslims inflamed Muslim sensibilities. Predominantly Hui Muslim students, joined by representatives of other Chinese Muslim nationalities, staged protests in Beijing and elsewhere. On May 12, some three thousand protesters marched in the capital, and significantly larger demonstrations occurred in the provinces. Unlike the student pro-democracy movement that was to culminate in the Tiananmen Square protests a month later, the government on June 4 provided the protesters with transportation, banned the offending book, and publicly burned copies of it. The official media stressed that the Muslims’ protests were legitimate because they were conducted by legally recognized representatives of a world religion (Gladney 1991:1–7).

There have been more violent Muslim protests in China when the government was less accommodating. In 1975, toward the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), when mosques were closed and religious activities proscribed, villagers in Shadian, in southern Yunnan, reopened their mosque and resumed congregational (Friday) prayers. Branding this as “counterrevolutionary,” the government dispatched troops. Many casualties resulted, and eleven Muslim villages in the area were destroyed (Wang 1992:371). In April 1990, Chinese television reported that a separatist group in Xinjiang province declared a jihad against the government and hoped to establish an independent “Islamic Republic of East Turkestan.” The government purged the fourteen rebel villages and issued a new set of regulations that required imams, along with other religious leaders, to support socialism and the People’s Republic before they could be examined on religious matters and licensed (Mirsky 1990). In June 1993, a group demanding an independent East Turkestan claimed responsibility for exploding two bombs in Kashgar, southern Xinjiang (Gladney 1994c:183).

The process of constructing ethnicities suggests that they are formed by the wider political processes and are inseparable from them; ethnic identities are not simply the creators of the political process. The ethnicities so developed serve as agents of Muslim politics, however. Ethnicity can empower peoples, widening the horizons of individuals as participants in a larger enterprise and providing them with a sense of a distinct political boundary between themselves and others. These boundaries may overlap, but not necessarily, with those of "Islam." Ethnicity can also be used against peoples, setting them apart and disenfranchising them, and it can be used to support or delegitimize states. The reason why ethnicity can serve as an instrument of politics is that it may be seen as the "natural" source of political and social cohesion, thereby "deepening" the language and imagination of politics (Berman and Lonsdale 1992:317, 347).

** 5. Protest and Bargaining in Muslim Politics

| M | USLIM POLITICS has attracted immense, and largely unfavorable, attention. Interest—one might even say obsessive interest—has focused on such undeniably significant events as Shi‹i unrest in countries of the Arab/Persian Gulf in the early 1980s, the assassination of Egyptian state functionaries throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Shi‹i suicide bombings in southern Lebanon since 1982, the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993, and the murder of journalists, intellectuals, and foreign tourists in Egypt and Algeria in the early 1990s. These acts, carried out in the name of Islam, earned Muslims a reputation for violence and radicalism, but the relationships between Muslim groups and governments are more varied and less coordinated than such an unnuanced negative image implies. Because actors always have available the vision of alternate "imagined" communities, an important component of understanding politics consists of recognizing how these alternative, oppositional, and purportedly peripheral visions revise or replace currently dominant and authoritative ones.

If one were to look at the Muslim world in the 1950s, the politically active element of the population was more limited, despite the emergence in some countries such as Egypt and Iraq of student and trade union groups. One observer of Iran has commented that the 1953 coup d'état, facilitated by American and British intelligence, was only possible because no more than 10 percent of Iran's population was politically active. Most Iranians "entertained little thought of challenging the traditional elite structure" (Cottam 1993:21–22). Since then, major economic and social changes have widened the political base and provided new challenges to traditional elites.

Among those who are politically engaged today, a range of activities exists. Some Muslims may become protesters but only in the sense that they engage in the "politics of silence" or in everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1985). That is, their actions—such as resort to alternative banking associations (Singerman 1994) and reliance on Islamic private voluntary organizations (Sullivan 1994:57–98)—suggest dissatisfaction with state-defined policies and institutions, although they do not necessarily imply direct confrontation with the regime.

Accommodation and opposition are often juxtaposed, but these terms mask more finely calibrated positions. Since Sadat's coming to power in 1970, the Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt—as opposed to "neo-Ikhwanist" groups—may have largely accommodated itself to the the political status quo. It has participated, for instance, in various elections, including parliamentary ones, under the banner of legally recognized political parties such as the Hizb alWafd al-Jadid (the New Wafd party) in 1984 and the Hizb al-‹Amal (the Labor party) in 1987. Yet it has also urged major changes in policies affecting social matters such as family legislation and in foreign policy concerns such as the peace treaty with Israel and Egyptian participation in the Gulf war of 1990–91. By the same token, opposition covers a range of activities—from working within the system to change it, as we have just mentioned, to rejection of the status quo as un-Islamic and violent confrontation with the existing political establishment. Therefore, the distinction between accommodation and opposition, as with other issues we have questioned in this book, cannot be sharply drawn and must be put into the perspective of local and shifting contexts.

Protest is a useful, if more general, term to refer to the spectrum of activities of Muslims, especially the politically active Muslims we refer to as Islamists. By definition, Islamist groups are involved in protest. They have resolved that the wrongs of society must be righted, but the corrective means are not restricted to one kind of activity. Protest may be "accommodative" (MacLeod 1991) in the sense of a desire to assert moral distance from and to criticize aspects of a political and social system whose foundations are basically accepted. This approach is not inconsistent with a process of bargaining between Islamist movements and the government or groups they criticize. Protest may also be "nonaccommodative" in the sense of either an unwillingness to abide by the rules of the game, or a desire to change the rules—although, as we shall see, even these approaches involve tacit bargaining.

*** Membership and Organization

All contemporary Muslim protest movements share certain elements. One is that they appeal to the same categories of persons who sense a gap between the status quo and their aspirations. They need not be materially deprived to feel discontent, but the perception of deprivation—relative to other groups in the society or to the globalized economy—is what matters. In fact, evidence suggests that those attracted to Islamist projects are often, but certainly not always, in what might be called the "lumpen middle classes"—the lower to mid–middle classes (Ibrahim 1980:438–39; see also, Goldberg 1992:211–13)—that include petit bourgeois traders and artisans (see Birtek and Toprak 1993:199) but also professionals who feel that their upward mobility has been thwarted by economic and political policies and conditions. In this broad socioeconomic grouping, many, if not most, see in their Islamist activity the chance for a better life. With specific reference to the Muslim Brotherhood, a "surprisingly consistent pattern that persists over almost a fifty year period is that radical groups appeal to, and recruit members from, the urban professional middle class, especially, in more recent times, engineers" (Davis 1984:141, also 142–43). A further indication of the attraction that Islamic ideologies exercise for professionals is the January-February 1990

elections in Gaza, in which Islamist candidates won five of the nine seats in the Engineers' Association; they likewise obtained 43 percent of the votes of the West Bank Engineers' Association in August 1992 (Jubran and Drake 1993:13; Milton-Edwards 1991a:260).

In the case of Shi‹i adepts of the Hizb al-Da‹wa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Call party) in Iraq, one study indicates that the majority have come from the urban lower middle classes, and include university students, soldiers, and small businessmen (Baram 1994:536). In Pakistan as well, members of the Jama‹at-i Tulaba (Students' Association), the student wing of the Jama‹at-i Islami (Islamic League), come from small towns and rural areas, but are primarily from the urban lower middle classes (Nasr 1992:72–73). Although the Jama‹at-i Islami itself has expanded its base, particularly since the 1970s, into rural areas, its core constituency is still from the lower middle classes in towns and cities (Nasr 1994:81–100). In Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley, the growth in Islamic activism that has occurred since 1989 has been fueled by "social and economic problems, especially in the cities, where the lower and middle classes are concentrated" (Abduvakhitov 1993:89).

This is not to suggest that the poor, especially the urban poor, are entirely excluded from Islamist groups. Indeed, young people in the towns of the Ferghana Valley, fearful of the future and without certain job prospects, have been attracted to the idea of Islam as the solution to their problems. In northern Nigeria as well, the millenarian movements of the 1980s attracted marginalized "lumpen" laborers, such as seasonal workers and street peddlers, many of whom were impoverished migrants from other parts of the country and neighboring countries who had been attracted by Nigeria's oil economy (Lubeck 1987; Nigeria 1981:79).

Islamist groups may also appeal to the rural peasantry. One group in upper Egypt, broadly inspired by the teachings of Shaykh ‹Umar ‹Abd al-Rahman in the early 1990s, were led by individuals from wealthy families but attracted a large following of the poor—"a mix of peasants, seasonal workers, fishermen, drivers, and people in rural, petty service delivery" (Auda 1994a:402; see also Buccianti and Claude 1992:1, 3). Similarly, a revolt broke out in the Delta region of lower Egypt in August 1992 in which most participants appeared to be drawn from largely illiterate artisans, day laborers, sharecroppers, and the unemployed (Auda 1994b). In Turkey, the Refah Partisi (Welfare party, RP) drew particular, though not exclusive, support from a squatter-house district in Ankara, where it won the majority of seats in the munipical council elections of March 1994. In seven prior elections, the RP and its predecessor, Millî Salâmet Partisi (National Salvation party, received most of their support in the least developed provinces, particularly in eastern Turkey, of those in which they were successful (Akinci 1994). The discontents that followed economic restructuring and massive urbanization doubtless played a large part in their success.

One general explanantion for this socioeconomic and class diversity among activists is the process of objectification that we have discussed. Mass education opens the way to "democratized" access to sacred texts and overcomes restrictions as to who is "authorized"

to interpret them. As a consequence, the monopolistic control by elites—whether attained in fact or merely aspired to—is countered by the greater number of would-be interpreters from diverse backgrounds yet commonly possessing modern-style education.

To this class dimension, youth and education must be added. Muslim activists are overwhelmingly young, often, though not always, following leaders in their forties or younger. They are usually educated as well, often to tertiary level. In some parts of the Ferghana Valley, Islamist groups dominated by young people have taken over responsibility for public order from the central government. The leader of one Islamic militia told Abduvakhitov (1993:89) that he had “8,000 young believers organized into patrol groups.” In Pakistan, the Youth Force of one Wahhabi-style political organization, Jamiyat Ulama-i Ahl-i Hadith (Society of ‹Ulama of the People of the Hadith), was active in expressing opposition to Saddam Hussein during the Gulf crisis of 1990–91. Mobilizing Pakistani as well as Saudi and Kuwaiti students, the Youth Force declared its willingness to defend the Holy Places threatened by Saddam’s aggression (M. Ahmad 1991:164–65).

The youthfulness of participants in Islamist movements is not surprising when the demographic trends of Muslim nations—those forty states with a Muslim-majority population or with significant Muslim minorities (25 to 49 percent)—are considered.[34] Over 43 percent of the population of these countries was under fifteen years of age (Weeks 1988:13), with over 50 percent in Gaza and the West Bank, 44 percent in Algeria, 40 percent in Morocco, 39 percent in Egypt, and 37 percent in Indonesia (Omran and Roudi 1993:15; Population Reference Bureau 1993). In one town in India’s western Rajastan in 1991, 45.72 percent of the Muslim population was fifteen years old or less. If the population nineteen and below is considered, the figure rises to almost 56 percent. These figures are comparable to other parts of India (Ahmad 1994:121; see also Ahmad 1993:99–103). The youthful profile of many Muslim communities does not directly translate into support for Islamist movements, but can contribute to it when, for example, state policies or political rivalries eliminate a more experienced, older leadership through violence or exile. For example, some observers speculate that the December 1992 deportation of 418 Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders from the West Bank and Gaza opened the way “for a younger, less experienced breed of leaders ... prone to internal divisions and splits” and more liable than older ones to be “trapped in an untimely showdown with the Israeli [and now Palestinian] authorities” (Abu-Amr 1994:129).

These young Islamists are often well-educated. In the case of the Da‹wa movement in Iraq, 61 percent of one list of martyrs (shuhada) to the cause in the early 1980s—victims of Saddam Hussein’s repression—were university educated (Baram 1994:536). Student elections, sometimes even at the secondary school level, are also a barometer of Islamist support, particularly in areas where other means of electoral expression are restricted or absent. In the West Bank, for example, Islamist groups won approximately 40 percent of the student vote between 1978 and 1987, and in the Gaza Strip, 65 to 75 percent (Legrain 1990; Abu-Amr 1994:19–21). Between 1992 and 1994, Hamas and Islamic Jihad participated in student elections at various universities throughout the West Bank and Gaza. Their success varied, depending in large part on community reactions to the stages of the

peace process and to electoral alliances that student activists forged on each campus. It is clear that Islamists have a distinct constituency on university campuses, but the size of the constituency and the strength of Islamist appeals vary.[35]

In Egypt, a 1988 survey of students at the Cairo University by Samia Mustafa al-Khashab demonstrates the disenchantment that university youth feel toward the official religious establishment and implies a substantial degree of attraction to Islamist groups. Seventy-five percent of the students surveyed regarded al-Azhar as “either partially or wholly ineffective” in responding to the needs of young people, while 70 percent wanted it to become more directly concerned with social problems. Nearly 75 percent of the students felt that Sufi orders made little contribution toward resolving social difficulties, and 68 percent believed that the orders were unnecessary. Concurrently, almost 75 percent of the students believed that the Islamist groups were responsive to the views and needs of Egyptian youth. Eighty-two percent believed that such groups should not be proscribed because they contributed to the improvement of social conditions and the “Islamic awakening” (cited in Starrett 1991:325–26). Such statistics, however, only partially capture the underlying tensions that accompany rising Islamic activism among the educated young. Patrick Gaffney’s narrative of mounting campus tensions at Egypt’s Minya University in 1978–79 suggests that Islamic activism in provincial universities possessed a more intense strength than was indicated in official and media reports. The role of Islamist sermons and religious “lessons” in spreading alternative and highly popular interpretations of current events was particularly underemphasized (Gaffney 1994:94–112).

Unsurprisingly, the Islamist movements that have become prominent in the 1970s and 1980s often have leaders who are relatively young, in their thirties and forties. The reason for this is not a supposed political tension between generations, and it is due to more than the changing demographic profile of the Muslim world. The reason lies in part in the higher educational level among the young, often enhanced by formative years overseas—stimulating negative as well as positive impressions—and in the fact that a good number of the older political activists already occupy important positions within existing parties or institutions. It is possible that individual members of this generation may break with the establishment for a number of reasons. Yet, younger people who have not been politically co-opted clearly do not need to be careerist in their politics, and can therefore afford to give voice to protest. Given demographic growth, it is this generation that is finding it hard to be assimilated into governmental and private sectors, and the grounds for their protest are considerable.

‹Abbasi Madani, one of the Western-educated leaders of FIS in Algeria, was a member of the revolutionary-era Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN, National Liberation Front) but came to believe that it needed to be reformed in Islamic directions. Until his arrest in mid1991, he showed a willingness to cooperate with the regime and to participate in multiparty elections as well as to endorse democratic ideas. Yet ‹Ali Belhadj (‹Ali bin al-Hajj) (b. 1956), another major FIS leader and imam of the al-Sunna mosque in the Bab al-Oued district of Algiers, articulates the disenchantment of his generation with the failures of the socialist and secular revolution. He has thus been harsher than Madani in criticizing the FLN and has

been more openly skeptical of the idea that the Islamic state must be democratic (Belhadj 1991:87–94).

The youthfulness of Islamist leadership has also been apparent in Central Asia. One of the first Islamist leaders in Uzbekistan, referred to in conventional Uzbek usage by his personal name only, Rakhmatullah (1950–81), came to prominence in his late twenties. In 1979, he publicly denounced his own religious teacher for having sold out to the Communist regime. Rakhmatullah, a mechanic by trade, and another young leader, Abduwali, argued that young Muslims should be thoroughly conversant in Marxist and Leninist doctrines in order to understand the politics of the state, but that students should also have direct access to printed literature on Islam. Muslim missionaries traveled to towns and villages throughout Central Asia and gradually won concessions from the Communist-era government. Although the movement slowed after Rakhmatullah's death in 1981, officially attributed to an automobile accident, what began as an apolitical Islamic "educational" movement in the late 1970s (see fig. 12) gradually became transformed into a political movement, known in Russian as the Islamskaia Partiia Vozrozhdeniia (Islamic Renaissance party), recognized by some but not all of the Central Asian republics.

We recognize, of course, that leadership, like the movements themselves, crosses generational lines. Rashid al-Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisia's Renaissance party, became politically active in his thirties and continues to exercise influence in his fifties. Other leaders, however, acquired political prominence only later in life, as the obvious case of Ayatullah Khomeini indicates. Another example is Ahmad Yasin (b. 1937), a religious scholar and Islamic leader in Gaza who is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and now Hamas. In the early 1980s, when Yasin was in his mid-forties, the al-Mujtama‹ al-Islami (Islamic Assembly) which he founded became a vehicle for Islamization, and in the mid-1980s he incurred the wrath of the Israelis (Yusif ca. 1989; Abu-Amr 1994:64–69). Shaykh Abubakar Gumi (1922–92), chief qadi of Kaduna in Nigeria, had long preached against the deviations of the Sufi brotherhoods, but he became politically prominent from the early 1970s, when he was in his early fifties. His political activity intensified from the late 1970s when the Izala reform movement (Jama‹at al-Izalat al-Bid‹a wa-Iqamat al-Sunna [Society for the Removal of Heresy and Reinstatement of Tradition]) was founded.

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-14.png][Fig. 12. In Central Asia, the apolitical Islamic educational movements begun in the 1970s gradually acquired political overtones. Religious class at a new mosque, Karshinskaia oblast, Uzbekistan, 1992.]]

The rise of the Izala is explained in part by another feature of the modern Islamist experience—urbanization. The traditional Nigerian economy had been dominated by agriculture, contributing 65.9 percent to the gross national product in 1958–59, but by 1980 agriculture's share had dropped to 18 percent. Droughts in the 1970s took their toll, but the impact of oil was more pronounced. Particularly under the first military regime (1966–79), revenues were disproportionately applied to urban projects, resulting in a substantial exodus

from the countryside. The consequence of such rapid economic dislocation was discontent among the new urban residents whose aspirations for a more prosperous and secure life were largely disappointed (Kane 1994: 492–93).

Rapid urbanization also contributed to the rise of religious activism in Algeria. FIS appeals to the large number of individuals in the cities and their shantytown (bidonville) peripheries—which some observers call the non-villes (non-towns) (Labat 1994:55–56). Although the Algerian state and the FLN controlled the countryside, the shift in state investments away from agriculture toward heavy industry in the l960s and 1970s contributed to massive emigration from the countryside to the shantytowns that grew up around Algiers, Constantine, and major urban centers. By 1988, the result was that 44 percent of Algeria's population was living in cities, with most of the new immigrants living in inadequate housing. Many people were further impoverished as a result of the economic liberalization implemented beginning in 1988 by the regime of Chadli Benjedid (b. 1929; r. 1979–92). A 1991 survey of Algiers indicates the extent of the economic and social crisis. Threefourths of the youth aged sixteen to twenty-nine were seeking work, and each year the educational system produced 270,000 additional unemployed diploma holders. Some 80 percent of the youth of this age group continued to live with their families, often eight persons to a room (Daoud 1991).

Islamists in Algeria have found sympathetic audiences in these bleak milieus. In the early 1970s, the state liberalized the laws that regulated voluntary associations and authorized the construction of mosques. In other cases, authorities turned a blind eye to converted garages and other buildings serving as mosques. In the shantytowns, poorly supplied with any form of government services, most of these activities were carried out by Islamists, and thus their activities were not limited to mosques (fig. 13). As the quality of government schools deteriorated, Islamists provided schooling through mosques, sports facilities, and health services. In the earthquake that struck the Algiers area on October 29, 1989, FIS gained wide attention for the effective relief operation that it mounted. The net result was that Islamic groups took over many local functions the state was unable or unwilling to provide (Rouadjia 1990:34, 59, 77, 111). Between unemployed educated youth and members of an older generation who saw their agricultural lands confiscated under a 1971 agrarian reform law, there was no dearth of candidates for leadership.

The overall profile of other countries in which Islamist movements have taken hold since the 1970s is remarkably similar to those of Nigeria and Algeria. In Egypt, there has been a rapid urban growth in Cairo

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-15.png][Fig. 13. Prior to 1992, the offices of the religious parties in Algeria, which were accessible to citizens and followers, had already begun to offer services that the government was unable to provide. Storefront headquarters of the Islamic Society Movement (Hamas), Oran.]]

and in provincial centers such as Assiut that has not been matched by the economic opportunities or hope for advancement available to earlier generations. Large areas of greater Cairo are deprived of effective governmental services, and in many poor areas Islamist groups offer basic medical and social services the government cannot provide. As in Algiers, these groups provided important, and publicly recognized, emergency assistance after the October 1992 earthquake in Cairo. Although education was once seen as a means of personal and social advancement and educational opportunities grew significantly in Egypt from midcentury onward, educational quality has declined and diplomas are no longer a guarantee of employment. In the decade of the 1970s alone, the number of students in Egypt doubled (Sivan 1985:51).

These “declassed, proletarianized students” form what Roy (1992:70, 73) has called a “lumpen-intelligentsia” for whom Islamist organizations and doctrines have much the same appeal as did Communism to western Europeans in the 1930s.

The situation is much the same in large cities elsewhere. Between 1976 and 1986 alone, Tehran’s population doubled from four to eight million inhabitants. The greatest rate of increase was from refugees and poor rural immigrants flowing into the slums of south Tehran

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-16.png][Fig. 14. Women in Istanbul campaigning for the Welfare party, which was victorious in the 1994 municipal elections in Istanbul and elsewhere.]]

(Hourcade 1987:68). As bleak as the living quarters of recent immigrants may appear, cities and towns offer considerable material and educational advantages over their villages of origin as well as the promise of a better future. In Turkey, Pakistan, Tunisia, and elsewhere, Islamist strength is centered in the larger cities and towns (fig. 14). Islamic activism knows no geographical limits, but it often finds considerable support among recent urban immigrants and the lower middle classes who find their economic and social status increasingly threatened. Islamism offers an educated, unemployed younger population the hope of a way out of their difficulties and a reassuring sense of their own place in society.

Although the urban dimension is clearly important, the significance of rural areas should not be overlooked. Recent urban immigrants remain deeply influenced by their rural origins and maintain their links with the countryside through family and economic connections (Nasr 1992:73; Early 1992:49; Khuri 1975:184–86). In the specific case of secondary schoolteachers who join Islamist groups, a large number move from rural areas to provincial towns (see Mardin 1983:154) or the metropole—or indeed both, in a two-step process of internal migration. Although they may change jobs once in the urban environment, the traditional religious education to which schoolteachers are exposed in the rural areas continues largely to shape their worldview (Davis 1984:141).

Protest groups organized in the name of Islam possess broad appeal and attract large numbers of followers and sympathizers. It is impossible to specify membership figures with any precision, however, and many claims, either of the government or the groups themselves, must be treated cautiously. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, founded in 1928, appears to have been a broad-based movement, expanding from four branches in 1929 to around 2,000 branches and between 300,000 and 600,000 “active members,” with possibly another half million sympathizers in the movement’s peak years between 1946 and 1948 (Mitchell 1969:328). Whether this figure is accurate or not, the Free Officers who planned the 1952 Egytpian revolution were acutely aware of the Brotherhood’s strength and made a tactical alliance with it (elSadat 1957:79–81).

Although Islamist movements pursue a power-seeking strategy that includes building a popular base in society, their membership is usually not mass-based, thereby providing another reason why it is difficult to do more than estimate their strength. Although they claim to speak for the Muslim community (umma) as whole, they depend on a cadre of committed activists supported by outer circles of supporters and sympathizers. Groups may distinguish between grades of membership, generally differentiating between the core of activists and others supportive of the goals of the movement. For instance, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the period of its founder, Hasan alBanna (1906–49) distinguished among active, assistant, affiliated, and combatant Brothers. In the Da‹wa party of Iraq, social and professional associations of Shi‹i sympathizers are called “the companions” (alansar)—the term used to refer to the Prophet’s first supporters in Mecca; they act “as a protective shield around the hard-core cadre” (Baram 1991:32).

Lebanon’s Shaykh Fadlallah and other religious leaders are disingenuous when they speak of Hizbullah “in the broad Qur›anic sense” of the totality of Muslims and deny that it is “an organized party” (hizb tanzimi), for it is clear that an institutional structure exists with gradations of membership (Fadlallah 1985; al-Shira‹ [1984] n.d.:147). Regular membership (al-intizam) is not open to large numbers of individuals—it involves special training and socialization, particularly for militiamen—but there are constellations of adherents or fellow travelers around this core (“Hizbullah” 1986). In essence, while the movement may attract popular support, depending on circumstances and issues, its membership may be seen to constitute concentric circles of sympathizers around a relatively small, though effective, group of committed adherents.

The Bangladesh Islami Chatri Sangshtha (Bangladesh Islamic Organization of Female Students), a women’s Islamic movement, parallels the male-only Muslim student movement, the Islami Chatra Shibir, and is active on university campuses and among the educated. Islami Chatri Sangshtha has six levels of membership, and progress through these is determined by a combination of mastery of a “syllabus” (consisting of reading, memorizing, and explaining the Qur›an; learning hadith; reading a specified set of Islamic books; and inviting others to join the movement), advancement of the movement’s goals, and obedience to the organization. Teaching sessions stress that “obedience to the Amir or head of the organization ... implies obedience to the Prophet Muhammad which in turn indicates obedience to God himself.” Discussion of politics is

introduced in the upper levels of the movement, and advanced members recognize that the movement raises women's political and religious consciousness and prepares them to take active political and social roles (Huq 1994).

In seeking a direct political role in society, some groups follow the model of organized political parties that seek to attract formally enrolled members and present a public platform of goals and policies. Such is the case with the Jama‹at-i Islami parties in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India, which have fielded candidates in elections and participated in government. In Lebanon as well, AMAL has organized along political party lines that are familiar to Lebanon where multiparty elections have occurred since the founding of the republic. AMAL's charter (mithaq) identifies itself with the Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement of the Dispossessed)—begun in 1974 by the Shi‹i religious leader Musa al-Sadr—and maintains that it is "a movement of all the people" and, as such, a national, Lebanese, organization (cited in Norton 1987:166). Yet AMAL simultaneously sees itself as a movement committed to improving the particular circumstances of the Shi‹a. To this end, it holds regular party conferences, produces policy statements, and issues membership cards. In Turkey, the Rafah Partisi evolved, according to Soncer Ayata, from a loosely-knit "confederation of Sufi groups" into an organized, professional party apparatus with a strong leadership and committed grass-roots support. This structure has helped them to get out the vote as, for example, in the March and July 1994 municipal elections, when they secured notable victories in Ankara, Istanbul, and elsewhere (cited in Akinci 1994).

Because of their claims to broad representation, however, Islamist groups such as Hizbullah assert that they are not like parties and do not depend on formal organization (tanzim). Yet, in practice, the movements are divided into public and secret organizations and are hierarchical and cellular, with rank determined by level of commitment. In some cases, as in the Iraqi Da‹wa and in Afghanistan's Jama‹at-i Islami, led by Gulbeddin Hikmatiyar (b. 1947?), the cell (khalwa) organization is inspired by the secular Ba‹thist or Marxist-Leninist structures in which some Islamists formerly participated. The Da‹wa is divided into two "wings" (janahs), one military, the other, political. The military wing has supervised the training of members in Iran, Lebanon, and Syria. Among other activities, the political wing has engaged in a vigorous publication program (‹Abd al-Hadi 1983:19).

In other cases, the model for inspiration and legitimation is the celllike structure of Sufi orders, which have layers of initiation and commitment, some of which are concealed from external view. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, was based on cell-like organization, and its leader was referred to as murshid (guide), a term used of Sufi shaykhs. As with the Iraqi Da‹wa organization, the secret wing of these Islamist groups is sometimes called the combatant (jihadi) wing, which may employ violence that would be deniable by the group's public, or "civilian" (madani) wing (Drayf 1992:237–41). The Muslim Brotherhood developed a "special organization" (al-tanzim alkhass), which was responsible for such acts as the assassination of Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha in December 1948 and other similar acts of violence.

*** The Technologies and Culture of Protest

In 1994, the film al-Irhabi (The Terrorist) created fierce controversy in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. Starring ‹Adil Imam, one of Egypt’s most popular actors, it cast Muslim activists in a violent light and portrayed them as simpleminded and boorish, with their leaders manipulative and authoritarian. Bourgeois life, by way of contrast, was depicted as cosmopolitan and tolerant. Liberal media professionals, unhappy with the Islamist project in Egypt, did not require instruction in the socializing or propaganda potential of mass communications—particularly in the video version of the film which could be viewed in the privacy of the home. Moreover, while the Mubarak government may not have produced the film, it could not have been unhappy with its message.

Muslim critics of the status quo also make use of the technological instruments of the modern mass culture. Television, radios, cassettes, videos, personal computers, photocopiers, facsimile machines, and electronic mail are frequently, if not routinely, found in the homes and offices of Muslim activists, ‹ulama, and Sufi shaykhs as well as those of government officials. The use that Ayatullah Khomeini and his supporters made of the direct-dial telephone and cassettes to incite revolutionary sentiment in Iran is well known, and was prefigured in the utility that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838/39–1897) saw in secretly printing and distributing leaflets to agitate against the Qajar ruler, Nasir al-Din Shah (r. 1848–96). Moreover, opposition to the tobacco concession, which al-Afghani and others among the ‹ulama, merchants, and townspeople expressed in 1890–91, was encouraged by resort to the telegraph. This new device allowed opponents to maintain contact with each other and Shi‹i religious figures in Iraq, and to coordinate their activities (Keddie 1981:65–67).

Such ready usage of available technologies is not, however, unique to Iran. Indeed, Islamic groups from Southeast Asia to Europe publicize and propagate their message in sophisticated ways that seem unremarkable. Groups responsible for the kidnapping of Western hostages in Lebanon were referred to as “telephone” organizations, and the Egyptian magazine al-Musawwar reported that a raid on a software import firm disclosed the structure of the clandestine wing of the Muslim Brotherhood (“Structure, Aims of Muslim Brotherhood Detailed” 1992:5). The organization used sophisticated coded computer records to track members who had infiltrated the police, judiciary, press, medical, and other professions.

Dar al-Arqam (House of Arqam), a Malaysian millenarian group that was outlawed and its leader arrested in October 1994, was adept at creating a financial empire in several countries. It ran bakeries and bookshops among its diversified activities in Malaysia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, but it also operated technology service and desktoppublishing businesses. It paid for its members to acquire technical as well as other training overseas,

and one of its posters proclaimed: “With advanced technologies, Muslims can manage the world according to Allah’s law” (Karp 1994).

Technology is of course neutral, but its use subtly alters the disseminated message. Print and other technologies create new forms of community and have transformed authority and social boundaries, defeating conventional assumptions of a “great divide” separating “tribal” and urban, nonliterate and literate. The collected essays in Literacy in Traditional Societies, edited by Jack Goody (1968; see also, Goody 1977, 1986) made a significant step toward recognizing the religious and political implications of the written and printed word, and Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983) subsequently noted the transformative value of writing and printing and demonstrated their contribution to the formation of national and religious identities.

A succession of new media technologies has profoundly contributed to Islamic political movements in Afghanistan, beginning with “print Islam” (Eickelman 1989b:17) in the course of this century. As David Edwards explains, the development of print communication in Europe over five hundred years appears leisurely in contrast to Afghanistan, where its development is compressed into little more than a century. Print and telegraph communications transformed the ways in which people were governed, thought about one another, and conceived of their religious identity (Edwards 1995; also see Edwards 1993).

The first Afghan newspapers of the late nineteenth century had a limited circulation, although, as in Central Asia at about the same time (Khalid 1992:116), they reached a small literate elite that had an influence far beyond its numbers. Newspapers provided a focus for the development of political ideas that were at least partially independent of the previously influential circles of court, tribe, and mosque (Edwards 1995:171–73). Indeed, by the late 1920s and 1930s, newspapers had become a major vehicle for advancing political causes. For example, a weekly four-page newsletter, Irshad-unNiswan (Guidance for Women), appeared in 1921 (Majrooh 1989:94). Such publications gave prestige to the government internationally and offered employment to graduates of Afghanistan’s secondary schools and madrasas (religious schools). Through the judicious use of subsidies, newspapers restrained potential dissidents by keeping them on the government payroll.

By the late 1940s, secular modernists had begun to speak out against the traditional religious establishment. Religious leaders were initially on the defensive, as they were unskilled in dealing with the ways in which secularists disseminated their ideas. Although by the 1960s leftist newspapers flourished, only one major independent religious newspaper, Gahiz, had emerged by 1968. Leftist newspapers and pamphlets, supplemented by Soviet radio propaganda in Afghan languages, provided arguments for secularists to use against Islam. In turn, Gahiz and religious tracts in Afghanistan, as with publications elsewhere in the Muslim world in the 1960s and 1970s, provided crucial texts and arguments for Muslim intellectuals to use against those whom

they regarded as antagonistic or less committed. In Kabul University and elsewhere, religiously minded students formed study groups in which many of these publications were discussed, their goal being educational rather than explicitly political.

Whatever the major differences between secular leftists and religious modernists in the 1960s, both had parallel experiences. They had both been educated in government schools and constituted the first generation to acquire literacy. Political radicals encouraged confrontation and polarization in Afghanistan through both their organizations and their newspapers and pamphlets. These publications emphasized loyalty to the authority of the organization, not to the authority of the state or traditional elites. Muslim groups, notably the Muslim Youth Organization at Kabul University, followed the lead of the leftist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood, which Afghan students in Cairo had observed firsthand in the 1950s. These Muslim groups thus used their publications to affirm not only the validity of Islamic solutions but also the necessity of allegiance to the Islamic organizations themselves. The larger Islamic mission became dependent on prior obedience to the movement, and the routinized expression and promotion of this linkage became essential for success. This process helps to explain how Muslim groups, initially organized for the purpose of education or spiritual improvement, became transformed into more formal political organizations such as the Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan (the Afghanistan Islamic party), dedicated to overthrowing the post-1978 Marxist government.

Although the various resistance groups, including Jama‹at-i Islami, two rival Hizb-i Islami groups, and Shi‹i organizations, all opposed the Soviet invasion and the Marxist government, and notwithstanding appeals to Muslim solidarity, their common goal did not lead to close integration. Most Afghans saw the Marxist takeover in April 1978 as having little to do with ideology, but as a triumph of the Ghilzai Pashtu, to whom many of the coup leaders belonged, over the Durrani Pashtu. In simple terms, it was read as the victory of one traditional qawm, or ethnic group, over another. By 1980, the Marxists had dropped most of their ideological propaganda, sought to persuade Afghans that they were not against Islam, and tried to play on traditional tribal rivalries. This was in contrast to earlier efforts at land reform and other initiatives that ignored traditional tribal and religious structures (Korgun 1993:106). The Islamic resistance groups failed to unite, even when urged to do so by their foreign supporters—including Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, Pakistan, and the United States; rather, each group relied on a particular set of tribal and ethnic ties. These divisions became more pronounced after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 as each group now saw the opportunity to seize power at the expense of its traditional rivals (Roy [1985] 1990:215–21; Canfield 1989).

As we described in Chapter 4, tribal, ethnic, linguistic, and kin divisions persist, despite Islamist aspirations. In some respects, resistance to Marxist rule and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided one of the most clear-cut opportunities for jihad against a clearly defined “infidel,” yet this did not result in higher unity in the name of Islam. The “routinization” of Islamic ideas through print and pamphlets and through higher educational levels helped institutionalize ideas of shared Islamic identity, but it did not in itself suffice to transform an oppositional movement into one capable of exercising state authority.

In Afghanistan and elsewhere, audiocassettes, easy to smuggle and readily duplicated, have begun to replace, or at least supplement, pamphlets as a form of religious debate. The pamphlet has the advantage of greater anonymity for the author, but the cassette has other advantages. Cassettes are inexpensively and easily reproduced, and they may be played virtually anywhere—in the home, automobile, mosque, or other meeting places. Perhaps the greatest advantage of cassettes is that they provide access to currents of Islamist protest outside of one's own society. The sermons of Lebanon's Shaykh Fadlallah, Egypt's Shaykh ‹Abd al-Hamid Kishk, and Malaysia's Haj Hadi Awang are widely available beyond their country of origin and are often found in Europe and America where Muslim students are located. "Voiced Islam" (al-Islam al-sawti) has thus become a formidable force rivaling "print Islam."

In earlier generations, the exposure of students to Islamic ideas would have been through the Qur›an and religious treatises. Increasingly, however, it is the pamphlet, the popular sermon (khutba), the cassette, the telephone, and the electronic mail news service (J. Anderson 1994) that distribute information and ideas to all parts of the Muslim world. The National Research and Fatwa Center in Ann Arbor, Michigan, has set up a toll-free telephone line so that individuals may seek direct advice and fatawa on issues of concern from "knowledgeable Sheikhs and Students of knowledge." One can telephone, fax, post, or electronically mail questions, and answers are given in English or Arabic (IANA 1995). One result of such use of modern technologies is a new awareness of larger trends in the Islamic world, which, as we will discuss in the following chapter, involves the creation of a Muslim transnationalism. Another consequence of the use of modern technology is a kind of empowerment of protest groups within each society. Conscious now that Islamic groups elsewhere bear similarities to their own situations, and influenced by transformations in the Islamic political vocabulary that others may have crystallized, protest movements may find a bolder voice and be encouraged to more decisive activity in pursuit of their goals.

In the cassettes that record the sermons of Shaykh ‹Umar ‹Abd alRahman, who has been influential in the Islamic Associations (alJama‹at al-Islamiyya) in Egypt and who was charged with complicity in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, one hears that sovereignty belongs to God alone (al-hakimiyya li-llah). In a commentary on Surat al-Kahf (18: "The Cave") of the Qur›an, for instance, he does not directly name his target, the Egyptian government. Yet, he makes an unambiguous political point when he argues that no congress or party has the right to make laws. The audience hears, "Anyone who makes such laws are not believers" (‹Isa 1992), and would understand that governments that infringe on God's sovereignty are illegitimate and undeserving of allegiance.

Cassettes that transmit sermons vary considerably in content, but most are similar in form and often echo the authority of the mosque.[36] The preacher (khatib)—and mosque preachers are exclusively male— chooses as his text Qur›anic verses that are to be explicated. Moral instruction is the primary purpose, and often most of the sermon deals

with standards of ethical conduct or matters of ritual practice and dress. Yet, as the above example illustrates, political matters are not absent, although the preacher rarely deals directly with such questions. Rather, the argument proceeds by indirection. For example, an approving reference to the probity of the “rightly guided” caliphs of early Islamic history would not be lost on the audience as a veiled attack on the injustice and immorality of present-day leaders.

Sermons also invoke a range of authorities that may be surprising. Invocations of the Qur›an and hadith are unexceptional, and references to classical Muslim thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and alGhazali would be common as well. Yet preachers frequently resort to citations of both contemporary Muslim intellectuals such as Sayyid Qutb, al-Mawdudi, Kishk, and Shaykh ‹Abd al-‹Aziz ibn Baz of Saudi Arabia, but also Western writers and publications.[37] For example, in Saudi sermons distributed via cassettes during the 1990–91 Gulf crisis, preachers explicitly invoked such sources as the memoirs of Richard Nixon, the Voice of America, the Financial Times, the Cable News Network (CNN), and the writings of George Bush, in addition to such contemporary Arab periodicals as al-Hayat and al-Watan al--Arabi. These references were invoked to support the case that the United States harbored nefarious intentions in the region. This has notably been true of Shaykh Safar al-Hawali, whose pronouncements during the crisis have been compiled as Kashf al-ghumma ‹an ‹ulama al-umma (The unveiling of distress about the ‹ulama) (al-Hawali 1991: for example, 16, 69, 71, 75–79, 83, 101, 131).

The consequence of this rhetorical style is the emergence—objectification, in our terminology—of an Islam that is manifestly political and ostensibly modern at the same time. Without directly advocating sedition, therefore, the preacher is able to deliver a political lesson that appears at once traditional and, because of the reference to both modern Muslim and Western intellectual trends and writings, “rational.” Although denouncing the West and Western values, many preachers thus implicitly employ Western arguments to convince their audiences of their own modern and contemporary focus.

The security implications of the dissemination of religious cassettes—and videos—are obvious, and government efforts to staunch their flow across borders are ineffective. Up to 1992, the Arab Postal Union banned the sending and receiving of audio- and videocassettes. Although by 1993 this formal restriction had been lifted (for example, Royal Mail International 1993:236, 390, 480), cassettes sent through the post are still subject to inspection and delay and often fail to reach their destination, and customs inspectors routinely seize such materials until they can be reviewed by censors. In one Gulf country in 1988, the head censor himself was implicated in smuggling radical Shi‹i videocassettes. In Egypt, proscribed material has not necessarily been smuggled from outside sources. Sections of larger towns and cities have become difficult to control, to the degree that the Egyptian press reports a clandestine arms industry, which, although it has crossborder links with Libya and the Sudan, appears mainly home-grown (Subhi 1993). If arms can be clandestinely produced and distributed, how much easier it is to circulate cassettes and

pamphlets. The effect may be significant: If cassettes are passed hand to hand, this may increase the solidarity of oppositional groups.

Although some of the videos and cassettes explicity advocate violence against the state, the vast majority, as we have said, stop short of this. Cassettes are used, for example, to transmit nashids (anthems), which are widely circulated and often reflect national or regional styles. Nashids build on such musical traditions as the quwwali from South Asia and rhythmic chanting from the Middle East, especially as practiced in Sufi traditions (see Waugh 1989). They typically have a martial air and involve male choruses that repeat, often to drum beats, variations on standard Islamic phrases such as Ya Allah Allah, Allahu akhbar (O God, God, God is most great) (“Nasyid Iran” n.d.) or the shahada, the profession of faith in the one God and His Prophet. Lyrics attesting to the greatness of Islam and the special mission to purify it are added (as in the nashids of the Muslim Brothers, for example, “Nasyid Ikhwanul Muslimin” n.d.), but at times explicitly political themes also emerge. Yusuf Islam, a British Muslim convert and a former popular singer, recorded a nashid in support of the jihad in Afghanistan:

O victory is coming and history will tell ’cause the disbelieving army is heading for hell.

And paradise belongs to the pious and firm, to God we belong and to Him we return.
Afghanistan and Islam,

Afghanistan and Islam,

Ya Muslimun, ya Muslimun

<right>

(Islam n.d.)

</right>

In the United States and western Europe, rap music has become tantamount to the nashid. Rap and hip-hop groups in Europe articulate a sense of disquiet with their societies and use their songs to highlight and implicitly protest against the racial and social discrmination that Muslims often feel. In the process, they attract audiences among

both Muslims and non-Muslim youth, the latter primarily from racial or ethnic minorities. The group Cash Crew projects a particularly resonant message of protest in “Thatcherite,” Conservative-led Britain:

I ask you a question Who is your master?

Islam says it’s time to wake up

In this place called England ...

The sun will rise in the West

And will bring them to one God,

Allah the Magnificent

Who has no partners

The truly Beneficent...

Englishman is funny ...

Worshipping the money ...

In this system you can’t be happy,

But this is all you know

Since you come out of your nappy

<right>

(Cash Crew 1994)

</right>

In the United States, Public Enemy is more outspoken in its denunciation of white-dominated society and has allied itself with the Nation of Islam faction led by Louis Farrakhan, who has often been accused of intolerance toward whites and Jews. The acknowledgments on its recordings contain the invocation, “All praise is due to Allah,” and the shahada, the profession of faith, is evoked in the following lines:

Listen Christian, Muslim, Jew

Here’s a little something that I thought you knew

There’s only one God and God is one

<right>

(cited in Wells 1990:43)

</right>

In its song, “Don’t Believe the Hype,” Public Enemy equates the initially skeptical reaction to Elijah Muhammad (1897–1975), the founder of the Nation of Islam, and Malcolm X (1925–65) to the hostility that greets Farrakhan in both the African-American community and the wider American society. In performance, the group appears with a bodyguard reminiscent of the Fruit of Islam, the security force of the early Nation of Islam and of Farrakhan’s faction today. Members of Public Enemy at times also display the star and the crescent. They urge followers to listen to their message directly:

The follower of Farrakhan

Don’t tell me that you understand

Until you hear the man

<right>

(Public Enemy 1988)

</right>

As the former “Minister of Information” of the group, Professor Griff, said: “If you say that black people have been robbed of their name, their language, God, culture and religion and stripped of their very being—can you say that we are ourselves?” Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam is attempting to rectify the situation in part through its “Do for Self” program: “We don’t steal, We don’t step on the poor. Black Americans have got to stop begging white Americans” (Wells 1990:43).

The importance of the nashids and rap music is that they represent the ways in which popular cultural forms can be mobilized to foster claims and counterclaims in Muslim politics. The insistent rhythms, assertive refrains, and often mocking tones are especially effective in articulating protest. Hannah Arendt reminds us: “To remain in authority requires respect for the person or the office. The greatest enemy of authority, therefore, is contempt” ([1969] 1986:65). Like humor, music can be subversive. It is a popular representation of Muslim symbolic politics, but, as we would expect, it may also be ambiguous in its political message. Even the intemperate language of Public Enemy leaves one uncertain as to whether the group possesses an exact political program. The ambiguity of these recorded messages makes it all the more difficult for governments to prohibit them.

Governments also worry about the use of such technologies as the fax and electronic mail. One group in Algeria, the “Fax Group,” has been charged with antistate activity (for example, BBC SWB, ME/1688, A/10, May 14, 1993). Often using the United States as a base, electronic mail networks also disseminate information and points of view across the world and are particularly used by university students at both the undergraduate and the postgraduate level. They relay news stories collected from various media—for example, on the status of Muslims in Bosnia, FIS in Algeria, and Kurds in Turkey—and comments on these stories. Many of these networks are specific to countries, including Israel, Palestine, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria. In some cases, officially disseminated news bulletins, such as those offered by the Algerian embassy in Washington, are immediately countered by

opposition groups. In other cases, electronic networks aim for a broader audience by referring to themselves as “Islamic.” One example is the Islamic Information and News Network, a subsidiary of the Pakistan News Service, which has regularly reproduced sermons and speeches of Hamas leaders, among others.

The self-representation of these networks expressly devoted to Islamic issues is unambiguous. Islamic World Journal, produced by the International Muslim Students Union (based in Seattle, Washington), says that it is “committed to raise awareness and enhance the unity of Muslim communities while providing an inside view of the Global Islamic Movement.” To this end, it provides extended commentary on such contemporary issues of Muslim concern as the Kashmir conflict (“Censoring the History” 1994). These networks also often call for action in support of “moral,” though not necessarily Islamic, causes. For instance, one electronic news service reported that Williamson County commissioners in Texas refused to give Apple Computer a tax abatement because Apple had granted health benefits to the partners of homosexual employees. The service called upon Muslims to write to the county commissioners to support them in their stand against “shrinking morality and [the] rampant indecency of sexual promiscuity” (“Williamson County” 1993).

The globalization of information is an inescapable part of the modern world, and, as elsewhere, in the Muslim world it may enhance the abilities of protest groups while increasing the vulnerability of governments (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994:28–31; Scholte 1993:47–49). In Saudi Arabia, for example, the government has recognized the potentially negative effects of satellite communications systems. Pressured by the ‹ulama, it has banned the use of satellite dishes, which had become popular during the Gulf war in order to receive CNN broadcasts. The dishes continued to grow in popularity, and the regime feared that Saudis would be able to obtain morally and politically harmful material that avoided state censorship (“Saudi Arabia Bans All Satellite Dishes” 1994; “Antennes paraboliques” 1994). Although the Ministry of Interior, responding to opposition from the middle classes, has quietly let the ban go unenforced, the Saudis are spending a substantial amount of money to develop a cable system which would compete with other cable systems—Arab and Western— and which would be easier to censor (Khalaf 1994). The Iranian Majlis also ratified a ban on satellite dishes in December 1994. In another indication of the importance of symbolic politics, some Iranians, angry about the domination of American cultural programming, compared satellite dishes to the American flag (“Iran Prohibits Satellite Dishes” 1994). Although the Constitutional Council soon declared the Majlis bill impermissible on narrow constitutional grounds (“L’Interdiction des antennes paraboliques” 1995), the fear that outside transmissions may undermine the cultural and political order remains apparent.

*** The Fragmentation of Authority

As we argued in Chapter 3, common to contemporary Muslim politics is a marked fragmentation of authority. The ‹ulama no longer have, if they ever did, a monopoly on sacred authority. Rather, Sufi shaykhs, engineers, professors of education, medical doctors, army and militia leaders, and others compete to speak for Islam. In the process, the playing field has become more level, but also more dangerous.

Two conceivable outcomes of this fragmentation are possible. One is the intensification of dispute and contest; in the metaphor of the market, the “price” of Islamism may be pushed upward by a number of keen, and uncooperative, bidders. This is the scenario that many, if not most, Western observers—and a good number of Muslim commentators—believe is likely. The political forecast for Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, and sometimes Indonesia, among other countries, is often unfavorable because it is assumed that they will succumb to the centripetal tendencies of conflict within Muslim societies.

Evidence can certainly be marshalled to support this line of argument. Takfir, the proclaiming of a fellow believer as an infidel, and the transformations in the concept of jihad so as to accord primacy to the enemy within the Islamic state or umma are ideological currents of marked potency in the current age. Moreover, the use of violence to support these currents is an undeniable fact of life. Ministers of Awqaf, presidents, amirs, and ‹ulama have all been targeted for attack, but so, too, have Muslim “liberal” critics such as Faraj Fuda, the Egyptian writer who was murdered in June 1992 for his supposedly antiIslamic views, and Taslima Nasreen, the Bangladeshi woman writer who is accused of suggesting in print that parts of the Qur›an need to be revised (Philip 1993; Brown 1994). In Algeria and elsewhere, Islamists have targeted intellectuals, journalists, novelists, teachers, and others identified with the propagation of values contrary to their own. In Egypt, a parliamentary deputy attacked the government for promoting anti-Islamic values and “immorality,” citing as evidence the publication six months earlier of a photograph of a nude by the Austrian painter, Gustav Klimt (1826–1918), in a cultural monthly. Following this attack, several Egyptian intellectuals, including the Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfuz, spoke out against “intellectual terrorism in the name of Islam” (“Le Terrorisme intellectuel au nom de l’Islam” 1994:1).

Such activities have polarized Muslim societies, with authoritarian governments ironically assuming the mantle of liberalism against Islamism. The ‹ulama may simply be instruments of the regime in this process, but very often they agonize over both the degree of what they regard as the radicalization of Islam and the extent of the government’s heavy-handed response. In Egypt, for example, Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali has spoken of his worry about Islamist groups at the same time as he has been anxious about the regime’s response. Curiously, for a member of the official religious establishment, he has also appealed for equal time in the media:

There are those who hate all Islamic trends, whether moderate or extremist. They are waging wars against Islam, both secretly and openly. They make derisory pronouncements

(al-ta‹alim bi-l-ghamaz) about it. All we want is that the callers to Islam (du-at al-Islam) be accorded the [same] opportunity [to air their views] that their rivals (khusum) have. (alGhazali 1989:1)

Such descriptions come close to suggesting that civil war looms on the Muslim horizon.

But this is only one way of looking at the situation. A second, alternative, view is that the multiple centers of power and contenders for authority come to various accommodations; in the market metaphor, the price is negotiated to the relative satisfaction of all. If we take just the Islamist groups as our example, it is apparent that they must interact with four sets of actors: the government, external patrons such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, other Islamist groups, and the masses or the target audiences from which they wish to attract sympathizers. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, has at times vigorously, even violently, opposed the government, but over time it has adjusted its strategy to the prevailing political winds. It has had to take into account both the suppression and the enticements of the government; the relatively conservative concerns of financial backers such as the Saudi monarchy; the pressure from other, more demanding Islamic groups that may regard it as having sold out to the establishment; and the amorphous, often illiterate masses whose religious and political formation they hope to control. An intricate politics of compromise and give-and-take may thus result and be as likely as civil war.

In several Muslim societies, Islamist groups—when indeed they are allowed to do so—have even routinely participated in electoral politics. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, not officially recognized as a political party, participated in electoral alliances in the parliamentary elections of 1984 and 1987, winning 12 and 32 seats respectively. Along with other groups, it refused to participate in the elections of December 1990. In Tunisia, Islamist candidates won 14.5 percent of the national vote in April 1989 and up to 30 percent in major cities. Partly as a result of this strong showing, the government has refused to legalize the main Islamist movement, Hizb al-Nahda. In Jordan, where King Hussein initiated a process of political reform in November 1989, Islamic candidates scored an unanticipated victory in the first parliamentary election in twenty-two years. Islamists took 34 out of the 80 seats, with the Muslim Brotherhood securing 22 of these seats and other Islamists winning 12 more. In the November 1993 parliamentary elections, following the adoption of a one-person, one-vote system, the number of Islamists elected declined to 16. Yemen’s first elections occurred in April 1993, and al-Tajammu‹ al-Yamani li-l-Islah (the Yemeni Gathering for Reform), while failing to win a single seat in the south (formerly the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen), won 62 seats in the north. It came second to the 121 seats of the General Popular Congress, the president’s party that governed the north prior to Yemeni unification in 1990 (Dresch and Heikal 1994).

In the August-October 1992 parliamentary elections in Lebanon, Muslim groups such as Hizbullah and AMAL fared relatively well. Boycotted by a number of groups, especially Maronite ones, and tarnished by allegations of voting irregularities, the elections were

nonetheless an indicator of Islamist strength in the southern Jabal ‹Amil and eastern Biqa‹ Valley areas. Out of a total of 128 seats in the Majlis al-Nawab (Deputies' Assembly), Hizbullah took 8 seats out of the 27 Shi‹i deputies elected. Four other non-Shi‹i deputies—two Christian and two Sunni—appeared on Hizbullah's lists and vote with it in parliament. Hizbullah has specifically used its parliamentary platform to oppose any Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty. AMAL, which has been more willing to accommodate itself to the Lebanese state, took four seats in the elections. Its leader Nabih Birri became speaker of the assembly, after the long-serving Shi‹i speaker, Husayn al-Husayni, resigned his post in protest at what he saw as Hizbullah vote rigging in the Biqa‹. In addition to Hizbullah and AMAL members, three deputies were elected from two Sunni Islamist groups (el-Khazen and Salem 1993:48, 419–33, plates 12 and 13).

In Indonesia, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP; United Development party), was founded in 1973 as a government-approved coalition of Muslim parties. In the 1977 elections to the House of Representatives, PPP won 99 out the 360 seats, and 94 in the 1982 elections. In 1984, however, Nahdatul Ulama, the most important component of the coalition, withrew from the coalition and PPP's share of the vote declined accordingly. In the 1987 elections, it took only 61 of the 400 parliamentary seats, and in 1992, 62. Malaysia has a well-established parliamentary tradition, and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS; PanMalaysian Islamic party) has participated in national and state elections, with mixed success. Although it had cooperated with the ruling party between 1973 and 1977, it became a sharp critic of official policies. On the national level, PAS won five parliamentary seats out of 154 in 1982; one out of 177 in 1986; and seven out of 180 in 1990 when several other smaller Islamically oriented parties participated. In the October 1990 elections, the ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition lost all 39 state assembly seats and 13 parliamentary seats in Kelantan to PAS and its ally, Semangat '46 ("Spirit of '46"). PAS has since cautiously promoted an Islamic social agenda there.

Rather than assuming that protest politics inevitably ends in confrontation, therefore, it is useful to recognize that the dynamics of interaction among the various political actors who are seeking power and influence generates de facto rules of the game. These rules need not overlap with constitutional, formalized precepts, but they suggest that competitors, including the government, engage in bargaining. Governments prefer to obscure the fact they are dealing with Islamist groups in this way, but there is no denying that they do so. It would be exceptional if they did not. The implication is that this tacit bargaining, the working out of implicit rules for a modus vivendi, creates a form of short-term stability—even though this may not be desirable ultimately. Indeed, each protagonist hopes that in the long run such de facto interaction will induce favorable changes in the conduct of competitors (Mitchell 1981:123–25, 197; also Auda 1994a:374–75).

Tacit bargaining is a more common occurrence than is normally acknowledged. The fact the British government and the Irish Republican Army are unalterably opposed and advocate very different resolutions of the Irish problem has not prevented their quietly talking to each other and devising procedures for limiting the effect of violence. Likewise, French authorities, who have steadfastly claimed in public that they would not meet with representatives of FIS,

labeling them as “terrorists”—and who tried to persuade the Americans to break off “dialogue” with FIS in mid-1994—were somewhat embarrassed by press revelations that Charles Pasqua, the Minister of the Interior, had met secretly in Germany with FIS leader Rabah Kébir and that the government maintained other contacts with FIS representatives (Cuau 1994; Lesieur 1994).

It would be foolhardy to predict the result of the protest politics of Muslims. Neither alternative that we have outlined is inevitable. Without question, politics is localized and subject to particular and changing circumstances. But, given the broadly held assumption that Muslim politics is inherently revolutionary, it is important to note that there is nothing preordained or permanent about its radicalization. Indeed, some observers believe that the radicals’ “moment” may have come and gone (Roy 1992). Whether that is the case or not, politics in the Islamic world belongs alongside other political orders: Protest and bargaining constitute its two, intimately interconnected, sides.

** 6. Muslim Politics: a Changing Political Geography

| A | S INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETIES struggle to make sense of the global processes of rapid social, economic, political, and technological change, standard conceptual maps of the social and political world become obsolete and the necessity for new guideposts obvious. Geopolitics—the “art and science of understanding and predicting spatial aspects of the shifts in political power among groups, particularly states” (Demko and Wood 1994:3)—once primarily focused on physical frontiers and the control of territories. Now it increasingly involves a politicized geography of groups and movements with competing claims and counterclaims. For nearly three decades, geographers have used terms such as “spatial awareness” (Wheatley 1976) to invoke the multiple levels of perceptions involved in understanding loyalties, opportunities, and affinities among persons and groups. Yet in recent years, a Brooklyn rabbi, Menachem Mendel Schneerson (1902–94), who never set foot in Israel, became a major voice in Israeli politics (Friedman 1994:328–30, 351–53; compare Kepel 1994a:140–90). Likewise, Morocco is only one of many states to recognize the continuum with its emigrant community. State authorities seek to promote a sense of “home” by encouraging emigrants to vote in national elections and by showing solicitude for their interests while living abroad.

Location and space have undergone such transformations that it is possible to argue that “primordia ... have become globalized.” Where once territory was the root of one’s identity, ethnicity and religious activism have become “deterritorialized” (Appadurai 1990:11, 15) to the point where adherents, such as Sikh or Muslim activists, identify with each other as much as, if not more, than they do with the fellow citizens of their national homeland. Migration in search of work or political freedom, socialization through the defining literature and practices of a new movement, and immersion in the global culture contribute to this reorientation and reorganization of religious identifications—and, by extension, of Muslim politics.

The political geography of Muslims operates at multiple levels. At the micropolitical level, it involves the ways in which households, families, neighborhoods, small communities, and sects weigh opportunities and chart courses of action that affect their well being. Even at this level, "locality" may refer to persons physically removed: Somalis in Cardiff or Turin may be consulted regularly on decisions affecting their families or households in Mogadishu. Other levels involve the calculations of regional and national elites, and the "market" forces of politics and economics as groups formulate their interests and plan their future on the basis of incomplete and shifting information. In the past, these various layers of political and moral awareness could be envisaged as separable spheres of activity, but the advent of mass education and mass communications has facilitated their intercalation.

In African-American Muslim households, for example, domestic space may serve as a way simultaneously to distance a Muslim family from its non-Muslim milieu and to breach the distance between the American Muslim and larger Muslim contexts. Curtains tend to be drawn, and the decorating of front doors with Arabic calligraphy signifies that in such houses "the hostile environment of racism, discrimination, and religious intolerance [is] locked out." Internal decoration, particularly in middle-class homes, is a mélange of Middle Eastern, African, Asian, and Western styles: "African American Muslims have thus taken small portions of various Muslim cultures and woven an interesting tapestry that transcends (without denying) both their American nationality and their ethnicity" (McCloud 1995:106, 110).

Geography is clearly not merely a physical construct; spatial relations may preeminently be a state of mind. Connections and disconnections, distance and proximity are notional, and perhaps all the more significant for that. Through television, images of political and religious authority as well as community are daily projected into domestic space (Ossman 1994); as we discussed in Chapter 5, other cultural technologies are also crucial to the dissemination of ideas and information. If, through these means, Muslims in Moroland in the southern Philippines and in Nigeria, as well as different Muslim groups within each society, acquire a sense of linkage between and among them, the implications are potentially immense.

First, the "decentering" of Islam away from a preoccupation with the Arabian peninsula allows an awareness of the myriad forms of relations—economic, cultural, political, social—that have developed among Muslims worldwide and that have little to do with their position relative to the supposed center (see, for example, von der Mehden 1993). One does not need to subscribe to the view that a "global ecumene" has emerged to recognize that at times "the peripheries talk back" (Hannerz 1989:70). Westerners flock to Indian mystics, dance to reggae music, and read the magical realist novels of Latin American authors. In the Muslim world, Arab states formulate questions of moral censorship on the basis of novels written by Salman Rushdie in Britain and Taslima Nasreen in Bangladesh. The long-term impact of the permeability of borders is not certain, but there is no doubt that Muslims are reshaping their identities and political agendas while becoming increasingly mindful of the manifold economic, communications, and social links among them.

Second, the “reduction” of distance may encourage those who hold minority views—as radicals, moderates, or conservatives—to join forces with like-minded persons elsewhere to accomplish common goals. The new political geography, blurring conventional social distinctions, empowering new groups, and challenging governments, may in the long run facilitate the emergence of pluralism, even as some forces in society vigorously resist it. In the sense that symbolic and political connections across national and other political boundaries may be encouraged, conventional understandings of “external” and “internal” appear doubtful.

*** Transnational Linkages

The ability of Muslims and Muslim states to adapt to changing circumstances is not in question, as we have indicated from the outset of this book; the compatibility of Islam and nationalism is beyond doubt. The appeal to Muslim unity—a doctrinal byproduct of tawhid, or the oneness of God—has masked accommodations in practice and ideas to the overwhelming reality of political decentralization and variety. Over the centuries, Muslims have been able to adjust to the superior power of the infidels, and hence to a territorially demarcated international system; moreover, they have adjusted to the existence of multiple centers of power, including multiple caliphs, within the broad umma. The result has been an elite—and perhaps popular—willingness to come to terms with the nationalist sentiments that have emerged since the nineteenth century and, increasingly in the mid– to late twentieth century, to deploy Islamic themes to buttress nationalist discourse (Piscatori 1986).

This de facto pluralism explains why pan-Islamic political integration has been minimal, despite the longstanding aspirations of Muslims such as Muhammad Iqbal who longed for Muslims “in their totality ... [to] range themselves under the Caliph” (Iqbal, cited in Esposito 1983:183). Indeed, the prospects for pan-Islamic integration were limited by several factors. Although the term was a European contrivance in the 1880s and was coined partially in conscious imitation of panHellenism, pan-Slavism, or pan-Germanism, it was promoted by Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1909) and supported by Ottoman propaganda and the proliferation of newspapers throughout the Muslim world. Yet the movement was thus identified with the weakening sultanate in Istanbul. When the Young Turks seized power in 1908, they accordingly deemphasized pan-Islam, although the theme was revived during World War I for tactical reasons. Moreover, colonial officials feared, and manipulated, pan-Islamic movements (for example, Landau 1990:54–64, 95–96, 103–29), and Muslim political elites, ruling at first in an informal alliance with the imperialists, solidified their power by promoting and articulating particular identities such as Egyptian, Iraqi, Nigerian, and Indonesian nationalisms. As a consequence, by the time the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the caliphate in March 1924, forceful divisions among Muslim political entities had already emerged. As the century has unfolded, they have become formidable features of Muslim political life.

So entrenched have these divisions become that, for the most part, Islamist groups have not called for the restoration of the caliphate. Rather, they seek to establish an Islamic state or Islamic order within their own national societies. A major exception to this pattern, however, has been Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation party), which emerged out of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jerusalem in 1952. Its leader, Taqi al-Din al-Nabahani (1905–78), believed that only with the recreation of one Islamic state would the Muslim way of life be able to free itself of the corrupting influence of Western political and cultural imperalism, and only with the restitution of the caliphate would the Islamic state be able to maintain itself against the divisive forces of imperialism, nationalism, and secularism (al-Nabahani 1953a and 1953b; "Supplement" 1994). Because the restoration of the caliphate is an "obligation upon all Muslims in the world," it is an urgent matter for political agitation, and Hizb al-Tahrir becomes the vanguard party that will advance the caliphal revolution (Hizb utTahrir n.d.:1).[38] This notion of a "vanguard" party appears as the basis of the declaration of Algeria's Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA), which announced that it had reestablished caliphate rule in August 1994 ("Le GIA annonce" 1994).

Regardless of the status of the GIA's claim to caliphal rule, panIslam may be thought to be advanced by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the interstate organization of the Muslim world which was founded in response to an arsonist's attack on the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in 1969 and, in a larger way, to the alignments of Arab and Muslim politics following the disastrous Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. Consisting of fifty-two members, including several of the Central Asian republics and Palestine, it is committed to the advancement of solidarity among its members (the first objective indicated in Article 2 of the OIC charter). However, union of the Muslim members has not been specifically endorsed, and it has in fact been undermined. Indonesia and Nigeria have been anxious not to appear too closely identified with the organization for fear that it would brand them as "Islamic states" and thus imperil their fragile domestic legitimacy.[39] In addition, the charter is transparent on the need to defend the individual sovereignties of its members. Article 2 affirms the principles of respect for "non-interference in the domestic affairs of Member States" and "the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each Member State" (cited in al-Ahsan 1988:128– 29; Moinuddin 1987:84–100).

The short history of the OIC, moreover, reveals significant fissures: ideological differences between such pro-Western regimes as those in Tunisia, post-1973 Egypt, and Malaysia and relatively pro-Soviet regimes such as those in Syria or Libya; political differences among the monarchies, republics, and military juntas; and economic differences between the oil-rich and the poor, particularly in Africa. The OIC was unable to resolve the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88) or defuse Iraqi-Kuwaiti tension that led to the second Gulf crisis (1990–91). Furthermore, its counsels have been bypassed in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and, despite the offer of its Secretary-General to mediate in the dispute, it did little to settle the related difficulties of civil war and mass famine in Somalia. In the case of Bosnia, over which Muslims have been agitated, the OIC in December 1992 gave the United Nations (UN) Security Council a deadline of January 15, 1993, to provide effective support for the Muslims. If the UN failed to respond, it said, unspecified collective measures would be forthcoming

from the Muslim world. In the event, no action materialized either in January or in the May 1993 meeting of Muslim foreign ministers at Karachi.

The activities of the OIC need, however, to be put into perspective. As clear as its inability to resolve intra-Islamic disputes or to protect Muslim peoples has been, such purported “failures” are the norm of international organization; no other international agency, with the possible exception of the comprehensive UN system, has distinguished itself in regional conflict resolution. In addition, the OIC can count effective contributions in a number of areas: It helped to galvanize the international consensus against the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afhganistan and support for the Afghan mujahidin; its Al-Quds Committee (created in 1975 under the chairmanship of Morocco’s King Hassan), concerned with working for the liberation of Jerusalem, has focused attention on Israeli policies in the city and generally the Occupied Territories; the Islamic Solidarity Fund (established in 1974 and based in Jidda) has channelled funds to relief and charitable causes; and the Statistical, Economic, and Social Research and Training Center (created in 1978 with headquarters in Ankara) compiles data on economic interactions, including trade patterns and commercial ventures, of the Muslim states.[40] The most important component of the extensive OIC network is the Islamic Development Bank, which was established in Jidda in 1974. It has proven adept at targeting development projects to finance and it has become one of the most active aid agencies in the developing world (Meenai 1990; Wilson 1995).

While the picture is thus mixed, it is clear that the OIC has not advanced, and in fact does not intend to promote, tight political integration of the Muslim states. An interstate organization like others, it is the creation of its sovereign members and survives as long as it fulfills their interests. In this regard, it has been a success. Pakistan has found in it a convenient foil to India’s manipulation of the Non-Aligned Movement, and Malaysia has used it as a way to enhance its voice in world and regional counsels, particularly as neighboring Indonesia evinces a certain wariness toward the OIC. Turkey has never deviated from its commitment to the Western security alliance and is sometimes uncomfortable with OIC resolutions. Yet, after the widespread condemnation of Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the worsening of the general economic situation from the late 1970s, the Turkish regime —particularly during military rule (1980–83)—appreciated the need to turn to the Muslim world for support of its foreign policy and for greater trade. Although at the Casablanca summit of December 1994 the OIC did not recognize the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” as a Muslim state or accept it as a full member, Turkey has largely been successful in promoting itself as the bridge between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to which it belongs, and the OIC. It thereby increases its international prestige while remaining unenthusiastic about more cohesive forms of political integration (Aykan 1994:73–196).

*** Raising Umma-Consciousness

Just as the emergence of a universal Islamic state is not on the horizon, neither are forms of pan-Islamic activity missing from the political geography of Muslims. As one scholar notes of

Catholicism, the development of religious orders such as the Jesuits, Dominicans, and Franciscans constituted a kind of “horizontal” transnationalism, not to mention pentacostalism, that clashed with the “veritcal” transnationalism of the Roman church (Della Cava 1991, 1993). In the case of Islam, vertical transnationalism is lacking, but there are three ways in which a horizontal transnationalism may be said to have political significance.

First, a range of non-state actors has emerged to promote da-wa, the “call” to Islam. Each may have their own particular versions of da-wa and Islam in mind, but in common they bind together networks of individuals and groups self-consciously committed to an Islamic community that is at once translocal and transclass.

As the creation and expansion of Sufi networks show, the general process of creating transnational Islamic networks is not new. Sufi brotherhoods have long formed transregional networks. Some, such as the Bektashiyya, founded in the thirteenth century, had a privileged role throughout the diverse lands of the Ottoman Empire. The order was closely identified with the Janissaries, the professional military body that played an important role in maintaining the Empire until Sultan Mahmud II (1785–1839) crushed them after an attempted rebellion in 1826. At the same time, he outlawed the Bektashiyya order, destroying its lodges, publicly executing three of its leaders, and exiling the rest (Lewis 1961:77–78). By the 1880s the Bektashiyya, like other orders, had again become politically influential and remained so through the early years of the independent Turkish republic (Lewis 1961:398–406). An estimated 10 to 20 percent of Turkey’s adult male population belonged to it just prior to 1925, when religious brotherhoods were outlawed in Turkey (Birge 1937).

As previously indicated, other orders, including the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya (Abun-Nasr 1965; Brenner 1988), had extensive links throughout North and sub-Saharan Africa and often wielded significant political influence. Colonial intelligence officers, such as Octave Depont and Xavier Coppolani (1897) in Algeria, may have overestimated the organization of these orders as monolithic “pan-Islamic” conspiracies—their elaborate, multicolored end map showing crisscrossing lines of influence linking brotherhoods across national and colonial frontiers throughout the Muslim world. Nonetheless, these transnational linkages formed important channels for communication. Moreover, the hierarchies of dominance between Sufi masters (Arabic, shaykh; Persian, pir) and their disciples (murids in both languages) formed a pervasive and popularly understood framework of influence and authority. Often new political communities resulted. For example, by crossing existing ethnic and social boundaries of identity, the Khatmiyya in the Sudan “paved the way for the first Sudanese quasinational movement, the Mahdiyya” (Karrar 1992:170).

Sufi networks may not always be highly integrated. In the Kurdish areas of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq, the Naqshbandiyya maintain a vague sense of loyalty to the supreme mufti in Syria as the order’s head, but some Naqshbandi connections are loose

at best while others are tighter owing to marital and family ties (van Bruinessen 1992: 226–27). Sufi movements may have stronger links in many regions of sub-Saharan Africa, especially West Africa, and their connections are far from negligible in Turkey and Central Asia. In the Sudan, for instance, the Niassiyya, a branch of the Tijaniyya order, has gained in popularity at the expense of the older orders, especially among West African immigrants. Spiritually centered on Kaolack, Senegal, this hierarchical movement has facilitated linkages of various kinds—social, economic, and political—among its adepts in both the Sudan and the region. One observer estimates that their transnational connections have been so important that “in the 1986 elections [in the Sudan], all members of the Niassiyya were directed by Kaolack to support the candidates of the National Islamic Front” (al-Karsani 1993:141–42).

Contemporary nonstate actors include the Rabitat al-‹Alam al-Islami (the Muslim World League) and the Jami‹yyat al-Da‹wa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Call Society), among others (Schulze 1990). The former is especially active in dispensing Qur›ans and other religious material throughout the world,[41] sponsoring religious educational programs, and providing religious scholarships for students to study in Saudi or other Muslim world universities. In but one religious school in Kelantan in northeastern Malaysia in 1989, for example, the Rabita paid for ten student scholarships (out of ninety-four students), with one advanced student going to Umm al-Qura University in Saudi Arabia for more specialized training. Publications bearing the Rabita’s imprint were readily apparent in the school’s library. The Call Society engages in similar activities, although its work often transmits the particular, and idiosyncratic, thoughts of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi.

A notable feature of these da-wa groups is their vigorous publication activities. The Rabita, for example, publishes a widely distributed monthly periodical in several languages, Majallat al-Rabita (League Journal; English title, The Muslim World League Journal). A typical issue contains educational and didactic pieces on various aspects of Muslim history and ritual, such as the hajj, but it also includes articles on issues of immediate relevance such as the Bosnian crisis and, at times, a review of contemporary intellectual debates in the West such as that inspired by Samuel Huntington’s Foreign Affairs article on “The Clash of Civilizations” (Muslim World League Journal 1994). The Rabita’s Southeast Asian affiliate, the Regional Islamic Dakwah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, publishes a regular periodical, alNahdah (The Renaissance) in thirteen regional languages, including English. The Libyan Call Society has published the periodical Risalat al-Jihad (Message of the Struggle), which in characteristically unrestrained language has criticized Muslim and non-Muslim regimes, as well as movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, for errant behavior (for example, “al-Wihdat” 1984). The Mu›tamar al-‹Alam al-Islami (Muslim World Congress), based in Karachi, publishes a weekly newsletter, The Muslim World, which reports on events throughout the world and urges on readers an appropriate Muslim conduct. For example, in 1994, readers were encouraged to protest against the supposed plans of the Austrian government to award the European Literature Prize to Salman Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses (“SecretaryGeneral’s Letter” 1994:1).

These nonstate organizations, particularly through their formal presentations of Islamic issues and standardization of language and approach, help to create incipient ideological communities that do not overlap neatly with those of state frontiers. The process of objectification is unfolding in the transnational arena as well as within national and local contexts.

A second and related way in which transnational Islam may be said to have political significance is in the increasing concern over the plight of Muslim minorities. In 1936, a new English-language journal, Genuine Islam, appeared in Singapore, which transmitted the Sufi ideas favored by its patrons but also regularly reported on Muslim concerns in Germany and elsewhere in the West as well as in Egypt, Palestine, and other largely Muslim societies (Weyland 1990:230–31). Today virtually every Muslim journal—such as Majallat al-Rabita, al-Nahdah, and others like the London-based Ahl al-Bayt (People of the [Prophet's] House), the Arabic and English language periodical of the Shi‹i Rabitat Ahl al-Bayt al-Islamiyya al-‹Alamiyya (World Ahl al-Bayt Islamic League)—has a section devoted to the problems and prospects of Muslim minority communities throughout the world. In the case of Ahl al-Bayt, "minority" often refers to Shi‹i communities within predominantly Sunni societies, as well as Muslim communities within nonMuslim societies. The Journal [of the] Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs has been especially effective in providing informed analyses of the diverse Muslim minorities of Asia, Europe, America, Africa, and even Latin America.

The dilemmas of Muslim minorities in the West are of special concern. A standard interpretation of Islamic traditions holds that Muslims must leave (hijra) or confront (jihad) un-Islamic society (dar al-harb [land of war] or dar al-kufr [land of unbelief]), and reside in dar al-Islam. Yet, because of economic or political deprivations or the desire to obtain education or reunite with family, Muslims have moved to Europe, the United States, and Australia in large numbers and now reside there permanently. This unexpected state of affairs has incited lively debate among Muslim intellectuals, with some arguing that hijra is permissible only as a strategy of da-wa—a way to propagate Islam— and others suggesting that this kind of migration is not only permissible but obligatory as a way for the umma to acquire the technical skills to progress (Masud 1990:42–43). Although a broad consensus appears to have emerged that the Muslim presence in Western societies is an irreversible fact of life, this state of affairs is not often viewed as satisfactory.

The debates within the minority communities themselves over the boundaries of accommodation to and protest against their home societies—the very stuff of their Muslim politics—have thus captured the attention of Muslim majority communities. Iranian publications, for example, follow these debates and speculate on the implications for their own understandings of Islam. Some are outrightly condemnatory, echoing the refrain commonly heard in the Muslim world that Muslim minorities, especially youth, are prey to the immoral and corrupting blandishments of Western materialism and popular culture (for

example, “WABIL Warns Muslim Immigrants” 1994). At the conclusion of a conference in London in January 1995 on relations between the Muslim and Western worlds, the intimate connection between the two “realms” of Islam—majority and minority Islam—was foremost in the minds of participants. They praised Saudi Arabia for its ostensible plans to launch a new Islamic satellite network to combat Westen media distortions of Islam. Satellite programming would penetrate Western societies and, by directly providing unbiased information on the Qur›an and hadith, link minority to majority. The Saudi Minister of Awqaf, Da‹wa, and Guidance, ‹Abdallah ibn ‹Abd alHasan al-Turki, said that it was imperative to find ways to rectify the image of Islam among Muslim minorities so as to help them avoid “the dissolution (tadhwib) of Muslim society in the minority country (bilad al-aqalliyat) in which they live (“Nadwat al-Islam fi wasa›il ali‹lam al-gharbi” 1995).

In explicitly acknowledging the permeability of frontiers—especially, as we have noted, in this age of globalized communication— Muslim leaders are subverting one of the presumed dichotomies of international relations: internal/external. On one level, it is conceded that dar al-kufr—or an intermediate, neutral realm, dar al-sulh (realm of truce) to which Western societies are often assigned—is an “external” domain in which Muslims routinely live. Yet, on another level, the defense and guidance of these very same Muslims are regarded as an “internal” Muslim prerogative. In such ways are the transnational dimensions of modern Islam transforming the Muslim political landscape.

A third reason why the transnational umma may be said to have acquired some substance is that Muslims are concerned with a number of “Muslim” issues. We do not mean to imply that these issues are Muslim in the sense that everyone understands them in a uniform or doctrinally defined way. Rather, they are Muslim in the sense that they take on symbolic currency and often play a part in Muslim politics. Examples of such issues include Afghanistan, Palestine, the Rusdhie affair, and Bosnia. In each, transnational concern is aroused because of the shared perception that Muslims and Islam are under attack and require defense.

Since at least the General Muslim Congress of December 1931, convened after the Wailing Wall riots of 1929 in order to promote protection of Muslim holy places, and more particularly the 1936–39 Palestinian Arab revolt against British rule, the issue of Palestine has exercised Muslim sentiment. The Congress, inspired by the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni (1897–1974), was intent on raising Muslim—and not simply Arab—consciousness about the growing Zionist movement and, of course, on soldifying his own ambitions to lead the Palestinian national movement (Kramer 1986:123–27). Since then and for reasons we outlined in Chapter 1, Muslims from around the world have identified themselves with the aspirations of the Palestinian people, and at times—such as in Egypt in the 1930s (see A. Cohen 1982:140–41)—manipulated the symbolic significance of the issue to validate their own claims to authority in the competition with rivals. “Palestine” has thus become a major element in the symbolic politics of Islam.

In Dhaka, Bangladesh, the Islamic Research Centre produced a characteristic book entitled The Palestine Issue and the Muslim World, which was “aimed at providing ... readers with an idea that it is the matter of faith in Islam and not adherence to the modern concept of Arab Nationalism that will ultimately decide the question of Palestine, nay, the conflict between Islam and the evil forces of Nimrod opposing it” (Jalil 1981:iv). The apocalyptic language highlights the depth of concern over the issue that has been felt in Bangladesh, and simultaneously undermines received notions that only the Arabs have an entitlement to the moral high ground in the defense of Palestine.

In South Africa, Muslims have been agitated over the Palestine question from at least 1948, and, in Durban for instance, a Palestine Islamic Solidarity Committee was established. Car stickers proclaiming support for the Palestinians have also become popular. The Muslim News, a leading newspaper in the Muslim community from 1960 to 1968, was a vocal critic of Zionism, even incurring an official ban on particular issues because of its inflammatory rhetoric. As sincere as Muslim sentiment doubtless was, another level of interaction was present. Identification with the Palestinians was at once an affirmation of Muslim “kinship” and a demand for justice for Muslims at home:

The Muslims throughout the world, be they in China or Palestine, see themselves as a single unit, linked by a dynamic that does not allow themselves to remain silent when people, especially those of the same faith, have their human rights trampled upon.... We, as Muslims, identify with the oppressed Palestinians because we experience oppression ourselves under unjust rulers in this country. If we are being accused, as Muslims, of importing the problems of the Middle East into this country we don’t deny the fact because the laws of South Africa force us to identify more closely with the oppressed people of Palestine. We are Muslims first and last, therefore, whatever happens to our brethren in the Middle East is of dire importance to us. In the same way that their problems are ours, our problems here in South Africa are theirs (cited in Haron

1993:224).

The Bosnian issue has also become a matter of general concern and has rapidly acquired prominence in the symbolic politics of Muslims. To give one example of grass-roots activity, Islamic Relief, the Central Women’s Association, and other Muslim organizations throughout Britain have organized fund-raising dinners and drives to assist the Bosnians, and many community leaders have called upon the OIC to send troops to the front (“Focus on Bosnia” 1994). In July 1993, six Muslim nations—Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Tunisia—as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization offered to send up to eighteen thousand troops to support the Muslims (Curtius 1993), and at least Iran and Saudi Arabia seem to have provided covert assistance in the form of weapons, ammunition, and armored combat vehicles (Tabatabai 1993). To mixed effect, Muslim “vounteers” also went to Bosnia, as they had as mujahidin to Afghanistan. But Bosnia was not Afghanistan, and many of the volunteers “found the Muslims of Bosnia a peculiar lot, secularists through and

through, children of Europe lightly touched by the faith" (Ajami 1994:35). Yet, in a sense, this realization was less important than the general outrage at what has been viewed as a genocidal attack on Islam.

While many Muslims have thus denounced both the parsimony and hesitations of Muslim governments, they have also sharply attacked the West for its reversals of policy and failure to punish the "aggressive" Serbs. Some have even seen in the Western handling of the crisis a profoundly negative commentary on Western values. The Turkish president, for example, accused the West of a double standard in which the obvious aggressor was not punished because of engrained fears of a Muslim state in the midst of Europe (Pope 1993).

As with the Palestinian issue, the transformation of Bosnia into a Muslim issue has not lacked local effects. Turkish outspokenness has helped to enhance Turkey's influence in the Balkan region and, perhaps more importantly, to signal to Central Asian Muslims that it can be counted on as a committed friend. The Malaysian government was the first member state of the United Nations to break diplomatic relations with Serbia, and it has opened refugee camps for Bosnians and channeled humanitarian aid to them ("Malaysia's Stand on the Bosnian Issue" 1992). While thus advancing Malaysia's international standing, Prime Minister Mahathir (b. 1925; r. 1981–) has been able at the same time to solidify his own standing at home, particularly in light of the concern expressed on the issue by such important Muslim groups as ABIM. One indicator of his relative success is the favorable comment his lead has drawn from erstwhile critics of his regime. Chandra Muzaffar, a Muslim intellectual and founder of the reformist, citizens' rights group ALIRAN (Persatuan Aliran Kesedaran Negara, Society for National Consciousness), has in the past been placed under detention, but on this issue he has applauded the prime minister's forthright condemnation of Western equivocation (Khan and Abdullah 1993).

*** The Significance of Muslim Transnationalism: Tablighi Jama‹at

The nature of Muslim transnationalism may be elucidated by an examination of one transnational movement.[42] Tablighi Jama‹at is a movement that began in India in the late 1920s and is devoted to the propagation (tabligh) of Islam. It is principally directed toward fellow Muslims whose faith seems to have been corrupted or lapsed. Appealing originally to illiterate or semiliterate peasants but gradually attracting followers in the professions and among the well-educated, Tablighi Jama‹at expanded, at first, from the region of Mewat to most of the Indian subcontinent, and, then, from South Asia to the Arab world, Africa, Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America. One study indicates that the growth rate of the movement in Pakistan is higher than that of the hajj (Qurashi 1989).

Its rapid expansion may be explained by patterns of migration from the Indian subcontinent and by reliance on nearly worldwide networks of Indian merchants; the doctrinal simplicity

and transsectarianism of its ideology; and the tolerance of local governments in response to the movement's avowed apoliticism. Tablighi Jama‹at would thus seem to radiate outward from an originating center and to contribute toward the concretization of a religious and social identity not based on the political culture of the nation-state.

As with the earlier examples discussed, however, the transnationalism of Tablighi Jama‹at poses certain challenges to conventional assumptions:

**** Center-Periphery Relations

One could possibly argue that a hegemonic center exploits a weak periphery in transnational orders (for example, Baran 1957; Amin 1990). Yet, as we have suggested, the notion of a uniform central focus in Islam appears to be questionable (also see Eickelman and Piscatori 1990:12–14)—as perhaps one could even say of the Catholic church. The "ultramontism" of the papacy in the nineteenth century may in fact have entailed its subordination to French and Italian episcopates. The paramount position of Mecca in Islam is challenged by such other centers as Karbala and Qum (for the Shi‹a), Cairo (for the Sunnis), Touba in Senegal (for Mourid Sufis), and, not least, London and Paris (for the large number of European Muslims and Muslim visitors). Moreover, to assume that the center supersedes authentic local traditions may be tantamount to applying stereotyped standards of authenticity and cultural purity; these standards may constitute a caricature of Muslim societies that are constantly changing and, in several though differing ways, interconnected.

The Tablighis seem alternately to accord primacy to the Nizamuddin mosque and educational complex in India, the Arabia of the holy cities, and Dewsbury in Britain where large numbers of Tablighis annually congregate. It may have been the case in many countries that Tablighis hailed from South Asia, and it may be true that delegations routinely go there for inspiration and to participate in the regular international convocation (ijtima‹). Yet there is no evidence that local branches are either chiefly funded by or directed from an outside center, and, as testified by the examples of Morocco, France, and Belgium where Arab and European missionaries predominate, Indian Tablighis have not always been the direct agents of transmission.[43]

In fact, the Tablighi Jama‹at becomes localized over time, much as the Muslim Brotherhood has become "Jordanian" or "Syrian" despite its origins in Egypt, or, in the Catholic world, as churches have increasingly taken on national identities. As Immanuel Wallerstein says, universalist and particularist forces "are not opposites but a symbiotic pair" (1991:167). However present the sense of participating in a great enterprise or of belonging to the worldwide community of believers, Tablighis are so dependent on local—national, provincial, city, and village—resources that they are almost inevitably transformed by the "periphery." In Belgium, the Jama‹at "remains faithful to the objectives and the missionary principles established by the founder [Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas Kandhalawi (1885–1944)], and it

makes use of human resources provided by the secular society which also constitute the human material considered by the founder as targets for Tablighi action" (Dassetto 1988:163).

In contrast to what has often been expected of transnational interactions, local experiences, in time, may thus produce an impact on the wider movement. In Catholicism, Pope John Paul II remains critical of liberation theology in Latin America and elsewhere, but he cannot escape subtle shifts in his social thought as a result of his connections with worldwide Catholic networks. This dialectical relationship between "center" and "periphery" is also present in the Tablighi case. The experience of life in such industrial democracies as France or Canada, for example, may have inspired the general sense that women should be full participants of the movement and the specific provision for day-care centers. The Moroccan Jama‹at now provides creches for its members, and there is a woman's branch of the

Tablighis in Aligarh.

The pattern of localization may also be applicable to exponents of missionary work (da-is) who begin to identify with those they intend to convert. Although Tablighis from several countries may descend on Muslim communities in Malaysia or Nigeria with the intention of disturbing, and rooting out, supposedly locally inspired mispractices, they have often come to appreciate the force of such specific circumstances as multiculturalism, sectarianism, or an official ethos of secularism that the local inhabitants face.

**** Instrumentality and Competition of Transnational Forces

This localization of a transnational movement suggests that Muslim transnationalism does not simply undercut existing state structures and lead to "denationalization" as might have been assumed from a reading of at least part of the transnational literature (see, for example, Sakamoto 1975:198–99). To the contrary, a dual effect exists. On the one hand, the ideological appeal of nationalism and, to some extent, the autonomy of state policies are diminished by the enhancement of both the sense and the institutions of greater community. The Tablighis, in terms of rhetoric and cosmopolitan membership, direct followers toward the pan-Islamic umma.

On the other hand, national regimes attempt to use transnational linkages to solidify or advance their own influence, and the da-wa groups mentioned above often project the ideological agenda of their primary state sponsors. The Libyans use the Islamic Call Society to advance their influence, especially in Africa. Although the Muslim World Congress is less identified with the Pakistani government, its positions and those of the Zia ul-Haq regime were complementary.

Saudi Arabia utilizes the Muslim World League and such related organizations as al-Majlis al-‹Alami li-l-Masajid (the World Council of Mosques) and al-Nadwa al-‹Alamiyya li-l-Shibab al-Islami (the World Assembly of Muslim Youth) to advance its relatively conservative brand of Islam, particularly to counter Iranian-inspired movements and ideas. Recognizing the importance of global communications, moreover, Saudi businessmen, connected to ruling circles though not simply controlled by them, have become major media players in the Arabic-speaking world. In addition to Saudi government plans for an Islamic satellite network, the Middle East Broadcast Centre (MBC) based in London, which broadcasts in Europe and the Middle East and, since September 1993, the United States (via ANA, the Arab Network of America), is tantamount to a Saudi version of Cable Network News. Arab Radio and Television (ART) broadcasts via Cairo and Rome. Like the other Saudi-sponsored cable services, its intent to counter alien cultural influences is clear. In the words of one of ART's managers, "We will do anything we can do to protect our Arab children from the coming invasion from western countries" (Khalaf 1994). Saudi influence over the press is similarly strong. MBC owns the United Press International (UPI) wire service, and the Saudi Research and Marketing Company based in London owns at least ten newspapers and periodicals with an international distribution, including al-Hayat, al-Sharq al-Awsat, and al-Majalla (Khalaf 1994; Marlowe 1992).

The Saudis also less publicly support a variety of groups throughout the Muslim world. It is impossible to track the extent of these financial subventions and to whom they are directed, and the degree of Saudi involvement is almost certainly overstated. Yet there is no doubt that the Saudis have, at various times, provided assistance to groups such as Ikhwan al-Muslimun in Egypt and Jordan, Jama‹at-i Islami in South Asia and Britain, Hizb-i Islami in Afghanistan, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, factions of the Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria, Jama‹at Nasr al-Islam (Society for the Victory of Islam) in Nigeria, and the Warith ad-Din–led Nation of Islam in the United States (see Black, Pugh et al. 1992; Backmann 1990; Rubin 1995:182–83, 197–98; Legrain 1991:75–79; Kane 1994:495).

The much-vaunted export of the Iranian revolution is another example of how da-wa activities may convey the political imprint of their state sponsors. Ayatullah Khomeini left no doubt that the logic of the Islamic revolution required a transcending of Iranian frontiers:

The Iranian Revolution is not exclusively that of Iran, because Islam does not belong to any particular people.... We will export our Revolution throughout the world because it is an Islamic revolution. The struggle will continue until the calls "there is no god but God" and "Muhammad is the messanger of God" are echoed all over the world. (cited in Rajaee 1983:82–83)

It has been argued that the primary way of achieving these goals is education and propaganda, but the Iranians are widely believed to supply financial, political, and military

assistance to groups in various parts of the Muslim world. As with the Saudis, charges of Islamic revolutionary intrigue and influence often betray the exaggerated fears that many governments—in the West as well as the Muslim world— hold toward Iran. Yet there is no denying that Iran has provided logistical, training, and financial support to Hizbullah in Lebanon and, particularly since the Arab-Israeli peace process moved dramatically forward in 1993, to Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza. Iraqi Shi‹i groups such as Hizb al-Da‹wa al-Islamiyya and particularly al-Majlis al-A‹la li-l-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi-l-‹Iraq (the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) have also received significant amounts of Iranian assistance. Pasdaran or Revolutionary Guards have been despatched to the Biqa‹ Valley in Lebanon in support of Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad, and, putatively, to the Sudan where they are thought to bolster the Islamic-oriented military regime that seized power in 1985 (see Katzman 1993).

Calculated, state-sponsored efforts may prove counterproductive, however. In such circumstances, when the heavy hand of state manipulation becomes resented, a transnational movement like Tablighi Jama‹at may acquire an advantage. Clearly, a movement which appears apolitical—even though in fact it may not be—and which advocates a kind of anti-institutional pan-Islam would have its attractions. This appeal would, in turn, allow the movement to manipulate the transnational ideology of “Islam” for its own purposes.

Indeed, although the Jama‹at avers apoliticism (see Metcalf 1993: 593–96) and eschews confrontation with established authority, it inevitably participates in political activity as it propagates its message.[44] In light of what we have said about objectification, it would be surprising if politicization were avoided:

[T]he very radicalism of their faith and their models of reference are powerful elements in a critique of political systems, particularly those defining themselves as Islamic. Everything suggests that the Tablighis, far removed from power by virtue of their position in society, instead of attaching themselves to it engage in challenging its legitimacy. They go to the heart of the problem of power in “Muslim” countries without touching it (Dassetto 1988:162).

Even in societies such as Belgium, the self-conscious and standardized understanding of what Muslims regard as Islamic orthodoxy has telling effect. The Tablighis have used the law on associations to promote their group interests, and, in doing so, they have entered into competition with other Islamic da-wa or missionary groups such as the Rabita. The competition is rarely vitriolic, but it involves a pointed contest over who speaks for a morally transformative Islam.

Although the groups would deny it, the competition is over the right to manipulate the symbolic capital of Islam and, ultimately, territory: Who speaks for Islam here?

To modify Appadurai’s perspective, therefore, deterritorialization has its limits. Consistent with a worldview that interiorizes states of purity and unbelief but ends by a kind of exteriorization, the Tablighis view the Islamic realm (dar al-Islam) as the territory of the soul, but end by identifying it with the home, the local community, and only finally, the pan-Islamic community. Just as kufr (unbelief) or bida‹ (unacceptable innovations) are thought of as states of mind but dealt with on the level of social organization, dar al-Islam—sacred space—becomes externalized and identified with domestic and territorial space. This carries within it the seed of competition with other Muslim groups that espouse their own visions of Islamic community. The competitiveness and politicization of da-wa successively complicate the general transnational politics of Islam and render the search for pan-Islamic integration all the more difficult.

**** Blurring of Boundaries Between Internal and External

As the prior discussion suggests, traditional dichotomizations of “inside/outside” and “internal/external” are unhelpful in understanding the dynamics of Muslim politics. The state is obviously permeable and “invites religious encroachment, precisely but not wholly because it is increasingly concerned with matters traditionally associated with the religious domain” (Robertson and Chirico 1985:225). One may, however, also point to structural factors, such as large-scale migration—the consequence of crises of the world capitalist system like mass un- or under-employment and political repression (Gunatilleke 1986, 1991) — and ideological fluidity as a result of both the global communications network and the movement of peoples. One of the reasons why the reaction to Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in Britain was so vocal was that Britain encompasses roughly 1.5 million Muslims, among whom slightly more than half are of South Asian origin. Only a generation removed from their peasant origins, they are, in one view, sensitive to appeals framed in terms of defense of honor and tradition (Ruthven 1990).

But the process is complex. Given that, at least initially, they stand apart from the traditional norms of British society and are compelled to formulate their religious aspirations through the mediating language of English, they come to feel a certain form of solidarity as against Christian British society. They “become” Muslim, rather than Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Gujarati, or Pathan (compare Warner 1992: 32–33). Yet, at the same time, they remain open to the pulls of the “homeland.” British Muslims of South Asian origin are mainly Barelwis, who follow pirs and are mystical in orientation but who are not entirely averse to political activity. Their primary competitors are the Deobandis, whose tendency is toward scripturalism in spiritual matters and apoliticism in worldly matters. They have been especially adept at disseminating their message of inner reform, owing largely to the vigor and organizational skills of Tablighi Jama‹at.

For the Tablighis, therefore, Muslimness is being affirmed on one level of consciousness, while sectarianism on another is subtly invoked and manipulated. Identifiably sectarian

mosques and schools constitute fertile ground for the Tablighis, for they simultaneously provide a bridge between the external world of South Asian, Deobandi Islam and the internal world of British Islam, between the past of the family homeland and the future of their new home. In many ways, as we have seen throughout this work, the emergence of a transnational Muslim civil society (see Peterson 1992: 376–88; Lipschutz 1992) has constituted or reaffirmed local Muslim identities even as it may act to subvert traditional hegemonic relations. To use inadequate but evocative language, Islam out “there” is now “here,” and the here of contemporary Britain is intimately tied to and transformed by the world out there.

In breaking down the barriers, therefore, transnational linkages may both empower and endanger. On the one hand, the sense of the umma grows more palpable in important respects and affirms to Muslims that they are not alone in their struggles and aspirations. To use the metaphor of Kalim Siddiqui, they feel increasingly able to plug into the “global grid of the power of Islam” (Siddiqui 1990:7). Yet, on the other hand, it is also clear that states and local identities may be reinforced, not undermined, by transnational interactions. Moreover, the electrical grid metaphor can be countered with the metaphor of the conveyor belt: political ideas and problems from elsewhere may be brought directly into one’s society. As the Islamist hijacking of an Air France jet in late December 1994 indicates, the fear of the French authorities that the civil strife of Algeria would be imported to France is not without substance (Charpentier 1994; Sage 1994; Swain, Franchetti and Leppard 1995). As unpredictable as this intricate political geography is, it reveals a more subtle appreciation of Muslim politics than that afforded by an either-or frame of analysis.

*** The Civic Geography of Muslim Politics

In an earlier era, the interpretation of sacred texts throughout the Muslim world was predominately the domain of a religious elite. With the advent of mass education and mass communications, their reinterpretation has become more diffuse, engendering a heightened confrontation and bargaining over the often blurred boundaries of religion and politics. In one sense, this means a relativization in the interpretation of sacred texts. In his widely disseminated al-Kitab wa-lQur›an: Qira›a Mu‹asira (The Book and the Qur›an: A contemporary reading), the Syrian civil engineer Muhammad Shahrur (1992) draws an analogy between the Copernican revolution and Qur›anic interpretation, which he says has been shackled by the conventions of medieval jurists:

People believed for a long time that the sun revolved around the moon, but they were unable to explain some phenomena derived from this assumption until one person, human like themselves, said, ‘The opposite is true: The earth revolves around the sun.’... After a quarter of a century of study and reflection, it dawned on me that we Muslims are shackled by prejudices (musallimat), some of which are completely opposite the [correct perspective] (1992:29).

On issues ranging from the role of women in society to rekindling a “creative interaction” with non-Muslim philosophies, Shahrur argues that Muslims should reinterpret sacred texts anew and apply them to contemporary social and moral issues: “If Islam is sound [salih] for all times and places,” then we must not neglect historical developments and the interaction of different generations. We must act as if “the Prophet just ... informed us of this Book” (Shahrur 1992:44; see also, Shahrur 1994).

In some respects, Shahrur’s book is an intellectual equivalent in the Arab world to Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind (1987), and in this respect he is not alone in attacking both conventional religious wisdom and the intolerant certainties of religious radicals and in arguing instead for a constant and open reinterpretation of how sacred texts apply to social and political life. A Kuwaiti bookseller argued in 1993 that Shahrur’s book “is more dangerous than Rushdie’s Satanic

Verses, [because] Shahrur writes that he believes in the basic tenets of Islam like the rest of us” (cited in Eickelman 1993). Although most of the Arab mass media have avoided presenting the contents of his book, the attacks of the religious establishment against it have offered an indirect measure of its significance and inadvertently signaled its existence to new audiences. Like al-‹Azm (1994) and Binsa‹id (1993), among others, Shahrur argues that a proper understanding of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence enjoins dialogue and a willingness to understand diverse opinions, and that this dialogue entails adaptation and the continual renewal of religious understandings within a framework of civility. Of course, such “frameworks of civility” remain fragile, as indicated by the censorship of the collected articles of Sadiq al-Nayhum (d. 1994) (1994) by Lebanon’s highest Sunni religious authority, Dar al-Fatwa. The publisher, who had just relocated his business from London to Beirut, warned the Prime Minister that he would again leave Lebanon unless the censorship of this and other books was revoked. Over 120 Lebanese signed an open letter protesting the censorship (al-Rayyes 1995).

Such dialogue is not confined to the literati. Major innovations in the Muslim world have often come from the “edge” and the “periphery,” notions that are highly fluid, as Bulliet (1994:201–7) reminds us. Today’s innovators are more likely to be religiously minded engineers—such as Syria’s Muhammad Shahrur—or Iran’s late ‹Ali

Shar‹iati, a sociologist—than conventionally trained religious specialists. A second supposed “edge” is the explosively growing masses of urban poor throughout the post–World War II Muslim world. As Bulliet suggests, these recent migrants respond to leaders who emulate conventional forms of religious authority, but who also speak directly to them about things that matter, including “access to jobs, provision of social services, curbing of government neglect and corruption [and] morality in public behavior” (1994:202). As in the past, these transformations in religious sensibilities often come from the bottom up, rather than from established intellectual and political elites.

France is only one of many European states where there has been a major transformation in Muslim sensibilities. France, regarded through the 1970s as dar al-harb has become dar al-Islam for many believers, or—a somewhat intermediate position —dar al--ahd, or land of contractual peace, in which the state and religion reach a mutually satisfactory accommodation (Kepel 1994b:207). Thus, when Muslim militants speak about Islam in France, they implicitly claim that France and the state must adapt to Islam. Other Muslims act out a distinctly French Islam, suggesting that through education, socialization in French rather than in a Middle Eastern or South Asian language, and accommodation with non-Muslim neighbors, Islam as practiced and thought has taken a distinctly French form.

In France, as elsewhere, the state fails to manipulate Islam for its purposes, just as Muslims are unable to control fully the political and social environment in which Islam is practiced and expressed. In France, as in Germany, Britain, and the United States, Muslims are caught up in contexts in which they explicitly or indirectly contest and redefine the boundaries of Islam and politics. In so doing, often they challenge the boundaries of the state itself. Thus for France, the Algerian problem is not just a foreign concern, but a French one. As often as not, the Minister of the Interior takes the lead in defining French policy and in linking developments in France with those on the southern shore of the Mediterranean (see fig. 15).

Similarly, faxes sent to Saudi Arabia from outside the kingdom call into question the regime’s religious credentials and authority, forcing it to recognize these challenges and respond to them through the media it controls or influences, condemning those who copy or distribute documents that slander the “legitimate rule” as guilty of a sin equal to that of those who create them (al-‹Uthaymayn 1994). Especially since the Gulf crisis of 1990–91, Saudi Arabia has witnessed an explosion of public discussion on the fundamental nature of its society and politics. Earlier attempts at such debate can certainly be found, such as Prince Talal ibn ‹Abd al-‹Aziz’s unprecedented call for constitutional reform, Risala ila muwatin (Letter to a compatriot) (1985), originally written during the Nasserist-led challenges of the early 1960s. But the recent period is notable for the diversity and quantity of attacks on, and counterattacks from, a regime that prides itself on its paramount service to Islam. Cassettes of popular sermons, faxed indictments from individual dissidents, electronically mailed pronouncements of human rights groups, official fatawa and bayans of the Committee of Grand ‹Ulama, and publications of the Rabitat al‹Alam al-Islami (the Muslim World League) all compete for public support.

In this process, two trends are discernible. First, the Saudi government’s attempt to manipulate religious discourse to bolster its legitimacy has produced an ironic countereffect: It has stimulated critics to seek in the printed formulation of their own views the most effective means to mount their protest. In a society in which considerable pride has been placed in the ability of individuals to seek direct redress of their grievances in regular majlis sessions with the king and other notables, attentive publics have increasingly turned to less personalized and more formal ways to express themselves. Thus, for example, government policies generate publicly critical memoranda

(nasihas) that are responded to in official fatawa, which in turn encourage further unsolicited, and reproducible, “advice.”

[[d-f-dale-f-eickelman-and-james-piscatori-muslim-po-17.png][Fig. 15. “Good! Whew! In short, this isn’t going to be easy.” French Minister of the Interior explains to the police how to distinguish between “moderate Muslims” and “dangerous ‘fundamentalists.’”.]]

Second, among the disparate actors in Saudi society, a striking convergence of discourse is occurring. As we saw in Chapter 3, the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (Lajnat al-Difa‹ ‹an al-Huquq al-Shar‹iyya)—consisting of lay and religiously trained individuals—in its very name evokes the language of both human rights and shari-a. This overlapping of discursive worlds is likely to strengthen the appeal of formalized criticism of the regime among the literate classes of society—however educated—and hence pose formidable challenges to ruling circles. The constitutional statement of March 1992, reaffirming the kingdom’s Islamic destiny while articulating for the first time certain limitations on the power of government, indicates an official awareness, to some extent, of the need to be responsive. The boundaries of public life are being redrawn. Yet this reconfiguration—or, to change the metaphor, this opening of the Pandora’s box of “print Islam”—is intensifying the fragmentation of authority. In the medium term, this may well generate an Islamic-tinged authoritarianism—in the kingdom as throughout the Muslim world— but over the long term it may well precipitate a civic pluralism.

If one is optimistic, the intensified confrontation and bargaining now apparent throughout the region can be seen as the incorporation, even if grudgingly, of voices previously excluded from the political arena. Even if the formal rhetoric of conservative states still stresses a trickle-down theory of development, in which all good flows from the top, large numbers of people now have the means to question authority and—thanks to a communications revolution that has undermined the efficacy of state censors—the ability to learn about a world independent of that offered by the state.

The issue of Islam’s compatibility with democracy has been thoroughly explored for both the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world (Hefner 1993; Madjid 1994; Norton 1993, 1995a, 1995b; Salamé 1994). Of signal importance is the strengthening of voluntary and nongovernmental organizations despite the fact that some terrain in the Muslim world may initially appear unpromising (compare Putnam 1993). Thus, it has been argued that Ottoman society lacked autonomous corporate bodies that could protect individuals against the arbitrary power of the state (see Ozbudun 1992:200–201). More recently, in a 1993 poll in Jordan, only 1.4 percent of respondents claimed affiliation with a political party and only 6.5 percent declared themselves prepared to do so in the future, in spite of an unprecedented wave of electoral activity—in 1993, Jordan had its second free parliamentary elections in four years (Brand 1995:148, 165). Yet politics pervaded the professional associations, labor unions, women’s groups, sports clubs, and family and tribal associations that proliferated

throughout Jordan. Through these associations, Jordanians could organize and express themselves and yet avoid a direct challenge to the state (Brand 1995:163–80).

Elsewhere, as in Morocco, recent municipal and parliamentary elections may appear indecisive, and certainly no triumph for organized political parties, but the numbers of people involved in registering, campaigning, arbitrating alleged irregularities, and voting have irreversibly heightened the general political consciousness (Eickelman 1994:269–70). Even though some people are disillusioned with existing political frameworks, most do not reject them outright. Some ruling elites undoubtedly cynically manipulate proclamations of adhesion to the "rule of law." Yet even in such cases, the act of claiming respect for such principles generates awareness among an increasingly sophisticated citizenry of what is needed to achieve a more just society.

In many Muslim majority countries, it can be argued that dynamic civil society can exist without formal political organizations because pervasive informal organizational structures often serve as the framework for effective political, social, and economic action. Over two decades ago, for example, James Bill suggested that an understanding of Iranian politics meant recognizing the significance of the dawra—an informal group of individuals who meet periodically. These circles could be formed through overlapping professional, religious, political, and economic ties, and networks of these interlocking coteries disseminated information and views and shaped forms of everyday resistance. Cumulatively, without an effective center or formal leadership for state authorities to co-opt, coerce, or suppress, such networks contributed to constraining the arbitrariness of the state and its exercise of authority. Dawras fragmented and re-formed as the interests of their members changed, and many individuals belonged to multiple circles (Bill 1973). Most Iranians assumed that real access to authority was through informal channels, so direct personal ties of trust and obligation, more than declared ideological preferences, were integral to understanding political action.

One scholar has noted with irony that the small-scale monarchies of the Arab Gulf best replicate the attributes of "oligarchic republicanism" that prevailed in ancient Athens (Salamé 1994:100; see also Hicks and al-Najjar 1995). Although many residents of such oil-rich states are noncitizens and lack political rights, males with full citizenship participate vigorously in far-reaching debates. In Kuwait, some of these debates take place in the reconstituted parliament; others occur in the context of networks of interlocking diwaniyyas—it is tempting to gloss the term as "salon"—which function much like the Iranian dawra. As we noted in Chapter 4, diwaniyyas in Kuwait can be for men, for women, or, since the 1990s, for both men and women. Added to these institutions are the jama-at ta‹awuniyya, neighborhood cooperative societies, which served as significant political arenas when Kuwait was deprived of its parliament and played a significant role in organizing daily life and resistance during the 1990–91 Iraqi occupation.

It might be argued that the Gulf states represent a special case of informal associations, but such ties are also crucial in larger political arenas. In Turkey, for example, the Islamic-oriented Welfare party (RP) won victories in the March 1994 local elections through a strategy that relied on building ties of interpersonal trust, taking “full advantage of neighborhood, regional, and other cultural bonds that tie people to one another in mutual assistance as well as its flip side: mutual obligation” (White 1995:11–12). In Algeria, the compact put forward by the FLN, in which citizens gave up political participation in exchange for economic security after Algeria’s independence in 1962, gradually eroded in the face of mounting inefficiency and corruption. As a last resort, the FLN in the period before military rule in January 1992 offered another “grand bargain,” this time a democratic one (Leca 1994:67–68)—granting new elites some access to authority in exchange for restored regime legitimacy and the prospects of future economic improvements and political liberalization. But it was too late for such a move to be convincing. Islamic associations, often existing on the margins of legality through the 1970s, gradually took over where state services had all but collapsed, building mosques, running schools and clinics, and providing services that the state was no longer willing or able to provide (Rouadjia 1990). The bonds of reciprocity and obligation created through these activities fostered a sense of moral and spiritual renewal and provided the necessary basis for Islamist organizations to create new political purpose and community and to achieve a significant victory in the 1990–91 Algerian elections (Vergès 1994:78– 82). In some views, civil society has all but collapsed in Algeria and the Sudan, but underlying mutual ties of commitment, concealed from state authorities and outsiders out of necessity, often exist independent of the state or in defiance of it (Simone 1994:67). These networks of understanding and reciprocal obligation make a semblance of collective life possible where the state has failed.

From Morocco through Turkey and Indonesia, formal civic institutions have begun to reach a critical mass with associations of migrants, journalists, human rights organizations, doctors, lawyers, women’s rights groups, and political parties. They are often built on the resilient framework of informal networks of trust and responsibility—informal associations—and the line between formal and informal associations is often exceedingly thin. Even in the Sultanate of Oman, seemingly removed from the vanguard of democratization and the development of civic associations, rising standards of education have created a citizenry that finds ways to breathe life into apolitical or moribund institutions. Discussions about fielding a sports team, improving hygiene in the market, or using a municipal budget to create a library or youth club rather than resurfacing a road or installing street lighting offer citizens an opportunity to express their views and learn to organize to get things done. Elsewhere, as in Morocco, the decision by a parents’ group to refurbish and pay for a prayer room in a secondary school, to offer lodging to indigent university students, or to offer medical services to the needy may be formally framed as apolitical activities, but they offer citizens the opportunity to work together, independent of state initiatives, to achieve common goals.

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An exclusive focus on election results or the assertion that democracy is categorically either present or absent deflects attention from major changes taking place beneath the surface.

They suggest that a transition is being made to a less arbitrary, exclusive, and authoritarian rule, notwithstanding the conditions of rapid population growth, stagnating economies, rising unemployment, and a young citizenry that is more articulate than preceding generations and less patient with conventional political arrangements. Even if the “hidden transcript” often remains a better measure of political vitality than the “public” one (Bennani-Chraïbi 1994:283–93; compare Scott 1990), disillusion has not led inexorably to revolt or to religious and political radicalism. There may be disillusion with existing political frameworks, but this does not necessarily mean their outright rejection.

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*** Of Paradigms and Policies

Lapidary formulas such as the “West versus Rest” (Huntington 1993) are deceptive in their Manichaean simplicity. This “essentializing” of civilizational traditions deflects attention from their internal and historical variations and from the vigorous internal debate among their adherents. Muslims, like other peoples, are themselves engaged in vigorous intellectual debates about the themes raised in this book. The upshot is Muslim “agency” in the sense that sociologist Anthony Giddens (1979:54, 256–57) uses the term—an individual’s or group’s capability to intervene, or to refrain from intervening, in a series of events so as to influence their course. Muslims increasingly perceive that Islam offers them agency, but not in the sense of a monolithic force. The new geography of Muslim politics also precludes a “West versus Rest” mentality because of the dissolution of prior notions of distance and frontier. A significant and continually growing Muslim voice is in the “West” itself. Muslim political voices are as likely to be heard in Washington as in Karachi, in Detroit as in Dhaka, and in Moscow as in Cairo. Because of permanent hijra (emigration), Western and Muslim societies are now on the threshhold of new understandings of one another.

Misleading in other respects, Huntington’s provocative formula reintroduced the concept of culture—albeit a dated and deeply flawed one—to the study of foreign policy and international relations and underscored the notion that nation-states are no longer the sole source of identity in politics. Civilizations, however, do not act on the human stage; actors are shaped by civilizational traditions. Even in societies labeled as “traditional”—or, alternatively, as populist—there is diversity and internal debate over identifying key civilizational values, who is “authorized” to articulate them, and how they are implemented. As a result, civilizations, like cultures, are “contested, temporal, and emergent” (Clifford and Marcus 1986:18). Essentializing formulations such as Huntington’s are pernicious because they deflect attention away from the cultural dynamics of political change.

Consistent with our argument throughout this book, Muslim politics is sufficiently complex that any attempt to reduce it to a single formula leads to mystification; rather than being monolithic, Muslim politics, while aspiring to umma-wide universals, derives its force and significance from the specific contexts, times, and localities in which it takes place. “Islam” cannot thus be a threat, any more than the “West” can be for Muslims, despite

Khomeinist demonization of all Western policy as inherently malicious and antithetical to Muslim aspirations. Muslim politics have a transnational dimension, but this does not imply that one Muslim cultural unit has coalesced or that a transnational Islamic space has acquired dominance. Even Muslims who denounce Western values accept many Western borrowings, as brought home by one religious activist in the Arab Gulf. In a 1978 interview, he explained how democracy would never take hold in the Muslim world because it was a concept alien to shura, which was Qur›anic and Islamic. In 1990, however, he asserted that al-dimuqratiyya (democracy) was compatible with Islam. When reminded of what he said a decade earlier, he replied: “Now we know better. Shura is not a major concept in the Qur›an and its few usages there are ambiguous. Democracy can be adapted to Islamic ideals” (interview with Dale F. Eickelman, April 27, 1990).

There is a way to think about politics and policy that goes beyond simply replicating the structure of political wisdom that dominated the cold war years. Responding to critics of his proposal to replace the cold war foreign policy paradigm with one based on the clash of civilizations, Huntington (1993:86) argues that people think “abstractly” when they think “seriously.” Although the cold war paradigm “could not account for everything that went on in world politics,” it accounted for “more important phenomena than any of its rivals” and “shaped thinking about world politics for two generations.” Huntington invokes Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) to assert that scientific advances consist “of the displacement of one paradigm by another.” By analogy, he claims that we need an equivalent “simple map of the post-Cold War world” (Huntington 1993:186–87).

A “simple map,” however, may be precisely the problem, especially if it is based on dated and misleading assumptions. Historians of science no longer focus almost exclusively on “theory,” as did Kuhn who, according to Peter Galison, invoked specific cases only to “confirm, refute, or generate theory” (1988:208). Galison, by way of comparison, proposes that those who seek to understand developments in science should avoid assuming that there is a fixed, hierarchical relation between theory, the instruments of perception, and experiment. There is no reason to assume that any one of these factors is inherently more important than the others. Similarly, a reliance on “simple” paradigms may inadvertently keep policymakers from envisioning alternative, more effective ways of thinking about other people’s politics.

In the specific context of Muslim politics, deemphasizing paradigms and reimagining the challenges policymakers will face in the years ahead entail listening to the many Muslim voices, not merely those of a Westernized elite. The first step is to learn to elicit their cultural notions of legitimate authority and justice and to recognize that ideas of just rule, religious or otherwise, are not fixed, even if some claim that they are. These notions are debated, argued, fought about, and reformed in practice. But the challenge is not only to recognize that such debates are occurring, although that recognition in itself would be salutary. More important is the need to place these debates in their settings, to understand the obstacles, false starts, accommodations, interconnections, and decisive shifts that have

emerged in Muslim political discourse and practice. In the end, such an understanding promises to undermine unreflective presumptions that Muslim relations with others are chiefly hostile, and that Muslim governance is almost inevitably arbitrary and authoritarian.

[1] Similar issues concerning the wearing of headscarves to cover women's hair and necks occurred in Great Britain at roughly the same time and were discussed in the popular press (for example, "School Backs Down in Scarf Battle" 1990).

[2] Although the number of female students wearing the headscarf has continued to grow in France, just over 700 wore it in schools as of June 1994 (Jelen 1994:82), making them a small number of France's school-age Muslim population. Their reduced numbers reaffirm the power of the headscarf to instigate a major national debate. Note, however, ambiguities in official and unofficial estimates of "veiling" in schools. One anonymous expert estimated students with headscarves at 2,000 in June 1994, but only 860 at the beginning of the 1994–95 academic year. The Ministry of the Interior, however, estimated headscarves in schools at 15,000 in September 1994. Although some of this variation is politically inspired, it also can relate to whether "discreet" or "minimalist" headscarves are also counted (Stein 1994:24).

[3] The citizen's decision to forego immediate and narrowly defined self-interest in the hope that others will do so for a mutually satisfactory solution—to sacrifice individual "rationality" for collective "rationality"—is a calculated gamble that theorists sometimes call the "prisoner's dilemma." Jon Elster goes so far as to say that "politics is the study of ways of transcending the Prisoner's Dilemma" (1976:249).

[4] Visits to shrines elsewhere in the Muslim world have also acquired political significance. For example, the newly established revolutionary leadership in Egypt, including Muhammad Neguib and Gamal 'Abdul Nasser, took part in the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna, on February 13, 1953, the fourth anniversary of his assassination. Although Nasser and Neguib later split with the Brotherhood, they sought to acquire political legitimacy through association with this popular Muslim martyr (Mitchell 1969:111).

[5] Of course, the transformation of religious pilgrimages into political events is not unique to Islam. In Israel, for example, national politicians often appear at pilgrimages to the shrines of leading saints (saddiqim) venerated by Israeli Jews of North African origin. During election campaigns, they hope to benefit from televised broadcasts of these visits (Weingrod 1990:231).

[6] Throughout this book, we distinguish between ‘ulama, Muslim intellectuals who have been trained in the madrasa (mosque school) to master the traditional religious texts under acknowledged authorities of an earlier generation, and “new” religious intellectuals, religious leaders who have been educated primarily in modern, state-supported educational institutions (see Kepel and Richard 1990). We include in this group those religious leaders who have experienced both styles of education. For example, in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of students failed entrance examinations for secondary schools and universities. This is because Iran had been following the French model of rigorous admissions examinations. Many students who failed these state examinations, but who had significant prior experience of state schooling, pursued madrasa education. In Morocco, partially in response to the perceived threat of Islamic radicalism, Hassan II tried to recruit senior Ministry of the Interior officials trained in both traditions.

[7] Salah al-Din al-‘Ayyubi (d. 1193), known in the West as Saladin, was a Kurdish general who took power in Egypt and Syria after overthrowing the Fatimid caliphate in 1169. In 1187, he recaptured Jerusalem from the Franks, but this conquest precipitated, in turn, the Third Crusade.

[8] Khomeini’s will, dated February 15, 1983, was made public upon his death in 1989.

[9] Whereas Shlomo Eisenstadt’s early work (for example, 1966) represents the school of thought that believed modernization would end in Western-style liberal democracy, Samuel Huntington (1968) pioneered the school of thought that preferred to speak of “order” rather than greater political participation as the end result.

[10] The Iranian revolution, which occurred in 1978 and 1979, was a sufficient counterexample to persuade the authors of this text to abandon this claim. In Bill and Leiden (1974:53), Yemen and Afghanistan are cited as examples of “backward” communities in which Islamic influence and control remain strong; in Bill and Leiden (1979:69), Yemen and Oman provide the examples, with Afghanistan (following abolition of the monarchy in 1973) dropped. The argument is dropped altogether from Bill and Springborg (1990), the third edition of this text. A notable exception to such views was presented by Donald Smith (1974:7). Because Islam is an “historical religious system,” which, unlike Hinduism and Buddhism, lives in time until it transcends time, it has proven to be adaptable throughout the centuries. Muslims, like Catholics, have a responsibility to bide their time as fairly and as comfortably as they can without adding to the misery of others; thus, waiting for the eschaton, they do their duty by promoting social justice and by coming to terms with the fluctuations of history.

[11] For a reappraisal of Marxist-Leninist theories of development as they apply to Afghanistan, see Korgun (1993).

[12] For detailed accounts of how Islamic law has been reformed in the twentieth century, see Anderson (1976) and Coulson (1964).

[13] Modern Islamic political theory is developing the idea that the people constitute the khalifa. Isma'il al-Faruqi, for example, says that men are "perfect in form and endowed with all that is necessary to fulfill the divine will... even loaded with the grace of revelation" (al-Faruqi 1986/1406:10; compare Moussavi 1992). Although al-Faruqi does not specifically do so, other writers are developing this point as the basis for popular participation as essential to governance.

[14] The Pakistani constitution of 1990 similarly displays the coexistence of contrasting notions of sovereignty. While reaffiriming that "sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone," it also speaks in the name of the people of Pakistan. Following the injunction of Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, the founder of the nation, it is the people's will that Pakistan be a "democratic state based on Islamic principles of justice." They are to be ruled by their elected representatives, but "in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah" (Preamble) (Pakistan 1990).

[15] Enayat (1982:69–83) provides an outstanding discussion of Rida's views on the Islamic state.

[16] Madan (1987:749), however, takes a highly negative view of the rise of Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, and Muslim activism—he uses the term "fundamentalist"—in the political sphere. By referring to contemporary activism as a "perversion of religion" because it has no precedent in "traditional" societies, he recognizes the objectification of religious tradition but goes too far in assuming that only "traditional" religious expression and practice are authentic.

[17] Educational statistics for Egypt and Morocco are derived from the World Bank (1981–89) and for Oman from Oman (1979–89). These figures are necessarily approximate; as countries change their classification and reporting of educational institutions.

[18] Although al-Ghannouchi uses the term islamiyyun, he uses other terms that seem virtually synonymous with it. Although he often refers to those Muslims committed to change the world as simply "the Muslims" (al-mus-limun), it is clear that he means that they are distinguishable from the general community. This point is made apparent when he speaks of "the Islamic tendency" (al-tiyyar

al-islami)—an implicit setting-off of the “tendency” from other religious-minded Muslims as well as secular ones, including the political elites which he opposes (for example, 1992:52, 164). Consider also his phrase, “we who are answerable as an Islamic movement” (nahnu mas’ulun ka-haraka isIamiyyajCGhannushi 1992:47). All of these self-designations indicate a heightened awareness of Islam as an ideological system. In fact, Ghannouchi (1992:58) refers explicitly to “the source of Islamic thought or Islamic ideology” (nsl al-fikra al-islamiyya aw-idyulujiyya al-islamiyyq). His specific language is important because it indicates the implicit “objectification” of Islam. Although the term “Islamist” has only gained currency in the mid- to late-twentieth century, it first appeared in the medieval period in the work of Abu al-Hasan’ al-Ash’ari (d. 935), Maqalat al-Islamiyyin (The theses of the Islamists). His work influenced Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) (see al-Azm 1993a:99).

[19] Although the term “Wahhabism” is a convenient shorthand expression, the Saudis resist it for fear that it implies that their ideas and practices constitute a separate sect of Islam. They argue, somewhat disingenuously, that they are simply “Muslims,” but they accept the designation “unitarians” (muwah-hidim), advocates of the absolute oneness of God.

[20] In January 1988, a plan to impose income tax on foreign businesses and workers was canceled after protests (Ibrahim 1988a, 1988b).

[21] Pharaonism has long been a controversial feature of Egyptian political thought. Muhammad Husayn Haykal (1888–1956) and Salama Musa (1887–1958), a Copt, found in Egypt’s Pharaonic, pre-Islamic past the model for a postcolonial future of greatness. It at once connected Egyptians to a monotheistic past and disconnected them from a specifically Middle Eastern milieu. In this way, Egypt could be as “civilized” as Pharaonic Egypt—treating women equally with men, for example—and as modern as the European imperialists. Such pan-Islamic writers as Hafiz Ibrahim (1870–1932) and Ahmad Shawqi (1868–1932) also found some inspiration in the Pharaonic past (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986:166–70, 184–85, 270–71). However, Arab nationalists (for example, Yusif Haykal (1945:27), as well as more recent Islamists, have criticized such emphases as the result of a conscious policy of Westernization and de-Islamization (and, by extension, de-Arabization). The Islamic component has not been entirely absent in Pharaonic conceptualizations, but Muslim activists, in particular, have increasingly regarded the focus on Pharaonism as an intolerable celebration of the pre-Islamic jahiliyya.

[22] As what we call a “new” intellectual, Siddiqui is concerned with showing the representative nature of the Muslim Parliament. His words are worth citing at length as an expression of the politics of inclusiveness, especially because many British Muslims attacked the parliament as unrepresentative and as promoting Iranian interests:

Members have come from every part of Britain and from all Schools of Thought in Islam. What is more. Members of this Parliament are not drawn from any single section of British Muslim society. We are not all Arabic, Urdu, Punjabi, Farsi, Turkish, Bengali, Malay, or Hausa speakers. Those here today come from all linguistic and ethnic backgrounds of Muslims living in Britain. The only language common to all Members of the Muslim Parliament (MMPs) is English. Even more important is the fact that among us are men and women of a great variety of social and professional backgrounds. There are philosophers and academics, doctors and dentists, religious scholars and penitent Marxists, scientists and engineers, teachers and students, writers and journalists, and small businessmen and a few tycoons as well. But above all there are among us ordinary men and women whose only education has been through life's everyday hardships and the trials and tribulations of the first generation immigrant working classes. (Siddiqui 1992:6)

The literature of the parliament invites interested Muslims to join one of their "networks" of specialist and professional groups—educators, doctors, scientists, and businessmen (Muslim Parliament 1992).

[23] But the state-controlled Muslim Spiritual Board of the North Caucasus, established under Soviet rule, issued a fatiun condemning the idea that women could be Sufis (Benningsen and Wimbush 1985:68).

[24] A certain conservative Islamic line of thought overlaps with Western criticisms of the public-private dichotomy. Abu-1 A'la al-Mawdudi, for instance, spoke of Islam creating a benign kind of "Islamic totalitarianism" in which "no one can regard his affairs as personal or private" (cited in Esposito 1987:147).

[25] A study in the late 1970s of 526 male and female heads of household in Kuwait indicates that 43 percent of households had relatives living in the immediate vicinity. Fully 80 percent visited their kin at least once a week. A significant number were in business with relatives and depended on members of their extended family for assistance in illness, child care, financial matters, the search for employment, and personal and business problems. Sibling help was most prominent, followed by assistance from parents (al-Thakeb 1985:576).

[26] In a similar manner, Iranian officials have argued (like some Western feminists) that in the West, women's bodies are used as "commercial aids ... to increase the sale of consumer goods," thereby contributing to "the disintegration of the family system" (FBIS, NES-94-239, December 13, 1994, p. 52).

[27] Throughout the Muslim world, changes in the shari’a provisions on family law have been mooted over time and have met with varying degrees of success. Attempts to change the law in Egypt excited national controversy, and proposed reforms in 1943, 1945, 1960, 1966, and 1969 failed to be implemented. Law 44 of 1979—often called “Jehan’s law” after President Sadat’s wife—made significant changes and was supported by ‘ulama of the official establishment such as al-Azhar and judges of the shari’a courts. For example, it required the registration of a divorce with a notary public, thereby making it impossible for a husband to divorce his wife without her knowledge; second marriages were seen as injurious to the first wife; the mother was given priority in custodial matters; and divorced wives were entitled to compensaton if divorced without their consent or without just cause. The Muslim Brotherhood objected to the law, particularly its denial of the right to have multiple wives, and in 1985 the law was declared unconstitutional by the courts because it had been promulgated in an era of emergency rule. President Mubarak made crucial concessions to conservatives and secured the passage of Law 100 of July 1985. This version of the law said that second marriages were not necessarily injurious, and that a divorced wife is not automatically entitled to compensation.

The Tunisian Code of Personal Status of 1956 abolished polygamy and allowed women to initiate divorce. In 1968, women were granted the right to be employed outside the home without the permission of the husband. In 1981, the Code was amended, giving divorced women priority in the custody of their children; arranged marriages were outlawed; and the legal age for brides was set at eighteen (Fluehr-Lobban 1994:120–30; see also, Esposito 1982; Anderson 1976).

In the early 1970s, the Indonesian government proposed a new marriage law that departed significantly from traditional understandings of Islamic family law. The usually compliant ‘ulama reacted strongly to the proposed reform (Katz and Katz 1975), forcing the government to rewrite the law to take their criticisms into account. Among other issues, they objected to the provisions that would have required formal registration of marriages and required a Muslim man to seek permission from a civil court before taking more than one wife. Both men and women would also have been required to seek permission from a civil court before divorcing their spouses. Objections were also raised to reforms in the status of adopted children, which some thought contravened the customary Islamic focus on blood relationships by placing adopted children on the same legal plane as natural children. Article 11(2) was particularly controversial because it maintained that religious differences were not obstacles to marriage, thereby in effect sanctioning intermarriage. In 1992, Indonesia’s Minister of Religious Affairs precipitated further controversy when he suggested that, as a way to reduce the number of unmarried couples living together, interfaith marriages should be legalized. Dutch law, which allowed mixed marriages as a civil procedure, was finally abandoned in 1973–74 when the government responded to pressure from the ‘ulama and entrusted them with control over marriage matters. But in 1986, a lacuna in the law, which had allowed separate civil ceremonies for mixed faith couples, was also eliminated, and bureaucrats in the Ministry of Religious Affairs often insist— contrary to a conventional interpretation of Muslim traditions —that a nonMuslim woman first convert before being allowed to marry a Muslim man. However, in 1989 the Supreme Court adopted a reformist position, ruling that a Muslim

woman be allowed to marry her Christian fiance. Since then, confusion and uncertainty have prevailed. Underlying this has been Muslim—especially ‘ulama—fear of Christian missionary inroads into the Muslim community. By way of contrast, Abdurrahman Wahid of the Nahdatul Ulama has argued that mixed marriages are “imperfect” but permissible: “We can’t just say that these people who marry non-Muslims are losing their right to be a Muslim” (M. Cohen 1992).

[28] According to Abdurrahman Wahid, there are “hundreds” of women qadis in Indonesia. The first were appointed in the mid-1950s. Although this may seem to contradict al-Mawardi’s argument that women cannot serve as judges, he argues, the practice of appointing women to shari’a courts is justified on the grounds that, as Indonesia is not an Islamic state, al-Mawardi’s stricture does not apply (Wahid 1995).

[29] Personal communication, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, December 27, 1994.

[30] The number of schools for girls run by resistance organizations was higher than those operated for the refugees by the Pakistani government. In 1985, there were eleven primary schools and six secondary schools for girls (compared with 248 primary schools for boys), and six secondary schools for girls (compared with thirteen for boys). In the Pakistani educational sector, there were sixty-eight secondary schools for boys, but none for girls (Majrooh 1989:92).

[31] Such stage management is not confined to Muslim countries. When President Clinton met Salman Rushdie in November 1993, Clinton’s words were reported by the international press, but the White House did not allow photographs. In Britain, the opposite prevailed: Downing Street allowed a photograph of John Major’s meeting with Rushdie but no report of the words exchanged.

[32] Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah argues that a man must not indiscriminately discipline his wife but he may legitimately beat her if, without prior contractual arrangement, she refuses to have sexual relations with him. He argues that men have stronger sexual impulses than women, and, as these should be channeled through the sanctified institution of marriage, a wife’s refusal of intercourse is “rebellion” that must be punished (Khudr 1994; see also Fadlallah 1993). Sisters in Islam (1991), a Malaysian women’s group, presents a strongly contrary view of Islamic traditions.

[33] The precise Al Sa’ud genealogy is impossible to delineate because of shifting loyalties, affiliations, and leadership claims. As Andrew Shryock (in press) indicates in his account of oral history and textual authority in tribal Jordan, when ideas of a tribal past are primarily oral, claims of identity vary significantly with context and social position. Genealogical histories, “not meant to be universal,” coexist awkwardly with one another when set down in

writing. There is a search for “proper” sources, known to select individuals, and “constant allusion” to hidden, “accurate” versions of the past. For royalty of tribal origins, as for commoners, the structure of genealogical memory, like tribal society itself, is one of “power and pervasive inequality” (Shryock in press), in which subordinate persons and groups do not directly challenge the claims of the more powerful. Because the Masalikh tribal subdivision had declined in prominence in the prior three hundred years, King ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz preferred to indicate his family’s affiliation with a currently prominent group. He routinely referred to one of the heads of a major tribal grouping (the ‘Amarat) of the ‘Anayza confederation as his cousin, thus equating himself with the shaykh of the major tribe of a major group of the ‘Anayza, rather than to the subordinate grouping that the Masalikh had become. We are grateful to H. St. B. Armitage for explaining the intricacies of Al Sa’ud genealogy (personal communication, July 4, 1994).

[34] For the purpose of examining demographic trends, Weeks excludes countries with “significant” Muslim minorities, such as China. With only 1.5 percent of its population Muslim, (by 1988 figures), China’s fifteen million Muslim minority nonetheless exceeds the total population of all but seven Muslim-majority countries. Likewise, India’s estimated Muslim minority of over eighty-nine million in 1988 exceeded the total population of all Middle Eastern states and all but three Muslim-majority countries: Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Weeks 1988:8–9). Moreover, official Indian statistics indicate that the country’s Muslim population is increasing at a significantly higher rate than non-Muslim populations. In 1951,9’91 percent of India’s population was Muslim; by 1991, 12.2 percent of Indians were Muslim (cited in Shahabuddin 1994).

[35] In the 1992 elections at Birzeit University in the West Bank, Hamas took none of the nine student council seats. In the November 1993 Birzeit student elections—two months after the PLO-Israeli peace accord—Hamas participated for the first time in an electoral coalition with the anti-Arafat Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The coalition secured 52 percent of the vote, winning all nine of the council seats, of which Hamas took four. The victory was all the more significant because Birzeit is regarded as a Fatah stronghold. In the Islamic University in Gaza, Islamists have controlled the student council since the university was established in 1980. In 1992, Hamas obtained 89 percent of the vote, when Fatah did not participate in the elections. In December 1993, with formal Fatah involvement, Hamas won 81 percent of the vote and Islamic Jihad, 2 percent, while 11 percent went to Fatah and 2 percent to the PFLP (“Syria and Israel” 1993; Prusher 1993; “Radical Palestinian Groups” 1993). In June 1994, Hamas won only a single seat out of eleven in al-Najah University in Nablus; and in December 1994, at al-Azhar University in Gaza, Fatah received 76 percent of the votes, while Hamas and Islamic Jihad received 20 percent (“PLO Group” 1994; “Arafat’s Fatah” 1994). At Najah University in Nablus, student politics has been dominated by competition between the pro-PLO Shabiba and the Islamic Bloc. The latter controlled the student council in 1979–80, but when not in office it has vigorously promoted an Islamist agenda through publications like the magazine al-Muntalaq (The starting point) (see Barghouti 1991:210–13).

[36] In a 1992 speech, Ayatullah Khamene'i eulogized the power of the mosque and the Friday sermon: "You will yourselves recall the times of the revolution [of 1979], which began from the mosques. Today, too, mosques still act as centres whenever people do something or mobilise for political or military purposes." He recognizes the importance of the modern media in maximizing the mosque as a place to further the regime's goals: "I do not say that we should definitely use modem publicity equipment and instruments such as films and suchlike—except if, perhaps on some occasion or other, a prayer leader would want to" (cited in BBC SWB, ME/1322, A/3, March 6, 1992).

[37] This invocation of foreign, non-Muslim sources is certainly not new. To give but one example, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905) cited the American writer on Islam, John William Draper ('Abduh 1954:15–16), as did the Indian intellectual, Ameer Ali (1922:221).

[38] Hizb al-Tahrir has become a transnational movement, operating in the Palestinian territories, Jordan, the Arabian peninsula, the Maghrib, Britain, and possibly Malaysia and Indonesia, among other places. Since the 1980s, it has become particularly active on British university campuses, and it publishes a regular periodical, al-Khilafah Magazine, in London. The intention may be to recruit Muslim students in Britain who would then, in their home countries, propagate its message, including unmitigated hostility toward the Arab-Israeli peace process (Oliver 1994; Fisher 1994). "The International Muslim Khilafah Conference" was held in August 1994 at Wembley Stadium, attracting a large number of Muslims and representatives of Muslim groups from around the world—and adverse reaction from the British and Western media, which viewed the conference as an international "fundamentalist" convocation at best, and as a possible cover for politically violent groups (Raufer 1994).

[39] The postindependence government of Indonesia fought a war against an Islamic insurgency, the Dar ul-Islam movement in West Java (1948–62) that was militating for the establishment of an Islamic state. The official state ideology, pancasila, while acknowledging a divine being, does not go any further and the prevailing ideological ethos in Indonesia is secular. This reflects official sensitivities both to demands for a fully constituted Islamic state in the largest "Muslim" country in the world, and to the presence of a number of non-Muslim religions throughout the archipelago. Although formally part of the OIC, Indonesia has tended to downplay its membership—unlike neighboring and sometimes rival Malaysia, which empahsizes its role in the OIC network. In the case of Nigeria, membership in the OIC had long been considered, and resisted. But in January 1986, ostensibly because of the influence of important Nigerian Muslims, the government announced its adherence to the organization. However, the resulting backlash, from mainly Christian sources, has caused the government to refrain from any active participation in its activities.

[40] This center produces a regular periodical entitled Journal of Economic Cooperation among Islamic Countries.

[41] Since the 1980s, the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Qur’an in Medina has produced vast quantities of Qur’ans. Supervised by a committee of religious officials and employing over 1,600 persons, the institution produces 9.5 million copies each year, including 3 million in languages other than Arabic. The figures available are not precise, but the importance of exporting the Qur’an is clear from what has been reported. Of the approximately 70 million Qur’ans printed from the early 1980s to 1992, in keeping with King Fahd’s directives, more than 50 million were sent outside of the kingdom: 45 million to Asia, 5 million to Africa, and 500,000 to Europe. Of the copies distributed inside Saudi Arabia, more than 5 million copies were given to pilgrims from various countries during the hajj (Complexe du Roi 1992).

[42] Much of the information in this section has been drawn from material presented a. a workshop on Tablighi Jama’at, sponsored by the Joint Committee for the Comparative Study of Muslim Societies of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies. It was held in London, June 7–8,1990 (Masud 1995).

[43] In Singapore, to cite another example, the All Malayan Muslim Missionary Society (commonly known as Jamiyah) was founded in the 1930s by a “transnational guru,” to use Peter van der Veer’s evocative phrase. Born in India, Muhammad Abdul Alim Siddiqui completed his studies in Mecca and Medina and eventually joined the Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya, Chistiyya, and Suhrawardiyya Sufi orders. No doubt, such cosmopolitanism would not permit a simple-minded devotion to the Mecca and Medina of Wahhabi control. Arab and Indian merchant families in Singapore played an important financial role from the beginning, and they seemed drawn to both Arabia and the Egypt of Salafiyya intellectual thought. Now strongly supported by the Muslim World League and reflecting its Saudi political agenda, the Jamiyah is predominantly Malay in membership while operating in an overhwhelmingly Chinese environment. The consequence is obvious: the sense of pull from Saudi Arabia, but also from Malaysia and Indonesia (Weyland 1990).

[44] In France, some observers believe that Tablighi Jama’at, despite its stated unconcern for political matters, functions as a recruitment vehicle for the expressly political Muslim protest groups. The Tablighis are particularly successful in attracting young, unemployed men at such suburban mosques as the Bilal in Saint-Denis and the Sid Brahim el Khalil mosque in La Courneuve. Perhaps originally motivated by a desire to improve their faith, these individuals may be open to explicit political activity, such as that associated with Fraternite Algerienne en France, a group allied with FIS (de Villiers 1995:5–6).

** Glossary

A = Arabic; F = French; I = Bahasa Indonesian; M = Malay; ML = Malagasy; P = Persian; R = Russian; U = Urdu; T = Turkish. Many of the terms, especially Arabic ones with religious connotations, occur in more than one language. Variations are specified only when significantly different from the language of origin.

~nlim; pl. ‘ulama (A). — Learned man; in particular, one learned in Islamic legal and religious studies.

amir (A). — Prince or tribal chief.

amir al-mu’minin (A). — Commander of the faithful.

baraka (A). — Supernatural blessing; quality of divine grace; abundance.

bay’a (A). — Pact, pledge.

bayan (A). — Decree, statement.

bid’a; pl. bida’ (A). — Unworthy innovation.

da’i; pl. du’a (A). — One who invites; missionary.

dar al-‘ahd (A). — “Land of the covenant,” i.e., under Muslim rule.

dar al-harb (A). — “Land of war”; against which war is religiously sanctioned.
dar al-Islam (A). — “Land of Islam.”

dar al-kufr (A). — “Land of disbelief.”

dar al-sulh (A). — “Land of settlement” or truce.

datu (M). — Honorary title granted by royalty.

da’wa (A). — God’s “call” to the true religion. Malay: dakwah.

al-dawla al-islamiyya (A). — Islamic state.

dawra (A, P). — “Circle”; discussion group.

dimuqratiyya (A). — Democracy.

din wa-dazvla (A). — Religion and state.

diwaniyya (A). — Regular informal gathering of relatives, professionals, members of the same religious group or workmates (Arab Gulf).

faqih; pl. fuqaha (A). — Islamic legal scholar; jurist (fem. faqiha). West African variation: faki.

faqir (A). — Sufi mendicant (fem. faqira).

fatwa; pl. fatawa (A). — Legal opinion or decree issued by a recognized Muslim scholar.

fiqh (A). — Islamic jurisprudence.

fitna (A). — Rebellion or disorder against established authority.

fundi (ML). — Religious authority (Comoros Islands).

ghayba (A). — Occultation, concealment (esp. in Shi’i theology).

hadith (A). — Reported saying of the Prophet Muhammad, based on the authority of a chain of reliable transmitters.

hajj (A). — Pilgrimage to Mecca.

halal (A). — Permitted food or activity.

haraka (A). — Movement.

hijab (A). — Veil or face covering.

hijra (A). — Migration. 1

hudud (A). — Prescribed Qur’anic punishments.

hukumat al-khilafa (A). — The government of the caliphate.

ihtijab (A). — Act of veiling.

ijtihad (A). — Independent judgment.

’ilm; pl. ’ulum (A). — Knowledge, esp. the religious sciences.

imam (A). — Religious or prayer leader.

islamiyyun (A). — “Islamists.” isra’ (A). — The Prophet’s night journey. jahil (A). — Ignorant (of Islam).

jahiliyya (A). —The pre-Islamic “time of ignorance.” jihad (A). — Religious struggle or endeavor; holy war. kafir (A). — Unbeliever in the Islamic revelation.

khadim al-haramayn (A). — “Servant of the Two Holy Places,” title of the Saudi monarch.

khalifa (A). — Caliph.

khatib (A). ’— Preacher (of Friday sermons).

khilafa (A). — The caliphate, the institution that inherited Muhammad’s authority in all domains except prophecy. I

khutba (A). — Friday sermon, lecture. I

kufr (A). — Disbelief. madhhab (A). — Established school of Islamic law.

madrasa (A). — Religious school, often associated with a mosque.

mahdi (A). — The expected, divinely guided leader.

majlis al-shura (A). — Consultative council.

marabout (F). — Sufi “saint.” French term from Arabic: murabit. See salih.

marja’-i taqlid; maraji’-i taqlid (P). — Source of emulation; paramount Shi’i religious authority.

maslaha ’amma (A). — Public interest.

mevlud (T). — A religious service commemorating Muhammad’s birthday (from Arabic: mawlid).

minhaj (A). — System or program. I

tni’raj (A). — Prophet’s midnight ascension from Jerusalem to the seven heavens.

Mudawwana (A). — The 1958 shari’a-based legal code that is the basis for Moroccan laws regarding marriage, family, and inheritance.

mufti (A). —Jurisconsult; issuer of fatawa.

mujahidin; sing, mujahid (A). — Lit. “strivers,” or those who struggle for the faith. Also used in a narrower sense to mean “freedom fighters,” as in the Afghan mujahidin. :

mukhabarat (A). — Security police; intelligence service.

mullah (P). — Preacher; prayer leader.

murid (A). — Sufi term for student or disciple.

murshid (A). — Sufi term for spiritual guide (fem. murshida).

nashid (A). — Chanted anthem.

nasiha (A). — Critical memorandum or report (Arab Gulf).

niqab (A). — Clothing that covers all of a woman’s body including the face.

I i nizam (A). — Order, organization.

nomenklatura (R). — “Named” or elite persons.

panqasila (I). — Indonesia’s secular national ideology.

pir (T, U). — Holy man, from a holy lineage; leader of a dervish order.

qadi (A). — Religious judge, magistrate (fem. qadiya).

qawm (A, P). — People or nation; kinship term in parts of Afghanistan.

quwwali (U, A). — Musical tradition in South Asia.

al-ra’is al-mu’min (A). — The “president-believer” (Egypt); term appropriated by Anwar al-Sadat.

salaf (A). — Ancestor, predecessor.

salafiyya (A). — Islamic reform movement founded at end of nineteenth century.

salih (A). — “Pious one,” or saint; a person, living or dead, thought to have a special relation toward God that enables him or her to ask for God’s grace on behalf of clients and to communicate it to them (North Africa).

sayyid (A). — Descendant of the Prophet (esp. Iraq and the Yemens).

shahada (A). — Declaration of faith in Islam; martyrdom.

shari’a (A). — The religious laws of Islam; “the straight path.”
shaykh (A). — A tribal leader, scholar, or senior (fem. shaykha).

Shi’a (A). — Literally, “sect.” Muslim minority community, principally located in Iran, southern Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain. Holds that legitimate succession to the Prophet is based on direct descent through his daughter, Fatima, and ‘Ali, her husband and the Prophet’s son-in-law.

shura (A). — Consultation.

sulta (A). — Political authority.

sunna (A). — Actions and sayings of the Prophet that constitute “orthodox” tradition for the Islamic community.

Sunni (A). — Muslim who belongs to the Muslim majority community; Sunnis accept the actions and authority of the early Muslim community and its caliphs.

sura (A). — Chapter of the Qur’an.

tabligh (A). — Propagation. Usually in the context of missionary activity. Related to da’wa,

tajdid (A). — Religious reform and renewal.

takfir (A). — The proclaiming of a fellow believer as an infidel.

taqlid (A). — Precedent.

tariqa (A). — Sufi brotherhood.

tawhid (A). — The oneness of God.

’ulama (A). — Muslim men of learning.

umma (A). — The Islamic community.

vilayat-i faqih (P). — Shi’i doctrine of the sovereignty of the jurist (Arabic: wilayat al-faqih.

waqf; pl. awqaf (A). — Pious endowment.

zakat (A). — Alms enjoined by the Qur’an.

ziyara (A). — Visit (to a saint’s shrine).

** Annotated Bibliography

A vast literature on Islam and politics exists and it would be impossible to provide an exhaustive review. Our intention, rather, is to highlight a number of works on several important themes that merit further examination and will serve as a point of departure for interested readers. Readers are also directed to other guides such as Burrell and Morgan (1989), Haddad, Voll, and Esposito (1991), and Brown (1992). The bibliographies that follow the relevant entries in the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (1995) are particularly helpful, while those in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, begun in 1960 and still in progress, are usefully cross-referenced.

Both general and specific studies of the roles of Islam in politics have appeared with regularity since at least the advent of the Iranian revolution of 1978–79. Among others, Esposito (1980), Kramer (1980), Ayoob (1981), Dessouki (1982), Israeli (1982), Mortimer (1982), Piscatori (1983b), Dekmejian (1985), Carre and Dumont (1985), Carre (1987), and Hunter (1988) deal with the manifestations of the Islamic “revival” in a variety of countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Cole and Keddie (1986) and Kramer (1987) deal specifically with the mobilization of Shi’i discontent and assess the significance of Shi’i protest movements in Iran, Lebanon, the Gulf, and elsewhere. There are also many country- and region-specific studies of contemporary religious movements, such as Abdullah and Siddique (1986) on Southeast Asia, R. Tapper (1991) on Turkey, Nielsen (1992) on western Europe, Nakash (1994) on Iraq, and Villalon (1995) on Senegal.

Hussain (1984) compares and contrasts modernization, Marxist, nationalist, and “Islamic” perspectives on politics in the Muslim world, and Ismael and Ismael (1985) explain why Muslim politics is largely the search for legitimization by both governments and their critics. Esposito (1987) indicates the place of Islamic political movements in the modern history of Islam and explains the ideologies and programs of activists in diverse parts of the Muslim world. Organized both topically and geographically, Ayubi (1991) traces the development of political Islam from pre-Islamic Arabia to the present, focusing on what happened in the first

centuries of Islam and on the ways this early period has figured in subsequent Islamic political thought and practice. Roy (1992, 1994) argues that the Islamist project is doomed to failure because of its inability to articulate a detailed political vision or to implement a strategy for governing. Muslim politics have also been illuminated in such comparative studies of religious “fundamentalism” as Antoun and Hegland (1987), Lawrence (1989), Sivan and Friedman (1990), the Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (for example, Marty and Appleby 1991, 1993, 1994), and Kepel (1994a).

Classical and modern Islamic political thought has been elaborated in a number of works by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. Asad (1980) and el-Affendi (1991) present modernist interpretations which argue that Muslim political orders are built on consensus and consultation and essentially involve limitations on the rulers and the participation of the ruled. Khomeini (1981), building on but also significantly departing from Shi’i traditions, provides the rationale for the governance of the ‘ulama. Enayat (1983), Sachedina (1988), and Modarressi (1991), among others, explain the basis of this doctrine of vilayat-i faqih. Arkoun (1994) considers the relationship between “church” and state and between ethics and politics in the context of his distinctive reformulation of Islamic thought in general.

Watt (1980) puts the development of early Muslim political thought in the context of seventh-century Arabia and demonstrates the continuities and discontinuities in the community’s ideological evolution. Lambton (1981) and Lewis (1988) provide further historical context, highlighting the medieval and early modern periods. Rosenthal (1965), Enayat (1982), Khadduri (1984), and Binder (1988) explain Muslim views on such modern themes as constitutionalism; democracy; socialism; legal, social, and political justice; and liberalism.

Arjomand (1988) and Richard (1991) elaborate on Shi’i political ideas, culture, and institutions. The variety of Muslim views on and formalized treatment of human rights is detailed in Mayer (1995).

Much attention has been devoted to specifically Islamist political ideas. Mitchell (1969) puts the thought of Hasan al-Banna in the context of the founding and early development of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Samman (1982) concentrates on al-Banna’s ideological formation and contributions. Haddad (1983), Nettler (1987), Diyab (1989), and Moussalli (1992) explain the thought of Sayyid Qutb, while Kepel (1984), Sivan (1985), and Jansen (1986) elaborate on the thinking and programs of Islamist groups in Egypt and of such influential figures as Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hamad Kishk. Kepel and Richard (1990) indicate the range of ideas offered by the “new” intellectuals and activists in the Muslim world, including the influential Iranian ‘Ali Shari’ati (for example, 1971; also see Richard 1991). Munson (1991, 1998) and Shahin (1994), explicate the thinking of the Moroccan Abd Assalam Yassine, and Hassan (1982) addresses the thinking of the Indonesian intellectual Nurcholish Madjid as well as others associated with the influential Muslim student movement in Indonesia.

One view of Islam and politics has long held that states are authoritarian, and perhaps "strong," because of the absence of countervailing institutions. P. Springborg (1992) argues that this view is a classic Orientalist contrivance. Moore (1974) and Ozbudun (1992) attribute the unrestrained power of government in part to the nature of Islamic law and social traditions which, they argue, do not recognize corporate bodies and institutions that mediate between the individual and the state, while Gellner argues that "Islam ... exemplifies a social order which seems to lack much capacity to provide political countervailing institutions or associations" (1994:29). Sadowski (1993) notes that, as oil revenues declined in the Middle East, scholars came to regard states in the Muslim world as "weak," or at least that civil societies were stronger than anticipated (for example, Migdal 1988). Standing the conventional view on its head, Sivan (1990b) argues that, if we accept that Islamist groups and movements are autonomous of the state, civil society possesses such potency that it "strikes back."

Two studies bring the issue of Islam and civil society into focus. Norton (1995a, 1995b), based on a major Ford Foundation-sponsored project, gathers both comprehensive conceptual essays and country- and region-specific studies that assess not only scholarly writings on the topic but also recent developments in the Arab Middle East, Iran, and Turkey. Salame (1994) focuses principally on the Arab Middle East, and is particularly strong on the Arab Gulf, Egypt, and North Africa. The compatibility of Muslim politics with civil society has also figured prominently in European political debates on the assimilation of Muslim immigrants, notably, although not exclusively, in France (Kepel 1994b; Lewis and Schnapper 1994). Polonskaya and Malashenko (1994) explain the ways in which Muslim groups and social practices in Central Asia persisted in spite of official Soviet antipathy and, since the collapse of the Soviet state, how they condition national and regional politics; Allworth (1994) I highlights the role of ethnicity and nationalism in the reconstitution of Muslim and political identities in Central Asia and the former Yugoslavia. Hefner (1993) places the development of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in the broader picture of Indonesian politics and explores the possibilities of "civic pluralism," while Othman (1994), noting the Malaysian situation in particular, discusses civil society in the context of the national role of the shari'a. Brenner (1993) brings together a number of studies that explore the "politicization of public life" in sub-Saharan Muslim societies, with special attention devoted to Muslim interest groups.

Particular focus has been placed on the question of Islam's compatibility with democracy. Lewis (1990,1993), Kedourie (1992), and Kramer (1993) stress the obstacles that Islamic political ideas or structures pose to the process of democratization, whereas Hudson (1991), Kramer (1992, 1993), and Ayubi (1993) find in evolving social, economic, and intellectual trends the possibility, though by no means the certainty, of greater political participation and pluralism. Intellectuals in the Muslim world have turned to the matter of Islam's democratic potential (for example, Markaz Ibn Khaldun (1992). Al-Mahdi (1990) argues that Islam is essentially democratic, whereas some Algerian Islamist intellectuals stress that democracy leads to the imposition of the will of the majority rather than to what is morally

right (see al-Ahnaf, Botiveau, and Fregosi 1991). Esposito and Piscatori (1991) survey the various Muslim intellectual responses to this question.

Key studies of the role of women in Muslim politics include Kandiyoti (1991), who explores the ambiguities of the relationship between women as citizens and subjects, and the state, and Keddie and Baron (1991), whose contributors, like L. Ahmed (1992), encompass Middle Eastern Islamic history in general. Among key country-specific studies, Taarji (1991) deals principally with Egypt and North Africa, Afkhami and Friedl (1994) focus on postrevolutionary Iran, and Altorki (1986) investigates elite women in Saudi Arabia, [while Doumato (1992) looks at Saudi women in the political process and as political symbols. C. Eickelman (1988) deals with women's politics in an Omani oasis, and Gole (1993) bases her discussion of the interaction between secularists and women Islamists on the case of Turkey. Mumtaz and Shaheed (1987) and Shaheed and Mumtaz (1992), associated with the transnational group Women Living under Muslim Laws (see Shaheed 1994), chart the changing positions of women in Pakistani society, and Coulon (1988) examines the gender dimensions of Sufism and finds that, in societies of West Africa, women have possessed baraka and have assumed leading roles in the tariqas.

The writing on Islam and international relations has been preoccupied with the question of Islam's compatibility with nationalism. Vatikiotis (1987) emphasizes the problems associated with nationalism, whereas Piscatori (1986) finds that territorial pluralism has long been entrenched, and accepted, in the Muslim world. Yavuz (1993) describes how Muslim intellectuals contributed to the construction of Turkish nationalism. Khadduri (1955) and Abu-Sulayman (1987) explain that classical Islamic sources allow Muslims to engage in conventional international relations, and Hamidullah (1961) demonstrates that modern Muslim diplomacy builds on the example of the Prophet and the early Muslim community. The history of the pan-Islamic idea and of plans to implement it is found in Narayan (1982), Kramer (1986), and Landau (1990), while Dawisha (1983) shows that foreign policies are not doctrinally prescribed but that Islamic values and concerns often enter into the determination of national interests and policies. Rajaee (1983) places the international-relations thought of Ayatullah Khomeini into perspective by examining his larger political thought and focusing on his ideas of territorial nationalism, the export of the revolution, and the international destiny of Iran.

The Muslim interstate Organization of the Islamic Conference is treated in Moinuddin (1987) and Ahsan (1988), and Schulze (1990) shows how the Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami (Muslim World League) functions as an international da'wa organization at the same time as it advances a Saudi political and religious agenda. Von der Mehden (1993) explores the international and transnational linkages between two parts of the broader umma. Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Gladney (1992b) considers the impact of transnational Muslim issues on Uighur national identity in China. Ahmed and Donnan (1994) investigate the implications that globalization has for Muslim societies and self-understandings, and Beyer (1994) specifically looks at the Iranian revolution in the course of a general consideration of globalized communications, cultural values, and religious movements.

The policy implications of Muslim politics have increasingly occupied the attention of Western scholars, journalists, and political officials. Lewis (1990) and Miller (1993) are concerned that elements within Muslim movements may be uncompromisingly hostile to Western interests, but Hadar (1993) and Esposito (1992) regard fears of an “Islamic threat” or “green peril” as exaggerated and emphasize that only a minority of Muslim activists—let alone Muslims—resort to violence in the pursuit of their goals. Fuller and Lesser (1995) advocate a nuanced approach, which avoids stereotyping Muslim critics of Western policy as “fundamentalist” and ascribing all political conduct to specifically religious motivations.

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and

Jon W. Anderson

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*** Dedication

To

Am al,

Lillian Claire, and

Miriam

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*** Preface to the Second Edition

The events of September 11, 2001, and its aftermath brought home not only the significance of the events themselves but also of the rapidly evolving new media environment— for Europe and North America and for the Muslim world—and the increasing interconnectivity among producers, consumers, and subjects of all forms of media. A recruitment video, circulated since May 2001 by the terrorist al-Qa'ida organization, slickly combined clips from CNN, the BBC, and Saudi and Russian television with their own CNN-style footage from training camps and "seminars" in Afghanistan, which took on new significance after September ll.[1] The Ara- bic-language al-Jazeera Satellite Television, based in Qatar and styled after CNN, came under intense scrutiny and political pressure as its policy of airing "other" voices that had already vexed Arab governments became an issue for policymakers everywhere. For the first time, British Prime Minister Tony Blair used al-Jazeera rather than the BBC to make an original policy statement, and al-Jazeera became a sought-out venue for U.S. government spokespersons, including the president's national security advisor, as well as an object of widespread scrutiny (El-Nawawy and Iskander 2002). These actions highlight the multiple and often unpredictable combinations of new media and new publics, new people and new interpretations that are reshaping the public sphere in the Muslim world.

New media undermine the theatre of the state, which Salvatore (1998) has called "staging virtue," with the theatre of the "street," making evident the multiple connections of this expanding public sphere. Eight months after al-Jazeera's Kabul studio was hit twice by "smart bombs" during the U.S. campaign to rout al-Qa'ida from Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden from the international airwaves, CNN, whose coverage in the 1991 Gulf War provided a model for al-Jazeera, "adopted a formal policy to avoid use of videotaped statements by Palestinian suicide bombers" and sent its top news executive "for consultations with Israeli officials about covering the conflict," after Israeli carriers threatened to drop CNN and placed Fox News next to CNN on the dial to offer "an alternative at the touch of a button" (Carter 2002). In between, private "hactivists" were busily disrupting Internet service to sites that they sought to silence. These and other interventions, from complaints about media incitement to national security claims, involve more than rights to speak and to represent. They involve constructions of the public sphere that are made particularly problematic by the advent of new media and growing recognition of their role in a rapidly changing communications ecology.

The extended social infrastructure of public communication is the context, frame, and often the referent of new media. New media frequently, but not always, offer self-consciously alternative forums for alternative voices, from the emergence of Islamic themes in romance novels in Bangladesh (Maimuna Huq, this volume) to thinking about modernity (Armbrust, this volume) to activists' campaigns for a public role (Robert W. Hefner, this volume) to new habits of listening, reading, and watching (Abu-Lughod 1995, Salamandra 2000, Oncii 2000, Hirschkind 2001). While new media give access to messages and voices that existing, particularly mass, media restrict or relegate to less public channels, they are in time also colonized by existing media institutions (Anderson, this volume) and newly emerging orders of discourse about Islam (Oncii 1995, Christmann 1998, Salamandra 1998), as new channels for communication become increasingly significant. Initial Internet sites created by some newspapers in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries, for example, were little more than home pages without content or were simply mirrors of their print editions. Increasingly,

however, some of these sites rapidly evolve in complex and diverse ways to reach different audiences than the print editions, facilitating the emergence of a new generation of journalists and information specialists, thus shifting the balance from newspapers' long and authoritative editorials to more diverse and immediate content (Gonzalez-Quijano, this volume).

What and to whom new media connect their users and producers pragmatically involves three layers or contexts of the social infrastructure of communication. One is the world of Muslim opinion, discourse, talk, and teaching focused by religion and concerning its doctrine, practice, and proper role in society. Spokespersons legitimized by conventional systems of learning and their means of production increasingly find themselves complemented and even challenged not just by locally rooted understandings of Islam, with which they are familiar, but with rival and alternative articulations of belief and practice. Also, rising levels of education create audiences for articulating and justifying religious practices that erode older distinctions between "high" and "low" forms of public religious expression (Oncii 2000, also Anderson, this volume). An important part of the dialogue with other Muslims involves new social capital that draws on contemporary intellectual styles and uses different communication technologies to circulate messages and views about what is properly Islamic. New media, from the Internet and audiocassettes to Islamic-themed novels and television dramas, add new performance genres to those of learned commentary and sermons that are already articulated in a range of works from scholarly treatises to chapbooks. As Armbrust and others in this volume explain, the new media draw in resources and skills of distinctly bourgeois character and settings. Far from limiting the potential audience, these resources and skills represent the expansion of Islamic public spheres that was set in motion by the spread of education, the essential social capital of new, growing middle classes, which are beginning to attract the notice of U.S. policymakers. "We must speak," said Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who articulated a doctrine of permanent war on terrorism, "to the hundreds of millions of moderate and tolerant people in the Muslim world, regardless of where they live, who aspire to enjoy the blessings of freedom and democracy and free enterprise" (quoted in Schmitt 2002).

A second layer or context emerges in those Muslim-majority societies where many local religious ideas and practices, long taken for granted and understood as Islamic, come under increasing scrutiny with growing familiarity with other Islamic communities and ways of doing things. New media play a major role in this foregrounding and questioning of local practices (Bowen 1999) and in changing local balances of competing religious authorities (Hefner, this volume), criticisms of other views, and defenses of one's own in public.

A third context is found in the larger public spheres in which Muslims are minorities, sometimes as immigrants and sometimes as converts, for whom the dynamics of new media include forging and sustaining contact and continued interactions between diasporas and homelands, increasingly through media (Starrett, this volume). The significance of such ties has long been recognized, as in the role of overseas Lebanese in influencing village and national politics (Winder 1967), but may mean that expatriates and immigrants are called upon to explain or interpret—or to distance themselves from—politics of their former

homelands. New communications technologies make such interaction immediate and interconnected. This may strengthen sectarian bonds; it also fosters keen attention to the fates of emigrants and Muslims in Western countries. In some contexts, it leads to a greater openness, as when women can more directly join public discussions about their role in society and public debate over such issues as family law; in other contexts, it may only reinforce entrenched views.

In all these contexts, new media blur boundaries and link public spheres that are Islamic with those that are technological, secular, and political, based on class as well as sect, on "cold" ties (such as bureaucracy and duty to the state) as well as the "warm" ones of family and immediate community (Eickelman and Salvatore 2002: 110-12). They provide channels for hate groups, too, but their very porousness offers little basis for exclusivity. One of the new media's chief empirical characteristics is a consistent, often insistent, outreach. An overriding feature of the contemporary communications ecology is that new media expand to shape the public sphere increasingly as a marketplace of ideas, identities, and discourses.

Responses to the attacks of September 11,2001, provide a case in point. Muslims and Islamic spokespersons almost universally condemned the attacks as non-Islamic (typically on the Qur'anic injunction against attacking noncombatants) and as tragedies with which anyone could identify. By November 2001, however, in Muslim-majority countries from Egypt to Bangladesh, rhetorical themes had begun to develop against U.S. imperialism, which secular media attributed to "imperialist muscle-flexing" and Islamic media to Western fears of the rising power of Islam. Muslim communities in the West also directly registered fears in the U.S. and European media which were quickly communicated to the Middle East both through personal and public channels with coverage of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab incidents and official acknowledgments that "Islam is for peace." An important entailment of new media is this thickening not just of ties to diasporas but also horizontally with other communities, including non-Muslim ones, that inflect new senses of "Muslim" community in the Muslim media.

The marketplace of ideas, identities, and ties is more than a metaphor. It is a reality that decisively shifts forums and resources of such discourse and its practices in favor of middle-class actors. Huq (personal communication, April 21, 2002) reports a pattern of educated Islamist youth in the middle and upper classes in Bangladesh introducing the works of more moderate writers on hot-button issues such as gender—authors who are regarded with suspicion equally by conservative traditionalists and radical activists. Authors of works that inspire these youth, such as the influential Egyptian Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have similar followings throughout the Middle East and reach a global audience through the Internet (Anderson 2001) as well as through translations.

Throughout the Middle East and Muslim-majority societies elsewhere, the increasing complexity of "local" settings is evident. Gonzales-Quijano (in this volume) opens his analysis of the reshaping of publication and the media in Lebanon with the arresting image

of an Internet cafe that has supplanted Beirut's Permanent Book Exhibit. Together with the ubiquitous satellite dish, Internet cafes have become icons of new media consumption across the Middle East. Internet cafes are particularly venues for youth, and Gonzalez-Quijano notes that younger members of established publishing families increasingly go into digital publishing and Internet services from web-site design and hosting to connections for users.

Likewise, existing publications and commercial publishing expertise have been the initial base for Internet ventures in neighboring countries, and Internet cafes are popular at least partly for repackaging telecommunications service (Anderson 1997). "A family that doesn't have money for a computer and Internet account at home can afford a dinar for the child to have an hour at an Internet cafe," a proprietor in Amman noted of his clientele (interview with Jon Anderson, June 13, 2001). Thus, the domestication of new media goes hand-in-hand with fostering new public places and new publics. But does this use of the new media constitute a public sphere?

Not by itself, argues Robert W. Hefner (in this volume): "there is nothing inevitable about the transition from plurality to civic pluralism." Echoingjenny B. White (1999), he finds amplification, not transformation, when looking at the larger communications repertoire of one of Indonesia's militant Islamic groups. That group marshaled a range of new communication technologies that became broadly available across Indonesia in the 1990s, "beginning with the fax machine and new software programs for desktop publishing, but quickly came to include the Internet, which was introduced into large Indonesian cities in late 1997 and early 1998," to project themselves into a public sphere dominated by Indonesia's larger and more moderate Muslim groups. Like the Daudi Bohras of Bombay (Blank 2001), who embraced information technology to unite their community, Indonesia's Lashkar Jihad use it to enhance their organization in the face of more established groups, but on its own terms.

In all, the evidence to date affirms the outcome of amplified extremist voices over the liberalizing one at the institutional level, but just the opposite at the individual level, where a clear enhancement of agency is commonly the gloss on, if not the outcome of, the new media discussed here. The novelties of the media discussed in this book lie in their incompleteness and in users' abilities to utilize them differently, for different purposes, and in different contexts. The Internet, teenage romance novels, popular cinema, fax and telephone for political networking, religious tracts and educational material all entail more participation by their users than has been associated with "media" viewed through the optics of broadcasting and the press. This, and not just the multiplication of channels, makes the control of state and religious authorities over what is printed or broadcast increasingly problematic (Teitelbaum 2002). Audiences are now defined by exponential rises of mass education since the mid-twentieth century in Muslim- majority countries and the much greater ease of communications and travel for religious goals, education, labor migration, and emigration.

New media and their contexts draw attention to the social organization of communication in which different media operate. They point to an emerging public sphere between the “masses,” evoked by an earlier era of state authorities and political leaders, and face-to-face solidarities of family, neighborhood, and community. Desktop publishing, delivery by fax and other small media, and Internet activists—but even more, Internet users—engender formal responses in the censored or “directed” large media, just as do the reading habits of youth, which vex traditionalists and radicals equally, obliging them, even if unwillingly, to call attention to the messages contained in media of more limited circulation, thereby eroding social distance and providing a model for others. Texts from sources as disparate as South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe circulate to American society, where they are adapted for Islamic teaching and sermons alongside material from the non-Muslim American mass media; similar patterns with Bangla and Indonesian translations of writings by Arab preachers are beginning to appear in media spaces opened by other writings.

The new media analyzed in this book are sometimes limited in audience, modes of participation, content, and authority. However, the practical result is opening up interpretation and introducing "lay" interpreters (Bunt 2000), “other” voices, and the scrutiny of conventional religious and political authority. There are no guarantees that the results will match liberal expectations long attached to enhanced flows of communication and information. While these seem to occur at an individual level, that does not necessarily happen at the level of institutions: existing ones prove adept at grasping the opportunities in new media to amplify their presences and capabilities, too.

The role of new media in expanding the public spheres of Islam, in Muslim-majority societies and for extended transnational Muslim networks, is as complex and multi-dimensional as the connections of these spheres locally and internationally. If it is unpredictable, the consequences are not: eroding social distance and multiplying role models are reshaping the meanings of local and global, and new media are their means.

[1] Excerpts of the video with translations and commentary by Richard Bulliet, Fawaz Gerges, and John Voll are on-line at <[[http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbrOO/video/excerpts/excerpts_index.html][http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbrOO/video/ excerpts/excerpts_index.html]]>.

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Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Study Center, panels on civil pluralism and new media at successive annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association, and a two-year Euro-American Summer Institute on “Public Spheres and Muslim Identities” supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin. Along the way, we have benefited from advice and comments by colleagues—including Arjun Appadurai, Richard Bulliet, Michael Collins Dunn, Brian Larkin, Madawi al-Rasheed, Armando Salvatore, and Richard L. Tapper—which we gratefully acknowledge. Preparation of this volume was assisted by grants from the Claire Garber Goodman Fund at Dartmouth College and support from the Publication Fund of the Anthropology Department at the Catholic University of America. For the first edition, in 1997-1998 the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars provided Dale F. Eickelman with an intellectual milieu that bridged academic and policy research and was appropriate for addressing issues of wide public concern. Christian Hummel, William F. P. Raynolds, and Allison L. Schumitsch provided critical and timely support for the second edition.

*** Note on Transliteration

This book draws on source materials in Arabic, Bangla, Indonesian, Persian, Turkish, Urdu, transliteration conventions preferred by Muslims writing in English, and colloquial as well as literary uses in all these languages. As consistently as possible, we use the system adopted by the International Journal of Middle East Studies, except that we omit diacritics. Although religious terms often derive from Arabic—for example, the Arabic plural ‘ulama (men of learning) becomes ulenia in Turkish—we decided not to impose the Arabic where it does not accurately reflect local or regional usage. When appropriate, the common origins of such terms are indicated in the glossary. Likewise, the plural of most foreign terms, especially those derived from Arabic, is indicated by the addition of an “s” to the singular.

** 1. Redefining Muslim Publics

Dale F. Eickebnan and Jon W. Anderson

A new sense of public is emerging throughout Muslim-majority states and Muslim communities elsewhere. It is shaped by increasingly open contests over the authoritative use of the symbolic language of Islam. New and increasingly accessible modes of communication have made these contests increasingly global, so that even local disputes take on transnational dimensions. These increasingly open and accessible forms of communication play a significant role in fragmenting and contesting political and religious authority. Muslims, of course, act not just as Muslims but according to class interests, out of

a sense of nationalism, on behalf of tribal or family networks, and from all the diverse motives that characterize human endeavor. Increasingly, however, large numbers of Muslims explain their goals in terms of the normative language of Islam. Muslim identity politics take many different forms that are not unitary or identical, but such politics have become a significant force in both Muslim-majority states and those in which Muslims form only a minority of the population. It is in this sense that one can speak of an emerging Muslim public sphere.

Situated outside formal state control, this distinctly Muslim public sphere exists at the intersections of religious, political, and social life. Facilitated by the proliferation of media in the modern world, the Muslim public can challenge or limit state and conventional religious authorities and contribute to the creation of civil society. With access to contemporary forms of communication that range from the press and broadcast media to fax machines and audio- and videocassettes and from the telephone to the Internet, Muslims, like members of Christian coalitions, Hindu revivalists (Juergens- meyer 1993), Jewish activists, Sikh militants, and protagonists of Asian and African values, have more rapid and flexible ways of building and sustaining contact with constituencies than was available in earlier decades. The asymmetries of the earlier mass media revolution are being reversed by new media in new hands. This combination of new media and new contributors to religious and political debates fosters an awareness on the part of all actors of the diverse ways in which Islam and Islamic values can be created and feeds into new senses of a public space that is discursive, performative, and participative, and not confined to formal institutions recognized by state authorities.

Public dialogue has long held a special place in the Muslim world. A religious public sphere of learned scholars, schools of jurisprudence, and their supporters was often autonomous from the official sphere of rulers in the early Islamic centuries. The precedent was set in the inquisition (mihna) of 833-848, in which four successive caliphs decreed that Muslims had to accept the belief that the Qur'an was created, in spite of intensely held popular support for the traditionalist view that it always existed. This authoritarian imposition of doctrine met fierce resistance, and the effort was abandoned after fifteen years. The result was to strengthen the role of men of learning (‘ulama) in the public sphere from the third Islamic century through the modern era. Subsequent caliphs and other temporal rulers intervened in this sphere only with caution, and in general left it alone (Hurvitz 1997: 6).

In more recent times, especially since the Second World War and the end of colonial rule in many parts of the world, state authorities have used modern means of communication and bureaucracy to craft, refashion, and promote a publicly expressed code of competencies that all citizens or subjects should assimilate and practice in order to achieve modernity. Since the 1970s, few citizens of Muslim-majority countries unabashedly accept the legitimacy of state claims to monopolize this task. Just as there is a general scholarly recognition that there are multiple paths to modernity (Eisenstadt 1996: 396-426), there is a practical awareness that there are multiple claimants to the task of staging virtue (Salvatore 1998a: 87-89), including a public engagement in the name of religion. In this respect, Muslim

activists, at least in public discourse, come close to what Warner (1990: 42-43) has called the republican virtues of colonial America, in which print or other media are used to direct consciousness to and craft certain models of civility, membership within a community, and citizenship within a nation, all resting on more or less mutual packages of commitments and expectations (Salvatore 1997: 55-56).

Publicly shared ideas of community, identity, and leadership take significantly new shapes in such engagements, even as many communities and authorities claim an unchanged continuity with the past. Mass education, so important in the development of nationalism in an earlier era (Gellner 1983: 28-29), and a proliferation of media and means of communication have multiplied the possibilities for creating communities and networks among them, dissolving prior barriers of space and distance and opening new grounds for interaction and mutual recognition.

States in this century have taken it upon themselves to control the broadcast and printed word to foster common, shared, and modern identities at least as much as to deny these means to potential opponents. The centralized, asymmetrical structure of mass media is a product of this; states see these media as vehicles of consolidation and standardization. The correspondingly piecemeal and sporadic impulses to control the small media of fax machines, desktop publishing, and video- and audiocassettes demonstrate how those media contribute to the fragmentation of political and religious authority by bypassing established channels. When recast as differences between senders and receivers, distinctions between center and periphery become far more ambiguous and porous as the senders become multiple and shifting.

Some new media seen as innovative even in the 1980s are now almost taken for granted. In countries such as Saudi Arabia, the same fax machines that rapidly disseminate criticisms of the regime are also essential to the conduct of business. The state is powerless to limit their use without disrupting the economy. Audiocassette tapes spread the sermons of Ayatollah Khomeni and others in the pre-revolutionary Iran of the 1970s, just as videotapes of anti-regime preachers and demonstrations today circulate in some countries of the Arabian peninsula. One such video, showing employees of the Saudi embassy in London videotaping masked demonstrators while the demonstrators videotape the embassy (CDLR 1994), indicates both how commonplace and how flexible the new media have become. Some of these media utilize existing formats, such as desktop-published newspapers. Others, such as Islamic law journals, create an innovative format in which readers from different walks of life —not just conventionally trained religious specialists—exchange views with editors and thus contribute to enlarging the ways in which legal interpretations are made and who can make them. Broadcast fatwas, or religious rulings, have much the same effect: they convert a form of highly personalized interpretation that in an earlier era was provided to individual questioners into more generic messages for a mass audience (Messick 1996: 319-20), and, thereby, shift part of the burden of interpretation to the listener/reader.

Internationally circulated Islamic educational videos, CD-ROMs, booklets, and Internet communications ranging from e-mail to World Wide Web pages frequently borrow formats as new and innovative to Western audiences as they are in Muslim contexts. It is not just that they are new; they are impersonal in the sense that they may be fitted to multiple contexts, put to diverse uses, employed by different people. Place becomes less contextually important than use: Is Pat Robertson's Web page less innovative than that of the Muslim Students Association? Perhaps because of a Western tendency to distinguish between spiritual and technical matters, the use of high-tech communications for religious purposes continues to seem noteworthy to secularists when they initially encounter it, but from Indonesia to Morocco, e-mail and the Internet foster new and rapid forms of communication and coordination for the religiously minded. Indeed, recent scholarly work on globalization and localization in the creation of Muslim private and public spheres in Indonesia (Bowen 1993: 315-30, Hefner 1997, George 1997) has been incorporated into the ongoing discourse of Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia and elsewhere.

Messages also migrate from one medium to another. Novels and recently even comic books (Douglas and Malti-Douglas 1994) address questions of how to lead an Islamic life, a domain previously exclusive to religious scholars who gave advice in the form of religious decrees (fatwas) or published booklets. The proliferation and privatization of television and radio, furthest advanced in Turkey and Lebanon among Muslim-majority countries although still subject to significant government restrictions (Kinzer 1997), includes a significant amount of religious discourse and subtle changes in what is deemed "religious" as broadcasters, competing for market share, reach beyond traditional religious figures to draw the widest audiences. These are counterparts in the public sphere of the earlier displacement of subversive or dissenting messages into more private channels, such as jokes or, in some cases, theater enjoyed primarily by the elite. Newer media reverse this flow and open channels to an expanding public space.

Two effects follow from the boundary crossings of these messages. First, asymmetries between senders and receivers, and between producers and consumers, are reduced as more people participate in religious and civil discourse. In this sense, the new media are more participatory, whether by the access they give for the uninitiated to join the conversation or by the implicit invitation to interpret that accompanies more generic, less personalized messages bound to particular contexts. This incompleteness that invites the further interpretation of messages is the mirror of more symmetrical, more interactive sender-receiver relations that characterize the newer media to which these messages migrate.

Second, boundaries between public and private communication that once seemed clear become blurred as telephones and faxes are used to cross frontiers once readily policed by censors, and conversations that were previously confined to people who knew each other move into a public of anonymous senders and recipients, and thus into a rhetoric of norms that transform the social imaginary and the idea of the public (Warner 1992: 378-79). Messages intended for one medium, such as print, may acquire significantly different meanings when broadcast or faxed, and in all media there are competing and fragmented

voices. Thus a leading Arab secularist, Syria's Sadeq Jalal al-'Azm, can debate Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a leading preacher and conservative religious scholar, on a Qatar-based pan-Arab satellite channel (al-Jazira TV 1997). Even now, such a debate would be unlikely on the state-controlled broadcast media, which generally avoid religious controversy. However, the Qaradawi/al-'Azm debate took place in an alternative broadcast medium, satellite television, where the weighting of questions primarily toward a fundamentalist religious viewpoint provided cover for the more unconventional secularist view expressed by al-'Azm. Viewpoints suppressed in one medium almost inevitably find an outlet in others. Thus the newer small media give broader access to these messages and widen the base of their producers, erode the gap between producer and consumer, and create new standards of public rhetoric. They create public space.

In this respect, new media share some of the properties of ritual in that they are performative. Media do not merely convey messages; they are also part of the message. When Saudi traditionalist 'ulania opposed the introduction of radio broadcasting, Ibn Saud quelled their protests by inaugurating Saudi broadcasting with a Qur'anic recitation, which has been a staple ever since. More recently, King Fahd used television in a major 1992 speech, a year after the end of the 1991 Gulf War, to reaffirm the kingdom's existing political values and contain growing dissent (Rasheed 1996: 359-63). Lacking access to this medium of legitimacy, opponents within Saudi Arabia and elsewhere replied primarily through the small media; but some, such as opponents within the religious establishment, replied through mosques and foreign newspapers. Although some of these media are prohibited or, in the case of mosques, not expressly authorized, the various protagonists are drawn together into an increasingly public sphere of performance with the enhanced accessibility of new media. As Taylor (1993: 220-21) argues, members of modern societies are deemed to meet in a common space through a variety of media and through face-to-face encounters, and "thus to be able to form a common mind about matters of shared concern."

Islam and Information

The new technologies of communication facilitate distinctively modern senses of religious and political identity that, rooted in specific local contexts, are also systematized on a translocal horizon opened by new forms of communication. Notwithstanding modern claims that Islam as practiced is uniform and universal, religious identities are everywhere joined to ethnic, political, and linguistic ones, where heightened senses of Muslim identity traditionally figure in local, regional, national, and transnational agendas and claims for leadership. At a local level, Moro nationalism in the Philippines is fueled by appeals to common Muslim identity, but the appeal is to a distinct ethnolinguistic group. It took shape only with the emergence of a colonial elite educated under U.S. rule, and emerged as a viable popular movement only after Philippine independence (McKenna 1998). At a more global level, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a truly international body, works through state organizations and copes with both national and international rivals. Such identities are set in relations to specific others. And, as times change, many would agree with conservative Muslim intellectuals like Pakistan's Zafar Ishaq Ansari (1997), who observes that there is no

longer any hard and fast line between West and rest, either as ideal types or as functioning communities, as we become aware of contemporary flows of communication. Boundaries are no longer primarily territorial, although these still count, but much more complex and cross-cutting. Those thought of as religious and civilizational, as Huntington (1993) and others remind us, transcend locality, as do other, intermediate levels in which specific bonds of loyalty and trust are elaborated for the purposes of business, worship, and community (Fukuyama 1996).

The emergence of a public sphere in which precedence is given to those who can authoritatively articulate universal standards depends on print and other media to assert this alternative sense of identity. Even as spokespersons for some groups assert that they seek a return to past values, as do some ethnonationalists and Muslim fundamentalists, they do so in a distinctively modern way, oriented to the future and assimilating new technologies and communicative forms (Bayart 1996: 239-41). In an era of restructuring state sectors, advancing market economies, global media cultures—including the globalization of idealized ethnic, sectarian, and regional cultures—and rapid flows of people and money, attempts to speak of transnational cultures, religious traditions, civil societies, or public spheres must take into account a fluidity of identities in these contexts that rests on their essentially, and alternatively, mediated character.

As in earlier public spheres, challenges to authority revolve around rights to interpret. Consequently, Muslim politics is less an expression of a unitary voice (although many would claim this as the goal) than an engagement to argue over correct interpretations. What is new today is that these engagements spill out of a few specialized channels into many generalized ones. They do not necessarily become more public than in the past—mosqueuniversities were public places and legal writings were public documents, although few had access to them; they instead become public in different ways. Their characteristic feature is more, and new, interpreters and, from them, the engagement of a more diverse and wider public.

The conversations and statements that contribute to this public sphere involve trusted partners, channels, media, topics, genres, and other communicative conventions set within different social realities. The result can be seen as both complex and evanescent since more publicness does not inevitably lead to greater participation in associational life—but it is the foundation from which associations can begin to emerge. Some channels, topics, and genres that have risen to prominence appeal primarily to the middleclass Muslim educators, engineers, doctors, and accountants whose techniques of thought and analysis these conventions deploy. These new genres attract identifiable social segments just as a bureaucratized form of Sufism earlier in this century acquired a following in the burgeoning bureaucracy of Egypt (Gilsenan 1973). Others, such as the telephone and local, even neighborhood, television channels in Turkey, fit the personalized network structures and information-seeking behavior of proletarian migrants, whose own networks of kin and friends have become widely, even internationally, dispersed. Across the social scale, some appeals have gained international reach, such as those of the late Ali Shariati (Iran) and Sudan’s Hasan al-Turabi, who cast traditional learning in a modern idiom to transcend traditional

scholarship in style and substance. Syria’s Muhammad Shahrur and Iran’s Abdokarim Soroush have similarly attracted followers, interpreters, and translators disseminating their ideas.

The messages of these thinkers, as of more anonymous persons, are inseparable from their context not just in tone and style, but also in the means of communication that they and others choose. In an era of multiple and alternative channels of communication, issues of how various publics are reached, how messages with religious and political content are listened to in the new Middle East and Muslim world, and what the limits on form and content are in different channels of communication are as important as the overt content of their messages. Much attention has been paid to how institutions formally recognized by the state provide agreed-upon boundaries of civility. Less has been paid to means of communicating the “ties that bind” (Qur’an 31: 22), to use a Qur’anic phrase that suggests how submission to Islam relates to the overlapping ties of kinship, language, and nations that contribute equally to creating institutions and a healthy dispersion of authority. Such means range from the lowly telephone for mobilizing dispersed networks of migrants in Istanbul’s working-class suburbs to the Internet for creating new networks in and to the Middle East’s overseas populations; they include transformed genres from Islamic romances and political comic books to new law journals in Indonesia and imported religious education material for African-American Muslims. They extend to movie making and magazines as well as amateur cassettes and leaflets, all in multiple, overlapping, international conversations.

New Publics and New Media

Throughout the Muslim world—South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia, Africa, and the Muslim communities of Europe, the United States, and elsewhere—increasingly vocal debates on what it means to be a Muslim and how to live a Muslim life frequently translate in highly divergent ways from one context to another. This means that the available publics are significantly expanded not just in numbers or reach, but also in diversity of opinion, over what was possible just a few decades earlier. Upon publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988, opposition press coverage in Pakistan emphasized how the government’s heavy-handed censorship cut committed Pakistani Muslims off from discussions initiated by their counterparts elsewhere. Thus the editor of the mass circulation Takhir (Karachi) wrote of the tragedy that Muslims in Britain and the United States could have direct access to Rushdie’s book, even if this pained their sensibilities, while censorship kept Muslims in Pakistan ignorant and unable to contribute to international debates (Salah ud-Din 1989).

Some of the new thinkers participating in debates within the Muslim- majority world are becoming better known, as boundaries both of debate and of channels in which debates flow shift. Ironically, however, while Arabic remains a universal medium at one level, language differences within the Muslim world significantly constrain the circulation of ideas. Some Indonesian religious intellectuals, often trained in the United States and Canada, interpret

developments in the Arab world, but virtually no Arab intellectuals follow debates on Muslim intellectual and political life in Southeast Asia (Madjid 1997). To some Muslim intellectuals, English has emerged as a preferred medium to call attention to new ideas. One leading Arab religious intellectual recently observed that, even to spread ideas in the Arab world, it helps to have one's ideas known in the English-speaking world and taken seriously by speakers of English, Muslim and non-Muslim alike (personal communication, New York, March 22, 1997).

New media aid this process significantly. Minor and emergent channels of communication that have proliferated are not mass in the same sense as conventional print and broadcasting. They are composed and consumed within more specialized, often voluntarily entered fields where producers and consumers, senders and receivers, are far less distinguishable than broadcasters or the press and their audiences. Instead, they merge in a kind of transnational community that moves the center of discussion and its impetus off-shore or overseas because their technology is mobile or was first available there (Anderson 1997). At times these contributions are anonymous, as is the case with some Internet postings, a tactic that transforms the notion of the public toward participation, as might illicit leaflets. In colonial America and the early years of the American republic, anonymous pamphlets were a major factor in sustaining an emerging public space (Warner 1990). At times, the anonymous leaflet or Internet posting plays a similar role today, as do generic spokespersons in the conventional press; although in some new media such messages are hard to distinguish from those of crackpots or fringe elements, or from disinformation contributed by regional security services.

Except in Turkey and, until recently, in Lebanon, where privately owned broadcast media have become increasingly circumscribed since the end of the civil war in 1995 (Norton 1997), television and radio are the province of official, usually state, institutions or, in the case of the Saudi-owned Middle East Broadcast Center (MBC), establishment commercial interests that limit their range of editorial expression. Through these media, establishments articulate their visions for education, worship, social services, politics, and entertainment (Alterman 1998: 15-24). Emanating from a center, they provide an authorized, top-down pattern of communication, so that competing voices are more likely to emerge through the alternative small media. Audio- and videocassette tapes are ubiquitous in the Middle East, and most countries acknowledge their significance by conducting rigorous inspections at frontiers, where they are subject to special scrutiny. Arab Postal Union regulations ban the posting of video- and audiocassettes. Such tapes circulate sermons, religious instruction, chants, and occasionally subversive folk music, including North African ra'i, as well as other entertainments; they utilize accessible, affordable technologies and vernacular languages to get messages across borders and past official and self-appointed guardians. They extend the speech communities of mosque or locality and also, as Babb and Wadley (1995) have shown for India, homogenize and demarcate regions and localities. To such media as cassettes can now be added local and even neighborhood television and radio stations in Turkey, plus forms of narrowcasting that range from pamphlets to the telephone and Internet discussion groups. Such forms of media link religious identity and civic action to activities in daily life, family, neighborhood, education, dress, jurisprudence, and patterns of consumption.

New media refigure audiences as communities, because senders and receivers have far more in common, not just in interests but also in cultural style and social position. While not nearly as widespread as the production and consumption of cassette tapes and pamphlets, the Internet reproduces many of these features at the opposite end of the social scale. As is characteristic of all these new media, the social and cultural distance on the Internet between producer and consumer is radically reduced. Similarly, with small but influential magazines in Egypt or law reviews in Indonesia, the size of audience is sometimes less significant than the quality and nature of the audience reached for a given purpose.

Another characteristic of the new media is that they occupy an interstitial space between the super-literacy of traditional religious specialists and mass sub-literacy or illiteracy. Their natural home is the emerging middle, bourgeois classes of the Muslim world. They draw—dangerously, in the view of traditionalists—on the techniques of multiple media domains, producing a creolized discourse that is not authorized anywhere but instead links others in an intermediate discourse (Anderson 1995). To the enthusiasts of such forms of communications, the eclecticism they permit is attractive. They are set in contexts of a generation-long rise in the level of mass education in Muslim countries and a relentless urbanization that has filled cities with both a work-seeking proletariat and career-seeking professionals whose mobility is international. Labor migration that puts Sri Lankan and Filipina maids and Pakistani construction workers in the Arab Gulf also facilitates the emigration of Egyptian, Palestinian, and Pakistani doctors, engineers, teachers, and administrators. Most labor migrants in the Muslim world are likely to be Muslims, which reinforces the international, or creole, character of their public space as an intermediate rather than merely disconnected or diasporic one. It is they who first consume and produce the new media, from ra'i music to Internet newsgroups.

The publics that emerge around these forms of communication create a globalization from below that complements and draws on techniques of globalization known in finance and mass marketing. While globalization from above is driven by multi-national corporations, globalization from below is traditionally associated with labor migration. Both constitute incorporation in an increasingly technological world. At their core are professional classes who are at least partly at home with the multiplying media of communication and the skills to operate them and more proletarian counterparts who use new media to incorporate expanding networks of otherwise traditional relations. Among the technicians of globalization as well as its participants, these professionals are both producers and consumers, forming communities on their own scale: interstitial, fluid, and resting on shared communications, a minimal definition of what constitutes a public space.

New People

By new people, we mean those who have emerged and have benefited from the huge increase in modern mass education, especially higher education. Circles of literacy have

been vastly widened and enhanced, creating a dense continuum between mass non-literacy and elite super-literacy. A generation of state-sponsored and, increasingly, private religious schools independent of state support spread the techniques of literacy and the demand for its products, along with a sense of the right to interpret religious texts or to choose interpretations attuned to immediate practical needs and aspirations. The transnational peak of this population takes the form of mobile professionals—a Tunisian Muslim psychotherapist in St. Louis or a Somali Muslim gynecologist in Toronto or an Egyptian Muslim computer programmer in Silicon Valley. But more modest examples of the beneficiaries of mass higher education are equally significant, as are those with less, but still some, education who move from rural village to working-class suburbs of Istanbul or Cairo or Dhaka.

The widening circle of those affected by the new media rests on this foundation of expanded education constituting a market for new mixes of ideas. In principle, traditional mosque-universities (madrasas) in the Muslim world were open to all members of the community; in practice, they empowered a narrow elite to interpret traditions and communicate authoritative interpretive techniques to others (Eickelman 1992: 106-10). Modern mass education means not only more widely spread skills, but also wider, competing repertoires of intellectual techniques and authorities and the erosion of exclusivities that previously defined communities of discourse.

These transformations increase the range of participants in discussions about Islamic values and practice. Women and minorities find their way into arenas of political and religious discourse. Women in Iran may formally acknowledge the male interpreters of Islamic discourse, but this acknowledgment is often marked with barely concealed irony and skepticism, the weapons of the weak in the face of arbitrary authority (Torab 1996: 241-44). Educated people who are not religious scholars increasingly contribute to the discussion of legal issues and create alternative sites for religious discourse and representation. Many of them claim legitimacy on the basis of simplified, systematized, and down-market interpretations of basic texts. Criticism from the shrinking numbers of traditionally educated scholars does not obscure the fact that the new media engage wider and more public communities with claims to interpret and to provide additional techniques of interpretation.

In book publishing, the work of the Syrian civil engineer Muhammad Shahrur is a case in point. His approach to rethinking the meaning of the Qur’an entails a Kantian notion of public enlightenment by ideas, independent of the writer’s status and thus to be evaluated on their persuasiveness alone. Despite the length of Shahrur’s first book (over 800 pages) and its cost (half a month’s salary for a government engineer in Egypt), it sold over 25,000 copies in authorized printings in Syria and many more in pirate and photocopy editions throughout the Arab Middle East, even though formally banned in many of the countries of the region (Eickelman 1993; interview, Eickelman with Muhammad Shahrur, Hanover, N.H., November 27, 1998).

At the other end of the spectrum, government-paid preachers (khatibs) appear on television from Morocco to Pakistan. Some preachers, such as Egypt's Muhammad Sha'rawi and Syria’s Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti, achieve media fame. Most, however, have difficulty extending their reach beyond the Friday sermon and the mosque-university. Shahrur, by comparison, joins an ever-widening cadre of interpreters of Islam who link vernacular expression, modern education, and Islamic themes. Few madrasas are yet on-line, with curricula and faculty profiles, although the International Islamic University of Malaysia, and a counterpart in Herndon, Virginia, target modern (and international) audiences through the Internet, as do branches of major Sufi orders, followers of the work of the Iranian thinker Abdolkarim Soroush, some da'wa (outreach) organizations, some of the theological schools in Qom, and at least one religious training school in Pakistan.

New Thinking

One feature of the new public sphere is a reintellectualization of Islamic discourse. Jeremiads against Western thought are still common, but critiques of Islamic micro-intellectuals or lumpenintelligentsia—to use Olivier Roy’s (1992: 72) term—miss the point that such thinkers successfully join global and local communities of discourse and reach wider audiences than their predecessors.

By reintellectualization, we mean presenting Islamic doctrine and discourse in accessible, vernacular terms, even if this contributes to basic reconfigurations of doctrine and practice. Reintellectualization has sometimes been thought of as the province of folk or local Islam, a category that has been criticized for deflecting attention from the presence of the global in the local throughout the Muslim world. But more is involved with new media and new people: Islamic discourse has not only moved to the vernacular and become accessible to significantly wider publics, it has also become framed in styles of reasoning and forms of argument that draw on wider, less exclusive or erudite bodies of knowledge, including those of applied science and engineering. Shahrur draws his images from the Qur’an and civil engineering, as well as from the linguistics of de Saussure, Sapir, and Whorf. In an intellectual world of systems and subjects, Islam becomes approachable in different ways, one system in a world of systems. It has long been the case that Islam is recognized as an alternative among competing systems of religious belief and practice, and susceptible to multiple interpretive techniques. This in itself is not new—one thinks of the Andalusian ‘Ali ibn Hazm (994-1064), author of extensive writings on various Muslim sects as well as the creeds of Jews and Christians, and of Christian missionaries in thirteenth-century Andalusia who learned Arabic in order to persuade Muslims of the error of their faith and the truth of Christianity—but now the available contrasts range beyond religious systems, so that some believers view Islam as competing with scientific disciplines, on the one hand, and secular political philosophies, on the other (for example, Ahmed 1992).

It is problematic to assert that the interpretation of Islamic precepts (iftihad) was ever closed (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 26). Instead, the modern period in Egypt and Iran and parts of North Africa and South Asia compartmentalized Islamic practice into distinct institutions under colonial or secular governments. But even defensive accommodations, starting with Islamic responses to imperialism in northern India in the second half of the nineteenth century, have been accompanied by continuous reinterpretation. In its older conventional form as jurisprudence interpreted by traditionally educated scholars, the shari'a had become increasingly marginalized and irrelevant to social life, of interest to religious scholars only. In its new form as a set of normative rules avidly discussed in the public sphere, not only are

elements of it implemented, often in novel circumstances, but it becomes a significant element of the political agenda (Brown 1997: 374, Eickelman 1998: 258, Nauimi 1996, Salvatore 1998b). One trend has been toward the de facto privatization of religious faith. Another trend has been toward radical doctrines, such as Khomeni’s principle of wilayat-i faqih, which asserts the sovereignty of jurists over the texts they interpret. However, even among jurists in Iran, there has been vigorous debate over whether Khomeni’s doctrine oversteps the appropriate role for the Shi'i religious establishment (Mir-Hosseini 1999). These two positions, however, merely define the ends of a continuum, the intermediate points of which acknowledge in practice a vigorous and growing religious public sphere and vigorous debate and diversity within it.

The reintellectualization of Islam is anchored less in long-standing conventions of interpretation than in the current experiences of believers. In this respect, Islamic discourse and practice is rapidly shifting from the boundary-minded forms it assumed after the advent of European imperial expansion into Muslim lands to a more confident and differentiated internal and external dialogue. The internal element of this reintellectualization engages many more believers in explicitly articulating Islamic beliefs than did its predecessors. As Gaffney (1994) relates in his detailed analysis of provincial Egyptian sermons, those identified as Islamists build their authority not only on personal reputation and knowledge of texts but, increasingly, from a demonstrated practical grasp of society and an ability to share with their audiences a grasp of their daily challenges. Similarly in Indonesia, the most politically influential religious intellectuals are those able to communicate their beliefs to large numbers of Muslims, delicately balancing state exigencies against the constantly growing religious public sphere (Hefner 1997). As Aswab Mahasin, an Indonesian human rights activist, remarked, the growing influence of Muslim social styles in the public sphere made many people who were previously embarrassed about their faith, because it looked backward and unmodern, proud to act like Muslims (cited in Hefner 1997: 111). Likewise, the relationship between Shi'i religious authority (maria') and follower has always been two-way. Ambitious ayatollahs adjust their fatwas to accommodate popular opinion, just as reformist ayatollahs often have to give in to the wishes of their followers. The major post-revolutionary development in Iranian religious thought is the challenge to the seminary-trained clerics of Qom by Muslim intellectuals educated outside the seminary, such as the London-educated Abdokarim Soroush (Mir-Hosseini 1999). At all times, believers have sought fatwas from religious authorities to guide them on specific issues. In turn, fatwas have

conventionally responded to unique instances and have not been meant as generic pronouncements of doctrine or practice. When published or broadcast and thus widely distributed, however, they fill different, more anonymous and “public,” functions.

*** a New Religious public sphere

The conjuncture of new media, new people, and the reintellectualization of Islamic discourse has broad implications. The first is that the translation or movement of messages from one medium to another changes the balance of what gets into circulation and who introduces new ideas. The proliferation of actors able to assert a public role leads to a fragmentation of authority, and it increases the numbers of persons involved in creating and sustaining a religious-civil public sphere. Even sloganeering—whether through graffiti, anonymous photocopied leaflets, or pamphlets—qualitatively changes the sum of Islamic discourse, even more so as many such documents are anonymous. The transposition of religious (and political) issues to new media also changes the associative ecology of Islamic discourse, juxtaposing religious issues in innovative ways with commerce, entertainment, and the professions, and contributing to the greater pervasiveness of religious themes in an increasingly redefined public life.

Issues such as who gets on national television and publishes mass-circulation books and newspapers and who gets confined to the small media contribute to the shaping of a new public sphere. Such channeling—who gets to speak in certain media or deflected to others—has always involved complex interlocking factors, such as official and unofficial censorship, available infrastructure, and gatekeepers who control access to newsprint, studios, and other required resources, including the training needed to use certain media. Messages are the complex products of many actors and factors, and when some actors and their messages are deflected from the major media into the smaller ones, the intermediaries between producers and audiences diminish, along with the ability of state and religious gatekeepers to influence what is said; and the sense of community correspondingly grows with senses of threat or insecurity. The determinant is not, however, the technological consequences of certain media. Media merely enable. Available technologies have a bearing on the messages communicated and the means of doing so, but equally important are the rising levels of education and the growing cultural understanding among the beneficiaries of mass education of politics and religion as embedded in contingent social relations, actions, and representations (Warner 1990: 6).

The second set of implications arising from the proliferation of new media is the emergence of new public spheres in which religious norms, practices, and values play a significant and sustained role that is not necessarily coterminous with civil society but that can offer powerful support to it (Hefner 1997: 110-16). In most Western contexts, religion has been formally consigned to the private sphere, although many observers comment that this may be due more to specific Western political reaction since the sixteenth century to a centralized and politicized church hierarchy than to anything inherent in civil society itself.

Muslim-majorify countries have never had such a centralized church structure against which to react, and the basis for regime legitimacy in most Muslim states is more tenuous than that for many of their Western counterparts. The boundary between public and private in most Muslim-majority states has never been clear or fixed. Thus religious speeches at weddings in Damascus, attended by hundreds of guests, including prominent political authorities, are formally private events. Nonetheless, they are tolerated, guests spread word of what was said, and videotapes of the talk circulate after the event. A speech at a different wedding several days later may provide a sharp rejoinder that is equally communicated to a wide and diverse public through word of mouth and videotape. Neither speech is mentioned in the authorized state media, yet the talks and the fact of their circulation are known to state authorities, some of whom listened to the talks when initially given (Eickelman field notes, Damascus, August 16, 1997). Neither public in an official sense nor private in a personal one, this space is nevertheless a privileged one, with its own formalities and well-understood scope.

Such blurring of lines—or, as we put it here, such intermediate, connective spaces—remind us of the impossibility of distinguishing sharply between public and private and point to more important continuities between one sphere and another that make them public between the private, on the one hand, and the political, on the other. We believe that it is more useful to see such events as giving wedding speeches in Damascus, publishing texts on the Internet, opening law journals to debates about Islamic requirements, or moving those into the genre of romance novels as elements of a public sphere in which cultural entrepreneurs adapt existing cultural practices to new communicative environments. The result, of course, is to develop and promote new understandings of the role of religion in society. As media command attention to it, the emergence of this new public sphere in turn promotes changes in the orientation and style of official discourse, which at least indirectly is obliged to take account of what is said (as in the case of denunciations faxed to Saudi Arabia) or to be perceived as ignoring or tolerating it (as in the case of Damascene wedding speeches). It also has a significant effect on the everyday practices embedded in social relations, where religious or political authority is a matter of face-to-face biographical familiarity rather than the more formal credentials or structural position that is its equivalent in the large media.

These new publics emerge along a continuum between mass communication aimed at everyone and direct personal communications to specific others with whom one already has a personal relationship. This expanding space of public dealings with those whom Alfred Schutz called contemporaries beyond one’s face-to-face consociates (Schutz 1967: 15-19)—indeed doing everything possible to turn the anonymous or unknown contemporary into a consociate working under common assumptions of civility and morality—is an important part of developing a public sphere in which religion plays a vital role. It contributes to the recognition that such a public is not mass and anonymous, but defined by mutual participation—indeed, by performance. In this sense, which Benedict Anderson (1991: 37-46) refers to as a growing sense of reading together, the public sphere emerges less from associations, more strictly the domain of civil society, than from ways of dealing confidently with others in an expanding social universe of shared communication.

We suggest that by looking at the intricate multiplicity of horizontal relationships, especially among the rapidly increasing numbers of beneficiaries of mass education, new messages, and new communication media, one discovers alternative ways of thinking about Islam, acting on Islamic principles, and creating senses of community and public space. Such a realization among large numbers of people is a measure of the potential for a rapidly emerging public sphere and a civil society that plays a vital role within it.

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** 2. The New Media, Civic Pluralism, and the Struggle for Political Reform

Augustus Richard Norton

When the al-Aqsa intifada began in the autumn of 2000, images of a terrified boy and his equally terrified father transfixed television viewers in the Middle East and beyond. As Muhammad al-Durra and his father were caught in the crossfire between Israelis and Palestinian demonstrators, the father futilely attempted to protect his son, edging him behind his back as they crouched against a wall and behind a large drum marking a checkpoint. In one moment the boy is alive with fear, in the next he slumps dead across his father's lap. His father, devastated, looks blankly into space. Within minutes, images of young Muhammad's death were beamed worldwide by satellite television, al-Jazeera, Future Television, LBC, BBC, CNN, and others. Images of the boy's final seconds were quickly posted on the Internet, spawning debate, accusations, and counter-accusations, official denials of responsibility by Israel, and, of course, web sites (for example, <[[http://www.fortunecity.com/marina/commodity/1089/idl_47.htm][http://www.fortunecity.com/marina/commodity/1089/idl 47.htm]]>). In reaction to the images, massive demonstrations erupted in Arab capitals, and citizens castigated their governments for impotence in the face of Israeli oppression of the Palestinians. Even where enthusiasm had faded for the cause of Palestinian nationalism, as in Kuwait, the issue became newly politicized. A mere five years earlier, certainly a decade before, more reliable but also more sedate foreign media would have marginalized the event, and the regional state media—television featuring soporific news readers detailing quotidian events in the ruler's life and banal government newspapers—would not wish to rile the masses.

In October 2002, two years into the al-Aqsa intifada, as the United States attacked targets in Afghanistan in retaliation for the horrendous attacks of September 11, Osama bin Laden and his associates appeared on alJazeera, the wildly successful Qatari-based news channel that is in part an Arabic-language answer to CNN. Bin Laden appeared in a shrewdly choreographed videotape and spoke eloquently to the Arab viewers, evoking twentieth-century political manipulation of the Arab world, the fate of Palestinians, the plight of Iraq, and threats to the sacred sites of the Arabian Peninsula. In the United States, official spokespeople and countless talking heads cried "foul." Bin Laden did not really care about Palestine and Palestinians, it was avowed; he was only trying to exploit the confrontations between Israelis and the Palestinians to gain a broader constituency.

A search for bin Laden's "true" beliefs misses the point entirely. Whether in his heart of hearts bin Laden mourned for the fate of Jerusalem was far less important than the fact that he was able to bypass governments and capitalize on widespread discontent by speaking resonantly to the public. If few Muslims approved of the terrorism that he employed, far more took his critique of the existing power structure to heart. U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice soon pressured U.S. networks to deny bin Laden and al-Qa'ida a place on their broadcasts, arguing unpersuasively that the messages could contain hidden codes. The problem was not hidden code, but the power of propaganda and the fact that bin Laden's television visage reinforced his importance and gave context to the killing that he spawned. U.S. media executives quickly acquiesced to the government request, and after pressure was applied on the Qatari government, al-Jazeera subsequently adopted a more cautious approach to broadcasting unedited statements from al-Qa'ida.

As the discomfort of the U.S. government revealed, the phenomenon of new media challenges existing governments, confronts American hegemony, and presents themes of disharmony, discord, discontent, and even vicious violence. Halcyon forecasts of a globalized market, universal values, and the seduction of yuppie culture are belied by the headlines that define the dawn of the new century. Yet, unpacked and contextualized, there is considerable promise for improvement in the human condition in the Muslim world precisely because contentious issues of government accountability, individual rights, and not least, religion have become topics of broad debate.

Much of what is happening is hidden from Western view not just by barriers of language and distance, but also by metaphors that betray stereotypes rather than reveal reality. An example is the use of “the street” to refer to mass public opinion in Muslim countries, especially Arab countries. Not only does the term imply a formless mass of people swayed by the sentiments of the moment and manipulated by autocrats, a modern parallel to “the mob” in revolutionary France or “the crowd” in nineteenth-century England, but also few nuances of opinion and no need to stratify points of view by class, gender, age, or regional or occupational distinctions. “The street thinks ...” intone sage-sounding television performers, as though talking about tidal movements. A rough equivalent for the United States would be “the mall thinks ...” But that is not used, because closer to home it is well understood that there are different points of view, different regions to hear from, and that no single group speaks authentically for the United States.

The Muslim world has not been immune to international travel and migration, increasingly globalized trade, and the penetration of all but the most remote geographic nooks and crannies by radio, television, cellular telephones, fax machines, and computers, as well as inexpensive means of printing and reproduction. Why should Islamabad be less susceptible than Cleveland to the pace of global change? Members of Muslim societies at the dawn of the twenty-first century use land-line telephones or cellular models (sometimes several at once), read pulp novels, go to the beach, operate fax machines, and debate their religion. Thankfully, there is more to the story. The focus of new media overlaps with a heightened interest in civic pluralism in the Muslim world.

Pluralism has always been more marked in Muslim societies than prevailing essentialist stereotypes suggest; but, even so, the diversity of Mus- lim-majority societies and awareness in them of intra-Muslim differences are increasing rapidly. From the lowly telephone to the latest Pentium computer, electronic communications permit both conventional and virtual neighborhoods to become sites for identifying, addressing, and solving shared concerns and complaints. Accessible, cheap communication technologies and mass education feed the appetite for new media.

Authoritative interpretations of Islam, long the preserve of learned men (‘ulama}, are now in many hands. Indeed, some of the most creative thinking on Islam in recent years has been done by Muslim men and women with little or no formal

training in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) or other specialties of the conventionally trained ‘ulama. At the same time, Islamically correct pulp novels and popularized interpretations of Muslim ideals and norms enjoy a wide readership. The authority of the ‘ulanta of a generation ago is now contested. The competition for Islamic authority is booming in the variety of tapes, inexpensive books, pamphlets, and kitsch that fill the marketplace.

In Saudi Arabia, the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) challenged the regime’s authority in the 1990s. The London-based group exploited the telephone and the fax machine to publicize its Islamist program and to report on the purported misdeeds of and corruption in the ruling family. One leader of the committee asserts that “Khomeini’s was a cassette revolution, ours will be a fax revolution” (al-Rasheed 1996: 16). By decade’s end, the kingdom addressed the challenge by co-opting the leading figures in the CDLR, and buttressed its Islamic credentials by lending tacit and active encouragement to the most conservative tendencies in Saudi society.

As elsewhere in the Muslim world, the Saudi ‘ularna, paid or subsidized by the government, have no obvious advantage in the contest for popular support. In most settings they suffer severe disadvantages by their association with the government, which is often perceived with suspicion and fear. Bin Laden has certainly been a beneficiary of ‘ulanta failings, just as he and al-Qa‘ida were beneficiaries of official Saudi efforts to propagate the particularly conservative and often intolerant variant of Islam that dominates society.

The structural context of growing diversity in large parts of the Muslim world raises important questions for the political evolution of Muslim societies at the dawn of the twenty-first century. In particular, what are the prospects for the transformations of authoritarian governments and what role will the new media and civic pluralism play in inspiring or shaping political reform?

Certainly it is wishful thinking to presume that new media are in themselves an antidote to authoritarianism. The discursive voices of the new media are fascinating, but their political importance has yet to be demonstrated. It is by no means clear how civic pluralism translates into political power, if at all. They may provide a fortuitous rationale for the political class to attempt to maintain its grip on power instead of to loosen it. Authoritarian governments enjoy support in the West, where the status quo is usually viewed as preferable to the potential turmoil of transition. Change is often perceived as jeopardizing Western links to stable authoritarian governments, especially in the Muslim world. One only need ponder the examples of Egypt, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia. In each case, major Western powers preferred the predictable comfort of autocratic rule to the uncertainties of change, notwithstanding eloquent avowals of support for human rights and democracy.

So, it is ironic that the horrors of September 11 led the U.S. government to “discover” political reform in the Muslim world. It is ironic because American opposition has often stymied reform. A good example is the Palestinian authority that emerged from the Oslo Accords. Faced with evidence of a lively, well-educated Palestinian society with arguable potential for democratic development, the United States, in league with Israel, preferred a Palestinian dictatorship to guarantee order. When, in 1993,1 asked Yossi Bellin, the Israeli deputy foreign minister who played a leading role in the Oslo Accords, whether Israel would be better served by an institutionalized, participant political system than by the creation of a fragile structure of peace resting on the power of a dictator (Yasir Arafat), he replied: “My friend, the Palestinian state is going to be a dictatorship just like all the other Arab states.” Now with the Oslo framework in shambles, the United States and Israel may embrace reform less as a vehicle for the actualization of democratic potential by the Palestinians than in order to find a more pliant, more effectual strongman.

Despite caveats about the persistence of authoritarian government in the Muslim world, social developments that point to the emergence of alternative voices and even a modest weakening of governmental control deserve attention. The quest for government hegemony in the post-colonial Muslim world has often centered on the reproduction of social values and the fostering of national solidarity, particularly in authoritarian republics such as Egypt, Iran, and Turkey; but this quest has largely failed. Instead, government is simply one of many competing sites, albeit a powerful one, in which values and ideals are adapted, debated, reshaped, or nourished. Although government efforts to shape, if not control, the dissemination of political communications persist, censorship is less effective than in the recent past, and sometimes it only serves to parody the abuse of power. While newspapers, radio, and television are relatively susceptible to control through licensing, restricted access to supplies of newsprint, and sweeping libel and press laws, newer media, such as the mass production of audiocassette tapes, are typically unlicensed and anonymous. Ubiquitous ministries of information, established on the premise that information flows downward, find their relevance steadily eroded by the new media, which spread laterally. The horizontal proliferation of information undermines vertical lines of control. Day by day, it seems, the ministry of information becomes more important as a source of employment than as a means of control.

Even so, the post-independence Muslim-majority state has proven remarkably durable and resistant to reform. Despite widespread sentiment in the Muslim-majority world for more accountable, less autocratic governance, the state continues to impose political structures and institutions with remarkably little resistance from society. Many Muslim-majority states have persistently crushed autonomous forms of association, and the legacy of authoritarianism in the Muslim world is stunted civil society. This is not a cultural artifact but a direct result of the policies of the twentieth-century state, with its penchant for a single political party and suspicion of independent voices. Thinking them not to be independent, government policies have tended to privilege populist Islamist forces, sometimes by design, but often as a side effect of the suppression of potential opponents among the secular opposition.

Government intolerance of dissent stems from several factors, chief among which is the political economy of the state, which has, in many instances, been able to draw upon a variety of natural resources and geopolitical rents (for example, cash infusions such as oil income and foreign aid) rather than rely upon a system of taxation. Taxation requires the active participation of citizens. It is no accident that political reforms have been pursued most seriously when straitened resources have forced reductions in subsidies and increased taxes. Consider the contrasting cases of Jordan and Egypt. In Jordan, by the late 1980s, the state was bereft of external subsidies and faced insolvency. In Egypt, despite the awesome economic chai- lenges the country faces, donors have not been shy about picking up the tab for a bloated public sector while underwriting myriad developmental and adjustment projects that have staved off economic ruin.

As the state has proven to be not only durable but also embedded, it is remarkable that the missing player is the state, especially since the behavior and fate of the state will substantially effect the further development of civic pluralism. The state still casts a large shadow even as a parallel global system of non-sovereign actors emerges (Rosenau 1990). The usual examples of these actors include groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which adroitly adopt the new media; but Jon W. Anderson's work on "virtual Islamic communities" (this volume) suggests a more novel example in oppositional groups finding a place on the Internet. The contemporary state must not only contend with growing domestic efforts to shape social values; it also faces an international milieu in which the state is increasingly susceptible to critique and opprobrium. There the transnationality of media (for example, the Saudi opposition's faxes, Islamic sermons on cassettes, CNN, al-Jazeera, and other satellite channels) undermines the state's control by providing alternative sources of information that people can use, whether they are displaced as refugees or labor migrants, members of a diaspora, creolized, or none of the above.

Perhaps we should be grateful that the state is constrained but not endangered. As Hann and Dunn (1996: 7) note, "Despite much heady talk of 'world civil society' in the context of globalisation, there is as yet no sign of any plausible alternative to the state as the primary institutional framework within which security and solidarity can be established in late twentieth-century social conditions." The state remains indispensable, especially for the maintenance of public order. Unfortunately, some governments construe public order in self-serving and capricious ways.

*** The Rise and Fall of Egypt's Law 93

On May 27, 1995, the People's Assembly of Egypt passed a comprehensive press law (Law 93/95) to curtail even mild allusions to official misbehavior and corruption. It included harsh punishments for libel (defined in the vaguest of terms): mandatory imprisonment, fines, and preventive detention. The law was widely viewed by Cairenes as a response to the increasing attention being paid by the press to incidents of corruption around President Husni Mubarak. The law held journalists responsible for the veracity of their reports, even if

they were merely reprinting reports first published abroad. The assembly speaker Fathi Srour pushed the law through the house, permitting no serious debate, and Law 93 seemed destined to be a fait accompli. However, the professional press syndicate reacted strongly to what was quickly branded the “Press Assassination Law.” In response, Mubarak agreed to the creation of a “seini-government” committee with a mandate to recommend amendments to the law. After several months of meetings, months in which journalists were aggressively prosecuted for violating Law 93, the prospects for modification of the law dimmed. In March 1996, the committee’s modestly amended law was submitted to the Shura Council, the upper house of parliament. Despite outspoken efforts by leading journalists to gain modification of the law, the Shura Council refused to permit any additional changes, and the draft law was referred to the People’s Assembly for passage in June 1996.

During this period, the leadership of the press syndicate led a carefully orchestrated campaign against Law 93. Their strategy included mass resignations by senior syndicate members, coupled with relentless confirmations of their loyalty to the state. Throughout the crisis, the syndicate was at pains to keep it a “family” dispute to insure that the government did not see its opposition as a source of insecurity. To the surprise of many observers, President Mubarak lent his support to the press syndicate, and Law 93 was abrogated. This was an impressive victory for the journalists, especially in the face of heavy opposition from government hard-liners. One participant in the crisis was struck by the careful strategic calculations that were made, the most decisive of which was enlisting the president as an arbiter, thereby neutralizing his earlier tacit support for the tough press law. Equally important, the president of the syndicate, Ibrahim Nafa‘, who is close to Mubarak and trusted by the president, played a key role in successfully ending the crisis. Despite his connections—Nafa‘ is a member of the political elite in Egypt and accustomed to being taken seriously—he apparently had no advance warning of Law 93 and was angry that he had not been consulted. Nonetheless, Nafa‘ understood that escalation would play into the hands of the regime’s hard-liners and impair negotiations. In effect, he wanted to avoid a sense of threat to the government or Mubarak. As one insider noted, “We did not want polarization.”

In contrast, Egypt’s university professors were flummoxed in 1993 by the government’s decision to appoint university deans rather than elect them, as had been the custom. In that case, the government was responding to the growing Islamist presence on campus and seeking to deny them high-profile leadership positions. But where the university professors were unsuccessful in getting the change rescinded, the journalists’ unified response was made easier by the small size of their syndicate and by its liberal tradition. Furthermore, since Islamists do not control the press syndicate, there was no risk of lending momentum to the most significant opposition force in Egypt. Had hard-liners prevailed, the syndicate might have been vulnerable to radicalization. As one close observer noted,

For the first time in a long while a strong professional movement appeared, with popular backing, without initiative for the Islamist forces. The journalists’ movement brought together a national consensus between numerous factions of liberal, leftist, and government

forces, and the Islamic factions joined in, but not as leader or most important player. This indicates the natural root of Islamist strength—it grows in the absence of alternative forces!!

Also noteworthy is the fact that 700 members of the syndicate work for the establishment daily, al-Ahram (of which Nafa‘ is chairman of the board), and the syndicate was able to draw upon its considerable resources. Many of the key working papers were drafted by an al-Ahrani working group created by Nafa‘. Several leading rights-oriented groups were also instrumental in preparing thoughtful critiques of Law 93, especially the Legal Center for Human Rights, which organized a workshop in June 1995 to study press legislation.

While the defeat of Law 93 was celebrated as a victory for a free press and for civil society, the circumstances that defined the crisis were unusual. The case illustrates how reform can take place in Egypt’s authoritarian political system, but it also underlines the low likelihood that other syndicates, most of them quite large, could emulate the success of the journalists. The case highlights the real locus of power in Egypt and the specificity of the power structure. The rise and fall of Law 93 illustrates just how deeply embedded is authoritarian rule in Egypt. Most associations lack the solidarity and the connections necessary to reverse major government decisions.

There is, however, strong sentiment in Egypt, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, for political reform. One member of the political elite, a reformer, argues,

Now there are at least two generations among the youth of Egypt in the workforce and active population [whose political consciousness awakened during the mid-seventies], their age being between 25 and 35, who support political freedom and freedom of expression as an absolute value. They are born with rights and live with them, and they won’t give them up. Those that do not take rights seriously cannot remember the previous era of oppression, to say nothing about the important values of freedom and human rights in the international context.

The writer’s claims are not so much wrong as that they misconstrue politics. Politics is not merely a product of sentiments and moods but a contest of organized interests. Therefore we turn now to the question of how civic pluralism translates into political influence, and whether civic pluralism leads to political pluralism.

*** The Importance of Civil Society

Civic pluralism meets the state in the realms where norms are contested and where the boundaries of state and society overlap. It is in civil society that contemporary citizenship is

being redefined and public space is negotiated. In civil society, sentiments and moods crystallize as formal and informal efforts to promote self-interest. If the rise of civic pluralism creates greater opportunity for individual action, the site for agency to be realized is civil society.

Although we should be justifiably skeptical of tropes of civil society that confuse the ideal-typical with the empirical, we should not ignore the fact that themes of civil society—translated, mutated, reinterpreted—have become part of the political discourse of the Muslim world. As Robert Hefner notes, “Much of the theoretical writing on civil democracy has been more concerned with summarizing technical debates among professional philosophers than it has in demonstrating whether those ideas inform actual people’s political actions in real human societies” (1998:7). Rather than focusing on competing theoretical perspectives, it is much more relevant, as Hefner implies, to look at what is actually happening.

The “discovery” of civil society as a topic of debate in the Muslim world is neither an example of ideological imperialism nor a Western liberal’s fantasy. The reason that civil society has attracted serious attention is because it evokes crucial questions: How may people peacefully organize outside of government control? How is citizenship engendered and strengthened? What role should the state play as a referee or rule-setter? How should people’s needs be met in the wake of the retreating state?

The civil society construct has suffered from several weaknesses when it has been addressed in the West. Some proponents, as well as many critics, have tended to conflate the concept with democracy or democratization, which has led to wishful thinking about political reform and has implicated writing on civil society with problematic U.S. government programs for promoting democracy. The result is either blind endorsement of civil society or disdainful rejection of the construct, depending upon one’s biases, and both mask the significant value of much recent discussion.

It is widely claimed that civil society checks the power of government, that it is the natural opponent of autocracy. This is a claim extracted from the observation of mature democracies in the West, and it is even problematic there. One can argue that civil society in some Western societies has been undermined by the full-blown development of the modern state, which provides many of the services and protections originally available within the framework of civil society. It is a bit naive to expect that authoritarian government will be routinely challenged by groups of citizens who lack effective legal frameworks to resist, to protest, or to demonstrate. Moreover, civil society is not locked into a zero-sum game with the state. A more differentiated view of state-society relations is necessary, one that recognizes the opportunities for a dialogue at arm’s length with a powerful state. Where government revenue derives largely from rents rather than the extraction of taxes, the purpose of the dialogue will often be rent-seeking.

Historically, civil society emerged as a bourgeois phenomenon and a reaction to expanding extraction by the state. Subsequently, the project of bourgeois civil society was liberalism, not democracy. In the contemporary Muslim world, where the middle class is anxious to preserve its access to state largesse (rents), it is often palpably unenthusiastic about democracy as well. As G. White (1995: 77—78) suggests,

There is historical evidence to suggest that the bourgeoisie—and many of its subalterns in the middle strata—are more interested in the liberal than the democratic component of liberal democracy, in negative rather than positive freedoms, and in a more strictly political than a socioeconomic definition of democracy. Other sections of civil society, poorer segments of the population, the industrial working class, groups representing socially subordinated or politically marginalized groups such as women, neglected regions, and ethnic, racial, and religious groups— have an interest not merely in the liberal but also in the democratic potential of liberal democracy, in the sense that it opens up new channels for articulating their grievances and pressuring the state to do something about them.

Several examples from recent scholarship on civil society illustrate that the bourgeoisie's disincentives for promoting democracy are clear. In Syria, until the regime launched economic reforms in the 1980s, the predominantly Sunni merchant class—the entrepreneurial heart of the country—was purposefully disadvantaged by the state's strategy of development that promoted state-owned industrialization and restricted private enterprise, as well as land reform. The legitimacy formula of the Ba'athist state was predicated on the building of a broader base in the urban lower class and the rural peasantry and suppressing the merchants, who were viewed as the core of support for the ancien regime. Now that the merchants are back in favor, their interests lie in improving their access to information, insuring the mobility of capital, and enjoying the consistent protection of law. They have little interest in democratizing Syria, which would have the effect of granting a larger voice to employees of public-sector companies or to the peasantry; to do so would jeopardize their newly privileged economic relationship with the state (Hinnebusch 1995).

The clearest illustration of the importance of distinguishing between the project of liberalism and the project of democracy is arguably Turkey. Turkey's encounter with democracy is only a half-century old, and throughout this period significant segments of the middle class have been extremely skeptical of democracy, never more obviously than in the 1950s, when the Democratic Party, led by Adnan Menderes, won power and kept it by building a populist base of support in the urban lower class and among the peasantry. Under Menderes, Kemalist laicism was relaxed, and, for the first time in the republic's history, Islamic institutions were actually promoted by the state. The army, for whom laicism often seems a political fetish, intervened to end the excursion into populist democracy and hanged Menderes in the process. The coup found enthusiastic support among the middle class, including many of Turkey's professional and other associations. One sees a similar pattern in Turkey in the 1990s, after the rise to power of Refah Partisi, the pro-Islam party. Self-proclaimed members of civil society proclaim regularly that they count on the army to intervene "to save democracy"—a strange conception of democracy, to be sure.

In Egypt, the government has met the challenge of reform by suppressing civil society. Stymied by refreshingly independent judges in applying new legislation to regulate external funding and generally tighten the control on non-governmental organizations, a signal example was chosen to chill opposition voices. The target was Professor Saad Eddin Ibrahim, an internationally known and respected sociologist and a leading advocate of democratic reform and human rights in Egypt. After Ibrahim played an organizing role in monitoring parliamentary elections and in revealing considerable vote fraud, as well as examining discrimination against Coptic Christian Egyptians, he was prosecuted for accepting foreign funding (although for technical reasons his research center fell outside the scope of the law that the state applied), defaming Egypt, and embezzling funds. He was convicted in very sloppy court proceedings in 2001 and sentenced to jail for seven years. After an appeal on substantive and procedural grounds, Ibrahim was released for retrial in 2002.

In July 2002, Ibrahim and eighteen of his colleagues were re-convicted of the same crimes and four defendants were sentenced to prison terms. The longest sentence meted out was to Ibrahim, who received a seven-year term for “tarnishing Egypt’s reputation abroad,” among a variety of other crimes, including fraud and illegally receiving funds from the European Union for monitoring parliamentary elections and reporting on discrimination suffered by the Coptic minority. The court went beyond the prosecutor’s charges, and alluded to funding that Ibrahim received from the Swiss Human Rights Organization, al-Jazeera Satellite TV, and from Haifa University (for a subscription to an Ibn Khaldoun Center publication), among other organizations. Predictably, the chilling effect has been palpable in Egypt’s NGO sector, where many activists now shiver at the thought of accepting foreign funding. Ibrahim’s young, idealistic colleagues have been stigmatized by the charges leveled against them and will find the going very tough as they attempt to pursue professional careers.[2]

Oddly, although Ibrahim was well known for his advocacy of democracy in the Arab world (he had been honored by Freedom House, among other U.S.-based organizations), the initial reaction from the Bush administration was relatively muted. (In fairness, so was the response of the Middle East Studies Association, the leading professional organization of its kind in North America, and the very organization that honored Ibrahim with its Academic Freedom Award in 2001.) Government spokespeople expressed “disappointment” at the convictions, but were reluctant to level sharp criticism of the Mubarak government. The U.S. government’s silence punctuated the basic contradiction between rhetorical advocacy of democracy and freedom in the Arab world, and realpolitic calculation.

Democracy and reform have been central motifs of U.S. commentary, within and without government circles, following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, but the Ibrahim case illustrates that other interests heavily condition U.S. support for democracy. Egypt, after all, is an important American friend in the Middle East. Following a surge of supporting statements from politicians, commentators, and academics (for example, Friedman 2002, Diehl 2002, Norton 2002), the Bush administration announced on August 15, 2002, that as a

result of the persecution of Ibrahim it would not extend further aid to Egypt over and above the annual allocation of two billion dollars. In a sense, this was an empty threat, since neither Congress nor the administration was contemplating further aid. The belated U.S. action met a recalcitrant response in Cairo, including from President Mubarak and his major political advisor ‘Usama al-Baz.

As a tactical matter, by focusing its criticism solely on the Ibrahim case, the U.S. government played right into the hands of the anti-Ibrahim slander campaign in Egypt by highlighting Ibrahim’s dual nationality and feeding the accusation—by now common in the Egyptian press—that Ibrahim’s activism served foreign masters, not Egyptian interests. Had the United States focused its complaints more broadly on the arbitrary legal procedures associated with the Emergency Law that has been in effect in Egypt since Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981, and which facilitated the state’s persecution of Ibrahim and his co-defendants, opinion leaders in Egypt may have been less inclined to rally around Mubarak. However, the U.S. response was calibrated to be as narrow and as palatable as possible, so as not to upset the geopolitical apple cart. Thus, President Bush was wont to reassure Mubarak that his stance did not jeopardize the generous annual stream of U.S. aid.

Unfortunately, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, conditions for reform are even worse across the Muslim world. Leaders like Husni Mubarak have used the “war against terrorism” to deny any space to the opposition and deny any exercise of basic human rights to whomever they choose. Mubarak offered the view that “terrorists have no human rights”; so for opponents classified as terrorists, the gloves are off. Militant opposition groups, including Islamist groups bent on replacing the state, are major beneficiaries of these policies, which only serve to validate their critique of government oppression and corruption.

Of course, the formal associations of bourgeois civil society, such as Egyptian NGOs, are only part of the picture. Comparatively less attention has been paid to networks of informal civic associations, which have filled the void left by governments’ failure to meet the needs of the urban lower classes and the rural poor. Perhaps the most attention has focused on the impressive array of service organizations created by Islamist opposition movements. What the reformist-oriented Islamists have accomplished is impressive and should be seen as an important step toward a more inclusive civil society. Nonetheless, the Islamists’ efforts are only one segment of an array of informal networks that crisscross the urbanscapes of the Muslim world (Singerman 1995, J. B. White 1996). It appears that their success has been less in creating networks of informal association than in exploiting patterns of association based on reciprocal relationships. Only when these informal forms of civic pluralism have been politicized—which is to say, only when the participants believe that there are political solutions to their problems—will political movements emerge. In this regard, the importance of the new media is to help sensitize heretofore economically marginalized people to the prospect that life chances can be improved.

We should not expect creative thinking about reform and political change to come from the regimes in the Muslim world. They are too embedded in privilege and too insecure in their power to think deeply about fundamental political or economic reform. The discourses that will give shape to change must emerge from society, and new media are some of its channels. New media are central to expanding the public space. Some of the examples provided in this book hint that growing civic pluralism in the Muslim world will result increasingly in organized demands on governments. Even if progress is slowed by the developments of 2001 and 2002, the slow retreat of authoritarianism in the Muslim world remains likely.

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This section is based on fieldwork conducted in Cairo with Farhad Kazemi in 1995 and 1996.

[2] Egypt's highest appeals court overturned Ibrahim's conviction on December 3, 2002, ordering a third retrial.

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** 3. Communication and Control in the Middle East: Publication and Its Discontents

Dale F. Eickebnan

Authority to suppress or “guide” the printed and spoken word in the Middle East has become inherently vitiated by social and technological developments that are reaching full force in the 1990s. In Gamal al-Ghitani’s Zayni Barakat (1988: 200-201), a historical allegory written in the early 1970s satirizing Nasser’s rule, a chief spy in Mamluk Egypt dreams of a world in which everyone is numbered and agents of authority can intervene in a conversation and move it in a particular direction. Sadly only for the censors, mass education and new communications technologies have rendered that dream impossible. Desktop publishing makes the expensive, vulnerable printing presses of older technologies

obsolete; satellite dishes, even when heavily taxed and regulated, evade effective government control; and Internet and computer links are rapidly eroding control of what is said (Alterman 1998: 45-72).

The frontier between banned words and images and those that are tolerated in the Middle East has never been fixed, but access to new technologies has multiplied the channels through which ideas and information can be circulated and has enlarged the scope of what can be said and to whom. It has eroded the ability of authorities to censor and repress, to project an uncontested “central” message defining political and religious issues for large numbers of people. In other words, the lines between the “official” and “hidden” transcripts (Scott 1990: 3-4) have become increasingly blurred. Censors may still restrict what is said in the mainstream press and broadcast media, but these media have lost the exclusivity they once had. Mass education and the availability of alternative media have irrevocably altered how “authoritative” discourse is read and heard.

State efforts to gain control of one medium—the press, the broadcast media, or even music —lead only to the proliferation of other means of communication and foster, albeit inadvertently, a “civil society” of dissent. The Iranian example is well known. From 1958 until 1969, Iran had only commercial television, but this ceased with the advent of National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT). Ostensibly independent when founded in 1969, NIRT lost its credibility in the early 1970s when, in the midst of an urban guerrilla movement, viewers were offered long lectures by Parviz Sabeti, a SAVAK (state security) official in charge of ideological matters, on the sinister intentions of “subversive” groups. Subsequent broadcast “confessions” by captured guerrillas further discredited the state-controlled medium (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994: 69). When the Shah exiled key members of the religious opposition, leaflets and audiocassettes smuggled into Iran or taped from international telephone calls and passed from hand to hand—creating bonds of complicity and trust among those involved— became a primary vehicle of communication.

A more recent example is contemporary Saudi Arabia, where the fax and photocopy machine make bans on the printed word impossible to enforce without alienating regime supporters. Threats in the Saudi-controlled media (for example, al-Sharq al-Aivsat 1994) to make those who distribute or comment on leaflets that defame or slander the “legitimate rulers” (wila’ al-umur) as guilty as their creators make public implicit circles of complicity and draw attention to the inability of authorities to control such communications. Newspapers, dependent on their presses, imported newsprint, and formal distribution networks, are easy to control. The “small media”— cassettes, photocopies, desktop publications, and electronic mail—are not. Such technologies, combined with the wider audiences created by mass education, create an irreversible trend toward a freer market in religious, political, and social ideas and foster a pluralism often resisted and poorly understood both by states and by religious authorities. These new technologies challenge those who seek authoritatively to demarcate the lines between the licit and the illicit.

In earlier eras, control and censorship were more predictable. The bookplate of Egypt's King Farouk (reproduced in Mitchell 1988: 91) foregrounds a turbaned man of learning next to a printing press. He is handing a book to a peasant, alongside his water buffalo and plough, who has stopped work in his field. In the background is a silhouette of Cairo's citadel and Farouk's name in calligraphy, topped by a crown. The image exemplifies the top-down notion of communication, where those in authority control what is printed and how it is disseminated.

It was easier to control the public word with older communications technologies. Printing presses could be confiscated, sequestered, or destroyed. More subtle techniques have emerged since the 1960s—manipulation of newsprint prices and supplies, direct or indirect publication subsidies, and control of distribution channels—strategies in which countries such as Morocco have excelled. Under such circumstances, a self-censorship more pervasive than any imposed by state security officials also constrained what was said.

When full literacy was restricted, for all practical purposes, to an elite, the print media—pamphlets, newspapers, periodicals, and books—addressed the elite and thus authority directly. From the late nineteenth century onward, however, the multiplication of printed religious texts, at first controlled by religious authorities, "struck right at the heart of person-to-person transmission of knowledge" and significantly enlarged audiences (Robinson 1993: 239). Print initially enabled religious scholars, the 'ulama, to expand their influence in public affairs because they sponsored and controlled religious publications. Yet the ironic consequence of printing reduced their authority because of the rapidly increasing number of educated persons and the shift to a more accessible, popular language (Robinson 1993: 245).

The frontier between the banned and the tolerated has become more uncertain in the past few decades with the advent of mass education, particularly mass higher education, throughout the Middle East because it has increased dramatically the audience for the printed word and the publicly spoken political and religious words of the broadcast media, audiocassettes, and videos. Although the onset of the commitment to mass education varies throughout the Middle East—1952 for Egypt, 1956 for Morocco, and 1970 for the Sultanate of Oman, for example—its growth in all cases was exponential. The combination of mass education and the "intellectual technology" of communication innovations has also changed what is said and not said, radically altering audiences, concepts, and practices (see Eickelman 1992).

Although the broadcast media and cassettes have become important means of communication, the printed word retains a special place in "authoritative" communications. Even if only a minority of the population read books, a much larger number hear them spoken about—and books, following the paradigm of the Qur'an—remain central to the cultural imagination (Atiyeh 1995). The most rapid growth for the printed word is in what Yves Gonzalez-Quijano (1998) calls "Islamic books"—inexpensive, attractively printed texts

that are accessible to a readership who lack the literary skills of the educated cadres of an earlier era and that take advantage of new printing technologies. Such books and pamphlets have also captured an increasing market share in Muslim majority countries outside the Arab world. As Huq (this volume) explains, teenage romance novels, once a specialty distributed in “secular” bookstores, now have Islamic counterparts, which are distributed through religious bookstores (Fig. 3.1). In Pakistan, the types of religious books that sell in Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore differ somewhat in each city, but in all cities religious titles far outsell other titles (Eickelman and Anderson 1997: 54-55). In Morocco, Mu’tamar sahafi m‘a jinn Muslim (Press Conference with a Muslim Jinn), generally available only in pirated photocopies, is a best-seller, with students at the nation’s thirteen public universities among the major consumers.

Figure 3.1. Secular and Islamic books are generally sold in separate bookstores in Dhaka, but the cover art for these novels suggests a competition for audiences also characteristic of publications elsewhere in South Asia and the Middle East. Budhdhodeb Guho, Pardeshia (The Foreigner) (Dhaka: Shameem Ahmed, 1985), above, is generally considered a “secular” novel; while Kasem Bin Abubakar, Basar Rat (Wedding Night) (Dhaka: Kakoli Prokashoni, 1993), right, is an “Islamic” one (Courtesy Maimuna Huq).

Figure 3.2. The eye-catching cover and theme of Shaykh ‘Ali Ahmad al-Tahtawi’s Ahtval al-qubur wa-ma ba'd al-mawt (Terrors of the Grave and What Follows Death) (Cairo: Dar al-Bashir, 1987) typifies the inexpensive, widely circulated “Islamic” book, the fastest growing segment of Egyptian and Middle Eastern publishing.

Since the late 1970s, religious books have eclipsed other types of publications, often bypassing bookstores and being sold on sidewalks, in kiosks, and in general-goods stores (Starrett 1995). The style of these books is usually a breezy mix of literary and colloquial diction; the covers are eye-catching. Some of the books deal with religious themes and the afterlife or answer questions on how to be Muslim in the modern world (Fig. 3.2); others deal directly with the political questions of the day, such as a Saudi pamphlet that argues that democracy is incompatible with Islam because Islam offers governance by the Creator (al-khaliq)—as understood by a properly instructed religious elite—whereas “democracy,” derided as a non-Arabic term, implies rule by the created (al-makhluqin), where unbelievers and the ignorant have an equal say in governance and usurp God’s rule (Sharif 1992:16-18).

In many parts of the Muslim world, including North Africa, the style of argument is sometimes regarded with amusement, but it is more accessible to recent beneficiaries of mass education and appeals more to their perceived interests and needs than books written by the established literary, religious, and political elite. Advertisers too have begun to notice

such books: on the inside cover of some of Shaykh Sha'rawi's books in Egypt, for example, are advertisements for consumer goods—in decorative script and citing Qur'anic verses.[3]

These "Islamic" books point to the changing nature of religious—and political—discourse. Many take the form of practical manuals on how women ought to conduct themselves in modern societies, children's religious education (Starrett 1996), death and the hereafter, and reconciling Islam with science. At one level, they indicate how religious and political beliefs are increasingly transformed into a conscious system. At another level, they encourage and mirror the growing fragmentation of religious and political authority. The net result of these changes—the growing tendency to think of religious belief and practice as a self-contained system and the fragmentation of authority—is to reconfigure the symbolic production of politics.

The accessibility of such writing to new audiences is an important theme that has parallels with the broadcast media. Unfortunately, few studies concern audience response to Middle Eastern media.[4] One of the first, conducted in Iran in the 1970s, revealed that a large portion of the population did not understand the language of broadcasting, "especially news programming" (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994:69). In the late 1960s, when newscasts were in "standard" Arabic, I had the dubious honor in a rural area of western Morocco of "translating" the formal Arabic of radio newscasts into colloquial Moroccan. Programming in Moroccan Arabic and in the Berber languages expanded significantly only after Colonel Qadhdhafi allowed Moroccan dissidents to broadcast in colloquial Arabic from Libya in the early 1970s.

The gap between broadcast production and audiences has narrowed in recent years, but it remains significant. A former minister of information in an Arab country commented on the decision to build a second television network: "We didn't need any opinion polls. I knew what the public wanted."[5] The commercial film industry in Egypt may have a better sense of popular taste: the Egyptian film al-lrhabi (The Terrorist) (Galal 1994) may seem crude in its portrayal of Islamic activists. Starring 'Adil Imam, one of Egypt's best-known actors, the film portrays Islamists as violent, naive, and boorish, manipulated by authoritarian leaders. Bourgeois life, in contrast, is depicted as cosmopolitan, comfortable, and tolerant. Egyptian commercial film-makers, unhappy with the Islamist project in Egypt, did not require instruction in the propaganda potential of mass communications—particularly in the video version of the film, which could be viewed in the privacy of homes in case some viewers were reluctant to see it in public cinemas. Some Arab intellectuals laugh at the film's crude portrayals, but a village-born Egyptian political scientist explains that the producers had a finely honed sense of the primary audience for whom the film was intended.[6] Similarly, many creators of more "highbrow" publications have yet to adjust to the "market economy" of popular religious and political writing.

In electoral politics as well, politicians only incrementally acquire the skills needed to communicate to audiences through print and the mass media. The 1992-1993 Moroccan

local and parliamentary elections were more open than earlier ones, with candidates given access to television for the first time, and even more access was permitted for the 1997 local and parliamentary elections. Unfortunately, most presentations took the form of speeches to party followers, so their impact on the elections was negligible.

In general, censorship and control of print and other media has had to become more multidimensional and nuanced. It shows a greater sophistication on the part of state gatekeepers about which media make a significant impact on the population. Thus small intellectual magazines in Tehran publish on a latitude of subjects, as the authorities—who retain tight control on radio, television, and the content of Friday sermons—know that their political impact is minimal and that the costs of repression outweigh those of turning a blind eye. Nonetheless, Islamic texts that few people read are published in profusion in post-revolutionary Iran, although what people buy is the more scarce “secular” magazine or book. In Morocco, censorship is frequently selective. In 1992, the arrest and trial of Hajj Muhammad Mustafa Tabit, a senior Moroccan police official convicted of raping over 300 women—activities he preserved in a personal videotape archive—went unreported by the Moroccan broadcast media. In contrast, newspapers, with the exception of one semi-official publication, carried daily accounts of the trial, which took place during Ramadan, the month of fasting. The timing was important, for the trial doubled as a morality play. Newspaper circulation soared as a result, and papers were rented out by the hour at some kiosks in Rabat and Casablanca. In Morocco, where most people get their news from the broadcast media, state-controlled except for a private radio station in which a holding company related to the palace has a significant interest, newspaper coverage—which reaches a much smaller number of people—offered a safety valve sufficient to control rumors and give the appearance of a relatively unfettered press.[7] Likewise, cassettes of Berber and Arabic songs commenting on the case circulated freely, although they were never mentioned in the broadcast or print media (Lakhsassi 1998).

Political and religious communications that are banned take on a new significance. The words of a hand-copied leaflet concerning how one can earn sufficient “credit” to enter paradise may be politically innocuous, but the risk a sailor in the Moroccan navy took to copy it and the bonds of complicity created in passing it to trusted mates parallels the circulation of leaflets in Afghanistan’s Islamic Youth Organization in the 1960s (Edwards 1995) and the now common distribution of photocopied leaflets.

On a technologically more sophisticated level, the “fax wars” in Saudi Arabia successfully evade government efforts to restrict criticism of the regime, which is virtually powerless to control the incursions of the “small media.” Prohibitions against circulating such documents only draw further attention to them (for example, al-Sharq al-Aiusat 1994). Efforts to ban books can also be easily circumvented. In 1991, Saudi Arabia banned Muhammad Shahrur’s al-Kitab wa-l-Qur’an (The Book and the Qur’an). Nonetheless, an estimated 10,000 photocopies circulated within the kingdom (“Prophetic” 1993). Although also banned in Egypt, large numbers of photocopies of the book circulated there as well, and for several years after the 1992 assassination of journalist Farag Fuda, for which Islamists claimed responsibility, al-Kitab was published in Egypt in a

pirated edition, which reached its third printing in mid-1995.[8] Even mainstream newspapers can escape state disapproval and build readership by publishing articles that attack Islamist doctrine, although readers sympathetic to such views can read the summaries of Islamist arguments differently (for example, Anonymous 1992).

Technology is supposedly neutral, but technological innovations subtly alter the structure and content of disseminated messages. Print and other technologies create new forms of community and transform authority and social boundaries. Thus an Egyptian newspaper reported that a raid on a software import firm yielded computer discs that disclosed the structure of the clandestine wing of the Muslim Brotherhood and potential targets for political action and infiltration into the police, judiciary, press, medical, and other professions. Omani security uncovered a similar use of computers in a sweep of Islamists that resulted in more than 300 arrests beginning in June 1994 (“Up to 70 Suspects” 1994; Abdullah 1995).

In some regions, audiocassettes have begun to supplement or replace pamphlets as a vehicle for religious debate. A pamphlet has the advantage of greater anonymity for the author—voices on cassette can often disclose authorship—but cassettes have other advantages. Inexpensive, easy to smuggle, and readily reproduced, they may be played in the home, automobile, mosque, or other meeting places. The sermons of Lebanon’s Shaykh Husayn Fadlallah and Egypt’s Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hamid Kishk are available throughout the Middle East and wherever Arabic-speaking Muslims are found in Europe and America. Cassettes, like the other “small” media, make it easier for Muslims to keep abreast of developments elsewhere in the Muslim world and to feel as if they participate in them. “Voiced Islam” (al-Islani al-sawti) has thus become a force rivaling “print Islam.”

Recent developments in communication technologies also empower protest groups within societies. Conscious that Islamic groups elsewhere bear similarities to their own situation and influenced by transformations in the Islamic political vocabulary, hitherto isolated protest movements or individuals acquire a bolder voice and are encouraged to act more decisively. The recent rapid expansion of Islamic publishing and the emergence of television channels controlled by religiously oriented groups in Turkey is a case in point (see Yavuz, this volume; also Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi 1994). Even repressive states have to take uncontrolled messages into account. Concerned about waning youth audiences for Iranian state television, a small interministerial group in Tehran called the “Optimal Image” (Simay-i-Matlub) committee considered adopting programs that could rival Western music videos for audience appeal.[9]

The content of Friday sermons also shows the influence of a wide range of print and broadcast media, and preachers now assume that the audience has been so influenced. They incorporate references and allusions to a wide range of texts and events (Gaffney 1994:50,215; Eickelman 1990). Preachers cite contemporary Muslim intellectuals such as

Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, Kishk, and Shaykh Ibn Baz of Saudi Arabia as well as Western writers and publications. In Saudi sermons distributed via cassettes during the 19901991 Gulf crisis, preachers invoked such sources as the memoirs of Richard Nixon, the Voice of America, the Financial Times, CNN, the writings of George Bush, and contemporary Arab periodicals like al-Hayat and al-Watan al- ‘Arabi. Criticism is often indirect. For example, an approving reference to the probity of the “rightly guided" caliphs of early Islamic history would not be lost on the audience as a veiled attack on the injustice and immorality of present-day leaders.

Dissident and subversive messages are also communicated through nashids, martial chants that rival ra‘i or even rap music in popularity. The importance of the nashids and rap music is that they represent the ways in which popular cultural forms can be mobilized to foster claims and counterclaims in Muslim politics. The insistent rhythms, assertive refrains, and often mocking tones are especially effective in articulating protest. Humor serves a similar function. Although Morocco’s Ahmed Sanoussi is no longer allowed access to the stadiums that once drew up to 40,000 people to hear his performances, his cassettes and appearances in small theaters consistently draw capacity crowds who appreciate his political satire (Hedges 1995). Comic strips often have the same effect (Douglas and Malti-Douglas 1994). Hannah Arendt (1986: 65) reminds us: “To remain in authority requires respect for the person or the office. The greatest enemy of authority, therefore, is contempt.” Music, poster art, and graffiti can also be subversive and indirectly indicate rival claims to authority. They arc popular representations of symbolic politics, but, as we would expect, they may be ambiguous in their political message.

In conclusion, the “migration” of messages, media, writers, and styles of discourse is part of an increasing fragmentation of authority. It also multiplies the ways in which authority can be represented and by whom. “Islamic” books and cassette sermons set aside the long tradition of authoritative discourse by religious scholars, so that chemists, medical doctors, journalists, and even garage mechanics, for example, can interpret “Islamic” principles as equals with scholars who have graduated from the schools of the 'ulama. This multiplication of voices in public discussion of religious and political belief further erodes the boundaries between kinds or sources of authoritative speech.

In addition, new forms of communication and their increased rapidity allow “peripheries” and audiences to talk back and can infuse new life to local and regional traditions. When states shut down one form of communication, others take its place, or diasporas sustain voices that otherwise would be silenced or muted. New technologies of communication and publication also enable those who hold minority views, including extremists, to join forces with like-minded people elsewhere to accomplish common goals. The new political geography of communications may actually facilitate pluralism. Finally, in the sense that symbolic and political connections across national and other political boundaries are encouraged, conventional understandings of “external” and “internal” become increasingly blurred.

Through fragmenting authority and discourse, the new technologies of communication, combined with the multiplication of agency facilitated by rising educational levels, contribute significantly to re-imagining Middle Eastern politics and religion. Understanding the dynamics of these new voices and the media through which they are disseminated entails listening to the many voices of the region, not merely to those of a Westernized elite. This fragmentation may contribute to political volatility in the short run, but in the long run, it may become one of the major factors leading to a more civil society throughout the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world.

[3] I am grateful to Yves Gonzalez-Quijano (personal communication, September 12, 1994) for drawing my attention to advertisements in religious books and pamphlets, an issue further discussed by Starrett (this volume).

[4] See, however, Pollock and el Assal (1995) and Claeson and el Assal (1996). Kamalipour and Mowlana (1994) provide a country-by-country inventory of press and broadcast laws and facilities. For television in Morocco, see Poindexter (1991).

[5] Interview, New York, October 18, 1993.

[6] Ibrahim Karawan (personal communication, Bellagio, Italy, March 23, 1995).

[7] For a summary of the Tabit affair, see Rocco (1993).

[8] As of mid-1996, the book had again been withdrawn from circulation in Egypt (personal communication, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, Leiden, March 26, 1997).

[9] Majid Tehranian, personal communication, February 2, 1995.

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** 4. The Internet and Islam’s New Interpreters

Jon W. Anderson

Recent discussion of civil society in comparative and international contexts of the Muslim world has focused largely on a search for voluntary associations as intermediate social forms between those of family and polity (Norton 1995, 1996). The hope of finding counterparts to de Tocqueville’s key to democracy in America cannot escape ethnocentrism for defining civil society so narrowly and misses more important developments in the realms where “civility” frames social space. Behind voluntary associations and other “intermediate” institutions lie understandings of individual responsibility in a public sphere (Seligman 1992) that may provide more productive ground for comparison. Every society includes conceptions of trust and responsibility, and of their scope. Prominent among these in Muslim societies is responsibility for interpretation of religion, of its requirements, of its expressions and, above all, for handling its texts. Today, more and more individuals are assuming such responsibilities, in public and through media that help to define or extend the public space of religious discourse. The Internet is one of these new media, by some measures a new public space, which enables a new class of interpreters, who are facilitated by this medium to address and thereby to reframe Islam’s authority and expression for those like themselves and others who come there.

This is not—or not yet—the world of Islamic organizations and activist intellectuals, who attract attention and exegesis of their views (for example, Kepel 1985; Moussalli 1992; Roy 1994; Rahnema 1994; Appleby 1997).

Surrounding them is a larger, more inchoate context of seekers and various other Muslims similarly if less dramatically engaged in defining a Muslim life in a world in which Muslim and non-Muslim are increasingly intertwined. A common issue across the range of discussions, positions, and arguments associated with Islamic activism is taking responsibility for interpreting religion in a world of competing voices, multiple authorities, and problematic legitimacies. This wider context of interpretive practices and discursive authorities sets the narrower, more solemnized and abstracted forms of the activists in worlds beyond those they would essentialize.

This larger public sphere is marked by a coming into public view, and discussion, of interpretive practices between the high textualism of ‘ulanta, marked by the super-literacy of an interpretive elite, and more mystical, participative expressions of the non-literate sometimes identified as “folk” Islam. Such orientations form more of a continuum than suggested by Hodgson’s and similar distinctions between sharia-minded and sufi-minded Islam (Hodgson 1974). Recent research shows fundamental similarities in modes of transmission, patron-client (master-pupil) relations, and cohort networks from those of sufi (Gilsenan 1973; Trix 1993) to ‘ulama (Fischer 1980; Eickelman 1985; Messick 1993) forms. Still, class and mass Islam have been treated as analytically separable domains, one subject to an updated version of textual analysis that probes for meaning (Moussalli 1992; Lawrence 1989) and the other subject to a more behaviorist analysis that probes for social forces (Sivan 1990; Goldberg 1991).[10] But contemporary Islamist discourse occupies, expands, and makes public a range of intermediate positions between these, combining features of traditional modes of representing the experience and interpretation of Islam with contemporary ones (for example, Gaffney 1994).

This linkage to social experience and contemporary cultural resources that expands the social space between elite and folk is crucially facilitated by media that feature the migration of discourse from narrower to broader, more “public” realms. Media make public what previously circulated in narrower, face-to-face interpersonal settings, such as coffee houses, dotvrehs, the majlis, and informal discussion circles from university dormitories to parlors to dissident cells and other places where familiars meet, by giving messages additional circulation. The examples of cassette sermons against the former Shah of Iran (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994) and faxed fatwas of today’s opponents of the Saudi regime (Sardar 1993) are joined by pamphlets and graffiti (Starrett 1995) that move messages from more restricted to less restricted spaces of circulation. In this move, relatively greater anonymity conveys an aura of more social—or at least more common—authority than that of face-to-face transmission between master and pupil, pir and murid, mullah and congregant. Media not only place messages into wider circulation, but also rebalance their authority from that of the sender to include the circulation itself. What is “new” here is the enhanced visibility that media afford.

Since the Salafiyya movement in the nineteenth century (Cole 1994), new interpreters of Islam have been tied to innovations in media. The founding figures of Islamic reform in this century such as Muhammed ‘Abduh (1849-1905) and Mowlana Mawdudi (1903-1979) have been journalists whose work was enabled by the arrival of printing and of print news with new audiences for the written word. They filled and expanded the space between previously restricted circulations of text and talk. A century ago, printed books were the “new” media of Islamic reformist movements that spread from British India (Metcalf 1982). An important medium for the rising influence of the Iranian clergy in this century has been the circulation of religious interpretation and guidance in printed booklets of religious counsel, often in simple question-and-answer format, that preceded the rape cassette sermons of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeni and others. And today, television makes stars of conservative vernacular preachers. In their time, all new media have a certain “down-market” quality from high-

textualist perspectives. They employ vernaculars and are often cheaply produced and ephemeral; but they expand the domain of Muslim discourse by engaging a wider public than previously had access to elite-controlled discourse and a more problematic public than other non-elite, “folk” forms reach.

*** The Internet's Public Space

Through the increasingly worldwide and nearly instantaneous Internet, Muslims adept at its use are increasingly able to reach out to each other and to publics beyond the Muslim world. They put into wider circulation views that previously circulated only in narrower circles and bring additional techniques for interpreting Islam, drawn first from those that facilitate access to the Internet itself. This extends the process that Eickehnan (1992) has identified with the massification of education in the contemporary Muslim world, which has given wider access both to the texts of Islam and to a wider range of interpretation than developed in mosque-university (madrasa) and religious lodge (zawiya). Born in the world of higher education, the Internet facilitates and links specific new interpreters lodged within or enabled by it to form an extended discursive space, marked by new techniques not only for interpretation but also for creating a public that lies between, draws on, and links previously discrete discourses.

This is a process I have described as “creolization" (Anderson 1995) in the extended sense not just of mixing codes but also of forming what Drummond (1980) recast as special-purpose, intermediate communities of discourse that array in a continuum between otherwise (for example, so- daily) separate communities of communication. Islam is represented on-line in a melange of wire-service news copy, transcribed sermons, scanned texts of the Qur’an and hadith collections, advice and self-help information ranging from where to find halal butchers and mosques to matrimonials and cheap travel to prayer-timers and Islamic educational materials. It is commonly driven by and often wrapped in intense discussion and debate about how to square Islamic requirements with modern life and how to lead a Muslim life in a non-Muslim society. Traditional apologia appear alongside attempts to think about Islam with techniques drawn from engineering and applied science. Islam on the Internet emerges as an intermediate realm of mixed content, mixed intellectual technique, and mixed persons who are not divided into the senders and receivers of mass (or of class) media but instead form a sort of community—commonly called “virtual.” This is a social-communicative sphere more comparable to the “creoles” that Benedict Anderson (1991) identified with the civic publics that arose, without prior design, with the earlier spread of print capitalism and particularly with early modern newspapers. That is, the Internet and its surroundings that enthusiasts call “cyberspace” or envision as a new “information age” do not facilitate the spokesperson-activists of established institutions, but draw instead on a broader range of new interpreters or newly visible interpreters of Islam (Fig. 4.1).

Organization as a speech community, rather than of mass media, is built into the Internet. Representations of the Internet as a new paradigm of work, community, thought, and utopia (or dystopia) of unfettered communication tend to generalize from a narrow range of experience and often the worldview of programmers (for example, Lammers 1989; Gates 1995; Negroponte 1995) or enthusiastic annointers of the avant garde (for example, Rheingold 1993; Rifkin 1995; Levy 1984). The Internet originated as a collaborative tool, constructed by engineers and applied scientists in accord with their work habits and values (Hafner and Lyon 1996; Leiner et al. 1997). They built into it open access, flattened hierarchies, freedom of information, and, more subtly, notions of transient, purposive connections among people and between pieces of information. Their Internet is organized not so much around transmission as around sharing of information. Their scheme, in turn, diffused to and was taken up by the larger world of higher education and allied activities and, subsequently, in an increasingly commercial communication ecology of business and leisure. This, in the view of one of its creators, is composed of a changing community of users, technologies linking them, schemes for managing the system, and now commercialization of access and content (McLellan 1997).

The Internet's transformations to successively wider realms has been one of partial translations of engineer's tools to the larger worlds of research and higher education and then to realms engaged by their occupants. They develop as extensions of the physical network of computers, the programs and protocols written by engineers to connect them, a social organization of work that engineers built into them, and a culture translating that organization into more general values. On the foundational technologies for remote access or connection to distant computers and for making files accessible, created in the 1960s, are built the functional technologies of electronic mail (1972), electronic mailing lists for groups of subscribers, newsgroups (1980) or electronic bulletin boards for discussion of special interests, and schemes for more ordered publication, which culminate today in the World Wide Web (1990).[11] With each, initial interest in professional communication has been quickly followed by avocational interests, first of engineers and then of others sharing those interests, including Muslims, first in the high-tech realms that invented and built the Internet and then in the wider world.

Figure 4.1. Early Islamic sites, like this Cybermuslim Webpage, displayed a clear "creole" character in their mix of forms (Western, Islamic, youth, university) and address to both believers and seekers. Sites like this one provided guides and links to similar efforts and material in cyberspace.

Setting aside the technologies primarily accessible to specialists and electronic mail, which is not a public medium, on-line communication for religious and other special interests breaks into roughly two kinds (Kinney 1995). One is found on Usenet newsgroups or electronic bulletin boards and e-mail lists. The dozen or so devoted to Islamic and Middle Eastern topics tend to be dominated by people with professional-technical qualifications who happen to be Muslims. Many, perhaps most, are students and expatriate professionals in the

Middle East’s “overseas.” They belong to the world of or are enabled by higher education and range from ordinary Muslims to dedicated polemicists. Newsgroups and mailing lists are nominally articulated by open access and freedom of interpretation, into which practically intrude other values that routinely are negotiated, and often hotly debated. Tension commonly arises between access and desires, usually not fully articulated until challenged, to construct something like a home away from home around values and attitudes of hospitality. Interpretive freedom escalates into disagreements and sometimes into accusations less of bad manners or bad faith than of personal “ignorance” or willful “violation” of previously unstated or lately ignored rules—in other words, disagreements over interpretation, followed by attempts to redraw the boundaries of discussion. For all its artificiality and newness, there is a sense of transforming information into knowledge, at the same time that boundaries are fluid and change with participants, through the practices they bring on-line. On an electronic mailing list devoted to discussions among Palestinians, limits on access were waived to admit Israelis professing sympathies with the Palestinian cause; but their interventions to “provide information” were repeatedly censured as “Zionist” violations of a Palestinian space, that is, an on-line home for Palestinians ordered by guest-host relations in which they were charged with being bad guests.[12] Another list devoted to discussions of the history of Islam altered to a forum for participants and for seekers’ questions about correct practice, and attendant disputes, that effectively excluded “objectivist” views offered by historians and drove them away.

By comparison. World Wide Web homepages, typically produced by individuals or groups to provide information, generally take the form of publications. Web technology facilitates linkage over discursiveness, and Web pages run the gamut from lists of links to other Web pages (and other on-line information) to extended presentations of original material. Here, interpretation is practically a matter of making and commenting on connections. The same material is often relinked over and over, with variations in organization, selection, and emphasis. In these respects, the Web is comparable in a contemporary context to early printing presses in the world of the scriptorium: it escapes the world of editors and arbiters of thought and interpretation by displaying the materials of interpretation and providing alternative organizations for them. And it brings together something of the moment. Into this world come people with views about Islam who are able thereby to extend those views into newly public forums—a “public” that is defined (like the readership of early newspapers) by those with access to its techniques (Fig. 4.2).

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Figure 4.2. The movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (al-Harakat al-lslamiyya li-l-lslah), established in London in 1966 as an offshoot of the Committee for Defense of Legitimate Rights in Saudi Arabia, takes advantage of Internet technology to add a “media watch," responses to international intellectuals, and links to other media to its own

chronology of dissent in Saudi Arabia, critiques, and data on Saudi leaders. The site is now fully bilingual in Arabic and English. <[[http://www.miraserve.com/englishnew.htm] [www.miraserve.com/englishnew.htm]]>

*** Internet Sociology and Communication Ecology

Internet sociology follows this continuum of forms between conversation and publication. Muslims initially located in the high-tech precincts that created the Internet included students who found their way overseas for advanced training in engineering and applied sciences and expatriate professionals. Located in universities and polytechnic institutions of the West or in corporate and government research labs, they have brought other interests on-line, including interests in the religion, culture, and politics of their home countries, and brought these on-line with a sense of empowerment by the technology they commanded. In this respect, they are no different from non-Muslims, who also bring interests outside of their work and interests in making connections; indeed, technologies such as Usenet newsgroups and the World Wide Web were, in part, motivated and developed to overcome barriers of dispersion and to connect people of like interests.

Around these cores accumulate others who are similarly situated but in other fields, similarly seeking to make contact, to share views, and to recruit others. Through the Internet, these activities create worldwide networks that significantly extend conversations, expressions, and representations of and about Islam that were previously confined to coffee houses, university dormitories, cells, peer circles, and other off-hours sites of discussion and debate. The Internet unites such people, not just electronically but also through shared intellectual techniques derived from higher education, including techniques other than those classically associated with religious discussion and exegesis that are organized by and delivered in madrasa and other “traditional” forms. Balance of personnel affects the balance of communication. This is a realm in which engineers and applied scientists, followed by others with access to international-standard higher education, followed by others in their circles and increasingly by wider, more anonymous circles with similar access can try their hands at religious interpretation in a new medium of publication that extends the reach of their intellectual technology and enlarges the public space of discourse about Islam.

This enlargement echoes those new senses of agency that Eickelman (1992) has associated with the spread of mass education—especially secondary and higher education—throughout the Muslim world that de-mo- nopolizes access to the texts of religion and opens their interpretation to new techniques. The process is reflected in the migration on-line first of translations and then of Arabic transcriptions of the Qur’an, collections of hadith, and other documents from history to apologia by those adept in the technology of the Internet. Use of the Internet as a channel is quickly overtaken by use of its techniques and the sense of confidence in their authority to carry messages of mutual recognition in a public of others like oneself. Texts are not only made available; what begins

as a pious act of witness is followed by interpretations that apply intellectual techniques developed elsewhere than the texts themselves, along with the practical lessons of interpretive freedom, including responsibility for interpretation that goes beyond challenging received views to a broader pattern of expanding the public space.

The pattern goes back at least to Salafiyya and similar movements in South Asia in the nineteenth century, in which new interpreters of Islam have arisen in conjunction with new media to take responsibility for interpreting Islam. It has become a commonplace that "fundamentalists" embrace the techniques of "modernity" in order to challenge its goals (Lawrence 1989, Appleby 1997); but reformer-critics are not alone in creating a public space for Islam between the traditional style of the 'ulanta and those merging Sufi with "folk" Islam. The bourgeois character of this space was revealed in Gilsenan's (1973) account of the recasting of Egypt's fastest growing Sufi order in modern times to the practices and values of rising first-generation clerks, teachers, and new urbanites of Egypt's new middle class. In his account, the rule of this order—modeled on bureaucratic practice and training office holders—is hardly to be described as "folk" as that term has been deployed by historians and indigenous observers to indicate something, especially something rural, beyond 'ulama control. It is the more professional middle-class end of this spectrum that is engaged on the Internet. The rising curve of expanded education to which Eickelman (1992) pointed as giving unprecedented access to the texts of Islam and opening interpretation to techniques outside the traditional frameworks of niadrasa training intersects the rising curve of the Internet's spread to more people and tasks and development as a public space. The Internet, which begins globally in high-tech precincts, arrives in Muslim spheres in hands committed to combining their values and expanding the public space for them through this means.

This more professional end of the middle classes attracts relatively less attention,[13] but it is the natural home also of representations and systematizations of Islam ranging from views that Islam is inseparable from all life (thus problematizing its integration in contemporary forms) to modernist views of Islam as a system in a world of systems (for example, Rahman 1982). Brought to the Internet, these make it an arena for alternative expressions of Islam both to popular and to traditional elite views that are soon joined by oppositional and alternative groups speaking to Western and other non-Muslim media and opinion publics. They range from political activists to Sufi orders, from mobilization to witness. They both recruit and propagandize, bringing their issues into a wider, already public sphere in some cases but in others carving out a new one that encompasses or repackages existing ones, compelling dialogue by leveraging forms of communication that reshape the social field.

The complexities of this process sort into stages by which it proceeds. Islam on the Internet is first a story of new interpreters, newly emboldened by confidence in and command of the channel. The channel's foundational values, drawn from the work habits and values of engineers and applied scientists' need to collaborate and share in flattened hierarchies—in other words, specific senses of responsibility for statements—are extended into broader "cultural" values about open access, freedom of information, and taking responsibility for,

rather than merely receiving, interpretations. Its context is an emerging bourgeois, essentially middle-class, and importantly a professional world, authorized by skills and increasingly transnational by virtue of the spread of professions through mass higher education and modern means of communication among them.

Until recently, the story of Islam coming on-line would have been limited to creole pioneers, located in the high-tech precincts that produced the Internet and drawing on a transnational population of Muslims. They still bring religious interests on-line as after-hours interests, essentially as devotions and as witness in a public space that they define and in which they give a new dimension to their interests. Such Islam on the Internet is shaped much like anything else relocated there by techniques, including intellectual techniques, from the world of higher education and research. The early creoles link up with others like themselves and extend their links to realms surrounding and served by higher education and research, especially in communication agencies and businesses that increasingly convey the Internet to the wider world. After the pioneers also come activists, some to recruit within this world, others to address a wider audience through the channel widely believed to be a leading edge and symbol of a globalizing "age of information." Until recently, also, "official" Islamic voices—of the tnadrasa, 'ulama, and authorized institutions such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Muslim World League—have been largely absent from these arenas, except as others brought bits and pieces of their discourse and documents on-line. Conventional, established voices of Muslim authority as such are unrepresented here, in part because the effect of the channel was to foster intermediate sorts of discourse that could be dismissed as naive, if pious in its own terms.

Increasingly, however, just as the creole pioneers were followed by activists, so both are now followed by officializing discourses that range from conventional da'tva organizations and, recently, Sufi orders to governments of Muslim countries. Forced to adopt the forms and formats already present, some organizations manage better than others a convergence on increasingly international, increasingly uniform formats. Al-Azhar, for instance, is not on-line. What are on-line are a School of Islamic and Social Sciences (SISS) in suburban Virginia that offers international-standard master's degrees in Islamic studies and pastoral training, an International Islamic University in Malaysia (HUM), which presents a public face, a table of organization, and programs formally identical to those of Western universities. In the United Kingdom, a Muslim national council presents the face of a religious denomination with houses of worship and ancillary charitable, educational, and community activities. SISS grew out of a project supported by pious foundations to update Muslim apologetics; the IIUM is a joint project of the Malaysian government and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to create an international-standard Islamic university for training professionals (Fig. 4.3); and the national Muslim council evokes parallels with other national religious establishments.

These convergences and measures of uniformity characterize presentations that do not homogenize the faith brought on-line so much as affirm universal access and a sense of participation in a pubic sphere of listeners, watchers, or, in cyberspeak, "browsers." This affirms new senses of interpretive freedom to go beyond previous forms and responsibility to

speak for Islam in a “civic” public that goes beyond transferring discussions from more restricted to less restricted realms. Getting the word out supplants the earlier felt need to reach out to others like oneself; public space replaces virtual community. The move is not just from private to public, but a blurring of that distinction through communication and interpretation that bypasses the gatekeeping and sanctions embedded in older media. Just as print bypassed the scriptorium, so the Internet bypasses institutions of mass media and those attached to it and currently institutionalized through editors, publishers, acceptable genre, and marketing to specific “readerships.”

Figure 4.3. The homepage of the International Islamic University Malaysia is regularly updated with the latest Internet technology—here, a rotating picture gallery. HUM was founded by the government of Malaysia and several member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1983 as an English-medium institution for “integrating sources of revealed knowledge with an arts and sciences curriculum,” which it proudly displays on its web site <[[http://www.iiu.edu.my/][www.iiu.edu.my/]]>.

While many of the views expressed in these media are intolerant in that context and are often driven into the underground or “minor” media, the larger contexts where they occur register a practical pluralism that prob- lematizes responsibility and what Bourdieu (1991) called the social capital that enables interpretation. Among the first opposition met by these new interpreters are liberal humanists, whose social capital is tied to media that the new interpreters bypass.[14] They call to account responsibilities assumed outside existing conventions no less than silence from Muslim establishments. For a social analysis, such oppositions are part of the redefinition of the public sphere, a part that points to rarely articulated, often implicit notions of taking responsibility for interpretation otherwise met as rights to interpret.

*** Conclusion

The Internet is a significant new medium in expanding the public sphere, where Islamic discourse is altered by new positioning and new interpreters. Like other media, from cassettes to novels and tracts, it is fast and flexible, not least for providing opportunities for alternative expressions, networking, and interpretations that draw on and extend its techniques. Additionally, the Internet is worldwide in its reach and rooted in, as well as rooting, a professional class not yet so widely represented but uniquely positioned to leverage the techniques to reshape the public sphere of Islam. The process is an emerging one, and absolute numbers are small. It is their extent and the techniques they bring that is significant. Initially, they joined others’ migrating discussions from more private to more public spaces that media make accessible and, ultimately, create. Increasingly, however, they reshape that space and what it means to be public.

What is happening with Islam on the Internet is a forging of at least three sets of related links. One set links individual Muslims via the medium of the Internet, individuals often in similar situations and often similar to each other, in social networks of communication. What begins as a home away from home extends to and then transforms the space in which "home" exists as this technology spreads, in part in these hands. Broadly speaking, these are the modern skill-based professions of expanding middle classes, whose mutual recognition and negotiation of rights to speak set the issues and character of on-line communities. The discourse itself reflects a creol- ization that does not so much mix religious with other talk as foster intermediate speech communities as contexts with rules that describe rights and responsibilities. They cast religious talk in idioms of speech and thought previously or otherwise allocated to separate speech communities, forming a continuum instead of a dichotomization between elite and mass, literate and folk. The significant feature of these links is the application to religious subjects and contents the techniques and models drawn from higher education generally and from science and engineering specifically. What emerges with the Internet is thus a sphere of intermediate people, new interpreters, drawn from these realms and linking them in a new social, public space of alternative voices and authorities.

Bringing these to the Internet also makes them more public. Internet discourse, in the first instance, migrated from less public to more public spheres by linking people, social networks, and modalities of thought in transnational networks of which they are in part the expression and in part its builders. Technology, not association, enables participation and is the means of participation in a space defined by taking it upon oneself to participate. In taking these as responsibilities to think about religion in the world, irrespective of the presence or absence of familiar institutions, a wider body of new interpreters of Islam beyond merely activists emerges, as does a context other than that of conventional and folk religiosities.

Islam on the Internet highlights not just new interpreters but also the presence of intermediate contexts that reflect a more nuanced diversity of views, settings, projects, and expressions of Islam today. This context is also occupied by Islamist critiques of both elite and folk traditions; but activists may not be its diagnostic creatures. Just as print—especially newspapers—opened a channel for what became recognized as Islamist critique and cassettes opened a channel for the circulation of sermons and other didactic material, so too the Internet opens arenas where responsibility is both problematic and engaged. These interpreters are part of a real diversity of opinion, interests, and variously formed programs, and part of a more general and diagnostic context shared with activists of sharper profile. The medium overlaps with others, as did those of previous interpreters. And the most striking features of the Internet are how it brings out the broadly intermediate character and location, the "in-between" and ordinary character, of the efforts that mark it, and its practical diversity. Finally, the recency of the introduction of its interpreters to a more public realm brings out the priority of responsibility and how taking responsibility, particularly for interpretation, in public (instead of forming associations) is the intermediating step for "civil" society.

[10] Gaffney (1994) has corrected this view by showing, on the one hand, how, at the level of expression and interpretation, activists are part of the same social field as shaykhs and pirs and, on the other, how they connect with their publics through emphasis on practical interpretation. A similar point is developed in more comparative terms by Eickelman and Piscatori's (1996) discussion of political Islam's many and local resonances.

[11] The World Wide Web, which has become the Internet for most users outside the research world, superseded earlier technologies of WAIS (Wide Area Information Servers) and Gopher, which were created to index and systematize access to information on networked computers.

[12] I am grateful to Rachel Rumberger for bringing this example, and this interpretation, to my attention.

[13] But compare the singular study by Clement Henry Moore (1980) of Egyptian engineers, Gdle (1993) on Turkish engineers. Palmer et al. (1988) on senior bureaucrats, and Vitalis (1995) on businessmen. Goldberg (1992) and Robinson (1991) focus on mobilization in this portion of the middle class.

[14] This is equally true in realms closer to debate about the Internet itself, from the anti-internet screed by the conservative literary theorist Gertrude Himmelfarb (1996) to reservations by journalists (Wald 1995) over the lack of "standards" and the rights of "experts" to judge what is acceptable.

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** 5. The Birth of a Media Ecosystem: Lebanon in the Internet Age

Yves Gonzalez-Quijano

(translated by Dale F. Eickebnan and William F. P. Raynolds)

Until a few years ago, a visitor to Beirut could escape the commotion of Hamra Street, West Beirut's main commercial road, by entering a large exhibition hall in the basement of a modern building on Sadat Street. It was the Permanent Book Exhibit (ma'rad al-kitab al-da'im), where most of the Lebanese publishers—the most important ones in the Arab world— had exhibition space. Today, the exhibition hall is just as calm, but the bookshelves have given way to an orderly array of computers. Only a soft drink machine and a counter at which clients, most of them young, pay for Internet connection time, break the impeccable array of computers.

As in most large Arab cities where this new type of business has flourished—Cairo, Casablanca, and Amman, of course, but also Damascus, Nouakchott, and Sana'a—the large bookstores of an earlier era have given way to Internet cafes. Many Beirut intellectuals invoke this symbolic replacement with bitterness. For them, it underlines the dangers of a new "culture" in which books have given way to video screens. In practice, today's concerns merely prolong the laments that the local intelligentsia has expressed since the time that the new technologies began to appear at an ever accelerating pace several decades ago. These new "mid-range" media technologies (Alterman 2001) and their associated techniques do not always need large financial investments and complex skills. It has become increasingly clear that this complex package of instruments and tools has profoundly modified the shape of the intellectual field. By means of these new instruments and skills, unexpected and at times bizarre new voices have begun increasingly to mix with those of the earlier "legitimate interpreters"—that is, when these new voices fail completely to replace their predecessors. These new voices get the attention of a radically different public, one that belongs to their generation. It accepts the cultural and intellectual practices that modern technology facilitates (Eickelman and Anderson, this volume).

These new practices are fundamentally altering how information and ideas are shared, communicated, and produced. They are accompanied by, and partially explain, social and political change in contemporary Arab societies. Sometimes they take spectacular forms, especially in the case of technical changes with visible consequences, such as the proliferation of parabolic antennas for satellite television. However, the influence of these

new techniques and technologies can also be less visible and more far-reaching. They can even radically transform established, “traditional” practices considered so old that they appear impermeable to change. Thus, the tremendous commercial success of the contemporary “Islamic book” (al-kitab al-islami) —which has totally reshaped the idea of religious books in conception, production, and marketing (Gonzalez-Quijano 1998)—offers a perfect illustration of the re-invention (Hobsbawm 1983) of “traditional” and “sacred” forms of knowledge in Muslim societies (see Eickelman, this volume, and Huq, this volume).

The re-invention of the modern Islamic book, made possible by the spread of desktop publishing techniques, could not have occurred without an associated decisive technological development, the creation of software applications to digitize Arabic. Word-processing programs for typesetting Arabic, such as al-nashr al-maktabi (literally, “desktop publisher”), were first developed in the mid-1980s.[15] These programs facilitated the creation of newspapers accessible to a worldwide Arabic readership. This first occurred in London in 1978 with the appearance of al-Sharq al-Aivsat. Then in 1987, al-Hayat became the first Arabic daily with an entirely computerized editorial process. Since the early 1990s, these technological innovations spread with the first on-line editions of daily Arabic language newspapers, beginning with al-Sharq al-Awsat in 1995 in image (PDF) format, and direct on-line text in more recent years. Today hundreds of Arabic publications are available on the Internet,[16] to which one must add a larger number of Arabic-speaking and/or Arab-oriented sites that distribute information in one form or another.

As part of the linkages and mergers of traditional media actors (the press and broadcast media) with financial enterprises, information technology, and telecommunications companies, a stiff competition is taking place for global domination of the emerging Arab information market (Anderson and Eickelman 1999: 59). As of March 2001, there were more than 3.5 million Internet users in the Arab world, a number predicted to grow to 25 million by 2005.[17] This growth has facilitated a wide array of entrepreneurial initiatives. Some of these are based on passing fashions and will probably soon collapse and disappear. Others, like web portals, on-line newsletters, and webzines are better adapted to the still uncertain market for on-line information in Arabic and have already succeeded in finding a niche in the regional Arab media scene.

For at least half a century, scholars have recognized the importance of public opinion and the media to the growth of Arab societies and, in recent years, to such developments as the Internet and its uses as a new channel for information. In spite of this, few studies on the new media focus on this development. They focus instead on international[18] or “Western” (Bunt 2000) subjects, or privilege the transnational mass media and their effects from a global perspective (for example, Alterman 1998) at the expense of detailed case studies. Victims of a sort of fascination with technology-oriented ideologies (Wolton 2000: 13), most of those who produce such studies take for granted that the new media have completely surpassed and replaced prior systems for disseminating information and opinion. This chapter takes a different point of departure and is based on Lebanon, a case study with

special regional significance. It requires us to note—in as detailed and specific a manner as possible—how an existing media system absorbs innovations, adapting new information techniques to its own needs.

*** Lebanon: The Crossroads of Arabic-Based Information

Lebanon stands out from all other arenas for technological transformation that influences the production of information in Arabic. Based on the changes that can be seen in editorial production techniques alone, Lebanon is at the core of a regional media network with global implications. The Lebanese played major roles in what can be called the incubation period of information technologies in the Arab world (1995-2000). Now that these innovators are crossing another development threshold, Beirut retains a number of features that allow it to remain an obligatory hub for the “Arab information highway.” It will remain so even if a good part of regional information flows shift, in the not-so-distant future, to states such as the United Arab Emirates, which have made important investments (more than a billion and a half dollars, for example, with Dubai Media City, Dubai Internet Media, and Dubai Ideas Oasis, launched at the end of 2000).

In spite of numerous challenges, the importance of the Lebanese press, initially favored by the weakening in the early 1950s of its Egyptian rivals, was not entirely weakened by nearly two and a half decades of civil war. In the context of a regional crisis that remains unsolvable, the political formula devised during the 1989 Taif Accords is not yet fully realized. In spite of everything, however, it has permitted the implementation of certain important legal measures vital to Lebanon’s future, including the fields of information and media technology. This new legislation, developed and applied with difficulty between 1992 and 1996, drastically reduced the number of media outlets. A decade earlier some three million Lebanese had access to some fifty television stations, and more than 150 radio stations, as well as a hard-to-calculate number of periodicals, not always legal, that occupied the many commercial niches of the local political market (Dajani 1992).

Clearly motivated by the political goals of maintaining a Lebanese national coalition and respecting the “privileged” relations with neighboring Syria, the Lebanese media reforms favored certain businesses able to use their “know-how” to help one of the political forces present on the local or regional scene. After this “cleanup” of the Lebanese media scene, a dozen important periodicals continued to appear and, of these, only a few—the most outstanding of which were the fairly liberal al-Nahar and the nationalist al-Safir—had a voice beyond Lebanon’s borders. As for central Beirut, now reconstructed, it once again contains the reopened offices of the international wire services and, just recently, those of al-Hayat, whose main offices have returned from their London exile.

If print journalism taken as a whole has regained working conditions that permit it to recapture its traditional markets, the growth of Lebanese satellite television has been even more spectacular. Among the most popular regional satellite TV channels—including Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) in London, Orbit in Rome, the Egyptian Satellite Channel, Emirates Dubai Television, and, of course, al-Jazeera from Qatar—are two Lebanese enterprises: the Lebanese Broadcasting Company International (LBCI) and Future TV, without forgetting al-Manar TV, a channel close to the Shi'i population which seems to gain more and more international influence. Even though the political ties of these corporations are mysteries to no one,[19] LBCI and Future TV are the only two private channels that broadcast from the Arab world, a situation made possible because Lebanon is the only Arab state to have legally relinquished its monopoly on televised information (al- Rammal 1999-2000: 62).

Finally, in spite of the inherent difficulties of rebuilding a technical infrastructure after the damages incurred during the civil war, it is remarkable that Lebanon became one of the first Arab countries to embrace the Internet. The information professionals of the Beirut daily newspapers were among the first in the region to make use of a technology that has been available since 1994. Competing against European-based rivals equipped with better financial support and technology, three Lebanese dailies (al-Anwar, al-Nahar, and al-Safir) placed themselves on-line by 1996. For the Arabic language press, al-Anwar launched a highly condensed version of its paper edition called al-Anwar fax. Al-Nahar, on the basis of a major investment in technology, launched the first real electronic edition on January 1, 1996. It was followed several months later by al-Safir. After this first wave and the enltry into play of foreign language journals (the Daily Star in October 1997, followed by L'Orient-Le Jour), al-Liwa followed (summer 1998), then al- Mastaqhal (August 1999), a mere two months after the launch of its print version. Al-Kifah al-‘arab opened a site with a PDF version in 1999, and soon followed it with a full-text format.

These pioneering efforts served as a model for many others, both existing newspapers and those created to take advantage of the Internet. By the beginning of 2002, Lebanon had around 200 web sites (of a total, probably underestimated, of 5,000) providing information and news of one sort or another (Mokaddem 2001).

*** A Cartography of Shifting Borders

The Arab information market has paradoxically benefited from its delay in investing in infrastructure. For the most part, it has escaped the economic crisis permeating the dot-com economy as a whole, particularly initiatives in developing and selling on-line information (Gonzalez-Quijano 2002). Quite the opposite; due to an increase in the number of users and hardware purchases, the growth of on-line commerce and advertising, the creation of local branches of international corporations, and the launch of important public development programs, even in countries such as Yemen and Mauritania, the overall impression is that

the new technologies have entered a new phase of growth. In Beirut, as in the other regional capitals, Internet usage was confined for a time to a narrow segment of the population drawn from the economic and cultural elite and largely imbued with a cosmopolitan spirit. This experimental period has been over for some time, because there is a much larger public now familiar with the “new” media technology. This implies, among other factors, the progressive Arabization of site content together with a lowering of communication costs, as Muhammad al-Shareh, the CEO of Sakhr Software, the principal IT firm in the region, explained to a gathering of political and economic advisors in Beirut in April 2001 (“Ajeeb.com” 2001).

Despite the many difficulties associated with two decades of a civil war that had barely ended just as the U.S. public discovered the Internet—the 1989 Taif Accords were signed just as html became the industry standard and the first browsers emerged—Lebanon was nonetheless one of the first countries in the region to rapidly develop a market interest in exploring the possibilities offered by this new and poorly understood media. Beginning in 1995, the first local Internet service providers (ISPs) offered people in Beirut a chance to connect to the global network. Today, many specialized firms (Gonzalez-Quijano and Taha 2001: 6) offer businesses and individuals connection rates that are mid-range for the region (about a $15 monthly connection fee).[20] This is even more advantageous because the standard of living in Lebanon is higher than in many neighboring countries. The number of Internet users in Lebanon was estimated at slightly more than 30,000 in July 1997, and is expected to pass 300,000, or roughly 8 percent of the population, by the beginning of 2002. Lebanese Internet usage is much higher than the average for the Arab world as a whole, which was only 1.29 percent as of March 2001. At this earlier date, the United Arab Emirates had the highest number of Internet users (around 25 percent), followed by Bahrain (17 percent), Qatar (10 percent), Kuwait (8 percent), and Lebanon (6.5 percent) (see note 3).

Different factors explain the relative success of the Internet in Lebanon in contrast to other countries in the region—its relative political liberalism, its higher level of socio-economic and educational development—Lebanese private and public universities offer some 22 academic degree programs in information technology—and a long and strong history of emigration, principally to industrialized nations. However, in spite of these characteristics, which make Lebanon seem like the most advanced Arab nation to put local information on-line, attempts remain largely embryonic. Nevertheless, limited as these early efforts may be, they offer a sense of the direction that later developments, vital for the region’s future, will take.

Even for a country as small as Lebanon, creating a reliable overview of Internet information sites, let alone evaluating their content, is a major challenge. The capital needed to start a business is minimal, and businesses disappear as fast as they are created, a situation further complicated by a multitude of mergers and acquisitions. This development can be interpreted as confirming the maturity of the market. For example, after the Inconet and Datanet companies merged under the name Inconet Data Management in early 2002, it became the most important private ISP operating in the region, with 120,000 subscribers. Now only three providers—the other two are Cyberia and Terranet—control the entire market for private subscriptions, a market that was once much more open. Just before the Inconet

and Datanet merger, the acquisition of the web-site portal Lebanon-online by Arabia.online based in Dubai and Amman—one of the biggest players in the local Net-economy—clearly suggests a regional trend of restructuring and consolidating the new information technology market.

Evaluating the implications of on-line information for Lebanon is equally difficult because of the gap that often exists between the services offered by different sites or even the same site during different stages of its existence. It is easy to note that many of the local companies, magazines for example, and also radio stations, limit their Internet presence to a simple publicity page, often devoid of other content. It is as though these companies are acceding to a passing trend and acquired an Internet address to give their enterprise a "modern" look.[21] Those responsible for these sites, many of which were created in 2000 or 2001 during a frenzied speculation over network potential, are content to maintain an Internet presence without exerting any effort on updating, simply to keep their options open should a change in circumstances justify increased investment.

Because the number of Internet users remains relatively small, the authorities in Lebanon have not yet found it necessary to set up a separate administrative and legal framework specifically for those new fields of information and communication. Out of roughly 200 on-line information sites operating from Lebanon, fewer than half have addresses that end with Lebanon's characteristic "lb." One reason might be that it is much cheaper and easier for a Lebanese webmaster to get a foreign URL address—often from the USA rather than from Lebanon (Tabbarah 2000). There are positive benefits to this governmental neglect, such as the absence of censorship,[22] but in the eyes of some there is also the negative consequence of a lack of any form of effective local regulation.

Any account of information-producing web sites must take into consideration the transnational nature of Internet activities, which makes it difficult to determine the identity of even the most important sites. For example, the daily al-Hayat has two addresses, one of which hosts two other publications of the same publishing group. Historically it has been Lebanese, including its editorial staff, but it has been subject to English law since it opened offices in London. Owned by Saudis, the newspaper has done well in the past few years since its return to Beirut, but its Internet site is still managed in London. Adding further to this "global" touch, the web site's technical base is the program Sakhr Press Solution, developed by a firm based in Cairo's duty-free zone operated by a Kuwaiti businessman. In contrast, al-watan al-'arabi, a weekly political magazine based in Paris since 1977 in order to escape political pressure, chose (perhaps because of costs) to repatriate only its Internet site to Beirut, while maintaining its offices abroad. In addition, [[http://www.naharnet.com][www.naharnet.com]], one of the most important web portals in the region, is registered in Cyprus.

In general, the Lebanese case, characterized by a strong emigre influence, confirms that the new media technologies transcend and in some cases efface state boundaries. Thus, many

emigrants contribute to the creation of a new professional space in which American corporations such as the Beirut Times, printed in California, or an “ethnic portal” such as <[[http://www.lebanon.com][www. lebanon.com]]>, created in 1995, can become players in the information market of their country of origin because of the lack of firm national boundaries on the Internet.

Of course, the idea of what is “information” on the Internet has been totally overtaken by the rapid technical, legal, and economic changes introduced by the use of new media. To assess the current situation, one must look beyond the conventional print media and focus instead on the new information forms made possible by the technologies. Some of these are readily identifiable—like web portals and on-line newsletters—because they share many points of resemblance with the earlier conventions of information professionals, especially of journalists. Other features are more difficult to discern because the new forms of publishing and disseminating digital data involve a change not only in the hardware associated with producing information, but in the idea of information itself. To sense this change, one need only visit the web site of a public figure such as Shaykh Husayn Fadlallah, the religious authority of Hizbullah, whose sermons and fatwas are available on the Internet ([[http://www.bayynet.org.lb][www.bayynet.org.lb]]). One can also visit the web site of a local militant based in south Lebanon ([[http://www.geocities.com/][www.geocities.com/]] sajedz), who reports on Shi'i resistance activities. Either web site can be legitimately considered—as do certain search engines such as <[[http://www.thedaleel.com] [www.thedaleel. com]]>—as information/media sites; all the more so as they sometimes reach a large public.

Besides these examples, where ideology is the sole motive, many web sites have an economic dimension in one form or another. One advantage of the Internet, particularly in societies where information is limited by political control or merely through a lack of a structured marketplace, is the possibility for communicating with a wide public at a cost considerably lower than that of other media, including recent ones such as fax. The spread of new media technologies in Lebanon has contributed to changing radically the economic value placed on obtaining certain types of information. For example, Lebanese authorities have placed some administrative information on-line. The result has been to break up the networks of petty corruption because certain essential administrative forms that some officials previously made available only at a high price are now available at the government web site. The same logic prevails among a larger number of actors who utilize the seemingly inexhaustible Web-based information resources, including political, economic, and technical bulletins, as well as chat rooms, practical advice sites, and even want ads. Observing the Internet scene in Lebanon demonstrates that the majority of these numerous initiatives flounder quickly. The few that survive today, and those that are bound to follow when conditions are better, lead not only to an increase in the supply of information, but also to a radical transformation in the idea of information.

*** The Impact of the Online

*** Lebanese Press

Is it possible to conclude that the first years of Lebanese sites on the Internet have begun to have specific consequences on the supply of information in Lebanon? It is difficult even to provide an exact number of sites. Some information providers share the same Internet address; others have multiple web-site addresses, and their visibility, according to the number of links that lead to them, can vary greatly.[23] On a strictly qualitative basis, of 160 Lebanese sites mentioned on the Web, 100 offer regularly updated information, another 40 appear dormant (without any regularly renewed content), and more than 20 have disappeared (their URL addresses no longer function). On the whole, the number of information web sites does not appear to be a major challenge to the traditional information sector, where there were officially more than 400 periodicals published in 1994 (Kalamipour and Mowlana 1994: 163). Moreover, among the Internet information sites created on the Internet, roughly two out of every three belong to a business already involved with the media. Nevertheless, this figure suggests that the growth of new media technologies has permitted the appearance, in a media form that is still poorly developed, of a significant number of new actors who are entering and modifying the local media landscape.

To elaborate on one such modification, there have been notable changes in language use on these sites. While the “traditional” actors have typically addressed their audience on the Internet in English as well as French and Arabic, the new actors favor English at the expense of the other two languages. The technical constraints, which are now completely identical for all actors, do not explain everything. In fact, a more precise observation of language choice, often linked to graphics, results in two general orientations that correspond to two different communication strategies. On the one hand, today the majority of the “cosmopolitan” sites directly introduce to the local region different models that were developed in other parts of the world that are more advanced in terms of new media technologies. On the other hand, a smaller group of sites where Arabic plays a much greater role (and is often the only language used) shows specific efforts to adapt the Internet to local conditions, especially in terms of graphics.

While the “cosmopolitan” sites remain dominant, it is increasingly clear that the predominantly Arabic sites are attracting an increasing number of users. In fact, large international sites like MSN (since November of 2001) and CNN (since January 2002) now offer their content in Arabic to facilitate reaching the local market.[24] In Lebanon as elsewhere, it is difficult to obtain reliable information about the number and frequency of web-site hits. In an emerging market that is still poorly regulated, one must view available figures with caution because the number of visitors at any given site may have been exaggerated as advertising budgets are determined by the number of people likely to be reached. Nevertheless, when the claims of the public and private Internet actors agree with the information available among specialists or with information suppliers, some general trends can be discerned. The number of advertising banners (which cost up to US $2,000 monthly for the best placements), the frequency of site update, and the status of advertisers (local businesses close to the company that opened the site or prestigious international organizations) are among the best indicators, as Lebanon is particularly active in the

advertising industry. The main Arab advertising agencies and the regional representatives for the large international agencies are in Lebanon, which is also where Arabad, the main advertising periodical, is published. Seen in this light it is clear that the sites that advertisers prefer are those of the principal local web-site portals, Cy- beria, Naharnet, and Yalta! as well as the sites of the major Beirut dailies.

Figure 5.1. The multilingual web site of Hizbullah's spiritual guide, Shaykh Fadlallah, has been redesigned more than three times since its opening in 1997. The earlier "oriental" touch has been replaced with this new welcome page, which integrates the graphic conventions of the Web with proper Arabic.

<[[http://www.bayynat.org/www/arabic/][http://www.bayynat.org/www/arabic/]]>

The importance of the local dailies is confirmed by the fact that after several years of activity on the Internet, Beirut's foreign-language press (the Daily Star and L'Orient-Le Jour) already attract a number of readers equivalent to their hard-copy circulation (8,000 to 10,000 visitors daily for the Daily Star, for example, with more than 1,000 people registered to use its on-line forum).[25] Admittedly, these publications are marked by their small local readership; their profitability is assured because these individuals are of high social standing, and the use of European languages makes them readily accessible to Internet users around the world. For the most part this has not been the case for the Arabic dailies, whose on-line readership increasingly resembles that of their print version. However, if the al-Nahar newspaper develops ambitious Internet projects, notably with the launch of its trilingual port, <[[http://www.naharnet.com][www.naharnet.com]]>, it is because its business managers know that the two or three thousand paying subscribers in the late 1990s are currently many thousands more and the number is rapidly increasing (Nagi Tueni, interview with Gonzalez-Quijano, September 2000).

Figure 5.2. Yalla! (Let's go!), a principal Lebanese portal directed especially to youth, illustrates the "cosmopolitan style": Arabic text is only provided through links and some ads, and the global emphasis of the home page is superficially adapted to local users, thanks to an agreement with ai-Manar TV, whose importance on the local media scene is thus confirmed.

<[[http://www.yalla.com.lb/NASApp/portal/YallaHome][http://www.yalla.com.lb/NASApp/portal/YallaHome]]>

In the aftermath of important political events such as local elections and bombings, web-site visits peak. In Lebanon, the May 2000 Israeli army withdrawal from south Lebanon created an increase of 60 percent over normal usage in attempts to connect to certain sites, forcing some servers, such as the one used by Hizbullah, to shut down to avoid attacks from

hackers).[26] Nevertheless, it is still the case that the number of on-line readers of the Arabic press remains small, especially if one takes into account the world daily information flow on the Internet. Even so, with the public informed by the local media and the small number of Arabic language Internet users, it can be noted that the usage rate of the on-line press, particularly among the elite, has become significant.

*** A “Small” Information Revolution

Now that the Arab world—or, more specifically, certain Arab states or certain sectors of the Arab population—seems to be entering the Information Age more than before, the case of Lebanon, whose regional importance has already been noted, suggests that the new technologies have accelerated the modernization of the local media that had already been underway for some time. Although the first Arab satellite television dates only from the early 1990s—the Middle East Broadcasting Company (MBC) began in London in September 1991—this development was preceded, as noted earlier, by the use of digital data transmission techniques by the Arabic- language press in the mid-1980s. The local media’s current Internet use highlights a certain number of current developments.

The case of Beirut does not significantly differ from what is happening elsewhere in the Arab world. The inevitable shift to new technologies has everywhere accelerated generational change. In every niche of the information industry, but especially in the daily press, the introduction of new technologies has been accompanied by a significant turnover of personnel. Journalists have been the first to be affected because the work styles accompanying the new technologies differ significantly from the earlier locally prevailing mode in which editorial commentary overshadowed new reporting. The current style increasingly approximates international standards for the on-line press, in which news content has become more important.

In a milieu in which social and professional mobility is rather limited, the new technologies have significantly accelerated the circulation of elites. The old guard of well-known writers have not adapted well to the specific format of electronic writing. A new generation of “inheritors” has been able to accede more rapidly to important posts on the basis of a technical competence largely acquired from abroad. Considering only the Beirut dailies, names such as Ahmad Salman (al-Safir), Nagi and Wadih Tueni (al-Nahar), Said Freiha (al-Anivar), and Majed Mneimeh (al-Liwa) come immediately to mind. They all belong to publishing families who have placed them in charge of projects for digitizing texts.

The winds of change are present in conventional enterprises, but they naturally blow much stronger in companies created thanks to the development of new technologies. These companies are often founded by emigre Lebanese professionals who have frequently trained abroad—like Ahmad Omari, the young founder of Cyberia, an Internet Service Provider that

currently dominates the Lebanese market and is also active in the regional market through contracts with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and projects in North Africa. In their offices, which fully resemble those that can be found in the most modern Western metropolis, teams of young bilingual editors, in addition to technicians, webmasters, and businessmen, share the experience of returning to their country of origin in following the technological flow. Convinced that they are the pioneers of a future Arab Silicon Valley, the names that they have chosen for their sites—Yallah! (Let's go!) or even ThisisCy- beria—directly reflect their inspiration.

Under their influence, on-line publication has significantly contributed to spreading a new journalistic style that places more value on the sheer amount of information at the expense of contextualization and analysis. Linked to feedback from the public, which is more apparent thanks to increased interactivity—forums, e-mail, guest books, and surveys—the home pages of sites indicate a new information hierarchy of which one sees categories highly valued earlier for ideological reasons—foreign affairs, for example—lose their prestige in favor of more everyday concerns such as local, practical, or financial information.

The younger actors who are taking charge of publishing enterprises facilitate the implementation of strategies better adapted to the needs of a global digital information market. Throughout the Arab Middle East, the openness to new styles of information management is often associated with the rise in influence on the political scene of a new generation—for example, in Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco, and soon perhaps in Syria and Libya. Following this trend, the Lebanese press thus chose to go on-line in order to strengthen its ties with its foreign-based readership and, thus, at the same time minimize the costs of overseas distribution. This decision also corresponds to their aspiration to play a major role in a new regional and even global space, as well as to become the local relay for the global media giants. As a function of their own market position and their available political and economic resources, the various Lebanese media have opted for a style of modernization that permits them to retain and, if possible, to reinforce their market share at a time when the new media technologies facilitate a means of exchange that is specifically Arab in terms of language and interests. At a time of information globalization, this option remains open for a market that can develop only due to production costs that remain low—in a region whose strategic importance makes it a continuing political hot spot ("al-i'lam al-'arabi" 2002).

The convergence among digital media has opened the way to strategies of syndication already evident in several sites. When al-Safir made an agreement in 2001 with the Arabic service of the BBC, al-Nabar responded with an agreement with the Arabic service of Radio Monte Carlo, a particularly popular regional service, and by developing a radio version of its print newspaper. Television stations have adopted the same strategy and have begun to use pictures and texts from their broadcasts on the Internet. In terms of the success achieved by the al-Jazeera Satellite Television web site launched in early 2001—unquestionably the first Arabic web site, with around 12 million hits daily, capable of competing with the major international sites[27]—the major private Lebanese broadcasters lag somewhat behind. However, they have a different market strategy and the

Arab public values them less for their information than for their entertainment value. The “Arab street” recognizes these essential features through a word play based on the acronym of one of them, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC)—in Arabic, albisi (“Get undressed!”), alluding to the dress code of some of the female announcers!

An unexpected rival of al-Jazeera may be another Lebanese station situated in a south Beirut suburb, al-Manar TV, in spite of the fact that it plays on a register diametrically opposed to al-Jazeera—or perhaps because of it. Started in 1991 as an offshoot of a radio station close to the Shi'i resistance and becoming since then a formally established television station in 1996, al-Manar opened an Internet site in the same year. Having made its local reputation by televising videos taken by Hizbullah combatants fighting the Israeli army in south Lebanon, al-Manar sought to acquire a regional reputation, especially after it received authorization to broadcast via satellite. These transmissions began on May 24, 2000, the day that the Israeli army withdrew completely from south Lebanon. Perhaps to capture market share, the station sometimes sets aside journalistic scruples. In October 2001, for example, it televised video footage that it falsely claimed was taken in Afghanistan (Liberation, October 13, 2001). These methods notwithstanding, al-Manar appears to have gained an increasingly important audience, especially in the Arab Gulf, where it directly competes with major Arab stations such as Dubai television (for example, al-Sammak 2002). The Shi'i or, more specifically, Iranian flavor of these programs only partially explains the audience gains that observers attribute to its editorial slant, notably concerning the Palestinian conflict, as well as the quality of its generally open debates involving different opinions in the Arab world, including nonreligious ones. The success of its Internet site is evident in the fact that its owners had to add a new web-site address in late 2000 to accommodate the large number of users. However, this site, along with similar ones, frequently finds itself at the front line of an information battle between pro- and antiIsraeli web-site hackers. Al-Manar is also deprived—because of the close ties that it maintains with Hizbullah (as a local ISP called “Destination”)— of advertising revenues from American companies such as Microsoft and Amazon (“The Odd Tale” 2001).

In sum, the rise of a media player such as al-Manar TV, which focuses on issues specific to the region, is even more significant than the presence of the Arab media giants so well represented in Lebanon. No doubt these “giants" are aware of the important changes, but they have not significantly altered their relationship with the political authorities. Although modernized and consolidated through regional and international alliances, the local media remain indentured to local financial circles and to technical networks over which the state authorities retain significant control. Even if a broadcaster such as al-Manar TV knows how to take advantage of Lebanon’s local political context to develop (like LBCI and Future TV), its placement on the media scene situates it amid new categories of actors who have appeared with the spread of new technologies. Their goal, that of reaching wide audiences and, if possible, to spread their worldview, may no longer be merely a utopian dream.

*** New Uses for Media

Jon Anderson (1997) stresses not only the technological but also the social stakes of the Arab information revolution. One conclusion to draw from an analysis of new media in Lebanon is the emergence, albeit still modest, of new media uses. Some signs of this are already apparent among the professionals who supply a good part of on-line information, but it is at the other end of the communications spectrum, that of the public, where one must look for more telling examples.

In a country like Lebanon, where political and even moral censorship is lighter than elsewhere—without being totally absent—the Internet contributes significantly to the trend underway since the introduction of new media technologies of diminishing the control that state authorities can exercise over the circulation of information. These openings are realized by various sites such as the Campaign for Good Governance ([[http://www.cggl.org][www.cggl.org]]) and by El-Sohof ([[http://www.elsohof.com][www.elsohof.com]]), a site maintained by young, local journalists who critically monitor the media. In a less formal manner, they express dissident opinions while creating new forms of political and social mobilization. Even on the web sites of the conventional press, sensitive stories are sometimes available, even if only in the form of links to other web sites. Gradually, under the influence of technical developments that range beyond the transfer to screen of reproductions (usually in PDF format) of print editions, the content of on-line editions is becoming independent. Following the trend of the foreign language press, often more liberal in tone than its Arabic equivalents—the case of the AI-Ahram Weekly is a prime example—the on-line press benefits from a greater degree of freedom, largely due to the nature of its readers. They feel freer to express themselves in the on-line forums associated with the majority of sites.

The anonymity offered by the various forms of digital communication is one of its strong attractions. Sheltered from the negative consequences associated with free expression in other contexts, Arab internauts do not shut themselves off in a virtual universe. Instead, they take advantage of the new spaces for exchanging ideas to contribute to public discussion. Polls that directly tackle taboo subjects, chat rooms focusing on political and religious issues as well as relations between women and men, and e-mail messaging services offered by different sites,[28] suggest the need felt for more open discussion on many issues. Because these web sites offer the opportunity to compare different sources of information, intensify the (virtual) coming and going between different local and international places, and transcend physical and intellectual barriers between political worlds previously sealed from one another—for example, exchanges, including hostile ones, between Arab and Israeli Internet users—the new techniques have been taken up by sectors of the population, such as women, who were earlier barred from public expression.

In grafting a horizontal communication network onto the traditionally vertical one of the traditional media, the Internet no doubt contributes to bypassing the older elite hierarchies to widen communications with a public that is only beginning to be envisaged. Because of the new media technologies, new understandings of the world are becoming increasingly accessible, including in a material sense. Digitalization expands, with the addition of sound and images, the limits of textual readings which gaps in the educational system make

difficult for many people. In contrast to the nahda (“renaissance”) and the earlier print revolution in the Arab world during the second half of the nineteenth century, partially held in check because of difficulties in integrating the Muslim cultural and religious heritage (Graham 1987: 165), the experience of a country such as Lebanon offers hope that the entire region is on the verge of taking part in the new age of communication and information in a positive way.

*** NOTES

The research for this chapter was conducted during four periods of field study in Beirut between January 2000 and June 2001. The data, brought up to date wherever possible, is presented in more detail in Gonzalez-Quijano (in press).

[15] The program developed by the firm Diwan (London) in late 1985 for Apple Macintosh. In its more advanced form, it remains the standard program for Arabic (see <[[http://www.diwan.com][www.diwan.com]]>). However, this situation may change due to the technical constraints of Internet browsers, mainly Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.

[16] The site <[[http://www.mafhoum.com][www.mafhoum.com]]>, which is not limited to Arabic-language publication sites based in the Arab world, contains more than 600 addresses.

[17] “Over 3.5 millions Arabs accessing the Net, according to Ajeeb.com survey,” a study published March 25, 2001, on the portal <[[http://www.ajeeb.com][www.ajeeb.com]]>. This portal was started at the end of 2000 by the company Sakhr (founded in 1982), a pioneer in Arabizing information technologies ([[http://www.sakhr.com][www.sakhr.com]]).

[18] As suggested in work published by the American University in Cairo’s Transnational Broadcasting Studies ([[http://www.tbsjournal.com] [www.tbsjournal.com]]).

[19] LBCI, founded by the Lebanese Forces (a Christian militia) in 1985, is now controlled by politicians known for their good relations with Syria. Future TV, as well as the daily Al-Mustaqhal and Radio-Orient (based in Paris but relayed in Lebanon) were created by the Lebanese prime minister, Rafic Hariri, who remains one of their principal shareholders. Al-Manar TV, founded in 1991 during Lebanon’s war against the Israeli occupation in south Lebanon, was legalized under the pressure of the Hizbullah Party.

[20] At one point in 2001, monthly rates were down to US$10 due to a price war between providers, but prices later increased. However, in the absence of strict regulation, there are many local arrangements, especially the use of illegal but tolerated cable links (see “Kayfa nasilu” 2002).

[21] For example, see <[[http://www.snobmagazine.com][www.snobmagazine.com]]>.

[22] The only recent example of censorship occurred in April 2000, with the trial of Kamal El Batal, the head of a human rights organization, and Muhamad Mugraby, the owner of the ISP “Destination” (which has Hizbullah among its clients). The proceedings, formally undertaken for reasons of public morals (the offense was that “Destination” intended to host the site <[[http://www.gaylebanon.com][www.gaylebanon.com]]>), ended with a lenient judgment. Nevertheless, the political interference with the press was clearly evident. See “Documents” on the web site for Campaign for Good Governance in Lebanon ([[http://www.cggl.org] [www.cggl.org]]).

[23] Al-Hayat can be found at <[[http://www.alhayat.com] [www.alhayat.com]]> and <[[http://www.daralhayat.com][www.daralhayat.com]]>; Al-Nahar can be found at <[[http://www.annaharonline.com] [www.annaharonline.com]]> and <[[http://www.annahar.com.Ib][www.annahar.com.Ib]]>, not to mention the portal opened by the press group <[[http://www.naharnet.com] [www.naharnet.com]]>. The web site for the town of Tripoli, in the north of the country, <[[http://www.tripoli-city.org/news/index.html][www.tripoli-city.org/ news/index.html]]>, gives excerpts from three local publications.

[24] This decision, taken in the context of the post-September 11 world and the war in Afghanistan, coincides with the launch of American media endeavors designed for the Arab public, such as the youth-oriented FM radio station “Sawa” (Together) on the Arabian Peninsula.

[25] Information given by various sources and confirmed by Ali Mneimeh, the webmaster for the Daily Star (personal correspondence, June 2000).

[26] At the time, the local press (see al-Safir, June 6, 2000) believed there had been 500,000 visits to Hizbullah’s web site. On information warfare in the region, see “Hasilat ‘amm” (2000).

[27] Al-Jazeera’s webmaster claims 41 million daily hits following September 11,2001 (al-Makki 2002).

[28] The significance of e-mail messaging services was indicated when the web portal <[[http://www.maktoob.com][www.maktoob.com]]> reported in June 2001 that its messaging service had more than a million members, or one-third of all Arabic-language Internet users.

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** 6. Muslim Identities and the Great Chain of Buying

Gregory Starrett It is obvious how economic goods satisfy physical

needs such as those for food and shelter; less evident, but of overwhelming significance in understanding modern society, is how merchandise can fill needs of the imagination. (Williams 1982: 65)

The protean capacities of new communications technologies are quickly making their way into the popular imagination through political speeches, phone company advertisements, and the anxious experiences of information workers threatened with obsolescence. Among Muslim groups, such technological and market-driven changes in information distribution have very diverse effects. It has been argued (Eickelman 1985, 1992; Roy 1994; Sardar 1993; Starrett 1998) that such obsolescence has to some extent already begun to overtake traditionally trained indigenous religious intellectuals in urban areas of the Middle East as growing literacy rates, publishing, and changing discursive practices bring growing numbers of literate citizens into public debates on religious, social, and political questions. But for African-American Muslims, who have not experienced Islam in the context of comprehensive institutional orthodoxies, issues of counterhegemony currently so important in the Arab world (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; see also Dannin 1996), are often less significant than

creating a Muslim identity in the first place through forming a community with its own body of knowledge and interpretive traditions.

The process through which new technologies and channels of information distribution come into play is one of creating a space for the production, appropriation, and consumption of intellectual commodities. Since the mode of consumption of such products is not a simple function of their availability, we need to study the way specific communities acquire and use information media and to understand this “consumption . . . [as] a key instrument in . . . the creation of. . . particular social relations and group identity” (Miller 1987: 204). Group identities and the public spheres in which they are negotiated are increasingly mediated by such consumption practices. A suggestive example of the way information and material goods help construct new publics has been provided by historian Colin Jones (1996), who writes of the change over the course of the eighteenth century in French notions of social order, especially the shift from a view of social institutions as hierarchically arranged in a vertical chain whose topmost link was in the hand of the king to a view “horizontally disposed: grounded in human sociability and exchange, . . . positfing] an open and relatively egalitarian social organization [which] undergirds a commercial society” (Jones 1996: 14). Imagining these horizontal linkages as a “Great Chain of Buying,"[29] he discusses a new kind of product in the latter half of the eighteenth century: weekly provincial advertising newspapers that addressed different classes, occupations, and localities as one consuming public. The commodification of culture and its circulation through these newspapers established “new links that transcended geographical localism, social particularism . . . and occupational restrictiveness . . . (through) the social and cultural capillarity” of advertisement (Jones 1996: 26). Jones’s image also suggests senses in which contemporary Muslim communities are formed through the cultural appropriation and consumption of intellectual goods. Following a brief overview of the nature of these products obtained through the market, this chapter examines an inventory of intellectual goods and how they are coded and used in an African-American Muslim community in the Southeastern United States.

Globally, the sheer scale of information on Muslim topics is enormous, taking advantage—to point in only one direction—of Anglophone publishers and research and educational foundations in Britain, Nigeria, Malaysia, Pakistan, and North America. A broad indicator of the availability of intellectual goods in this marketplace is the most recent catalog of the Iqra' Islamic Foundation in Chicago, which lists 250 titles in English and Arabic. One can also order an entire pre-packaged K-6 curriculum, including books, charts, and curriculum guides for setting up an Islamic school. Islamic Publications International, based in Teaneck, New Jersey, lists nearly 1,500 book titles and offers 250 videotapes, as well as Qur’anic CDs, perfumed oils, inspirational plaques and bumper stickers, T-shirts, calligraphic watches, three-dimensional models, posters and jigsaw puzzles depicting the mosques in Mecca and Medina, greeting cards, board games, and computer software, including Qur’an and hadith databases, and computerized aids to Arabic learning. Other companies, like Chicago’s SoundVision (the media arm of the Islamic Circle of North America), produce and distribute specialty videotapes for children, as well as computer software like SalatBase (prayer base), and a new serial publication. Young Muslim. Arabic-language

Islamic software, including games, databases, and interactive guided tours of the Pilgrimage sites, are available from Egypt through distributors in the Middle East, Malaysia, Indonesia, Britain, and North America.[30]

Given the linguistic, socioeconomic, and cultural diversity of the Muslim world, the flow and spread of these products into different communities is necessarily uneven. Geographical and ethnic origins, wealth, taste, tradition, education, association membership, community structure, and other factors influence the availability and use of Muslim intellectual commodities. For African-American Muslims, links to this market are forged primarily at the household level, as religious media—primarily books and videotapes—are purchased with personal funds and shared with other community members in the mosque, which serves as a public forum where the use and interpretation of these commodities are negotiated. At the same time, the gradual construction of an inventory of communally held intellectual commodities and practices is shaped by multiple links to a wide range of non-Islamic media.

*** Communities of Knowledge

In the United States, a number of African-American Muslim movements have developed during the twentieth century (see Haddad 1991; Haddad and Smith 1993, 1994; Waugh et al. 1983), each of which has constructed a unique relationship to the texts and traditions of the wider Muslim world, often in competition with one another. In 1975 Wallace D. Muhammad, the son of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad, succeeded his father as leader of the 44-year-old Nation of Islam (NOI). Diverging sharply from his father's precedent, Wallace Muhammad embarked on an Islamization program that repudiated the racial separatism of the NOI and sought to bring the movement into line with international Islamic practices. In 1976 he renamed the organization the "World Community of al-Islam in the West" (WCI), isolating and demoting some of his father's associates, including Louis Farrakhan, who revived the Nation of Islam in 1977 under his own leadership and promised to remain true to the legacy of Elijah Muhammad. In the ensuing years, Wallace Muhammad's WCI was renamed, first as the "American Muslim Mission" and then as the "Ministry of W. D. Muhammad, Muslim-American Spokesman for Human Salvation." W. D. Muhammad's movement began to benefit from close relationships with international Muslim and ecumenical organizations, the leaders of some of the Gulf states, and even the U.S. government, which had so assiduously spied on and persecuted its predecessor, the NOI, throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s as a perceived threat to national security. In part because of the movement's historical origin and in part because of ethnic, class, and political differences, many immigrant Muslim groups are suspicious of W. D. Muhammad's Ministry, stereotyping it as a prison ministry and not to be mistaken for "real" Islam. W. D. Muhammad's followers, on the other hand, consider themselves victims both of Farrakhan's ethnic separatism and of the general misunderstanding and suspicion of Islam in the West.

According to W. D. Muhammad’s followers, the extent and development of the NO1 has been retarded because little of its theology and practice is shared by the world Muslim community. NOI members, they say, are not taught proper Muslim prayers, fasting during Ramadan, or Arabic. There is a rumor, though, that a cadre of leaders close to Farrakhan has this knowledge but does not share it, either with the mass of the believers or with visitors. One former member recalled that NOI centers ran public religious services in ground-floor meeting halls and afterward held different private services in the basement for members only. Such secrecy confirmed for him that the NOI, unlike the Ministry of W. D. Muhammad, has something to hide from the rest of the world. The right to speak authoritatively about Islam is tied to the issue of free access to knowledge, both on the part of local community members and on the part of the world community.

The Masjid al-Nur of al-Islam is a local affiliate of the Ministry of W. D. Muhammad, occupying a rented clapboard building on a corner of a main thoroughfare through the African-American section of a mid-sized city in the Carolinas. The street has been the site of thefts and narcotics sales, and since only a handful of the 100 or so families who belong to the masjid actually live in the surrounding neighborhood, the directors plan a move to a recently acquired three-acre lot in a better location. Members feel that their young community is still growing from the kernel planted in 1975. The head of the Education Committee, Brother Shaheed Bilal, told one of his classes that

We’re still pioneering (here). We’re not established. You’re established when everybody knows when the ‘Id is, when they put it on the calendar like Christmas is or like Rosh Ha Shana or Hannukah is. They had an ‘Id at the White House last year, and you’d think if Bill and Hillary are getting in on the act, someone would be smart enough to put the 'Id on the calendar. But because we’re just establishing Islam here, we really ought to give more [in sadaqa and zakat, to build up the community]. (September 15, 1996)

The masjid hosts activities every day. On Tuesdays there are adult Arabic classes, taught until recently by a Mauritanian graduate student from the Sorbonne who had married a local woman. Thursday is for committee meetings, Friday for collective prayer, and Saturday has social activities and seminars, including a Sisters class. On Sunday, there are three levels of regular classes for children and adults. From 10:00 a.m. to noon, a preschool and an elementary Islamic school operate simultaneously in the mosque’s main room. The younger children draw, write, and listen to stories read by Sister Kenyatta, a young graduate of one of the state’s historically black land-grant colleges who is taking graduate courses in education at the local urban university to complete her teacher certification. The Islamic Sunday School, for older children, is taught by Brother Bilal, a public middle-school teacher who recently relocated from Georgia. From noon to one o’clock, there is an Orientation to Islam class for new believers (many of them former NOI members, some new Muslims, others curious members of the local black community). Finally, from one o’clock until the mid-day prayer, Brother Ansari holds a hadith class where new and more advanced students study the sciences of evaluating and interpreting the traditions of the

Prophet, using chapters photocopied at his own expense and books purchased from a home-based book distribution business operated by one of the Sisters.

In contrast to those of the other two Islamic centers in town, the library at the Masjid al-Nur is tiny. It holds a dozen copies of the Saudi reprint of Pakistani A. Yusuf ‘Ali’s translation and annotation of the Qur’an, a two- volume hadith collection, and four or five Arabic reference works on morals and theology. Also on the shelves are a set of Funk and Wagnall’s Encyclopedia, an English dictionary, and a student writing manual. The collection in the adjoining Sister Clara Muhammad School office is far more extensive.[31] Aside from a single copy of the Qur’an and a few Arabic workbooks and dictionaries, the collection consists mostly of general-interest books and old college texts from the 1970s. There are do-it-yourself legal manuals, IBM CAD and OS/2 manuals, tax and test preparation guides, several books on basketball and baseball, a dozen or so children’s picture and story books, four identical fuel-injection manuals, a text on film criticism, four volumes on “Insect Life” first published in 1890 and harvested recently from a used book store, and a row of thirty trade paperbacks ranging from Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals to The Book of Lists. The collection was mostly donated by Brother Bilal.

The bookshelves also hold stacks of twenty different photocopied documents. Two are school planning and fund-raising documents outlining plans for the establishment of a full-time Islamic school; the other eighteen are 11" x 17" copies of material from children’s books meant to be folded in half and used as worksheets: Islamic crossword puzzles, charts outlining activities that Islam discourages, color-in Arabic calligraphy and transliterated Islamic phrases, Td songs. There were excerpts from more advanced books on the Caliphs ‘Umar and ‘Uthman, tips for “Raising Your Child with Faith,” and a dot-matrix printed sheet of advice on “The Selling of Our Children—Coping with Commercials.” These materials were compiled for an intensive two-week Islamic day camp held in mid-summer and are not currently used in Sunday School classes.

On shelves to the right of the book collection are the school’s videos. Three two-volume sets of “Religion and Politics in Contemporary Society” show Imam Muhammad’s guest lecture at The Citadel earlier this year. A video featuring an African-American woman storyteller stands next to two nature videos, one taped from broadcast and the other the introductory piece to a Time-Life subscription series, two videos about the history of baseball, episodes from the civil rights series Eyes on the Prize, a video biography of 1920s dance sensation Josephine Baker, two copies (either taped from broadcast or copied) of “The Book of Signs” about scientific knowledge in the Qur'an, and a copy of “The Furthest Mosque,” about the history of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa mosque. There are two purchased Islamic videos: “Salam’s Journey,” an animated cartoon about the evil king Abraha, who tried to destroy the Ka‘ba in the sixth century, and “Fatih,” a two-hour animated epic produced in Turkey and dubbed in English, chronicling the collapse of Byzantium at the hands of the rising Ottoman Empire.

More tapes are expected soon. The school has more than one hundred dollars' worth of the Adam's World series on order from Sound Vision. Bilal was impressed when he saw some of the series on cable television during a visit to Washington. The AW series features a bright green, red-headed Muslim muppet and his multi-ethnic friends learning about Islam while traveling about the Muslim world courtesy of Adam's high-tech Trans-Visualizer, all while producing a basement talk show with famous and not-so-famous Muslim guests. Alphabet songs, segments about the wonders of nature, plays illustrating Islamic values like honesty and courage, and Adam's fantasies about what he'll be when he grows up (Adam the Wonder Journalist), alternate with Adam reading Islamic children's stories and folksy songs about prayer and pilgrimage.

Videos, though, are special and infrequently used. In weekly classroom use, the more usual instructional aids are books, which come and go as personal copies in the briefcases of the teachers. The range of texts in use both privately and in class enforces a continual interpretive project in public discussions. Bilal, Ansari, and other visiting teachers bring books from their home collections—from the Anglo-African Islamic Foundation's Islam for Children, Short Suras, and The Promise, to hefty tomes of scholarship for adults—and read excerpts or use them as references for the class. Adult students in the Orientation to Islam class, too, often bring books they have come across in stores or ordered through the mail. Bilal warns them constantly that they have to take secondary works and translations with a grain of salt and that even the best English translations of the Qur'an are flawed. "You've got to learn the Arabic," he tells them, even if only well enough to look up a word here or there in Hans Wehr's Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. One day an adult student was comparing two paperbacks before class, one of which Bilal had recommended some weeks before, the other of which he had brought with him from his former home in Philadelphia. The two books presented such different English texts of the tashahhud, the ritual statement of intention to pray, that he brought them first to me and then to Brother Bilal, who initially attributed the difference to translation. But closer inspection revealed that the Arabic texts were not the same either. Checking the publicity statements on the back covers, we discovered that the student's older book was a reprint of a work originally published by the Ahmadiyya, an Indian Muslim movement that had done significant missionary work among African-Americans in the 1920s. Bilal shook his head. "There shouldn't be any sects or schools in Islam. That's why we left the Nation. Sometimes there are just different versions of what you say. Basically, I suppose either one's fine. The important thing is their statement of intention."

Working with texts from multiple sources creates other uncertainties as well. The use of English as a lingua franca of the world Muslim community (see Metcalf 1996) disperses texts far beyond their original target markets, sometimes rendering incomprehensible ideas and ritual requirements that have been translated into local terms. During one discussion of zakat during the Orientation class, Brother Bilal produced from his briefcase the paperback Elementary Teachings of Islam, an unusual Indian volume written by Maulana Abdul-Aleem Siddiqui in catechistic, question-and-answer format. "Now," he said, "about specific items you have to pay zakat on, the book says, 'You should pay on gold in the amount over—' . . . hmm, the note gives the equivalent of

‘Pakistani tolas,' but I have no idea what a Pakistani tola is. This doesn’t do me any good.” He sighed, looking up at the audience.

You see, that’s why we need to have something for America.... We’ve got a lot to do, and we’ve got a road to pave that nobody’s ever paved before. In every area there’s plenty of work for us to do. When a Muslim intends to do something, he seeks to perfect it, that’s what the Prophet said. Do it so nobody could come behind you and do it any better. . . . We need to do one of these zakat tables for the United States. Hardly anybody owns goats anymore! We need to put together a zakat information package so that when new believers come and convert over from Christianity, they know. Right now they think it’s the same; you just give over ten percent of your check.

He called on Brother Karim, an accountant and construction contractor who serves as the mosque’s treasurer, to form a committee to put together an easy-to-use zakat table and contribution form so that members could understand how their financial obligations to the community are part of their ritual obligations as practicing Muslims.

*** Mediations of Knowledge

Creating a community of correct practice is one way in which the mosque works to distinguish itself from the Nation of Islam and to integrate itself with the world Muslim community. In support of correct practice, a community of reliable knowledge has to be forged and expanded,[32] and as part of this project, the mosque’s educational programs deal both with the specifics of Islamic tradition and with the character of knowledge itself. The Sunday hadith class, for example, offers a substantive review of Prophetic traditions and a course in epistemology. For several weeks the teacher. Imam Ansari, distributed photocopies and read to his students from the book Hadith Methodology’ and Criticism, both about the process of hadith verification and about the way the Prophet distributed knowledge to the Believers during his lifetime. First, the Prophet did so orally, repeating important parts three times so that his companions might remember. Second, he did so through writing, including letters and treaties dictated to the forty-five scribes who recorded his words. And finally, he did so by means of practical demonstration. “Islam is easy,” Ansari assured the class,

because it’s natural. It agrees with your nature. The Qur’an is the manual for all human beings. Allah sent the manual, but also sent a demonstrator, Muhammad. He was a Qur’an. A living, walking, talking Qur’an. You should emulate the Prophet in your actions, in your speech. You should always carry the Prophet inside of you. We need to have a course on the Companions—and that way we’ll learn that we are the Sahaba—we’re his companions, in their place, and we have to do what they did. (September 15, 1996)

The Prophet was both an embodiment of Qur’anic knowledge and, through his behavior, a commentary on the Qur'an. In studying this behavior and thus being the companions of the Prophet (Metcalf 1993), members of the community are bound in turn to share their knowledge with others, particularly those who are less involved with activities in the masjid. “There are a lot of Muslims walking around out there who don’t come to these classes,” Bilal told the Orientation students, “who don’t hear what we’re saying, who don’t know this. People need to know’ this stuff, and it’s up to you to tell them” (28 September 1996). “Islam is the way to go for human beings,” he had said two weeks before. “Allah’s trying to show you; he shows you the signs. Some information can renovate your personal life and then the whole community. Use the information we give; we’ll run off some copies, but don’t hog it—spread it around.” In the children’s Sunday School class, a visiting teacher, Sister Khadija, repeated the theme. “Knowledge increases your faith,” she explained.

“As we walk through our lives, this is what Allah has given us. We have to think about garments not just as shirts and shoes, but as knowledge. Knowledge gives you a protection and a covering. Faith gives us the shahada, and prayer, sawm, zakat, hajj. The things Allah gives us should be as close to us as a garment, to protect and cover us. You have to guard your own soul first, and then you are responsible for guarding the souls of families and others around you. What are you supposed to do with knowledge?”

“Practice it,” suggested one student.

“Recite it,” offered a second. “Study it,” answered a third.

“And aren’t you supposed to teach it, to give it to someone else? That’s the worldview. You’re not supposed to just keep it, to see how big it makes you, but to share it with others.” (October 27, 1996)

In both children’s and adults’ classes, these oral and personal channels for transmitting knowledge of the sacred tradition are supplemented by, and refer to, media outside the domain of Islamic intellectual production, including general newspapers, movies, television, public school textbooks, mass-market paperbacks, and the signs of nature. Experiences at meetings and conventions, local and national news stories, television series, and films stimulate discussion of the global values shared with other Muslim nations, as well as considerations of the difference between American and foreign Muslim contexts.[33] Both teachers and students use such examples, which rely for their force on the assumption of common knowledge of extra-scriptural media.[34] Illustrating the necessity for self-control during Ramadan, Bilal told adult students that they needed to control their environments so as not to fall into tempting thoughts during the fast. If you fall asleep watching a football game and wake up with the lithe dancing bodies on “Soul Train” staring you in the face, he said, you’ve got to get up and turn it off. You can’t predict when Satan will slip through the

cable on the back of your television set, he argued, but you can control whether or not you listen to his whispering. This is a media culture, and the market is evoked as one context of Islamic messages.

Teaching the children about etiquette on another occasion, Bilal told a story from David Carradine’s 1970s television show Kung Fu. The children knew the series well enough to remind him of the name of the Chinese temple—Shaolin—where the action took place. The week before, a discussion of proper dress had included a hadith condemning cross-dressing, which ignited an unprompted and enthusiastic student recital of examples from the media, from basketball star Dennis Rodman to transvestite pop-culture figure RuPaul. As an extreme example of the moral degradation manifest in the practice of men wearing women’s covering, one student eagerly recited details from the 1991 Jodie Foster/Anthony Hopkins movie, Silence of the Lambs, in which the male villain constructed a body suit from the skin of his female victims.

Even though the mass media and its referents provide useful fodder for religious critique (Moore 1994), the media should also confirm and amplify positive understandings gained through public discussion. When an adult student asked whether there was going to be an advanced class after the Orientation to Islam was completed, Ansari replied, “Listen to the Imam [W. D. Muhammad]. He will take you where you want to go. His teaching is precise, clear, simple. Imam Muhammad is an advanced Islamic class: listen to him on the radio on Sunday. Attend his class on WBAV 1600, every week” (September 8, 1996). If Imam Muhammad is a person, a class, and a radio broadcast all at once, this is in part because the lines between the media of knowledge are permeable. They include not only intellectual commodities like books and the technologies of broadcast, but also, according to mosque members, the signs of the human body and the observable structure of God’s creation.

*** Lord of All the Systems of Knowledge

Media used in the classroom are broadly merged under a common purpose and a conception of their source in God. On a flyer tacked to the bulletin board of the mosque’s anteroom, one of the state functionaries of the Ministry's Office of Public Relations makes this point theologically in stressing the importance of the Sister Clara Muhammad School as a basis for community building:

Prophet Muhammad said it best: “Knowledge is the lost property of the believer.” Imam W. D. Muhammad has recently given a new and clearer translation for the Qur’anic verse, [U]al-hamdu li-llahi rabb al-'alamin.”[35] Imam Mohammed translates this, “Praise be to Allah, Lord of all the Systems of Knowledge."

This new label for God is starting to circulate beyond the Ministry's flyers and is gaining currency in public discussions. Anything with instructive value is fair game, whether it is specifically "Islamic" or not, and consequently, instructional themes range widely. The Islamic Sunday School begins each week with twenty to forty-five minutes of Arabic, using elementary workbooks for learning the alphabet and vocabulary. It ends with a story read from a Muslim children's story collection or from Aesop's fables, or told by the teacher. These are usually focused on the theme of leadership. Otherwise, science, Islamic history, and etiquette are treated as interchangeable subjects, all unified ultimately through their relationship to God, as the Lord of all the systems of knowledge, and the needs of the community He established.

This theme is also developed by appropriating additional material for the classroom. For the first few weeks of the fall semester, Brother Bilal assigned homework not only from the Arabic workbook but also from the Jurassic Park Puzzle Book, a short volume of logic, mathematical, and word puzzles (anagrams, word searches, crosswords) based on the 1993 Steven Spielberg blockbuster movie, which he had purchased in bulk from a local discount store. He discussed scientific method with the students and told them to use their own minds to find out about the world, including topics like the life of the Prophet. "You have to check it for yourself to see if what people tell you is true. Don't just believe me when I tell you something. Think about how you would check on it, verify it, research it" (September 15, 1996). On other days he brought in large-format (18"x 24") photo books he used for his sixth-grade public school class on topics like The Rain Forest or Recycling. "What's science?" he asked the children. After they mentioned technology and finding out about nature, Bilal confided to them.

Now, I can't say this in the public school, but I can tell this to you all: science is the study of Allah's creation. Science is the study of Allah's creation. Any word you see with an "-ology" at the end is part of science. Like biology, the study of life. Ecology, the study of how living things relate to each other. And that includes people as living things.

He showed them the photo book on recycling, counseling them to get their parents to use the bright plastic recycling bins the city provides for cans, bottles, and paper. "Allah designed the world," he said, "in a way that everything gets recycled back to where it came from. Allah has put a recycling system in nature. A lot of recycling systems. One of them is called the Water Cycle...." "I teach the children about science," he told me later, not only to provide extra attention to children the public schools define as at-risk, but "because 1 want to show them the unity of creation and how they can understand it. 1 want to show them that God is mathematics."

The unity of God, the unity of creation, and the consequent importance of science and knowledge are themes that consistently run through public discourse at the mosque, drawing on and tying together various media and sources. "We need to have a workshop on diet and nutrition for Muslims," Bilal told the adult students:

There’s a book out called Medicine of the Prophet; you should have that. Any food mentioned in the Qur'an is good for you. Lentils, cucumber, olive oil. In fact, everything that’s in the earth is in your body: gold, silver, phosphorus, magnesium—and you need all of that to be a healthy adult. (September 28, 1996)

He had drawn this latter image from one of his favorite videos, “The Book of Signs," a lavish 1986 production of the Regional Da'wa Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Narrated by Briton Robert Powell, the video was approved by the Malaysian Prime Minister’s Office, a Saudi da'wa council, and al-Azhar University in Egypt. It is based on a book by Frenchman Maurice Bucaille, which details the parallels between the Qur’anic worldview and that of modern science, asserting that the Qur’an anticipates modern knowledge of everything from embryology to meteorology. Islam, one with human nature, reveals its plan through the signs of the observable world. “When Jibril told Muhammad, ‘Read!’," Bilal told his adult class,

He didn’t have a book to read, so what did he read? What was the angel telling him to read? Read Allah’s creation! Read the sunrise, read the world! Jibril is not talking about a physical book; he's talking about the creation. When we start kids in school, they don’t know how to read, so we start them off with picture books. There were slaves that couldn’t read, but they could read the north star, to keep the star in front of them as they walked to freedom! (September 28, 1996)

Being encouraged to read the natural world as they might read a book bestows a measure of interpretive authority on each member of the community and not only frees them to deepen their own understanding but makes them responsible to enter into discussion with other community members in the context of the mosque as a public forum. A young substitute hadith teacher, weaving together a complex set of images comparing the sun and its planets to the Ka’ba and its pilgrims, explained that “God’s creation shows the virtue of taking one’s place and allowing others to have their place. You have to know who you are, have your culture and let others have theirs. The sun is symbolic of God’s light and also of our work enlightening others through spirituality.” And not only the natural world, but the body especially, is a sign of God. When a local Muslim politician substituted in the Orientation class one day, he elaborated on the meaning borne by the body:

God doesn’t pay attention to the intellect, he pays attention to the heart, to the human sensitivity. You see, your body is a sign. But the sign won’t be held accountable on the Day of Judgment. The body is Muslim; in fact, on the Day of Judgment the body will testify against the soul; the body is made to follow the soul. So when you see, move toward the light. Don’t go back! (October 27, 1996)

Being Muslim, the body will follow Islam naturally. The soul, on the other hand, is subject to temptation, to error, to falling away from the truth. “The Qur’an says your body parts will testify against you on the Day of Judgment,” the substitute hadith teacher agreed. “You need to think about the symbolism here. The hand, for example, is symbolic of your actions; your arm is symbolic of your power. Take the literal meaning, but don’t be limited by that literal meaning” (December 8, 1996). Others contrasted this ongoing interpretive project, the continuous intellectual challenge of Islam, to the emotionally expressive tradition of black Christian churches. “Part of the reason I became a Muslim,” Bilal told the adult students, “is because it gave me academics, and it gave me knowledge, and it gave me facts. It’s not about emotion. Lots of things can make you feel good. If I just wanted to feel good I could go to a nightclub!” (November 7, 1996). Another hadith student agreed:

When Allah says, “submit,” you’ve got to submit everything. You have to become a scientist when you become a Muslim. You have to have a whole curriculum. Give up your Afrocentric way of thinking, give up your whole way of life, and submit. Everything is a schoolhouse for Muslims. You have to become a storehouse, submit not only to the rituals, but you have to study, establish a community, be the pioneer, the forerunner, rewrite everything. (December 29, 1996)

*** Offshore Investments

Not everything can be easily rewritten by the growing Muslim community. There are communities and cultural networks already in place whose boundaries and intersections—whether local or international, ethnic or confessional—require effort to cross, adjust, exploit, or transcend. One of the links strengthened through participation in a globalized market for Islamic intellectual commodities is an investment of identity in the larger Muslim world. In making this investment, the followers of W. D. Muhammad are forced into a complex series of negotiations with the local African-American community, with the imagined community of Africa, and with the larger Muslim community, both regionally and internationally. “I don’t even like to say ‘American Muslim,’” Bilal explained to the adult students,

because I don’t like divisiveness. Or “Black Muslim,” like the Nation of Islam. One of our brothers went to Pakistan, and while he was there, they were always talking about a Muslim writer named Maududi. It was Maududi this, and Maududi that. Maududi represents a leader for them, like the Grand Mufti of Russia who was here visiting the States a while back. These people represent different communities. Now, I have to accept other ways of doing things, [but] I don’t have to be an Arab to be Muslim or eat camel meat to be Muslim. African-Americans have a unique problem. There is an Islamic culture. We don’t eat pork. But in the plantation culture we were taught to eat everything off the pig—the feet, the intestines; and it’s a real adjustment. (December 8, 1996)

National, regional, and local identifiers, whether writers, leaders, clothing, or culinary traditions, set communities apart from each other, despite belief in a transcendent Islamic culture. Different expressive and consumption habits provide students with points of articulation to different communities. The boys come to class in winter coats emblazoned with NFL logos, while Amina, the one girl in the Sunday School, covers her hair with a plain white scarf like one of her Arab sisters might. When a class on appropriate dress turned into a discussion of cultural differences in bodily decoration, some of the boys described the scarification rituals undergone by immigrant acquaintances from Nigeria, and Amina gasped, "I sure am glad I'm not from Africa!" (December 8, 1996). Similar sentiments expressed publicly have recently caused controversy in local African-American communities (Young 1997). But particularly where multiple orders of identity are in play, the sense in which any of them are local or transnational, authentic or authoritative, becomes problematic (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 149-55). In a June 7, 1996, sermon in Philadelphia, Imam Muhammad Abdul-Aleem proclaimed,

My dear Brother and Sister Muslims, let us stop feeling that we have to abandon what is the best of our cultural tradition to be Muslim. When we come to the table, our other brother may bring chicken curried. However, I may like chicken smothered in gravy, like Grandma used to cook. So I am going to bring that to the table. My chicken smothered in gravy has to have the same respect as the brother who brings the chicken with curry.... If we come to the table looking identical, then you won't recognize me, because I don't know myself. I must get to know myself and feel comfortable coming to the table as who I am.

We have to stop being carbon copies. . . . Let me just give you one example. . . . You would think that African-Americans would at least look at Africa for Islamic models. Yet too many of us look past Africa, like it has never been Muslim and try to be something from the Middle East. That's not us, Brother and Sister Muslims. Let's be comfortable. Our last contact with Islam was on the African continent. We should reconnect ourselves with that life and stop trying to graft a life that is not for us. The Islam we are used to is colorful and has vibrant life to it, it isn't dark or drab. No, Sister, that isn't you. . . . You are the best educated Muslim women in the world. So use your knowledge. Use your insight. Use your flair for style to create a beautiful Islamic expression that is native to here, and stop trying to import and graft yourself onto a life that isn't you. You won't last. After a while, you will get tired of that same old shabby dress, as Otis Redding once said. You have to come alive. Be more creative in the way you dress, the scarves and everything. Don't just have an old drab look, because you know it won't hold up. (Abdul-Aleem 1996: 12)

The authentic African/American/Islamic modes of expression should be native to "here," the United States, a space defined in part by the shared vocabulary of popular culture. Bilal and others feel that in some ways it's easier for African-Americans to be Muslims in the U.S. because they already have a place in the culture; unlike immigrant Muslims, they already know how to deal with the potentials and problems of living in the majority white Christian culture, with all its temptations and distractions.

These different points of articulation were mediated in one of the two instances I've seen so far of a commercial video being used in class.[36] One cold day in fall Bilal had the older students watch a portion of Fatih, the 1995 video about the Ottoman Empire produced in Istanbul and marketed in the United States by SoundVision. Detailing the life and times of Sultan Muhammad II, founder of the Ottoman empire "through his struggles dealing with the plotting and aggression of the Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI,... it shows his creative planning for defense against an inevitable clash with the Crusaders" (cover blurb). The protagonist—who looks remarkably like Sean Connery on the video case—is portrayed as a precocious leader who refuses the pomp and luxury accorded to his Byzantine rival. When it comes time to build a strategic fortress, for example, Sultan Muhammad rolls up his sleeves and acts as the construction foreman, to the bemusement of visiting Byzantine messengers.

The four older students were shivering in the cold building and distracted by the noise of the younger children playing nearby. On top of that, they were slightly unsure of the conventions of the Epic Civilizational Clash movie genre (they had no idea, for example, what the video and their teacher meant when they said the Ottomans "laid siege on Constantinople"). After half an hour or so, Bilal stopped the video and began asking questions, always referring to the Ottomans as "we."

"Who," he asked, "were the Byzantines?" Silence. "The Byzantines," he answered his own question, "were the enemies, in the ancient times, of the Muslims. Who was Constantine?"

"Emperor."

"Emperor of who?" Silence. "I see we're gonna need to watch the whole thing again two or three times." He shifted his line of attack. "Remember when the Byzantine messenger came and knelt down? Why did the Sultan [Muhammad] tell him to get up?"

"You don't worship no one."

Bilal nodded, "You don't bow down to any man. In Islam we don't do that. . . . What else did you notice about the Sultan?"

"The first one or the second one?"

“They were both pretty much the same,” Bilal explained. “The second was fulfilling his father's dream, building that fortress.” He paused. “If I told you to write an essay contrasting the Sultan with Constantine, what would you say?”

“What’s ‘contrast’?”

“Show the differences between two things.” “Constantine had servants cleaning his feet and stuff.” The teacher nodded. “What are some other ways the Sultan and Constantine are different?" Long silence. “Have you studied the Ottoman Empire?”

“The what?”

“The Ottoman Empire. I know that in your [public school) social studies books, in the world history part, that they say something about the Ottoman Empire, because when I teach Social Studies in the public school, I talk about it. You never heard of the Ottoman Empire?” One of the boys shook his head. “All we study,” he said, “is about Africa.”

The sensitivities of the American majority culture that prompt it to provide limited resources for the creation of a non-Eurocentric identity for young African-Americans are sometimes wide of the mark. The majority culture’s limited and homogeneous perception of African-Americans derives from an understanding of origin and identity as constituted by a system of naturally discontinuous spaces rather than by the intersection and convergence of cultural, political, and economic processes (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). The case illustrates, among other things, that the “we” of the African/American/ Muslim (or Muslim-American, as in the label W. D. Muhammad has chosen for himself) community is labile and does not necessarily presume or privilege Islamic Africa as an intermediary. For Muslim Americans like the followers of W. D. Muhammad, the investment in broader identities pays a higher dividend, insofar as it can move beyond a specific Africanness and connect with wider global currents (Dannin 1996: 142) and Islamic histories alternative to both America-centered and Afrocentric identities.

At the same time, the linkage with multiple offshore identities coincides with the creation of a comfortable space of consumption and entrepreneurship on a local and national level. While some scholars have pointed to an “anticommercial” bias in the bourgeois black community, which associates commerce with hustling (Austin 1994: 240-41), the Muslim community tends to treat the market with cautious respect, interpreting its potential as enormous and its lapses as the result of moral rather than economic forces. For example. Brother Bilal once quizzed his young students on the life of Muhammad.

“Now Muhammad was married to Khadija, and he was known as a trustworthy man in his business transactions. People admired him, people respected him. While he was working for Khadija, did he make her a profit?”

The children misunderstood. “Was she a Prophet too?”

Bilal puzzled for a moment, then smiled. “No, no. P-R-O-F-I-T. You're thinking P-R-O-P-H-E-T. He was a Prophet, and he made her a profit; he made money for her business.”

Islamic history provides plentiful support for the dignity of the merchant life, and one of the items advertised on the back page of the Muslim Journal is a book by W. D. Muhammad, Islam's Climate for Business Success. During the class section on recycling, Bilal had emphasized that the recycling industry not only was morally important but was the site of enormous economic potential and that some of them might one day be in the recycling business. The unspoken implication was that, given God’s interest in creating a world where recycling of material is a natural process, the creation of profit from the enterprise not only fulfilled the economic needs of the family and the community but could be interpreted as a pious act in itself.

*** The Great Chain of Buying

Given this predominantly positive view of commerce, communities like this, which construct their identities in part through the market, experience the market as liberating, empowering, and creative. Jones (1996) demonstrates that, for France, the provincial advertising newsletters that proliferated in the latter half of the eighteenth century helped shape their readers—from domestic servants and women to artisans, physicians, lawyers, merchants, and the minor nobility—into a consuming public. In this world of the market, wealth and taste rather than the social rank of birth or nobility defined an audience linked together in a “communication and commerce of minds,” “‘a reciprocal commerce in enlightenment’ . . . tied closely with their belief in the enlightening and civilizing powers of trade” (Jones 1996: 24-25). As the century wore on to its revolutionary climax, these newsletters came to carry more and more literary and political material, although they still relied on their subscribers and on each other for most of their copy, providing a mechanism through which “the parish pump spoke to the world, and the world to the parish pump,” effectively preparing the ground for a bourgeois public sphere “that transcended geographical localism, social particularism, gender exclusivity, and occupational restrictiveness” (Jones 1996: 26). Likewise this Muslim community is oriented and situated through the commodities linking it with others.

Intellectual commodities play a key role in the contemporary Muslim world, as they did in creating France. But instead of focusing only on the market for printed materials like books or periodicals (Anderson 1983), we can look also at the ways that printed materials act as a window to a market, the sense in which printed materials like newspapers are self-sustaining links to other products, other services, other communications, and in general are links to the imagined community of world commerce. Large parts of Muslim periodicals, like other periodicals, are given to these sorts of links through advertising.[37] A comparison of three popular journals suggests the extent to which they provide these extra linkages.

The type of advertising in the sample periodicals differs somewhat. While the Nation of Islam and the Ministry of W. D. Muhammad devote most advertising to products, the Islamic Society of North America—largely comprising educated and relatively prosperous immigrant Muslims and WASMs (White Anglo-Saxon Muslim converts)—devotes its largest single block of ads to services, largely financial planning services that proportionally fewer African-American Muslims have the means to benefit from. But these services, international in scope and serving to construct the financial underpinnings of other sets of connections, can diffuse through multiple links (for example, entities like the Iqra' Foundation or the Islamic Circle of North America's SoundVision corporation, which advertise in the Muslim Journal), [38] to benefit communities like the Masjid al-Nur, whose new lot was donated by a consortium of thirty or so "Arab Brothers."

Figure 6.1.

A Content Comparison of Three American Muslim Periodicals

JOURNAL TITLE

| What Is Advertised | Muslim Journal (WDM) | Final Call (NO1) | Islamic Horizons (ISNA) |

| % of Total Space | % of Advert Space | % of Total Space | % of Advert Space | % of Total Space | % of Advert Space |

| Conventions | 17.0 | 32.0 | 3.0 | 10.0 | 9.0 | 19.0 |

| Speeches, Broadcasts, Services | 0.4 | 0.8 | 3.0 | 7.0 | 17.0 | 35.0 |

| Products (Total) | 27.0 | 51.0 | 22.0 | 72.0 | 11.0 | 23.0 |

| Print | 9.0 | 17.0 | 5.0 | 16.0 | 6.0 | 12.0 |

| Audio/Videotapes | 3.0 | 5.0 | 14.0 | 46.0 | 3.0 | 6.0 |

| Charities | 4.0 | 8.0 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 8.0 |

| Help Wanted | 7.0 | 15.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 7.0 | 15.0 |

| Total Proportion of Space Devoted to Advertising | | 52.0 | | 31.0 | | 49.0 |

Like any periodicals, Muslim tabloids and magazines depend on market linkages to subsidize their cover or subscription price. But it would be a mistake to assume that advertisements are unwelcome distractions breaking up blocks of “real” content. Given the high percentage of space devoted to them (a percentage that is much higher in some other mass periodicals), it is likely that both editors and readers experience advertising as part of the informational content of periodicals (Miller 1987: 171-72). The advertisements, which define and grant access to constellations of goods that demarcate particular communities and lifestyles, are part of the reason magazines and newspapers are purchased.

Habermas (1989: 16) reminds us that the original newspapers were really newsletters distributed by the guild-like organizations of sixteenthcentury merchants seeking to construct their own larger-scale imagined community, a point repeated by Anderson (1983: 62) and Jones (1996) with respect to later developments in North America and France. They were engaged in constructing an imagined universalism of distribution and consumption, a universalism of the same type we see being built by the world Muslim community through its entry into intellectual commodity production and distribution on an international scale. As we have seen, the availability of particular products on the market has not led to their universal adoption[39] but to a selective and strategic use of materials to create both a local community and investment in broader identities. These two elements are clearly reciprocal, for it is only by establishing a strong and responsible local Muslim community that individuals can feel a part of the world community of Muslims. Hence the emphasis on knowledge, which is held to be the core of Muslim identity, and the effort to identify, acquire, and consume intellectual commodities from a variety of sources, marking a cosmopolitan participation in a global market of ideas rather than a particularist one consuming mostly proprietary goods, like the Nation of Islam.

*** Conclusions

The diversity of sources that shape given interpretive worlds and the diversity of those worlds themselves are facts of the first order. The sense of investing in the historical and geographical community defined by Mecca as the Center-Out-There is shared by the African/American/Muslim as well as by the Islamist radical in Egypt (Goldberg 1991). Both strive to create an encompassing local community in which personal and public virtue can be achieved. For both, the creation of this community is perceived as liberation stemming from a return to the sources. The difference between them lies in the different structures of power and networks of position and identity to which and through which new markets in intellectual sources are responding. Returning to the sources amidst the enervating abundance of Islamic literature in Egypt (Starrett 1998) means locating a culturally specific purity of knowledge and practice that transcends the globally corrupting influences of power, careless imitation, and worldly desire. Activists strive to "make the discursively

mediated public sphere govern the public environment influenced by commodification, . . . reimposing a politics of high meaningfulness on what appears to them the exteriority of consumption" (Salvatore 1997: 15-16). The paucity of similar literature in the American context stimulates, conversely, an omnivorous appetite for a corpus of knowledge that transcends cultural specificity, either that of domestic black nationalism or that of Middle Eastern tradition. The local Muslim community looks outward toward the global umma as a storehouse of materials for building a sense of identity in situ. Returning to the sources means focusing on the universality and naturalness of Muslim identity, those aspects of Islam that are independent of culture and of place.

Only by looking precisely at what are the sources for specific communities can we identify real interpretive worlds, worlds not deducible either from individual media or from the constellations of intellectual commodities assembled in advertisements, bookstore shelves, or market stalls. In the process of returning to the sources, members of the Masjid al-Nur combine two strategies: pooling individually held commodities (books, videos, software) and forging linkages between religiously inflected materials that are consciously sought through the market and those that represent the common knowledge of the community (the unavoidable mass media, the historical experience of African-Americans, the signs of the human body or of the physical world). These strategies underline the sense in which the religious imagination in both its public and its private forms is stimulated and circumscribed by the vehicles at its disposal. The multiple links forged through the market elaborate, unavoidably, multiple communities of Muslim knowledge and practice.

*** NOTES

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[29] Jones derived the phrase as a pun on Arthur Lovejoy's classic examination of ancient and medieval understandings of the ascending linkages between living things. The Great Chain of Being.

[30] Another important set of questions about these developments—unfortunately, far beyond the scope of the present chapter—has to do with the formal transformation of fourteen centuries of textual and embodied knowledge into new representational

conventions, distributed through new mechanisms and intended for new audiences (Eickelman 1985; Messick 1993; Starrett 1996, 1998; Anderson, this volume).

[31] Sister Clara Muhammad was the wife of Elijah Muhammad. Her interest in education led to the naming of NO1 and WCI schools after her.

[32] During a heated discussion of the mosque’s financial troubles, several people pointed out that during Friday prayers the parking lot has more than one Mercedes Benz in it but that the wealthier members of the community did not seem to be contributing their share. One of the regular participants in the hadith class attributed this to the casual but well-to-do believer's lack of “scientific Islamic information.” He insisted, and several others agreed, that the basis of the community is knowledge and education, on which everything else depends.

[33] At one point there was a lively discussion of the fact that young Arab and Pakistani children visiting mas/ids in the U.S. can sometimes recite the whole Qur’an from memory. When it was pointed out by Brother Bilal’s wife, Angela, that they didn't understand much of what they were reciting, admiration for the feat of memory turned into disappointment in the flaws of such an approach to schooling.

[34] Bowen has noted the same process in Indonesia, where the Gayo “would at times elucidate an Arabic text (or its translation) with a Gayo proverb or compare the power exercised by Moses with that wielded by a local ancestor spirit" (Bowen 1992: 496).

[35] This is usually translated “Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds." The verb 'alam is derived from a verbal root denoting knowledge; the noun ‘alam means “that which is known.”

[36] The other case was on a day when Sister Kenyatta didn't make it to school; Bilal hooked up the TV and used the storytelling video and “Salam’s Journey" as babysitters for the younger children.

[37] The Muslim Journal is published weekly by the Ministry of Wallace Muhammad; The Final Call is published weekly by the Nation of Islam. Islamic Horizons is published bimonthly by the Islamic Society of North America. This is a rapid comparison of single issues of these periodicals and is thus suggestive of questions rather than representative.

[38] Each devotes between 43 (MJ) and 83 (FC) percent of its product advertisements to intellectual commodities—books, other periodicals, informational video- and audiotapes. In general, products advertised in The Final Call are proprietary— for example, videos of speeches by Minister Farrakhan and other NOI officials.

[39] At the Masjid al-Nur, only the Imam, who works full-time as a county prison chaplain, has access to a computerized Islamic database—at work—and the school's one ancient IBM PC currently gathers dust in the office, too slow and small to run Islamic computer games or databases, even if the school could afford them.

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** 7. Bourgeois Leisure and Egyptian Media Fantasies

Walter Armbrust

Egypt has rich and diverse mass media that have grown up and expanded with the country's modernization. Modernization, in turn, has been one of the Egyptian media's major topics. In exploring the meaning of modernization, mass media are part of the public space that is explored in them, and they help to define it. They not only describe, they also simulate, in the words of John Hall, the spaces "in which people could try out, at first or second hand, different social roles" in "a lively sphere marked by the spread of new codes of manners" (Hall 1995: 7). Such a "lively sphere" in Egypt has been all but invisible to analyses that focus on associational life and its structures as measures of freedom of expression. But media do more than record or promote. They are especially significant sites of social experimentation because they are at once removed and engaged, observers of the public space that their activities also define.

Tester (1992: 11) has suggested that social experimentation is especially significant for its ability to enable the transcending of social bonds previously thought to be immutable (or as likely, previously not thought about). Leisure is such an experimental site for modernizing societies; in the perspective that goes back to ideas about mass culture and mass media developed by the Frankfurt school sociologists, particularly Adorno and Horkheimer (1944), leisure channels disruptive emotions into a controlled release that is part of modernity (Rojek 1995: 51-52). While reducing mass culture and mass media to a "safety valve," such functional views still allow a place for disorder, ambiguities, and, most important, the exploration of change. Leisure—particularly as constructed and disseminated in the mass media—consists of ideologically informed texts, but it is also experienced by consumers. It is "mediated," presented as well as represented in the media, in the company of incentives to consume products and practices associated with it. But leisure consumption is also inseparable from an imperative to imagine a world in which the givens of the social order no longer remain unexamined, and so also falls within a sober discourse on civic pluralism and the shape of public space.

To tease out these connections, I focus here on representations of a particular instance of leisure and consumption: the practice of going to the beach, particularly the practice of men and women going to beaches where mixed bathing occurs. This practice pointedly depicts women in public space. These are, furthermore, not just representations of women in public space but, in varying degrees, attempts to sanction behavior that clashes with traditional social practices relevant to gender roles. They bear a superficial resemblance to orientalism's use of women to imagine an unbridled space (Graham-Brown 1988, Alloula 1986) and to the more recent neo-orientalist strategy of juxtaposing images of "Westernized" Middle Eastern women with images of tradition to suggest a sense of inevitable modernization (Graham-Brown 1988: 241). Indigenous representations of women in public space are also modernizing, but in a different way. Here nationalist imagery often dominates (Graham-Brown 1988: 244), including representations of idealized motherhood and iconographies of emancipated social progress, which, Graham-Brown contends, are not necessarily matched by substantive changes in the status of women. Graham-Brown also notes that representations of women have been used in locally produced Middle Eastern media to eroticize Western-style consumption (1988: 247).

Representations of going to the beach similarly contain a great deal of such visual juxtaposition that has, like beach-going itself, been dismissed as Western-influenced and passed over as unworthy of further analysis. But media commentary on the beach, with its controversial mixing of partially dressed men and women in public, indicates that “the beach” as a destination of leisure and a topic of representation implicates the reality of Western involvement in popularizing this form of leisure. Still, it is not reducible to Western hegemony. Neither does it represent a purely indigenous, traditional “response.” Instead, it presents a zone of danger that media representing it share, symbolized by their treatment of women as the most contentious issue in East/West polemics. Beach representations always pointedly include women. If they did not, there would be nothing to say or represent, nothing to register the zone of social experimentation that they mark out and share.

These representations have been formally continuous over time and across different media, suggesting that while the issue is not new, it does find new homes or vehicles of expression. Beach representations, like political cartoons, are topical; they are a fluid representational genre that maintains an internal consistency, while at the same time responding to the political and social contingencies of particular periods. What the different media used to convey these representations have in common is that they are also the vehicles of modernity’s public spaces and its modes of representing social experimentation. Here, I examine the iconography of such representations at different moments in time and in different media that, having no prior counterparts, are intrinsically definitive of the new public space they examine.

Beach representations operate in the space between “the super-literacy of traditional religious specialists and mass sub-literacy or illiteracy” (Anderson and Eickelman, this volume; Anderson 1995). Such a space can be thought of as “interstitial," for it does indeed stand between all sorts of differences conceptualized as tradition and modernity, male and female, elite and common, or literate and illiterate. However, interstitiality suggests a misleading image of an emergent bourgeoisie wedged uncomfortably between well-defined hegemonic cultural formations. In fact the imagery described below has been ubiquitous in Cairo for decades, and present to varying degrees in the rest of Egypt and the Arabic-speaking world. It has become naturalized; its hybrid character is more apparent from an outside perspective than from that of someone who grows up with it. New media in Muslim societies are new to the extent that they are inseparable from the content they convey. An analysis of the content properly begins with an understanding of how these media carry forth, and sometimes transform, processes with established trajectories.

*** Beach Discourse: 1992

“Aristocratic Girl for a Pack of Cigarettes” was the title of a cover story of a 1992 issue of Ruz al-Yusuf (no. 3348, August 8), one of Egypt’s largest and oldest mass-circulation weeklies. The picture on the cover is a lurid drawing of a woman reclining on a beach towel. She has exaggerated bare thighs, big hair, and sunglasses, and she stares

boldly at the viewer. In front of her are a bottle of suntan lotion, a pack of Marlboros, and a cigarette lighter. The picture is repeated inside the magazine (Fig. 7.1), along with a text by ‘Adil Hamuda, a well-known columnist.

Eyes born of the temptations of the night.... The hunger of the sun for the water of the sea. Passion. Caprice. Quenching the thirst. Satisfaction. Sunset. Pain. Boredom. Departure. Waiting for the winter to wash away the sins of summer. This is the story of every summer in al-Agami. Firdus: beach of hot bikinis, excessive liberty, the madness of pleasure reaching into the brain. This is the private beach, only for the rich. (Hamuda 1992: 38)

Figure 7.1. “Aristocratic Girl for a Pack of Cigarettes.” Ruz al-Yusuf 3348 (August 19, 1992): 38-41.

Hamuda explains that Firdus, this private beach in an area west of Alexandria known as Agami, was, until a short time ago, undeveloped and owned by bedouin. He scathingly characterizes the bedouin as ignorant, boorish overnight millionaires, enriched by easy profits from beachfront development projects. Now rich foreigners in scandalous “French-cut” bikinis expose most of their backsides (but not, he notes sourly, their midriffs) alongside similarly attired corrupt Egyptian elites. An Egyptian woman (Hamuda claims she is a real person but mentions no names) spends her summers on this beach by herself because her parents have divorced and moved to Spain and Australia. With no family to protect her, the woman lives the life of a prostitute, so desperate for sex that she will sell herself for a pack of cigarettes—hence the article’s title.

At a glance this article seems to be anti-leisure—to have everything to do with creeping fundamentalism and class resentment and nothing to do with tolerance or Hall’s “lively sphere marked off by the spread of the new.” The article points to massive social contradictions that could threaten the painful rebirth of civil society that some observers (for example, Ibrahim 1995) see as having come about in the 1980s, after decades of state domination. Indeed, at one point the article strongly implies that “liberty [and] the madness of pleasure reaching into the brain” is a recent corruption of more innocent pleasures experienced by ordinary Egyptians. The decadent Firdus beach, Hamuda tells his readers pointedly, is a private beach—a product of the infitah, Egypt’s post-1973 “open door” economic policy. The infitah was an early instance of what is now termed (in Egypt and elsewhere) “structural adjustment” of state-dominated Third World economies: forced capitalism under threat of withdrawal of support from the IMF and World Bank. Beside the decadent infitahi beach are more wholesome outlets for the summertime leisure urge.

There are public beaches on either side. The distance from those beaches to the public beaches takes you from one world to another; from an exciting beach—naked, wealthy—to a modest, crowded beach from which women enter the water wearing

galabiyyas. The line between the two beaches appears to be imaginary, but it really isn’t. It divides between whiskey and nti'assil a honey-steeped tobacco associated with a more modest lifestyle]; between arrogance and humility; between debauchery and sedateness; between the motor boat and the raft. But in the end all of them are swimming in the same sea. (Hamuda 1992: 39)

This image of women entering the water fully dressed has a power to fascinate imagemakers, although the way they employ these presumably contradictory juxtapositions of extreme modesty and extreme bodily exposure varies. Yusuf Shahin’s semi-documentary film, Cairo Enlightened by Its People (Shahin 1991),[40] used juxtaposition of flesh and modesty to show a city groaning under the weight of its contradictions and ripe for trouble. Unemployment, sexual frustration, dirt, dilapidated public housing projects, seedy foreigners on sex vacations, and the ever-present lurking menace of fundamentalism run together throughout the film. At one point we see people praying in the shadow of a giant movie billboard showing a big-breasted film starlet. The juxtaposition of fundamentalist and sexual imagery, together with the film’s relentless pessimism on the likely fate of freedom of expression if the situation is not bettered, suggest a city on the point of explosion. Shahin’s film debuted at the Cannes Film Festival just as American and IMF officials were deliberating on whether Egypt would be rewarded by debt relief.

Neither the state nor the public was pleased with Cairo Enlightened by Its People. Shahin had not shown the finished version of the film to the censorship authorities before releasing it at Cannes. Journalists attacked him mercilessly, calling him “khaioaga Yusuf” (more or less, “Gringo Joe”). Although nobody in Cairo had yet seen the film, the general feeling was that it “slandered Egypt’s reputation” abroad. The key to this feeling is that it was first shown abroad; nothing in the film was markedly different from the contents of many commercial Egyptian films, which are, however, not shown widely outside the Arabic-speaking world.

Another recent film shown in the West, Marriage Egyptian Style (Head 1991), touches on the assumed contradiction between bodily exposure and modesty less explicitly than in Cairo, but with a beach scene.[41] Marriage Egyptian Style is an ethnographic film that focuses on the life of an old woman who works as a domestic. The film explores the woman’s hopes for remarriage (she is divorced) and for her children’s marriages. In the course of the film, she, her son, and the family of a prospective bride take a trip to the beach. The purpose of the trip is for the two families to get to know each other better prior to the marriage. On the beach the two families mix freely with other bathers. Some of the women in these scenes wear bathing suits, and some appear in more modest dress. Most of the men wear swimming trunks.

Such trips are in fact common. I have been told that, aside from providing a means for families to get to know one another in a leisurely setting, a groom’s family can observe how

the prospective bride behaves in a potentially licentious public setting. Given that such beach outings do occur and would strike few Egyptians as controversial when the young couple is accompanied by their families, the reaction of the Egyptian media to Marriage Egyptian Style was surprising. The film, it was said, was a complete scandal. In the opinion of Egyptian journalists, this was not how real Egyptians lived. Because a foreigner had been involved in making the film and because it was intended for foreign consumption, the film was instantly labeled a national shame. As one writer put it, “An Egyptian researcher helped to produce the film Marriage Egyptian Style—the director was a British woman. She chose everything that was wretched, disgusting, and ugly, and photographed it” (al-Gamal 1993: 97). As in the case of Cairo Enlightened by Its People, the objection was not to the content of the film, which was commonplace, but to the involvement of foreigners and the fact that foreigners were the intended audience. But even the foreign involvement might have been forgiven if the film had not focused on lower-class subjects. In Egyptian media discourse, leisure is an aspect of a “clean” middle-class lifestyle.

The problem is that what constitutes “middle class” in Egypt is difficult to pin down. It does not correlate with a material standard of living. There are, however, certain attitudes and expectations commonly associated with a middle-class ideal. Egyptians who have at least a high school education, and therefore basic literacy and familiarity with how modern institutions work, generally consider themselves middle class. Egyptians who think of themselves as middle class expect a lifestyle free from manual labor. In the media, the ideal of middle class is often associated with modernity, bureaucracy, and office work, and it is portrayed as having a degree of familiarity with an ideology of national identity that seeks to balance local Egyptian and classical Islamic cultural referents.[42] Certainly middle-class Egyptians, as previously mentioned, consume objects and images that they do not themselves produce “in the first instance” (Miller 1995: 1).

The juxtaposition of flesh and modesty in Marriage Egyptian Style, “Aristocratic Girl for a Pack of Cigarettes,” and Cairo Enlightened by Its People allude to a class dimension in the way leisure is represented. “Aristocratic Girl” and the furor whipped up in the media over Marriage Egyptian Style mark the socioeconomic limits of leisure in Egypt. Leisure is not for the poor, and it is not healthy when the extremely wealthy indulge in it. The presumed decadence of both the poor and the rich brackets middle-class identity. The poor are suspect because of their “failure” to adjust their lives to modern institutions, the wealthy for a rootless cosmopolitanism at the opposite end of the socioeconomic spectrum. Thus failure to “get with the program” is marked by presumed backwardness in the case of the poor, and for the rich, by an inauthenticity tainted with foreignness. To be middle class is to refuse both extremes.

Cairo Enlightened by Its People suggests that social conservatism, alongside licentious imagery, presages an imminent explosion. The film depicts such juxtapositions as new, as the harbingers of change. It encourages viewers to assume that the society depicted in the film has been entirely covered and that leisure as represented in the lurid billboard’s backdrop to prayers threatens the social equilibrium of traditional society. This implication of

novelty marks the film for foreign consumption. The other two instances of covered/uncovered imagery—“Girl for a Pack of Cigarettes” and Marriage Egyptian Style—are more closely connected to a local discourse over the meaning of exposure in the pursuit of leisure.[43] It would be misleading to suggest that the local reading of these violent juxtapositions is only a constructed vision of an imposed modernization theory or of nationalism. Although both Marriage Egyptian Style and Cairo Enlightened by Its People were intended in part for foreign audiences, audiences that read novelty into juxtapositions of exposure and modesty, it is not necessarily the case that the sense of outrage conveyed by “Aristocratic Girl” arises from the same impulse. The article was published in the mass-circulation weekly Ruz al-Ynsnf, intended primarily for an Egyptian readership. “Aristocratic Girl” was accompanied by a cartoon that emphasizes the starkness of visual juxtaposition by showing a man and a woman walking together on the beach, other bathers in the background. The man is grotesquely fat and hairy; the woman wears a bikini with a niqab—a Saudi-style face veil that covers her entire head, leaving only a slit for the eyes (Fig. 7.2). Such dress is considered a statement of radical fundamentalism in the Egyptian media and a sign of backwardness by many Egyptians. Of course it is normally worn with a long shapeless gown and gloves. As the pair walks, the man says to the woman, “Don’t look back—there are informers.” One might be tempted to interpret the cartoon, along with the article, as an instance of the lurid Western iconography that careens from the harem to the brothel. But in Egypt, these images are part of a long-standing discourse within the Egyptian media; there is in fact nothing new here. Ruz al-Yusuf's “Aristocratic Girl for a Pack of Cigarettes” portrays a thoroughly modern sense of leisure fully entrenched in Egyptian society that has been represented uninterruptedly in Egypt for decades.

Figure 7.2. “Don’t look back— there are informers." Ruz al-Yusuf 3348 (August 19, 1992): 40.

*** The Beach in 1969

In 1969 the Egyptian public sector was near the pinnacle of its power and influence. Saad Eddin Ibrahim describes the 1960s, when Gamal Abdel Nasser led a wave of populist postcolonial regimes in nationalizing social institutions that had previously been in private hands, as the low tide of civil society (1995: 36-37). Starting in 1963, the Egyptian cinema was extensively nationalized. The state acquired almost all the means of production, distribution, and exhibition. Many Egyptian intellectuals remember the period as the golden age of Egyptian cinema, when state sponsorship of the industry gave filmmakers a freedom from constraints imposed by the marketplace. However, since 1967, when Egypt was crushed militarily by Israel, the public sector has declined. Public-sector film production was one of the first casualties. By 1971 the cinema had been “reprivatized,” to the extent that direct state funding of films was ended, although the state has not yet relinquished control of the decaying studios.

Papa's up a Tree (Kamal 1969b), released in 1969, was one of the first significant films not made in the public sector since 1964. Intellectuals feel ambivalent about the film. Papa's up a Tree, unlike the expensive prestige projects of the public-sector period, could not be shown in European film festivals; it was geared to a popular Arabic-speaking market. The masses, however, were not ambivalent about the film and allegedly made it the most profitable film in the history of Egyptian cinema up to that time. Papa's up a Tree was a musical, starring ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz, the most popular singer of the Nasser period and the singer most closely linked to the fortunes of the state. ‘Abd al-Halim was the heir apparent of another giant of Arabic music, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and the only active performer who rivaled him in popularity was the female vocalist Umm Kulthum.

The director, Husayn Kamal, trained in France, was artistically ambitious and was given his first chance to direct by the public sector. His first film, The Impossible (1965), was a morality play.[44] A man and a woman, both married but not to each other, live lives of quiet desperation until they develop a powerful urge to have a torrid affair. Before the affair can really get off the ground, they decide not to go through with it for the sake of their children. The Impossible was not very successful at the box office. Kamal’s second and third films, The Postman (1968) and A Bit of Fear (1969a), were adaptations of literature, and both films had limited appeal. Papa's up a Tree, written by novelist Ihsan ‘Abd al-Qudus, was Kamal’s first privatesector production and his first popular film.[45]

Papa's up a Tree is a beach film, and it gives a much more detailed exhibition of the discourse invoked in 1992 by “Aristocratic Girl.” In particular, it elaborates a representation of what happens, in media fantasy, on the “other beaches” located on either side of the decadent locale described in the article. In a nutshell, the film is about the middle class only briefly alluded to in “Aristocratic Girl;”[46] its focus is ultimately a vision of what the beach should be with respect to middle-class ideals. ‘Abd al-Halim plays a college student who goes to spend his summer at the beach with friends from school, one of whom is his girlfriend. He craves intimacy with her, but she is shy and insists that they stay safely with the group. He runs off with a prostitute and spends his summer trying to accept the fact that she has other lovers.

In the first fifteen minutes of the film (including a song), the film develops several themes, including (1) generational conflict, (2) romantic love between individuals before marriage, and (3) leisure as an escape from the ordered world of work. It begins with ‘Adil (the character played by ‘Abd al-Halim) preparing to travel from Cairo to Alexandria for his summer vacation. His teenage sister packs his bags for him. This is quintessentially conservative, as brothers and sisters in many Arab societies are held to have a special bond, a semi-romantic relationship in which a brother and sister’s “masculinity and femininity were defined and practiced in a connective relationship that was often sexually charged” (Joseph 1994: 66). There could scarcely be a more efficient way to evoke a patriarchal social structure; the first five minutes of the film further evokes what Gellner (1995: 33) characterized as the “tyranny of cousins"—a more extended version of patriarchy that he

argues is anathema to civil society. But mixed in with what are unquestionably tradition-bound family relations are copious references to order and modernity.

As ‘Adil’s sister packs his suitcase, she discovers that he has already written and addressed his postcards for the summer. He explains this as an attempt to better organize his time—he does not want to waste his summer having to worry about the “work" of corresponding with friends and family back in Cairo. As his sister finishes the packing, she complains that she does not get to go to the beach, even though she too has passed her exam. ‘Adil tells her she is too young, and she retorts that girls grow faster than boys; her sixteen years make her the equivalent of twenty-six in relation to him, therefore she is “older" and should be allowed to go. This light-hearted joking in the first scene essentially states the film’s theme in miniature: the younger generation yearns to be free of rules imposed by tradition. And of course a temporary relaxation of rules is inherent in leisure generally (Rojek 1995: 80). The rest of the film constantly reiterates a dialectic between order and disorder.

As the sister packs ‘Adil’s bags, their mother enters the room with a cake “for Khalid.” The reason for the gift is that Khalid—‘Adil’s schoolmate and a native of Alexandria—will watch over him during the summer, just as they watch over Khalid during the school year. Khalid's parents will be there too. The film never explicitly describes Khalid’s relationship to ‘Adil, but the close connection between the two families suggests that he is kin, perhaps even a cousin. Furthermore, Khalid’s sister Amal is ‘Adil’s girlfriend. Patrilineal parallel cousin marriage (between the children of male siblings) is so prominent in the anthropological literature on the Middle East as to be almost a cliche, and the issue of cousin marriage has, in fact, been present in the Egyptian cinema since its beginnings in the late 1920s. Some films portray cousin marriage as coercive and undesirable, and others as the perfect match. But in all films, the prospect of cousin marriage is an icon of tradition.

Papa's up a Tree, although it leaves ambiguous the issue of whether ‘Adil and Amal are biological cousins, portrays their relationship as the traditional ideal, but also as problematic. It is ideal in that the eventual marriage of the two is condoned, or even arranged, by their parents, and problematic in that ‘Adil chafes under the dead hand of tradition. He wants more than a conventional marriage to a family his parents know and respect (and may be related to). Not to put too fine a point on it, he wants a romantic relationship with an individual woman, a relationship not constrained by the overbearing presence of a group, whether the group is their friends from school or their parents.

The film's alternation between work, authority, and order on the one hand, and rumblings of rebellion on the other continues when ‘Adil and Khalid arrive at an isolated bungalow on the beach. The bungalow is a mess, and ‘Adil immediately starts cleaning. Khalid comments that he wishes his colleagues from college could see him so that they know what his real future will be: “engineer and janitor.” ‘Adil replies that their shilla (group of friends from college) has never seen him at the beach in anything but a bathing suit, and in a bathing suit everyone looks the same. One who sweeps the floors looks just like the boss of

a company; someone who lives in a hut looks exactly the same as a person who lives in a palace. Khalid then excuses himself, saying he has to join the shilla because they are preparing a mahkama, a “court.” ‘Adil has an errand to run before his date in beach “court.” The audience sees a dreamy juxtaposition of Amal, a woman who has light auburn tresses flowing in the breeze and wears a form-fitting pink blouse with tight pants, and ‘Adil. Both are running, and eventually they meet and embrace. He tries to follow up the embrace with a kiss, but Amal pulls away. “Mother and father say hello. They’ve missed you too.” And she walks away from the frustrated ‘Adil.

Next the “court”: It begins with young men in bathing suits blowing seashell “trumpets.” Swimmers and boaters standing on kayaks come ashore like South Sea islanders. The orchestral music swells. A group of students run out from beneath a row of colorful umbrellas. A ring of them bend toward each other in a close-up shot, hands clasped, and as they rise, the sun blazes out from among them. The singing begins: Bismi-l-hatva wish-shams wi-l-viligat; bismi-sh-shabah wi-l-hubb wi-l-agazat (in the name of the air, the sun, and “villages” of beach bungalows); in the name of youth, love, and vacations). The dancers form lines of women in tight shirts and pants, alternating with lines of boys in bathing suits. The overall effect up to this point is rather pagan—pointedly so, as their “in the name of...” invokes the sun and wind rather than the God of a traditional Islamic benediction. As they sing, they set up a podium, and the “judge” arrives with two officials of the “court.” The officials, both men, wear tiny bikini bathing suits; the judge (played by ‘Adil’s friend, possibly relative, Khalid) wears a brown robe, a turban improvised from a towel, and a beard made of seaweed. The parody here is not of South Sea natives in canoes, but of an Islamic court. The joyful song about love, sun, and carefree vacations is interrupted by one of the judge’s cronies yelling Mahkama! (Order in the court!).

The judge calls for ‘Adil, son of Kamal, “a student on summer vacation." He approaches the podium guarded by soldiers carrying kayak paddles instead of swords. ‘Adil sings his case: “Judge of the beach, O judge, I’ve been absent since last summer, and now I’ve come back to my dear friends” (he casts a glance at Amal, who stands in the line of students leading to the podium). “I’ve found my place still open, what are we waiting for, O judge?”

The judge points at him accusingly: “You’re asking to spend the summer, boy?”

“I want to have my vacation both summer and winter.”

“Raise your hand and take the oath,” says the judge. “State your defense.”

The music grows more lively, the stiffness of the “court” dissolves momentarily, and 'Adil dances back into the crowd of students, singing, “By God, I’ve studied all year; it gave me

headaches and colds; but I’ve passed my exams, and that’s why I want a vacation—I and my friends and festivity; it’s all up to you, O judge, my love to you, O judge.”

“Al-niyaba” (the prosecution), calls the judge.[47] One of the two men on the podium with the judge sings censoriously, “He's forbidden to spend his summer here: no beach, no love, not even an air-conditioner; and he has to take the first train back to Cairo.” The guards hustle ‘Adil off to a prison constructed of kayak paddles.

‘Adil sings, “What is my crime? What have I done?” A female chorus repeats his plaintive appeal.

The prosecutor responds, “Why have you come here in a bathing suit without permission?” The women all rush to the kayak-paddle prison, exclaiming “Yd Latif" (O God—but perhaps also “How nice,” a double entendre, as the women are looking over ‘Abd al-Halim as they say the line). The prosecutor continues, “And why has he come here without bringing cookies or a cake?” (‘Adil’s mother had given him one to bring to Alexandria, but he ate it on the train). “ Yd Hafiz" (O God), sings the female chorus in make-believe shock.

The judge then asks the opinion of his “jury,” which consists of the various male “guards” holding kayak paddles. Some say, “Let him stay"; others say no. Finally, ‘Adil breaks out of his “jail” and approaches the judge directly: “You mean I’ve left mother and father, fled from domestic lockup,[48] and now I can’t enjoy my vacation? By the Prophet, you students, we’re being oppressed!”

Order breaks down once again. The students, ‘Adil, and even the judge and the prosecutor begin dancing and singing about the joys of vacation after a hard year’s work. Then the court crier once again yells Mahkamal bringing the court to order once again. All three—the judge, prosecutor, and crier—sing portentously: “The legal interpretation of the beach court . . . is to give him the title musayyif daraga ula [summer vacationer first class].” The students erupt in cheers. They gleefully wash ‘Adil in sea water and put him in the judge’s place, dressing him in the robe, the towel-turban, and the seaweed beard. “Long live the judge,” they sing. The scene is ritualistic in a fairly classical sense: the initiate (‘Adil) is set apart and put in a liminal state and then reintegrated into society transformed to a new social state.

Now ‘Adil gets to judge other students. A pretty young woman approaches the court, singing that she’s finished prep school, high school, and most of college. “So how old would you say I am?” she asks.

“How should I know?” replies ‘Adil.

“What kind of judge are you?" she asks indignantly. ‘Adil replies that he knows all about legal interpretation, even statistics and agriculture, but nothing about women. She replies, “What would you say if I told you I’m seven years old?"

“Seven!” he exclaims.

She explains: “Mama and Papa think I’m not more than eight; they treat me like I’m still in kindergarten wearing ribbons in my hair; my whole life is ‘Shame,’ ‘Don’t talk back,’ ‘You can’t have that.’ When do I get to be myself? 1 want to live. Mama and Papa have become ancient.”

The court descends once again into a chaos of joyous singing and dancing until the crier again yells Mahkanial

‘Adil pronounces: “After legal deliberation of the beach court, family disputes branch, and after reviewing all the documents, we have decided the following: we will change her status, for those responsible for her, from the age of seven to the age of five.”

The court tries several more cases, always reiterating the same pattern: order alternating with a sense of disorder that is barely contained. Eventually the lighthearted joking of students in this early beach song gives way to real rebellion, as ‘Adil temporarily abandons his conservative girlfriend and has an extended fling with a prostitute (the film’s version of “Aristocratic Girl"). Patriarchal authority tries to intervene when ‘Adil’s father comes looking for him, but the father too falls victim to the charms of the prostitutes. Eventually they meet in a seedy bar, both having been shamed by their wallowing in lewdness. They forgive each other; the conservative Amal forgives ‘Adil because she truly loves him; everybody goes back to their ordered lives (except the prostitute, who it seems, truly loved ‘Adil and is heartbroken).

*** Back to the Future:1934-1969

Papa’s up a Tree suggests that the novelty factor in the material from the 1990s (described above) is purely a function of our own stereotypes. The ability of racy Western style juxtaposed with what we assume to be icons of tradition to induce a sense of shock or urgency—to suggest barely contained social strife as in Yusuf Shahin’s Cairo —depends in some cases on a certain separation from local traditions of

representation. “The beach” is one of these and as a destination for leisure was certainly in full bloom in Egypt by 1969.

One might question whether Papa's was a novelty of an earlier time, an artifact of Nasserism—a kind of forced secularization with shallow social roots. The director, Husayn Kamal, was at that time in good graces with the regime, and his first three films were made in the public-sector cinema. Indeed, he was one of the few directors of any distinction to have made his first film while the cinema was nationalized. By the same token, ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz, the singer who played Adil, is also frequently associated with the Nasser regime. It might, in other words, he possible to look at Papa’s up a Tree as a cultural artifact from a period in which, as Ibrahim has described it, “an explicit or implicit 'social contract’ was forged by which the state was to effect development, ensure social justice, satisfy basic needs of its citizens, consolidate political independence, and achieve other national aspirations” (Ibrahim 1995: 37). The feisty near-nudity (by Egyptian standards) of young people cavorting in the sand could perhaps be seen as attractive window dressing for the film’s rather obvious affinity with patriarchal attitudes. Even the carnivalistic beach court might be viewed as an indulgence by a regime determined to deflect attention from the far more serious political repression everybody knew was being carried out in the mid-to-late 1960s, not to mention the catastrophic collapse of the Egyptian army in the war against Israel only two summers earlier.

But to look at the film as only or even primarily an artifact of Nasserism would be overinterpretation, for the image of beach leisure noted in Papa's up a Tree was scarcely more original in 1969 than it was in 1992. Beach leisure has been the subject of a consistent discourse going back at least to the 1930s.[49] By the end of World War II, for example, many Egyptians resented the rise of allegedly boorish nouveaux riches who had profited from serving the British war effort and from hoarding scarce commodities to sell to their less fortunate neighbors. The campaign against these “war profiteers” (aghniya’ al-harb) was carried out in a long-running campaign in the magazine al-Ithnayn. The new class was mercilessly mocked in cartoons for their presumed ignorance and lack of taste. The cover of al-ltbnayn, no. 567 (not pictured), shows the stereotypical war profiteer as a grotesquely overweight man in slightly old-fashioned European clothes—the sort of outfit that might be worn by someone accustomed neither to finery nor to dressing like a European. The bottom of the page says, “In this issue—war profiteer contest.” The contest is to invent a caption for the picture. A few issues later the winner was announced: “War profiteer [holding telephone): I wonder what the number of the black market is?”

In summer issues the beach was a favorite site for these cartoons. Fig. 7.3 shows a pair of “war profiteer” cartoons from 1945. The story on the page matches the cartoon. A war profiteer and his wife plainly don’t know what a beach is (Egyptians often use the French word plage—bilaj in Arabic—meaning, this ignorant, non-French-speaking clod doesn’t know what bilaj means). They ask a lifeguard, and he tells them they’re on it. “But I want to meet him personally” says the profiteer, who is accustomed to being able to buy an audience with anyone he pleases. They refuse to take

off their clothes because it appears low-class to them. By the end of the story they enter the water fully clothed and are on the point of drowning (lower right-hand corner). These cartoons bear a striking resemblance to the way the infitahi class of 1990s Egypt is sometimes depicted (compare Fig. 7.3 with Fig. 7.2). The rhetoric of resentment, in other words, is hardly a new feature of the representational repertory of Egyptian public culture.

In popular imagery, the objectionable nature of war profiteers was often signaled by an obvious lack of taste and refinement, making them out of place on beaches, which were sold to the public as a place for cutting-edge modern habits. This is still true, as the media campaign against Marriage Egyptian Style, with its lower-class beach outing, suggests. This does not mean that the tables aren't occasionally turned. Some cartoons made fun of what must have been for many a strange new habit. Figure 7.4 shows a cartoon in which two peasants (by the look of their clothing) go to a beach. In the first frame (top) they see a sign that says "LE 50 reward for saving a person who is drowning." One man says to the other, "I'll throw myself in and you save me." In the second frame the man is in the sea drowning, while his friend, who was supposed to save him, lounges in a chair. In the third frame the nearly drowned man says, "Didn't we agree that you were going to save me?" In the fourth and final frame the lounging man says to his angry companion, "But I hadn't yet seen that other sign." The sign says, "LE 100 reward to anyone who pulls a corpse out of the sea."

Figure 7.3. War profiteers. Top cartoon (man and woman walking with servant carrying umbrella): "What fools. Why would anyone put an umbrella in the ground and sit under it?" Bottom cartoon (man soaking his wrist in a bucket of water). Wife of the war profiteer (in incorrect Arabic, suggesting that she either is a foreigner or has spent so much time abroad she no longer speaks Arabic well): "Look, sister she is talking to a man], ever since he bought a 'waterproof' watch he hasn't taken his hand out of the water." Al-Ithnayn 577 (July 9, 1945): 5.

Figure 7.4. "Is This For Real?" First frame: sign says, "LE 50 reward for saving anyone drowning." One man says to his companion, "I'll throw myself in and you save me." Second frame: "Too bad, someone's drowning. Isn't anyone with him?" Third frame: "Didn't we agree that you'd save me?" Fourth frame: "But I hadn't yet read that sign." The sign says, "LE 100 reward for pulling corpses from the water." Al-Ithnayn 577 (July 9, 1945): 15.

In addition to its social commentary, representations of beach leisure have also been part of a broad network of consumerism.[50] Advertisements for leisure products run from the 1930s (and very likely from even earlier) to the present, including advertisements selling accessories for the beach. For example, Fig. 7.5 shows a man and woman with a beach ball in an advertisement for the store of Muhammad Hindi al-Khimi, which sells umbrellas and beach chairs.

Another subgenre of representations of beach leisure is advertisements for train rides to the beach. In one advertisement from al-Ithnayn (July 9, 1934, p. 47), the reduced price for tickets is 325 millimes (the ad doesn't give the regular price), which was not necessarily accessible to everyone (the magazine itself cost only 10 millimes), but it does suggest a broadening of interest in this particular kind of leisure. An article and accompanying drawing in another issue of the same magazine (July 2, 1934, pp. 32-33) shows hordes of people descending on the beaches of Alexandria.[51] The title is “Train of the Sea, or Train of the Resurrection” (qitar al-bahr aw qitar al- hashr—it rhymes in Arabic).[52] The article describes a man buying a newly discounted summer train ticket to the beach 24 hours in advance and going to the station half an hour early to buy more tickets for friends, only to find the place packed with people. The author finds all the cars full and finally jumps onto the last one in the train, where he finds Muhammad al-Qasabgi, a famous composer, who announces he will make the trip pleasant for everyone by playing his lute. The man leaves al-Qasabgi “drowning in his tunes” and finds himself in a crowd of bureaucrats from various government ministries, with the exception of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. “Are they [the Ministry of Religious Endowments] waiting for yet another reduction in price from the railroad company? Or has the price reduction been hurtful to them, and made them abstain from traveling and participating in this ‘democracy’?” Suddenly he’s joined by Zaki ‘Ukasha (presumably the Minister of Religious Endowments), who tells the author to follow him, and they go to a car where four men give up their seats. The author discovers that his ticket cost 32.5 piasters, but the Minister of Religious Endowments paid 34.5. He wonders why ‘Ukasha was charged 2 piasters more—initially he suspects this unworldly man of religion has been taken advantage of—but he learns that the four men who gave up their seats were the minister’s employees, whom he’d sent to hold his place. The rugs the minister is carrying are not for prayer, as the author had assumed, but to furnish the villa he’s rented at the shore, which is supposed to be finer than those leased by the really big ministers. The Minister of Religious Endowments, it seems, is no pious prude but something of a high roller.

The mocking of religious authority evident in the story is quite common, as is illustrated by a “beach laws” feature (Fig. 7.6) remarkably analogous to the “beach court” song in Papa’s up a Tree. The accompanying picture includes a “shaykb” in robe, turban, beard (Fig. 7.7). There are also

Figure 7.5. Muhammad Hindi al-Khimi's store. “Rare opportunity” to buy umbrellas and beach chairs. Al-Ithnayn 577 (July 9, 1945): 30.

strong overtones of generational conflict, as is evident in the text. But this was in 1934, thirty-five years before Papa's up a Tree. The drawing of a bearded Azharite shaykh in robe and turban, strolling on the beach among reclining beauties conversing with boys in swimming trunks, accompanies the “Bathing Law” (Fig. 7.6). The caption by the shaykh says, “What is this ‘unveiling’ the women want? Isn’t it supposed mean that they’re taking off their long dresses?!” He says this as if the woman lying on the sand next to him with the shoulder strap on her bathing suit slipping off—an affront to standards of public decency—was somehow overdressed.

*** Conclusion: Consumption, Modernity, and Media

Consumption is important in the analysis of media effects, but content also matters. The machinery of new media—and perhaps even of less novel media such as large-scale publishing and television—is controlled by metropolitan producers. Obviously consumption is far less controlled. A consumption-oriented research agenda draws us away from concern with the technological and commercial dominance of metropolitan societies, but should not cause us to lose sight of the production of media content.

Figure 7.6

Laws for Bathing

| Article 1: | -Everyone must obey the law. |

| Article 2:

| Article 3:

| Article 4: | -Male and female bathers must be good.

-“Good" means that boys must be handsome and girls pretty.

-Those who are not “good” can swim under the following conditions:

a. they are rich

b. they are cultured

c. they are lighthearted |

| Article 5: | -Those who do not meet the conditions of article 4 will be expelled from the beach at the first sign of disagreeableness. | Old People (shuyukh wa-aga‘iz)

| Article 6:

| Article 7: | -God created them to cause fear.

-They can come to the beach under the following conditions:

a. they leave their “irritated faces” at home

b. they wear one of the protective masks used in the military club [presumably a fencing mask|

c. they can prove that they were once handsome |

| Article 8: | -An old woman can come to the beach only on the condition that she drown herself in the water (tighraq). |

| Article 9: | -If she cannot meet the conditions of article 8 she must stand far away so as not to bother the girls and the children. |

| Article 10: | -We assume no responsibility for lost items such as false teeth, glass eyes, wigs or the lives of any other old women (al-baqi min ‘umraha). |

| Article 11: | -Before swimming with wives and children, men must know that morals are old-fashioned. |

| Article 12: | -Pray for the deceased spirit (al-fatiba 'ala rub . . .) of modesty and jealousy. | This law has been issued for the shore, and is in effect 15 minutes after coming onto the beach.

| Signed: Minister of Waves (tvazir al-amwag); Sultan of the Jinn (sultan al-ginn). (al-Ithnayn 8 [August 6, 1934|: 26) |

Figure 7.7. “The Shaykh: What is this ‘exposure’ that the women want? Isn’t ‘exposure’ taking off long clothes?!” (as if the women all around him aren’t already exposed enough). Al-Ithnayn 8 (August 6 1934): 26.

The content in question here is a discourse about a particular kind of leisure—beach leisure. In Egypt there is a vocabulary for talking about leisure, and for talking about the beach, and it has developed over a long period. None of the elements utilized in beach discourse of the periods discussed here—1934, 1945, 1969, and 1992—was original. To characterize the consumption patterns evident in “Aristocratic Girl” or Papa’s up a Tree strictly in terms of such contemporary academic concerns as the expansion of transnational capital and culture or reaction to Islamist politics would be ahistorical. It would similarly be mistaken to think of this kind of consumption as a product of digital-age technology developed substantially over the past two decades, or even technology of the post-World War 11 era. The fat man walking with the woman in bikini and niqab on the “Aristocratic Girl” beach of 1992 is recognizably a variation on the corpulent war profiteer of 1945, and even in 1945 this was no longer a novel image. Simmering resentment of the overprivileged and excessively Westernized in the 1990s bears an eerie resemblance to resentment of the

rootless cosmopolitanism of the 1930s and 1940s. Carnivalesque digs at religious and patriarchal authority in Papa’s up a Tree reiterate the imagery of juxtaposed law and youthful rebellion in the “Bathing Law” of 1934, right down to the ridiculously robed and turbaned shaykh striding on the beach amid throngs of teenagers in revealing swimsuits. The recognition of such continuities protects analyses of new media from anachronism.

It is important to acknowledge the continuity and depth of this discourse. There is a tendency in discussions of the Middle East, and increasingly of Egypt in particular, to search for signs of imminent change, to point to social contradictions and say, “It’s about to blow—the entire edifice of modern Egypt is about to come tumbling down,” or conversely to point to Egypt’s increasing integration into world systems and say, “They’re over the hump—civil society must be just around the corner.” Both the panicky rhetoric of those obsessed with “fundamentalism” and the cheery and self-serving association of globalism with democracy (and the presumption of open markets for metropolitan-based companies) associate new forms of media with sweeping change. And of course many things have changed in Egypt, including certain conventions in popular culture.[53] But there are also elements of popular culture that show strong continuities. And furthermore, some of the changes we associate with new media are arguably extensions of processes initiated through “old media.”

Egyptian beach discourse fits readily within current emphases on creolized or hybrid cultural forms. But at what point does the emergence of such discursive practices as hybrid cultural form cease to be its most salient feature? All cultural forms are hybrid at some level, but hybrid for whom? Under what historical circumstances? And for how long is hybridity the most compelling aspect of the phenomenon? The representations described here appeared in media that are no longer strikingly new. Truly mass-circulation weeklies have been produced in Cairo for most of the century if not slightly longer, and films since the 1930s. The machinery of new media produce an appearance of continually shifting boundaries. And yet the machinery itself is locatable. Metropolitan societies produce it, and these same societies control the wealth generated by it, and this tends to force analytical attention up the scale and away from the continuities of popular forms. Reproduced on the English-language-dominated Internet, beach discourse would look as new as Yusuf Shahin’s Cairo Enlightened by Its People. But in both cases the effect of novelty would be largely a product of our metropolitan location.

Beach leisure, and leisure in general, are not novelties, but they are modern. Change comes about partially through the tensions generated by the rigidity inherent in the more orthodox conception of modernity that rarely reflects the actual experiences of human beings. Conventional notions of modernity have channeled disorder into the field of leisure: leisure was for the betterment of individuals, a healthy release that enables one to function more efficiently in the rational world. Rojek (1995) suggests that confining disorder to the margins of society did not eliminate the unsavory aspects of life as much as it created a liminal zone in which new forms of social experience could take place. The liminal zone constructed in leisure activity is one area in which the social space necessary for the formation of civil society could take place. Rojek claims that this liminal zone could be exploited by leisure

producers eager to create new commodities and by individuals whose leisure habits could never be completely controlled, and who might well experience leisure in deviant ways.

Whether beach leisure ultimately buttresses the hegemony of the bourgeoisie or creates a space in which people can experiment with freedom from it is ambiguous. For some, mass-mediated images of rebellion or freedom from the strictures of conventional social order can be nothing more than “insipid, enervated, co-optable forms of carnival” (Stam 1989: 92). Certainly, the portrayal of beach leisure in Egypt has always been tied to the construction of class through a pictorial grammar of consumption, and the excesses of unchecked commodity fetishism can be alarming.[54] But there are good reasons for paying attention to such representations. For one thing, the construction of class, particularly the bourgeoisie, is essential to discussions of civil society and the public space it occupies. Yet analyses of the manifestations of bourgeois culture in the Middle East are conspicuously lacking—as if civil society, artistic culture, or the intellectuals (both Western and Egyptian) who write about them are all ideally free from any taint of it. The promotion of consumption in general, so evident in the material described here, looks like the vanguard of dependent capitalism. Although one might readily concede that all these representations are shot through with Western influence, even Western hegemony, this does not diminish the importance of such material as a forum for a discourse that can only be understood through a historicized understanding of the local culture. Unless we reevaluate the importance of the mass media as a vital creator of modernity, we will restrict ourselves to talking about the failure or success of modernity experienced or not experienced by the Egyptian bourgeoisie without ever delving into how the bourgeoisie was created and how it experiences itself.

The idiom of leisure—in this case the imagery of trips to the beach—is a productive point of entry into this space, but of course by no means the only one. Such material is salient in magazines read by mass audiences, and it is often presented in ways that intersect with wider social concerns. Beach imagery is part of the growth of consumerism in Egypt, as it was in the West; but it is also a blank canvas upon which the concerns of the day could be painted. In Egyptian beach imagery specific issues, such as the economic infitah, war profiteering, and the phenomenon of neo-Islamic conservative dress appear beside the advertisements for summer villas, bathing suits, and beach blankets. The beach also comes to its audiences intertwined with more general issues of obvious relevance to discussions of the public spaces like courts, the rule of law, the regulation of commerce, the toleration of new practices, and, perhaps most important, the division of life into realms of ordered work, play, and family life, social obligations and individual fulfillment. Every drawing, photograph, and film discussed here can be dismissed as vulgar, but to do so is to use the word “vulgar” in a thoroughly modern way: as a morally charged aspect of lowbrow/highbrow distinctions used to create canons of taste (see Twitchell 1992). Beach imagery is one of many vocabularies used to construct such canons in ways that are both modern and distinctly Egyptian.

In the end, while the issues in going to the beach (or in imagining that one does so) are not identical to those in forming an opposition party, neither are they entirely separate from conventional politics. Associational life and the habit of leisure are each an aspect of

modernity with political ramifications. Both are potentially important aspects of social change, and we should not automatically assume that the social consequences of leisure are always of a lower level of importance than the consequences of explicit politics. Politics may be easier for the state to identify and control. Hardly a day goes by that our own media fail to mention the authoritarian nature of Middle Eastern regimes, and more serious analyses than those typically found in the media must also take this troubling aspect of the region into account. By comparison, leisure, although ambiguous in its effect, is part of this discourse locally. Throughout the entire period, media—one after the other— have constructed beach leisure in persistent terms; habits and expectations were routinized; comparisons to other social institutions were made; and a new concept of work and non-work was instilled. These were not processes that were always imbued with explicit politics, but by facilitating both a sense of order and an expectation of change, they may in fact enable new kinds of politics.

A simple comparison makes the point. Women did not disappear from the public sphere once a majority of them started wearing the hijab, even though some of its proponents advocate restricting women to the domestic sphere. As Macleod (1991) notes, the hijab is an ambiguous symbol, a form of “accommodating protest,” that for some legitimizes non-traditional activities of women even as it signals loyalty to a concept of tradition. And the neo-Islamic hijab—ascetic, class leveling, and radically pious in its original conception (el-Guindy 1981)—quickly became enmeshed in elaborate webs of commercialism. Styles proliferate, stores specialize in “modest women’s clothing” that in fact is quite varied, advertisements appear in the middle of videotaped films that militant Islamists denounce as sinful. One now often sees the hijab worn with bright accessories and blue jeans rather than as the austere shapeless gowns associated with “fundamentalism.” In other words, it “migrates” much as beach-leisure imagery moved among media as the local accent of what was “new” shifted. Moreover, it is a fashion statement that occupies the same commercial galaxy as the bathing suit. And like all fashion statements, the hijab and the bikini leave open the possibility—indeed, the expectation—that tomorrow’s fashion will be different. This, of course, is the message in all modern media, which exemplify this restlessness in the very ways they examine such practices as the making of fashion statements.

NOTES

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[40] Cairo Enlightened by Its People mixed genres indiscriminately. The film depicted numerous street scenes in Cairo but combined the

anonymous masses with more intimate situations staged with actors. Which parts of the film were staged and which were not was not always immediately obvious to an audience unfamiliar with commercial Egyptian cinema.

[41] Head worked with Egyptian anthropologist Reem Saad, whose role in the film was bitterly criticized in the media (see Saad 1998).

[42] Elsewhere (Armbrust 1995, 1996) 1 have described the way “authenticity,” including classicism and “folkloric” imagery, is constructed in the mediated popular culture of various periods. Lockman (1994: 167) describes Egyptian class consciousness in its formative stages (late nineteenth to early twentieth century) as a discursive process in which “the poor” is the most vaguely defined category. The middle class, by contrast, “comprises those who ‘work for the benefit of the nation in such occupations as commerce and agriculture and industry,’ as well as scholarship, writing, and government service” (Lockman 1994: 164). In contemporary Egypt, “middle-class” occupations such as these are often impoverished, and the social prestige associated with them is, at best, ambiguous.

[43] Marriage Egyptian Style is the most complex of all these examples. A BBC production, the film was made to be shown in the West, but at the same time it conjures distinctly Egyptian assumptions about national identity. The differences in how the film is viewed in the West and in Egypt attest to the film’s ability to speak a double language. To a Western audience, Marriage is a colorful glimpse into a social world that most Westerners do not associate with the Middle East—a world of a strong woman unafraid to speak her mind and very much in control of her life. The film will be shown almost entirely in educational settings, where the desired effect is to break up the prevalent image of a monolithic Middle East. To an Egyptian audience, Marriage challenges assumptions of class propriety, most generally by giving an unvarnished and unsentimental look at the lives of the poor and through showing lower-class people doing stereotypically middle-class things. But it is also true that the challenge to middle-class propriety comes from showing the film outside Egypt. In terms of domestic audiences, the film has practically no point. Without the crucial element of national identity brought to the film through its foreign audiences, it is little more than a collection of commonplace images and conversations.

[44] The Impossible was written by Mustafa Mahmud, a medical doctor and former atheist who returned to Islam in the 1960s and began transforming himself into a government-sponsored religious commentator—essentially the government’s fundamentalist. He has his own television show called al-Ilm iva al-Din (Science and Religion), dedicated to promoting the idea that there is no inherent contradiction between science and spirituality. He also writes a weekly column in the public-sector paper al-Ahram, as well as numerous short stories, novels, and essays.

[45] ‘Abd al-Qudus is a novelist with numerous screenplays to his credit. He is also the son of Fatma Yusuf, the founder of Ruz al-Yusuf, the weekly that published “Aristocratic Girl.”

[46] Armbrust (1998) discusses the attitudes of spectators to Papa’s up a Tree. Many Egyptians joke about the alleged sexiness of the film. It is also a film with a considerable cult following, and many young people today treat it almost as camp.

[47] In the Egyptian court system, the myaba has powers of both prosecution and investigation—rather like the chief of police and the district attorney combined.

[48] Harabt mm d-baytabu bawwaba, “I’ve fled from the house of locked gates.”

[49] This is not to say that the depiction of youth culture and leisure were entirely devoid of a period style. Marriage the Modern Way (Karim 1967) and other films treat the beach theme; Midterm Vacation (Rida 1962) and Love in Karnak (Rida 1967) are about leisure. But the concerns of these films were not new in the 1960s. For example, “beach issue" magazine covers have been regular features of mass-circulation magazines since at least the 1930s, if not before (for example, al-lthnayn 851 (October 2, 1950); 786 (July 4, 1949]; 731 (June 14, 1948]; 572 (May 28, 1945]; 7 (July 30, 1934]). The models on these magazine covers tend to be almost exclusively European-looking. On the whole, the imagery is more Papa's Up a Tree than “Aristocratic Girl.” But sometimes more resentful, critical, or even playful attitudes were on display inside the magazines.

[50] By contrast, the commercialization of leisure in England began as early as 1690 and was well marked by the mid-eighteenth century (Plumb 1973).

[51] The phenomenon of special rail transportation to oceanside leisure sites echoes a similar development in mid-to-late Victorian England. Railroads transformed visits to the sea, formerly a variation on “taking the waters” in a health spa, to a mass phenomenon involving, by the 1850s, the transport of hundreds of thousands of lower-to-middle-class visitors (Walvin 1978: 69-82). In England, as in Egypt, the advent of mass leisure caused some anxiety over the mixing of disparate social groups and quickly resulted in the socioeconomic stratification of beach recreation sites (Walvin 1978: 70).

[52] “Train of the resurrection" is perhaps a play on yawm al-hashr, the “day of congregation” or day of resurrection (of the dead). In other words, the train is so crowded it looks as though it is taking all the desperate souls off to their salvation (or perhaps

damnation) on the beach. The drawing gives an impression of complete chaos. Hashar means “to stuff,” so the title might be a double entendre—the train is obviously stuffed, but the religious sense of yawm al-hashr also fits with the theme of the article (one of the passengers mentioned is a shaykh).

[53] In earlier works (Armbrust 1995, 1996) I have argued that there was a broad sea change in the character of Egyptian popular culture, particularly with regard to the way images of the middle class are constructed. Before the 1970s, the cinema and, to some extent, the other arts were a synthesis of vernacular and classicist elements. After the 1970s, the tendency of popular culture was to refuse any kind of viable social synthesis of cultural elements.

[54] For example, Sonallah Ibrahim’s latest novel, Sharaf (1997), takes commodity fetishism to its extreme. The protagonist spends the novel in prison for a crime he did not commit, but his real prison is the iron grip of his desire for consumer goods. Ibrahim punctuates his prison narrative with commercialist reveries—essentially lists of products and brand names. The protagonist’s memory of his outside life gradually fades as his stay in prison lengthens, but the grip of commodity fetishism remains forever fresh and inescapable.

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** 8. From Piety to Romance: Islam- Oriented Texts in Bangladesh

Maimuna Huq

Public protests in Bangladesh against the controversial novel Lajja (Shame) by the Bangladeshi feminist-secularist writer Tasleema Nasreen seemed to demonstrate the growing strength of Islamic “fundamentalism” in Bangladesh.[55] However, the furor effectively concealed the pluralistic base from which “fundamentalist” opposition to her work arose and concealed the similarities between Nasreen and many of her foes. While many among Nasreen’s opponents are products of traditional religious schooling, other “fundamentalists” not only hold secular college and university degrees but are also

physicians and writers, as is Nasreen. Some enjoy reading her works. Some “fundamentalists” write novels themselves—romantic ones with hard covers as “secularly” and provocatively illustrated as Nasreen’s, a style and language as contemporary as hers, and plots equally laden with the sufferings of women in an unjust society. Paradoxically, the producers and readers of these novels consider them “Islamic” works, so do not deem them objectionable. While the form of these works clearly delineates the influence of new media on Muslim societies, their contents signify a shifting attitude toward Islam, and their producers and consumers constitute part of the new Muslim public sphere, primarily urban, which increasingly challenges the religious authority of traditional experts.

Most scholars of Bangladesh attribute the recent and unexpected growth in Islamic activism to “internal” efforts of the state and “external” efforts of Middle Eastern countries (Khan 1990: 50-62; Kabir 1990: 118-36; Husain 1990: 137-52). I depart from imputing such centrality to the state in explaining Islam-related developments over the last two decades and instead shift the focus from state-sponsored Islam to an Islam emerging “from below,” exploring a zone of Islamic literature not dominated by the state, even though the state participates in the production of this literature through sponsorship of institutions such as the Islamic Foundation. I argue that the phenomena related to this literary zone are at least as important, if not more so, to the comprehension of the recent increase in Islamic activities in Bangladesh as the role of the state of Bangladesh or of other Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Islamic literature and Islamic activism are symbiotically related. Each field experienced new ripples as people with new qualifications began to contribute to religious discourse in Bangladesh during the late 1970s. Until then, public religious discourse in Bangladesh had been dominated by a narrow base of madrasa-trained specialists, a dominance facilitated by the adoption of secularism by the state from 1970 to 1975 and one that continues to be buttressed by state-sustained segregation of “religious” and “modern” education. This privatization of Islam in a society where Islam is an integral part of everyday life sustained the concentration of religious authority in the hands of traditional experts. The deliberate and sometimes scornful distancing of the secular intelligentsia from Islam-centered issues has only enhanced this process. Thus the traditional religious elite has been able to ensure that Muslim personal laws, for example, remain firmly grounded in traditional interpretations of the shari'a, despite the efforts of the feminist movement in Bangladesh and despite the abuse of these laws to the detriment of women. Most importantly, these traditional Islamic specialists continue to define what it means to be a “good” Muslim. The authority of these wuJrasa-trained experts has been contested in recent years by the growing number of secularly or modern-educated Islamists, even though the formal ideological core of the Islamists closely resembles the outlook of the former, especially with regard to gender ideology. It is only when the focus is shifted from the ideological terrain to that of daily practices of those “below” or on the margins of political or social authority that important differences in their approaches to Islam can be observed. One area of such practice, the emergent and seemingly apolitical domain of Islamically oriented novels, is my key concern.

Even though the successive regimes of Zia-ur-Rahman and Hussein Muhammad Ershad turned to Islam for a variety of reasons, especially to popularize their ruling bases and to garner financial support from oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, neither regime sought to challenge the entrenched authority of madrasa-educated religious specialists. However, the Zia regime's decision to lift the ban that the earlier government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had imposed on Islamist or political Islamic groups transformed the relationship between Islam and the public sphere. Along with other Islamist groups, Jamaate Islami re-entered the national stage during the late 1970s. It quickly emerged as the most powerful Islamist group in the country. A unique feature of Jamaat is its domination by those educated at secular, modern, state-run institutions of higher education as well as by those trained first at religious schools and later at secular colleges and universities. These self-styled students of Islam contribute to the fragmentation of religious authority by re-conceptualizing and disseminating discussions of religion using novel approaches evident in the compilation of political biographies, booklets, and romance novels. Indeed the domain of Islam-oriented literature particularly exemplifies the changes and continuities that the public religious imagination has experienced over the last two decades in Bangladesh. This experience can be best grasped if considered through the junctures of "new media," "new people," and "new thinking" (Eickelman and Anderson, this volume).

The changing features of this literary domain from the early 1970s through the mid-1990s tell us much about how literate Bangladeshi Muslims conceptualize and practice Islam, blurring conventional boundaries between the religious and the secular in the cultural imagination. On the one hand, these literate Muslims are educated at largely secular state institutions. On the other, they are exposed to "informal" Islamic knowledge through training in Islamist groups, through Islamist productions in print, and through exposure to audio- and videocassettes, public performances of scriptural commentary (waaz niahfil), and television and radio programs. The linkage between the rise of mass higher education, the globalization of media technology, and the emergence of new forms of authority in religious discourse in much of the Muslim Middle East (Eickelman 1992: 643-52) is vital for contextualizing the appearance of new genres of Islam-oriented literature in Bangladesh in recent years, especially didactic booklets and romance novels.

One way of looking at these new literary genres is to view them as profit-making projects for Islamists, who invest the money derived from the sales of romance novels with eye-catching cover illustrations in other more "serious" projects. Many would argue that these texts deceive their readers into thinking them meaningful; others see them as commodified tools of political propaganda and manipulation. However, as various arguments concerning commodification suggest, such an approach is unsatisfactory, for "things" have social lives (Appadurai 1986). I propose that a study of Bangladeshi Islamic texts, centered on the aesthetics and politics of production, allows us to trace some of the continuities and changes in the engagement of literate Bangladeshi Muslims with what it means to be a "true" Muslim, a "good" member of the Bangali ethnic community, and a "loyal" citizen of the Bangladeshi nation-state.

In this essay, I focus on recent transformations in this engagement, as exemplified by didactic booklets and romance novels. Such transformations are also visible in the genres of Qur'anic exegisis and hadith literature, the compilations of the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad, although these two genres of literary space remain beyond the scope of this chapter. Here I also treat, but briefly, the continuities in Islam-oriented literature, ranging from the texts that prescribe cures and instruct in religious rituals— mas ala texts—to romantic prose, can be traced back to the vast quantity of punthi or dobhashi (compositions in Bengali verse or rhymed prose heavily influenced by Arabic and Persian) literature produced by and for semi-literate Bangali Muslims during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Ahmed 1974: 306-69, 1981: xvii-xxvi). Later, however, especially with the rise of Bangali nationalism in post-partition Pakistan, boundaries between the "religious" and the "secular" solidified, so that the domain of romantic love, for example, became a secular prerogative. In fact, the entire arena of creative literature came to be dominated by secular artists, and this has continued into the present decade. Whenever Islam occasionally appears in a secular novel —and this is especially true for the 1950s through the 1980s—it does so "in the form of a hypocrite mullah (a rural preacher with little formal Islamic education), profligate pir (religious leader), cohort of a reactionary political thug and the like" (Maniruzzaman 1990: 75).

Cultural, political, and material tensions between the Punjabi ruling elite based in West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and the Bangali inhabitants of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from the 1940s through the 1960s led to the rise of Bengali nationalism among the political and intellectual elites of East Pakistan. This nationalist spirit privileged a Bangali cultural identity over a Muslim identity and crystallized into state-sponsored secularism during the reign of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1971-1975), the first premier of Bangladesh (Murshid 1995: 284-360). Later governments diluted the secularist project for a number of reasons, including the continuing popular appeal of Islam as a cultural tradition. Indeed, this dilution began during the Mujib era itself (Rashiduzzaman 1996: 41-2; Kabir 1990: 46). Despite the gradual inclination of national politics toward "cultural" Islam, secular tendencies have continued to prevail in most elite national arenas, particularly that of creative literature. However, secularist hegemony in the literary arena is being increasingly contested by Islamist "micro-intellectuals," who occupy the interstices between traditionalist religious experts at one end of the intellectual spectrum and secularist intellectuals at the other.

While print culture has been shown to secularize Islamic knowledge in modern Turkey (Yavuz 1995: 2), I demonstrate that print in contemporary Bangladesh is Islamizing secular discourse. Islamic texts have conventionally ritualized (mas'ala texts) and devotionalized (biographies) religious meaning, but now they have begun to socialize, politicize, and culturalize the religious imagination. In other words, new Islamic texts—namely, polemic booklets and romance novels—attempt to introduce Islamic themes firmly into issues of cultural identity, social problems, and "national" concerns, just as new Turkish "Muslim" writings have been said to do in their setting (Meeker 1991: 203). By clarifying a unified Muslim consciousness compatible with Bangali culture, national history, scientific progress, and global modernity, these texts engender semantic spaces that provide a wide audience with common interpretative frameworks for imagining itself as a cohesive

community both internally and in relation to external groups. This new approach to thinking about and presenting Islam also bears implications for older forms of religious affiliation.

Treating the market for Islamic literature as an indexical symbol, I identify it as a site of multiple intersections of the sacred and the mundane that not only “refers back to classical constructs and forward to uses in the present” (Tambiah 1993: 4) but also invents the classical or traditional through a discourse of the mandatory “Islamic state,” for example, and classicizes the present by imagining it as jaheliyat (the Benjalized Arabic for jahiliyya), the pre-Islamic period in Arabia generally understood by Muslims as one of ignorance, paganism, moral depravity, and injustice.

This invention of tradition or “blurring” of temporal, cultural, and conceptual frames, implicit in Tambiah, is explicitly discussed by Eickelman and Piscatori (1996: 22-45) as an integral aspect of current Muslim politics. They criticize modernization theory for its rigid delimitation of tradition from modernity, which oversimplifies the complex interaction of tradition and religion with modern conditions and leads to serious misperceptions of Muslim societies and politics. “Since values take on symbolic form, the parameters of culture appear to remain intact while the renewal and transformation of values are in fact taking place” (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 28). A consideration of the interaction between tradition and context is crucial to a grasp of the complex and seemingly inconsistent ways in which Islamic activism manifests itself in Bangladesh. A good example of such heterogenous manifestation is the claim that female Islamists lay to an ideological struggle for the re-establishment of the seventh-century “golden age of Islam,” even as some of these women study at unisex universities, work in offices alongside men, stay out late to participate in religious activities in defiance of parental and spousal authority, watch romantic Bangla, Hindi, and English films, and read romantic novels, including those by Western writers. An awareness of the ongoing fusion and diffusion of religion, politics, and socio-economic processes is pivotal to the illumination of the peculiarity embodied in the writing of a love story interspersed with discussions of the Qur’an and hadith.

While most books in the market for Islamic literature are generally within the financial reach of the middle class, one can segment this market from a “literary-economic” perspective, for this uncovers the partial link between educational level/type and purchasing power. For example, mas'ala texts have persisted in Bangladesh for decades because of a pragmatic and strategic convergence of economic, educational, and stylistic elements. While the writing style often appeals to only the mudrasu-educated, the type of knowledge provided—advice on worldly problems—is accessible to both the madrasa-educated and the secularly educated. Furthermore, the pricing of mas’ala texts covers a broad range, transcending economic boundaries. Although larger volumes are usually more expensive than smaller ones, they provide formulas for treating numerous mundane concerns. Members of the lower middle-class, especially those who have had some madrasa education, sometimes purchase these relatively expensive volumes as “investments” to spare them medical fees and long trips to religious experts or saints. This “literary-economic” perspective is useful for tracking the emergence of new literatures and the persistence of older literary forms.

*** Mas’ala Texts

These texts provide detailed and specific information on how to benefit from Qur’anic verses in various aspects of life—health, intellectual ability, socio-economic well-being, family affairs, and the attainment of greater virtue or satvab for success in the Life After Death. They prescribe religious formulas for curing illnesses, improving performance at work, enhancing eyesight, securing jobs, outwitting adversaries, and passing examinations. They also discuss many Islamic principles, performances, and laws.

Most of the Islamic literature produced between 1971 and 1975 focused on mas’ala. Such texts made up one of the largest segments of Muslim Bengali literature during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Ahmed 1974: 324), and it remains one of the largest categories of religious writings in Bangladesh today. The books enjoy wide popularity, although both Islamic and secular activists tend to look down on them. Mas’ala texts, Islamists believe, limit Islam to rituals and hinder the growth of a revolutionary or reformist consciousness. To many secularists, they embody backwardness, rusticity, and superstition. Mas'ala texts include translated works of Islamic scholars and are produced in hard-cover editions with flowery and geometric patterns or mosque domes, minarets, and the Qur’an on the dust jackets. Since none refer to politics and few to socio-cultural concerns, they were compatible with the socialist-secularist character of the Mujib regime, which promoted the idea of Islam as a “religion” limited to one’s personal life. During this period, while other forms of religious literature and public religious activities waned, publishers such as Ashrafia, Emdadia, Nomania, Osmania, and Rahmania produced mas’ala texts in abundance (Maniruzzaman 1990: 76).

Demand for this type of text also reflected the profound influence of those Sufis whose preaching played a central role in the spread of Islam in Bengal as early as the seventh century (Haq 1975). More importantly, it reflected the significant difference in cultural imagination between the secularist political elite and the greater public even at a time when the nation had just emerged from its struggle for independence from the Islamic state of Pakistan. Many Bangladeshis (then East Pakistanis), especially the political elite, felt that the Pakistani state had used Islam to oppress East Pakistanis, to exploit them economically, and to denigrate their culture. After his ascension to power following the independence war, Sheikh Mujib, with his party (Awami League) ideology of Bangali nationalism, appointed a Commission on Education to reform the educational structure on the basis of the four fundamental principles of the constitution—nationalism, democracy, secularism, and socialism (Maniruzzaman 1990: 71).

The commission submitted an interim report in May 1973, which recommended a complete separation of religion and education. Nonetheless, responses to questionnaires circulated by the commission showed that about 71 percent of the respondents, most of whom were

secular-educated, advocated modernized religious education (as opposed to the madrasa type) as an integral part of general education. This revealed a significant gap between the worldview of the educated Bangladeshi public and that of the dominant political elite, even during the heyday of secularism.

The Commission could not neglect the decisive opinion of the respondents. While they did not include religious education in the syllabi for classes i to iv, they reluctantly recommended religious instruction as an alternative to ethical studies in classes vi to viii and as an elective subject in classes ix to xi only for those in the humanities. (Maniruzzaman 1990: 73)

Indicative of how deeply rooted Islam is in the popular Bangladeshi imagination as a guide for daily living, mas'ala texts are as abundant today as ever. Alongside new ntas'ala texts are new editions of old and popular ones, such as Shamsul Haq's Neyamul Qor'an. It was first published in 1937; the eleventh edition appeared in 1989. A certain Kitabul Molla, whose review was reproduced in the seventh edition (1960), claimed that the primary reason for the popularity of this text was that people benefited directly from the formulas it contained. He suggested that the most important prerequisite was complete faith in the efficacy of the text. And, since Neyamul Qor'an explains the "spiritual, philosophical, inherent, and scientific principles of the formulas it contains, this feature enhances the reader's faith in these formulas" (Haq 1989: 8; emphasis added).

In Islame Halal-Haramer Bidhan (1984, 1994), the Bangla translation of an Arabic text written by Yusuf al-Karzavi, the translator, Muhammad Abdur Rahim, writes that the text responds to "inquiries of the modern mind" (emphasis added) in the Muslim world. The topics in this book are discussed at many "centers of Islamic thought worldwide," Rahim explains, but the "scientific way" in which the author presents "high quality and comprehensive principles and information-based research in this text makes it unique" (al-Karzavi 1994: 8; emphasis added). More recent mas'ala texts imagine a "worldwide" Islamic consciousness. These attempt to enhance linkages between religion and science/modernity. Indeed, this enhanced objectification is reflected in the very forms of these texts. For example, Islame Halal-Haranter Bidhan is more systematically structured than older texts like Neyamul Qor'an.

Mas'ala texts play a significant role in shaping public consciousness of Islam by encouraging a ritual-based piety in readers. The content of the books spreads quickly by word of mouth, especially in the densely packed middle-class and lower-middle-class neighborhoods, foregrounding Islam and the Qur'an in daily practice, even if the texts do not encourage explanations. More like handbooks than discursive formations, mas'ala texts appeal to a majority of the mudrasa-educated. Their pragmatic, "how-to" approach also appeals to many secularly educated Muslims—those who perceive

Islam as a “religious system” (as opposed to a “code of life," which is precisely what Islam is to many Islamic activists) clearly demarcated from the political.

It has been argued that modern mass higher education in the Muslim Middle East facilitates the conceptualization of religious beliefs as “objective systems” (Eickelman 1992: 646-47), a premise easily transposed to South Asia. The view of Islam as an objective system is one that secularists and Islamists in Bangladesh share. However, while Islam represents to Islamists a system of thinking, acting, and living—socially, politically, and economically—it symbolizes an apolitical system of personal values to secularists. Both Islamists and secularists are therefore vehement in their claim to know the “real,” or legitimate, concerns of Islam.

In Bangladesh, the slow but steady spread of modern/secular higher education appears to be eroding the privileged position of traditionally educated religious scholars, as is the case in several Arab countries (Eickelman 1992: 646). However, in Bangladesh, this erosion is due at least as much to the secularist activism of non-governmental organizations in rural areas as to the spread of modern/secular higher education. While a majority of Bangladeshis continue to live in rural areas, modern/secular higher education is available primarily to urban regions (Chaudhury and Ahmed 1987: 39). Masala texts appear to further diminish the roles of traditional religious experts. By exposing the secularly educated Bengali Muslims to specific, practice-based, Qur'anic knowledge compiled by various authors, these texts allow readers to play off one authority against another and reduce the necessity for face-to-face interaction with traditional specialists.

On the other hand, these texts reassert the importance of traditional religious education, perceived as the basis for religious cures. They also enhance the dependence of secularly educated Muslims on the traditionally trained, since the former are not likely to engage in the public production of mas’ala discourse. This dependence is occasioned by people’s need for private assistance—in the case of illness or childlessness, for instance. The language of the texts, sadhu or classical Bangla, is unattractive to many modern-educated persons and hard for them to emulate; knowledge required for writing mas’ala texts must be acquired primarily from traditional religious training.

Lacking in secular modalities for meaningful renderings of sacred phenomena, mas’ala texts fail to engage a majority of the modern-educated, who are reluctant to perceive a text as authoritative and interesting simply because it is full of Qur’anic verses and hadith. They demand that citations be explained, contextualized, and buttressed by references to shared ideas, common-sense examples, scientific evidence, or corroboration by recognized scholars. Such challenges, in turn, indicate how Islam is becoming increasingly objectified in the consciousness of many of its believers: “What is my religion? Why is it important to my life? and. How do my beliefs guide my conduct?” (Eickelman 1992: 643). While the newer mas’ala texts respond to shifting criteria for persuasiveness more effectively than older ones, they do not compete

well with more recent booklets and novels in attracting readers in a society with rising levels of modern/secular higher education, especially readers from influential circles.

*** Biographies

Like mas'ala texts, biographies are an old literary form, one that constituted a very popular category of Muslim Bengali literature during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Ahmed 1974: 352-53). They are one of the few types of Islamic literature available in general bookstores, probably because of their apolitical nature, easy-read style, and suitability for both adults and children. Like most mas'ala texts, biographies have bright-colored hard-cover designs in floral and geometric patterns, and the writing style is similar—sadhu Bangla with a fair amount of rhymed prose (characteristic of nineteenth-century punthi literature), dialogue, and monologues assigned to Allah, prophets, angels, and saintly characters. They seem to inspire piety by narrativizing the religious devotion of other characters.

A significant break in the tradition of biographical texts occurred in the late 1980s (although the older tradition remains dominant), but the new biographies are not yet visible because the project is still nascent and because new texts entail higher production costs due to their more sophisticated appearance—such as high-quality paper and print—and the qualifications of their producers, who are often the recipients of higher education in both traditional and modern state-run systems. Prices and style of presentation indicate that the audience for the new biographies is growing, but it is still a small literary-economic one—primarily members of the middle and upper-middle classes with modern higher education or higher education in both modern and religious schools. The texts are primarily sold at stores affiliated with Islamist groups and located around group headquarters or mosques that tend to be Islamist strongholds, such as the Kantaban Mosque in Dhaka. These sites are usually removed from general bookstore locations.

One example of the new biographies is Sirate Ihne Hisham, translated from Arabic into Bangla by Akram Farooq and first published in 1988 (republished in 1990 and again in 1992). With a somber-colored and simply illustrated hard cover, this biography of the Prophet Muhammad is much longer and of a more "authoritative" or "serious" appearance than most popular biographies. Also, since it is a translation of an Arabic text, authored by an Egyptian named 'Abd al Salam Harun and based on Ibne Hisham's work in 1953, its organization of material and its writing style differ from those of traditional Bangladeshi biographies. For instance, the work includes a comprehensive introduction and notes. It is aimed at a wide audience, especially recipients of secular higher education.

Another instance of divergence is Rasulnllahr Biplahi Jihan (The Revolutionary Life of the Messenger of Allah), a translated text based on a work by the Indian writer Abu Salim Muhammad Abdul Hai. A considerable amount of material has been added to the

original, including a chapter entitled “The Role of Female Companions in the Preaching of Islam.” According to Muhammad Habibur Rahman, translator and editor of this new-style biography, “Muslims today see the life doctrine of the world Prophet in segments, as the life of a mere preacher of religion.” Consequently, they fail to grasp the “revolutionary significance” of his existence and hence do not see the need to reform their problem-ridden states and societies (1993: preface). This text claims to enable the reader to “see the entire form of (the Prophet’s] life” (preface; emphasis added). Such emphasis on the wholeness of form resonates with the increasing perception of "religion as system and object” (Eickelman 1992: 646-47). This is one of the few biographical texts in the Bangladeshi Islamic market that attempt to objectify Islam for readers through a contemporary Islamic activist vocabulary—“Islamic movement,” “Islamic state,” "Islamic society,” “establishment of Islam,” and “training of the faithful.”

It is noteworthy that translation, compilation, publication, and distribution of both Sirate Ihne Hisham and Rasnlnllahr Biplahi Jihan have been undertaken by Jamaate Island. Jamaat has also contributed significantly to the new genre of Islamic literature in Bangladesh that I call “booklets,” and it is to these that we now turn.

*** Booklets

Booklets started to appear in noticeable numbers in the late 1970s. As far as the basic nature of their contents is concerned, of course, they can be traced to “social” and “political” works of nineteenth- and early-twentieth- century punthi literature (Ahmed 1974: 341-52, 359-69). Current booklets are cheap and readable because they adhere closely to colloquial Bangla and treat specific issues. They are not usually eye-catching in appearance, probably to keep costs to a minimum and to insure accessibility to a larger readership. Another reason might be to communicate the seriousness of the contents. Many producers of booklets and most producers of the new-style, austerely illustrated biographies are often affiliated with the same Islamist group, Jamaate Islami, while mas’ala texts tend to be produced and purchased by those attracted to either orthodox or non-radical modes of Islam, such as that advocated by Tablighi Jamaat. Potential recruits to Jamaate Islami and its offshoot groups are sometimes introduced to Islamist literature through translations of the works by Maudoodi, which are often produced in booklet form (Huq 1994). In fact, these are the works through which Jamaat launched its literary campaign following its re-entrance into national politics in the late 1970s.

Booklet writers in Bangladesh, like those in Turkey described by Meeker (1991: 91), “have adopted a style and stance that has no exact precedent.” They address wide-ranging issues, from broad Islamic principles to particular historical and current socio-political concerns, such as the women’s movement (Nizami 1991), secularism (Rashid 1993), and freedom of expression (Gofran 1989). Booklets Islamize what has been conventionally regarded as secular knowledge, and, as in Turkey (Yavuz 1995: 14), play a pivotal role in the formation

and dissemination of Islam-centered discourse. Many booklets go through five or six editions.

As mentioned above, Jamaate Islami “flooded” (Maniruzzaman 1990: 77) the market with booklets upon its return to national politics nearly two decades ago. As it turns out, this booklet production could not have been more opportune. While Islam has always been integral to popular culture, its political image had just begun to recover from the severe blow suffered in 1971. At the same time, modern schools were turning out significant numbers of men and women who had been the recipients of higher education. Only 1,210 students were enrolled in 1968 in modern high schools; 513,835 were enrolled in colleges throughout the country in 1975 (Chaud- hury and Ahmed 1987: 43, 45). These numbers are not significant in relation to the total population in 1975, hut the point is that there was virtually no Islamic literature in the mid- and late 1970s that could appeal to these educated readers. Furthermore, these young graduates developed an interest in national and religious identities, boosted in part by the Zia government’s advocacy of “Bangladeshi nationalism" (Rashiduzzaman 1996: 42), which departed from Mujib’s “Bengali nationalism” in re-integrating Islam as an important component of national identity and in refusing to privilege ethnic identity over a religious one. Mas’ala and biographical texts, which were practically the only types of religious literature available at the time, did not employ modern writing styles; neither did they address elements of identity politics. But booklets—or rather their producer, Jamaate Islami—rose to the occasion.

The production of most ntas’ala and traditional biographical texts is not directly connected to Islamic activism, but most authors, publishers, and readers of booklets are affiliated with various Islamic groups. Jamaat- affiliated publishing agencies and distribution centers or bookstores, complete with Jamaat-connected authors, editors, translators, cover designers, and computer experts, currently dominate booklet literature. Therefore, while some booklets may be seen as formulating a new type of Islamic knowledge that is “abstract, reflective, and universal,” as Yavuz argues is the case for Turkey, such information is not “context free.” Islamic knowledge is not “freed from its narrative base” (Yavuz 1995: 3). Rather, it is uprooted from its more conventional bases to be resituated in a culture w here modalities of secular education are increasingly dominant. Where a booklet is sold and by whom it is written, published, and read tell a great deal about the “narrative base” or social location of this Islamic discourse.

The sorts of literature discussed so far do not, however, attract the majority of the literate, who are increasingly those secularly educated at state schools, with a taste for modern styles and non-religious, non-political topics; they hold aspirations for secular, “modern” jobs and careers. Islamic literature does not entertain or help obtain well-paying positions, or facilitate peer talk on campuses, many of which continue to be secularist strongholds. Some Jamaat-affiliated publishers complain that “Islamic publishing centers, critically limited by economic factors in their productions, are unable to satisfy demands of the Muslim mind. Therefore secularists, with formidable financial resources, are taking over the literary arena empty of Islamic literature” (interview, December 24, 1994).

While booklets employ more contemporary styles of argumentation, providing a voice “flexible enough to address anyone from small shop owners to university professors,” as Yavuz suggests is true for contemporary magazines in Turkey (1995: 8), they lack the right physical look and depth of discussion for the secularly educated, who lay claim to higher social and intellectual status through enacting sophistication. But booklets target the working middle and lower-middle classes, even though they are written primarily by degree holders from secular state universities.

Furthermore, for graduates of secular universities, the political messages of booklets arouse suspicion. Many Bangladeshis today find political propaganda unattractive, and those advocating political Islam are seen as having collaborated with the enemy in 1971. As electoral patterns and Razia Akhter Banu’s (1992: 163-68) study have shown, most contemporary Bangladeshis would prefer to separate religious and political authority, even though the government is expected to uphold Muslim tenets. All these factors financially undermine the production of both existing booklets and new ones, especially ones more likely to appeal to the growing numbers of better-educated, middle-class Muslims.

*** Novels

What complaining publishers do not tell us is that, unable to compete with secularist literature in quantity, Islamist litterateurs are turning to novels in an attempt at diversification. The format of novels, especially romance novels, attracts an audience from active followers of political leaders—high school, college, and university students—and provides the Islamic-minded with alternatives to secular literary entertainment. Romance novels with their vividly illustrated covers have been a stronghold of secular literature, one that Islamists could not have imagined as appropriate, at least not for the purpose of Islamization, even a decade ago.

It is not difficult to see how Islamists, looking for alternative national visions, could have moved from a mas u/u-text-dominated market to one of booklet production in which the Islamic principles discussed in mas'ala texts become related to specific social, cultural, and political issues. This shift obliges readers to move from an awareness of principles to a realization of how society might be transformed. It is challenging, however, to imagine linkages between Islamic teachings and stories of romance that involve not only married couples but unmarried ones as well. Yet, when one considers the popularity of the romantic novel, particularly among the youth of Bangladesh, one can see why Islamists might have adopted this genre to move the audience toward a particular brand of Islam. Readers are persuaded to Islamically imagine various aspects of their lives and the lives of others around them. I see this adaptation of the project of Islamization to the medium of the romantic novel as a pragmatic attempt to extend and redefine the boundaries of the Islamic imagination and to create a platform for Islamist critiques of secular ideologies and practices. Since romance is well grounded in popular culture, it is

strategically more effective to give a negative portrayal of certain aspects of a romantic relationship than to denounce it wholesale.

Where the interplay of cultural symbols is so layered and cacophonic that any overarching agenda the master narrative might have tends to be lost, one encounters in Bangladeshi fiction an illusion of incoherence and purposelessness. However, this style lends authenticity to the stories. In a culture where political themes threaten to eclipse all else, fiction is a welcome respite. Novels therefore become more than genres of creative writing by their performativeness, where, in the reader's imagination, ordinary individuals become performers of domination, opposition, nationhood, and culture. They have voices, desires, strengths, and weaknesses that readers can ally with (Ghosh 1993; Combs-Schilling 1996).

These developments are not unique to Bangladesh. In other Muslim- majority countries as well, the "Islamic" novel constitutes the latest mode of articulation within the broadening zone of religious discourses and symbolizes a turn to "discursive practice" and away from "didacticism," as Meeker (1991: 214) notes for Turkey. Montgomery (1991) highlights the place of story poems in the modernization and secularization of Uzbekistan's Islamic community during the transition toward sovietization in the 1930s. Bowen (1993: 632), on the other hand, describes the use of poetry in modernist Islamic reform among the Gayo in Indonesia from the 1930s through the 1950s. Yavuz (1995: 15) and Meeker (1991: 206) mention the role of novels in the production of Islamic thought in modern Turkey, and Banks (1990) discusses the role of Malay novelists in the invention of Malay rural culture in the context of "resurgent Islam."

While some Islamic activists do not accept novels as "Islamic" literature (interviews, December 1994), the novels I am concerned with here are sold exclusively in Islamic bookstores. Some Islamic publishers see novels becoming the most popular form of Islamic writing in the near future (interview, December 24, 1994). Their popularity stems in part from the fact that novels are simply more fun to read and in part from the apparent distance between the intimately social Islam of the novels and the rhetorical Islam of propagandist literature such as booklets and newspapers, and this is refreshing for readers of Islamic materials. Most importantly, perhaps, these novels bridge the gap between the types of romantic novels written by Tasleema Nasreen and Humayun Azad, who advocate transcendence of all social mores and attack religious values, and normative Islamic literature, which is preoccupied with reaffirming Islamic principles, purifying society, and decrying the moral depravity of various Bengali cultural practices.

Such bold appropriation of the distinctively modern and secular genre of the romantic novel to disseminate ideas about Islam is unprecedented in Bangladesh. These novelists seek not only to redraw the boundaries of an Islamic imagination but also to chart new ways of acting (Meeker 1991: 197). More pragmatically, Bangladeshi writers and publishers use the novel to attract young readers who are not particularly enthused about religious discussions. These novels do not constitute just an Islamist space; they give voice

to the large segment of “middle roaders” (Maniruzzaman 1990: 89) to whom Islam is important but who do not support the radical societal visions of either Islamists or secularists.

Although Islamic novels began to appear in Bangladesh only in the 1980s, historical novels by an Urdu writer, Nasim Hejazi, were translated into Bangla and published as early as the 1960s. Hejazi’s novels are quite popular among Islamic activists. Produced in grim hard covers, these novels retain numerous Urdu words, but the writing style is dated and the progression of events slow in comparison to current Islamic and secular novels. Slightly colored with romance, Hejazi’s works emphasize Islamic history. The current publisher of Hejazi’s works in translation is Bangladesh Co-operative Book Society Ltd., whose chairman hails Hejazi for proving that novels can become popular in Bangladesh without being sex-oriented (Prologue, Hejazi 1988). The translator of Hejazi’s Khun Ranga Path (Blood-Colored Path) (1988) writes that the novels are “inspired by Islamic thoughts and sentiments” (emphasis added). The spaces between this Islamic intentionality and the stories told are often pregnant with the politics of ambiguity and with the potential for attracting a broad audience, for whom the same event might convey different morals.

Among more contemporary Islamic novels are series of paperback thrillers such as Typhoon and Saimoom, which closely resemble secular series like Masud Rana (Anwar Hossen 1994) and Western (Shawkat Hossen 1994) in both appearance and writing style. Saimooni creatively enmeshes Islamic doctrines and history in plots involving romance, adventure, and local as well as global socio-political issues. The first Saimoom story appeared in 1987 as Operation Tel-Aviv—1. Novels by Qasem Abubakar began to appear at about the same time, followed by the works of Abdus Salam Mitul in 1994. Both writers’ works are similar to secular social novels such as those by Humayun Ahmed and Imdadul Haq Milan. Other novelists, writing in similar styles, began to make their presence felt during 1995 and 1996. Works by some of them are virtually indistinguishable from secular novels, since Islam does not appear in them at all. Yet they are regarded by distributors and publishers as “Islamic” and “decent” (interviews, August 1996).

Ahmed Musa, the principal character of the Saimoom series, is a Muslim driven from his homeland in Central Asia by Communists. He is now an international Islamic revolutionary, the leader of an international Islamic group called Saimoom. Musa travels from one part of the world to another to help Muslims in trouble. Operation Tel-Aviv finds him in Israel, helping Palestinians establish a state of their own. It contains fairly interesting discussions of Islamic principles, history, and organization and Muslim nationalism. The plot proceeds through strategies and counterstrategies, attacks and revenge, torture and betrayal, martyrdom and organizational loyalty, and a romance that ends in marriage between a Palestinian Islamist and an Israeli woman. Detailed descriptions of places, events, groups, and individuals, clearly as much a product of the imagination as of research, contribute to the persuasiveness of the story.

Abubakar’s and Mitul’s writings, on the other hand, are social novels. Both writers claim to show that novels can be entertaining without being “indecent” and casually inform readers about various aspects of Islam. According to Mitul, “In the current world of novels, a group of writers with distorted taste do not seem to be able to write novels without sexual appeal and amorous male-female interactions.” He tries to show that “love is sacred and how this sacredness turns people’s lives toward principles, productivity, and fear of Allah” (1994). Mitul urges readers not to weep over the pain of his main characters but to “try to accept their principles” (Golaper Kanta [Rose Thorn] 1994). Abubakar sketches images of urban and rural societies in Pratikhkha (Waiting) (1992). He hopes that the reader might “attain some religious knowledge from (the novel] and be inspired by it.” However, while political Islam has a favorable presence in Mitul’s work, it is altogether absent in Abubakar’s.

The “Islamic” nature of these novels cannot be deduced from their appearance. For instance, Abubakar’s Basar Rat (Wedding Night) (1993) has a glossy hard cover with a bride and groom sitting on a bed. Mitul’s Golaper Kanta has a glossy cover of a woman’s face with a rose placed sensuously across it (Fig. 8.1). In terms of graphics, the novels are indistinguishable from secular novels such as those by Tasleema Nasreen and Imdadul Haq Milan.

Despite the remarkable similarities between secular and Islamic novels in Bangladesh, the Islamic character of the latter is quite clear in some cases. In the case of Nasir Helal’s Obanchito Kalanka (Undeserved Disgrace) (1996), for example, the narrative itself contains strong Islamist overtones. In the case of works by Abdus Salam Mitul, on the other hand, Islam is latent in the story, but appears clearly in the preface. In his introduction to Borkha Pora Sei Meyeti (That Veil-clad Woman) (1994), Mitul thanks Allah profusely for enabling him to write this novel. Then he recites dorud (a set of Qur'anic verses in which God is implored to bless Muhammad and his family) “hundreds of tens of million times,” referring to the Prophet Muhammad as “the great messenger of the liberation of humankind” and “director of the liberation of the exploited, oppressed, and tortured peoples.” Abubakar, somewhat less enthusiastic, often begins “in the name of Allah, the Extremely Merciful.”

Mitul’s and Abubakar’s support of Islam in their novels does not mean that their works are perceived in the same light by everyone. Group affiliations and differences in Islamic attitudes play a key role. While the affiliations of Asad (Saimoom) and Mitul with Jamaate Islami are quite clear (Asad is a prominent Jamaat activist; Mitul’s publisher, Al-Falah Publications, is Ja- maat-linked), it is not clear to which group—if any—Abubakar is connected. That Abubakar has no Jamaat connections is clear from the comments of a Jamaat-affiliated publisher and salesman: “Qasem Bin Abubakar’s books do not create an interest in readers concerning the Islamic movement and render readers suspicious towards Islamic regulations through weak and out-of-contextual usage of the Qur’an and Hadith.” He further remarked that “seeing nudity and dirtiness alongside the Qur’an and hadith, it would not be ridiculous to speculate that Qasem has begun to compose so-called religious literature with a commercial outlook” (interview, December 25, 1994).

Yet Abubakar’s works are stocked at this Islamist’s store. One could venture that this is because Abubakar’s books sell well. But if profit is the key factor, why not keep some popular secular works as well, especially those without “nudity and dirtiness”? Besides the commodification of Islamic literature, we see a tolerance for literature averse to one’s own taste,

Figure 8.1. It is difficult to distinguish Mitul’s Islamic novel Golaper Kanta (Rose Thorn), above, from Nasreen’s secular novel Fera (Returning), on the right, by appearance. as long as there is some “Islamicness” present, a tolerance influenced perhaps by the scarcity of Islamic novels at a time when, according to this publisher, novels show the potential for becoming the most sought-after literary items among young Islam-oriented readers (interview, December 25, 1994). Such tolerance and flexibility are further produced by the educational and cultural “habitus” the producers and audiences have in common.

The fact that Abubakar’s and Mitul’s works sometimes have the same publisher attests to this fluidity. Publishers’ personal knowledge of an author and familiarity with her/his “basic” values, regardless of whether the author actually uses Islam in his/her work, plays an important role in the publication of Islamic novels. This sort of trust goes beyond writer-publisher relations to affect writer-reader relations and relations among the audience. Particularly in the case of Islamic novels where Islam is not mentioned directly, Islamicness is imagined and becomes objectified through the book’s association with an author or publisher known for her/his religiosity or knowledgeability about Islam or with a specific Islamic place such as an Islamic bookstore or fair.

Furthermore, Islamist publishers gain by publishing works of writers not affiliated with Islamic activism, for the credibility of a novel then increases for a broader audience. Two examples are works by Al Mahmud and Razia Majid. Both are known well as writers, but little is known about their political inclinations. Conventionally, their works have been published by various agencies. Razia Majid’s latest novel was published by Preeti Prokashon, an Islamist publishing house. There is a color photograph of the writer at the back of the novel’s glossy dust jacket, along with a blurb on her earlier publications. The photograph depicts a bespectacled female scholar with very short hair who wears make-up and fashionable clothing. In other words, it is clear that the author is among those least likely to have sympathies for Islamism.

The publisher went out of his way to violate the basic Islamist principle that a Muslim woman should carefully conceal her physical appearance from public gaze by veiling. The publisher’s transgression becomes meaningful when one realizes that this novel effectively problematizes the secularist depiction of the 1971 war of the independence of Bangladesh. The controversial role that Islamists played in this war continues to haunt Islamist attempts today to popularize Islam as a political ideology.

While ambiguity as to the Islamic credentials of a novelist endows a novel with additional political innocence for a broader audience, a novel's physical location among other Islamic books tints it with the authority and propriety of more explicit Islamic books such as nias'ala texts, booklets, and exegetical works on the Qur'an and hadith. In other words, Islamic novels "become components of a 'paradigmatic' series" (Tambiah 1993: 263). Even though the Saimoom series contains romantic exchanges of which pious adults would disapprove, young Islamic activists can cite the name of the author of the series, Abul Asad, a prominent Islamic activist. In the imagination of an Islam-oriented audience diverse in age, educational background, and degree of religiosity, Asad's ideological commitment is stamped onto the novels he writes and serves as a guarantor for the goodness of the work.

Despite some Jamaat-affiliated publishers' approval of work by writers like Mitul, political Islam—and more accurately Jamaate Islami—does not play as prominent a role in Mitul's work as in the novels of Mosharraf Hosain Shagar. In Abujh Ridoy (Uncomprehending Heart) (1st ed. August 1995; 2nd ed. January 1996), for instance, Shagar describes how the main character becomes an Islamic activist and advances from one cadre to the next in an Islamic group called Islami Mukti Sangha (Islamic Liberation Association) (Fig. 8.2). Anyone familiar with the internal workings of Jamaat or its student groups will easily recognize the group Shagar is talking about. Malti-Douglas argues, in contrast, that in an Iraqi novel entitled al-Ayyam al-Tau>ila (The Long Days) by 'Abd al Amir Mu'alla, "a partly fictionalized account of a period in Saddam Husayn's life," this "semidisguise permits Mu'alla to take whatever liberties he wishes with the life of his protagonist, while permitting the identification with the historical personage essential to the latter's legitimation" (Malti-Douglas 1994: 47). The Bangladeshi novelist Shagar, however, takes little or no liberty with the organizational facts of the movement he deals with, yet the poor disguise is essential for legitimizing the fictional form he is using.

The fictional form itself is crucial for the contemporary Islamic activist agenda of Islamizing national culture and history, not only through didactic works and speeches but through entertainment. Islamist novelists rely heavily on readers to subscribe to the "language of politics" approach, while they use the "politics of language" approach. The former assumes that "language carries intrinsic authority that is largely independent of the political circumstances in which it is used" (Piscatori 1990: 770). The latter assumes that "language acquires authority according to usage and has primarily tactical value" (Piscatori 1990: 771). Islamic novelists' perception of the role of secular novels in contemporary society also plays a key role in their fiction. One of Shagar's goals in writing, for instance, is to counter writers who, "in the name of writing novels," are ruining "national ideology, tradition and culture and youth character" and trying to "distance young men from Islam" by "distorting the great objective and real spirit of the liberation war of 1971." Thus Islamic novelists see themselves as not only sustaining national identity but also writing national history as it "really" took place.

A decade ago, Islamic activists either avoided the issue of the independence war or became defensive when charged with betraying the Bangladeshi nation by secularists who wrote enthusiastically about this war. This secularist-Islamist split can be traced to the early twentieth century, the twi-

Figure 8.2. In his Islamic novel Abujh Ridoy (Uncomprehending Heart), Shagar makes little attempt to conceal the real identity of the Islamist group at the heart of his narrative.

light of British colonial rule in India (Murshid 1995: 120-68). For Bangladeshi secularists, the 1971 war demonstrated that the Islamic bond could not supersede cultural differences between West and East Pakistan and that embroiling Islam in politics could only lead to exploitation and disaster (284-360). For Islamists, this war was the product of the unjust rule by the military dictator of Pakistan and the efforts of Hindu-ruled India to break up Muslim-ruled Pakistan. It therefore bore no connection to "real" Islam (Asad 1990). Some Islamists collaborated with the Pakistani army in eliminating fellow Bengalis who either supported or fought for independence (Ahmad 1991:501). An inability to adequately justify or refute charges of collaboration has prompted Islamists to shy away from the topic of the war. These charges also constitute a serious obstacle to the popularization of Islamism in present Bangladesh, for they can be and have been effectively used by opposition groups to whip up popular emotions against the Islamists.

Yet young Islamic novelists are entering previously forbidden terrain by boldly incorporating the 1971 war into their narratives for the purpose of popularizing Islamist ideologies. They employ the war as a strategy for retelling national history and for historicizing the marginalized discourse of political Islam. Challenging the negative linkage between the war and Islam in dominant secularist discourse, these Islam-oriented novelists attempt to show how good Muslims (whether affiliated with Islamic activism or not) were persecuted by both the Pakistani army and Bengali secularists. They also delineate the violence unleashed by Bengalis on Urdu-speaking or non-Bengali residents of East Pakistan as a consequence of the war. An example of such a novel is Judhdho O Bhalobasha (War and Love) (1996) by a female novelist named Razia Majid. As with many Islam-oriented romantic novels, it is impossible to know this book as Islamic from its cover illustration or even from the contents, for Islam appears only sporadically within the body of the text. But this is precisely why the book is effective. While distancing itself from Islamic activism, it complicates the glory and clarity of meaning that secularists assign to the war, thereby destabilizing the sharp boundaries drawn between friend and foe in the dominant literature on the war. In effect, the writer manages to accomplish what seasoned Islamist writers have not been able to before, either through booklets or through more scholarly works such as Abul Asad's Kalo Ponchisher Age (Prior to the Dark Twenty-fifth). This book is certainly more "historical" in appearance, style, and scope—footnoted to the hilt—but high school and college students are much more likely to pick up Majid's narrative of love and loss.

The fictional form frees authors from the need to provide concrete evidence for their claims. It also provides an element of unpredictability and distance from political motifs. While a booklet with a title suggesting the independence war immediately politicizes what is to come—and booklet titles have to be specific—fictional dialogue, especially an entertaining romance, has enabled Islamic writers to enter one of the most powerful arenas of nationalist discourse, that of the liberation war, with a voice that is not easily dismissed as political propaganda. It is the abstract and artificial engagement with reality that fiction allows that Bangladeshi Islamic intellectuals find useful for laying claim to cultural and political spaces conventionally guarded by secular intellectuals.

Most important, romantic fiction, as a popular performative genre and emblem, is a powerful pathway to the heart of the national imagination. Bangladeshi society is remarkably heterogeneous in its perceptions of a variety of national, cultural, and religious formulations. A key source of this heterogeneity is the informational arena, which consists of state and private religious schools, state and private Bengali-medium schools, a growing number of private English-medium schools, books written for these different audiences, television, movie theaters, songs on audiotapes, Hindi and Western films on videotapes, and the satellite dish. In each of these arenas, romance is envisioned somewhat differently. However, the significant presence of romance in each of these spheres, along with the wide range of meanings it encompasses, forms a thread of “national” commonality that cuts across educational and socio-economic boundaries.

Speaking in general terms, madrasa students tend to read romantic novels by Islam-oriented writers; Bengali-medium students read novels by secularly oriented writers (however, most Jamaat activists are educated at Bengali-medium schools and therefore tend to read both secular and Islamic novels); English-medium students read English novels such as the Mills and Boon series, the Harlequin series, the Sweet Valley High series, and novels by Danielle Steele, Barbara Cartland, and Sydney Sheldon. Many Bengali-medium and English-medium students are familiar with romantic Hindi songs and movies, and madrasa students are at least familiar with Bangla romantic films and drama through theater and television.

Discussions of real romantic encounters and of romantic drama and films, as well as exchanges of romantic novels, are widespread. Brightly illustrated covers of romantic novels are there for everyone to gaze on in marketplaces and at fairs, as are brightly illustrated graphic posters advertising new films in the theater. Madrasa students watch romantic Bengali films, often modeled after Hindi ones, in the theater without their parents’ knowledge. Many Islamic activists continue to engage in interests that began before their participation in Islamic activism, and such interests often include Bengali and Hindi romantic films and secular romantic novels such as those by Humayun Ahmed.

An example of such textured continuation is an event organized by a group of student Islamic activists, a showing of the Hindi film Bombay, which featured a

romance and subsequent marriage between a Hindu man and a Muslim woman where the Muslim woman does not convert to her husband's religion. The movie ends with horrifying scenes from the Bombay communal riots. The organizers of this event convinced their supervisors that the movie would provide an excellent opportunity for “learning about religious communalism in India.” The supervisors agreed only on the condition that one of them be present to ensure its propriety. The activist assigned the task of supervision was not particularly interested in the movie and spent most of her time outside the room where the movie was being shown. Scenes of physical intimacy were quietly watched in the absence of the supervisor and fast-forwarded diligently whenever the supervisor walked into the room (Huq field notes, Dhaka, July 1997). This spilling of specific kinds of the romantic imagination across formal borders further facilitates the production of romance as a popular discourse; everyone partly knows what everyone else is talking about where romance is concerned.

Since Islamic activists are now trying to appeal not only to the Islamically inclined but also to the secularly inclined, what better icon to employ than that of the romantic novel? Such a text can discuss the blissful irresistibility of romance and its destructive potentialities, loyalty to one’s Islamic organization and competing loyalty to one’s lover, the necessity of family life and its increasing impossibility in a fast-moving world. In these novels, registers of piety shift from praying to preying upon oppressors, from making the pilgrimage to Mecca to traveling around the globe like a true transnational revolutionary, from giving zakat to embracing martyrdom for a noble cause, from enjoining fasting to reforming the government.

The popularity of Islamist novels like Saimoom lies not in ideological coherence or consistency but in effective symbolic constancy of form-oriented closeness to a conventionally popular secular thriller series like Masud Rana. It is virtually impossible to distinguish between Saimoom and Masud Rana through either outer appearance or inner style. Both series use a graphic imagery of heroism, romance, sci-fi techniques, organizational conspiracies, and violence. At the same time, the heroes and heroines of Saimoom have a very specific kind of Islamic mission; they are upholders of a specific kind of goodness. But this ideological difference between Saimoom and Masud Rana gets muted through “emblematic constancy” (Combs-Schilling 1996: 12), through the sort of broad-banded whimsicality that is a regular feature of thriller fiction. Islamic novels attempt to become part of popular literature by having an audience that is very much a product of national education— the young Islamic activists of today—and that can easily spread the word about these novels to non-Islamic activist classmates, friends, and relatives.

Here we see an objectification of Islam different in texture from that discussed for booklets where the words impinge directly on the reader’s intellect; where Islam becomes a body of clearly delimited compartments, and where authority emanates from specificity. In the case of novels, on the other hand, awareness is meant to develop through the diffuse transformation of consciousness; authority is effective because its form may not be easily recognized. This becomes clearer in looking at those novels that, despite being perceived as Islamic, do not apparently draw on Islam. Abul Khayer Muslehuddin’s Medhabi

Meye (Brilliant Girl) (1996) (Fig. 8.3) does not mention Islam but deals with the peer pressure that young women feel to acquire boyfriends and the ways that young women are seduced through false promises of marriage and then abandoned at the first sign of pregnancy. The woman becomes a social outcast, her aspirations to higher education and a career are cut short. Firoz Ashraf's Deep Jele Jai (I Go On Kindling the Light) (1st ed. 1993; 2nd ed. 1994; 3rd ed. 1995) treats the social problems of how men deceive women, how young women are forced into prostitution, and how women are not consulted about choice of marriage partner. The reader is entertained, but if the romance does not end in marriage or leads to physical intimacy outside marriage, it is indicted.

Reading between the lines in such novels where Islam is barely perceptible, one could perhaps see in them certain implicit Islamic messages, such as the ills of extra-marital sexual relations and of free mixing, and the need to uproot prostitution. However, such views are also fully consonant with popular Bengali cultural ideology. Instead of relying on Islam for legitimizing a particular social value, as earlier generations of Islamists in the region tended to do, contemporary Islamic novelists draw on the authority of popular notions of "cultural decency."

Figure 8.3. Islam is never evoked directly in Muslehuddin's Medhabi Meye (Brilliant Girl).

*** Conclusion

It remains difficult to define "Islamic" literature, especially since there is little consensus among readers: "Islamic" is a volatile signifies When a bookseller at the Islamic Book Fair in Dhaka in August 1996 showed me a novel by Shukumar Rai entitled Pagla Dash" (Mad Dashu), I exclaimed, "But he is a non-Muslim writer!" The salesman smiled benignly and said, "Yes, he is a Brahmin. However, he is not anti-Islamic. There is a big difference, you know. Muslims can be anti-Islamic while non-Muslims can be tolerant. This guy brings up Islam in his work but does not attack or ridicule it—he treats it quite respectfully."

But if Islam encompasses every aspect of life and is as tidily packaged as many Islamic activists would have it, how can an Islamist read an "in-between" novel and encourage others to read it? Given the hostilities between Muslims and Hindus in India, for a well-known Indian Brahmin writer to write well of Islam not only adds to Islam's prestige but also shames those secularist Muslims who are perceived as denigrating Islam in their works.

When I asked a salesman why some Islamic activists do not consider Abubakar's work as particularly Islamic, he replied, "Well, it may not be fully Islamic, but it's certainly pro-Islamic and by no means anti-Islamic." Thus, as long as a novel does not support ideas and imagery

in direct conflict with Islamic principles and is acceptable in terms of “Bengali cultural decency,” it is regarded as possessing a degree of Islamicness and therefore suitable for Muslims. As such, it may be considered part of “Islamic literature.”

This willingness to widen the boundaries of the Islamic resonates with the position of the noted Indonesian scholar Ibrahim Hosen on Islamic legal interpretations. Hosen insists that “all types of laws and rules are to be valued as Islamic (or Muslim) laws as long as they are not in opposition to the intent and spirit of shari'a, even if contradictory to the surface (harfiah) meaning” (cited in Bowen, this volume). A similar privileging of “intent and spirit” over literality enables Islamist publishers to publish non-Islamic novels.

Some Islamic activists assert that fictitious literature, even when written from Islamic perspectives, does not count as Islamic literature since it deals with the “imagined,” while Islam is real. Sometimes this literature includes “romance between unmarried men and women,” which cannot be a part of Islam (personal communication, December 1994). A high-school Islamist did not hesitate to challenge the Islamic nature of the thriller series Saimoom, even though she is an avid Saimoom reader and particularly appreciative of the agency granted women in this series, where women often engage in combat, espionage, and defiance of male authorities. Referring to the main character of Saimoom, Ahmed Musa, she commented, “I’ve no idea where Abul Asad (the well-known Islamist author of Saimoom) is going with his macho character. He refuses to let Ahmed Musa get married and kills off every woman who comes into his life. This is not Islamic, is it? Not only are marriage, family, and home important in Islam, but this endless number of romantic affairs, with occasional physical contact as well, is really a bit too much.”

The issue of what role novels play in Islamic literature in Bangladesh resists closure at this time. But looking at different kinds of Islamic literature tells us several things. First, mas’ala texts, biographies, and booklets exemplify an “objectification” of the Muslim consciousness—codification, principles, citations from the Qur’an and hadith, and recognizable forms of authority (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 37-45). Such crystallization of Islam as a system among other systems is a product of mass higher education. It attains the effectiveness it does because of rising literacy. Booklets as well as subtle changes within mas’ala and biographical formats indicate changes in forms of authority in religious discourse closely linked to the increase in numbers among the secularly educated.

Second, novels depict a different type of objectification: Islam is objectified not through apparent systematicity, coherence, organization, and the positing of clear-cut differences but through the openness of cultural symbols and shared local notions, the presence of non-Islamic elements like premarital romance, the voicelessness of religious authority, and the absence of particularity. The fact that the ideas of the new Turkish Muslim intellectual Ismet Ozel are not necessarily consistent with popular Muslim opinion lends his works “an

atmosphere of frankness and sincerity" (Meeker 1991: 214). Likewise, the projected distance between regular political Islamic rhetoric and romantic novels creates new spaces for interest, empathy, and understanding. This projection is perfected in those novels where the Islamic credentials of the writer are purposefully rendered ambiguous. However, even as Islamic novelists seek to draw readers to their view of Islam, their reliance on the fictional form, which has traditionally been considered as secular, enhances the ambiguity of their messages and significantly dilutes their projects.

Third, variety in Islamic literature, even within a specific category such as the novel, reflects a pluralistic view of Islam, ranging from an Islam hinged on political power and organizational training to one based on shared understandings of cultural decency and goodness malleable to symbolic manipulation and semantic fluidity. While sharp differences may exist between past and present carriers of Islamic culture in certain Muslim-majority countries, such as Turkey (Yavuz 1995: 5-6), I submit that older styles of Islamic knowledge coexist with newer ones in Bangladesh, as they do in Middle Eastern countries such as Oman (Eickelman 1992: 648).

Fourth, types of literature such as thrillers and romantic novels indicate attempts to talk about religion in ways that undercut either "secularist" or "fundamentalist" approaches to Islam. Through the signifier/signified dis- juncture built into their narrative forms, such Islamic writings facilitate the entrance of new voices into delicate debates over the place of religion in local culture, history, politics, and the formation of a personal identity, voices that probably could not have participated otherwise, either because secularist publishers found them "tedious" or because Islamist publishers regarded them as "indecent."

Fifth, closeness in form between secular and Islamic writing styles, as is evident in the novel, reflects complex interactions between formal, secular, higher education and informal religious training, especially in the case of writers affiliated with political Islam. Such an interaction allows those interested in Islamic discourse to rework their particular notions of what is Islamic and what is not into a "locally effective discursive form" (Bowen 1993: 629). This heterogeneity in educational imagination opens young Islamic activists to using popular cultural human imagery on book covers, considering them "acceptable," and dwelling on romance while confidently citing the Qur'an and hadith in appropriate places.

Last, while the recent varieties of Islamic literature do not have massive audiences, they are often aimed at and read by those from the prestigious circle of upwardly mobile professionals, the powerful communities of high school, college, and university students, and the influential associations of small and big businessmen. These are the groups out of which the national leadership arises and which serve as the conduits between the local and the global, for they are able to forge transnational connections via international conferences, business networks, study-abroad programs, and, of course, the revolutionary information superhighway. These groups, even though they constitute a small percentage of the total Bangladeshi population, grow every day, as thousands of young men and women graduate

from public and private institutions of higher education throughout the country and enter the work arena.

*** NOTES

In transliterating Bangla words, I have preferred to go by the pronunciation rather than follow the conventional system, which treats Bangla words as though they were Sanskrit. With regard to Arabized and Persianized Bangla words or “Musulmani Bangla” such as the book title Neyamul Qor’an, I have transliterated them as they are printed and pronounced in Bangia. Hence the Arabic word “Qur’an” appears as “Qor'an” in the book title.

[55] “Bangladeshi” denotes the national identity of the people of the nation-state of Bangladesh. “Bangali” refers to the ethnic identity based on the language “Bangla." The ethnicity of the majority of Bangladeshis is Bangali. Most inhabitants of West Bengal in India are ethnically Bangalis as well. “Bangali” is both a noun (e.g., “She is a Bangali”) and an adjective (e.g., “This aspect of Bangali culture must be preserved”). “Bengali” is the anglicized term for both “Bangali” and “Bangla.”

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** 9. Civic Pluralism Denied? The New Media and Jihadi Violence in Indonesia

Robert W. Hefner

It is a truism of modern democratic theory that prospects for democratization increase with the development of multiple centers of power and a plurality of public discourses in society. Classical statements of this so-called pluralist theme in political theory (Dahl 1971, Held 1987: 186— 220) emphasize that a multiplicity of ideas and authorities makes it difficult for any single group to win a clear monopoly of power. The frustration of monopolistic aspirations has the unintended consequence of increasing the chances of parties to the political process agreeing to some kind of powersharing compromise. In other words, if incapable of capturing the whole, actors are more likely to put aside their totalizing ambitions. If this really is a key to democracy’s possibility, of course, it means that democratization is less the product of ancient civilizational dispositions than it is the contingent and creative outcome of contemporary pluralist impasses (cf. Przeworski 1988).

One commonly cited antecedent for the pluralist model of democratization is Max Weber's and Marc Bloch's description of the four-cornered contest between kings, feudal lords, town dwellers, and the Church in Western Europe from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries (Bloch 1961, Weber 1978: 1082-88). These models explain that by the late medieval period no single estate was capable of effectively dominating the others. The resulting standoff led to the great compromise embodied in the Standestaat ("state of estates"), whereby the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, and the Church pledged allegiance to the monarchy in exchange for being granted powers and liberties of their own. These included a degree of autonomy in one's own affairs and limited representation in a jointly managed, but not yet truly democratic, government (Poggi 1990: 9-51, cf. Lipset 1960: 88-89).

Writing on the dynamics of European democratization in a different historical period, Jurgen Habermas (1989 [1962]) has largely accepted the premises of the pluralist model. But he has also emphasized that, in addition to structural countervalences and great political compromises, democratization needs something more specifically cultural. In particular, it requires a public sphere and a participatory culture that encourage citizen participation in discussions of matters of shared interest. In the eighteenth century, Habermas observes, Western Europeans used coffee houses, newspapers, literary clubs, and other social forums to develop an incipient sense of themselves as a public with a right to speak about common concerns. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these civic precedents were scaled up into general frameworks for citizen participation in state and society.

As has been widely observed (Calhoun 1992), the Habermasian model overlooked the extensive restrictions placed on the access of certain groups (women, the poor, ethnic and religious minorities) to the public sphere in this early period. The model was also silent on the way in which European frameworks of civility and participation periodically broke down, giving rise to the class and religious violence with which modern European history has been blighted. Despite these omissions, literature on the public sphere has provided a useful reminder that the social preconditions for democratization include not just countervailing powers (although these are important too), but a culture that embraces pluralism and elaborates the terms for public participation. This insight in turn points toward another; namely, that it is too simple to equate democracy with majority rule alone. Democracy involves not just the relationship of a dominant majority to a subordinate minority, but civil and non-coercive mechanisms for engaging the full variety of identities and interests present in all modern societies (cf. Lijphart 1977, Parekh 2000).

There is another way of stating this conclusion more immediately related to the present book's concerns with new media, new leaders, and the prospects for civic pluralism in the contemporary Muslim world. It is that civil society and democratization require not merely the growth of plurality in religion and society, but a commitment to engaging that plurality in a civic and pluralist manner. A society or tradition is plural where it has developed a high measure of social and cultural differentiation, not least of all as regards ethnicity, religion, gender, ideology, and class. A society or association can be described as civic pluralist, however, only where its members renounce any

intention of repressing this pluralism, and respond to its challenge in a peaceful and participatory manner (Casanova 1994, Hefner 1998, 2001).

There is nothing inevitable about the transition from a structure of plurality to a culture of civic pluralism. European history provides numerous painful reminders of the fact that a plurality of groupings and interests can give rise not to democratic pluralism but to struggles to capture the state and unleash programs of ethno-cultural cleansing. New technologies of communication have a similarly double-edged potential. In his famous essay on the origins of nationalism, Benedict Anderson observed that newspaper reading among nineteenth-century Europeans helped to foster a sense of simultaneity and, ultimately, nationhood (1991: 37-46). In this case, then, new media promoted symmetrical patterns of participation and identification. However, far more than Anderson was aware (cf. van der Veer 1994), modern communications and associations can also be used to exclude minorities and promote public cultures that are anything but civil democratic (cf. Hefner 2001, Keane 1996: 10).

It is just such a contest over pluralism and the terms of public participation that is raging in the Muslim world today. As Eickehnan and Piscatori (1996) have observed, in the 1970s and 1980s mass education and urbanization combined with new communications and organizations to pluralize religious authority and heighten contests over the meaning and social relevance of Islam. The seeds of pluralization and contestation had been sown earlier with the great movements of religious reformation that swept the Muslim world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, in the 1970s and 1980s the process took a new turn. As Jon Anderson has put it (this volume), drawing on Eickelman's work, in those years new technologies of communications intersected with "the rising curve of expanded education . . . giving unprecedented access to the texts of Islam and opening interpretation to techniques outside the traditional frameworks of madra- sa training." The classically educated scholars ('ulama), who long dominated the religious tradition, awoke to face a host of new challengers, including secularly educated new Muslim intellectuals, independent preachers, Internet Islamists, and other beneficiaries of new technologies and organizations.

The question these events pose, and which the present chapter addresses, concerns the prospects that this growing plurality of groupings might give rise to a civic pluralism that accepts and legitimates this diversity and, from there, goes on to develop public institutions for its peaceful regulation. Clearly, the fragmentation of religious authority in the Muslim world is creating "multiple centers of power and contenders for authority" and an "intricate politics of compromise and give-and-take" (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 132, 134). What remains to be seen is whether the new plurality can be "scaled up" (Evans 1996, Hefner 2001) into a stable and inclusive pluralism.

The case through which I want to explore this question is that of the Laskar Jihad or Jihad paramilitaries in contemporary Indonesia. The Laskar Jihad is or, as of

October 15, 2002, was the paramilitary wing of a larger jihadi organization known as the Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet or FKAWJ (Forum Komun- ikasi Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jamaah). Founded in Solo, Central Java, on February 14, 1998, just prior to the collapse of the Suharto regime (1966-May 1998), the FKAWJ burst into national prominence in early 2000, when it defied Indonesia's president and sent jihadi paramilitaries to fight against Christians in the troubled provinces of Maluku and North Maluku in eastern Indonesia. From early 2000 to October 2002, the paramilitary fielded some 10,000 armed fighters in Maluku and on the nearby island of Sulawesi. At its peak, the FKAWJ claimed 40,000 members and several hundred thousand supporters. These and other activities eventually led the U.S. State Department to charge that the Laskar Jihad had ties to Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida. When terrorists blew up a nightclub for foreign tourists in Kuta, Bali, on October 12, 2002, killing some 200 people, analysts were quick to point the finger of suspicion at the Laskar Jihad.

The Laskar Jihad leadership has consistently denied any connection to al-Qa'ida and insisted that its political concerns were exclusively domestic. Muslims make up 88 percent of Indonesia's 215 million people; Christians comprise about 9 percent. In the Maluku region, however, Muslims and Christians are roughly equal in number. In the late 1990s fighting between the two communities gave rise to horrifying incidents of mass slaughter. In 1999, Muslim civilians were on the receiving end of some of the worst of this violence. The FKAWJ claimed at the time that its aim in establishing the Laskar Jihad paramilitary was to defend Muslims from Christian paramilitaries that the government seemed unable to contain.

In interviews I conducted in July-August 2000 and 2001, however, FKAWJ leaders openly admitted that their paramilitary had an additional aim: to drive President Abdurrahman Wahid from power. Before becoming president in October 1999, Wahid was known as a pro-democracy Muslim and the leader of the world's largest Muslim association, the Nahdlatul Ula- ma ("renaissance of religious scholars"; see Barton 2002, Feillard 1995). The FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad bitterly opposed Wahid's tenure as president, however, on the grounds that he refused to implement Islamic law, had proposed to lift the ban on the Communist Party, and was considering establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. In the eyes of the Laskar Jihad leadership, these actions marked Wahid as no less than an apostate and communist.

From the perspective of new media and the Muslim world's public sphere, the Laskar Jihad is of special interest for several reasons. First, the Laskar Jihad relied heavily on new communications technologies that became broadly available ac.oss Indonesia in the 1990s. This began with the fax machine and new software programs for desktop publishing in the early 1990s, but quickly came to include the Internet, which was introduced into large Indonesian cities in late 1997 and early 1998. No mass organization in Indonesia has relied more heavily on these technologies to coordinate its operations.

Second, the Laskar Jihad utilized these new technologies in combination with conventional media to overcome the disadvantages it faced relative to Indonesia's larger and more moderate Muslim groupings. As in Jenny B. White's (1999) discussion of Turkish Islamists, the combination of abstract, electronic communication with face-to-face mobilization extended the Laskar Jihad's appeals well beyond what would have been possible using web-based or face-to-face communication alone.

Finally, the Laskar Jihad phenomenon illustrates that the growing plurality in Muslim society does not necessarily guarantee civic pluralism or democracy. Indeed, the example suggests that the new media may at times work to the benefit of absolutist jihadis more than moderates. In the Indonesian case, the country's huge, mainstream Muslim associations, the Nahdlatul Ulama (35 million members) and the Muhammdiyah (25 million), were slow to take advantage of the new communications technologies. Part of the reason for the lag is political. Both bodies are, first and foremost, social-welfare and educational organizations, not ideologically cohesive parties dedicated to the transformation of Indonesian society. By contrast, the Laskar Jihad was a vanguard organization dedicated to specific political goals and willing to use whatever was required to achieve them.

Notwithstanding its media savvy and mobilizational skills, the Laskar Jihad suffered from a critical vulnerability, one that became glaringly apparent in the aftermath of the Bali bombings in October 2002. Three days after the bombings, the Laskar Jihad was suddenly and unceremoniously dissolved. Its parent organization, the FKAWJ, survives, but its future is cloudy. This unexpected outcome reminds us that, to understand the impact of new media on Muslim (or any other) politics, we have to situate them in a broader political economy of alliance, mobilization, and countervailing powers. Having done so, we can then assess the capacity of different groupings to "scale up" their influence into "solidary ties and social action on a scale that is politically and economically efficacious," not least of all against political rivals (Evans 1996: 1124). The transformative alliances that result from these initiatives are a key to understanding the impact of new media on pluralism and civility in the Muslim world.

*** Pluralization and Contestation

Although the Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet (FKAWJ) was officially established only in February 1998, its origins go back to the great pluralization and contestation in the Muslim community during the final years of President Suharto's "New Order" regime (1966-1998). Over the course of the New Order period, Indonesia's urban population grew from less than 20 percent of the population to 35 percent today. Between 1965 and the early 1990s, the number of young adults in Indonesia with basic literacy skills rose from 40 percent to 90 percent (Jones and Manning 1992). The increase in the numbers of people completing senior high school was equally dramatic, rising from 4 percent in 1970 to more than 30 percent in 1990 (Hull and Jones 1994). This educational expansion was accompanied by the development of a new, urban, Muslim

middle class. Comprising about 15 percent of the total population, the new middle class became the trendsetter in new religious media, new styles of religious education, and new ideas on Islam, state, and society.

New religious organizations and mobilizations were, of course, common across the Muslim world in the 1970s and 1980s (Eickelman and Pis- catori 1996: 71, Kepel 2002). What was unusual about the development in Indonesia, however, was that the dominant streams in the resurgence were moderate, not politically radical. Several of the most distinguished new Muslim leaders were educated in the United States. In addition, the two most prominent Muslim leaders of the 1980s and early 1990s, Nurcho- lish Madjid (a former leader of the Muslim Students Association, or HMI) and Abdurrahman Wahid of the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU; see Barton 2002, Hefner 2000), were outspoken supporters of religious pluralism, Western-style democracy, and heightened participation by women. The combination of higher education, a growing middle class, economic expansion, and—not insignificantly—state controls on radical Islamism seemed to give a comparative advantage to moderate Muslims.

Over time, however, the Suharto regime responded to the resurgence in a way that weakened the influence of moderates and worked to the advantage of hard-line conservatives. Since coming to power in early 1966, the New Order regime had strictly enforced regulations requiring that all citizens profess one of five state-sanctioned religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, or Buddhism). Students received two hours of religious instruction weekly from grade school up through their college years. State-sponsored programs of mosque building and religious proselytizat'on (known from the Arabic as dakivah, or “appeal”) introduced Islamic activities into neighborhoods previously indifferent or even hostile to Islamic piety. In its early years the New Order regime hoped to use these programs to inoculate the public from the perceived threats of Marxism and Western liberalism. The Suharto regime was determined that these cultural programs did not lead to the revival of an Islamic political movement. But its policies on Islam were soon to have unintended effects.

By the mid-1980s, ethnographic reports made clear that many former bastions of secular nationalism, especially in Java, which has half of the country’s population, were being swept by the Islamic revival (Hefner 1987).

In the 1950s, secular nationalists, Western-style democrats, army technocrats, and socialists were united in their opposition to any form of Islamic governance. From the late 1980s on, however, the popularity of secular nationalist ideals among the political and military elite declined significantly. Although, along with Turkey (see Gole 1996), Indonesia once had the largest movement for a secular or multiconfessional politics within the Muslim world, after the political violence of 1965-1966, Indonesia’s conservative nationalist elite was uninterested in creating a mass-based movement comparable to Turkey’s Kemalism. Their reluctance reflected their internal ideological divisions and the fact that they were more

interested in containing civil society than they were in promoting any form of popular mobilization, even if conservative.

As the Islamic resurgence gathered momentum, the Suharto regime responded by changing tack, moving from its earlier policy of repression to systematic co-optation. The target of the regime's outreach changed over time. At first the regime attempted to co-opt moderate Muslims like Abdurrahman Wahid of Nahdlatul Ulama and Amien Rais of the Muhammadiyah. When these leaders continued to demand political reforms, however, the regime directed its appeals to the radical margins. From 1993 to 1995, Suharto intermediaries conducted a series of secret meetings with the leadership of the hard-line wing of the modernist Islamic community, in particular with groups regarded as the ancestors of today's radical groupings: the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication (DDII) and the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (KISDI). The DDII leadership had once figured among Suharto's fiercest critics; the KISDI leadership had always been more accommodating. By 1994-1995, however, the DDII had moved from the ranks of the regime's critics to join with KISDI and became one of its most ardent defenders (Hefner 2000).

It was during these years, too, that regime spokespersons and their conservative Islamist allies began to speak jointly of an international conspiracy of Christians and Jews against Indonesia. It was alleged that European and American criticism of Indonesia's human rights record in the occupied province of East Timor was all part of this anti-Islamic master plan; so too was Indonesia's growing democracy movement (Hefner 2000). The message was soon to be embraced by others once marginal to the Muslim mainstream.

*** Jafar Umar Thalib and

*** Radical Salafism

The Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet (FKAWJ) and its paramilitary wing, the Laskar Jihad, have their roots in a theologically conservative movement founded in the early 1990s by a young (born December 1961) Indonesian of Hadrami- Arab and Madurese parentage, Jafar Umar Thalib. Thalib identifies his followers as "Salafy" (in Arabic, Salafiya), a reference to a long-established movement that aims to purify Islam by taking as its model the first generations of followers of the Prophet Muhammad (Shahin 1995). However, in the form promoted by Thalib, the movement is better described as neo- Salafy, because it emphasizes extreme political views not associated with earlier variants of Salafism, including those still popular in Saudi Arabia. One such emphasis is the firm belief that the United States and Israel are leading a worldwide conspiracy to destroy Islam, and that the response by Muslims to this effort must be armed jihad.

Thalib began his career studying in a conservative modernist religious school in Bangil, East Java, in 1981. Upset by Suharto policies on Islam and impatient with the apolitical nature of his instruction, he soon traveled to Jakarta to study at the Saudi-sponsored Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies. In the capital, Thalib became active in student groups opposed to Suharto policies, which at that time included efforts to force all Muslim groups to accept the state's "Five Principles" (Pancasila) rather than Islam as their ideological foundation. Awarded a scholarship by the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication (DDI1), Jafar traveled in 1986 to Saudi Arabia to study with, among others, two well-known Wahhabi scholars, Muhammad Nasr al-Din al-Albani and 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd Allah bin Baz (Hasan 2001: 6). The DDII was formerly the official representative in Indonesia of the Saudi-based Muslim World League (Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami, founded 1962). In my interviews with him, Thalib acknowledged that, though he took his education seriously, he was restless because his lessons kept him from other Muslim struggles. It was not long before he left for Afghanistan in 1987, once again under the auspices of the Saudi-sponsored Muslim World League. In Afghanistan, he met briefly with Osama bin Laden. However, Thalib opted to join with a faction of the mujahidin with ties to a strict Salafy organization known as the Jam'at al-Da'wa ila al-Qur'an wa-Ahl-i Hadith. This Saudi-based organization is famous for, among other things, instructing its followers that rulers who fail to implement Islamic law are apostates and must be overthrown.

in 1989, Thalib returned to Indonesia, accepting a teaching post at a Salafy school in Salatiga, central Java, a two-hour car drive northeast of Yogyakarta. Eager to further his Salafy education, he traveled back to Yemen in 1990, where he studied with a Yemeni teacher, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wad'i, well known for his ties to Wahhabi conservatives in Saudi Arabia. In 1993, Thalib came back to Indonesia. Now, for the first time, he directed his attention away from small-town religious schools to student circles in the nearby university town of Yogyakarta. In 1994 he founded a religious school for young adults known as the Jama'ah Ihya al-Sunnah, twelve miles north of Yogyakarta in the subdistrict of Kaliurang. According to Muslim activists I interviewed in 1999, the land on which Thalib founded his religious school was donated to his organization by a prominent army retiree, who had settled in the Yogyakarta region in the late 1980s. According to these reports, the officer met in 1993 with several other military retirees residing in the province in an attempt to bolster the efforts of conservative Islamists against what they described as growing "communist" influences in Yogyakarta's Muslim community. In an interview with me in August 2001, Thalib denied that military retirees had helped him to acquire the land for his school. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that one of his school's aims was indeed to combat "secular," "liberal," and "communist" influences among Yogyakarta's Muslims.

During these early years, however, Thalib was better known for his emphasis on the re-Islamization of society rather than any direct effort at political mobilization. He made a point of distancing himself from activists associated with the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) movement, many of whom had recently relocated from West Java to Yogyakarta. Although Thalib criticized the democracy movement as "Christian-dominated" and "un-Is- lamic," he and his followers saw their primary mission as the re-Islamization of society from below. By 1996, when I first encountered members of the group, Thalib's followers were famous throughout the city for their distinctive garb and exclusive social behavior. Although women

are underrepresented in the organization, they attract special attention when out in public because of their full-bodied black hijab and facial veil (which may or may not have slits for the eyes). As with the patriarchal Islamists whom Olivier Roy calls “neofundamentalist” (1994: 75-89), women are barred from leadership roles in the movement and, once married, are discouraged from working outside the home. Even at home, any socializing with unrelated males is strictly forbidden. Women offer snacks to their husband’s male guests by handing both items to their husband while otherwise remaining behind thick cloth curtains. Male associates grow long beards, and wear white turbans, loose-fitting tunics, and baggy trousers of a broadly South Asian variety. Males, but not women, are enjoined to perform all five daily prayers in congregation.

In these early years, what was most distinctive about Thalib’s pro- selytization was that it was aimed not at the whole Muslim community but at university students in the exact sciences, computer science, and professions. Many were at first recruited from among the discussion groups or halaqah popular among students in these disciplines. Students from these fields, Thalib told me, are better able to appreciate the “precision” of Islamic law than are those in the social sciences and humanities. Education in the latter fields leaves individuals “only more confused.” For this reason, Thalib insisted that it is best to avoid taking courses in these topics entirely. From the beginning of his career, Thalib’s proselytization was also distinctive in the way in which it combined face-to-face preaching with the new and more anonymous technologies of electronic publishing and, from late 1997 on, the Internet.

In his sermons and public lectures, Thalib decries the failures of secular nationalism and the perfidy of infidels (especially Christians), and calls repeatedly and passionately for Muslims to wage unceasing jihad against the infidel. For Thalib and other neo-Salafis, jihad is understood in a literal military sense, and is regarded as a duty as incumbent on male Muslims as the annual fast or daily prayers. The purpose of jihad is to cleanse society of un- Islamic influences and to bring God’s law into daily life. Jihad also insures that unbelievers understand that their proper status in society must be that of protected minorities (dhimmi). A concept from classical Islamic politics (An-Na'im 1990: 88-91), dhimmihood stipulates that non-Muslims not be allowed to exercise authority over Muslims in any field. Unlike the great majority of Indonesia’s Muslim leaders, then, Thalib emphasizes that the equal citizenship upheld by the constitution is antithetical to Islam. So too is the idea of democracy, which Thalib told me is a Western import intended to destroy Islam from within.

*** Media Islam

More than anything else, Thalib’s reliance on new communications technologies allowed him to establish a foothold in Yogyakarta's highly competitive Islamic religious market and, from there, catapult himself into a position of national leadership. Although Yogyakarta is regarded as Indonesia’s leading university town and has a relatively liberal atmosphere, the

city’s Muslim organizations have long had a reputation for resisting out- of-town interlopers. The two largest organizations are the Muhammadi- yah and the Nahdlatul Ulama. With some 25 million followers, the Muham- madiyah has one of its two national headquarters in the city, where it was founded in 1912 (Peacock 1978). The association is modernist in theological orientation, and well known for its efficiently run and centrally coordinated social-welfare activities. Although it claims 35 million followers, the Nahdlatul Ulama is a more loosely organized and fractious federation, theologically “traditionalist” in its commitment to the schools of Islamic law and canonical commentaries (Feillard 1995).

However much they might differ on questions of theology, the Mu- hammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama have long agreed in their commitment to the ideals of Indonesian nationalism. This spirit of nationalism made most of their membership resistant to Thalib's appeals for the imposition of Islamic law and the assertion of Muslim hegemony over non-Muslims. In fact, in the 1990s, Muhammadiyah and NU leaders in Yogyakarta had been at the forefront of those insisting that Islam is compatible with democracy. Some had even openly urged Muslims to join the struggle against Suharto’s New Order regime.

The one portion of Yogyakarta’s religious scene not dominated by these two great organizations is the city’s thirty-plus colleges and universities. Since the late 1980s, Yogyakarta’s universities had spawned several of Indonesia’s most famous new Islamic movements. Some have been theologically conservative, but others have been pluralist and democratic (see Abdul Aziz et al. 1989). The many university-based Islamic study groups (halaqah) active in the city offered Thalib a means to outflank Yogyakarta’s Muslim establishment and promote a vision of Islam at variance with that of the moderate mainstream. Thalib gathered a small circle of halaqah students around him shortly after his arrival in Yogyakarta in 1993. With the regular turnover in the student population, however, Thalib’s following remained small. His Salafy school in Kaliurang had less than 100 students, minuscule by comparison with the NU-linked pesantren found to the south of Yogyakarta, which have thousands of students. As one of Thalib’s followers told me in 1999, “the problem was that once we left the university, most of us could not stay on near the Ihya al-Sunnah school, because we had to make a living. So after graduation many of our friends would return to their home communities and lose their way, coming under the influence of unbelievers (kafir).”

To combat this chronic problem of membership defection and to disseminate his message more broadly, Thalib turned to the new religious media. A year after the founding of the Ihya al-Sunnah school, several of his media-proficient students got together to create Salafy, an inexpensive, glossy- covered monthly dedicated to Thalib’s militant Salafism. Taking advantage of new desktop-publishing technologies, the staff of Salafy did most of the editorial and layout work at their homes or at the Ihya al-Sunnah school. Printing was then out-sourced to a shop in the nearby town of Klaten. After the establishment of the FKAW J in February 1998, Salafy became its official organ.

The establishment of the FKAWJ coincided with two important shifts in Thalib’s broader political strategy. First, the move reflected a heightened commitment to political activism, prompted by the crisis of governance into which Indonesia was rapidly descending. As a result of the Asian economic crisis, in late 1997 Indonesia went into severe recession, the worst since the economic ravages of the early 1960s. The economic tumult was soon compounded by a political crisis, putting new wind into the sails of the antiSuharto democracy movement. Yogyakarta quickly became a stronghold of democratic activism, with a rank-and-file famous for including Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists alongside the Muslim majority. In interviews with me in July-August 2000 and 2001, Laskar Jihad leaders, including Thalib, explained that they felt compelled to become involved in public politics because of what they regarded as the left-wing and secularist bias of the democracy movement. Although Thalib was critical of many Suharto policies, he said that he feared that the president’s ouster would usher in a government dominated by Christians, communists, and secularists. Activists close to the FKAWJ told me that military officials had also made contact with Thalib at this time, encouraging him to take action against the political left. Thalib vigorously denies that his actions had anything to do with these visits, although he acknowledges that meetings took place.

The other event with which the formation of the FKAWJ coincided was the movement’s increasing reliance on the Internet. It was only in late 1997 that commercial servers made the Internet broadly available in major cities in Java and Sumatra. The net was then extended to urban centers in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and eastern Indonesia in late 1998. The FKAWJ leadership immediately recognized the mobilizational potential of the new medium. The Internet allowed the Salafy staff to maintain editorial and layout operations at the Ihya al-Sunnah school outside Yogyakarta, while more than tripling their staff to include writers from around the country. As Internet technologies became more widely available, the FKAWJ established branch offices in other cities, using the Internet, telephones, and fax machines to coordinate operations.

It was only with the establishment of the Laskar Jihad paramilitary in February 2000, however, that Thalib’s followers began to take full advantage of the new communications technology. The founding of the paramilitary was catalyzed by an escalation in fighting between Christians and Muslims in the eastern provinces of Maluku and north Maluku in early 1999. Maluku had been a center of conflict almost two generations earlier, when, during the war for independence (1945-1949), some in the—at that time—predominantly Christian province tried to declare their independence from the majority-Muslim republic. With the great economic shifts of the New Order era, immigration transformed the province’s demographic profile. Muslims came to comprise half of the population, and the hardworking immigrants quickly dominated the economy. Combined with Suharto’s shift toward a pro-Islamist policy, these changes caused deep unrest among Maluku's once dominant Christian population.

Some political analysts have argued that the violence in Maluku was deliberately inflamed by ancien regime provocateurs determined to use ethnoreligious violence to scuttle the democracy movement, undermine Christian-Muslim unity, and turn back calls to

remove the armed forces from politics (Aditjondro 2000). While acts of provocation by outsiders do indeed appear to have contributed to the violence (ICG 2002a), the fact remains that Christian Malukans, especially those from the criminal gangs known as fireman, were responsible for some of the worst violence during the conflict's first year (1999-2000). Alarmed by Muslim losses, hard-liners in Jakarta called for a jihad, claiming the fighting was a Western conspiracy to dismember Indonesia. The radicals' appeals were quickly silenced by mainstream Muslims, however, who demanded that the conflict be resolved in accordance with nationalist principles and the rule of law.

With the election of Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency in October 1999, however, the campaign for jihad in Maluku gained new momentum.

Wahid was deeply unpopular among the armed forces leadership because of his support for efforts to curb military power. As Wahid told me in an interview in November 1999, he was concerned that some in the armed forces might use the Maluku violence to reassert the military's right to involve itself in politics. Faced with a hostile military command, Wahid appealed to Christians and Muslims in Maluku to settle their differences peacefully and on their own. The fact that the Christian forces in 1999 still had the upper hand and had committed atrocities against Muslim civilians, however, convinced hard-line Muslims that the real reason for Wahid's reluctance to commit troops was his sympathy for the Christian side.

*** Scaling Uncivil Society

It was in this context of growing violence and disunity among political elites (national and local) that the FKAWJ established its paramilitary wing, the Laskar Jihad, in February 2000. Although Thalib has repeatedly denied the claim, two men once active in his organization told me in July 2000 that Thalib, before establishing the paramilitary, held secret meetings with representatives from a faction of the armed forces unhappy with the Wahid presidency and determined to use the Malukan crisis to drive him from power. Western intelligence reports claim that army officers transferred $9.3 million to the militant group during 2000 (Huang 2002). In interviews with me in August 2001, Thalib explained that he felt compelled to act because President Wahid was an apostate and a "communist." Earlier, in late 1999 and early 2000, Thalib had secured legal pronouncements (fatwas) from Salafy muftis in Saudi Arabia and Yemen sanctioning jihad in Maluku. In April 2000, a leading Salafy mufti in Medina, Muhammad ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, also issued a fatwa declaring that President Wahid's prohibition of jihad in Maluku was contrary to Islamic law (Hasan 2001: 17).

With these resources in hand, the Laskar Jihad leadership combined conventional mobilization techniques with new communications technology to catapult their once-fringe movement to national prominence. In April 2000, Laskar Jihad supporters marched outside

the presidential palace, brandishing swords and appealing to able-bodied males to join the jihad in Maluku. This brazen show of force encountered no opposition from security officials. A few weeks later, the Laskar Jihad force traveled to the port city of Surabaya in eastern Java. Despite the fact that the president, the minister of defense, and the governor of Maluku all appealed to security officials to stop the militia from coming, the convoy did not encounter a single security checkpoint. Indeed, the militants were given military escorts along portions of their route. In the port of Surabaya, the fighters boarded state-owned ferries for Maluku. According to interviews I conducted with Laskar Jihad volunteers from Yogyakarta, upon their arrival in Maluku, the recruits were taken into the city and given weapons by soldiers under the command of anti-Wahid army officers. Interviews that 1 conducted with student activists involved in the Maluku mobilization during July 2000 indicated that a Jakarta businessman with close ties to ex-president Suharto coordinated a vast flow of funds and arms to the jihad forces. The flow of aid had a powerful impact. By August 2000, the Christian paramilitaries in Maluku were suffering severe losses, including the mass slaughter of 500 Christian villagers in a portion of north Maluku where atrocities had earlier been committed against Muslims (Tomagola 2000).

Coincident with the jihad campaign in Maluku, the Laskar Jihad established a web site at <[[http://www.laskarjihad.org][www.laskarjihad.org]]>, featuring photo galleries of alleged Christian atrocities, daily news reports on the fighting, and Indonesian- and English-language commentaries on the religious significance of jihad. During its first year-and-a-half of operation, <[[http://www.laskarjihad.org][www.laskarjihad.org]]> also featured stories and links to the web sites of other jihadi groups around the world, including those in Chechnya, Kashmir, and Afghanistan. Curiously, however, after September 11, 2001, and U.S. administration accusations that the Laskar Jihad had ties to al-Qa‘ida, these international links were quietly removed from the site.

Another change in the content of the Laskar Jihad web site occurred after the organization’s first national congress in Jakarta, on May 13-19, 2002. Up to this time, the site had featured articles describing the Maluku conflict as having been instigated by Jews, Christians, and the United States. After May 2002, accusations of international conspiracy did not disappear entirely from the web site. But the message was featured far less prominently than reports that—in a language that mimicked armed forces’ appeals for national unity—accused the Christian Malukans of wanting to destroy the unity and integrity (persatuan dan kesatuan) of Indonesia by establishing a Republic of South Maluku. These changes provided at least suggestive confirmation of reports I was receiving from Muslim activists in Yogyakarta: that elite supporters of the Laskar Jihad were pressuring the paramilitary to sever its ties to international jihadis and tone down its attacks on the United States.

Since the organization was first established, the Laskar Jihad leadership demonstrated great skill at linking its Internet resources to other communications media. It used the Internet to send daily reports on the Maluku violence to each of some 24 Laskar Jihad branch offices around the country. Each bureau downloaded the messages, which were already laid out in a desktop-publishing format. These were then printed out on a single, two- sided sheet of

paper, to create a bulletin with the masthead “Maluku Today” (Maluku Hari Ini). The l.askar Jihad emblem, with its open-paged Qur’an set above two crossed swords is featured to the left of the masthead. Information on the Laskar Jihad web site, e-mail address, bank account (for donations), and local branch address are featured on the bottom of the back page. At the height of their operation, Laskar Jihad officials in branch offices gave young male volunteers thousands of copies of the bulletin to distribute to the public. Clad in the jihadis’ trademark tunic, trousers, and turban, the volunteers positioned themselves at stoplights in cities across Indonesia. They distributed the bulletin for free, but with the understanding (conveyed in a none-too-subtle fashion by passing a bucket in front of car windows) that donations to the Maluku campaign were welcome. The more senior among the volunteers also sold copies of the monthly Salafy, as well as a large, sixteen-page weekly known simply as Buletin Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah tval Jama'ah. Unlike Maluku Today, the large-layout Buletin features color photos and advertisements.

Although the largest of the groups sponsoring jihadi fighters in Maluku, Laskar Jihad was not alone in the effort. Other hard-line groups, including most notably the Islamic Defenders Front {Front Pembela Islam or FPI) and the Indonesian Council of Jihad Fighters (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) dispatched fighters too. The Laskar Jihad contingent in Maluku, however, was ten times the size of its nearest competitor, the Council of Jihad Fighters—a fact that Council members acknowledged in interviews during July 2001. For most of 2000 and 2001, the Laskar Jihad stationed 2000 fighters in the field, rotating individuals out of the province every four to six months. While in the field, all but the senior command lived in the homes of ordinary Muslims, an arrangement intended to facilitate Salafy prosel- ytization. According to interviews I conducted in 2000 and 2001 with Muslim Malukans residing in Yogyakarta, the military support provided by the Laskar Jihad was at first well received. Local Muslims recognized that the outsiders helped to shift the balance of the war in the Muslim favor. However, Malukan Muslims have long been famous for being casual about daily prayer, fasting, and the consumption of alcohol. Laskar Jihad opposition to these infractions led to widespread tensions and, on a few occasions, physical clashes.

The success of the Laskar’s military campaign eventually revealed a critical tactical vulnerability. In March 2001, a Laskar Jihad officer in Maluku was accused of having sex outside marriage. The condemned man acknowledged his guilt and accepted the sentence Thalib pronounced against him, death by stoning (raj am). The death sentence was carried out. A few weeks later, Thalib was arrested by the police on charges of incitement to violence and murder. Three weeks later, after conservative Muslim politicians rallied to his defense, Thalib was released from custody, although the charges against him were never resolved.

By March of 2002, momentum for a peace accord in Maluku was growing. A report released by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG 2002a) stated that there were indications that some in the armed forces were attempting to prolong the conflict because of

the lucrative income it generated. In late July 2001, however, President Wahid had been removed

from power, and the new president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was known to have cordial ties with the senior military command. Megawati made clear that she had no interest in supporting further investigations into alleged human rights abuses by the military. With Wahid out of the way, pressures for a peace deal in Maluku grew, and Christian and Muslim leaders signed an accord in April 2002.

Thalib showed that, whatever his ties, he was no simple puppet of the military, and quickly went public with his opposition to the peace plan. In early May 2002, he called on his supporters to defy the government and continue the jihad against “Christian separatists.” In the months preceding this declaration, Thalib had also worked furiously to extend the reach of his paramilitary to new fronts. In August 2001, he dispatched 1000 fighters to Poso, Central Sulawesi, an area where, like Maluku, a native Christian population had done battle with Muslim immigrants. In December 2001, Thalib sent a smaller team of Laskar Jihad trainers to the province of West Papua, where some of the local population, which is non-Muslim, was militating for independence. On February 14, 2002, Thalib traveled to Aceh, another province plagued by secessionist violence, where he formalized the opening of a branch of the FKAWJ. Even conservative Muslim leaders in the troubled province denounced Thalib as a proxy for hard-line elements in the armed forces.

In mid-May 2002, Thalib was again arrested and charged with incitement to violence. Police officials explained that Thalib’s arrest was sparked by a speech he gave on a Muslim-owned radio station in Maluku, in which he appealed to Muslims to defy the peace accord and continue the battle against Christians. Thalib’s arrest provoked a flurry of demonstrations by his supporters across the country. Conservative Islamists, and some independent journalists, accused the government of arresting Thalib so as to create the impression that it supported the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism. A religious conservative and the leader of the country’s largest Muslim party, Vice President Hamzah Haz defied President Megawati and visited Thalib in prison, declaring that he too felt the arrest was politically motivated.

The legal case against Thalib was still unresolved when, on October 12, 2002, someone planted two bombs outside a popular tourist nightspot in Kuta, Bali, killing 200 people, most of them young foreigners. Some in the conservative Muslim press denounced the attack as a provocation instigated by the United States to discredit Indonesia as a haven for international terrorism. A week later (and at the time of this writing), however, the climate of opinion in the mainstream Muslim community seemed to be shifting. Like many of their non-Muslim counterparts, most Muslims in Indonesia are bitterly opposed to the American administration’s policies with regard to Israel-Palestine and Iraq. However, mainstream Muslims were also shocked by the slaughter in Bali and by the idea that such actions might have any place in Islam. They were also concerned that the calamity might send the country into even deeper political and economic crisis. Spurred by this sentiment, on October 19 the

government announced stern measures against organizations and individuals suspected of ties to international terrorism.

Three days after the bombing and before the government put these new regulations into effect, Laskar Jihad officials dissolved their paramilitary, shut down their offices, and closed their site on the World Wide Web. The leadership claimed that the measures had been planned since September and were in no way related to the bombing in Bali. My Muslim contacts in Yogyakarta confirmed that the dissolution of the paramilitary had indeed been under discussion in early September. However, these reports add that many Laskar Jihad officers were actually opposed to dissolving their organization, but were overruled by Thalib, who was said to be under great pressure from former supporters in the military and among military retirees.

The irony to Laskar Jihad’s dissolution is that, of the two domestic organizations identified as possible suspects in the Bali bombings, the Laskar Jihad is the least likely to have been in any way involved. Although when I first interviewed high ranking Laskar Jihad leaders in August 2000 they expressed sympathy for Osama bin Laden, Thalib himself was more cautious. In an interview, he reminded me that he had opted not to work with bin Laden’s forces when in Afghanistan in the 1980s. He also expressed disdain for bin Laden’s understanding of Islam, and took exception to bin Laden’s effort to overthrow the Saudi government.

By contrast, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the spiritual leader of the other jihadi grouping regarded as a possible suspect in the Bali bombings (the Council of Indonesian Jihad fighters, a group with ties to the Jemaah Islamiyah and, possibly, al-Qa'ida; see ICG 2002b), has expressed strong support for bin Laden and the attacks on the United States. He did so once again in the course of a long-distance interview he granted me (conducted with the help of a local field assistant) on May 19, 2002. Although Ba asyir denied involvement in any acts of violence, he acknowledged, with a beguiling smile, that some among his students have been “naughty” (nakal) and may have had something to do with “certain actions” in Malaysia and the Philippines. These and other comments provide no indication one way or another of Abu Bakar Ba’syir’s involvement in the Bali bombings. Leaving the question of the bombings aside, however, Ba’asyir’s statements and his international ties place him under a darker cloud of suspicion than Jafar Umar Thalib.

Unlike Thalib’s Laskar Jihad, Ba'asyir’s Council of Jihad Fighters had always kept its distance from armed forces officials, and does not appear to have enjoyed the support of either active or retired members of the military. Indeed, in Yogyakarta, it is an open secret that police and army officials despise the Council, which they associate with the Darul Islam, an Islamist movement against which the military did battle in the 1950s (van Dijk 1981).

In our discussions, Thalib was always careful to distinguish his organization from Ba'asyir's Council. Just like many in the armed forces, Thalib characterized the latter as a Darul Islam front, and described Darul Islam itself as a rebellion that had betrayed the Indonesian nation.

The irony here is that it is precisely because the Laskar Jihad enjoyed a close relationship with some active and retired army officials that, when pressure grew on the Indonesian government to take action against Islamist radicals, the organization was more vulnerable than the rival Council of Jihad Fighters. Elite support and the skillful use of new media technologies had allowed the Laskar Jihad to outflank Indonesia's mainstream Muslim organizations. In so doing, the Laskar Jihad had challenged their moral vision and scaled up a militantly anti-Christian and anti-pluralist interpretation of Islam. Unfortunately for the Laskar Jihad, their radical message, dispersed organization, and, perhaps most important, ties to elite supporters, made them all the more vulnerable to the changing winds of elite politics. Media savvy alone could not save them when some in the shadowy coalition of which they had been a part concluded that the Laskar Jihad had become a political liability.

*** Conclusion

In the last half of the Suharto era, the expansion of education, new media, and a new Muslim leadership brought about a remarkable plu- ralization of the country's Muslim community. Indonesia also witnessed a movement for a civic-pluralist reorientation of Muslim politics that, after contemporary Iran, was arguably the Muslim world's most vibrant. The democracy movement that toppled President Suharto in May 1998 was a multireligious coalition that included Christians and secular nationalists as well as Muslims in its ranks. Among its core theorists, however, was a diverse group of intellectuals interested in devising Islamic grounds for pluralism, democracy, and civil tolerance (see Abdillah 1997, Barton 2002, Hefner 2000).

Although secular-minded theorists may not recognize its importance, a key feature of Muslim politics is that political initiatives must be justified in relation to divine injunctions and religious commentaries. The role of Qur'an and Sunna-based rationales in Muslim politics is so decisive that the scaling up required to develop a civic-pluralist politics must involve not only countervailing powers and a social capital of civil society groupings, but a sustained enunciation of the religious grounds for pluralism and democracy. Indonesia in the 1990s was unusual in that it had an efflorescence of such discourses. Moreover, unlike related efforts in Egypt, Morocco, or Syria, the reorientation of Muslim politics wasn't just the work of a few intellectuals or tiny civil society organizations. On the contrary, the initiative showed one of the key features that political theorists like O'Donnell and Schmitter identify as necessary for a transition from authoritarian rule: a coalitional structure linking "exemplary individuals" to mass-based organizations in society (1986: 48-56). By these twin measures of intellectual vitality and mass base, Indonesia in the late 1990s was one of the most vibrant centers for new Muslim political thinking the modern world has seen.

Sadly, Indonesian Muslims may never get credit for this achievement because their movement to create a civic-pluralist Muslim politics was quickly overtaken by events on the ground. The ethnic and religious violence in Maluku, in particular, dealt a major blow to their efforts. Part, but only one part, of the answer to the question of how this came to be lies in the fact that the new media and technologies of communication that swept Indonesia in the 1990s were more skillfully exploited by jihadi hard-liners than they were civic pluralists. The example provides a sobering reminder that, although new media and mass education are agents of pluralization, they alone cannot guarantee a transition to civic pluralism or democracy.

Just why this is so, just why new media and social pluralism cannot alone generate a culture of civic pluralism, recalls an insight into transitions from authoritarian rule offered a few years ago by the California political sociologist Peter Evans (1996). Evans observed that for a transition to succeed it is not enough that there be a vibrant civil society or reform-minded citizenry. For a transition to move forward, civil and democratic precedents in society have to be scaled up into state institutions capable of amplifying and solidifying civil trends in society. When Evans talks of scaling up, the primary thing he has in mind is the social capital of civic associations and citizen networks. As the Indonesian case shows, however, the scaling up to create a civic-pluralist Islam must be cultural and discursive as well. It requires a cultural capital that legitimates pluralism and civility in Islamic terms, and provides religious grounds for challenging those who would deny the plurality of the modern world through the imposition of a totalizing and repressive unitarianism.

As has been the case with pluralism and democratization in the modern West, there is nothing inevitable about the outcome of this transition. The chances of success are greatly enhanced, however, with the development of new media, mass education, and a participatory and plural public sphere. But the process is made even more secure if the broader political economy creates a multiplicity of social powers, making it difficult for any single class, party, ethnicity, or status group to impose its will on the whole. These pluralizing developments in society remain vulnerable, however, if they are not also accompanied by efforts to implement pluralism-defending structures in the state. It is this scaling up from society to the state that has proved especially difficult for Indonesia’s moderate Muslims. Their task has been complicated by the preference of some in the political elite, local and national, for making common cause with violent radicals rather than with quietistic moderates.

As the aftermath of the Bali bombings has shown, however, the contest between jihadi and moderate Muslims is far from over. Perhaps the greatest advantage enjoyed by the moderates is not simply their numbers, but the depth of their moral opposition to those who would use cruelty and violence in the name of Islam.

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** 10. Media Identities for Alevis and Kurds in Turkey

M. Hakan Yavuz

The assertion of identity among Turkey’s diverse religious (Alevi, Nurcu, and Nak^ibendi) and ethnic (Kurdish, Bosniak, Albanian, and Cherkes) groups since the 1980s has taken on new dimensions through expanding communication channels, expansion of the higher education system, and political and economic liberalization. New communication networks have aided the struggles of Alevi and Kurdish groups for public recognition.[56] These networks provide a means for framing socio-political issues, contesting and accommodating different conceptions of identity, and “globalizing” local identities. With the help of new communications technology, for example, Alevis and Kurds frame their local views in terms of universal concepts of human rights, democracy, and self-determination. Even the everyday imaginations of “authentic” and “autonomous” identity are shaped by this synthesis in the expanded public sphere facilitated by a burgeoning of new media (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 37-42).

*** Communication Networks as a Space for Identity Creation

Turkey is one of the most media-saturated Muslim countries in the world. It has 10 national newspapers; 20 national, 35 regional, and 350 local television stations; 41 national, 120 regional, and 1234 local radio stations—numbers that far exceed those of any other Muslim country (Sonmez 1996; The Economist 1996).[57] A private television channel. Star One, brought formerly taboo subjects to the public airwaves, and by 1992 Show TV, Kanai 6, Flash TV, HBB, ATV, and TGRT joined the television market.[58] These new communication networks mix and cross-fertilize ideas from ethics to fashion to religion in Turkey. More important, the media outlets—private television and radio stations, newspapers, and magazines— offer new avenues for ethno-religious entrepreneurs to enter the public domain by inventing, legitimizing, disseminating, and shaping national histories and charts of identities (Aziz 1991).

The recent proliferation of television, radio, periodicals, and newspapers has provided a habitat for the evolution of native intellectuals. Through these media outlets, “organic” intellectuals become pivotal in identity-seeking movements. Broad and long-term shifts from an oral to a print culture, based on the spread of mass education, diminish the significance of traditional religious scholars (ulema for Sunni Muslims, dede for Alevis) in favor of urbanized intellectuals better adjusted to new media outlets. Local mechanisms of socialization through neighborhood Qur’anic seminaries or dede-based teaching have gradually lost their authority, leading to searches for new ways of building authority to challenge, articulate, and participate in the formation of identities and ideas on a national scale. The new communications networks promote such shifts in the production and control of knowledge by offering new avenues for the introduction of more abstract and flexible frames of reference to cope with the evolving socio-political landscape. Identity makers, cultural entrepreneurs, and opinion makers all struggle to carve out a space for themselves in these new media by bringing sensitive issues into the public debate.

These new communication networks also bring “hidden others” and “distant others” into the household. Private television channels have offered debates on Alevi practices, homosexuality, feminism, Kurdish nationalism, and other formerly taboo issues. For example, the Siyaset Meydam (Political Forum) of Ali Kirca became a main arena for airing hitherto suppressed ideas and positions in public, hosting an open debate on Alevism on September 24,1994. Such issues are also discussed increasingly in the press.

*** Globalization through New Communication Networks and Privatization

The new communications channels have combined with a wave of Islamic movements to promote sectarian and ethnic minority consciousness by a fusion of local and global identities. Interaction between the state-centered national Turkish culture and Kurdish or Alevi culture has been marked by resistance, acculturation, and borrowing. While modern mass media have promoted a state-centered and territorial Turkish identity, contemporary Alevi and Kurdish identities have been, to a substantial degree, constructed in Berlin, Brussels, Koln, London, and Paris and projected into Turkey via communications networks such as Kurdish MED-TV and Alevi Alcanlar TV based in Berlin. But the impact of all this media is conditioned by the contexts within which messages are embedded, the availability of local idioms to express global ideas, and the institutional rules that regulate the functioning of the media.

In the context of Turkish experience, new communication networks join themes for articulating proper conduct within society and the image of the good life. Besides providing arenas for exploring such questions, their pluralization and privatization contribute to constestation over the definition of identities and to their objectification as commercialization of television networks has shifted their main function of education and state-sanctioned information in service of secular nation-building to entertainment and

alternative life-styles. Even self-styled Islamist television channels, such as Kanai 7, Samanyolu television, and TGRT, which helped objectify Islam, now offer diverse Islamic frames of references, and wrap those in a commercial context.

To attract an audience, for instance, talk shows bring together a variety of perspectives, including Islamist and Alevi. For issues as diverse as the environment and pop music, these shows use scholars to present the “Islamist” or the “Alevi” view (Oncii 1995). Moreover, Islamist television stations and Alevi radio stations compete within a larger common market. In this way, the “new” Islam—what Fethullah Giilen (1995) refers to as the “Islam of Turkey” as opposed to a Turkish (i.e., national) Islam—and Alevi identity are made and sold on television, in newspapers, and on radio. This introduces the competition-based logic of the marketplace into the identity debate and thus, in turn, into the fragmentation of identity.

Privatization of the media has accompanied a shift from passive reception or one-way transmission to active engagement with communicative networks and expanding political rights. One of the popular radio stations, AKRA-Radio, belongs to a Nak§ibendi Sufi order led by Sheikh Esad Co§an. Listeners can call the sheikh and raise questions that might be seen as outside traditional protocol. The station’s programming appears to be directed primarily to supporters of the order. Similarly, Alevi Mozaik Radio also deals with such sensitive issues as Sunni views of women, sex, and alcohol to mold the identity of its listeners.[59]

Cultural solidarity associations, with their financial resources and skills, even more than profit-oriented individuals, can use the new communications networks not only to talk to their audience but also to seek recognition in the public domain. Amir Hassanpour argues that MED-TV “empowered the stateless people to communicate with each other for the first time by disregarding the international borders that have divided them. Many

Kurds felt that the independent body in the sky was a historical step toward sovereignty on earth” (1995: 16). Although new communication networks address a common Kurdish culture in the sky, they also highlight linguistic, religious, and class-based differences within the Kurdish community.

*** Shifting Identities and the Formation of Communicative Spaces

Perhaps most striking, new communication networks combined with economic and political liberalization led to a new debate over identity and citizenship. A popular expression in Erzurum, a conservative town in eastern Turkey, says that “Muslims were forced to change their kihle [the direction one faces for prayer] three times during the last century.” Likewise, citizens of Turkey had to change kihles three times within a generation. National identity in Turkey has been framed first by religion (Islam), then by language (Turkish), and more recently by territory (of the state).

In the Ottoman Empire (prior to 1923), Sultan Abdiilhamid 11 (r. 18761908) created institutions to formalize the union of the Muslim nation (millet} and the state (Yavuz 1993: 184-90). This union of Muslim state and nation was swept away with declaration of the republican state that made language, rather than religion, the unifying factor for constructing a Turkish nation-state. From the 1920s through the 1940s, the republican state treated ethno-religious diversity as a threat to its project of nation building, and it used every means at its disposal to eliminate the causes and consequences of differences (Be^ikci, 1990).[60] The state closely organized and monitored the public sphere as national and secular arena to exclude Alevi, Kurdish, and Islamic identities. This, in turn, transformed Islam into an oppositional identity; even Kurdish identity was contained within this oppositional Islamic identity. There were more than a dozen rebellions between 1924 and 1938. Not until the 1950s did the availability of limited communication networks under a multi-party system enable social groups to articulate their concerns publicly vis-a-vis the center. However, the communications explosion that began in 1980 shattered state-built homogeneity and brought “diversity” to the forefront as an issue. Increased news coverage and the airing of suppressed collective memory and history are regarded with some skepticism by supporters of the state ideology, but this has not prevented ethnic (Kurdish) and religious (Alevi, Nurcu, Nakjjibendi) groups from publishing their own magazines and newspapers. Nurcu publishes Zaman, a newspaper that is also available on a web site (http:// [[http://www.zaman.com][www.zaman.com]]), and it owns the (national) Samanyolu television station. The Nak$ibendi own radio stations, periodicals, and web sites that they use to shape public opinion. According to Esad Cojan, leader of the Iskenderpa^a Nak$ibendi order, the new site of jihad for the faith is the media, and the new frontiers of evangelizing are the radio waves (Co$an 1993: 31-32). The Alevi community in Ankara has opened seven radio stations: Mozaik, Cankaya, Cagda$, Arkada$ Ezgim, Imaj, and Gercek.[61] Radio Mozaik, has become a national station, and the Alevi Cankaya television beams signals to several regions of Turkey.

*** The Alevis: From Co-opted Ally to Imagined Enemy

The Alevis make up 11 to 30 percent of Turkey’s total population (Andrews 1989: 48, 57; Ozum 1997: 11) and have several identities, such as ethnic, regional, and family, stressing one identity over another in any given situation. Alevis are a syncretic religious group whose practices vary from one region to another. Generally, they emphasize inner spirituality and call on members to internalize faith. The Alevi belief is expressed in narratives, poems, songs, legends and popular sayings. In daily practice, Turkish Alevis speak Turkish, and Kurdish Alevis speak Zaza or Kirmanji (dialects of Kurdish); but for both, the liturgy is in Turkish (van Bruinessen 1996b). Scholars such as Nur Yalman and David Shankland essentialize the confessional and communal boundary between the Alevis and Sunni Muslims by reducing it to different interpretations of the five pillars of Islam (Yalman 1969: 53; Shankland 1994); but this approach does not explain how, when, and which cultural differences are politicized. Neither religious- nor descent-based essentialism fully explains the malleability of Alevi identity.

The marking of the boundaries of the Alevi community goes back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Ottoman state viewed the Alevis as a fifth column of Safavid Iran and treated the Alevis as blasphemers and heretics (Imber 1979). The Alevis were targets of frequent massacres by the central government, which forced them into small communities in the mountainous areas of Turkey. Isolation played a key role in maintaining the boundaries of the community, and dissimulation was one way of overcoming Sunni prejudices. This experience of oppression at the hands of the Ottoman state made the Alevi community a supporter of Kemalist reforms, which aimed at instituting a more secular polity. As a multi-party electoral system emerged, the Alevi community supported the Democratic Party (DP) against the Ismet Inonii (r. 1938-1950) government in the 1950 national election. When the DP adopted pro-Islamic (Sunni) positions, the Alevis shifted their support in the 1957 elections to the Republican People's Party (RPP). In October 1966, a group of Alevis formed the Alevi Union Party of Turkey (Tiirkiye Birlik Partisi), which failed to gain a seat in Parliament until 1969.[62]

Expansion of education and urbanization in the 1960s and 1970s led to geographic and social mobility and increased interaction between the Sunni and Alevi communities and heightened the Alevi consciousness. The first urban-born generation of Alevis, those whose parents moved to the squatter towns of major metropolitan areas in the late 1950s and the early 1960s and supported more revolutionary socialist ideas, dominated the identity debate because its members were literate and switched easily between local idioms and universal concepts.

The state and various left-leaning groups saw the Alevis as a group susceptible to secular-progressive or Marxist ideas (Atalay 1991; Co§kun 1990: 104-06; Mardin 1982). The heterodox practices of the Alevis and their collective suffering were articulated in folk music and poetry that became associated with left-wing ideas. This association provided an opportunity for conservative Sunni groups to charge that the Alevis were "Communist."[63] Martin van Bruinessen (1996a: 8), a leading authority on the Alevi and Kurdish minorities, argues that "the radical left, construing the Alevi rebellions of the past as proto-communist movements, considered the Alevis natural allies." Thus, the Alevi community moved in the late 1970s from being the ally of secular forces to being a "communist threat." This, in turn, made the Alevis a target of communal pogroms in 1978-1979.

The leaders of the 1980 coup introduced an Islamization of Turkish nationalism as a move against Kurdish assertiveness, and further alienated the Turkish Alevi community from the state. This state ideology, known as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, turned the Alevi community into an oppositional minority, and the Alevi community became more isolated and insecure. To overcome this sense of insecurity, many Alevis organized around regional associations and supported specific magazines so as to benefit from the new wave of political and economic liberalization of the late 1980s. With the collapse of socialist ideology and the rise of a Sunni Islamic movement, the Alevi community, using new communication networks, has subsequently transformed syncretic religious practices into communal boundary markers for the purpose of political mobilization.

Alevi assertiveness presents a paradox: modern Alevi identities, objectified by commercial and communicative means, are subjectively rooted in “ancient” histories. These identities have the power to mobilize, but they are prone to fragmentation along differences of class, region, and dialect in the flourishing publication and broadcast media outlet. In the 1990s, different versions of Alevism competed for control of community symbols. A major conflict took place on July 2, 1993, when the Pir Sultan Cultural Association gathered left-wing Alevi intellectuals in Sivas to commemorate the Alevi saint Pir Sultan Abdal (Co$kun 1990). The gathering included the late Aziz Nesin, one of Turkey’s leading atheist Sunni writers, who had translated extracts of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. A mob, mobilized by pro-Welfare Party (Refah) activists, attacked the hotel where the meeting was taking place, and many of the intellectuals were killed. The incident was filmed by the city police force and the video was leaked to private television channels, where (like the film of the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles) it was rebroadcast continuously for almost a week. The film showed the police making little attempt to disperse the mob.

The government’s response to the attack was a turning point for the Alevi community. The film heightened their security concerns and catalyzed their mobilization and organization. A parliamentary investigative committee blamed Nesin’s inflammatory statements for the conflict, and the police blamed the Alevi association for holding the meeting in a conservative Sunni town (TBMM 1993). Although a court originally sentenced 26 people to fifteen years’ imprisonment and 60 more to three years’ imprisonment, the Alevi community was not placated. Citing state complicity in the Sivas incident and the statements of Erdal Inonli, then a deputy prime minister in the coalition government, Alevi intellectuals made use of the wide availability of diverse communications networks to reject Kemalist secularism as a “surrogate identity” for Alevis and to articulate a more autonomous Alevi identity.

As Alevi magazines, publications, and radio stations became active arenas for political mobilization, the Sunni-Islamist magazine tzlenim, presented the articulation of Alevi identity in public space as the impulse of a community that seeks to “come out from the underground” (Kanber 1993). Subsequently, Turkey’s major newspapers have competed with one another through series of articles on the question of Alevi identity. In 1995, the Kemalist newspaper Cumhuriyet published a week-long series on “What do Alevis want?” (Engin 1995). This practical question brings forth other questions: “Who are the Alevis?” and “How and who will speak for the Alevis?” The media also offer images and concepts from similar cases around the globe for adaptation, borrowing, and participation (Yavuz and Indeoglu 1996).

At the same time, Alevi folk culture has become increasingly intellectu- alized and politicized through media exposure. Media are spaces for cultural elites to articulate and redefine subcultures and to carve a space for themselves in the cultural and political arenas. New private communications channels such as television, radio, and satellite expand the public domain and move global discourses on human rights and self-determination downward while

pulling local identities and prejudices upward. When Gliner Umit, a leading talk-show personality, expressed a common stereotype among Sunnis, that Alevis practice incest, the Alevi community in Istanbul launched a massive demonstration in front of Interstar television on 9 January 1995, and Omit was forced to resign. This event illustrates how new media outlets promote an open discussion of historical prejudices (see also Yaman and Gliner 1995). However, an Islamist magazine, Izlenim, ran an article about an Alevi ritual service in which the reporter claimed, “When I heard the Aievi dede [spiritual leader), Huseyin Orhon, saying to his flock 'do not come to the ritual ceremony (cemayini) without gusid' [Islamic ritual ablution after sexual intercourse], my conviction that the Alevis do not take gusul was shattered” (Kanber 1993: 13). The media can also dispel deeply rooted pejorative images that circulate unchallenged in other channels.

Modern media provide avenues to connect Alevis with Turkey’s national culture and with the global community, too. For example, there are eleven new web sites on the Alevi identity and community. To Alevi youth, the enlarged public space for them allows the options both of belonging to and of feeling free of their community. Through the media, Alevi youth unite the symbols of Ali and Ataturk in their demonstrations. Underneath Ali’s picture, for example, often is written “Guide” (Rehber), and under Ataturk “Leader” (Onder): Ali Rehber, Ata Onder. This cultural reimagination fuses the religious and secular, local and universal, traditional and modern within the modalities brought about by new communication networks and in an environment in which Alevi intellectuals are more dominant than traditional dedes.

*** The Shift of authority from

*** Dede to alevi Intellectuals and Dergah to Magazines

Due to the Ottoman state oppression, the Alevi community institutionalized its religious authority through genealogical origins. The dede has been central to Alevi identity. These itinerant holy men, who controlled esoteric religious knowledge and often claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad, were “living libraries” who tightly controlled religious knowledge and selectively shared it with their followers. Thus dedes formed a well-functioning network of information throughout the country by belonging to a holy lineage, known as a heart (o(ak). This kin-based religious leadership remained at the center of Alevi practices until print-culture became the dominant medium for constructing knowledge. The role of the dedes has been under challenge for some time, and a new class of intellectuals now leads the community. Nejat Birdogan, for example, a popular writer on Alevi issues, openly challenged the hereditary nature of the institution of the dede and argued that “since Alevism is outside Islam, these dedes cannot be coming from Prophet Muhammad’s lineage” (Birdogan 1994b: 1920). Some Alevis reacted sharply to Birdogan’s interpretation of Alevism as a Turkish “faith system” outside Islam (Aktiiel 1994); under this interpretation, dedes

have almost no role in the new codification of Alevi culture and beliefs. Print media has replaced dedes with journals.

These new forms of journal-based religious authority emerge around people with modern university degrees who have become commanding authorities. For example, in the 1990s the debate over Alevi identity began with the formation of media outlets (Cumhuriyet 1991), and Alevi periodicals such as Cem, Nefes, Genq Erenler, Asura, Kervan, Cagda$ Ziilfikar became forums for debate. New communication networks not only led the shift of authority to modern intellectuals but also decentered the construction of Alevi identity from Istanbul to Koln and Berlin (Mandel 1990). The Federation of European Alevi Union, with 140 associations and 150,000 members, plays an active role in the internationalization of the Alevi identity. Major financial support comes from Europe, where the Alevi community is well organized and where Alevis own local television stations and publish journals that play a prominent role in Turkey's political life. The Alevi community in Berlin, for example, publishes a magazine called Algiil and owns both an Alcanlar radio station and an Alcanlar television station which broadcast four hours a week (Zaptcioglu 1995).

The second major impact of these new media outlets is an historicization of Alevi identity (Bender 1991; Bozkurt 1990). Writings about the historical roots of Alevi culture increasingly deploy a Manichean dualism of good and evil, justice and injustice, freedom and oppression through the narrative of Caliph Ali's sons Hasan and Huseyin and the Ummayad ruler Yezid. Good is represented in the persons of Ali and Huseyin and by Haci Bekta$i Veli and Pir Sultan Abdal, who was executed by Hizir Pasha. Yezid and Hizir Pasha are presented as the personifications of injustice. Significantly, Kemal Ataturk is treated as a "liberator from Sunni hegemony." The myth of collective suffering at the hands of Sunni rulers because of their beliefs and practices has been a mobilizing force in Alevi assertiveness (Eral 1993), popularized through the printed word in a more systematized way than would have been possible through oral tradition. There has been a veritable explosion of books and journals on Alevi culture and practices. Karin Vorhoff, a leading scholar on modern Alevis in Turkey, notes that

At the turn of 1989 to 1990 a press campaign and a deluge of books on Anatolian Alevism not only put an end to the silence that had reigned on Alevi beliefs and practices, but also to the process of dissolution that had grasped the Alevi community and their religious system as a result of secularization, modernization, wide-ranging migration, and the severing of political conflict in the 1970s. (1995: 7)

The debate and literature around the great historic Alevi figure of Haci Bekta^i Veli (d. 1290?) indicates several versions of Haci Bektafji Veli in formation. Some scholars (e.g., Sener 1991) represent Haci Bekta^i Veli as the revolutionary leader of a suppressed community. In this representation, they construct a vision of Alevi culture that reinterprets oral tradition within a global idiom of human rights, democracy, tolerance, and freedom

(Zelyut 1992). This process of blending local folk beliefs and global culture or reading religious culture in secular terms facilitates standardization. Abidin Ozgiinay, editor of the prominent Alevi magazine Cem, argues that “secularism, democracy, the rule of law, and modernity are integral parts of Alevism” (1993: 13). This case indicates how moving communication to a more global context breaks down barriers and reframes integral, local figures in more universalist terms that fragment local frames.

A third major result of new communication networks has been the contestation and pluralization of Alevi identity. Two separate Alevi identities have been presented by two competing Alevi journals. The first revolves around Cem, a magazine funded by affluent Alevis in 1991 with a circulation of about 5,000. Cem is pro-state and pro-Turkish nationalism. To a great extent, it propagates the views of Turkish scholars (Ersoz 1977; Figlah 1994) that the Alevi understanding of Islam originates in a Turkic, semi-nomadic conceptualization. Cem's editorial board champions a liberal economic order and demands official recognition of Alevism. It is dominated by Turkish Alevis, who present Alevism as the “essence of Islam.” Articles in Cem situate Alevism in the Qur’an and the Turkic culture of Ahmed Yasevi and Haci Bekta§i Veli (Noyan 1995: 84). These magazines stress secularism, modernity, and human rights as integral elements of Alevi teaching. The Cem Foundation organized the first international conference on Alevism, held in Istanbul in March 1996, and demanded that the state integrate Alevism into the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Aydin 1996; Camuroglu 1996).[64] The foundation also receives state support.

The Cem Foundation’s leader, Alevi intellectual-Jede, Izzettin Dogan, a professor of international relations at Galatasaray University, argues that “Alevi identity is a synthesis of Turkism and Islamism. This is the Turkish understanding of Islam, which is more tolerant” (Dogan, 1992). One of Dogan’s goals is to introduce courses on Alevism into the schools and to produce television and radio programs explaining the Alevi belief system (Dogan 1995). Dogan also presents Alevism as a guarantor of Kemalist secularism. The mass media, major talk shows, and radio programs have made Dogan a public figure, and his profession adds to his authority: those who are part of the university system become authoritative sources of Alevism.

Some state officials also played Alevism against Kurdish nationalism and mounting Sunni Islamic political activism. In 1991, the Directorate of Religious Affairs organized a series of meetings with prominent Alevi leaders (Aygiin 1991), and the semi-official Foundation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs organized a conference on Alevi belief and Islam in 1992 (Mert 1992). A group of Alevi youth formed the magazine Gem; Erenler in 1995 to disseminate their own understanding of Alevi identity. This group, led by Tugcu Kiitahya, a sociologist at Hacettepe University, stresses the unity of the Turkish state and interprets Alevism within the dominant Sunni paradigm as a folk Turkish culture, not a belief system.

The presentation of Alevism as quintessential Turkish Islam by the Turkish state and Cem has been sharply criticized. Cemsid Bender, a Kurdish-Alevi (1991), argues that Alevism is a Kurdish religion.[65] Kurdish Alevis, mostly Zaza-speakers, tend to integrate Marxist terminology into Alevi discourse to express their universality. Pir Sultan Abdal Kiiltiir Sanat Dergisi, a Marxist, anti-state magazine, argues that Alevism is not “rooted in Islam” but is influenced by Islam, as does Murteza Demir (1993), head of the Pir Sultan Abdal Associations.[66] These associations, which have 35,000 members, refuse to join the Directorate of Religious Affairs because they fear assimilation into the state system.

Intermediate positions between the poles represented by Cem and by Pir Sultan Abdal are associated with other associations and publications. The Haci Bekta^i Association, for example, presents Alevi identity as anti-state and stresses traditional institutions of Alevi identity, such as the dede. Alevi communities in Corum and Amasya, unlike other Alevis, go regularly to mosque and represent themselves as being in accord with Shi'i understandings of Islam through their own magazine, A$sura (§ahin 1995).

*** Turning Alevism against the State and Sunni Islamic Movements: Gaziosmanpasa Incident

In 1995 gunmen opened fire on Alevi tea-houses in the Gaziosmanpasa neighborhood of Istanbul, killing two people and wounding three. The police were slow to react, and a rumor spread in the neighborhood that the local police station might have been involved in the attack. An Alevi detainee had been killed earlier while being held at the same police station, and the rumor galvanized the Alevi community. Alevis from all over Istanbul poured into the neighborhood. The presence of television cameras and journalists encouraged the demonstrators to harden their stance, and they subsequently encircled the police station, demanding justice. When a group of armed demonstrators fired on the police, the police responded in kind, and the clash ended with twenty-two deaths, all Alevis.

This conflict and the one in Sivas show how new avenues of communication, increasing literacy, and political and economic liberalism have transformed Turkish society and previously subsumed identities. By the 1990s, many in the Alevi community viewed the police as hostile. Izzettin Dogan, a prominent Alevi leader, claims that there is “open discrimination against the Alevi communityj;] . . . they are not made governors or accepted into the military high schools.” Dogan presents the view that “many Alevis believe that the state is preventing them from having a higher position in the civil service; they feel marginalized” (Dogan 1995). However, this shared perception did not overcome socio-cultural cleavages within the Alevi community. With opportunities opened by the media and the market, added to state policies to hinder the formation of a unified Alevi front, Alevism has become a zone of contestation among different Alevi groups. Today, more than 170 associations in Istanbul are based primarily on regions of origin. These associations have

become centers for power struggles among Alevi elites, and this in turn leads to fragmentation. To reconcile the competing versions of Alevi beliefs and establish a single representative body, thirteen major Alevi associations convened in Istanbul in 1994 and formed the Assembly of Representatives of Alevi-Bekta§i (Alevi-Bekta^i Temsilciler Meclisi). (The Cem Foundation subsequently broke with the assembly and established its own independent structure.) The assembly council decided to produce a text of common Alevi rituals and practices entitled “Contemporary Anatolian Alevi Charter” (Cagda$ Anadolu Aleviligi Buyrugu}. Unfortunately, the council itself disintegrated in internal strife and disagreement over who had the authority to codify Alevi practices and oral traditions. The second initiative for unification took place in 1996 (Demir 1996).

This move of an oral folk culture into print has created a new forum for diverse versions of Alevi identity. Because Alevis include both ethnic Turks and Kurds, the print media have become a site of contest among different ethnic, linguistic, and educational groups. Since the rise of the (Sunni) Islamist Welfare Party into the government in 1996, secular newspapers such as Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, and Yeni Yiizyd and some state organizations present the Alevi as a natural ally. The Kemalist Republican People’s Party sought to capitalize on the Alevi community’s fear of the rising Sunni Islamic movements.[67] With the changing perception of threat from the left-wing movements to Islamic political movements, the Turkish state is seeking to expand its social base by meeting the demands of Alevis. After the 1995 national elections, the armed forces and the Republican People’s Party regularly invoked Alevi sensibilities to garner political support, and many political commentators argued that the change of the Sivas court verdict from imprisonment to capital punishment was aimed at overcoming Alevi alienation from the state.

*** Politicization of the Kurdish

*** Language and the Law of 1983

A major reason for the military takeover in 1980 was to end leftist use of Alevi culture to penetrate Turkish society; a second reason was the desire to curb Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey. The leaders of the 1980 coup justified their actions in a small booklet (Tiirkiye’de Boliicii ve Yikici Aktmlar} distributed to high-ranking officials with a stamp indicating that it was “secret and not open to public consumption.” The first “divisive and destructive force” they mentioned is the Kurds, who are defined as those “who live in the mountains of eastern Turkey where there is too much snow.” As stated in Tiirkiye’de Boliidi ve Ytkia Akimlar (1982: 43): “Those who walk on this snow create a different noise, and this noise is known as Kurd.” The coup introduced several harsh measures, including a total ban on printing in Kurdish or its use in public spaces. These measures helped crystallize Kurdish identity around language.

A repressive language law, Law 2932, imposed by the military regime on October 22, 1983 (Resmi G azete 1983: 28-29), gave authorities the right to curb Kurdish cultural activities, even in the private sphere. This law prohibits the “utilization of any language in the dissemination, printing, and expression of ideas which is not in the official language recognized by the Turkish state” (Article 2). It declares Turkish as the “mother tongue” of all Turkish citizens and prohibits the use of other languages as a mother tongue (Article 3). This law contributed to the promotion of the Kirmanji dialect as the “official” Kurdish language, which served as a rallying point for Kurdish ethno-nationalism. The main grievance of the Kurds shifted from underdevelopment of the Kurdish populated provinces to the issue of language and cultural rights. When Turkish state officials argued that there was no standardized Kurdish language to be recognized, Kurdish intellectuals mobilized to make the Kirmanji dialect a standardized Kurdish language. Most of the activity took place in Europe, and Sweden and Germany became the centers of standardization and publication in Kurdish.

Partly in response, Turgut Ozal (1983-1991) adopted a new set of domestic and international strategies toward the Kurdish question as part of his goal of making Turkey a regional power in concert with Western strategic interests. He allowed them greater cultural freedom and, for the first time, recognized them as a distinct ethnic group; he introduced a set of bills designed to remove restrictions on the Kurdish language. In 1991 he met with the leaders of two Iraqi Kurdish factions and repealed the draconian Law 2932, in response to European Community conditions for closer European-Turkish relations. Kurds were free to sing songs in Kurdish and to publish in Kurdish, but not to use their language in public. However, military measures against the Kurds continued, and Article 89 of the 1982 Constitution remained in force: it states that “no political party may concern itself with the defense, development, or diffusion of any non-Turkish language or culture; nor may seek to create minorities within our frontiers or to destroy our national unity.”[68]

*** The Formation of a “Literary” Kurdish

From the moment Law 2932 placed the language issue at the center of debate, Kurdish intellectuals mobilized to standardize the Kurdish language. The first Kurdish Institute was opened in Paris in 1983, a second in London in 1984, another in Brussels in 1989, and a subsequent one in Berlin in 1993. In this diasporic space, Kurdish intellectuals in Europe developed a standardized Kurdish language based on the Kirmanji dialect and introduced Kurdish language courses in many European cities. Advances in the technologies of printing and distribution assisted this diasporic “revival” of Kurdish, filtered in through new communication media from grammar books to cassettes, videos, and movies.

The language issue assumed additional dimensions when a group of Kurds in Europe established MED-TV and began to broadcast to Turkey via satellite. A Turkish official has claimed that “MED-TV threatens the security of this nation more than the guerrilla attacks of the PKK [Kurdistan Worker’s Party].”[69] MED-TV programming suggests three interrelated goals: entertainment (articulating a distinct national culture and addressing a collective

memory), education (teaching Kirmanji Kurdish and promulgating the antiquity of Kurdish nationhood), and information (providing news and political debates to promote ethno-linguistic political consciousness) (Has- sanpour 1995).[70] The introduction of MED-TV challenges the state's attempt to promote the Turkish language and control news of ongoing conflicts in the region.

With the proliferation in Sweden, Germany, and France of Kirmanji as the standardized version of Kurdish through broadcasts and cassette distribution and on MED-TV's World Wide Web site on the Internet, a new, full-fledged Kurdish "nation" is being formed by Kurdish cultural entrepreneurs. Using every means possible to historicize the Kurdish nation, these cultural entrepreneurs claim that "MED" stands as proof that Kurds are descended from the Medes (Giirsel 1977: 77).[71] This identity is not constructed within the local space and a stable community but instead within transnational space and by expanding the boundaries of knowledge. A group of jailed Kurdish members of the Turkish parliament argue that

MED-TV brought life to the Kurdish cultural scene the way water and a mirror reflected their reality to them. Thanks to MED-TV, the Kurdish language [Kirmanji) was coming alive, something which threatened those who wanted to suffocate it. MED-TV epitomized the hope of the Kurdish people for recognition; it was a magnet which drew the Kurds together.[72]'

Between MED-TV and printed materials in Hawar (Turkicized Latin) characters, Kurmanji is becoming a "literary" language. In Iraq, official Kurdish is still the Sorani dialect, and it is the only language taught in Kurdish schools there. In Iran, Kirmanji, Sorani, and Zaza dialects are used by the Kurds, but Kirmanji has emerged as the main literary language. There are several Kurdish television and radio stations, most of which broadcast in the Kirmanji dialect.

MED-TV began to air Kurdish and Turkish programs from Europe in March 1995. Most of its programs are prepared by a Belgian communications company, ROJ N.V., while MED-TV itself received licenses from the British Independent Television Committee (ITC) to open studios in London.[73] It first used Polish TELECOM satellites to broadcast to Turkey and northern Iraq, but Turkish government diplomatic intervention prompted the Polish government to halt the broadcasting. MED-TV then rented American INTELSAT satellites for its broadcasting. Through new communications technology Kurdish nationalists have been able to circumvent the Turkish state's attempt to enforce its official ideology.

The Turkish government claims that MED-TV activities are linked to the PKK and to drug trafficking. But INTELSAT is owned by 139 governments—including Turkey—and merely broadcasts programs. According to spokesperson T. Trujillo, "INTELSAT cannot control the content of the programs" (Bozkurt 1996: 13). MED-TV employs its British company to use INTELSAT; that corporation claims that "If MED-TV promotes terrorism, then the Turkish government should pressure the British government to stop the use of the satellite" (Bozkurt 1996: 13). The British government refuses to pressure ITC on the grounds that "there is no

evidence which shows direct connections between the PKK and MED-TV" (Bozkurt 1996: 13). However, Turkish government pressure forced London to conduct a massive police search of the offices of the Kurdish-language satellite station, MED-TV studios in London, and its production company, ROJ N.V., on September 18, 1996. While the investigation of MED-TV is still going on in Europe, it is the most popular TV station among Turkey's Kurds. Sahin Alpay, a journalist who recently visited the region with the help of the military, asked the government to establish its own Kurdish TV station to counter the popular MED-TV (1997).

New communications networks have simultaneously reinforced the consciousness of a shared identity and increased an awareness of difference. MED-TV, which is a powerful agent for the standardization of Kirmanji among the Sunni Kurds of Turkey, is also forcing a competing Kurdish consciousness among Zaza-speaking Alevis and Sorani-speaking Iraqi Kurds. The language of MED-TV is not spoken by most Alevi Kurds living in Turkey, who speak the Zaza dialect. Alevis increasingly refer to themselves more as Zaza than as Kurd, suggesting the emergence of a new language-based identity (van Bruinessen 1992).

*** Conclusion

New communications networks are reshaping political spaces and linking global discourse on human rights and the recognition of alternative ethnic and religious identities of great complexity. These networks have helped to create a new class of cultural entrepreneurs who work as editors, journalists, talk-show personalities, and fiction writers to construct and disseminate reimagined Kurdish or Alevi identities. Significantly, they have displaced older networks of communication that fitted Kurd and Alevi identity to past regimes. Upheavals of the twentieth century exchanged these oral networks for others forged by literacy and by media. Particularly with the reordering of political and economic spaces in the 1980s, Alevi identity has gradually transformed into a political "confessional" identity. The Alevi community is experiencing profound systematization of its oral doctrine, secularization and rationalization of oral Alevi practices and beliefs, and a shift of leadership to those who command the means of these processes.

These processes extend from journals, magazines, and local broadcasting to the introduction of MED-TV, which has made the Kurds the first "satellite" nation. They do not have a seat at the United Nations, but they do have a powerful television frequency with which to shape the imagination of Kurds, at the same time that "Alevi" has been recast in the commercialized environment of more mundane media from exotic marginals to "essentially Turkish." By comparison, "Zaza" identity is a counter-move that shifts the domain to linguistics, again highlighting the changing interplay of community and communication. Communication networks have simultaneously reshaped consciousness of a shared identity previously taken for granted and increased an awareness of differences. The media, by offering many opportunities for politically conscious elites to diffuse their ideas, have brought ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious identities into public space and contributed to the fragmentation of authority by multiplying not just its voices but also their subjects and,

most important, their contexts. Above all, it is the multiplication of media and of media outlets that contributes to this fragmentation. On the one hand, it contributes simplification of previously complex, nuanced identities. On the other, the contribution of media to this process is what, and who, they bring together.

*** NOTES

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[56] Two major cultural cleavages in Turkey are the ethnic split into Turks and Kurds (7 to 20 percent of Turkey’s population) and the religious division into Sunni (orthodox majority) and the Alevi. The Alevi make up 11 to 30 percent of the population. Ethnic and religious divisions partially overlap, and there are Alevi Turks and Alevi Kurds, Sunni Turks and Sunni Kurds.

[57] According to The Economist (1996: 7), “at the last count there were 16 national and 15 regional stations, as well as about 300 local ones. Radio is even more extravagant: 35 national stations, 109 regional and almost 1,000 local ones.” According to the Supreme Board of Radio and Television, a state watchdog that monitors radio and television broadcasts to ensure compliance with the Kemalist principles, 260 TV stations and 1200 radio stations have an official license, and there are many more without license (Zaman, 25 March 1998).

[58] The television revolution began in 1992, when the Magic Box Channel, Star One (a German-based Turkish company, in which President Turgut Ozal’s son was a partner) began beaming programs to Turkey. Article 133 of the 1982 Constitution made television and radio broadcasting the province of the state. This article has become irrelevant as a result of transnational broadcasting.

[59] Mozaik Radio was established and funded by the Koln-based Federation of European Alevi Associations in 1994. For economic reasons, the Federation sold the station to Ali Haydar Veziroglu, a prominent Alevi businessmen, in 1997.

[60] Earlier state-centered studies (Lewis 1968) of Turkey celebrated the homogeneous Turkish nation and its march toward modernity. Recent scholars (for example, Andrews 1989; van Bruinessen 1992) pay attention to Turkey’s diversity.

[61] Genjek, however, is in the process of closing. Almost all these stations are located in or near Ankara, which has the largest Alevi concentration. Most of the Alevis in Dikmen are Kurdish and are economically better off than the Turkish Alevis in Mamak, another Ankara neighborhood. Most political demonstrations take place in Dikmen, where Kurdish identity is expressed through Alevism. Rapidly growing cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Adana do not become melting pots but rather agglomerations of coexisting neighborhoods defined by ethnic, religious, and regional origins.

[62] The symbol of the party, a lion, represented Ali, son-in-law of Prophet Muhammed. The party received 2.8 percent of the 1969 national vote and garnered eight seats in the parliament.

[63] Ay$e Giine$ Ayata (1995) argues that, since Alevi migration to urban centers was higher in the 1960s, they became blue-collar workers. She challenges the accepted notion that egalitarianism and democratic thinking are inherent in Alevi culture and argues that these characteristics have only became ensconced in the Alevi culture since the 1960s.

[64] The associations and printing houses that participated in this meeting are Avrupa Alevi Birliklcri Federasyonu, Pir Sultan Abdal Kultur Dernekleri, Haci Bekta$ Veli Kultur Dernekleri, Hollanda-Alevi-Bekta$i Sosyal vc Kultiir Demekleri Federasyonu, fjahkulu Sultan Dernegi, Karacaahmet Dernegi, Semah Kultur ve Ara$tirma Vakfi, Pir Sultan Abdal Kultur Dergisi, Cem Dergisi, Can Yaymlan, Yurrta Birlik Gazetesi, Goniillerin Sesi Gazetesi, and Kervan Dergisi. Six of the thirteen groups owned either a journal or a publishing house.

[65] Two magazines support the connection between Kurdish nationalism and Alevism, Qagdas Ziilfikar (in print since 1994) and Yeni Ziilfikar (June 1996).

[66] Pir Sultan Abdal Kultur Sanat Dergisi, no. 17 (December 1994), p.l.

[67] Ali Haydar Veziroglu is a rich ex-parliamentarian of the Republican People’s Party from Tunceli Province who formed the Democratic Peace Movement (Demokratik Baris Hareketi). Before the 1995 general election, DPM pulled out of the election to allow RPP to overcome the 10 percent hurdle (Siyah Beyaz, December 12, 1995). Almost all DPM candidates were Alevi (for names and provinces, see Siyah Beyaz, December 2, 1995). The slogan of the DPM is “Our first names are different; our last name is Turkey” (Adlarimiz farkli olabilir, soyadimtz Tiirkiye). DPM advertisements stressed the cultural rights of different ethno-religious groups, a non-nationalistic state, and constitutional

citizenship (see Cumhuriyet, July 7, 1996). However, most Alevis do not support the concept of a “confessional” party.

[68] M. Hakan Yavuz, “A Preamble to the Kurdish Question: The Politics of Kurdish Identity,” Introduction to special issue on the Kurds, Journal of Muslim Minority Affiars 18, no. 1 (1998), pp. 9-18.

[69] Interview with high-ranking Turkish military officers in Ankara, June 1996.

[70] Hassanpour offers this breakdown of MED-TV programming for November 1995: information (news, debate, politics), 37 percent of total program; education (youth, children, culture, history, documentary, religion), 35 percent; entertainment (music, film), 35 percent.

[71] The founding charter of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Turkey (Tiirkiye Kurdistan Demokrat Partisi) offers an example of “invented history” by claiming that Kurds derive from the Mede and Karduk civilizations. It argues that Kurds have always lived in independent empires and states.

[72] Cited by the Canadian Kurdish Information Network (CKIN) in a press release condemning Turkish government policies toward MED-TV.

[73] MED Broadcasting Limited is registered in England (Company Number 2960 755 and VAT Number 653 1082 60). Its current director is Hikmet Tabak, a Turkish Kurd.

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*** RECENT CHANGES IN TURKISH MEDIA: AN UPDATE

In April 1999, Britain’s Independent Television Commission revoked the license of MED-TV, charging that the station repeatedly flouted its regulations on incitement to violence, and also for sympathizing with Turkey’s Kurdish separatists. Blocked in Britain, Kurdish intellectuals in July 1999 established Medya TV and began broadcasting from Paris via satellite. The Turkish state tried to penalize viewers by, for example, firing five teachers caught listening to Medya TV broadcasts and publicizing the incident (Politika, February 2,2002, <www. ozgurpolitika.org/2002/ 02/02/hab07.html>).

Turkey’s expanding public sphere has both differentiated and unified the cultural and political aspects of Kurdish identity politics. After the 1999 arrest of Abdullah Ocala, the head of the PKK, the right to education in Kurdish became the core issue for Kurdish cultural rights, as for many others in Turkey. A hopeful step toward accommodation started with the European Union’s recognition of Turkey’s “candidate status” for joining the EU in December 1999. On the basis of this new status, the EU asked Ankara to reform its legal system and to recognize Kurdish cultural rights. Turkey responded by allowing "broadcasting in other mother tongues” and amended the Turkish constitution in accord with common EU criteria. Despite these legal changes, the Turkish government expelled thousands of Kurdish university students from their schools when they petitioned for education in Kurdish in 2002.

*** Glossary

Key to abbreviations: Ar, Arabic; Ben, Bangla or Bengali;

In, bahasa Indonesia; Per, Persian; Turk, Turkish

‘ada (In; orig. Ar): custom

abkam (sing.); hukm (Ar): scale of religious precepts, from obligatory to forbidden, applicable to various activities

Alevi (Turk): Shi'i religious sect found in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon
al-kbaliq (Ar): “the Creator,” one of the names of God
al-ntakbluqin (Ar): “the created” (pl.), those subject to God’s rules
Ba'atb (Ar): populist political party, primarily in Syria and Iraq, which combines doctrines of Arab nationalism and socialism

CDLR: Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (Lajnat al-Difa‘ ‘an al-Hurur al-Shar‘iyya), an overseas Saudi oppositional group

CD-ROM: “Compact Disk Read-Only Memory,” permanent storage of computerized data

dalil (Ar): guide to interpretation provided through revelation; scriptural proof

Da'wa (Ar): outreach, proselytizing

dede (Turk): Alevi religious leader

dobbasbi: See punthi

dorud (Ben): a set of Qur’anic verses in which God is implored to bless Muhammad and his family

dowreh (Per): an informal discussion circle, frequently meeting on a regular schedule, among friends in Iran

electronic bulletin boards: See newsgroups

falsafa (Ar): philosophy

fatwa (Ar): religious ruling, decree, advice

fiqh (Ar): Islamic jurisprudence

galabiyya (Egyptian Ar): tunic, ankle-length outer garment

baditb (Ar): oral traditions recounting the actions and sayings of Muhammed
halaqa (In, from Ar): circle, or study circle

hijab (Ar): the “Islamic” head-covering for women, also refers to the practice of wearing one

‘Id (Ar): religious holiday or feast day holiday marked by sacrifice t/ta’(Ar): the giving of nonbinding opinions by a religious authority (mufti) in response to a question

ijma' (Ar): a “consensus” of scholars with respect to interpretations of Islamic law (shari'a)

ijtihad (Ar): striving to interpret correctly the divine path, shari'a, revealed through scripture

infitah (Ar): “opening”; Egypt’s post-1973 “open door” economic policy jaheliyat (Ben; orig. Ar jahiliyya): the pre-Islamic period in Arabia commonly understood as being one of ignorance, paganism, and injustice jihad (Ar): an effort to achieve a determined objective, ranging from military action to solving a legal problem or attaining moral perfection

kapah, (Turk): “closed,” referring to the conservative head-covering common for women

kafir (Ar, also In): unbeliever

khatib (Ar): preacher

ktble (Turk; Ar qibla): the direction one faces for prayer

madrasa (Ar): mosque-university or religious school

marja‘ (Ar): Shi‘i religious authority

mas’ala (Ben; orig. Ar): question, problem, issue

masjid (Ar): mosque

maslaha (Ar): legal doctrine of social interest or utility

Mihna (Ar): inquisition (of a.d. 833-848)

millet (Turk): nation; sectarian community under the Ottoman empire
Moro (orig. Spanish): Muslim ethno-linguistic group in the Philippines
mufti (Ar): the religious authority who delivers a legal opinion
mujahid (Ar): struggler or striver (for a religious cause)

murid (Ar): a Sufi follower or disciple

Nakfibandi (Turk): Sufi order prominent in Turkey and Central Asia
nashid (Ar): martial chant or chanted poem in praise of the Prophet
newsgroups, also electronic bulletin boards: Internet sites where messages and commentary on them may be posted and arranged by topic

niqab (Ar): Saudi-style face veil that covers a woman’s entire head, leaving only a narrow opening for the eyes

pesantren (In, pl.): religious schools

pir (Per): a Sufi master or model

punthi or dobhashi (Ben): Bengali verse or rhymed prose produced by and for semi-literate Bengali Muslims during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

qadi (Ar): Islamic judge

ra‘i (Ar, French rai): a hybrid of North African folk music with rock rhythms

sadhu (Ben): classical Bangla

Salafiyya: a liberal movement for reform in late-19th- and early 20th-cen

tury Egypt

salat (Ar): ritual prayers

shari'a (Ar): conventional jurisprudence interpreted by traditionally educated scholars

shura (Ar): consultation, today used for limited parliaments; upper house of the Egyptian parliament

Simay-i-Matlub (Per): “Optimal Image,” Iranian government committee for programs to rival Western music videos for audience appeal

siyasa (Ar): politics; policy

Sufism: Islamic mysticism

sunna (Ar): conduct, especially that modeled on the conduct and precepts of the Prophet Muhammad

Syndicate: officially sponsored professional associations in Egypt and some other Arab countries

‘ulama (Ar): Islamic men of learning. Also ulama (In), ulema (Turk)

umma (Ar): the (religious) community of believers in Islam

waaz mabfil (Ben): public performances of scriptural commentary (in

Bangladesh)

waqf (Ar): pious trust, endowment for religious purpose

ivila’al-umur (Ar): “legitimate rulers”

u>ilayat-i faqih (Per): “government of the jurist,” the sovereignty of jurists over the texts they interpret

zakat (Ar): tithe, one of the five basic Islamic obligations

zawiya (Ar): Sufi religious lodge

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AND THE COMMON GOOD

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*** [Dedication]

For Amal, Miriam, and Yasmin

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** Note on Transliteration

Any book that draws on materials in Arabic, Hindi, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu, among other languages, poses considerable challenges for transliteration, especially as we incorporate

colloquial as well as literary usages. With as much consistency as possible, we use the system adopted by the International Journal of Middle East Studies for Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu, using ‘ to represent the Arabic ^cayn, and “ to represent the Arabic hamza, as in Qur”an, which we render as Qur”an. We drop the terminal hamza and full transliteration from words such as ‘ulama (‘idama’, men of learning), fatwa (fatwa), imam (imam), Sufi (Suf), and shaykh that now appear in standard English dictionaries. Sunni (Sunni) and Shi’a (Shi’a) are also rapidly becoming standard English terms, so we have also simplified their transliteration. The plural of words in languages that have “broken” plurals is formed by adding an “s” to the singular, except for ‘ulama, in which the plural form is becoming standard English usage. Only in the glossary are all terms fully transliterated. When persons or writers are known to have a preferred spelling of their name in a European language, we generally use this form.

** Preface

PUBLIC ISLAM AND THE COMMON GOOD

Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman

Now more than ever, secular and religious Muslims have to confront issues concerning “public Islam and the common good” in open and public debate. Colombia may still lead the world in the number of deaths directly attributable to terrorism, but the events of September 11, 2001, the October 2002 bombings in Bali, May 2003 “kamikaze” attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, and the staccato repetition of bombings and violence elsewhere, including Jerusalem, Baghdad, Gaza, and Ayodhya, test the limits of civility and trust. Ironically, “kamikaze” has become one of the first Japanese words to enter educated Arabic usage, being the word of choice in Moroccan newspapers and transnational Arabic-language newspapers such as al-Sharq al-Awsat (London) because it offers an alternative to calling the perpetrators of such attacks either “martyrs” or “suicide bombers.”

This book aspires to look beyond immediate—and often disturbing—events and to discern long-term trends and developments likely to shape world politics for years to come. It may only be a tiny minority of Muslims who use or condone terrorism in the name of religion, and apologists find a ready stock of counterpart examples among Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, Christians, and followers of other religions. Political trends in the Muslim majority world are often violent and contradictory, due in part to the authoritarian regimes of many states.

“Public Islam” is not immune from such contradictions, but for the most part it works against violence.

A major theme in this book is that advancing levels of education, greater ease of travel, and the rise of new communications media throughout the Muslim-majority world have contributed to the emergence of a public sphere in which large numbers of people, and not just an educated, political, and economic elite, want a say in political and religious issues. The result has been challenges to authoritarianism, the fragmentation of religious and political authority, and increasingly open discussions of issues related to the “common good” (al-maslaha al-amma). At the same time, we recognize that this trend has been uneven and often contradictory. Thus there are several strands of “Euro-Islam,” many of which strongly advocate civility and full participation in the wider civil society dominated by nonMuslims, but within the Muslim majority countries of the Middle East, as in Africa and Asia, it is often difficult to assess the strength of such voices beyond the confines of an educated and ruling elite.

“Public Islam” refers to the highly diverse invocations of Islam as ideas and practices that religious scholars, self-ascribed religious authorities, secular intellectuals, Sufi orders, mothers, students, workers, engineers, and many others make to civic debate and public life. In this “public” capacity, “Islam” makes a difference in configuring the politics and social life of large parts of the globe, and not just for self-ascribed religious authorities. It makes this difference not only as a template for ideas and practices but also as a way of envisioning alternative political realities and, increasingly, in acting on both global and local stages, thus reconfiguring established boundaries of civil and social life. Not all these trends are unique to the modern world. One can read Michael Cook’s (2000) majestic account of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” in Islamic thought, a study that flows from the early Islamic centuries to the present, as an account of an engagement including both Muslim jurists and a wider Muslim public with issues of community concern and conduct. The present book primarily concerns the contemporary Muslim world, but the chapters on the emergence of ideas and communicative practices of the public in the late Ottoman period (Kirli, Chapter 4, and Frierson, Chapter 5 in this volume) indicate that such concerns are profoundly shaped by the course of history.

Many of the emerging new voices and the leaders of movements within this proliferating public space—which is simultaneously physical and communicative—claim to interpret or be inspired by basic religious texts and ideas, and work in local or transnational contexts. These new interpreters of how religion shapes, or should shape, societies and politics, however, like their counterparts in Poland’s Solidarity movement and the liberation theology movements in Latin America in the 1980s, often lack the theological and philosophical sophistication of the religious scholars of earlier eras who previously led such discussions. Such new leaders and spokespeople have nonetheless succeeded in capturing the imagination of large numbers of people. These trends often intensify the ties that bind Muslim communities in the Muslim-majority world with Muslims in Europe, North America, and elsewhere in the world.

Muslims in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the West have developed ideas and practices of the common good that have inspired historical and contemporary thinkers, movements, and associations. Only encyclopedias can aspire to global comprehensiveness. One could equally have drawn on the books and essays dealing with Islam in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia (Hefner 2000; Bowen 2003), Malaysia (Peletz 2002), Central Asia (Rashid 2002), "EuroIslam" (Vertovec and Peach 1997, Modood and Werbner 1997, Allievi and Nielsen 2003), and the importance of Islamic values in redefining the ideas of "public" and "secular" in contemporary Turkey (Qinar 2001, White 2002). We refer to such work, but our primary concern throughout this volume has been to explore issues and themes that increasingly transcend the specifics of region or place. Thus the contemporary "publicization" of Islam is often more commonly rooted in practice than in formal ideology (Adelkhah, Chapter 10 in this volume). It has often created new social spaces, a trend significantly accelerated since the mid-twentieth century, and it has facilitated modern and distinctively open senses of political and religious identity.

Such practices and the resulting social spaces involve both emotional and intellectual engagement among participants in overlapping circles of communication, solidarity, and the building of bonds of identity and trust. Some of these are based on local communities. Others are geographically widespread and targeted to receptive audiences. One example is the use of e-mail among the Indonesian university students who coordinated nationwide campus protests that contributed to the downfall of President Suharto in 1998. These modern practices and new communication technologies create new, effective, and geographically more dispersed bases for effective mobilization—but they can also threaten tolerance and civil society by facilitating publicity and calls to action by extremist groups (Hefner 2003).

Social practices that are based on ideas of the common good and that contribute to shaping public Islam include collective rituals, such as popular festivals and religious and secular commemorations. They also encompass disciplining and performative practices as diverse as Sufi rituals, regional pilgrimages, the informal economy, the routines of modern schooling, and the use of the press and modern communications technologies.

Prevailing theories of modernity and modernization in the midtwentieth century assumed that religious movements, identities, and practice had become increasingly marginal, and that only those religious intellectuals and leaders who attached themselves to the nationstate would continue to play a significant role in public life. These assertions concerning the eclipse of religion in the public life of North America and Europe may have been exaggerated. Casanova (1994) was one of the first to note that by the late 1970s this prevalent view was challenged by the impact of several parallel developments: the Iranian revolution, the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland, the role of liberation theology in political movements throughout Latin America, and the return of Protestant fundamentalism as a force in American politics. In the Muslim majority world, however, the role of religion in social and community life never receded. This does not mean that it did not change and

develop in ways often underemphasized by Western observers and by Muslims themselves (Zaman 2002). Only in the last decade has the idea of an “Islamic public sphere”—Islamische Offentlichkeit in German—come to the fore in contexts that Reinhard Schulze (2000 [1994]), responding to the work of Jurgen Habermas, discerned as forming the infrastructure of communication and discourse of a new intellectual class, from the classic era of Islamic reform in the late nineteenth century through the structural transformations of the 1960s and 1970s, and the present.

The contributions to this book trace how public Islam—a concept by which we also encompass nonelite practices and interactions and their premodern antecedents—has developed over the last two centuries. We seek to trace the problem of the authority of interpretation of sacred texts from the idea that the wider Islamic community, the umma, will never agree on error, to the essential tension that exists today between transcendent norms with their claims to divine sanction and ideas of the rule of law. The way that a shared sense of public is built into social interactions varies considerably with context and notions of personality, responsibility, welfare, justice and, not least, piety. Notions of public are rooted in those values that define the common good. The form of state authority has also affected how these values are elaborated.

Ideas of the common good are not an immutable heritage of religious or normative traditions, even if some Muslim spokespersons claim otherwise. They are defined by ethical notions and social values contested and redefined through interaction, practice, and transmission over generations. Sectarianism in Christian Europe provided the habitus and the congregational form for developing such ideas and practices, and it is possible to see in the Sufi tradition and other Muslim religious practices a similar contribution to learning to participate in the public sphere, but also to notions of the limits of such participation and to the idea of the public sphere itself. Like the Christian sects, the more orthodox forms of Sufism and other styles of public piety (Soares, Chapter 9 in this volume) have also contributed to shape reasoning selves and to reconfigure the relationship between legitimate authority and independent pursuit of truth. Immanuel Kant was not born in Iraq; public reasoning has, however, a long tradition in Islamic jurisprudence, both Sunni and Shi’a, that flourished in that country and inspired modern Islamic reform.

The processes through which one moves from a locally based practical apprehension of the common good to the level where it is debated in the wider public sphere create various and often fractured forms of public Islam. This process of gaining access to public spaces and shaping them is delimited by discursive traditions—including religious ones—authorized speakers, and the state. It has often been the case in the history of the West that religion has been privatized, as the Church and various Protestant sects were increasingly placed at the margins of public authority and set apart from direct influence on matters of the state. As Casanova (1994) argues, various sectarian movements in Europe played a major role in developing the idea of the modular self, empowered with a moral conscience and confronting the authority both of established religion and the state. In this European trajectory, only when the freedom of individual conscience is recognized and tolerated can a public sphere develop. It is, nonetheless, a more general argument that religious ideas and

practice can foster through different paths the emergence of the public sphere, and we seek in this volume to show the ways that this has taken place in the Muslim-majority world.

The generative source of public Islam is the articulation of the common good in social practice in ways that cannot be captured by the predominantly European dynamics of privatization or deprivatization. There was no Church or churchlike establishment in the Muslim world to disestablish. In an essay on the so-called “inquisition” (mihna) initiated by Caliph al-Ma”mun in 833, lasting until 848, Nimrod Hurvitz (2002) shows how the effort of four successive caliphs to support by force—through the torture and execution of dissidents—the belief that the Qur”an was created, in spite of intensely held popular support for the contrary view that it existed forever, was doomed to failure from the start. The mihna involved both a struggle over people’s imaginations and a contest over boundaries of authority. The result of this struggle—the suppression of the heinous tribunal—was gradually to establish and endow with authority the public space in which men of religious and legal learning, the ‘ulama, could define religious belief and practice and set limits to a field of public action in which subsequent caliphs and temporal rulers intervened only with caution, and in general only to protect society against religious extremism. The modern fundamentalist cry that “religion and state” (din wa-dawla) have always been one and the same in Islam is not borne out by Islamic history, in which there has been a de facto separation of public religion and state authority since at least the eleventh century (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 46–47, 55–57).

It is important to incorporate historical and contextual accounts of ideas of public reason and shifting notions and practices of public life and social exchange in the Muslim majority world and elsewhere, rather than to assume, as has often been the case, that there is a single ideal form of the public sphere for all contexts and times. Ideas of the public are historically embedded and have strong links with culturally shared senses of self and community. They are situated at the strategic intersection between practice and discourse. In the context of the contemporary state, modern techniques of authority, persuasion, and control also shape ideas of the public sphere. Such techniques often promote a secular outlook of citizenship and social membership, but these usually coexist with the enduring vitality of religious traditions and the emergence of new socioreligious discourses and leaderships that intersect with and challenge nation-state projects.

How do these developments match views of the public sphere premised on the existence of a religiously neutral, indeed “secular” threshold of access to public debate? Some ideas of “secular” divest participants in public exchanges of their religious and cultural identities, or at least marginalize these identities. But the creation of a public culture promoting exchange and discussion can involve deliberation over issues of common interest, through the invocation of traditions of religious, moral, and legal discourses. It can also encourage the gradual emergence of ever more abstract patterns of membership and citizenship that rest on obligations and rights which increasingly fit a legal vocabulary and a contractual view of society.

Such developments, including the discontinuities between tradition and modernity created by the emergence of a “culture of publicness,” have been the focus of interest of political philosophers, social scientists, and historians alike. It suffices here to mention such diverse authors as Giambattista Vico, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Alexis de Tocqueville, Ferdinand Tonnies, and John Dewey. These thinkers have concentrated on developments in Europe and North America, developments that are specifically Western in our view but that they regarded as exemplary of universal trends.

The contributors to this volume explore the forms that ideas of the public take in social spaces inhabited and shaped primarily by Muslims—and increasingly in a world in which national, territorial, and cultural boundaries can be readily crossed. They also show how engaging Islam through associations and media communications facilitates more often than it impairs change through various trajectories, dynamic tensions, and background understandings of accepted social practice—to use Taylor’s (1993: 213) term, the “social imaginary” of cultural understandings shared by a given people.

This book links the idea of the “public sphere”—a key concept in social thought and social science—to the formation, transmission, and shifting nature of Muslim traditions past and present. Thus in the eyes of some observers, Muslim majority societies—notwithstanding the experience of countries such as Indonesia (Hefner 2000)—are not fertile ground for the development of public debate over the common good. Although the idea of the public sphere has been developed to date primarily on the basis of the European and American experiences, it has often been criticized for not adequately representing the complexity and nuances of developments elsewhere. By focusing on the role of the public sphere in diverse contemporary and historically known Muslim majority societies, we suggest ways in which understandings of the public sphere can be enhanced and developed to encompass the evolution of societies in the non-Western world.

This book has two goals. It suggests answers to how the idea of the public sphere, applied to Muslim majority societies and to Muslim communities elsewhere, contributes to the main currents of social thought, and links these currents to Islamic studies. This book is also intended to encourage those engaged in thinking about historical and contemporary issues concerning Islam and Muslim societies in different parts of the world to look across boundaries of region and academic discipline and to integrate various disciplinary approaches—including history, anthropology, political science, and philosophy—to areabased knowledge.

The editors, like many of the contributors, have become increasingly disenchanted with the presumption that secularism and secularly oriented practical rationality was the exclusive normative base for “modern” public life (Eickelman 2000; Salvatore 1997, 2002). Some of the contributions to this book suggest how religious thought and practice in the Muslim world inspires rational-practical orientations as much as do secular approaches to social action. Some practices, including Sufi (mystical) disciplines (Pinto, Chapter 8, this volume),

interact and sometimes clash with different forms of secularism as incorporated in the ideologies and practices of most states within Muslim-majority societies or where Muslim minorities live (van der Veer, Chapter 2, and Zaman, Chapter 6, this volume).

For both the nineteenth century and the contemporary era, the contributions to this volume seek to identify the norms of exchange and discourse that are the product of these interactions and clashes, and also the creation of a variety of explicit and implicit Muslim forms of civility and publicness. This in turn requires an effort to discern the social history, or genealogy, of the emergence of a sense and structure of public communication and participation in societies shaped by Muslim cultural, religious, and political traditions (see Chapters 4 and 5, by Kirli and Frierson, in this volume).

The present period differs from earlier ones in the speed, intensity, and large numbers of people involved in pushing the contours of tradition, but the publics of an earlier era were equally engaged in doing so. The reshaping of religious identity and forms of communication and publicness in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire is especially important in this respect. Kirli and Frierson focus principally on Istanbul, a city inhabited by a religiously, ethnically, and linguistically diverse population who outnumbered the Muslims for a good part of the Ottoman era. The most commonly held assumption is that the confessional communities of the empire lived separately, with minimal reciprocal interaction, and developed social bonds and allegiances exclusively within their own communities. This assumption diverts an appreciation of the mobile and relational aspect of community relations in Ottoman Istanbul, and it says little about the people's sense of identity and of collective allegiance. These two chapters also suggest how an understanding of the ongoing transformations of the Ottoman Empire from the nineteenth century to the present can facilitate a better grasp of the possibilities for change in the contemporary Muslim majority world.

The collective historical experience of coexistence among Muslims and non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire can be analyzed on the basis of their common interests as members of a vibrant society. In India, the relation between Hindus and Muslims is crucial to the development of ideas of secularism and religiosity in relation to the public sphere. In such an historical and interreligious perspective, the forms of public Islam in the twentieth century appear as contingent crystallizations of much more complex historical processes. For example, imperial encounters have been of great importance to the historical development of public debate in the metropole as well as the colony (van der Veer, Chapter 2; Kirli, Chapter 4; and Frierson, Chapter 5, this volume)—a circumstance that the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003 brings once again to light.

Notwithstanding this diversity of experience, most Muslims share inherited conceptions of ideas of the common good. These shared ideas of the past shape contemporary understandings of publicness in Muslim societies (see Eickelman and Salvatore, Chapter 1; Zaman, Chapter 6; and Didier, Chapter 7, this volume). For example, although Islamic

religious scholars, the ‘ulama, claim that God reveals the ideas of the common good to humankind, they also regard these ideas as discernable primarily by themselves—men with expertise in the science of scriptural hermeneutics. Nonetheless, these religious scholars debate vigorously among themselves about what the common good entails. Moreover, they are rarely the only participants in this debate. Their authority remains strong in the modern world, but is increasingly challenged by alternative religious authorities that often lack formal training in the traditional religious sciences. Even the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on two conflicting principles, the absolute sovereignty of God (Principles 2 and 56) and the people’s right to determine their own destiny (Principle 3:8) (Islamic Republic of Iran 1980), thus opening the door to wide debate over issues of government and society. Within Sunni Islam, it is also becoming increasingly common for “lay” personalities to lead the Friday prayers at mosques. Thus like the state, the ‘ulama rarely maintain a monopoly over the implicit understandings and formal ethical pronouncements guiding the Muslim community.

The increasing accessibility of the new media, including satellite television, the Internet, and new uses of older media such as video- and audiocassettes and CDs contributes to fragmentation of the traditional structures of religious authority. It also facilitates innovative ideas of religious authority and representing Islam in public in unexpected ways (van der Veer, Chapter 2, and Anderson and Gonzalez- Quijano, Chapter 3, this volume). Several contributions to this volume show various combinations of fragmented and sustained old and new forms of religious authority and influence in the public sphere, making debates about what constitutes “good” or authentic Islam much more competitive than has been the case in the past.

One of the paradoxes of modern Muslim publics is that despite this discursive expansion in many Muslim-majority states and communities, the public good is increasingly defined within the parameters of Islam. Some states, such as republican Turkey, vigorously sought to domesticate and neutralize Islamic institutions and ideas, yet current Turkish politics are defined by a mutual accommodation and tacit bargaining, as the guardians of secularism and those who participate in Turkey’s public sphere and civic life learn to accommodate one another through public debate and practice (White 2002). As Adelkhah (Chapter 10, this volume) indicates for Iran, the most powerful part of the women’s movement is not formal and recognized organizations, all monitored and repressed by the state, but women’s activities in the informal economy and in shaping religious practices. As in the French revolution, Adelkhah argues that such “informal” activities can be at least as powerful a vehicle for changing gender roles and ideas of Islam as explicit ideological statements and formal organizations. In all cases, Islamic ideas of the common good shift in content and elaboration over time and, despite explicit denials, may often converge with Western understandings of such major issues as democracy and tolerance for religious diversity (Hefner 2000; Sulaiman 1998). Thus the role of Islam in shaping understandings of the common good is unlikely to recede in importance in the years to come.

Muslims participate in crafting the idea of the common good in a variety of ways, and they also contribute to shaping the definitions of wider and more inclusive public goods in

societies where Muslims are not a majority, as in Europe (Khosrokhavar 1997; Kepel 1997 [1994]); or, as in Syria and Turkey, they are confronted with a profoundly secular elite; or, as in Iran, with an increasingly unpopular, although powerful, clerical elite (Adelkhah, Chapter 10. this volume). In India, Muslims live in a secular state strongly buffeted by religious extremism (van der Veer, Chapter 2, this volume). Such historically known and contemporary debates argue against efforts to find a single, overarching idea of the common good shared by all Muslim societies, even if some ideologues—both those claiming to represent Islam and those attacking it—make such essentializing claims. It is often the case that such debates or conflicts about what "good" or "true" Islam entails disrupt implicit or even camouflaged conceptions of the public sphere, as in many communities throughout the Muslim world (Didier, Chapter 7, this volume). The analyses of these debates and the contexts in which they occur throw into relief competing claims to speak in public, revealing threads of consensus and points of divergence or rupture.

The participation of religious authorities in public religious debate cannot be understood without an analysis of the audiences to which their discourses are directed and the elements that connect the followers of religious leaders to their persona. The new media, including sermons on tape, popular journals, and local radio broadcasts, may combine with more conventional media (including gossip or published fatwas, or religious interpretations) to widen spheres of participation and make them more complex. The degree to which the participation or influence of these new audiences alters conceptions and implementation of the common good, however, is a question that must always be asked rather than assumed (Eickelman and Salvatore, Chapter 1, and Frierson, Chapter 5, this volume). New authorities or speakers emerge in the space between the state and more traditional religious authorities, and thus come to represent alternative points of power.

Religious authority can be an essential part of the construction of public religious discourse in many different ways. For example, the participation of Sufis in public religious debate combines modern forms of conceptualizing and presenting religious arguments with membership in a hierarchical and intensely personalized religious framework. The public articulation of the common good does not require the equality of all participants in order to raise a claim to truth and justice. The relationship between religious authority— whether claimed by traditional religious scholars or by "new" religious intellectuals (Roy 1994 [1992]) —and the public sphere is therefore profoundly ambiguous and much more complex than conventional Habermasian theories, in spite of their theoretical sophistication, would make us believe (Pinto, Didier, and van der Veer, in this volume). Even in places where there is a state-sponsored Islamic ideology, as in Pakistan and Iran, individuals, groups, and communities often appropriate this ideology to reinforce their position in public religious debate by claiming Islamic credentials for defining the common good, or furthering particular interests in the guise of shared ones—a device common to public spheres everywhere.

Well before September 2001, the growing number of Muslims in Europe and North America had begun to address questions about national identity, citizenship and multiple loyalties, as in France and in Germany. Events since then have further foregrounded the vulnerability of

Muslims living in the diaspora. At times this has lead to efforts to organize for more effective participation in the political life of the societies in question, and at times has lead to waves of self-estrangement, exposing the fragility of multicultural discourse. In these cases, some elements of public Islam become primarily a defense against the contingencies of global events and diaspora society, much as did the Black Panther movement in America in the late 1960s and a movement by the same name that developed shortly thereafter among North African Jewish Mizrahi immigrants in Israel in the 1970s. Even in such a predicament, however, a positive outcome of double estrangement with the home and the receiving societies is to encourage engagement with transnational Muslim causes, especially where Muslims are the victims of human rights abuses. Therefore, the fragilities of the diasporic predicament, exacerbated by the events of September 2001 and subsequently, might in the long run reinforce participation in transnational Muslim publics (Werbner 2002a, 2002b).

The contributions to this volume suggest that there is no singular public Islam, but rather a multiplicity of overlapping forms of practice and discourse that represent the varied historical and political trajectories of Muslim communities and their links and influences with societies elsewhere. Some elements of the approach underlying the chapters in this volume indicate that debates in the public sphere and about the common good encompass both words and practice. They are also profoundly shaped by new practices, new forms of publication and communication, and new ways of thinking about religious and political authority. The contributors to this volume intend this book as a significant port of entry for anyone wishing to understand Islamic debates and practices related to ideas of the public sphere and the common good as they have developed in the past and as they are elaborated and reproduced in modern social and political contexts.

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* Part I: The Public Sphere and Religion in Contemporary Societies

** Chapter One: Muslim Publics{1}

Dale F. Eigkelman and Armando Salvatore

*** The Precolonial Muslim-majority World

The ideas of public accountability and political belonging are not recent in the Arab or the Muslim-majority world. Consider, for example, the oath of allegiance (bay^ca) to the ruler in precolonial Morocco. In that setting, political “belonging” was not based on unquestioned belief but on a continuing process of contest and reaffirmation. From at least the fifteenth century onward, Moroccan monarchs circulated almost continuously throughout their domains. In these royal progresses (harka s) with their entourage, they embodied their personal authority in constantly shifting locales, including the four imperial cities of Fez, Marrakesh, Meknes, and Rabat (Geertz 1983 [1977]: 136—37).

The legal and popular dimensions of the bay‘a shed light on the nature of Morocco’s precolonial public. Bettina Dennerlein (2001), for example, discusses the October 1873 oath of allegiance in Fez to Sultan Mawlay al-Hasan. The artisans of Fez insisted on making the bay^ca contingent on the abolition of certain non-Islamic taxes. The men of learning (‘ulama) and others (notables, and military leaders) who drew up the bay‘a agreed to this provision, although a few days later “certain people” prepared to reinstate the tax. Learning of this development, the tanners of Fez and their followers attacked and plundered the residence of the tax administrator, who took refuge with his family in the shrine of Mawlay Idris, the patron saint of Fez.

A month later, Mawlay al-Hasan announced an amnesty for those involved. When the sultan himself arrived in Fez in April 1884, however, he ordered the non-Islamic taxes restored. Again conflict erupted. This time the royal army besieged the rebellious quarters, killing and pillaging until the inhabitants again accepted the same taxes as had been levied under the ruler’s father and predecessor, Mawlay Muhammad ibn ‘Abdarrahman.

The bay^ca documents that Dennerlein analyzes indicate the contingent nature of collective identities. Kinship, social status, locality, and occupation were all “possible organizing principles for the construction of political belonging.” An important element in achieving notable status was the ability—whether as judge, military leader, descendant of the Prophet (shanf), head of a guild of merchants or artisans, or tribal leader—to secure loyalty and obedience to the ruler. Bayfa documents were read aloud in public in every town in which they were prepared, generally in mosques. Some represented collectivities, others prominent notables, and the texts of various bay‘a s were circulated throughout the monarchy.

The specifics of these texts varied, but the standard components included elements affirming the ruler’s legitimacy and at least implicitly limiting him to rule according to the precepts of Islamic law and “generally accepted standards of how a ruler should act” (Dennerlein 2001: 309). Another element venerated the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, the shurafa[>]. As Dennerlein concludes, the bay^ca “obviously did not represent a contract freely agreed upon between equal parties and creating mutually binding, immediately obtainable rights and obligations.” Neither, however, did it merely justify autocratic rule by the sultan. Its significance “lay in its contribution to sustaining and acting out a sense of political belonging.” Recognition of the ruler was “rather the result of a combination of different forms and different levels of empirical involvement of individual and collective actors with a particular discourse on political ruler in Islam.” Religious discourse was rarely used to delegitimize a particular ruler, but it “nevertheless created a certain space for debate.” It also indicates that the various social actors were “actively” involved in sustaining the sense of political community (Dennerlein 2001: 310).

The practical workings of the precolonial bay^ca in Morocco point to the existence of a premodern public sphere, offering a wide-ranging flow of discursive social action. In this public sphere, members of the social body monitored one another and acted through a combination of at least partial consensus and a shared hierarchy of leaders of influence. There were some formalized institutional arrangements, such as pious endowments (awqaf), but informal and pervasive patterns of influence, responsibility, and shared expectations were equally important. These arrangements offered a framework for discourse and practice that extended beyond households, villages, and immediate localities, facilitating discussions of the common good and of shifting, continually contested, boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.

The public sphere is thus not limited to “modern” societies. It is the site where contests take place over the definition of the “common good,” and also of the virtues, obligations, and rights that members of society require for the common good to be realized. This emergent sense of public goes hand-in-hand with the sharing of norms that define ideas of community and the responsibilities of those who belong to it. The idea of the public sphere is thus a

wider and at the same time more specific notion than that of civil society. As Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (2002: 141) explains:

<quote>£££civil society entails a public sphere, but not every public sphere entails a civil society, whether of the economic or political variety, as defined in the contemporary discourse, or as it has developed in early modern Europe through direct participation in the political process of corporate bodies or a more or less restricted body of citizens in which private interests play a very important role. We do indeed expect that in every civilization of some complexity and literacy a public sphere will emerge, though not necessarily of the civil society type.£££</quote>

In claiming that the bay^ca in precolonial Morocco suggests the existence of a public sphere, we encounter a limitation, noted by Eisenstadt, that is still at the core of much current social theory. In spite of the fact that several historical and anthropological works on Africa and Asia have shown the elements of transaction and legitimacy present in clan, lineage, and tribally based collectivities, social theory still foregrounds developments in Europe to the detriment of other world regions (see Chakrabarti 2000: 3—6). In the introduction to his sociology of religion, Max Weber (1920: 1) stated that his interest was to explain the combination of factors that resulted in European uniqueness. Later scholars were less cautious. They used European institutions as the comparative basis against which to measure social and cultural institutions elsewhere.

Even if he did not intend to create a yardstick for interregional comparison, Jurgen Habermas, whose name is closely associated with the idea of the public sphere, sees as its essential element the historical emergence in Europe of “rational-critical” discourse among the “reasoning public” of eighteenth-century bourgeois society (Calhoun 1992: 7). The vast international echoes that Habermas’s argument gained after the translation of his book into English and after the fall of the Soviet Union have made his argument on the public sphere an equally powerful token of Eurocentrism in social theory.

*** The Public Sphere: Beyond Europe and Before Modernity

At its base, Habermas’s idea of the public sphere implies a realm separate from the formal structure of political authority and the space of households, kin, and, later, the European “nuclear” family. Habermas defines the public sphere as “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private citizens assemble to form a public body” (Habermas 2001 [1989]: 102–103). In a notion that can be traced back to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), the public sphere is for Habermas ideally an intermediate space in which ideas are presented on their own merits by self-reflective moral subjects rather than as emanating from authorities such as preachers, judges, and rulers.

Authority is vested in the public sphere itself. In it, all participants have in principle an equal opportunity to persuade others.

Even for early modern Europe, however, the early Habermas neglected the role of religion in the development and expansion of the public sphere. For example, he ignored the movements of pietism and religious revivalism that were so successful in different parts of Germany, including Prussia, as well as in Scandinavia and other Protestant-majority parts of Western Europe. These movements instituted a sense of legitimacy through congregational forms of deliberation, as opposed to the dominant state-bound Lutheran churches. In later writings, Habermas acknowledged that the process through which norms are produced, which reflect general interest and create an "overlapping consensus" in society, can only be rooted in tradition, familiarity, and culture, through which individuals internalize the procedures of consensus. This also applies to "those who do not belong to the lucky heritage of Jefferson." The communicative presuppositions for generating such a consensus are not the privilege of a particular culture (Habermas 1992: 84—86).

In emphasizing the "rationality potential" of communicative action rooted in the "life world" as the generating source for shared notions of justice, Habermas (1992: 62—77) in his more recent writings has made a major contribution in showing that there is no inherent reason why the notion of public sphere has to be restricted to an idealized European bourgeoisie. Building on Habermas's work in discussing the eighteenth century and later periods, Casanova (1994: 56) reminds us of the "public and political posture of free, congregational, 'leveling,' non-conformist sects or of any disestablished religion ready to clash with an unjust and sinful state."

Although the complex relationship of the Enlightenment to movements of religious renewal was known to European thinkers before Habermas, and has been increasingly evidenced by historians after the translation of Habermas's main work in English (Salvatore 1997: 26), prevailing theories of modernity and modernization in the midtwentieth century assumed that religious movements, identities, and practices had become increasingly marginal to modern societies. These conventional assumptions have also until recently blocked the search for distinctive public spheres in "traditional" societies in general and "Muslim" societies in particular. Ernest Gellner (1994: 211), for example, regarded Islam as imposing "essential" constraints on the conduct and thought of those committed to it. Similarly, consolidated frames of interpretation of the evolution of the Ottoman Empire discouraged consideration of continuities between the religiously legitimated empire and the ensuing secular republic. New approaches to social, political, and economic history point instead to how the Ottoman Empire initiated many of the underlying developments of modern Turkish society, including changing notions of belonging, land, and territory. Modernity as a process antedated the republican era (Meeker 2002; Duben and Behar 1991; Frierson, Chapter 5, this volume).

*** Discerning the Public

In The Public and Its Problems (1927), John Dewey (1859—1952) argues that in no two ages or places is there the same idea of the public. By “public,” Dewey means an institution with recognized common goals and at least an informal leadership, so his notion anticipates Habermas’s concept of the public sphere. Dewey (1927: 33) writes, “What the public may be, what the officials are, and how adequately they perform their functions, are things we have to go to history to discover.” When acting in the public interest, people behave neither like business or professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints. The state is part of this public insofar as it is seen as legitimately representing the interests of the community. The public is “organized and made effective by means of representatives who as guardians of custom, as legislators, as executives, judges, etc., care for its especial interests by methods intended to regulate the conjoint actions of individuals and groups. Then and in so far, association adds to itself political organization” (Dewey 1927: 35). Dewey reaffirms the necessary role of intermediary institutions and authorities, as against the emphasis that Kant and Habermas place on the freedom of the public sphere from the influence of such authorities. Admittedly, Dewey saw little future role for religion in public life, arguing that “religions now prevent, because of their weight of historic encumbrances, the religious quality of experience from coming to consciousness and finding the expression that is appropriate to present conditions, intellectual and moral” (Dewey 1934: 9).

Antagonistic to the role of religion in modern life, he argued instead for the pervasiveness of religious values, the rational-practical orientation of individuals and communities, that “introduce perspective into the piecemeal and shifting episodes of existence” and sustain the “implicit public interest,” turning into practice the human impulses “toward affection, compassion and justice, equality, and freedom” (Dewey 1934: 24, 28, 80—81). We argue that the dividing line between “religion” and “religious values” is not as hard and fast as Dewey claimed (cf. Ryan 2003: 43).

Dewey’s approach also offers an alternative to treating history in monolithic “chunks” such as “Pre-Axial/Agrarian,” “Axial,” and “Modern,” categories that inadvertently deflect attention away from how societies change. Political forms for Dewey (1927: 84) develop incrementally through “the outcome of a vast series of adaptations and responsive accommodations, each to its own particular situation.” He also cautioned against the idea of technology itself structuring culture. The invention of the printing press, for example, did not inevitably lead to democracy (Dewey 1927: 110). Yet at the same time, inventions such as the electric light bulb contributed vastly to restructuring the use of space and time, just as television has been crucial in constructing the leisure time of privatized and passive late-twentieth-century consumers. For Dewey, writing in the aftermath of World War I, the great transformation was the “machine age,” which had “so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified and complicated the scope of the indirect consequences” of vast, impersonal economic and political actions. The result is too many “inchoate, conflicting, and uninformed” publics, whose common interests are difficult to discern and construct (Dewey 1927: 126, 131).

If a sense of the public, including “local communal life,” can be established in the modern “machine age,” Dewey argued, then “it will manifest a fullness, variety and freedom of possession and enjoyment of meanings and goods unknown in the contiguous associations of the past.” It will be “alive and flexible as well as stable, responsive to the complex and world-wide scene in which it is enmeshed” (Dewey 1927: 216).

Dewey’s formulation of the public is more open and flexible than that of Habermas and thus can be applied to more historical contexts. Habermas himself has cautiously and indirectly recognized the value of Dewey’s non-Kantian approach (Habermas 1992: 211). Dewey highlights the features of “modern” society—for Dewey, the “machine age” of the 1920s—that distinguish it from earlier eras. At the same time, Dewey eschews the attribution of public to merely one type of society or historical era. He emphasizes the vast number of practices, habits, and responsive adjustments to different situations that contribute to shaping a sense of public based on overlapping interests.

The development of mass higher education in Muslim majority societies since mid-century (Eickelman 1992) and, more recently, increasingly accessible forms of communication and new media have played a significant role in fragmenting and contesting political and religious authority (Eickelman and Anderson 2003). But these recent developments did not call a public sphere into being. Instead, they contributed significantly to reshaping a sense and structure of public—based on shared inherited notions of “common good”—that was already available. The intensified fragmentation of religious and political authority characteristic of the modern era does not lead inevitably to democracy or “civil society,” but the transparency that recent developments—including rapid communications by telephone, fax, Internet, and a greater ease in travel—obliges even the most authoritarian of regimes to justify its actions. It also increases the scope, intensity, and forms of involvement in a multiplicity of overlapping public spheres. Human rights organizations, nongovernmental organizations, women’s rights groups, and religious organizations (including Sufi orders), among others, can operate more quickly and independently across national and regional boundaries in modern conditions. Actors in a repressive “homeland” public sphere can also enter more readily into contact with their “diaspora” counterparts, who often live in circumstances less subject to political control and intimidation.

The increased possibilities for transnational communication also contribute significantly to widening “homeland” public spheres. Some ideas of public can be intensely local; others can be transregional and transnational, expressing multiple ideas of group and community. Participation in the contemporary public sphere implies an openness and at least implicit pluralism in the sense of a capacity to act—or at least communicate—independently from state or ruling authorities.

*** Islam in the Public Sphere: Linking Past and Present

The significance of informal ties in creating a vital public sphere becomes more salient when we focus on accepted and socially legitimated means of accomplishing a task, rather than just on formal institutions authorized or acknowledged by some authority or ruler. These clusters of frameworks for reasoning and dialogue, shared understandings, and practices underpin the public sphere in any historical era (Taylor 1993: 213). Guilds of merchants and craftsmen, although recognized by the Ottoman administration, operated in an autonomous manner, punishing infractions by their members, defining acceptable practice, and settling disputes. Pious foundations (waqf; pl. awqaf) enjoyed a similar autonomy.

Due to their informal organizational character, Sufi orders, or religious brotherhoods offer an excellent locus for understanding historical shifts in the public sphere in Muslim majority societies. In recent centuries these developments have become increasingly entangled with European ones, although they do not necessarily follow the same trajectory.

Although informal, the ties between master and disciple in Sufism have a substance and concreteness as significant as such formal and legally recognized institutions as guilds, pious endowments, and mosque-universities (madrasa s). Acknowledging the change in political forms over time, anthropologist Abdellah Hammoudi (1997) argues that the master-student tie in Sufism serves as the key metaphor and practice by which authority is legitimated throughout the Arab world in general, and Morocco in particular, notwithstanding the formal trappings of parliamentary and other representative institutions since independence.

Hammoudi’s argument can be criticized for imputing to earlier historical contexts the social relationships of later periods. However, other historians show how many Sufi orders shifted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries toward more formal and hierarchical organization. This shift allowed some orders to serve as vehicles for social and political change (Levtzion 2002). In some cases the authority of the shaykh expanded beyond the narrow range of both the madrasa and the tariqa (brotherhood) and became a vehicle for internalizing Islamic norms in the wider society. Dealing with the early-nineteenth- century Sudan, Hofheinz (1992—93) pointed out how religious specialists with a high degree of formal schooling worked to spread the norms of scriptural Islam among the illiterate population of smaller towns and the countryside, as opposed to forming a more aloof scholarly or mystical elite. In a manner comparable to the Pietistic missions in the countryside in central and northern Europe, these movements inculcated the know-how needed to adapt emotionally and structurally to the wider socio-political transformations taking place as part of incorporation into the colonial system and the slow formation of nation-states. These transformations are part of what sociologist Norbert Elias (2000 [1939]) called the “civilizing process.” They consisted of the formation among wide sectors of the population of more or less uniform norms that helped anticipate the consequence of one’s behavior in wider society, and therefore created a sense of public interest.

In a similar vein, Sufi leaders and orders in Algeria, long discredited because of their reputation for compromise with French colonial authorities, reemerged in the 1980s together with Islamic associations as a backbone for collective action independent from both Islamic extremists and the state (Rouadjia 1990: 34, 59, 74, 111; Andezian 2001: 76—78, 86—88). As in the example of the Sudan in the nineteenth century, Sufism offered a template—as did other forms of religious association—for developing norms and expectations that encompassed social life in general and not just that of the religious order.

The common element among Sufi organizations in earlier eras and in the present is the tenacity of the master-disciple relationship and its potential for legitimating various forms of religious and political authority (Pinto, Chapter 8, this volume). Sufi orders reached out to a variety of constituencies, using not only madrasa Arabic but also its colloquial counterparts and the vernacular languages of different regions. Ruling authorities were often deeply suspicious of the orders because of their autonomy and capacity for independent action, linking the local with much wider spheres of influence. In fifteenth- century Morocco, for example, saints or “pious ones” (salihun) manifested not only a closeness to the Divine presence (walaya) but also exercised worldly authority (wilaya) (Cornell 1998). Saints embodied a just moral order. Both in practice (for living saints were prominent in North Africa as elsewhere) and as cultural metaphors, saints set limits to the abuse of authority and contributed to the creation of Morocco’s political order.

More generally, the innovative Sufi movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in many parts of the Muslim world, from the Maghrib to South and Southeast Asia, interpreted texts and practices far beyond the narrower compass offered by scripture- and lawbased religious scholarship. Sufi practices in this period increasingly favored understandings that were less oriented to the esoteric and mystical than to inculcating collective understandings and shared practices that could cut across lines of occupation, wealth, lineage, and region. These notions were still ambiguously poised between the disciplines of mystical self-denial and a more socially oriented disciplined participation in society (Gran 1979: 42—49; Salvatore 1997: 41—48). Still, these shared habits and practices contributed significantly to developing Islam as a principle of the social order.

Sufi “revivalism” in the last three centuries paved the way for a new conception of Islamically legitimated action in public life by implicitly developing the idea of the social Muslim. Sufism asserted the right of individual believers to experiment with the “truth” independent of the sharfa, or accepted practice and the conventions of legal scholarship. Sufi orders, often interconnected over large distances, were usually not directly political but offered a template for intervention in society independent from both the state and from local affinities such as tribe, village, or region (Reichmuth 2000). These orders often offered a secure social role and engendered a strong sense of interdependence. Several revivalist movements in North and West Africa even led to the foundation of new forms of political domination, including Sufi and Mahdist movements in Cyrenaica, Sudan, and Nigeria (Keddie 1994; Reichmuth 1996). These movements became increasingly active in politics—sometimes within major centers of learning and sometimes challenging the

established order. The neoSufi movements often grew in response to European political and economic domination, but responded equally to local developments.

Parallel to the emerging sense of social Islam engendered through Sufi orders by the eighteenth century, religious scholars and the general public alike increasingly began to see the sharfa as more than a specialized juridical-theological notion. The spread of printing, in particular, accelerated the standardization of texts (Robinson 1993). It also encouraged making the sharfa a popular trope rather than just a jurist's notion, encompassing the explicit and implicit, taken- for-granted rules, habits, and practices needed to live a good life as a Muslim. In Egypt, for example, by the late nineteenth century the concept of sharfa took on a new meaning as a template for reasonable, just, and expected social practice—in short, social normativity. In this sense, it acquired a meaning distinct from the concrete law applied by the courts and from the science of jurisprudence (fiqh) charged with making sense of it (Salvatore 2000). This discourse was illustrated and propagated by the rise of a print culture that increasingly incorporated issues of economic prosperity and their associated social and moral requirements into the public virtues of faith (Gasper 2001).

*** The Emerging Public Sphere in Muslim Majority Societies

Even in societies where religious expression and practice are strongly regulated or circumscribed in the public sphere, such as constitutionally secular Turkey—governed as of late 2003 by a political party strongly imbued with religious principles—and Ba'thist Syria, they serve as an important element of the background understandings for most members of society. Adapting such understandings to current social practice, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwan al-muslimun) emerged in the late 1920s to become what many observers still consider the only genuinely popular mass political movement in twentieth-century Egypt, reaching its heyday after the Israeli defeat of the combined Arab states in 1948. Royalist Egypt allegedly saw the movement as a sufficiently serious political threat to organize the assassination of its leader, Hasan al-Banna", in 1949. Two years after the 1952 Egyptian revolution, Nasser ruthlessly suppressed the movement for the same reason. Again in 2002, the Egyptian state indicted the movement as a threat to state security in spite of prior tacit approval for some of its key figures to participate in the parliament.

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was well organized for gaining popular support in an earlier era and served as a model for similar movements elsewhere. It retains a strong hold in Egypt. However, popular political and religious movements of more recent origin, including Lebanon's Hizbullah, Palestine's Hamas, and—for the sake of a non-Islamic comparison—Israel's Shas have adapted themselves to play a role in their respective public spheres. It is easy to think of such movements primarily in terms of their political influence. At their base, however, they appeal to their respective constituencies through their implicit and explicit invocation of shared moral understandings of social action. In the case of the

two Arab groups, the social base includes a primary commitment to social work or action (al-iltizam bi-l-amal al-ijtima'i). Morally and religiously inspired social action underlies the building of networks that provide assistance to the needy, basic health care, and education—services that the state often cannot efficiently provide. Such social action can be informally organized, based on affinities of shared habits, expectations, practices, and interests. It can also coalesce around formal institutions and associations. Such movements can also provide nonstate forms of arbitration and justice, media representations, and blueprints formulated for the entire national polity (see Deeb 2002). These associations provide dependable personal ties to cut through poorly understood bureaucratic regulations and indifferent bureaucracies. Religiously based charitable associations, focusing on a wide array of services (medical, educational, family welfare, and emergency assistance), play exactly such a role. They build initially on ties of local trust (Benthall 2000) and community, although they can also provide a base for subsequent political participation.

Such forms of religiously motivated charitable and service association involve an intricate web of informational and expressive transactions, which are constitutive of the public sphere (McQuail 1992: 2). They remind us that the public sphere is composed of more than agents who actively participate in specific institutions or associations, although the existence of such associations is an important element of the public sphere. Other groups lack formal organization and are clustered more on the basis of affinity. This is the case for the groups and activities associated with Fethullah Gulen in Turkey, for example. They lack central organization and coordination—an asset when elements of the state turn repressive and seek to seize assets and people—but their component associations and groups share a common moral orientation to action within society and polity.

An indicator of the dynamic, underlying values on which such informal and formal activities are based is the proliferation of what have been called "Islamic books," a style of writing that appeals to new audiences. These are inexpensive, attractively printed massmarket texts that address such practical questions as how to live as a Muslim in the modern world and the perils of neglecting Islamic obligations. Some offer advice to young women on how to live as a Muslim in modern urban society, and some take the form of popular catechisms. These books articulate basic questions bearing directly on the lives of average citizens. For example, do Islamic traditions and practices—subject to deep and traumatic strains and transformations, especially since the colonial era—still offer sure guidelines for how to conduct one's life, educate one's children, and participate in community affairs, mosque, nation, and community of Muslims worldwide? If not, how can such traditions or practices be restored or adapted to current practice?

Such "Islamic books" break with the cadences of traditional literary Arabic (and with parallel traditions in other languages widely used by Muslims, including Bangla, Urdu, English, and French) and instead are often written in a breezy, colloquial style. They often are sold on sidewalks and outside mosques, and since the 1970s have competed strongly with other types of books in the market (Gonzalez- Quijano 1998: 171–98). The more conventional sort of "grand" intellectual discourse continues, but is often confined to narrow intellectual

circles (Salvatore 1997: 219–41), or is displaced by that of younger intellectuals more geared to wider audiences, who situate themselves between the style of “Islamic books” and the highly restricted fashion of conventional religious scholarship. Equally pervasive are audio- and videocassettes, and popular preachers who have mastered the new media. Some of the more successful, such as Shaykh Yusuf al- Qaradawi, combine multiple media—personal appearances, books (often based on the spoken word), pamphlets, audio- and videocassettes, radio, television, satellite television, and Internet—to reach a variety of audiences.

*** The Public Sphere as the Site of “Shared Anticipation”

The transformations associated with the rise of modern nation-states, bureaucracies, and capitalist sectors within societies are related to a phenomenon that can be termed an “education into anticipation.” This notion builds on Norbert Elias’s (2000 [1939]) concept of the “civilizing process” and overlaps with the notion of habitus as “a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions,” a “generative principle of regulated improvisations that makes possible the achievement of infinitely diverse tasks” (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 78, 83). However, the notion of habitus downplays the importance of the “externalities” of discourse in setting rules of communication and interaction (Calhoun 1993: 73–74). Dewey offers a more comprehensive approach, arguing that shared habits and practice, mediated by discourse accepted as authoritative, allow a community to build up a sense of expectation about others.

Equally important are common forms of resistance to the state. Thus Iranian villagers, faced with the disruptions of the Shah’s White Revolution, developed shared practices to deflect or indirectly defeat state intervention in their affairs (Goodell 1986). Iranian youth born since the 1978–1979 revolution are also beginning to participate in a “post-Islamic” public space in which they increasingly ignore regime restrictions on dress, leisure activities, relations between the sexes, and other aspects of life (Khosrokhavar and Roy 1999: 143—205). Throughout the Muslim-majority world, as elsewhere, students learn not only the formal elements of the curriculum in school but also the hidden lessons of bureaucratic indifference, hierarchy, class, ethnicity, and gender identity. In the diverse, rapidly changing conditions of modern society, the state cannot provide guidance from above to shape all activities. More complex ways of inculcating and negotiating background understandings are needed to provide the “connecting tissue” of information, expression, and solidarity.

In drawing attention to the communicative and interconnected aspects of social life that we call the public sphere, Dewey shows how acts become public when their consequences, even if initiated in private, indirectly affect the welfare of many others (Dewey 1927: 13). For this reason, the state or the community also acts to regulate or to limit certain actions of individuals if these actions threaten the community. The public sphere entails awareness among members of a society that discrete acts have a general impact on others. Hence the sense of public is the means through which this perception of the consequences of actions is

generalized. People are “educated” into this perception, anticipating the consequences of one another’s actions. This is the point at which Dewey’s notion of the public and Elias’s of the “civilizing process”—despite their divergent theoretical concerns—show an interesting convergence. Shared anticipation is the condition of possibility of a public sphere.

The emergence of the public coincides here with the opening up of the circles of reciprocity and mutual obligations, which also allows for the crystallization of a notion of social welfare and general interest. The consolidated effect of the socialization that allows people to anticipate the consequences of their actions can also be called “moral agency,” a broader notion than citizenship.

Of course, media-mediated, mass forms of communication that are not face-to-face are also crucial to the modern public sphere. Schooling and television broadcasts (including interview programs and soap operas) contribute to developing a collective sense of anticipation and internalization of norms. These patterns of anticipation are crucial to debates on the common good, but they are not the whole story. Liberal political theory, as exemplified by Kant and Habermas, assumes that participants in the public sphere are engaged in basically free exchanges of opinions unrestricted by considerations of status or authority. Dewey’s approach requires no such idealism. For him, the public sphere is at once more dynamic and more fragile. Speakers and their audiences take a variety of background information into account and engage in a great deal of miscommunication and misapprehension.

In the context of modern, complex societies, shared standards of anticipation must still be based on ties that are perceived as local, even if these “localities”—taking advantage of modern communications—are not local in a geographical sense. Even in the 1920s, Dewey (1927: 216) called for a restoration of “local communal life,” a task perhaps technically easier today than in earlier eras. The public spheres of contemporary societies and polities are made up of highly diverse groups. These groups all possess a strong sense of local knowledge, but not always the same local knowledge, although they, like the public spheres to which they belong, significantly overlap. Modern public spheres are constituted through a frail, overlapping consensus based on shared mechanisms of anticipation. In the Turkish case, for example, nationalists may say that loyalty to the nation transcends all other identities. Yet, as Beller-Hann and Hann (2001: 22) explain, many other identities emerge from the “continuous flow of social interaction.” National identity combines with “identities of a more traditional sort, such as those linked to language, gender, family and religion, and with newer identities that people create in increasingly globalised marketplaces.” Moral agency does not necessarily operate with the same intensity or in the same way in all shared circles of consensus. For example, a media campaign to raise funds for relief work in Bosnia or Palestine, or to provide meat for the poor on Muslim feast days, entails dimensions different from those of a movement based primarily in a single locality.

Among the multiple modern public spheres, the nation-state claims primacy, prescribing models of homogeneous identity formation and ritual constitution for the whole community.

One key ritual, even in authoritarian states, is the general election. The complexity of social life, the modularity of identities, and the contest over primacy cannot be reduced to nor obliterate the importance of “warm” circles of community and obligation. Warm circles offer mutual trust and familiarity. They are also open-ended. They demand loyalty and imply reciprocity, yet loyalties are intersecting, overlapping, and inevitably divided. “Cold” circles of community—those that are formal, distant, and single-stranded—also make claims to primacy, but they are too removed from daily practice and concerns to secure the ultimate loyalty they claim. What is distinctive about the modern public sphere is the rapidity with which cold circles of community can sometimes merge with and incorporate warm ones, creating novel senses of belonging and identity. Thomas Scheff (1990: 22) argued that there has been a paucity of systematic studies of bonds of communal solidarity, with the result that Durkheim’s distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity—or for that matter the distinction between community and society—deflects attention away from the possibility that these two types of solidarity are often interwoven.

Inculcated and shared standards of anticipation, generated and transformed through habit and practice, often are conceived in terms of a stable “tradition” (Elias 1997: 67). In this form, they establish the cohesiveness of norms in modern societies. The reproduction and transmission of these norms always requires an endless capacity for creative adaptation. Nicolas Haddad, a major Egyptian reformer and “proto-sociologist” of early-twentieth-century Egypt, reformulated the tradition of adab (manners) in terms of acquisition of the skills necessary for “social commerce”—a notion that resonates with Elias’s underlying idea of the civilizing process. Haddad maintained that “unlike other species, man’s struggle for survival is associated specifically with two ideas: life expectancy (al-ajal al-madid) and quality of life (al-hazz al-sa‘id, literally, good luck). These two ideas come together in the concept of the future (al-mustaqbal)” (Farag 2001: 109). This new sociology—paralleled for the Turkish context by Ziya Gokalp and for the Iranian context by Ahmad Kasravi (Parsi 2000: 133–39)— was also a new program of education. Haddad’s examples of how normativity works—through teaching anticipation—evokes Gellner’s (1995) conception of building a “modular self,” a modern sense of responsible agency based on a distinction between different fields of social action and action within these fields. Gellner’s notion of the emergence of the modular self may be too regimented, but it presages the sense of “social agency” and the autonomous individual so crucial to modern societies (Giddens 1984: 314).

The way a sense of public is built into social interactions varies considerably with social context and notions of personality, responsibility, and justice inherited from older traditions. In the context of the contemporary nation-state, modern techniques of authority, persuasion, and control must be taken into account. These may limit the construction of a freely flowing sense of social agency. State techniques such as military conscription, policing practices, the perceived pervasiveness of informers, and modern schooling dramatically influence the sense of shared anticipations. In repressive regimes, this is done through persuading the public of the omnipresence of informers.

Less sinister forms of social control also abound. Discussion may often be “channeled,” so that the major media (radio, television, and mass-circulation newspapers) are carefully regulated in what is said and not said, while the “little” media, such as books and magazines of more limited circulation, are given considerably more latitude for expression. Modern censors and state authorities often allow some open forums for discussion, knowing that these media fail to reach the majority of the audience effectively (Eickelman 2003: 39). Not only the state, moreover, but also private organizations and interest groups seek to regulate and control their presentation of self in the public sphere (Jackall and Hirota 2000).

There are many forms of state, as Dewey says, but in most societies the modern state, whether authoritarian or liberal, is strong and pervasive, and there are continuing debates about the proper limits to state authority. The modern state says that it exercises censorship for the good of its citizens, and polices society for the same reason. Whether in Muslim-majority societies or in Europe, the state sets the stage and the rules of conduct. On the other hand, the state may be increasingly challenged or criticized. Such criticism may not always be effective and sometimes may be dangerous to those who utter it and to the state, but most state authorities are increasingly aware that their current secrets or indiscretions, and those of the past, may be the subject of public commentary and discussion.

The existence of a modern nation-state, however, does not inevitably lead to an open public sphere in which the discipline of shared anticipations (only part of which emanates from the state) and the possibility of deliberation on public matters emerge together. For this to occur, other social actors are needed who have some degree of autonomy, who are not instruments of the state (although detractors may impute this role to them), and who communicate through available and effective forums and communications media. The mix of resources will vary. In Syria, it may be the salons of established businessmen and intellectuals, gatherings known to state authorities but tolerated because they are not mentioned in formal media (Al-Azm 2000). Other venues include the new media, audio- and videocassettes, and photocopied leaflets, as well as coffee shops, mosques, and church congregations. They may also include secret or “nondeclared” associations (see van der Veer, Chapter 2, this volume). Just as secret lodges were important for the Enlightenment movement in Europe, organizations neither formally declared to the state nor reported to it often acquire a major significance. Sometimes the same people are involved in both kinds of activities. This was as much the case for French philosophes such as Denis Diderot as for Muslim reformers such as Muhammad ‘Abduh. In the end, however, not all authority ends up being absorbed into the public sphere. There is a constant tension between state and society over the space allowed for the public sphere.

*** Solidarity and Circles of Communication in the Modern Public Sphere

Communications within “warm” circles and the creation of public circuits of communication in wider, “cold” public spheres do not mark two different social types of public. They are crosscurrents within the same societies and the same or overlapping public spheres.

Consider, for example, Egyptian Islamic intellectual and media star Mustafa Mahmud (born 1921). His career, especially after he became identified with Islamic thought and practice, shows how expressive and informational transactions are linked to representations of social solidarity (Salvatore 2001). Mahmud's particular role in the Egyptian public sphere has been to articulate the scholarly discourse of 'ulama with the needs and practices of wider groups, contributing to a "reintellectualization" of Islam in an accessible vernacular form. Before becoming an Islamic intellectual in the 1960s, he was a secularist. Following vigorous protests from some religious figures, in 1956 state authorities confiscated his book Allah wa-l-insan (God and man) on the allegation that it spread atheistic and impious thoughts. By his account, he then began a journey in the search of truth that brought him "from doubt to faith" (min al-shakk ila-l-iman), the title of one of his later best-sellers. He began his "Islamic career" in the late 1960s with the publication of a Qur"anic commentary (tafsir). Its popularity was due to the inclusion of both the vocabulary of the natural sciences (Mahmud was a medical doctor) and the vernacular of everyday experience. This blend of religion, science, and common sense— and showing the consistency among them—proved a winning formula.

His public liked him because he helped them to identify Islam (erected against a wall of doubt elaborated by poorly understood but respected modern science) as a blueprint for social responsibility that transcended material and individual interests. By the early 1970s, Mahmud built up a successful television series, "Science and Faith" (al-ilm wa-l-iman), founded his own mosque, and created a charitable medical association. These actions legitimized his public discourse because the public—primarily Egyptians, but also Palestinians and Jordanians—knew that it was accompanied by concrete social acts.

Mahmud's rapid rise in popularity did not represent the ascendancy of "lay" religious authority over that of the 'ulama. His ascent and the crucial support he received from the Shaykh al-Azhar of the time, 'Abd-al-Halim Mahmud, shows how much he still depended on an implicit association with traditional 'ulama. Nor did the Egyptian public see his style of media authority as radically alternative to that of the leading television preacher of the time, Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli Sha'rawi (d. 1998). Mahmud's audience considered these two "stars" as different in style but mutually reinforcing. In Mahmud's heyday in the 1980s and early 1990s, his public also listened to him in a different way than they had listened in an earlier era. In an earlier period, Nasser spoke to audiences. Mahmud spoke with them. Families gathered in their living room to watch his program, so that he shared their domestic space. Invoking the master-disciple relationship of Sufism, some people who knew him only through television referred to him as "their" shaykh, a claim made more vivid by knowledge of his charitable works. In his clinics, some patients expected to be treated by him (although he had ceased practicing medicine decades earlier) rather than by the regular clinic staff. Whereas public figures such as Muhammad Shahrur and Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti of Syria represent opposing types with incompatible views, Sha'rawi and Mustafa Mahmud made more of a double billing of complementary personalities in Egypt.

The ability of some actors and messages to transform the “cold” sphere into a “warm” one, as Mustafa Mahmud successfully did, is characteristic of the modern era. This transformative ability is rapidly being accelerated by new interactive media such as the Internet and satellite television—media freed from many conventional state restrictions. The result is an intensified cross-cutting of messages. There has long been a de facto pluralism in the Muslim majority world, although sometimes masked by some groups and leaders asserting their leadership over the umma, the worldwide community of Muslims. Intensified communications have resulted in a sort of horizontal transnationalism of nonstate actors. This may be expressed in a concern for Muslim minorities, the boundaries of accommodation to non-Muslim majorities, and the permeability of the frontiers of Muslim thought and practice. The cross-cutting includes “Western” and “Muslim” circles of communication. The two circles often overlap and are mutually supportive. Debates over “being Muslim” can be intensely local or follow lines of language. They can also be regional or even global, as in a Kuwaiti newspaper debate over whether women should participate in the 1995 Beijing World Conference on women (Shahrur 1998). In these discussions and practices, “being Muslim” is never an exclusive identity, for one also has identities of family, language, nation, region, gender, and others that make identities situational and which also require pragmatic compromise and accommodation.

In modern societies, including authoritarian ones, there are other actors besides the state. For example, engaged Muslims who have the means to do so use media as well as the ability to support collective projects for the public good, creating vehicles for teaching others in words and in deeds how to be a good Muslim. This consciousness of media power and the partial accessibility of some media even in authoritarian sociopolitical contexts also provide alternatives to thinking of Islamic action in immediate political terms. It can equally mean contributing to the construction of an Islamically informed public as a more realistic goal than the establishment of a local or worldwide Islamic state (Yasin 1999: 75–83). This option also corresponds to a Dewey-like gradualistic (in Arabic, mutadarraj) view, which is also a pragmatic means of accommodating to authoritarian states or militant secularism. Following the World Trade Center bombings of September 11, 2001, David Martin (2003) argued against the idea that the relation between religion and modern society can be arrayed on a continuum ranging from minimal relations between the two, as “required” by the “Western Enlightenment,” and the maximal relations between the two, as found in “Islam.” An alternative view is that in all societies, including both Muslim majority ones and those of Europe and North America, religion can play an important role in providing ethical and moral guideposts to individuals as they take responsibility for their lives. This has been the case for liberation theology in South America beginning in the 1970s, and may be one of the currents paramount in the Muslim world today. Such an empowerment of individuals can motivate the actions of small but deadly groups of extremists. It can also support individuals breaking with authoritarian religious and political authority.

*** Conclusion: Whither Modularity?

Modern identities are basically modular and individualistic. They are often inculcated through formal education and state practices, but they always have to be socially sustained

and are subject to change over time. Modularity is never self-sufficient and self-sustaining, but needs underlying, horizontal, ties of solidarity without which social identity is ineffective. There are cultural differences in how collective frameworks of reasoning, or even a “public reason”, are distilled and legitimized out of these overlapping “ties that bind” and how they interact with the “firmest tie,” as Islam is called in the Qur”an (2:256; 31:22). On the other hand, in seeking to understand the link between the public sphere and Muslim identities, we see more than a pure politics of “identity,” of almost optional affinities, as is the case in the entitlement politics of certain U.S. and European contexts. Contemporary Muslim publics encompass the publishing business (magazines, books, and audiocassettes, and their networks of distribution), reading groups, relief associations, solidarity networks and political movements, and—of particular significance—the mosque and the collective Friday prayer and sermon. These media and sites combine in multiple ways. These Muslim publics are grounded in practices that emerge through the complex process of ingraining of Muslim traditions into modern social life. Eisenstadt’s (2000) notion of “multiple modernities” is one way of accounting for these different trajectories and relating them to the idea of the public sphere.

One reason for the importance of seeing continuities between the public spheres of the past and the present is to foreground the element of shared standards of anticipation that make public spheres— and in some cases, democracy—work. This chapter suggests some points of departure for understanding a variety of historical trajectories and cultural and religious traditions that can shape public spheres. It also suggests ways of accommodating some of the Europeancentered main currents of social thought to the variety of ways in which religion continues to play a dynamic, and often constructive, role in shaping public spheres.

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** Chapter 2: Secrecy and Publicity in the South Asian Public Arena

Peter van der Veer

Some authors conflate the notions of civil society and public sphere, while others distinguish them sharply and argue for one against the other (Calhoun 1993, Dean 2001). I think that the two belong together. In my reading, civil society comprises institutions and social movements that are independent enough from the state to be critical of it, and the public sphere comprises the spaces, sites, and technologies available for public discourse that is critical of the state. Both concepts carry overtones of liberal political theory. This is especially true of Habermas’s understanding of the public sphere, with its emphasis on a particular kind of secular rationality and subjectivity, excluding the not-yet-modern subject. Despite Habermas’s training in the Frankfurt School, there is much in his analysis of the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere and its transformations that is close to liberal political thought (Habermas 1989 [1962]).[1] His emphasis on freedom of expression combined with rationality of debate reminds one of John Stuart Mill’s famous “Essay on Liberty” (1982 [1859]). For both Habermas and Mill, it is clear that only rational adults can participate in this debate. Habermas writes about the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere in England without any reference to the British Empire. Mill, a colonial administrator, is more direct in his denial of the possibility that the colonized world can create and participate in orderly, public debate. The colonized are like children who have to be educated before they can engage in rational debate. Postcolonial studies have sufficiently shown that this “little England” perspective is a nationalist fallacy. For instance, in her discussion of the concept of freedom in Edmund Burke’s famous reflections on the corruption of the East India Company, Sara Suleri (1992: 24–75) demonstrates clearly how political theories about Britain in the eighteenth century were directly related to thoughts about empire. As I have argued elsewhere (van der Veer 2001: 3–14), imperial encounters have been of great importance for the historical development of public debate in the metropole as well as in the colony. The imaginary of the nation-state itself is a product of

global history. Moreover, it is important to highlight the imperial genealogy of the public sphere in order to understand better the current transformation from the national public sphere to a transnational public sphere. Keck and Sikkink (2000), for instance, rightly point to the antislavery societies of the nineteenth century as precursors to present-day transnational movements and advocacy networks.

Another significant congruence between Habermas's thought and that of J.S. Mill is that neither sees a place for religious argumentation or religious movements in the public sphere, since in their view religion is an obstacle to the freedom and rationality of debate, because of its absolutist claims on truth. Their assumption is that society has to be secular before one can have a critical, public debate. Habermas's public sphere is an ideal-typical construction that fits parts of liberal political thought, and this would explain why his later writings, focusing on procedural democracy, are close to the theories on rational argumentation in liberal democracies developed by the American political theorist Rawls, but antithetical to Foucault's fundamental critique of liberalism.

The limits of liberal political theory for understanding the world do not have to be outlined here, but nevertheless it may be useful to retain some aspects of the notions of civil society and public sphere insofar as they are productive in interpreting the social sources of self, community, and imagination. To do this, one may emphasize the element of "openness," publicity, and open debate that is so clearly conveyed in the German term Offentlichkeit, used by Habermas and translated into English as the "public sphere" in English. At the same time, one may look at the opposite of openness—secrecy—to understand better the nature of a space for criticism of the state.

The aspect of communication and the role of technology therein seem crucial for civil society and public sphere, but also for religion. In this connection it is interesting that Benedict Anderson (1983, 1999) has argued that one media revolution, the rise of print capitalism, has had a profound impact on the way human societies imagine themselves. Although his interest is in the rise of a secular national consciousness—crucial to the formation of civil society and public sphere—he also pays some attention to the ways in which religion has been transformed by later media revolutions. Not only the imagination of community is important here, however, but also the imagination of the "self." The mediation and virtuality involved in new technologies of communication, like the book and now the Internet, may have a profound impact on religious communication. Religion is not only mediated but is also crucially concerned with the forms and practices of mediation. According to William James, religion is founded on the subjective experience of an invisible presence. This may be true, but we only have access to that subjective experience through the mediation of concrete practices, such as speaking, writing, and acts of worship, while at the same time, these acts may be considered to produce the experience. There is a whole range of activities that induce religious dispositions and concern the relation between human subjects and what I call provisionally, for lack of a better term, the "supernatural." Crucial in that mediation is the relative invisibility of the supernatural or, perhaps better, its virtuality. There is always ambivalence in religious mediation about the addressee and the arrival of the message that is connected to epistemological uncertainty.

Not only are communication and “openness” crucial to civil society, public sphere, and religion, but also, paradoxically, so is publicity’s opposite: secrecy. Reinhart Koselleck (1988 [1959]) has argued in a book that appeared three years earlier than that of Habermas and became almost as influential, that the emergence of secret societies of freemasonry were crucial in the development of Enlightenment critique of the absolutist state.[2] In the mid-eighteenth century, the Masonic lodges saw an immense increase in membership and can be seen as the most important sites for the new sociability of the Enlightenment, besides the more public ones such as coffeehouses, clubs, salons, and literary societies. The important point here is that these lodges were able to erect a wall of protection for their debates and rituals against both intrusion from the state and intrusion from the “profane” world.

Religion is a privileged site for examining an aspect of secrecy that is simultaneously the opposite of the public sphere and foundational for it. Religious movements and religious sites are often suspected of secret conspiracy by the powers that be. And it is precisely the moving away from state institutions and official politics that gives possibilities for fundamental moral critique. It should be clear that this critique can take an unpleasant and terrorist form, as it did in the Jacobin ideology of the French revolution. This uncomfortable dialectic is what German theorists like Koselleck and Habermas were interested in after the Nazi period. The events after September 11, 2001, have put this element of secrecy and terrorism again sharply into focus. The al-Qa’ida campaign to attack in a number of covert operations what it perceives to be the hegemonic force of the United States has become a major challenge for the functioning of modern, liberal society in many parts of the world. The government of the United States has responded with a war on terrorism that furthers national security by limiting civil liberties and the functioning of the public sphere. The specific operations of the U.S. government within that war, such as the removal of the regime in Iraq, are, however, themselves legitimated by secret intelligence that is only partly revealed in the public sphere and put to democratic scrutiny. The theme of secrecy and public discussion in an open society is therefore wider and more fundamental than that of secret groups that have to be countered by liberal states that are controlled by representatives of the people. The debates in 2003, especially in Britain, surrounding the decisions to wage a war against Iraq without U.N. support, show its significance even after a military victory.

In this chapter, I first examine the emergence of the public sphere in colonial India as part of colonial modernity. Second, I discuss the use of Protestantism as a model for understanding the effects of the print revolution on other modern religions. Finally, I examine the dialectic of openness and secrecy in two major religious movements in South Asia today: the Tablighi Jama’at and the Vishva Hindu Parishad.

*** The Colonial Public Sphere

One finds a new configuration in the modern nation-state that allows citizens to follow different religions without immediately raising the question of political loyalty. The loyalty to one's king and state no longer follows from religious affiliation, but from national identity, of which religion can be one ingredient among others. Nationalism replaces religion in this regard, and one can come to nationalism by way of a variety of religious affiliations. Another way of expressing this is that in the modern era, religions are nationalized. Separation of Church and State does not lead to the decline of the social and political importance of religion, but with the rise of the nation-state there is an enormous shift in what religion means. Religion produces the secular as much as vice versa, and this interaction can only be understood in the context of the emergence of nationalism in the nineteenth century.

In India, the religious neutrality of the colonial state left the public sphere open for missionary activities of Christian organizations. A great number of Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh organizations emerged in the nineteenth century to resist the Christian missionary project. This dialectic of aggressive missionizing and Hindu resistance contributed to the formation of a public sphere in British India in the nineteenth century that is not at all secular. Secularity and religion receive particular historical meanings in this atmosphere of debate, however. The administration and upkeep of Hindu temples and rituals fell to new, emergent elites that used the British legal apparatus to create a new "corporate Hinduism" that was fully modern. These elites were not only interested in controlling Hindu institutions, which especially in south India, were quite powerful and immediately connected to political control. They also had a reformist agenda concerning religious education, ritual action, and customs that is crucial even today.

The colonial state not only attempted not to interfere with native religions but also did much to disavow any connection to the missionary project and to Christianity as such. One can indeed speak of a secularity of the British state in India that was much stronger than that in Britain itself. The British considered a sharp separation of Church and State essential to their ability to govern India. Their attempts to develop a neutral religious policy in a society in which religious institutions played an important political role could not be anything but ambivalent. In the management of both south Indian Hindu temples and north Indian Sikh and Muslim shrines, the colonial government remained involved, despite all efforts to the contrary. Nevertheless, externality and neutrality became the tropes of a state that tried to project itself as playing the role of a transcendent arbiter in a country divided along religious lines. Again, however, this did not contribute to a secular atmosphere in society. Indian religions were transformed in opposition to the state, and religion became more important in the emergent public sphere. As in Britain, religion was transformed and molded in a national form, but that form defined itself in opposition to the colonizing state.

The denial of participation in the political institutions of the colony led Indians to develop an alternative set of institutions of a jointly political and religious nature. Indians did not conceive of the colonial state as neutral and secular, but rather as fundamentally Christian. Similarly, popular conceptions of British rule, as evident in the Cow Protection Movement of the 1880s, portrayed it as having an alien, Christian nature. When in 1888 the North-Western Provincial High Court decreed that the cow was not a sacred object and thus did not have to

be protected by the state, the decision galvanized the movement not only against Muslims but also against Christian rule by “cow-eaters.” When the state started to use religion among its census categories, it came itself to be understood in terms of religious categories. Although the legitimizing rituals and discourses of the colonial state were those of development, progress, and evolution, and were meant to be secular, they could indeed easily be understood as essentially Christian. The response provoked by both the state and the missionary societies was also decidedly religious. Hindu and Islamic forms of modernism led to the establishment of modern Hindu and Muslim schools, universities, and hospitals, superseding or marginalizing precolonial forms of education. Far from having a secularizing influence on Indian society, the modernizing project of the secular, colonial state in fact gave modern religion a strong new impulse.

The development of a public sphere of debate, petitions, and pamphlets is in Habermas’s view the privilege of a literate, bourgeois public. In the later part of the nineteenth century this public sphere, according to Habermas, deteriorates in democratic mass politics, in which critical debate is replaced by agitation. Habermas raises the important issue of elites versus the masses. A number of studies explore whether we can speak of a rise of a bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century India or whether more fundamentally the category “bourgeoisie” is significant in a society that is stratified by caste and not by class. I would think that it is, and that it is signified by the emergence of a literate group of businessmen, educators, and administrators whose careers show the geographical range of imperial business. The spread of education, the improvement of transport, and the modern need for mobility make this possible. The fact that caste endogamy is still practiced does not mean that this is not a bourgeoisie, but it is a bourgeoisie fractured, as in many parts of the modern world, by ethnic and religious bonds. According to Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), the formation of the bourgeois individual has been incomplete in India because one does not find an interiorized, “private” self that is reflected in autobiographies, novels, diaries, and so on. This kind of formation of the self does belong to a particular Western history, of which Protestant Christianity is one of the most important sources. But although this is true, I do not take it to imply that there are no Hindu individuals or Muslim individuals with private selves and public personae, but that the discursive sources of the self are different. Moreover, there are a number of technologies of the self, such as modern education, novel writing, autobiographies, newspapers, and modern art, that emerge in India in the nineteenth century as they do in Britain. Similarly, there are technologies of public debate, such as pamphlets, petitions, newspapers, but also processions in public arenas, that emerge in India as carriers of “public opinion” outside of the older patterns of elite patronage and influence (Freitag 1989).

Partha Chatterjee (1993) has argued for the rise in India of another kind of private and public distinction under colonial rule. This is a division of the world of social institutions and practices into two domains—the material and the spiritual. In Chatterjee’s analysis, it is the private sphere of the household that is the site of spirituality and has to be protected against colonial materialism. Reforms of the household, female education, and the transformation of marriage practices, however, are all the subjects of public debate. The modern notion of spirituality that appears in the imperial encounter between Britain and India is not,

moreover, against materialist science. Hindu nationalists claim that science is part of India's spiritual heritage, and they find support among Britain's theosophists and spiritualists.

The rise of mass politics, of a politics of numbers in both the metropole and in colony, transforms the public sphere in major ways at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. In the absence of democratic participation, it leads in India to the development of mass agitation in the form of political rituals such as Tilak's Ganapati festival in Maharashtra. It also leads to the representation of Hinduism as a majority religion and Islam and Christianity as minority religions. In the context of a politics of numbers, questions of untouchability, Dravidianism, and Sufi syncretism acquire new meanings, and in this transformation of the public sphere the print revolution is of great importance. In the analysis of the transformation of religious communication through the print revolution Protestantism is often used as a model.

*** Is Protestantism an Appropriate Model?

Historical sociology has always highlighted the profound effects of the rise of the market for printed books on Christianity in Europe. The expansion of Protestantism is generally thought to have been connected to that historical phenomenon. Benedict Anderson highlights how central Luther was to the great expansion of the market for printed books in Germany in the early decades of the sixteenth century. Protestantism was the main product on the vernacular print market and created new reading publics, essential for the rise of national consciousness. Before the novel, we have the printed bible and the huge proliferation of religious tracts that enabled Christians to have direct, personal access to religious truth without the mediation of a class of priests; this even involved, in some cases, the abolition of a priesthood. What is important here is that the modern reading public is a religious public. This is true not only for the period of early Protestantism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries but also for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the centuries that witnessed the emergence of both a national and an imperial consciousness. Protestantism plays a role in the shift from hierarchical, mediated-access societies to horizontal, direct-access societies. As Charles Taylor (1998: 39) argues, hierarchy and mediated access went together in the ancien regime, and modernity implies an image of direct access. Like Habermas and Anderson, Taylor understands this within a larger narrative of liberation from religion. Protestantism is then seen as a step in the unfolding story of secularization. If one does not accept that story, however, it is possible to arrive at a better understanding of the religious public sphere and the religious subject under modern conditions of direct access through literacy and mass education.

Not enough has yet been done to understand the effects of literacy and the availability of a printed religious literature on the construction of the Christian subject and his or her communication with the supernatural. But study of the effects of developments like print and literacy on the construction of the Hindu or the Muslim subject has hardly begun. The consequences of low and gendered literacy rates like those in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and

India for the spread of certain forms of religiosity rather than others are insufficiently examined. What we find in South Asia is a not yet fully developed market for reading that competes with a rapidly expanding market for viewing films, videos, and television. In this and other cases, the ideal-typical comparison with Protestantism opens up certain questions, but forecloses others.

Nevertheless, there are a great number of interesting attempts to use the sociological interpretation of the rise of Protestantism as a model for understanding transformations in Hinduism and Islam. These studies emphasize the commonality of the search for the authentic authority of the basic texts and the circumvention of received authority by reading these texts directly or by reading pamphlets that refer to them. Crucial to this search is a religious notion of scripture as the ultimate source of truth. This notion is readily available in religions in South Asia such as Islam and Sikhism, and to a lesser extent in Buddhism and Hinduism. According to Gombrich and Obeyesekere (1988: 15—29), who use an explicitly Weberian approach, Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka derives its authority from the teachings of the Buddha as given in the Pali Canon. At the same time, however, they acknowledge the fact that the religious life of Sinhalese Buddhists has always included belief and action that was not authorized in Buddhist scripture. They describe the development of what they call a Protestant Buddhism, which stresses the authority of scripture as against that of monastic hierarchy, as well as the development of what they call spirit religion, in which divine possession is central and positively valued.

The status of scripture in Hinduism is even more complicated than in Buddhism. On the one hand, there is the great authority of the Vedic tradition but, on the other, that tradition can hardly be made available for moral guidance outside of the strictly ritual sphere that is dominated by highly specialized priests. Something similar can be said about more regional scriptural traditions, such as the Agamas that are crucial in south Indian temple practice. Nevertheless, even Hinduism has witnessed some quasi-Protestant movements, such as the successful Arya Samaj that advocates a return to the Vedic tradition while at the same time completely transforming it. Similarly, in south India there has been a strong lay movement to force Brahman priests to make a scriptural knowledge of the Agamas more central to their practice.

The comparison with Christian Protestantism is often forcefully made in the case of Islam. The attack on traditional Islam characterized by the veneration of Sufi saints may strike us as a Protestant iconoclasm. This attack also entails the undermining of the traditional authority of Sufi shaykhs and ‘ulama with the ascendancy of the literate middle class. Islam has in the Qur”an something similar to the Bible, a central scripture that can be used to give moral guidance, but it is important to observe that Qur”anic interpretation has never been carried out in one centralized authority structure like a church.

It is striking that the Islamic world rejected printing until the later part of the nineteenth century, and that it was only in the 1920s that the Egyptian standard edition of the Qur”an

rolled from the presses. Francis Robinson (1993) argues that the negative Muslim response to printing has to be explained by the nature of Islamic transmission of knowledge. He neglects the extent to which imperial structures such as the Ottoman and Mughal empires have been obstacles for the spread of print, but he certainly brings out an important element. For Muslims, the Qur”an is God’s word. It has always been transmitted orally. Learning the Qur”an by heart and reciting has for a long time been the defining feature of Islamic education in madrasas. This system is also the basis of the transmission of other knowledge. Written texts are only used as aide-memoire (often in rhyme) for learning by heart. The oral tradition passed from person to person, always with reference back to the original author, is superior to writing. Muslims only adopted print, according to Robinson, when it was felt to be a necessary weapon in the defense of Islam against the attacks of Christian missionaries. This emphasizes the fact that the idealtypical comparison with Protestantism should not obscure the real influence of Christianity on other religions in the colonized world.

The first Islamic books printed in South Asia, where one-fourth of the world’s Muslims live, were the revivalist books by Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi (1768—1831) in the first part of the nineteenth century. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, revivalists at Deoband in northern India started a major program of translating Arabic and Persian works into Urdu. This—and the emergence of Muslim newspapers—enabled an interest in things Islamic to extend beyond the South Asian region to a larger part of the Muslim world. The most important change was, however, the decline of the authority of the ‘ulama in relation to the well-educated laity. Their challengers were modernists like Syed Ahmed Khan, founder of Aligarh Muslim University, and Islamists like Sayyid Abu Ala Maududi, founder of the Jama’a-i Islami. Both were laymen who were not traditionally educated.

Although the ideal-typical comparison with Protestantism offers a number of important parallels with the history of other religions,

such as Islam and Hinduism, it is crucial to recognize that the place of scriptural authority and the nature of scripture are quite different in different religions and thus cannot be easily compared. If we can show that the authority of scripture becomes more important in a kind of Protestant revolution in a number of religions in the modern period, this does not imply that therefore the construction of scriptural authority has the same or even similar religious and political effects. Not only is the text different but also the context. The Protestant revolution is a sixteenth-century phenomenon in Europe that is not easily comparable to nineteenth- or twentieth-century developments elsewhere.

In the next section I examine the role of openness and secrecy as well as orality and visuality in two contemporary movements that are crucial in the transformation of the public sphere in South Asia.

*** Islam: The case of the Tablighi

At least two major developments affect the mediation of modern Islam: mass education and mass communication. These developments result in a certain measure of objectification and packaging of religion. Dale Eickelman (1992: 643) calls objectification “the process by which three kinds of questions come to be foregrounded in the consciousness of large numbers of believers: What is my religion? Why is it important to my life? and How do my beliefs guide my conduct?” Eickelman argues that the fact that a large number of people debate these questions is a distinctively modern phenomenon. He observes that engineers (like the leaders of the Islamic Virtue Party in Turkey), journalists (like Mawdudi), literary critics (like Qutb in Egypt), and Sorbonne-trained lawyers (like the Sudanese leader Hasan al-Turabi) have replaced ‘ulama as leaders of religious opinion. Islam, like Sinhalese Buddhism, has now seen the emergence of the notion of a religious curriculum and of a catechism. These developments are crucial in the “objectification” of religion. Religious statements become more explicit and less contextualized when broadcast on television and radio or put in general textbooks.

It is interesting that the new media simultaneously build on the earlier Muslim preference for orality and presence, and enable decon- textualization and objectification of religious messages. Eickelman (1992) points out that Islam becomes a subject that has to be explained or understood. Some local group’s particular understanding of Islam can become a subject of transnational debate thanks to the new media. Since religious and political activists often try to dominate the debate about religion in the new media, the control over the media is of paramount political significance. As elsewhere, states try to limit and control these debates, but they face great difficulties in doing so.

The objectification of Islam in mass education is paralleled by the packaging of Islam on television. In an analysis of the emergence of commercial television in Turkey in the 1990s, Ayse Oncu speaks of the “issuetization” of Islam on television: “Islam, as packaged for consumption by heterogeneous audiences, becomes an ‘issue’—something that has to be addressed and confronted—demanding each and every member of the audience to make a choice and decide where they stand, for or against” (Oncu 1995). Whereas the secular state television had made Islam invisible, as it were, commercial television packages it either as a “viewpoint” on a number of issues and thus part of democratic debate, or as a “global machination” that is a matter of international conspiracies. Oncu’s general point is that Islam is not any more something relegated to tradition or to “the bazar mentality of small town shopkeepers,” but through the packaging on commercial television is part of the culture of the present. The effects for Turkish politics, but also for the Muslim subject, are significant. Nevertheless, it remains important to realize that the so- called “impact” of new media on audiences is always multifaceted and complex as well as contradictory (cf. Anderson and Gonzalez, Chapter 3, this volume). Tradition is certainly not swept away by television, but television is an important new element in a process of transformation inherent in living traditions.

This argument about the centrality of mass media and mass education in Islam today is challenged in interesting ways by the most successful transnational movement in Islam: the Tablighi Jama'at. This is an internal missionary movement among Muslims, founded in north India in 1926. It is associated with the famous seminary of Deoband (with which the Taliban are also associated; see Metcalf 2001), but less focused on learning and more on simple preaching. Its origins are only understandable in the colonial context in which a politics of numbers and communal competition made it essential for both Hindu and Muslim movements to strengthen their ranks and numbers. Hindu purification (shuddhi) movements tried to "invite back" and reconvert Muslim communities that had recognizable Hindu customs. Movements like the Tablighi Jama'at tried to counteract this by asking such communities to reform their practices and become "good Muslims." Like the Jehovah's Witnesses, they go in small groups from community to community to "invite" Muslims to join them and perform simple Islamic tasks such as going regularly to the mosque and reading the Qur"an. They have annual gatherings, some of which, such as the ones in Raiwind in Pakistan and Tong in Bangladesh, are, except for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, the largest gatherings of Muslims in the world (some two million). There are three important elements in the Tablighi Jama'at discussed in this chapter —their attitudes toward media, politics, and the creation of a transnational space.

Research on the Tablighi is difficult because, unlike many Islamist movements, they put no value in media such as books, pamphlets, and certainly not video—or audio—tapes in spreading their message. They have some official publications, such as transcripts of lectures delivered by leading Tablighi, mostly containing simple short, edifying stories. There are also some hagiographies of the founder of the movement, Muhammad Ilyas, and some leading figures. This kind of literature is fundamentally antihistorical. Like stories of the behavior of the Prophet and his companions, they have value only as models for behavior. History is a worldly (duniyavi) pursuit and simply distracts from ritual observance (din). The message is spread through small groups who go to Muslims and speak to them. The focus is not on reading but on ritual observance. The movement is definitely secretive in its way of organizing. Communication between Tablighi activists is largely oral, and letters are destroyed after being read. Still, some letters have been retained, and this allows researchers to do some historical research on the spread of the movement.

Yoginder Sikand argues in his recent study of the Tablighi that, despite the turn away from reading, they remind him of the early Protestants. Like the early Protestants, Tablighi leaders call for stern self-control, hard work, thrift, a simple lifestyle, abstinence from excessive worldly indulgence, the giving up of wasteful customs and ceremonies involving great expenditure not sanctioned by the sharia and proper, measured use of time— all ingredients of an inner-wordly asceticism of the Protestant sort that Weber has described (Sikand 2002: 260).

What is indeed striking is the focus on individual, behavioral change connected with the creation of a unmediated public sphere of huge gatherings (ijtima^cat) and taking time off to go in groups

(jama^cat). It is a kind of pietistic quietism that wants to change the world (and make it a place controlled by Islamic Law) by transforming the Self.

To what extent does the Tablighi Jama'at belong to civil society and provide a space for criticism of the state? The answer is ambiguous, since the Tablighi explicitly do not want to be of this world and explicitly do not want to be political. Nevertheless, the movement's stress on personal matters such as "Islamic" dress and education brings it into direct confrontation with the agenda of the secular nation-state, which cannot refrain from intervening in the ways communities organize their lives. When Tablighi immigrate into Western societies, they cannot help but come into conflict with secular arrangements in schools and so on. Integration into secular societies is the opposite of what this movement wants to achieve. Their personal jihad may be less overtly political than the jihad of Islamist groups, but within the conditions of modern state formation it is still of great political significance. Khalid Masud (2000: 111—18) reproduces a 1971 letter in Urdu from a Tablighi missionary in Flint, Michigan, to the headquarters in Delhi that is full of severe criticism of the consumerism and racism of American society, which is, according to the letter, largely controlled by Jews. The ardent, deeply emotional tone of its condemnation is striking, and there seem to be two possible outcomes: rejection and passive pietism, or moving on to a more active struggle as offered in the Islamist groups.

The Tablighi Jama'at is the largest transnational Islamic movement in the world. Thanks to its universalist message, it can escape from the claims of national societies and play a significant role in providing models for migrant communities. The studies collected in Masud's volume show how Tablighi cope with the different circumstances in Canada, South Africa, Morocco, France, Belgium, and Germany. By being in a transnational space, these migrants can create a sphere of their own that is relatively independent of their daily breadwinning activities. This sphere offers them a dignity and routine that is unavailable in the leisure activities offered by the host societies. It allows for a moral condemnation of the state without taking any political responsibility, just as Koselleck (1988) describes the sphere of criticism in Masonic lodges.

*** Hinduism: The Vishva Hindu Parishad

The twentieth-century impact of media on religious transformation in South Asia is not limited to printed words, but is significantly broader in that it includes printed devotional posters, audiocassettes, videocassettes, movies, radio, and television. It is difficult to separate strictly religious communication with the supernatural from broader communal communication. The use of Sanskrit or Arabic (in the South Asian context) would safeguard the linguistic marking of the religious situation, but much of religious communication is carried out in vernaculars that in the second half of the nineteenth century have become increasingly communalized. David Lelyveld (1993) points out how vehemently contested the language of All-India Radio was before Independence, since Hindi was considered to be Hindu, Urdu Muslim, and Hindustani the syncretistic solution for an undivided India.

Similarly, in the field of music the interactions between Muslim and Hindu devotionalism are reinforced by the linguistic conventions of popular film songs. Themes and styles connect more strictly religious performances with broader popular ones. On the other hand, it is necessary to relate this broad interactive field of daily practice with discursive traditions that carry a debate about how to conceptualize textuality and visuality from a religious perspective.

In Hinduism, there are at least two elements in the debate about textual and visual mediation that deserve our attention. In the first place, there is the notion that the Word is God or that the utterance of the mantra is tantamount to the presence of the supernatural. Perhaps even more than in Hinduism, the power of the Word is explicit in Jainism where it is believed that the founder, the Jina, emanated a divine sound when he achieved liberation form suffering. All living beings in the universe turn to listen to that sound. That is why Jains refer to themselves as s hravakas, listeners. In Hinduism there is a complex theology connected to the transmission of the mantra and the divine character of powerful words. Because of the esoteric nature and secrecy of the transmission, there are serious limitations to the formation of religious communities that transcend guru-disciple networks. This is true even in the face of globalization, in which these networks are formed through the constant travel of gurus like Bombay's Swami Chinmayanand, the founder of the Vishva Hindu Parishad. This can be assisted by the new media and especially audiotapes and videotapes, as in the case of the Swadhyaya movement, which involves more than one million people worldwide (Little 1995). They use tapes by means of which the guru's sermon (pravacan) is distributed to the various centers in the world. Television sets are garlanded when the video is played, marking a sacred event. The circulation of the videos is restricted to group gatherings (satsangs). Despite these possibilities of global devotional gatherings, the importance of a personal relation with a guru continues to be a crucial element of mediation even in this form of Hinduism. Videos can enable the globalization of religious sermons and devotional gatherings, but they cannot provide the secrecy necessary for the transmission of the mantra. Wherever that relation is replaced or superseded by an unmediated relation with the Word, we see the potential for the formation of more stable groups, such as the Sikhs or the Arya Samajis.

The other element is visuality. This is a field in which mass media play a major role. Central to Hindu worship is darshan, or "sacred seeing." The viewing of a divine image brings one into the presence of the supernatural. Certainly some images are more powerful than others, so that indeed Hindus go on long pilgrimages to be in the presence of divine power. Also time is important in this regard: some spaces are more powerful at some moments. Nevertheless, the mass reproduction and dissemination of certain images have a strong influence on religious experience. To use Lawrence Babb's (1995: 3) terminology, it has made an increasing mobility of images possible. This in turn allowed for the spread of certain devotional cults not only spatially but also socially, beyond the social circles in which they originated.

The processes of objectification and packaging through mass education and mass media are not limited to Islam. Similar processes can also be detected in Hinduism. As in the packaging

of the Ramaya»a and Mahabharata on Indian television. Considering the significance of visuality in Hindu practices, it is important to note that television makes dramatic performances and mythical places, such as Ayodhya, visible in a way that is simultaneously decontextualized and “superreal.” For many centuries, pilgrimage to Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh was a regional affair of limited significance. “Ayodhya” of the Ramaya»a, however, has always been visited in the mind by those who read any of many Ramaya»as. This virtual pilgrimage received a visual actualization in the televised version of the Ramaya»a that helped the political packaging of Ayodhya. It is not simply a question of whether the televised Ramaya»a has replaced or marginalized the rich variation of popular performances of the Ramaya»a in India. I agree with Philip Lutgendorf (1990) when he argues that the televised Ramaya»a incorporates older forms of Hindi Katha and Ralrla traditions and that it should be seen as adding to that rich variation of performances. Central to it is darshan, and there for me is the crucial question of the form of mediation between the viewer and the sacred view. To transform the streets of Ayodhya into the sacred streets of heavenly Ayodhya (Saket) depends on a deliberate, meditative effort by the viewer, assisted by the priest or monk who takes him around in actual, historical Ayodhya. Or it depends on a particular, theatrical framing in a Ralrla performance. On television, however, viewing is not guided by theologically inspired meditative practice. Television’s melodramatic conventions may derive from Ralrla performances, but its virtuality relates in novel ways to religion’s virtuality by making the viewing “superreal,” but theologically undisciplined. To travel to Ayodhya by actual pilgrimage transforms a person into a pilgrim, but to travel to it by way of television transforms a person in someone who might have an opinion. In the end, it is these transformations of religious mediation that enable political interventions of the kind we have witnessed in India over the last decade. The major agent in these transformations has been the largest transnational movement in Hinduism, the Visva Hindu Parishad.

The Visva Hindu Parishad (VHP), or World Hindu Council, is of much later date than the Tablrghr Jama’at. It is an initiative taken in 1964 to “unite the Hindus” worldwide in order to recapture the Indian state from the Nehruvian socialists who dominated it and to prevent conversions from the Hindu fold to Islam. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) plays an important role in the VHP. This militant organization emerged in the 1920s and has been continuously involved in communal violence against Muslims since then. The ideology of the VHP is not much different from that of other Hindu Unity (sangathan) movements over the past century. It expresses the need to reassert Hindu dignity and pride in the face of alleged attempts of the state to secularize society and appease the Muslim community. It sees itself as an alternative to parliamentary politics in Delhi, but its organization, which depends on changing alliances between religious leaders, is very unclear and secretive. Its secular leadership, which derives from the RSS, depends on decisions taken in a public debate among religious leaders in what is called a

Parliament of Hindu Religion (dharm samsad) which convenes in one of the big Hindu bathing festivals, the last being the Kumbh Mela in February 2000 in Allahabad (Hindu name: Prayag), where more than twenty million pilgrims and monks convened for a holy dip in the Ganges. The tone in these meetings is highly critical and demands a change in the policies of the government toward the Hindu community. The

political role of the VHP is indirect but very important, since its campaigns have led to electoral successes of the allied BJP, which dominates the current Indian government.

The VHP had its first success on a terrain very similar to the one in which the Tablighi Jama'at originated: the context of mass conversion as part of a politics of numbers and communal competition. After the oil crisis of 1973, there had been an explosion of allegations and violence centering on the idea that conversions to Islam were induced, it was alleged, by oil money. The most important of such conflicts related to Meenakshipuram, a south Indian village in which an untouchable community converted to Islam in 1981. The VHP successfully mobilized some of the nation's Hindu majority by arousing fears of being overwhelmed by the Muslim minority, and saw its following increase to the extent that it could mobilize support for a far-reaching attack on the Babar Mosque in Ayodhya, which was destroyed in 1992.

In contrast to the Tablighi Jama'at, the VHP has nothing against the use of media for spreading its religious message. Although its religious leaders are ascetic renouncers, the movement also has nothing against acting in the world as such, but everything against secularism and Islam. It is highly conscious of the positive impact that the religious soap operas on Indian television in the 1980s have had on their campaigns. Moreover, as visuality (darshan) is a central medium of worship and communication in Hindu belief, its challenge is to capture this field of visual imagery in a market that is saturated with cable television broadcasting fashion shows, advertising, and music clips. The most interesting aspect of this is the way in which the VHP is able to capture both a peasant audience in rural India and an urban, middle class. It does so by packaging its message in campaigns that are modeled on Gandhi's Salt March and involve the traversing of the country by motorized processions that are simultaneously packaged in video messages and websites. The VHP is very astute in using religious symbolism in its campaigns. In doing so it is informed by the long Bollywood tradition of cinematic melodrama. An important aspect of this is its syncretism, the creation of a unified, national religion that can bridge the gaps between the various strands that make up the Hindu tradition. Not only is this new religious unity excellent for use outside of India, it is in fact created in a transnational space in which transnational migrants contribute to the transformation of religion at home. A guru in India can only be called successful if he can show support from Hindu followers abroad. These networks are enabled by constant air travel, like that of the late Chinmayanand, the founder of the VHP, but also increasingly by digital religion, that is websites where one can "click a deity," as in [[http://www.prarthana.com][www.prarthana.com]].

The VHP is a movement that is very active globally, and one of the prime agents of the globalization of Hinduism. It performs an important function for professionals who increasingly operate in this transnational space. I am referring here to what are called "astronauts," software engineers and entrepreneurs who shuttle from India to the United States to create and maintain a transnational service industry. In the United States, the VHP has been active since 1974, following sizable immigration from India. The anti-Muslim politics that is central to its activities in India does not make much sense in America, and is not emphasized. Antiglobalization rhetoric is also conspicuously absent from VHP

propaganda in the United States, since its supporters there are strongly in favor of the liberalization and globalization of the economy (Rajagopal 1997). As nonresident Indians, they have also direct personal advantage in the free flow of capital. The focus of the VHP in the United States is, as with many religious movements globally, on the family. Indian migrants struggle to reproduce Hindu culture in a foreign environment in order to socialize their children in the hybridity of Indian-Americans. Their fear is often that the children will lose all touch with the culture of the parents and thus, in some sense, be lost to them. Both Internet chat groups and youth camps are organized by the VHP to keep Hinduism alive among young Indians in America. As Arvind Rajagopal (1997) rightly observes, the VHP needs different tactics, different objectives in different places in order to be able to recruit members. In India, it is a Hindu nationalist movement, but in the United States it is a global religious movement. Arjun Appadurai's work on globalization has reminded us how important it is to keep these dis- junctures and differences in global flows in view (see Appadurai 1996).

The globalization of production and consumption, including the flexibility and mobility of labor, is addressed by movements like the Vishva Hindu Parishad and is a major element in their nationalist politics of "belonging." The idea that "symbolic analysts"—to use Robert Reich's (1992) term—are rootless because they are highly mobile misunderstands the imaginary nature of roots. To have roots requires a lot of work for the imagination (dream work). One element of that dream work is that pride in one's nation of origin is important in the construction of self-esteem in the place of immigration. It gives a different feeling to admit that one is from a country ravaged by famines and floods than to say with pride that one is from a superior civilization that is also very good in high-tech developments (see van der Veer 1995). The coherence of a Hindu modernity tied to the sovereignty of India's past and territory has gradually given way to a postmodern bricolage of deterritorialized and dehistoricized discourses on family values and cyberspirituality that is very hard to capture. Contrary to what their opponents think, these movements are not "outside" of modernity—they have been very much part of it and are now moving beyond it.

*** Conclusion

There are six general conclusions to be drawn from this discussion. First, the transnational public sphere today is the successor of a public sphere that in many societies is formed in the context of the interaction between empire and the nation-state. When one examines the colonial context of British India, one finds a public sphere that is perhaps better characterized as a public arena in which religious movements challenge the colonial state and each other. The form of criticism is not only debate, although public oratory (as for example in religious polemic, such as shastrartha in Hinduism), and pamphlets as well as lithographic posters are crucial, but also includes religious symbolism and ritual processions.

Second, religious issues and movements that articulate them are crucial in the formation of the public sphere. A politics of numbers in the context of democratic politics in a colonial or national state is the context of the articulation of religious issues such as conversion. The debates around them do involve critical, rational discussion of history and geography, but also violent attacks on the symbols of the other community. It is striking how many of current forms of mass mobilization in South Asia are prefigured in the colonial period.

Third, mass education, mass media, and mass politics are essential elements of the transformation of the public sphere. Religious movements, however, such as the Tablighi Jama'at and the VHP, challenge generalizations in this field. The Tablighi can easily communicate without a focus on reading and writing and modern media. The VHP continues some of the older forms of communication, such as processions, while also connecting to the religious melodramas in the mass media.

Fourth, transnational migration is a defining element in these new religious movements and in the emergence of a transnational public sphere. The technologies of transport and communication developed under the present conditions of global forms of production define the transformation of the life worlds of a growing number of people, but also the religious responses to it. It is especially the constant shuttling between countries of origin and countries of immigration that constitutes such a transnational field.

Fifth, technologies of communication, such as print or the Internet, create a new sense not only of community and the public sphere but also of the self. The act of reading in private shields one off from direct interactions with the immediate life worlds, while linking one to a larger world of virtual interactions. The same seems to be true for the Internet. The act of reading and writing constitutes the world of print but also the world of the Internet. The kind of virtual interactions enabled by the Web is characterized by indeterminacy and secrecy. The decentralized nature of the Internet even allows secrecy at the level of authorship, which copyright has made difficult in the world of print. Again, as in religious movements, it seems also that in cyber salons the play between publicity and secrecy constitutes a critical debate.

Finally, in the contemporary world moral visions with different genealogies clash in a transnational public sphere. These visions are communicated in media that mix the genres of the virtuous and the virtual. In an unbounded media landscape with mixed genres, terrorist attacks by engineers look like video games and the responses to it have a mimetic quality. Public debate itself about the virtues of imagined world orders (enlightened, Islamic, or otherwise) seems not to be able to escape the indeterminate, continuous, secret nature of contemporary technologies of communication (see van der Veer and Munshi 2004).

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** Chapter 3: Technological Mediation and the Emergence of Transnational Muslim Publics{2}

Jon W. Anderson and Yves Gonzalez-Quijano

Contemporary Islam is swept up in transformations that move discourse conventionally bound to institutions into more open “publics,” alter the balance of topics and emphases of public talk, and forge new alliances for cultural production, all the while attempting to exploit, expand, or renew ideas and discussion about what “being Muslim” now entails. These moves involve all media from down-market cheap print and cassette tapes to the mass market of satellite television and the increasingly transnational hypermarket of the Internet. These new media bring messages into the forums of mosque, madrasa, and other sites of conventionalized discourse of and about religion that range from religious courts to the more informal settings of lesson circles and others characterized by “lay” hosting. On the Internet, particularly, they range from “chat” groups, to old-line religious schools’ posting scholarly texts, to a mushrooming of sites dedicated to women asking for and discussing religious guidance. In these contexts, mediatized messages and channels complement, displace, and expand discourse of and about Islam, much as the arrival of print a century ago facilitated new people and ideas moving into the public sphere of Islam. Then as now, religious renewal movements, the rise of religious parties, increasing levels of literacy, and new modes of consumption facilitated by rising mass education are leading to a technological reshaping of the political economy of meaning. Both technologically and sociologically, the Internet represents a similar leading edge: it includes features of other media and forges a new public sphere through its capacity for potentially infinite linkages, notably within disapora populations but today also with a growing “native” audience, reshaping public priorities, interests, capacities, and practices deemed Islamic. As the print revolution fostered new classes, styles, and sites of Islamic interpretation complementing the ‘ulama-based ones of mosque and madrasa, the Internet provides a similar site and body of technical practice in the contemporary public spheres of the Muslim majority world. The aim of this chapter is to tie the emergence of new Muslim publics to particular forms of media.

*** Mediated Communication and the Public Sphere

Connections between media and the public sphere are widely assumed to be pervasive and profound, but the generalizability of models linking them is problematic. The basis of modern media studies is the general theory of communication first articulated by Claude Shannon (Shannon and Weaver 1949), who drew on new theories of information as the reduction of uncertainty to conceptualize communication in terms of improving choices (Rogers 1994). This had the effect of focusing on the enhancement of individual decision making or agency by receivers of messages, and in time converged with the development among European theorists of more reflexive “readerresponse” theories (Holub 1992) concerned with “completion” of messages in reading or their use as structural features of input loops. Such views applied particularly to mass media, with their structure of few senders and many receivers, and focused on analyzing the responsibility of recipients of messages, in both critical-deconstructive (European) and pragmatic-applied (American) perspectives on media. Manipulation, conscious or unconscious, critical or not, by but above all of receivers, is central in such perspectives.

Such narrowing of focus to receivers' agency and of its scope to effects on their choices, even in resistance and reflection, is sociologically weak. It discounts the material base and social fields of media and of communication generally, and treats the nodes in systems of communication as black boxes. More comprehensive interpretive approaches can open up the black boxes by providing fuller accounts of senders and receivers. Even these, however, can still fall short of accounting for the social life of media to the extent that they focus on messages in a unified fashion. Thus, an unreflective emphasis on "impacts" and global measures deflects attention from the social organization of communication and techniques of media (Anderson 2000). It also leaves aside accounts of the wider social settings that are the context of mediated communication, except to assume that they are modern. Where media actually "fit" is only thinly described, implicitly modeled on the mass media and generalized from their modern form (e.g., Lerner 1958), thereby limiting sociological analysis to the assembling of audiences and to identifying the public sphere with a consensus of opinion or market share.

In contrast to these approaches, the perspectives ofJurgen Habermas (1962) and Benedict Anderson (1990) start instead from the mechanisms of communication in the public sphere. Each places media in crucial, even causal, relation to the emergence of bourgeois public spheres, although neither is specifically focused on the media per se. Both focus more on the content of messages, although for some critics their approach is still insufficiently attentive to gender, class, and non-European experience. In particular, they draw attention to the social contours of media as the practical composition of the public sphere. Each locates the process in the social dynamics of the onset of modernity rather than in the later or "high" modernity of mass industrial society that is the focus of most media studies theory.

For Habermas, the public sphere has prototypical sites where relatively unrestricted communication flourishes and becomes established as a normative alternative, such as the salons and coffee houses of early modern European cities. In these locations, diverse people gather outside the restricted spheres of private domesticity and the public sphere of ritual communicative acts that enact privilege and justify status. Instead, relatively unencumbered by responsibilities for ritual representation, speakers' words and utterances must convey their own responsibility without the crutch of the speaker's status. Habermas's various elaborations of this view (most systematically in Habermas 1989 [1980]) have been roundly criticized for, among other things, disregarding gender distinctions, the implicit privileging of the bourgeois over other social classes, and equating "rationality" with "freedom" and even more narrowly with modernity (for example, see Calhoun 1992, Benhabib 1992, Fraser 1992). From an anthropological perspective, in which communication is seen as a socially organized process, the value in Habermas's analysis is less in identifying a public sphere of opinion, which is still problematic, than in identifying a more pragmatic sphere of communication relatively free from demands of status representation, particularly representation of authority (royal or ecclesiastical). Semiprivate but quasi-public in its original typesites, Habermas's bourgeois public sphere emerges structurally over time. It develops from an intermediate site between the private and the public into an arena of debate within a limited public identified with appropriate communicative skills, and finally as a generalized social space with a new and evolving kind of authority that is not fundamentally dependent on status and ritual responsibilities.

Another virtue of Habermas's view is that it is developmental, which makes it useful in contexts beyond the unfolding of early European modernity in which he set it, and which is obscured by retrospective views of the public sphere from within its later settings, which Habermas himself came to view with suspicion as a late bourgeois counterpart to earlier royal and ecclesiastical spectacle. The public sphere unfolds through practices that in time set their own generalized context. Although concentrating on responsibility to the exclusion of other issues, his concept of a bourgeois (as opposed to a royal or ecclesiastical) public sphere usefully calls attention to the relocation of responsibility in alternative sites of communication, and thus to its dispersal or—from the point of view of existing authorities—its dilution. A more serious limitation lies in its flattened view of communication that limits it to denotative rationality (Habermas 1989: 77ff.) that ultimately becomes a type of ritual, which was his point of departure.

Benedict Anderson compensates for this shortcoming in Habermas's theory by locating the origin of a public sphere earlier in creolization. Anderson's (1990) approach, like that of Habermas, is situational and dialectical but more strongly tied to an experiential and material base in an alternative sense of community (of dynastic states or religious identity) that became attached to shared linguistic practice in the earliest period of European expansion in Latin America and Southeast Asia. There, Anderson identified a new sense of community—of a "public" in Habermas's terms—in the experience of "creole journeys" on the margins of empire that found expression in the form and medium of "print capitalism." Anderson focused on how shared ideas of ethnolinguistic community emerged as seemingly "natural" with no experiential basis other than common language and a growing sense of "reading together" in a shared time-out-of-time.

His notion of creoles lacks a full linguist's sense that they are not so much mixed languages as intermediate speech communities; but it is sensitive to how language expresses identity and feeling beyond referential meaning, and to media. Central to his whole theory is the emergence of print capitalism—with forms and genres of writing from newspapers to novels to standardized "national" languages—as magnifying and focusing the experiences, practices, and techniques of creole journeys. The public sphere for Benedict Anderson—although he does not use the term, preferring instead to speak of "imagined community"—is thus a mediated one conveyed by and exemplified in media that separate messages from senders into a separate marketplace of and for ideas and alternative ways of expressing them.

Our interest is in the generalizable features of the close identifications of emerging public spheres with changing practices of communication and institutions of new media. Public spheres develop out of practices of communication that become instantiated in media, which in turn have careers that leave their own origins and originators of messages behind. State and market are part of this context, evolving with it and, as Anderson noted, beyond it to the point that they seem natural. The Muslim world today is experiencing something similar to Anderson's creole journeys in seeking to extend the margins of what being Muslim

can mean in the modern world, and something similar to the structural transformation of the public sphere that Habermas identified with the emergence of bourgeois consciousness as its frame. We would insist that this is a contingent and ongoing process that has to be placed in historical context to avoid anachronism. Key features of this development include the emergence of intermediate social-communicative spaces with media as their tools and expressions. These public spheres are mediatized in ways not predicted by models derived from mass media of mature modernity, but are similar to earlier print revolutions. We suggest the utility of directing attention to the relatively neglected material base and practical techniques of media and to the social milieus in which they become new resources or factors of production that help project communicative practices aligned with new—often but not always emergent—social strata. Social milieus, material bases, forms of communication, techniques of media, intermediate social spaces, and wider bodies of practice compose this public sphere and its habitus in the actions of individuals drawn to it.

*** The Media Ecology of Islam Today

The leading-edge communication technology in the Muslim world today is arguably the Internet. Less popular or less widely utilized than television, or even print, structurally it includes their features of multiple channels and thus of choice, to which it adds its own hypermedia of potentially infinite links. The ease of creating such links blurs distinctions between cultural production and consumption, and at a very low cost opens production as much as consumption to new participants and to deeper participation in cultural production through more interactive engagements than mass media provide. Early theorists of the social impact of the networked computing model in the Internet (for example, Pool 1990) put this as convergences of information streams, user control that reverses the mass media revolution, and the “death of distance” including social distance (see also Cairncross 1997). To the mass media world of few senders and many receivers, the Internet counterposes a many-to-many model of communications, interactivity, and an underlying mode of production more comparable to the early days of print than to the later days of broadcasting.

The Internet in the Muslim world likewise has a trajectory more like that of the print revolution than like broadcasting, which everywhere in the Muslim world was until recently a state monopoly and closely tied to the centralizing, nation-building states of the independence period of the mid-twentieth century. Widespread use of print came relatively late to the Muslim world in comparison to Europe and as a late-stage accompaniment to industrialization, urban growth, and modernization in the era of colonial domination. Print brought newspapers in a relatively developed form—not as shipping news, from which they originated, but as political news and commentary into which they developed under nineteenth-century “official” nationalism. Mechanical printing stimulated book publishing, including Islamic publishing, and the new voices that came, like newspapers, with projects to inform and to express sensibilities attendant upon or stimulated by challenges of modernization under the conditions of imperialism. Among their innovations was Islamic publishing in the vernacular and for what were no longer conceived as classically trained audiences (see Gonzalez-Quijano 1991).

In this new creole space, intermediate between classic and vernacular discourse and between secular rulers and the masses, the exemplary, defining figure might be Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935). Rida was the scion of Syrian village notables; he obtained both a religious and modern education and became a journalist in Cairo in the 1890s (Cole 1983). In a city of 168 periodicals and newspapers, he founded a religious journal with the aim of linking orthodox Sunni jurisprudence to journalism in order to “guide the faithful in the ways of progress and civilization” (Hamzah 2002). Hamzah describes his expository technique as a “discrete” and “discontinuous” journalistic style that Rida applied to writing about religion, in contrast to the intensely intertextual style of the ‘ulama, a style that requires their professional guidance to read. Although the content of his writings is about Islam, his style is not the rigorous demonstrative one of jurisprudential categories or of religious rulings (fatwa) but the “omniscient and omnipresent” style of writing in science or medicine (Hamzah 2002). Articles were in turn to be assembled into books, previously the domain of the ‘ulama, whom Rida invited to join him in his mission to free Muslim lands and institute a viable political system compliant with both Muslim identity and modern conditions. Hamzah points out that Rida’s approach also involved a knowledge of market conditions and required a determination to shape the public sphere through both commentary and public debate.

The result was thoroughly the product of a creole journey tied to an emerging public sphere, which Rida conceptualized as the “common good” (al-maslaha al-amma) that was forged partly through the new print media of his day and that found its way to India, repeated across the range of Muslim responses to British imperialism from Deobandi revivalists to Aligarh integrationists (Metcalf 1982). In this context, Rida is an intermediate figure, who collaborated with Muhammad ‘Abduh, a key leader of the Salafi renewal movement among nineteenth-century ‘ulama, and influenced the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, that came to define political Islamic activism in the twentieth century.

Rida’s efforts and the contexts they addressed help identify the material bases and social fields of a mediatized public sphere. The contexts include rising levels of education, but more mixed forms of education than the classical disciplines imparted in madrasa are implied by the alternative style of writing about Islam that aims to persuade on its own rather than by adherence to demonstrative conventions. Rida represents more than an alternative voice using a new medium. New vehicles of communication, from mechanical printing itself to the newspapers and the book trade (Gonzalez-Quijano 1991), were profoundly modifying the shape of the intellectual field as a mode of production, as well. Rida’s activities were part of the diversification of discourse of and about Islam initiated in the religious-intellectual field through a new medium (journalism) tied to a material base (mechanical printing) in a social context of rapid urban growth in a colonial economy that, more than fully formed institutions, was the setting of creole journeys like his that made the links.

Today, a similar pattern is playing out with the advent of digital technologies. Arabic word processing first appeared in the mid-1980s, which facilitated a recreation of Arabic

newspapers to reach a worldwide readership through the Internet. These range from the explicitly transnational al-Sharq al-Awsat, published in London since 1978, to the conversion of the Lebanon-based al-Hayat, to a fully computerized editorial process after 1987 (Gonzalez-Quijano 2003). Nearly every major Arabic-language newspaper now has an on-line edition, and hundreds of Arabic publications are available on the Internet: some six hundred are linked on a site, [[http://www.mafhoum.com][www.mafhoum.com]], maintained by a Syrian computer technologist in Paris. Preceding and surrounding this development is a burgeoning of publishing activity in venues small and large that include local and regional papers (Eickelman and Anderson 1997) and a new genre of modern "Islamic books" that address contemporary topics and are written in the vernacular (Gonzalez-Quijano 1998), all facilitated by the spread of personal computers and Arabic-language software.

The context of all this activity includes other media technologies. Since the 1970s and the period leading up to the Iranian revolution, sermons have circulated on audiocassette tapes, which are widely available in audio shops alongside popular music and oral performances of folklore. Religious shaykhs now routinely appear on television dispensing fatwas to callers, engage in question-and-answer exchanges with moderators, and offer formal televised lessons and Friday sermons, later sold on video tapes or even CD-ROM. These various media share a common body of technique and patterns of consumption as well as the technology. Religious texts and teaching materials, particularly for children, are widely produced by software companies, which often acquire the content from others and then "program" it much as they do calculus lessons or large text databases of secular material from parliamentary proceedings and government regulations to business guides and the archives of newspapers, such as currently on offer from al-Hayat. These new media combine production values and intellectual techniques shared with contemporary products of popular culture and what Starrett (1996: 11) has called a "functionalist" approach to education as training that imparts syncretic and highly creolized qualities to the Islamic discourse that migrates to these media. In turn, consumption of that discourse is set not only in well- established religious practices but also in the habits developed around commercial popular culture (see Hirschkind 2001).

This migration is importantly a function of another wave of people who join the new technology and contemporary Muslim discourse in the intermediate public space that their activities are forming. These activities range from conscious efforts like Rida's to open Islamic discourse to wider audiences through alternate discursive forms, broadening its authority, to the forging of new links and practical alliances not based on ideological motives but in the practices of organizing and delivering media on a market basis. These new links and alliances unfold in contexts where computer use and Internet growth are hemmed in by costs and limited infrastructure that initially shape the social field. Although the extension of Islam's emerging public sphere to the Internet is in its infancy, the Internet's "horizontal" format, in which peers comment on one another's ideas and arguments, especially among the rising generation, bypasses the more "vertical" hierarchies of authority and creates a public beyond earlier, established religious authorities.

Like the earlier print revolution, the Internet today involves a material base and social field that is already transnational. This includes the Internet itself, but also a recentering of the worldwide Muslim diaspora in a transnational sphere associated with middle classes, professional educations, and the global diffusion of an emerging industrial regime centered on practices of what are called “knowledge industries” (e.g., Pool 1990) or, more prosaically, on the service sectors that make it work and to a considerable extent are its work. Their roles and influence are both functional and expressive. Beginning in the 1980s, these middle classes acquired the skills and access to the technology before the national governments and ruling elites in Muslim countries from Malaysia to Morocco came (in the later 1990s) to see the Internet’s potential role as a development tool and as a potential development sector in itself (Anderson 1997). They were not only drawn to the Internet professionally, however, but also early claimed a place for Islam in it.

*** A Tri-Phased History of Islamic Media

At the time that the Internet itself was being formed in the 1980s, students who went from Muslim countries to leading Western universities and research institutes that were developing it soon followed the example of their colleagues by bringing avocational interests into what began as an engineers’ work tool (Anderson 1998). In pious acts of witness, they scanned and placed on line texts of the Holy Qur”an and hadith of the Prophet. These students and a penumbra of emigre and other diaspora Muslims who joined them on line engaged in often fierce discussions of how to apply Muslim rules and interpretations to conditions of modern life—particularly modern life in non-Muslim-majority societies that lacked many familiar reference points, extended family life, and public institutions. Their discussions were often focused on conditions of diaspora life in Western societies, international affairs, and practical issues such as how to find a mosque or a halal butcher, cheap flights home, or matrimonial services that betoken continuing links.

These discussions were characterized by an absence of contributions from ‘ulama, and they did not show much training in religious hermeneutics. Used to the methods of the physical sciences, contributors to these discussions had a habit of sanctioning interpretation by quick recourse to texts treated analytically as sources to be reasoned about objectively (Anderson 2003), much as Eickelman (1992) has described with the spread of modern education in Muslim countries themselves. This gave early on-line discussion of Islam a widely ranging character that, as much as the medium, attracted the attention of more conventional spokespersons of official Islams and of oppositional or militant voices as the Internet became more public with the advent of the World Wide Web in the early 1990s (Fandy 1999, Mandaville 2001, Sreberny 2002). Citing needs to present interpretations and views of Islam that they define as “correct,” Muslim governments and oppositional movements or parties began establishing publication-like websites that purvey more institutional views of religious establishments and of oppositions to them. Some classic dawa organizations brought their conventional apologetics on-line in a context of free-for-all ijtihad (see Bunt 2000). Most were also located in the Muslim world’s emigres to Europe and North America, where Internet expertise and infrastructure were available and were also being

tapped by Arab media conglomerates that were likewise establishing initial presences in cyberspace (Anderson 1997). Generally, these second-round Web sites were static, often directly transposed from other media, and preserved their formats and the diction of formal, official pronouncements.

This second phase is giving way to a more modulated one, orthodox in theology and mainstream in interpretation but more dynamically attuned to developing an audience or public on line. This phase takes technological advantage of the development of the World Wide Web to provide more interactive content and sociological advantage of the Internet's demographics to reach a transnational population of middleclass professionals. Their habits of work and often of leisure bring them on line for news and information that they extend to finding an Islam that is expressively and in its focus attuned to their interests, problems, resources, and practices of information seeking. These sites use the latest Web techniques of instant polling, searchable databases, on- the-fly formatting of results, and email queries to engage a base of users and build sites that respond to their interests and grow with them. This may include databases of fatwas and also of advice of a more social and psychological sort, material for religious instruction of children as well as formal sermons, news with a Muslim interest and other kinds of religious commentary on current issues. The format is shared with portals that organize and provide links to other sites and with newspapers whose on-line editions adopt continuously changing content, searchable databases, other query features, and user-modifiable interfaces that invite interaction of users with a website. Indeed, the style is indistinguishable from that toward which news, and newspaper, sites have evolved, exemplified in the completely online multilingual news portal, Albawaba.com, produced in Jordan.

These sites are distinguished by the ideological profiles they project and their practical profiles. An example is the website of Shaykh Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual authority of Hizbullah, in Lebanon, which has replaced Hizbullah's own earlier static collection of pronouncements and position papers with a growing collection of the shaykh's fatwas, sermons, and links to extensive Shi'a websites in Iran that provide access to libraries of digitized religious documents, including those produced by 'ulama. From the Sunni world, the website of Islamonline.net features perhaps the currently most famous Sunni preacher, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawr, and a cohort of other "young Azharis" (Zeghal 1999) who contribute sermons, fatwas, social and psychological advice, lessons, and commentary that is modern in expression, orthodox in theology, and middle-of-the-road in interpretation.

This fully bilingual site is produced in Arabic and English versions by a company in Qatar that also designed and maintains the website for al-Jazeera Satellite Television. Its content is produced in Cairo, where Shaykh Yusuf and his colleagues are based near al- Azhar University. Others range from strict Salafi and Wahhabi to Sufi "outreach," and from Iran's religious universities to hybrid organizations of local and national Muslim organizations in Western countries. Whatever their ideology, their styles are modern, engaging, and oriented to pious middle-class professionals who seek an Islam that is orthodox and accessible and that addresses how to lead a Muslim life in a modern society, whether Muslim-majority or where Muslims are a minority and immigrants.

These phases are not mutually exclusive. The first phase is characterized by technological adepts in diasporic settings who reached out through the Internet for a shared Muslim community, which they primarily found with each other. They were tied not only by the Internet but also to the world of universities and research centers that produced it and housed them and provided their skills and social base. This is a contemporary diaspora population that in addition to students includes professionals pursuing careers in adopted countries as well as exiles and other emigres. They place online an Islam of textual objects and intellectual techniques rooted more in professional milieus into which they have been tracked from early schooling than in the hermeneutics that is the forte of ‘ulama training and interpretation that requires them.

A second phase was dominated by content providers who restored interpretive contexts that surround the texts, and hence claims to interpretive privilege, both in traditional and in political Islams. Here, technological prowess took a back seat or was purchased, often from outsiders with additional media skills lacking among the technological adepts of the initial phase. Formal and formulaic expression returned, often in the conventional apologetics of da^cwa, or missionary (literally, call) organizations, but primarily in English, the lingua franca of the Internet—it was in but not of the diaspora. A third phase presents a coming together of content providers and programmers in a transnational population of Arabic speakers, Muslims, and modern professionals including modern shaykhs, who are at home with the Internet, with which many of them work and which some of them are building. What they are building is a transnational composite of business practices and religious outreach, both of which are mobile and can be produced from multiple locations, just as the Internet is consumed in multiple locations. Indeed, these initiatives open alternatives in cyberspace that may not be available locally and which produce a new “deterritorialized” Islam specific to the Internet (Roy 2002).

The result is not an interest-group Islam, for it lacks the sharp edges and singular focus distinctive to special interest groups and their activism. It is multidimensional, user-oriented, modulated to the settings and concerns of professionals, and set within the concerns of pious middle classes. It implicitly mobilizes Muslim traditions of choice in seeking guidance by providing more rather than less information through the linking capabilities of the World Wide Web’s technology, which is not only hyper-linked but also increasingly interactive. Above all, this is a social field of people on the move or potentially ready and able to move. Through cyberspace they find organized expressions of Islam and communities that are unavailable closer to home. In this respect, they mirror the model of the creole journey, forming a sort of inner diaspora that is a counterpart in the region to the diaspora outside it and in some respects continuous with it.

This is an “inner” diaspora in several respects. It is scattered in modern occupations and high-tech corners in the Muslim world, but rarely in numbers sufficient to constitute a local community with enough patronage to shape a distinctive religious profile. It is highly mobile population, like Benedict Anderson’s creole journeymen, or the technological adepts of the

first phase, but also able to pursue modern careers from their homelands through the Internet without emigrating, or in moves within the region or to neighboring countries and on shorter cycles than long-term international migrants. These practices carry over to seeking out others like themselves in cyberspace and extending to religious lives the habits of working with others at a distance developed through the Internet. The diaspora of the third phase is also inner, in that the process of bringing Islam on line that began in the external diaspora and centered on its characteristics comes full circle in a transnational public whose primary concerns are increasingly post-Islamist (Roy 1999; see also Kepel 2002).

The institutional side of this process is deeply enmeshed in the market, but in an unexpected way. Just as Arabic-language newspapers have not been commercial ventures but are supported by special interests, so also getting Islam on line has been an important motive and a source of support for companies that develop and provide services and products for Arabic text processing. In the experimental period marked by technological adepts, a fully searchable Arabic text of the Holy Qur”an was the first product of what developed into the largest Arab software firm with a full range of programs for processing Arabic text. Although some content activists turned initially to foreign firms, religious patronage has been crucial in developing the businesses that Arabize content, and crucial to businesses created to provide web hosting, site design, text-processing software, and graphics that today compose Web technology. Services that were often sought initially from foreign firms are shifting to local firms, which assemble their own network of suppliers that further embed the Internet in institutions and practices of the marketplace and make religious interests important factors in that market’s priorities.

*** Technological Mediation and the Public Sphere

Transnational Islam is recentering diasporic contexts, and in those contexts is linking new sensibilities of minority status to the concerns and habits of professionals, middle-class priorities, and marketplace practices. Much attention has focused on political and particularly on militant Islam; but contemporary Islamic-oriented discourse actually engages a much broader range of concerns and practices. It ranges over social, personal, and identity issues, psychological matters and behavioral issues, over questions of authority that are often implicit and made problematic by increasing choice. Indeed, it has been argued (Kepel 2002) that the discourse of political Islam is receding at least partly in favor of social and psychological discourses focused more on personal and behavioral issues than on political constitution and governance. If this is so, it is not yet clear how much it is an artifact of observation, although the observation gains strength as attention turns from intellectuals (for example, Moussalli 1992, Lawrence 1989, Rahnema 1994) to wider publics that would be called “lay” in Christian terms. Issues engaged in this context have focused on authority, its multiplication, and the dilution implicit in that. Evidence suggests that the range is broader still, and that it includes the techniques of media, from journalism’s pithy formats that feed the discursive style of political Islam to the capacities for linkage that make the Internet “smart” and increasingly interactive.

Little of this is captured in easy dichotomies such as Barber's popular "Jihad vs. McWorld" (1996) and others that would relegate Islam and information technologies to clashing sides of a great divide or project one as the impediment of the other. Such formulas draw on too narrow views of both Islamic activism—not to say of Muslims— and information technology that not only excise their histories but also miss the real sociology of their intersections. Those intersections include the spread of mass education and before that of print in Muslim countries, on the one hand, and the diasporas of Muslims, on the other hand, that increasingly extend to mobile professionals in the global information economy. They also miss the more interesting contribution of religious patronage in actually developing this information economy, both internationally and in Muslim-majority countries, and the contemporary internal diaspora of professional middle classes that it unites through the medium of information technology.

In drawing these processes together, it is easy to overstate the role of new media. Muslims throughout the world have multiple channels for religious expression and for seeking religious guidance. Many such messages, and messengers, "migrate" to new media, whose contribution is to delocalize choices and voices. In this sense, newer media join older ones as channels for religious expression and outreach, but do not necessarily accept all their established conventions. Each has a material base, a corpus of practices, and a network of actors who produce them. Migrations of Islamic discourse into new media are accompanied by vernacularization, whether in print or on television or on the Internet, and by their location in the market space of commodities (Starrett 1995, Gonzalez-Quijano 2003: 72–76) rather than as circulated ritual objects. Thus, an Osama bin Laden might pose before a library of bound classical commentaries while recording a video message in ordinary Arabic, whereas the traditional 'ulama deploy classical Arabic and a more esoteric diction that recalls books that are out of sight. Not apparent on the surface but implicit in such migrations and the transformations that accompany media- tization are altered conditions of cultural production that bring new skills, practices, and habits, and a new constellation of actors to the media ecology of Islam.

Applying models of mass media to the Internet aligns modes of consumption but not their modes of production, which with the Internet reduce social distance between producers and consumers. The Internet joins the mass media of modern print and broadcasting by adding to an already expanding range of choices for consumption. In this model, a newsstand, a television with fifty or two hundred channels delivered by cable or satellite, and the Internet are equated as media characterized by choices, which in modern media theory express the agency of actors (Rogers 1994). Such comparison makes them contemporary, but at the expense of recognizing the different stages at which each is present. Print is relatively mature and broadcasting a maturing medium in comparison to the Internet, whose early stages are not yet obscured by years of later development, history of reconceptualization, and reflexive understandings that have their own lives.

One important history that is obscured by the comparison to mass media is the technological development of the medium itself. Here, the Internet stands apart in that the basic technologies diffused quickly and then experienced local development, not just application, in context that already included the print and broadcast computing technologies, mass education, and economic globalization which particularly privileges the technologically adept and the knowledge worker. Development, which had commenced in Arabic text processing that made on-line Arabic newspapers practical, has been followed by Internet-servicing businesses that draw support from religious customers and utilize the highest available Internet technology to service their needs and capabilities to interact with users, who are not just an audience but also a community, this time in “cyberspace.”

More than a century after the widespread diffusion of print technology in the Middle East, cultural production under conditions of globalization also ties the Internet particularly to a diasporic sphere. The Internet revolution is fluid, transnational, and connects stocks of knowledge, common orders of practice, and similar social actors. Islam on the Internet began in the diaspora; and the Internet increasingly resonates in Muslim-majority countries as a channel for expressions, interests, populations, and projects of an inner diaspora that is the late modern counterpart to early modern creole journeys. Likewise, its habits and techniques are the practices of the emerging public sphere that is transnational, not because it is Muslim but because those practices are.

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* Part II: The Historical Emergence of Publics in the Ottoman Empire

** Chapter Four: Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the Nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire

Cengiz Kirli

*** Informers and the Making of Public Opinion

If it were possible to travel back to Istanbul in the 1840s to find out what was going on in the Ottoman Empire, not even the only newspaper that existed at the time, Takvim-i Vakayi, would satisfy your curiosity. It would reveal only the promotions and demotions in the higher bureaucracy and the accomplishments of the Ottoman state in a bland official narrative. Walking into one of the thousands of coffeehouses, however, would allow you to catch up with the latest developments and current events. Going from one coffeehouse to the next, eavesdropping on conversations carried out at different tables, you would feel as if you were turning the pages of a newspaper.

If you wanted to find out the intricate politics behind the promotions and dismissals in the bureaucracy, the coffeehouses along the Divan Yolu near the Topkapi palace would be your best bet. There, you could hear the internal gossip from the clerks working in these offices. If you were interested in learning about the latest developments in the near and distant provinces of the empire, you would visit the coffeehouses built into the dwellings of the inns in several districts of the capital. If you were curious about the state of trade in the Mediterranean, you would listen intently to the conversations of ship captains in the coffeehouses of Galata and the nearby small docks. Even information about the European states would not be beyond your reach. The places that would provide you with that kind of information were not the embassies in Beyollu, but rather the coffeehouses in Galata, where you could find residents and merchants from various European nations chatting about European politics, economy, and international relations.

The coffeehouse was essentially a place where coffee was served, but after its introduction to Istanbul in the mid-sixteenth century, it emerged as the most important site of public sociability—at least for adult males, if not for women and children, who were excluded from it altogether. As Lumieres, a nineteenth-century French traveler, said (in Georgeon 1997:

39), Istanbul looked like “a big coffeehouse.” There was one coffeehouse for every six or seven commercial shops, and perhaps as many as 2,500 Istanbul coffeehouses in the first half of the nineteenth century (White 1845: 282).

Throughout its long history, the coffeehouse as a ubiquitous place of sociability has served multiple functions. Coffeehouses were places of leisure where Istanbul men met, played games, smoked tobacco, listened to political fables told by story tellers, and laughed at the grotesque characters of shadow theater that displayed profanity, irony, and humor with a highly political subtext. They served as commercial venues where merchants struck deals, ship captains arranged their next load, and brokers looked for potential customers. They were occupational spheres where practitioners of different professions and trades frequented particular coffeehouses, where employers found new laborers and laborers found new employers. They were the nodal points of migration networks where new immigrants found temporary and sometimes even permanent shelter, and established contacts in setting up a new life in Istanbul. They also were spheres of manifest resistance and opposition. They were used as headquarters for the janissaries, the elite soldiers of the sultan that significantly shaped Ottoman politics from the seventeenth century until the corps was abolished in 1826.

Coffeehouses were the primary place where people gathered to talk and exchange news, information, and opinions. Modern means of mass communication such as newspapers did not exist until the late nineteenth century, but there was hardly a demand for them by the predominantly illiterate public. Nonetheless, this public had a dense oral communication network running through rumor and gossip, and the coffeehouse was at its center. Displaying an unending appetite to know and to inform others about the events affecting their lives, the people were especially curious about politics and affairs of state, even though they were supposedly not involved in political discourse.

What did they talk about? How did they make sense of the events affecting their lives? When it comes to ordinary people’s actual dialogues and conversations, the historian usually runs into a wall of silence. We are fortunate, however, in having access to an unusual set of documents in the Ottoman archives. These documents, dating from the period between 1840 and 1845, contain gossip, rumor, and hearsay told by Istanbul men about current events in various public places. In hundreds of pages, there are thousands of paragraphs, each containing the record of a comment or a rumor on various social and political issues. Upon close reading, it becomes clear that these documents were the reports recorded by spies and informers in charge of listening to anything said in public places.[3]

Given the relative absence of evidence reflecting ordinary people’s views on social and political issues surrounding them, these spy reports—jjumals as they were called then—are of exceptional value for providing that rare glimpse. They enable us to suggest people’s perceptions of, and reactions to, the rebellion in Egypt by Mehmet Ali Pasha, views on the new tax system, gossip about the new appointments in the

administrative bureaucracy, complaints about prices and living standards in Istanbul and in the provinces, attitudes toward other confessional communities in Istanbul and elsewhere, opinions about ethnic movements in the Balkans, and assessment of the Ottoman Empire's relations with European powers. In short, capturing the ordinary language of the people, these spy reports provide an ample opportunity to trace a distinct trajectory of public opinion in the mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire.[4]

Other than the reports themselves, our information regarding the details of this systematic spying activity is inadequate. We do not know, for instance, how the reports were prepared or who the informers were. What is certain, however, is that these reports occupied a central place in the Ottoman administrative system. As the cover page on each set of reports indicates, they went up as far as Sultan Abdulmecit (1839–1861). Each week the chief of police collated some of these public conversations gathered by his spies and presented them to the grand vizier, who in turn submitted them to the sultan to keep him informed about what was being talked about in public.

Informers were mainly stationed in coffeehouses, a perfect locale for the informer to "steal information" in the form of rumors, grumbling, and criticisms both from local residents and from transients coming from the provinces or abroad. In a rough estimate, coffeehouse conversations constituted half of the available reports. Coffeehouses played a central role in circulating information for the conduct of daily business in Istanbul, and for this reason they were the primary focus of attention for informers. However, informers operated in other settings, including barber shops, mosques, streets, public baths, lighter-boats, cemeteries, and even private homes and hotel rooms.

The lack of information about the informers prevents us from shedding light on how they were recruited. We do not know if they were trained employees from the security department or recruited from among the people. Some indicators scattered between the lines in the reports, however, support the assumption that the informers may have been recruited from among locals. There are several instances indicating that the informers were personally acquainted with the purveyor. Sometimes we find the informer sitting in a shop and engaging in a heated debate with friends, sometimes walking down a street encouraging acquaintances to talk, asking "What's the latest?"

It is also very likely that some of these informers were recruited from among coffeehouse keepers. An English traveler who resided in Istanbul in the early 1840s wrote: "Here the gossips and quidnuncs of the quarter assemble to discuss private as well as public affairs.... The coffee-houses are therefore watched by the police, and in many instances the cahvagees [coffeehouse keepers] are paid spies" (White 1845: 282).

The characteristic tone of these reports is monotony; the same narrative style is used throughout the reports. All begin with "it has been heard that" in such and such place, so

and so person said this or that. Some of the conversations are written in a dialogue form. The wording and composition of the reports indicate that the informers offer almost no personal interpretation; every word is in narrative form and seems to have been directly quoted from the initial author. Informers were not passive listeners, however. They would occasionally intervene as direct participants or ask questions to direct the conversation. To be sure, informers did not invent questions on their own initiative. They can be likened to modern questioners who conduct opinion polls. Undoubtedly, they were instructed to pull words out of people, and their reporting served to measure popular opinions on certain issues for the Ottoman administration.

Reading these reports, one is struck by the precision about who and where the rumors were uttered. There are almost no impersonal expressions referring to the authors. In these reports it is extremely rare to find usage of subjects like “they,” “people,” or expressions such as “they think that,” or “people say that.” Only occasionally do we come across the grumbling of a group of people, without any names mentioned. Details were so obsessively noted that it is not uncommon to find in which month, day, and even at what time the rumor was uttered. As for the people whose words were reported, not only their names and titles recorded, but also their occupations, places of residence, and even marital status. If the person in question was a transient, where he came from and where he was staying in Istanbul were also punctiliously recorded.

There is no indication that the purveyors of the rumors recorded in the reports were persecuted for their involvement in political discourse.[5] In other words, it seems certain that the reason for the reports’ persistence in individuating the source of a rumor was not to find and to persecute his purveyor. Surveillance of the public in minute detail by the state and the emergence of public opinion as a legitimate force in the business of governance are the constituents of the same historical process. In other words, the state’s appeal to public opinion inevitably brought about an active involvement of the state in people’s daily lives. In this sense, the operation of spying on the people in the mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire bore strong resemblances to, for example, spying in eighteenth century France or the late- nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire during the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876—1909). In the latter, however, the chief purpose of spying was the denunciation of subversive political discourse and its perpetrators, although capturing public opinion was also an important concern (see Farge 1995, Darnton 1995: 232—46, and Darnton 2000). Inevitably, the vast majority of such police reports recorded only those who were, at least potentially, criminals, and not the large majority of the population who went about their daily business.

The main purpose of spying on the people in the mid-nineteenthcentury Ottoman Empire, however, was to capture public opinion, evident in the spy reports’ apparent lack of concern to record sedition or subversion in order to build an indictment for criminal conduct. These spy reports are therefore not strictly conventional police reports, and at least potentially were more comprehensive in reflecting popular opinions than the spy reports produced in eighteenth-century France or the late-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire.

Now let us turn to the content of the reports and provide examples.

*** Mehmet Ali Pasha and Egypt

In 1840, the major topic of conversation in Istanbul coffeehouses was the war with Mehmet Ali Pasha, the rebellious governor of Egypt. Starting his long career as the Ottoman governor of Egypt in 1805, Mehmet Ali Pasha, unlike his predecessors, managed to establish effective control over this lucrative province, and proved his loyalty to Sultan Mahmut II (1808—1839) on several occasions by suppressing rebellions with his powerful army in different parts of the empire (see Marsot 1984, Fahmy 1997). Once a loyal governor, he then turned against the sultan in the early 1830s in an attempt to secure hereditary governorship of Egypt. He defeated Ottoman armies repeatedly and conquered a substantial portion of Ottoman lands that stretched from the neighboring province of Syria to inland Anatolia. The first episode of the ordeal ended with a peace agreement in 1833, with the assistance of Russia, but the struggle between Cairo and Istanbul was far from over. The final episode started with yet another defeat of Ottoman armies in 1839 by Mehmet Ali's forces led by his son (brahim Pasha. Mahmut II died just before the news of disaster reached Istanbul, and his son Abdulmecit ascended the throne when he was only sixteen.

The repercussions of the events surrounding the Mehmet Ali affair were strongly felt on the streets of Istanbul. The helplessness of the Ottoman government and this very direct and concrete challenge against the sultan were translated into a fearful anxiety among the ordinary people. Feelings of loss of trust, pessimism for the future, and the expectations of chaos are palpable in the reports that started to record public mood in the midst of this unparalleled political crisis. Mustafa was heard saying in a Yenikoy coffeehouse that "Ottoman lands will be lost whether we fight or not (ID 1038, September 28, 1840). Public weariness with the continuing uncertainty of the situation was reflected in Veli Mehmet A[a's desire that "things would take their course in one way or the other as soon as possible; then, at least, we would have peace of mind" (ID 1038, September 28, 1840).

This weariness and pessimism were accompanied by rising rage against the source of this chaos. Coffeehouse conversations are full of examples of anger and hate focusing on the person of Mehmet Ali. His name, when uttered, was accompanied by cursing and swearing. People in coffeehouses told each other elaborate methods of torture they would inflict if he fell into their hands (ID 1210, November 13, 1840).

The rage against Mehmet Ali was compounded by the fact that this was a conflict among Muslims and that it resulted in the intervention of non-Muslims. The ordinary folk of Istanbul were humiliated and profoundly confused when the Ottomans sought help from Russia, their longtime nemesis, to solve an internal problem. The thorny problem that the empire was on the verge of destruction by a Muslim was resolved in the popular consciousness by declaring Mehmet Ali an "infidel." "If somebody rebels against his sultan, he becomes an infidel; he

rebels against God, too. Mehmet Ali is not a Muslim" (ID 1210, November 13, 1840). Through gossip, people in Istanbul were propping up their confidence and further justifying the perception that Mehmet Ali was committing the greatest of sins, rebelling against God's will; he was supposed to have said, "Allah cannot dictate. I can do whatever I want to do" (ID 1210, November 13, 1840). Two soldiers who fought in the battle of Nezip were heard telling one another what they had heard there: in a moment of anger Mehmet Ali's son (brahim Pasha drank his liquor by tossing his glass against God, saying that "God, you make me angry. Look, I am drinking my arak in your face" (ID 1210, November 13, 1840).

This threatening state of events was intensified when the Grand Admiral Ahmet Pasha, nicknamed "the Traitor," defected and handed over the entire Ottoman fleet to Mehmet Ali Pasha in July 1839. From the reports we learn that the people in Istanbul were anxiously waiting for the fleet to return to the capital, and their anxieties crystallized around political maneuvering at the highest level of the empire. The people were convinced that the reason for Ahmet Pasha's "treason" was the appointment of Husrev Pasha, a long-standing nemesis of Mehmet Ali Pasha, as grand vizier (Cevdet-Dahiliye, 12037, undated).

The enmity between Mehmet Ali and Husrev dates from 1801, when both joined the Ottoman navy sent to Egypt to fight against Napoleon's army. At the time, Husrev Pasha was a protege of the grand admiral and Mehmet Ali was his subordinate, commanding the troops of Albanian origin. After Napoleon's army was evicted from Egypt, Husrev was appointed as the governor. Soon after his appointment Albanian troops, provoked by Mehmet Ali, revolted against him. Mehmet Ali took Husrev prisoner, deported him from Egypt, and eventually was appointed as the new governor in 1805. The bitter rivalry and enmity between the two continued for another three decades, and it was the common belief that Husrev would do everything in his power to dispose of his foe. Upon the succession of Abdulmecit to the throne in 1839 by snatching the imperial seal, Husrev Pasha appointed himself as the grand vizier. This act created much dismay on the part of Mehmet Ali Pasha, who later launched a campaign to have him deposed (Fahmy 1997: 285—90).

Husrev was not immediately dismissed, but his term of office lasted less than a year. Despite the official statement that Husrev resigned due to old age, the people inferred that he was dismissed from office because of the Mehmet Ali affair. In Istanbul coffeehouses, the whole issue was seen as a concession to Mehmet Ali. Rumor circulated that Abbas Pasha, Mehmet Ali's son, brought a letter from his father to the sultan, asking for Husrev's dismissal (Fahmy 1997: 285–90). Although this concession was to some extent seen as a sign of weakness of the Ottoman administration, the great joy over Husrev's dismissal prevailed over the sense of humiliation that the sultan was taking orders from his insurgent governor. Not only did people hold Husrev as much responsible as Mehmet Ali in this ordeal, they also blamed him for seeking the assistance of Russia, probably the most notorious country in the popular perception. In an exemplary instance of how inside information from an office found its way almost immediately to coffeehouses throughout Istanbul, we hear "fresh news" from a clerk who overheard the conversation in a meeting of the Supreme Council for Judicial Ordinances: "Husrev Pasha said we should take care of Mehmet Ali. Let us send for Russia and hand

Istanbul over to them. Then we can be at ease" (Cevdet-Dahiliye, 12037, undated). The reliability of this information is trivial in itself. What is important was the people's readiness to believe information that derived its credibility from their distrust of Husrev. In the eyes of the people, his image was already tainted with rumors of bribery, nepotism, and his self-serving character: "It is very good that Husrev Pasha was dismissed. This relieved a great burden from everybody's shoulders. Even the ground he is stepping on should be removed" (Cevdet- Zaptiye, 1833, undated).

The reception of Husrev Pasha's case shows us the search of the ordinary people for something to hold onto in periods of crisis. People quickly turned his dismissal into a sign of hope. "The moment he was dismissed from office" said Haci Hasan in Uskudar, "the curse on us has been lifted. With God's will, we will be given our salaries at the beginning of each month as it used to be" (Cevdet-Zaptiye, 315, undated). Mehmet talking in a Mahmutpaa coffeehouse, said that "he was such a cruel man. During his term all business stopped. We all became indebted" (Cevdet-Zaptiye, 315, undated).

The abundant evidence of political conversations throughout the reports reveals that one of the most important functions of gathering rumors was to uncover popular sentiments toward the sultan in the wake of the Mehmet Ali affair. This crisis, which shook the empire and threatened to bring an end to the Ottoman dynasty, and was defused only by Mehmet Ali's hesitation and British help, caused concern for the Ottoman ruler's legitimacy. It is no surprise, then, that the reports include several public utterances directly about the sultan himself. The following report, composed and narrated in an unusual way, demonstrates the informer's impressions and interpretation about the mood of the populace:

<quote>£££Your humble servant has observed in the past month that the people's dislike and hatred against Mehmet Ali has aggravated to such an extent that they are praying from the bottom of their hearts for his wretchedness. Even more, hearing the roars of cannons last night on the occasion of the birth in the palace, the people in coffeehouses and other places felt immense joy, for they assumed that "God willing! Egypt was conquered" or "(brahim Pasha was caught and brought to Istanbul" (ID 1210, November 13, 1840).£££</quote>

The reports are full of extremely positive remarks about the sultan. Muslims and non-Muslims prayed for him, cherished him, and cursed his opponents. Are we to believe that informers did not come across anyone in Istanbul who opposed the sultan? Despite the impossibility of answering this question authoritatively, three possibilities could be raised to tackle this conspicuous absence.

First, even though some people had uttered insolent words about the sultan, informers might have distorted the reports in an attempt to protect gossipmongers from possible punishment. Second, people were aware of the pervasiveness of informers and therefore

held their tongues in check. Although, as mentioned earlier, surveillance of the population was not primarily intended to punish sedition or subversion, gossipmongers, and possibly informers themselves, were not necessarily aware of that. A strong fear of being punished for talking about affairs of state can easily be detected in their voices. When a politically sensitive subject comes up, most of the time we find the purveyor warning his friends not to leak the information he provided by such cautionary remarks as “this is between you and me,” or “don’t tell this to anyone, spies are everywhere.” Third, it is possible that these reports were not distorted by informers or their superiors, and that the people thought positively about the sultan. This is also a strong possibility, because one of the main tenets of the premodern popular consciousness in relation to the ruler was that esoteric power was usually attributed to the ruler. He was not merely human but had a power and authority that emanated directly from God. For ordinary people, his power could not fully be comprehended but only marveled at and obeyed.

Consider, for instance, the following example:

<quote>

smail A[a, residing at }ekerci Street in Aksaray, said in the coffeehouse next to the Katip mosque that I read the new issue of the Takvim [a newspaper]. May God protect our mighty sultan, he conquered many places. Nobody can cope with sultans; they possess power of sanctity that creates miracles, and their breath melts stones and mountains. Once Sultan Beyazid was having a mosque built, a European king’s envoy came and deliver the message that his king had declared war. Our mighty sultan said “Go and tell your king, when I move my fingers, I make him blind.” Then the king goes blind. You see. Sultans possess the power to make such miracles (ID 1232, November 20, 1840).

</quote>

Since the ruler was perceived as having supernatural attributes, reconstructing the popular imagination of the state, which was embodied in the ruler, is an exceptionally difficult task. The otherworldliness of the ruler makes his popular representation ambivalent. This ambivalence does not emerge immediately from a literal reading of the reports; rather it becomes salient in between the lines and through metaphors. What could be a more suitable medium than fairytales to articulate fears, anxieties, expectations, and hopes? Through the instrumentalization of fantasy, there is in almost each fairytale a sociopolitical statement about existing conditions (Zipes 1979, 1988) In other words, fairytales and legends were the means through which the ordinary people could articulate and convey the world as they experience it. For example:

<quote>

(brahim, the son in law of petitioner Huseyin Efendi residing in Ugler neighborhood, said in his own shop: “[Once upon a time] a child was born in Egypt. His mother puts him in his cradle and goes inside to knead dough. Then the child gets up, eats and drinks whatever he

finds in the house, and sits on the sofa. After a while, his mother comes and sees that her child is not in the cradle, and somebody is sitting in the sofa. ‘Mother,’ says the child, ‘I ate everything in the house.’ Then his father shows up, and then their neighbors. Unable to understand how this was possible, they eventually decide to inform the governor. When the governor questions the child, the child says, ‘I am hungry and thirsty, how can I talk like this.’ They give him a table full of food, and he eats them all and asks for more. Another round of food comes, and he again eats it all, and asks for more, then again, then again. After eating three or four such full tables of food, he says, ‘Let me tell now.’ There will be much drought, blood will run as water, and a messiah will appear in 75 [1275/1859]. The governor says he would rather be dead than alive, and orders his execution. For three or five days, the knife cannot sever his head from his body, so they kill him by hammering on his head (ID 1210, November 13, 1840).

</quote>

This fairytale feeds into a desire for mystical, unusual, and impossible happenings but can also be read as foreshadowing the biography of Mehmet Ali seen through the eyes of the Ottoman state. Just like the greedy child in the tale, Mehmet Ali Pasha could enhance his power to unprecedented proportions almost from nothing. During his reign for over thirty years, his preemptive actions were accepted and his endless demands were fulfilled, and these in turn carried him to the doors of the capital. This is not to say that replacing Mehmet Ali Pasha with the greedy child of the tale was necessarily what the teller had in mind. Its ambiguity served as a buffer against accusations of uttering antiregime sentiments. What prompted him to tell a fairytale like this is more important. Telling a story is a complex process. In between the lines of tales, fantasy and reality are intertwined; and the real and the imaginary characters often collapse into one another. Fairytales offer imaginary, yet desired, solutions to real problems (Zipes 1979: 4). Mehmet Ali’s head was never smashed, but the story nonetheless underlines the desire to challenge his authority.

The unease in Istanbul coffeehouses was further compounded in the summer of 1840, when the Ottoman, British, Russian, Prussian, and Austrian delegates convened in London to discuss the Mehmet Ali affair. According to the subsequent agreement, Mehmet Ali was offered the hereditary governorship of Egypt and Acre in return for the evacuation of his armies from Hijaz, Syria, Crete, and Adana, as well as the immediate return of the Ottoman fleet. The terms of agreement sent to Mehmet Ali in the form of an ultimatum quickly began to echo in Istanbul’s streets. The diplomatic traffic between Ottoman and European officials was being monitored in minute detail by the people. The arrival of every foreign noncommercial ship into the Bosphorus was taken as a sign of arrival of a European ambassador to discuss the matters relating to Mehmet Ali’s answer to the ultimatum, and the news of these landings hastily spread to streets and coffeehouses and fueled speculation.

The popular hope for peace swiftly turned into dismay when war became inevitable upon Mehmet Ali’s rejection of the ultimatum. Public mood changed swiftly as contradictory news led to conflicting views, speculations, and opinions grafted onto changing circumstances.

One day, the biggest concern was whether France would fight along with Mehmet Ali's forces against the Ottomans and its allies. As some people were spreading news that France was mobilizing its forces against the Ottomans, others were convincing their friends that France would never fight against Britain and Russia over Egypt (ID 1210, November 13, 1840). The next day, new concerns and new opinions were generating novel perspectives. Conversations often included certain traits attributed to the people of other countries, friends and foes. The imaginative content in these attributions supported the rumors in circulation. In Ismail's coffeehouse in the district of Sultan Mahmut, Huseyin Aga, a glazier, raised his concern that British forces could easily be defeated by Mehmet Ali's army because England had not fought a war for several decades. Russians from ages seven to seventy, on the other hand, were all considered warriors, and untrustworthy (ID 1210, November 13, 1840). In the same coffeehouse Mustafa Aga kept his hopes high by attributing fraudulence to Arabs, whom he thought "will react against Mehmet Ali as soon as they understand how much trouble he is in" (ID 1210, November 13, 1840).

The pessimism and anxiety haunting the streets of Istanbul in early 1840 was transformed into an air of optimism toward the end of the year, when the Ottoman-British alliance defeated Mehmet Ali Pasha's army and ended his rule over the province of Syria. News of fresh developments reached Istanbul quickly during the course of the war. While an Austrian merchant in a Galata coffeehouse was bringing the news that British forces besieged port Alexandria, Ismail Aga read out the capture of Acre recounted in Takvim-i Vakayi in an Aksaray coffeehouse (ID 1232, November 20, 1840). Istanbul echoed with joy at the news of the victory, and the general mood of the public was enthusiastically reflected in the reports of the informers: "Your humble servant reports that in most coffeehouses in Istanbul and its environs, the people are indulged in pleasure and jubilation, and pray for our mighty sultan" (ID 1232, November 20, 1840).

Popular comments, however, did not constitute a monody. "I am surprised by how quickly Acre was captured. It cannot be our navy. It must be the British or Austrian navy," said someone in response to a newspaper read out in a Kemeralti coffeehouse (ID 1232, November 20, 1840). Informers were curious regarding the popular reception of the news of the triumph. An informer commented to incite others: "Egypt is over. We hear that they have been devastated in each fight." "Wait and see the end. There must be something else in this," replied Haci Mustafa, expressing weariness in his response (ID 1232, November 20, 1840).

Ambivalent and discontented voices were also loud after the peace between Mehmet Ali and the Ottoman government in May 1841.

For Osman Efendi, granting Mehmet Ali the hereditary governorship of Egypt was a complete disgrace to the Ottoman government. "They have not had the peace published in the Takvim [newspaper]. They must be embarrassed" (ID 1776, April 14, 1841). Similarly, Yorgaki was not content with the outcome, saying to his friend Anata of Ankara in

his home, “What kind of a peace is this? They put the other four kings to shame as well. For the sake of four sancaks [administrative units] they depleted the whole treasury. You’ll see, this dude would take them back anyway and all this money spent would be in vain. They call this peace. He is called Mehmet Ali, you’ll see the end” (ID 1776, April 14, 1841).

There are voices in these reports that also remind us the fact that this was a conflict within the empire that had contradictory repercussions for its various subjects. Kostandi, a Greek broker, told in a Karakoy coffeehouse the story of an Arab he witnessed the other day on a lighter boat crying after his family trapped in Egypt (ID 1210, November 13, 1840). Two Arab shopkeepers watching the parade of Egyptian prisoners of war in Sultan Beyazid said, “they are all soldiers of Egypt. Some are our brothers, some our relatives. Even in our own lands our children perish like this. God damn Mehmet Ali” (ID 1210, November 13, 1840). These examples challenge the misleading black-and-white picture that draws a clear-cut boundary between the Ottoman as self and Egypt as the other, as the enemy. It was a victory, albeit a broken one. There were plenty of those who were wounded and disenchanted caught within the jubilant atmosphere of the Istanbul streets and coffeehouses. These voices not only frame the gray and shady areas of the picture but also give depth and perspective to it.

What triggered conversations in coffeehouses were events and circumstances. As the Mehmet Ali problem was settled in the summer of 1841, popular talk about it slowly faded away. Whereas one day it was rumors of a war against Russia, the next it was war against Greece that invaded the smoky coffeehouses. Yet again, in between sips of coffee, for a time the Druze uprising was the most favorite topic; another time, it was the Serbian rebellion.

“Domestic news,” however, was not all the people talked about. “International news” constituted no less an important topic of conversation. One source of this news was European newspapers that were read aloud by merchants, especially in coffeehouses in Galata— the heart of international commerce in Istanbul—and then dissem- mated quickly to other parts of the city by word of mouth. The popularity of topics regarding international politics among ordinary people was matched by the keen interest of informers in eavesdropping on the conversations of foreign merchants trading between Istanbul and European ports. Although information from the European Great Powers took up much of the space in the reports because of their centrality to Ottoman affairs, some seemingly less inconsequential news for the Ottomans—ranging from the Portuguese king’s visit to France to the British opium war in China—were also discussed by the people and recorded by informers. Despite the fact that the rumors recorded in the reports were written in simple Ottoman Turkish, reflecting the language of the streets, sometimes the informer mentioned the original language of the conversation that he had overheard and translated into Turkish. Throughout the reports, one finds records of conversations translated into Turkish from Arabic, Persian, Greek, Bulgarian, Russian, English, French, German, and Rumanian. The variety of languages suggests that informers were widely recruited from among the non-Muslim as well as Muslim communities. It also points to the extent of the spying activity.

*** State Officials

Besides the changing topics determined by political atmosphere, there were other persistent themes. One of these was the overall discontent and frustration against state officials. Although popular criticism of the sultan was never direct but rather hidden and latent, when state officials and local functionaries were concerned, the populace was direct and uninhibited in articulating discontent. Thus, in expressing condemnation, people, as Rude (1980: 31) aptly writes, “tended to prefer the ‘devil they know’ to the one they did not know.”

While Istanbul locals were preoccupied with palace officials, immigrants and transients continued to grumble about the officials in the provinces. For instance, we hear constant complaints coming from people from the Erzurum province about Hafiz Pasha, the governor. “There can’t be any vizier as ruthless as Hafiz Pasha. He is forcefully taking money from the villagers. If he were to be dismissed many would be happy,” said dervish Hasan from Arapkir (Cevdet- Zaptiye, 2474, undated).

Centrally appointed tax collectors (muhassil) were one of the main targets of complaints. They were seen as instigators of disorder, corruption, and havoc. In 1840, the first year in which the spy reports started to record popular opinions, the Ottoman state launched a cadastral survey to identify the tax base. There are numerous grumblings in the reports regarding the inconsistency and arbitrariness of the survey. Zekeriya from Ni[de complained that their muhassil was registering land in Ni[de and people in Nevehir (Cevdet-Zaptiye, 1833, undated). Let us listen to Mehmet of Yalakabat talking in Kadir A[a’s coffeehouse in Sultan Beyazid: “In our district we were supposed to pay according to our lands. Then, notables said we were to pay 250 guru per head. Yet again, they began to ask 500 guru per household. But still not being satisfied they told us to pay 1200 guru. The poor came to the Porte and submitted a petition. Let’s see how it’s going to turn out” (Cevdet-Zaptiye, 1833, undated).

Discontent did not remain only in the form of coffeehouse grumbling. In several places muhassils were killed by peasants, and some muhassils resigned due to fear (Cevdet-Zaptiye, 2474, undated). The people of Istanbul were no less unhappy about their taxes. Migirdi^, an Armenian shopkeeper, complained that he was asked for 15 percent of the value of his newly built house as tax. He said, “I applied to higher offices and they said to me: ‘Look, infidel, this 15 percent is an emergency tax.’ I don’t know what to do. Now we are in the hands of God. There is no kadi, no court, who is to look after our case?” (ID 1038, September 28, 1840).

All this popular discontent boiled down to an overarching moaning about the difficulty of life and times. Disgruntlement was articulated and expressed by people as it impinged upon their subsistence or economic well-being. If people were angry at Mehmet Ali Pasha, it was

because they believed that he obliged the Ottoman government to print worthless paper money instead of silver coins for the first time, or that he blocked the importation of flour from Egypt and made them buy expensive dark bread. If people raged against muhassils, it was because they saw or heard of people dying due to famine in their lands. If people hated Husrev Pasha, it was because they believed that during his tenure business slowed down. We hear plenty of stories from those who have immigrated to Istanbul with the dream of building a better and more secure life, almost always to be disappointed in the end. Albanian Zeynel A[a remorsefully remembers that he did not listen to those who told him not to move to Istanbul while he was in Edirne: “Just as they told me I regret my decision thousands of times” (ID 1038, September 28, 1840).

Thanks to the informers’ style, we can learn about individual life stories in a strikingly vivid fashion, in contrast to the layers of rhetorical cloaking of critiques of high officials. Neither poverty nor misery is wrapped up in blandly general or impressionistic accounts, obscuring the singularity of the voices of ordinary people who lived in the first half of the nineteenth century. From among many let us hear one:

<quote>£££It has been heard that the retired captain Mehmet A[a of Ayntab who migrated from Tripoli said in the barbershop next to the restaurant in Irgat Pazari: It’s no longer possible to secure a living in Istanbul. I regret that I moved out from Tripoli. They are giving me a ninety guru salary. If I were to seek to be a subject of another country, they would not accept me because I’m a former officer. I am now thinking of going back to Tripoli. It seems that there are only two places left to make a living, one is Baghdad, the other is Tripoli.... My subordinates have now become captains or colonels. The wife kicked me out after thirty-one days. I divorced her, then I heard that I had a child. They make me pay thirty guru alimony per month. I don’t know what to do. I’m going to drift away (ID 1232, November 20, 1840).£££</quote>

*** Intercommunal Relations: Differentiated Opinions?

Popular voices reflected in the reports were not homogeneous, though the topics of conversation were not significantly different from one neighborhood to another or from one coffeehouse to the next, for certain events that affected people incited these conversations. Popular opinions were always reflexive, interactive, and related directly to the developments and to other opinions. As much as there were agreements, there were also disagreements and opposing views, and moreover, within agreements and disagreements, there were nuances, fine differences, and a persisting ambivalence reflecting multivocal- ity and resistance to the idea of public opinion in the singular.

On what basis, then, did opinions differ? More particularly, is it possible to discern clear patterns in this heterogeneous and multidimensional public opinion that distinguished Muslims from nonMuslims, and one non-Muslim community from another? Looking for

possible differentiation of opinions along confessional lines allows us to use these unique forms of evidence to question both Ottoman historiography and Ottoman history.

The dominant Ottoman scholarship has stubbornly imagined the different confessional communities of Istanbul in hermetically sealed boxes, a city that was inhabited by a religiously, ethnically, and linguistically diverse population. Instead of trying to recapture the social meanings of the nineteenth century in the dynamics and the interactions of its complex social world, the accepted historiographical paradigm obscures this complexity with superimposed contemporary categories and conceptual tools that are heavily loaded, and often tainted by nationalist imaginations even when the empirical evidence suggess otherwise.

To overcome this methodological fallacy, the first order of business is to refute the idea of the compartmentalization of Ottoman society along confessional lines. In so doing, I do not mean to imply that religious affiliation was trivial, or that it did not contribute to making sense of the self and the other. Religion did matter, of course, and provided a significant foundation for people in organizing their mental universes. Religious identities did not restrict people's sense of society above and beyond confessional lines, however. Opinions were formed dialogically; social meanings were created through dialogues between the different confessional communities in the course of everyday life practices in an urban context.

The reports make it strikingly apparent that opinions routinely crossed confessional lines to create a common discourse. As much as confessional differences divided, poverty and power unified. For many people, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, the feeling that they were on the same boat was very strong. Kostandi of Tatavla, a broker, was heard complaining in a Galata coffeehouse about the missionary activities of the British and the French, arguing that the non-Muslim communities of the Empire were unified in their opposition against "these Franks" (ID 1210, November 13, 1840). Hurit Aga, recounting a conversation he had witnessed among some non-Muslims, was telling his friend that he heard them saying: "Thanks to the Ottoman state for years our ancestors have been living peacefully. Now the Great Powers are intervening in our state affairs and chained the [Ottoman] state to themselves. God protect the Ottoman state and God forbid us from slipping into their hands" (ID 1210, November 13, 1840). Dimitri of Kayseri said in Silivrikapi: "I went to Buyukdere the other day. The English fell upon me and told me, 'Come let's make you a British citizen.' And I replied to them, 'My lineage is Ottoman. I can't do it.' These people are offering this to anybody they see" (Cevdet-Zaptiye, 556, undated).

A romanticized interpretation of popular opinions that assume the harmonious coexistence of the different confessional communities, even if it were acknowledged that that popular opinions did not necessarily differentiate along confessional lines, would be equally erroneous. The populace expressed their opinions in response to ever-changing events and circumstances. Thus, in order to better understand the dynamics of everyday life in Istanbul

and the molding of public opinion among the ordinary people in the mid-nineteenth century —especially regarding the issue of relations between and within confessional communities— popular opinion needs to be contextualized in the larger world of the Ottoman Empire. Only a decade before, Greece had become a separate state, and the separatist movements in the Balkans were gaining momentum at this very period. Although in general the sense of Ottoman imperial identity remained strong among the populace, this identity was strongly challenged by the rising nationalist tide. The Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire in particular were standing at a crossroads that provided them with options and alternatives in crafting their identities. In this period, incentives to redefine themselves allowed them to acquire powerful European patrons, and to take advantage of the economic benefits that the Ottoman Empire granted to several European states. Numerous Greek subjects acquired British or Greek citizenship, Armenian Catholics French, and Gregorian Armenians Russian. Austrian (spiro's words reveal how easy it was to acquire various citizenships: "If a non-Muslim approaches me to ask for a citizenship, I can get the passport of the state he chooses, whatever that may be.... Lately an Armenian came and asked for a Wallachian passport.... He gave me three hundred guru in return. I can do the same for anybody" (ID 1776, April 14, 1841).

Precisely because the Ottoman imperial imagination, and the set of values, allegiances, desires that came with it, had a strong presences in shaping the beliefs and projections of the ordinary men of Istanbul, the rebellious turmoil around and within the Ottoman Empire ignited animosities at the heart of the Ottoman society. Those who were being left behind to sail on the imperial ship that was getting increasingly leakier were translating their disenchantment into anger and animosity against those who had already left or who were trying to jump ship. This was especially apparent among the edgy segments of the Muslim population. The reports reveal a few examples that convey feelings of abandonment, fear of losing their lives as they knew them, and blame toward the non-Muslim peoples of the empire for these problems.

(brahim Efendi, talking on the tailors' street in the bazaar, said that "In the old days these tailors were all Muslims. Now there aren't any left, they are all non-Muslims. Muslims are becoming extinct. God help us" (ID 2704, March 23, 1842). A Muslim in a Samatya coffeehouse was heard saying that "In the old days these non-Muslims did not wear furs. Even if they did they would not walk in the streets in them. In today's order furs belong to them, I wonder what will be left for us in the next order" (ID 4191, February 11, 1844).

Further, despite the common identification of Christians as a group, reflected in Ottoman historiography to date, popular opinions captured in the reports testify to the absence of a homogeneous Greek identity in the imperial capital. On the one hand, we read of a perceivable anxiety among the subjects of the recently established state of Greece. Most of them believed that a war between the Greek state and the Ottoman Empire was inevitable, and this anxiety was especially salient among import-export merchants who were burdened by "an unprecedented customs duty on imports from Greece" (ID 1776, April 14, 1841). Widespread rumors began to circulate in Istanbul streets that the subjects of Greece living in Istanbul would be deported. A pharmacist called Yanni was heard saying that his embassy

advised him not to further increase his stocks since the shops were in danger of being closed down (ID 1038, September 28, 1840).

On the other hand, the words of Yanko remind us of the persistence of imperial allegiance among the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire: “Nowadays the Greek [Rum] millet has so much freedom.... Everybody supports the sultan. If this had been the case before, the people of Morea [Greece] wouldn’t have fought the war and perished like that. They would continue to be the subjects of the [Ottoman] state” (ID 3218, August 21, 1842).

*** Conclusion: Opinions versus Public Opinion

“Word on the street travels quicker than fire,” said an officer of the US forces ruling Iraq in a report published in the Chicago Tribune (July 11, 2003). This proverbial statement reflected one of the most important concerns of the U.S. occupiers in the months following the military collapse of the Iraqi regime. That “night-vision goggles let soldiers see through women’s clothes”; that “the country’s oil is being piped to Israel”; and that “U.S. authorities are keeping power off in Baghdad as punishment” for attacks against American troops were among the rumors circulating, according to the newspaper report, among Iraqis who were living in a regime of uncertainty and doubts. It was exactly this kind of uncontrollable rumor that worried U.S. authorities most, rather than the more than 130 Arabic-language newspapers published across the country since the occupation of Iraq, despite the fact that many newspapers oppose the U.S.-led regime. Newspapers could be silenced at will, rumors cannot. Recognizing the mobilizing capacity of rumor for dissent, U.S. authorities reportedly devised measures to counter the rumors, including handing night-vision goggles to local imams, who are considered to be among the main sources of dissemination of rumors, “to prove the limits of their power” (ibid.). If modern technology will be capable of penetrating Iraqi minds as much as it does Iraq nights remains to be seen. But, as a high-level U.S. official in Iraq bitterly acknowledged, “we are losing the information war” (ibid.). The war on public opinion was indeed one that the U.S. and the nineteenth-century Ottoman state alike waged desperately and usually ineffectively.

Complex, disjointed, ever-changing, and fragmented, popular opinions of mid-nineteenth-century Istanbul examined in this article revealed that the floating of information in the streets, shops, and coffeehouses of Istanbul was a process intertwined with personal interactions in the public sphere. Unlike contemporary times, when news is heard through professionalized medium, information in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire was never reified. It was always coupled with intimate life stories of the people, directly related with the life of the teller. The developments regarding Mehmet Ali Pasha or Husrev Pasha or any other public figure were attached to the personal concerns of a Mustafa or a Migirdic or a Manol or a Mehahim.

Does the sum of individual opinions amount to public opinion? Habermas, whose writings on the historical formation of public sphere continue to inform the burgeoning scholarship on public opinion, answers the question negatively, making a clear distinction between opinion and public opinion. He argues: “Whereas mere opinions (things taken for granted as part of a culture, normative convictions, collective prejudices, and judgments) seem to persist unchanged in their quasi-natural structure as a kind of sediment of history, public opinion, in terms of its very idea, can be formed only if a public that engages in rational discussion exists” (Habermas 1991: 399). In the examination of popular opinions here, however, it makes little sense to make a clear-cut distinction between mere opinions and public opinion. These mere opinions that Habermas relegated to the “sediment of history” were not private exercises but utterances produced in the intimate atmosphere of public sociability. Every individual opinion articulated in a public setting incited comment from others, then further disseminated through the word of mouth, and ultimately contributed to the formation of public opinion. The means of written communication networks such as newspapers, which in part led Habermas to distinguish between opinion and public opinion in the “specific constellation” of an idealized Western European history, did not exist, but neither does a serious need for them in the dense oral information network in nineteenth-century Istanbul.

Neither did the Ottoman state of the mid-nineteenth century perceive these opinions simply as collective prejudices enveloped in rumor and gossip. If general characteristics of rumor are its orality, anonymity and elusiveness, then individual opinions recorded in the spy reports show none of these. By recording these opinions without the purpose of persecuting political gossipmongers, the state turned the oral into the literal, the anonymous into the authored, and the elusive into the tangible. This was, in fact, the process in which rumor became news; and the individual opinions that were hitherto persecuted for their political content became a public opinion to which the nineteenth-century Ottoman state was obliged to appeal.

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** Chapter Five: Gender, Consumption and Patriotism: the Emergence of an Ottoman Public Sphere

Elizabeth B. Frierson

When our Summer Institute first met in Berlin in July of 2001, we thought, spoke, and wrote against a rich backdrop of encounters between everyday beliefs in twenty-first-century Europe: headscarf controversies in France, unassimilated and assimilated German Turks, homosexuality and conservative Muslim clerics in the Netherlands were all conflicts between secularism and faith communities, but also between what should be public and what should be private. In these encounters, ordinary objects played extraordinarily important roles: a piece of cloth on a woman’s head as she attempted to teach in a state school, or work in other state (and therefore rigorously secularized) spaces; or barbecue grills in public parks in Berlin; or, of course, newspapers, magazines, cassette tapes, computers, radios, and televisions. Little did we know that our scholarly discussions of the importance of making literacy “ordinary” in the Middle East, of widening spheres of literate or informed debate beyond palaces to schoolyards, and of how everyday objects assume vast symbolic importance were soon to be thrown into a harsher light by the weaponizing of an increasingly ordinary and, in the last decade, cheaper mode of transport. In a sense, the 9/11 bombings were a militant takeover of advanced Western technology, and an attempt to use this technology to sear the hearts and minds of heedless Westerners with anti-Western rage at the global costs of Westernization and U.S. foreign and domestic policies in particular.

Then, as we met again in August 2002, U.S. voters and armed forces were being prepared for an invasion of Iraq and a continuing occupation of Afghanistan in terms that most of us, as scholars of the modern Middle East and North Africa, found specious. And, as we go to print in 2003, the causal links between 9/11 and Saddam Hussein are collapsing like poorly wrought tin passing as steel. In a story often pushed to the background of war coverage, the United States' staunchest ally in the region, Turkey, has been transforming its internal terms of debate and reform, and its foreign policies, in terms that are increasingly Muslim, and straining for autonomy from NATO and the United States. The country that once sent its troops to fight and die alongside U.S. troops in Korea, and in the winter of 2001 sent troops to serve in Afghanistan, refused to open its airbases to facilitate a U.S. invasion of Iraq from the north. In July of 2003, Turkish politicians were still refusing to send Turkish troops in to support U.S. forces in Iraq; in the words of one national leader, "Turkish soldiers should not be human shields for American soldiers" (Temel Karamollaollu, quoted in the Turkish Daily News online edition, "Political Parties against Sending Troops to Iraq," July 23, 2003). Some observers have drawn a direct line between the rising prominence of moderate Muslims in Turkish politics (first as reformist mayors of Istanbul and other major cities, and then as politicians on the national stage pursuing diplomatic contacts with Islamic regimes), and Turkey's reluctance to wage war on Iraq. They articulate the fear that one of our "secular" allies in the region will become a haven for "Muslim fanatics"—even as Turkey struggles to comply with European Union conditions for full participation in the E.U. (see Turkish Daily News online edition, "Turkey Adjusts Press Law to EU Standards," July 23, 2003).

In fact, Turkey has a long history of adapting Western ideas and technologies to its own internal purposes, and of moderating both Western ideas and Muslim ideas to create compounds of modernity closely tied to regional and local realities, and fueled by active trade economies and diplomatic wrangling with Western powers. Turkey also stands as an object lesson in regime change, first from empire to nation-state, then to its own tutelary regime under a reformist strongman, then to multiparty secular democracy, and now to a democracy that can accommodate religious beliefs informing political action. Ottomans' and then Turks' insistence on setting their own terms for modernity, including how, when, where, for what reasons, and in what quantities their people would communicate with one another, is a consistent theme from the outset of their efforts at modernization. Here I present the prelude to a regime change that proved important not only for who held ruling authority but also for who had voice in what the state should be to its subjects and later its citizens. This prelude played out in the most ordinary of ways—family magazines, discussions of fashion, children's schooling, good nutrition, and gossip—and as such, its themes were carried forward seamlessly into the otherwise startlingly new national culture of modern Turkey.

*** Empire to Nation-State

Historians and social scientists writing on Japan have long referred to the period from 1895 through 1945 as the "fifty years war." This term denotes an era when the Japanese state was either preparing for or actively waging war with one or more Western powers or its neighbors in East Asia. In addition, the era is portrayed as containing the fundamental

moments that defined how Japan would become a modern nation-state, since it encompasses the formation of a constitutional monarchy, and the development among ruling elites of the aspiration to become a stable, modern state, a leader in East Asia, and, ultimately, a world power. Japanese politicians and intellectuals devoted much of these fifty years to training Japanese subjects to become “modern,” devoted to the Japanese state. They sought to retrain the public into a new relationship with the state, inducing patriotism and individual responsibility for the Japanese public (Hane 1986; Gluck 1985; Jansen 2000).

One can draw similar brackets around spans of war-torn decades that cross regimes to encompass the massive political, social, and economic changes that comprise the foundations of the modern nation-states in the Middle East and North Africa. For each successor state of the Ottoman Empire, the bracketed era bears different dates. To construct Egypt’s timeline of modernization, for example, one could begin with the aggressive industrialization of Egypt in the time of Mehmet Ali (r. 1805–1848), or with the era of expanding public education for ordinary Egyptians under Khedive Ismail at midcentury, punctuated through the 1960s with efforts to restrict public education (under the British) or expand it (under the Free Officers). For Iraq, state-led reform began in earnest under the reformist Ottoman governor, Midhat Pasha in the late 1800s, and then lurched forward by degrees between 1920 and 1932 under the uneasy alliances between British Mandate forces, local notables from different ethnoreligious communities, and the imported royal family; then forward again with oil wealth; then the great leap forward in expanding public education under the early Ba’th regime of the 1960s. In both these cases, various education and literacy agendas were forwarded most often as complexes of selective adaptation of Western models combined with local Muslim traditions or, for minority communities both in and out of state systems of education, as Western models less critically adopted by Christian and Jewish educators born or educated in the West.

For the creation of modern Turkey, the roughly fifty years spanning 1876 and 1928 mark an era containing three major regime changes, starting when the Ottoman sultan aborted his brief experiment in constitutional monarchy in 1876, and ending five years after the establishment of modern Turkey as a secular nation-state in 1928. This era begins with a significant reinvestment of interest and energy in saving an empire from colonial and military encroachment, largely through weaving new ideas about Muslim identity and Islamic statesmanship into the fabric of Ottoman daily lives. It ends with a modern state whose leaders turned their backs in anger and mistrust on the people and ideologies affiliated with a modern Islamic polity, and with a charismatic state founder who in hundreds of speeches equated Islam with superstition and despotism at a state and individual level. At the same time that Ataturk was pushing Islam out of definitions of the public good—whether with speeches, or laws, or with the execution of clerics—he built popular support for radical changes by borrowing liberally from the tool kit of the despotic reform and liberation ideologies that preceded him in Ottoman territories. He assessed and utilized the resources of the people for a forced march to modernity. Islam was replaced with Turkishness as the prime identifier after 1923, but reform-minded elites continued to motivate people to serve state agendas by appealing to a public good and delineating how, precisely, individuals could serve it.

In this chapter I argue that a modern public sphere took shape in Middle Eastern state-society relations as early as the 1890s in the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. It differed from previous articulations of the public good in its reliance on a rapidly expanding print sector; rising enrollment in primary schools that produced potential readers and respondents to print production, increasing interaction among commerce, advertising, and etatism; modern wartime economies, and ethnic self-identification tied to patriotic values. As an exercise in comparative history, positing a modern Ottoman public sphere allows us not only to illuminate hidden or forgotten state-society

interactions in Ottoman society but also to interrogate relations of power both within and across state boundaries of the late imperial age. Central to the purposes of this volume, the Islamic despot, Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876–1909) and his revolutionary successors, the Young Turks (r. 1908–1923), and the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (r. 1923–1938), all based their policies in a rhetoric of the public good (Haniollu 1995, 2001).

One key marker in understanding the continuities and the real (as opposed to the fictive) breaks with the past in the late nineteenth century is the way Islam was defined and utilized by state actors. It was articulated as one element among many contributing to the public good of the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim world. By the beginning of the twentieth century, “Islam” was increasingly used as an identifier superseding the ethnicity of refugees pouring into the empire from the Balkans. Finally, by the Republican era, the ruling elite saw “Islam” as a wrapper in which to discard the inconvenient events and mentalites of the nineteenth century. Of signal importance in this articulation were cheap, and free, illustrated publications that had wide circulation in public schools, news kiosks, and home subscriptions beginning in the Hamidian era and continuing until today. Twentieth-century Turkey’s vibrant, complicated, and raucous print culture, with its overlapping spheres of contestation over the meanings of modernity, had its origins in the last decades of the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II and has continued to the present.[6]

*** An Ottoman Public Sphere

Sultan Abdulhamid II took control of a state apparatus vastly changed in the decades preceding his reign. From the 1820s forward, Ottoman sultans and reformers recentralized the state apparatus, using for this purpose a number of pedagogical and quasi-pedagogical projects that also carried direct benefits, such as founding new school—from kindergartens through professional training academies—recruiting the military from among ordinary subjects of the empire, and using the latest communication technologies to recruit civilians among the populace into the new ideologies articulated in heterogeneous and often competing formulations by the empire’s ruling elites. Sultan Abdulhamid II took these practices and added the new technologies of communication as they became available—first, teaching more Ottoman subjects to read, then expanding the number and thematic breadth of publications for them to read, and also making abundant use of telegraphs and

improved postal technologies internal and external to the empire. As a result of these and other state initiatives, what one could reasonably call a public sphere had expanded exponentially by the late 1890s.

Since its articulation in 1962, Jurgen Habermas's notion of Offentlich-keit ("publicness" or "public sphere") has been tested, prodded, expanded, stretched to the breaking point to fit different cultural settings, and not infrequently dismissed as irrelevant. A number of scholars of non-European popular presses have also used the public sphere paradigm against non-European settings. In particular, Gary Marker (1985) and Louise McReynolds (1991) have both challenged and drawn on Habermas's model in their studies of the imperial Russian press in ways that are relevant to the Ottoman case.

Roughly stated, the Ottoman public sphere was compounded of three sectors: first, the state apparatus, divided into servants of the Porte and servants of the sultan, and the sultan himself; second, the press, divided into its larger, official and loyalist, group, and its smaller, opposition, group; and third, unofficial and private society. These three categories are useful only insofar as they mark out the boundaries of interaction among elements in each sector. The Hamidian cheap, illustrated press can be read today to understand the points of rigidity, flexibility, and permeability of these boundaries on specific topics. The late Ottoman cheap, illustrated press made a major contribution to the political public sphere because of the highly flexible practices of censorship, the cheapness of serial publications and their illustrated sections to aid unsophisticated readers, the high numbers of participants in its production, as well as the topics discussed. The critical thrust of this sector of the press was not, however, like Habermas's public sphere, aimed at the indigenous monarch but rather at loci of power and secrecy formally external to the Ottoman polity. By the late nineteenth century, this type of press was deeply interwoven into Ottoman daily political, social, and commercial life. Journalists and their readers engaged in long-running discussions of the modern empires of Europe and the Americas. Europeans and Americans, both external to and resident within Ottoman territories, and their clients among non-Muslim communities within the empire, played a central role in popular constructions of new Ottoman identities. Late-Ottoman journalists and their readers articulated criticisms of the rising power of Europe and the Americas to constrict both the material and mental, as well as the spiritual autonomy of Ottoman state and societal developments.

This chapter is based primarily on the cheap, illustrated press for families, including women and children, including not only serials but also pocketbooks and pamphlets of the official and (apparently) unofficial presses of Istanbul. The several thousand pages of print material to which I refer represent only a fraction of an extremely active print sector. The prevailing narrative, that Hamidian censorship was highly effective at suppressing critical rhetoric, is a myth. As with new print sectors in other state settings, Ottoman print capitalism was a compound of state support, entrepreneurship, and ideologies that both competed with and overlapped each other. As others (Gelbart 1987; Judge 1996) have documented for prerevolutionary France and China, Ottoman regimes of censorship until 1909 were effective in promoting reams of loyalist print but less effective in catching all criticism of internal events in the empire. Moreover, there is clear archival evidence of officials from ministries,

such as Interior or the Police, intervening to protect their client publishers from shutdown and exile by other ministries such as Education, which tried to use press laws and codes to silence critical response to their policies (Frierson 1996: 58—63). Understanding censorship as a continual series of negotiations allows us to see more complexity in the prerevolutionary Ottoman press than is allowed by most current historiography.

*** Family and Women’s Magazines

In addition to the women’s supplements to journals primarily addressed to men, publications entirely for women were founded with some frequency. Many folded after a short run, whereas others achieved an impressive longevity. Hanlmlar (Ladies), for example, was founded in 1882 and published only one issue, whereas Mtirtivvet (Munificence) published nine issues in 1887. Kadin (Woman), was one of several publications bearing this title, as opposed to “Ladies,” after the 1908 revolution. It began publication in 1911. Twenty-six biweekly magazines were issued before it closed in 1912. The hardy survivor of these magazines was Hanimlara mahsus gazete (Ladies’ own gazette, cited below as HMG). It not only thrived for fourteen years (1895—1909) but also published its own supplement for girls and a separate gazette for children, and was financially successful enough to found its own press. It circulated throughout the empire, Europe, and Russia. In its pages we can trace the results of Hamidian reforms in education as well as changes in the economic and social environment. Although Hanimlara mahsus gazete has been mentioned occasionally in earlier studies of Turkish women, it has generally been dismissed as an upper-class phenomenon, a publication severely restricted by stiff Hamidian censorship, and in any case unreadable by women—as the vast proportion of women were presumed to be illiterate In short, many have assumed it a pre-Kemalist failure, a fiction of literacy.

In fact, although the first writers for this magazine, and almost all writers for earlier publications, were indeed daughters of high civic officials and an occasional princess presented to the public with layers of protective attributions such as edibane (cultured, master/mistress of erudition), by 1896 professional journalists and schoolteachers almost entirely took over writing for the magazine, a trend that was to continue through the Young Turk and early Kemalist eras. The journalists, schoolteachers, and entrepreneurs of Hanimlara mahsus gazete and its less successful competitors, along with the writers of hundreds of letters to the editors and authors, have left us a record of how their attitudes and activities were increasingly tied to a general conception of the public good, patriotic service given through everyday civilian activities such as raising and educating children, dressing appropriately for leaving the house, and shopping for a family’s needs.

At the same time, the success of this magazine, as with its successors in the Young Turk and Kemalist eras, may also be attributed to state or high bureaucratic patronage, or at the least

to a savvy negotiation of censorship and self-censorship. The founding goals of the magazine, pronatalist and proeducation, also survived in the women's press through war and regime changes: to enable women to continue their education after leaving school and, more fundamentally to train women to be good Muslims (later, good Turks), good wives, and able mothers of loyal Ottoman subjects (later, patriotic Turks). Its scope rapidly exceeded this goal, or perhaps expanded the parameters of what being a good Muslim and a good mother entailed, as the parameters of Ottoman identity narrowed to exclude Greeks, Armenians, and other "suspect" subjects of the empire. Hanmlara mahsus gazete presented short items in nearly every issue about foreign women entering professional life, qualifying as doctors, forming unions, or being invited to join professional honorary associations. The editors frequently included statistics on the numbers of Western women in various professions, such as secretarial, accounting, architecture, publishing, and advertising. At the same time, these exemplars of Western progress were set against frequent discussions of Ottoman and Muslim women's productive and reproductive capabilities framed in an anticolonial rhetoric, presenting an Islamic critique of capitalism and Western mores, which were identified increasingly with minority communities within the empire. In addition, the greatly expanded public education system under Abdulhamid II was both a conduit toward and site for women's employment as schoolteachers, skilled workers, and footsoldiers in the front lines of the economic warfare over markets and manufacture.

As with other changing sectors of society and state, women's family life, their education, and economic life as both producers and consumers were ceaselessly debated by the editors, writers, and readers of this type of cheap, illustrated family magazines in the Hamidian era. Within the family, the women's traditional role—raising healthy, devout, ethical, and responsible children—was examined and adapted to the demands of a modernizing state and society to add to maternal duties those that fostered a sense of patriotism. Many of these roles were taken from family elders (commonly mothers-in-law, aunts, and grandmothers) and transmitted to relatively young women, new brides who were also heads of conjugal instead of extended households (Duben and Behar 1991). Even stepmothers, in the serial monogamy set into motion by death or divorce in many upper-middle-class and upper-class households, were given hundreds of column inches of prescriptive and hortatory literature to guide them in their family roles. The meaning of education also changed dramatically. It came to mean not only literacy and recitative memory but also knowledge of the life sciences, ethics, religious traditions, commerce, geography, and logical reasoning, knowledge of which allowed a woman to steer herself and her family through the ever more chaotic and crowded pathways of information available to Ottoman subjects. Women were also encouraged to learn skills that could turn them into economically productive members of society, branching out from traditional arenas of female entrepreneurship and piecework, such as the textile and clothing industry, into factory work and skilled technical work.

This latter trend became especially evident as the wars of the 1870s were followed by the wars of the 1880s, bringing Balkan refugees into the Ottoman heartlands and creating the necessity of incorporating them into state and society at all levels. Constant warfare at the frontiers translated at the local level into a steep drop in the male population and sharp rises

in the number of Muslims proportional to ethnic minorities throughout the empire (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 115–18). These Muslims complicated the pan-Islamic project of the Hamidian state in the sense that they had assimilated into Balkan society and had to be retrained for life in Istanbul and other refugee centers in Anatolia. Throughout these changes and the debates that accompanied them, religious and then ethnic identities became threads that were constantly reworked into new patterns and textures in the fabric of public life.

The late nineteenth century saw increasing numbers of new working women on Ottoman city streets, such as factory girls, teachers, and telegraph operators, cutting a wider swath in the streetcars, steam ferries, traditional manufacture, commercial districts, government offices, and the streets of the city. The state sought to regulate these new demographic currents through the ancient practice of sumptuary laws, prescribing frockcoats, tailored trousers, cravats and fezzes for men and the much looser category of “modest dress” for women (and postrevolutionary regimes used sumptuary laws well into the early days of the Republic to effect a new public order). The result was something similar to Revolutionary France as depicted by Lynn Hunt (1998: 224—49): men became drab and uniform in their dress, while women stepped over old boundaries and into new patterns of display. In Istanbul as in Paris, much to the delight or dismay of many observers, women fought bitterly among themselves over the semiotics of dress. To the dictates of reformist concerns shared by French revolutionaries and Ottoman loyalist reformers, we must add the multivalent, vexing question of Ottoman Christian identity and all that it came to convey by the turn of the twentieth century: wealth (seen as unfairly won by ethnic minorities), social prestige (gained by association with and protection of powerful foreign powers), potential treason and disorder (ethnic-nationalist movements, often supported by foreign powers), and religious competition (sparked by missionaries and their schools, orphanages, and hospitals). Increasingly these questions were put and answered on the streets of Istanbul and other port cities of the empire—arson, architecture, print capital, and patriotic consumerism reformulated an Ottoman modernity.

*** Editors’ Prescriptions and Readers’ Responses on the Streets

Modernist Islam was on display in Istanbul in its model factories, new governmental architecture, piped-in gas and water, and neighborhoods constantly being rebuilt in the spirit of Haussmann, Viviani, and the Vienna Ringstrasse, as frequent fires burned away Istanbul’s old wooden houses (Qelik 1986, 1992). The resulting cityscape conveyed in physical form many distinctive mixes of Ottoman Westernization and Islamic neotraditionalism that were constantly crafted and recrafted by journalists and their readers. The new stone and brick architecture was on display not only to pedestrians on the old, narrow streets and the new, widened boulevards but also to those plying the Bosphorus in caiques or the new steam ferryboats. The waterway in a sense opened the city to view and also became a dividing line between the most modern and the most traditional parts of the city. As earthquake, fire (both arson and accidental), and renovation remade the city, however, this sharp division between the new and the old, and the foreign and the familiar, began to be recreated in hairline fractures within neighborhoods with old wooden houses and artisanal quarters cheek by jowl with new mansions, apartment houses for conjugal households, and dormitories for

foreign and migrant workers—the latter being a new form of the old bekarhanes, or bachelor hostels, that had always vexed city administrators.

With the addition of display windows to new department stores in Pera and Galata, and the competition these stores represented to the cloth merchants and tailors of the old city, the nature of displaying goods and shopping was changed. Shoppers themselves also became part of street scenes, with goods displayed on their bodies. The presence of, among others, European capitalists, diplomats, engineers, doctors, merchants, teachers, and missionaries, combined with people's aspirations to link Western fashions in the popular mind with wealth, education, and power. The new culture of display seems, however, to have presented an immediate problem for Muslim women: how could they display their mastery and adaptations of the new European fashions, which included the new notions of health and physical fitness, while remaining in keeping with traditions of Islamic modesty, which dictated full and loose coverage from head to instep? By contrast, minority and European women were relatively free to adopt the new hats and corseted styles, and thus to display a streamlined, rocksolid profile of modernity—a profile that traced their cultural and commercial connections with European wealth, power, and privileges such as the extraterritoriality that had been exploited for commercial and political purposes by Europeans and their minority clients for centuries.

Recently, we have come to see the veil and its accompanying overcoat or sheet of fabric covering the body as an option increasingly chosen by religious Muslim women in secular states such as Algeria, Turkey, France, or Germany, or as a black bag dropped by ayatollahs and Revolutionary Guards over the bodies of Iranian women forcibly abducted into the modernists' past. In the Ottoman era, however, tesetttir (literally, being veiled, curtained, hidden, shrouded; or, concealed) was a custom, a matter for sumptuary law, and a street marker of ethnic identity among several different types of headgear. Its forms, primarily a type of overcoat (ferace), or sheet of fabric ($araf), loose skirt and mantle or pelerin (also referred to as faraf), and a veil (yamak, pefe), were legislated by sultans, tussled over by police and women, and contested in ordinary, everyday encounters between women, and between women and men, on the street. These everyday encounters became increasingly aggressive and even dangerous as the veil took on new meanings, moving from a basic marker of ethnic identity and family status and honor to become also a means of display of fashion and of wealth in an increasingly monetized economy. Through richness of fabric, embroidery, ornamentation, and color in even the cheapest of cotton overcoats and headscarves, and in sheerness or strategic draping of the veil and overcoat, women's curtain from observation (pefe) had become a bold statement of identity and access to goods, as well as of the politics of shopping. As such, it became a contested object in arguments not only over standards of modesty but also against consumption of European and Christian goods and against adopting, wholesale, European fashions and behaviors.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the upper-class uniform offerace and yamak, reinforced by the protection of livery, maids, and chaperones, began to appear more frequently on the streets, on the bodies of less high-ranking Muslim

women who were unaccompanied by chaperones and male servants. The wives and daughters of upwardly mobile bureaucrats, for example, as well as female journalists, schoolteachers, businesswomen, and housewives added to the numbers of middle- and upper-ranking women visibly active in the public life of Istanbul. Perhaps in an effort to cloak themselves against the effects of this unaccustomed visibility, women began increasingly to adopt the two types of garaf, a move that aroused the anger of ferace manufacturers and merchants who were losing profits to the new fashion, as the garaf took less fabric and time to sew (Issawi 1980: 305). It is perhaps precisely for this reason that it became popular with women, who were able to afford more variety in their outerwear, a variety that was both functional—as they were out in the dirt of the city more often—and more productive of varieties of display. The municipality of Beyiktay attempted to forbid the wearing of farafs, but to no avail as they gradually replaced ferace s for all but the most formal occasions such as visits to the palace (Tascioglu 1958: 23–24).

In 1900, the translator, journalist, and novelist Gulistan (smet posed a question for the readers of Hanmlara mahsus gazette (HMG): “Where does fashion come from?” Although she never really answered her opening question, she argued forcefully against the expense and wastefulness of fashion, but with compassion for its victims. They were either interested in fashion and were caught up in competitiveness and covetousness, or they ignored fashion altogether and were then subject to mockery and contempt. Her only recourse was to recommend moderation—that women seek harmony and appropriateness to their own persons in their choice of clothes, in essence arguing for timeless fashions immune to the latest trend from Paris, and thus requiring less frequent expenditure (HMG December 9, 1900: 3).

In the next issue of the same magazine, the journalist Mustafa Asim related a Salonican Frenchwoman’s description of the Istanbul two- piece $araf and pe$e as revealing and highly ornamented with braids and laces, and thus out of keeping with Islam—not all that different, in fact, from Parisian pelerines and voilettes. The author agreed, adding his own opinion that these styles were not only improper but also expensive and soon outdated, leading to wasteful expense. “We are absolutely convinced that we are heading for great dangers if our women continue for the sake of show their practices of day by day reducing their veiling in imitation of each other, and increasing their ornamentation and toilette” (HMG December 13, 1900: 3–4). In this respect, women’s changing fashions were a burden on the head of household. In late-Ottoman sociopolitical dialect as elsewhere, the household was the building block of the nation and women bore ultimate responsibility for the soundness of the household (Duben and Behar 1991; Frierson 1995). Thus, in its transmutation from protector of honor to destroyer of household finances, the outerwear of Muslim women had come to endanger national security at its foundation.

*** Underpinnings of Modernity

The seemingly trivial matter of what people wore had profound effects on the Ottoman economy. Istanbul was especially suited to serve as a matrix for interwoven enterprises of factory, sweatshops, and home industries. Hundreds of thousands of Balkan refugees in 1877—1878 and from other conflicts through the end of World War I and the Turkish War of Independence made the city's labor pool vast and inexpensive. Coincidentally, these survivors of the flight to Dar ul- Islam brought with them fresh resentments against Europeans and Christians and aroused pity and anger among the Istanbul population, as well. The survivors fed a pool of cheap labor that, along with the new and growing infrastructures of communication and transport at the disposal of merchants, made "Istanbul particularly suitable for the emerging low-wage industries of the late nineteenth century" (Quataert 1993: 55—56). Modern factories and free-enterprise zones were key elements in Istanbul's display of its mastery of Western technology both at home and abroad through the endeavors of photographers extensively subsidized and patronized by Abdulhamid II (Qelik 1986: 35—38). These photographs were published in the dozens of papers circulating in the city in European languages, and in Arabic, Armenian, Greek, Persian, Turkish, Russian, and mixtures of all of the above (Frierson 1996: 49—58). Home-produced lace, rugs, and embroidered goods were also increasingly important for domestic and export markets, and shoemaking and ready-made clothing became growth sectors of domestic manufacture that relied on sweatshops, home manufacture, and advertising in the cheap, illustrated press (Quataert 1993: 56—57). Although at the moment the experiences and attitudes of these low-wage workers have been captured only partially and in the aggregate through statistics, foreign and Ottoman reportage, and strikes, for the middle-ranking participants in late- Ottoman manufacture, a familiar dynamic was at work in the textile industries. Just as the Hamidian government undercut the European monopoly on tobacco (the Regie) by not enforcing antismuggling laws, so it supported the emergence of new Muslim entrepreneurs and retailers to compete with Europeans, especially in Istanbul, through a variety of formal and informal means.

Ottoman consumers were increasingly urged to buy local, and popular writers hastened to support this effort by denigrating the quality of imported goods, and their poor ratio of cost to value. Even though, or perhaps because, Muslim manufactures were on the rise, feelings against minority landowners, merchants, factory owners, and retailers ran higher and higher as the century wound up. The cheap, illustrated press was intimately tied to the textile industry, as display space for Ottoman progress in manufactures; in advertising fabrics, ready-made clothes, and tailoring services; and in instructing the public what to wear, how and when to wear it, and, if necessary, how to sew it. Women's gazettes in particular were closely tied to fabric, fashion, and handicrafts from their inception. Merchants and manufacturers in textiles and other dry goods were the first to make use of advertising in the cheap, illustrated press, as in the first advertisement appearing in Terakki in 1879: "Osman Efendi sells all types of Trabzon bezi (linen or cotton cloth) at low prices in the number two room of Baltaci han in Tahtakale" (Terakki July 18, 1879: 4). This brief announcement was one of two in this particular issue, the other presenting a new book, written in "very clear Turkish," available at all newspaper stands, and entitled Ekonomi Politik. The editors promised that the book would be useful to both male and female readers, as it discussed how individuals could earn money and, on a society wide level, how wealth is attained.

By the 1890s, basic tailoring and embroidery were taught in magazines as part of a package of scientific housewifery that drew on traditional Ottoman handicrafts. Patterns for lace, embroidery, and clothing made up most of the illustrated sections of general interest magazines or women's and girls' magazines. The rest of the sections were generally taken up with "tableaux" such as a woman or girl in Western-style clothing displaying her educational interests or accomplishments. The illustrations came with instructions, and in 1901—1902 Gulistan (smet translated an entire Western sewing manual, including instructions to make the corset-requiring wasp-waisted fashions of the day. Serialized as feature articles over a period of several weeks, this manual was greeted with eagerness and expressions of gratitude, but ultimately not with unmitigated delight. Readers wrote to the translator in extreme frustration with the instructions, to which she responded that her translations were accurately transmitting what was in the original text, and, with all humble apologies to her respected readers, she was doing the best she could with a very difficult book (HMG October 31, 1901-May 15, 1902).

In the midst of Gulistan Ismet's sewing lessons, however, yet another article on the corset appeared, this time in the imperative "Do not wear the corset" (HMG April 17, 1902: 1–2). There were sixteen feature articles devoted to this topic over fourteen years in this magazine alone, and writers of hundreds of general articles on health, physical fitness, and exercise usually managed to fit in a bad word or two against the corset. Illustrated with diagrams of crushed ribs and dislocated organs, these articles must have left readers in a quandary as to how they were to fit their bodies into the wasp- waisted fashions featured under the heading of Son Moda Libaslar, or "Clothes in the Latest Fashion." Whatever lexical and pictorial confusion may have reigned in the press, the temper of the times was clearly for European fashions, especially if they could be bought in Muslim stores or sewn from fabric bought in Muslim stores. A number of state decrees prohibited Muslim women from shopping in Christian stores, a prohibition that was easily skirted or defied. Still, there are signs that this idea was in force in subtle and not so subtle ways.

Many goods were advertised in the press with illustrations and Greek, Armenian, Latin, or even Japanese characters to convey a foreign cachet. Muslim tailors and retailers received different treatment in the advertisement section of Hammlara mahsus gazette. They were presented, generally without illustrations, as editors' announcements or recommendations. This format was originally developed to announce the services and addresses of Muslim men of the new professions, describing in detail their Ottoman or Western degrees, honors, and honorable characters (Frierson 1996: 204—206). By the late 1890s, editors began to describe Ottoman female entrepreneurs in similarly glowing terms. Raide Hanim's bridal shop near the Bayezid complex, for example, was given an endorsement for her "appropriate" fashions at low prices: blouses, jackets, skirts, bridal gowns, dresses, and overcoats, as well as jewelry and supplies for banquets (HMG December 13, 1900: 6). In format, then, the Muslim purveyors of Istanbul fashions and services were on equal footing with the new experts in the critical fields of medicine and health, a significant promotion in professional status achieved entirely through their Muslim identities, honest characters, and national loyalties.

Journalists argued for informal boycotts of foreign manufactures, and for patronizing Ottoman stores and buying Ottoman, and more particularly Muslim, manufactures. The Young Turks reified these and similar attitudes in their National Economic Program in 1914, but consumers had learned to think and act protectively towards Ottoman products well before the 1908 revolution (Zurcher 1993; Toprak 1982). In this light, the Son Moda Libaslar and Tablo features take on an added meaning. Whereas these sections ostensibly gave models, descriptions, and sometimes instructions and patterns for the latest fashions, I could not find illustrations of veils or cana/s “in the latest fashion” portrayed on a human body, or indeed anything that would identify the women in more Westernized fashion illustrations as Muslim or even Ottoman minorities. The fashions shown on bodies, rather than sketched and hanging on empty air, were, in fact, Western women on display, and the constant iteration of the corset’s ill effects no doubt gave the thinking woman pause before imagining and then putting herself physically into some version of son moda libaslar. With the corset’s physical and psychological discomforts as a foundation, as well as an air of national betrayal hovering around any new allafranga, or European, suit, one has to wonder if the whole ensemble did not provide wear with all the comfort of a hairshirt woven of interethnic tensions and conflicting self-perceptions.

As if crushed ribs and low treason were not enough weight to put on such slight confections as embroidered belts and pin-tucked blouses, even a woman who had hidden her corseted body under the loosest of (or^af, on the street was bombarded with enough images of half-naked women in corsets to add an element of impropriety to the simple act of getting dressed. An illustrator’s convention of depicting European salonieres, actresses, and female authors with one sleeve dropping off the shoulder was frequently deployed in corset illustrations, implying that women who wore corsets were as suspect in their morality as the most bold and forward of European women. Unlike the economic protectionist agenda and the corset’s physically harmful effects, however, this latter point could cut two ways, either to make the new fashions unthinkable or to make them infinitely more entertaining to wear. Portraits of two or three generations of women in one family suggest that both perspectives held sway.

Whatever the individual Ottoman woman’s sense of her son moda libaslar may have been, she could create her own version of the latest fashions by watching and judging European women on the street and in vitrines from behind the anonymity of her veil and overcoat of honor. A second means of observation lay in the press, as she could be an entirely anonymous viewer of Western women who had been flattened, despite their exaggerated curves, into two-dimensional, monochromatic caricatures of fashionable creatures.

Tesettur and the Enforcement of Identity

Ottoman women’s clothes could have had any number of points of origin and transmission. They could have been imported ready-made, tailored out of imported or local cloth by Muslim or minority seamstresses, sewn at home with directions from women’s magazines, manufactured by factory workers from local or imported fabrics, and ornamented with lace made in Silivri by Jewish girls, or sewn with embroideries by women in Bosphorus villages (Quataert 1993: 56). By the turn of the century, the vast majority of middling to elite women of all ethnicities showed remarkable though not uniform similarity in their suits, dresses, and toilettes. Once in overcoats and headgear on the street, however, even minute details of appearance became ground for contests between popular will and allafranga aspirations. Police officials made various failed attempts to dictate and enforce height of hemlines and thickness of veils, but they were often compelled to withdraw their announcements or see them ignored altogether.

Mary Mills Patrick described an effort by the police to reinstitute thicker veils and longer skirts, launched with this notice: “The adoption of new forms of apparel has become a public scandal in Constantinople. All Mohammedan women are given two days in which to lengthen their skirts and to substitute thick veils for thin ones.” The police notice caused an uproar.

At sight of this notice, the wives of Turkish aristocrats, of ministers, and of high government officials united in general indignation. All the women’s organizations threatened to stop work unless the order was rescinded. The following day this very humble notice appeared:

<quote>

“We regret that, because of the meddling of certain old women, a subordinate of the police department attempted to regulate the length of women’s dresses. The police department regrets the blunder and cancels the previous order” (Patrick 1934: 303—304).

</quote>

Patrick’s observations about the continuing vitality of sumptuary laws and their inevitable corollary, difficulties in enforcement, are borne out by a directive from the Ministry of the Interior in 1901 in response to a police request to hire and train female police detectives. They were pushed to this innovation by women’s strategies for evading interrogation, which relied largely on Muslim female etiquette in refusing to speak with “strange men” (policemen), even as they walked the boulevards of the city in close-fitting fashions adapted from Paris and London (Frierson, 1996). Far more effective at holding the line against European fashion was day-to-day enforcement on the street. Selma Ekrem, granddaughter of Namik Kemal, suffered constant harassment over her beloved hats; here, she was accompanying her elder sister who was that day gladly wearing her garaf and veil for the first time:

We left the house, mother and Abla in their tcharshafs and Beraet and I walking behind in our hats. Abla had thrown back her veil and her face was proud and self-conscious. We walked from our ill-paved street to a steep hill lined with little shops where the pounding of hammers filled our ears and the windows were cluttered with shining copper kettles and bowls. The copper drew me to it when suddenly I heard angry voices in my ears.

“To what days are we left? Women going about open to the world! Hey, hanim, do you want your daughter to go to hell? Cover her face!”

I looked into the angry eyes of a turbaned hodja [sic] who was waving a finger at Abla. We quickened our pace but the hodja was following us threateningly.

“It is the like of you who bring ruin to this nation! Imitating the Christians, showing your face!” the hodja screamed out.

A crowd was about us, mother was almost running and Abla threw down her black veil over her face. We children were hurrying along but I felt my heart turn blazing hot with fury. Why should that old priest interfere? By what right should he chase us and heap maledictions on our heads?

“What is it to you, you narrow-headed priest!” I screamed back, but mother dragged me away so fast that my words fell on the dumb stones. But my anger could not be pacified with my broken words. I wished I had been big and strong and had crashed my mother’s umbrella over that hodja’s [sic] head. But the crowd would then have closed over me and crushed me as the sea crushes pebbles into sand (Ekrem 1947: 180—81).

There was clearly a class component to this encounter. The Ekrem family were long-time residents of wealth and modernist standing in their neighborhood. More glaringly apparent than any criticism of consumption habits, though, is the hoca’s rage that this mother is dressing her daughters like Christians, and in so doing abandoning the good fight for Muslim female integrity and beauty on its own turf and in its own terms, as defined against the standards set by minorities and Europeans with their myriad unfair advantages and suspect morality.

*** Politics in the Latest Fashion

Muslim women exploited their ability to be anonymous as well as their female identity to achieve political ends. They acted as couriers for opposition groups in the empire, concealing correspondence, and probably banned newspapers and books as well, under

their inviolable overcoats. Women's protests over arrears in pensions and salaries were frequent, furthermore, and were generally expressed both vocally and as written petitions stuck onto the points of umbrellas and shoved through the railings of iron gates locked against them in front of modern ministry buildings. One foreign resident spoke with admiration of their persistence during a pension protest: "they filled every corridor, blocked every door they could find, and made the building resound with lamentations and clamors for payment... the authorities bowed before 'the might of weakness,' and made the best terms they could induce the victors to accept" (van Millingen 1906: 250–51). With the rise of ethnonationalist terrorism and the wars of the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, public expressions of discontent became both more loaded with dangerous meaning and more direct in their anger at Europeans and their proxies, local Christians. The last years of the Hamidian era were marked by riots, strikes, and massacres, and it was this popular discontent that facilitated the constitutional revolution that brought the Young Turks to power in 1908.

At the very outset of their rule, the Young Turks attempted to use public protest to their own ends, as when they called for boycotts of Austrian goods after the Habsburg's formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 5, 1908. Religious students and Young Turk ideologues led demonstrations in front of the Ministry of War three days later, but the field of operations rapidly moved to the shopping districts and the docks as demonstrators blocked customers' entry to Austrian stores. On October 10, appeals began to appear in the newspapers, calling for revenge in the name of the Ottoman nation. For its part, the state fez factory increased production to make up for a projected shortfall in Austrian fezzes that, along with sugar, were the main Austrian export to the empire. Austrian Lloyd ships stood laden in the harbors of Istanbul and Salonica, as the lightermen's and dockworkers' guilds refused to unload their goods.

Although the boycott was rumored to be ending on October 10, on October 11 religious scholars and military officers urged a crowd of roughly 15,000 in Sultan Ahmet Square to continue. Although the retail boycott was not initially effective, the port workers' continued refusal to deal with goods from Austrian Lloyd ships began both to cost the Austrian firms and local merchants time and money, and to cut the number of goods reaching the shops. When the guild refused to obey the grand vezir's command to stop the boycott, the Young Turks stepped in and took over the boycott as a weapon both against the Austrians and in their struggles with the Sublime Porte and the Palace. On November 3, a committee was set up to run the boycott, and this committee launched a Union of Economic Warfare, in charge of issuing certificates for display to merchants who complied with the boycott, and denouncing those who did not. The leaders of the boycott demanded reparations from Austria for the annexation, ironically and aptly in the form of taking on part of the Ottoman public debt. Porters and lightermen continued during the winter at ports throughout the empire to refuse to disembark passengers, mail, or goods from Austrian ships, despite increasing pressure from the grand vezir and the minister of commerce and public works. A brief effort by Greek lightermen to unload the ships in Istanbul was rapidly quashed with forced oaths of allegiance. Efforts by Lloyd to bring in its own workers met with a warning from the minister of police that he could not guarantee their safety, and the boycott syndicate ultimately controlled receipt or refusal of all European goods coming in to the port.

When an agreement containing Austrian concessions was signed on February 26, the grand vezir ordered that Austrian ships be unloaded immediately, but the minister of interior argued that as it was the people's boycott, the people should be allowed to decide when it ended. The next day the porters accepted the arguments of a prominent Young Turk ideologue and agreed to end the boycott, but lightermen pressed for better pay and the removal of foreign workers. Ultimately, after a strike from March 4 to 11, all foreign shipping firms agreed to the lightermen's terms, bringing to an end this five-month contest among guilds, import/export merchants, ministers, shopkeepers, consumers, and foreign capitalists. Ultimately, the Kurdish porters used the Greek attempt to break the boycott against them, eliminating Greeks from the porters' guild, as they had eliminated Armenians in 1895 by more brutal means (Zurcher 1993: 86—88). In 1908—1909, they succeeded in defeating the Armenian plea for reinstatement and maintained their hegemony over the docks (Quataert 1993: 121—45).

The matter-of-fact conclusion of the following announcement in Kadin (Woman) on the third anniversary of the Young Turk Revolution shows that protectionist agendas survived the Young Turk revolution, and in fact became even more part of what journalists hoped would become a popular consciousness:

<quote>

To our honored readers...

In order not to be overwhelmed or deceived by the deep torrents of Istanbul trade; if you wish to make a visit that is pleasant, elegant, graceful, and good-natured ... if you would both encourage an Ottoman place of business and also be of service to our nation then, dear readers, we sincerely recommend that you visit the Nejidler Store, next to the Qomanto Han, for inexpensive, elegant, sound and beautiful $arafs, fabric for clothes, laces, cords and ribbons and so forth, all of these things inexpensive to an astonishing degree, our hope being that Ottoman money would stay in the Ottoman state (Kadin July 23, 1911: 13).

</quote>

*** Capital and Nation

From this point forward, disillusionment with Western goods, Western economic policy, and the social outriders of Western capitalism came to play increasingly greater parts in the construction of a Turkish identity in the press and in other public spaces. In the 1909 counterrevolution against the Young Turks, manned largely by religious students, the revolutionaries demanded an end to such Western intrusions as bars, theatres, photography,

and women’s presence in public life. In the course of the uprising, a woman’s club was burned down, and after the suppression of the revolutionaries, Hanimlara mah- sus gazete Publishing House, which had published political journals in the period 1908—1909, apparently ceased operations (Zurcher 1993: 100). Although the counterrevolution was suppressed and women continued to increase their public presence in new jobs and socially, for the first time in the company of their husbands, there was an acceleration in the move away from the sheer veils and colorful (ar^afs of the nineteenth century and toward the more puritanical and neotraditional (araf with a thick veil that could be worn down or thrown back. When the Young Turks allowed Muslim Turkish girls for the first time officially to enter the American Constantinople Women’s College, which Gulistan (smet had attended secretly and illegally during the reign of Abdulhamid II, the headmistress noted that the “fashion in Turkish dress at that time no longer included the gay colors and white veils of the early days; loose black outer garments and thin black veils were worn. It constantly thrilled us to welcome groups of these black-robed students, eager for a life of study. Once across the threshold, the black veils disappeared, and modern seekers for knowledge came to view” (Patrick 1934: 210).

The stringencies of revolution, wartime, and British occupation during the War of Independence heightened the closeness with which Ottomans scrutinized each other’s behavior and beliefs, and in novels Westernized women changed from figures of fun to traitors, showing “a primary preoccupation with the moral decay that Westernization creates in women, or rather a predilection for female characters as the ideal bearers of corruption and decay” (Kandiyoti 1988: 42—43). As during the Hamidian era, however, the women of the Young Turk era were as adept at negotiating with the paternalist state to open new avenues for themselves as the state was in finding new uses for women. Telegraph operators formed their own union and political clubs blossomed, even after one of them was targeted and destroyed during the 1909 counterrevolution. Hundreds of women became nurses and postal clerks, appointed by the government, and a group of women founded and ran their own dry goods store in Pera (Qakir 1993). The Young Turk era, as well as the physical misery of poverty and shortages experienced by Istanbul at war and then under occupation between 1911 and 1922, led to the dampening of women’s displays of beauty and fashion, and perhaps this closure in conjunction with women’s increasing public visibility as nurses, clerks, and public speakers can illuminate the rigidity, fragility, and quest for legitimacy of the postrevolutionary state. In the rising tide of antiWestern sentiment and the bitterness of defeat and occupation, the politics of display became too risky, and too costly. Sheer veils and streamlined, ornamented bodies came to represent a force that at a carefully measured distance had held enormous appeal, but which as an enemy and arbiter of national shame and destruction became intolerable.

*** Conclusion

In this essay I have argued that producers, consumers, and regulators of public information created a modern public sphere in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, with its most consistent critical component being directed at Western states and societies. Looking West from the East allows us to question the degree of freedom of allegedly free presses in

Europe or elsewhere. The Western press, like its counterparts in the Ottoman Empire, was entangled in relations of power and structures of authority, and the very familiarity and commonality of human experience in the face of state structures built in conformity with or in apparent rebellion against Abrahamic world views common to rulers—de facto or de jure—of Europe, Asia, and Africa at the turn of the twentieth century. In an era of increasing intrusion by the Ottoman state on individual subjects' lives, print culture became a vibrant realm of contestation over prescriptive literatures, modern practices and ideas, and the duties and responsibilities (vaz- ife ve mesuliyet) of Ottoman men, women, and children in the struggle to save the empire. At the same time, this process was both ancient and extremely new. For example, prescriptive literature grew directly out of the adab/edeb or advice literature offered for centuries in the Mediterranean and Mespotamian regions before and after the advent of Islam. Classical adab literature, however, was written for rulers and their elite core of state servants, whereas Hamidian adab literature was written for the newly literate masses, giving them for the first time in Muslim history a key civic role, a patriotism, that required continuous exercise of will and independent reason, fluidity in social definitions of self and other, and active intellectual involvement in deciding the fate of the empire.

In modern Ottoman patriotism, subjects were presented a value set that reduced the ancient duty of loyalty to the ruler to one of many loyalties—to one's fellow Muslims, to Ottoman civilization, modernity, and progress, and against parts of Western culture that were deemed dangerous or weakening—and they were urged through the new world of widespread print culture to incorporate this value set into every act of their daily lives. The activities encouraged included bearing healthy children, "shopping local," refusing to become fashion victims of the West, and surrendering one's sons and husbands to lifetime terms of conscription on the shrinking frontiers of empire. Ultimately, ordinary Ottoman men, women, and children were made responsible for the public good of the empire and its subjects, regardless of ethnicity (though religious identity became increasingly important in including and excluding groups from perceptions of the public good), family relations or the lack of family ties, or any of the traditional ties to neighborhood, guild, or Sufi order. The state, in the persons of hundreds of reformers great and humble, reached into individuals' lives and turned these traditional loyalties toward the state and the larger society in crisis that surrounded most Ottomans in the cities of the empire. The revolutions of 1908, and the great project of building a modern Turkish republic in the 1920s, were able to succeed insofar as they did because their leaders inherited a population steeped through public schools and new urban architecture and print culture in modern patriotism, accustomed to the mental and physical processes of self-correction, and committed to becoming edibane, no longer meaning just cultured and civilized, but also modern and progressive.

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* Part III: Religious Authority and the Common Good

** Chapter Six: the ‘ulama of Contemporary Islam and Their Conceptions of the Common Good

Muhammad Qasim Zaman

As scholars of Islamic law and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, as exegetes of the Qur”an and religious guides, the ‘ulama have shaped or contributed to the dominant religious discourses in Muslim societies for more than a millennium. Their position has varied in different Muslim societies, and their views—no less varied—have scarcely ever remained uncontested by rivals within or outside their ranks. Yet they have carried, and in many cases continue to enjoy, considerable influence in Muslim societies. The impact of mass education, new technologies for disseminating knowledge and information, and dramatically changed social, economic, and political contexts have led to a “fragmentation” of religious authority since the nineteenth century; and the traditionally educated scholars, the ‘ulama, have paid a considerable price on account of these changes (Eickelman 1992; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 37–79, 131–35). Yet they have also adapted to these changes in ways that have often enabled them to expand their influence, forge new alliances at the local, national and

transnational levels, and participate in new ways in religious and political discourse in contemporary Islam (Zaman 2002).

The ‘ulama self-consciously represent a complex scholarly tradition that they typically see not so much as being inseparable from Islam as constituting its very definition. It is with reference to this tradition that they view themselves and the world around them, express their ideas of an Islamic society and state, and elaborate their conceptions of the common good. The ‘ulama’s conceptions of the common good are important for understanding not just their thought but also the processes through which facets of that thought are articulated, as well as the public sphere in which they are constituted. Yet what these conceptions of the common good are and how they relate to the ‘ulama’s long-standing tradition—as well as to their contemporary contexts—are questions that have seldom been asked. This chapter represents a preliminary effort to address these questions in a broadly comparative framework.

*** The “Common Good”

The common good, what it consists in, and how it is best realized, are matters of contestation in any society—a contestation that is central to any adequate understanding of how the common good is itself constituted (cf. Mansbridge 1998: 3–19; Calhoun 1998: 20–35).[7] This suggests, as Calhoun (1998: 20–35, esp. 20) argues in his critique of communitarianism, that the common good cannot be seen “ahistor- ically in substantive terms—for example, as rooted in communities that always already exist or in Aristotelian virtues.” Given, moreover, that the conception of the common good is produced by ongoing public contestation, there can scarcely be a single conception of it, nor can it simply be equated with that which is best for most people. In the former case, it is the dominant group that ends up defining what ought to count as the common or public good. And in the latter case, that which best suits most people may not conform to the minorities’ sense of the good (Calhoun 1998: 29). The common good is best seen, therefore, as expressing itself in a variety and diversity of forms rather than in a single, idealized formulation (Calhoun 1998: 20–35).

How do these conceptions of the common good relate to the ‘ulama? They often exemplify many of the things that Calhoun and Mansbridge caution against in understandings of the common good. The ‘ulama typically imagine the common good as something discoverable rather than as a “social and cultural project.” If they can have their way, they would not like this concept—or any other, for that matter—to be a subject of contestation, as Mansbridge thinks such concepts ought to be. And many of their conceptions of society would be unsuitable for, if not hostile to, liberal conceptions of a civil society.

Yet, however much the ‘ulama might wish to be able to define the dominant discourses in contemporary Muslim societies, their voices are at best only one of several competing views and voices. And inasmuch as they are part of this landscape, and are often loud, even articulate, contributors to public debate, the ‘ulama help shape the public sphere. Indeed, their discourses contribute in practice to precisely the sort of contestation that constitutes not just the public sphere but also notions of its common good. For all the ‘ulama’s wish simply to discover and enunciate concepts rather than acknowledge creating them, it is precisely through a long history of discourse and contestation that the tradition in terms of which they define themselves has been constituted. The ‘ulama’s discourses in the present are not just articulated in contestation with other, rival voices in society but are also in constant dialogue and argumentation with the resources their own tradition offers.

A number of doctrines and methods in medieval Islamic jurisprudence concern themselves with what may be regarded as matters of the common good. In their writings on the principles or foundations of the law (usul al-fiqh), medieval jurists often posited five fundamental values as encapsulating the “purposes” of God’s law, the sharfa. These values—religion, life, progeny, property, and rationality—were based not on any explicit listing of their contents in the foundational texts but were derived, the jurists believed, through what Wael Hallaq has characterized as “inductive corroboration.” These fundamental values converged on the preservation, within the limits prescribed God, of the interests of human beings—their individual and collective good.[8]

The concept that best expresses this concern with securing the interests of the people, and around which much of the discussion on the purposes of the sharfa revolves, is maslaha (pl. masalih). Maslaha (or, more precisely, maslaha ‘dmma, “public interest”) can, broadly speaking, be understood as the “common good,” though it is more accurate to see it as a means, or a legal criterion, through which the common good is realized. Yet because considerations of maslaha usually lacked explicit justifications for themselves in the foundational texts, it was a rather controversial doctrine in medieval jurisprudence (Hallaq 1997: 112–13, 214). Those inclined to the use of maslaha did, however, come to find support for it in terms of the general purposes of the law—purposes that maslaha was thought to promote. And several medieval scholars, most notably the Hanbali jurist al- Tufi (d. 1316) and the Spanish Maliki jurist al-Shatibi (d. 1388), gave maslaha considerable importance in their writings.[9]

The doctrine of maslaha came to enjoy a new salience in modern legal thinking. Muslim reformers of the twentieth century extensively invoked it to justify reformulating their legal tradition. Among the best known of these was the Syrian Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935) who, as Malcolm Kerr has shown in some detail, saw maslaha as the cornerstone of “a utilitarian methodology” in terms of which to reform the sharia (Kerr 1960, part 1: 101 and passim; Kerr 1966: 187–208). In this venture, Rida sought to muster the support of figures from the medieval Islamic tradition, reintroducing his audience to the works of Tufi and Shatibi.[10] He argued that

considerations of maslaha were far more pervasive in Islamic jurisprudence than was commonly recognized (Rida n.d.: 143–44).

I will briefly discuss maslaha with reference to certain scholars more recent than Rashid Rida. Although the idea of maslaha comes closest to the topic of this chapter, my concern here is much broader than maslaha in the conventional juristic sense. It is to understand the ‘ulama’s notions of the common good even when they do not necessarily use a particular term or phrase that translates as such, and even when they are not specifically discussing issues of law and legal theory.

Maslaha and the Contemporary ^cuiUmw,

In the work of Rashid Rida, as Kerr (1966) has demonstrated, maslaha or public interest becomes the principal means of effecting legal change. Rida argued that although matters of liturgical practice (‘ibadat) as laid down in the sharia remain immutable, God and the Prophet intended for the laws regulating the affairs and interactions of people in the community to remain receptive to change. The criterion for rethinking and change was the public interest or the common good. Tuff’s controversial view—that instead of necessarily basing considerations of maslaha on explicit indications in the foundational texts, the texts themselves should be interpreted in light of maslaha— was one that Rida found congenial to his own way of thinking (Kerr 1966: 194; on the break with medieval jurisprudence that this entailed, cf. ibid.: 196, and Hallaq 1997: 219).

Yet, as Kerr (1966: 203–208) points out, there is a highly instructive tension in Rida’s legal thought that reveals his discomfort with the implications of his own proposals. As concerned as he was with demonstrating—and making room for—the responsiveness of the law to changing needs, the case for such responsiveness threatened to make this law appear as a product of human effort, a matter of historical evolution, rather than as a divine blueprint. Rida could not have it both ways; and his discomfort with seeing the divine and sacred dimension of the sharia dissipated by the emphasis on its historical dimension is best illustrated by his polemics against those who seemed to him to emphasize the human and historical dimension of the sharia.

Rida’s dilemma has not quite been resolved by more recent scholars and activists. The Qatar-based Egyptian scholar Yusuf al- Qaradawi—a major figure among the contemporary ‘ulama—who has written on maslaha in addition to many other themes, seems to be aware of the dilemma but wants to steer clear of it.[11] His book, al-Siyasa al-shaliyya f daW al-nusus al-sharla wa maqasidiha (“Governance according to the sharia in light of the texts and purposes of sacred law,” 2000), offers a substantial discussion of maslaha. This book is part of a series of his writings that “treat diverse intellectual issues— of law and legal theory, faith and practice—where

the [true] path might have become obscured.” In clarifying these intellectual issues, the series focuses each of its published or planned volumes on one or more of the “Twenty Principles” enunciated by Hasan al-Banna” (d. 1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. [12] Qaradawi’s al- Siyasa al-shariyya is one volume in this series.

Qaradawi discusses maslaha primarily in the context of areas where, according to Banna”, one ought to act in accordance with the opinion of the ruler (imam/walt al-amr). Three such areas are identified: matters that are not explicitly regulated by indications in the foundational texts; matters on which several different options are available; and matters of maslaha (Qaradawi 2000: 65–98). Qaradawi largely follows the medieval jurist al-Ghazali (d. 1111) in characterizing considerations of maslaha as themselves being of three kinds: those for which the sharfa provides clear indications, and which therefore are clearly authoritative; those against which the sharta provides clear indications, and which consequently are clearly inadmissible; and, finally, those on which the foundational texts provide neither clear support nor reasons for rejection. Ghazali’s argument for maslaha rests on the sharta’s purposes—themselves classifiable as matters of “necessity,” important “need,” and finally, “amenity.” Foremost among these purposes are the five necessities of religion, life, progeny, property, and rationality that the divine Lawgiver is presumed most interested in preserving. It is around these issues that considerations of maslaha must revolve (al-Ghazali 1995, I: 257–59; Qaradawi, 2000: 76–80).

Maslaha, Ghazali is careful to note, is not just a matter of seeking that which is beneficial and warding off what is injurious. Instead, it signifies the safeguarding of the sharta’s aforementioned purposes (al-Ghazali 1995, I: 258). The criterion of what counts as maslaha is therefore provided by the sharta itself rather than by the people, for all that it is the latter who are the beneficiaries of the sharta’s concerns. Qaradawi concurs with this crucial qualification, but he also wants to make Ghazali’s category of the “necessities” that the sharta protects through maslaha more expansive. He writes:

<quote>£££If I were to add to Ghazali’s definition of maslaha, I would use his original formulation but say [the following]: “By maslaha, we mean safeguarding the purpose [s] of the sharfa. And the purpose [s] of the sharfa for the people are to protect their religion, life, rationality, progeny, property, honor, peace, rights and freedoms, the institution of justice and shared responsibility in [what ought to be] a model community, and everything [else] that makes life easier for them, removes oppression, perfects their character, and guides them to what is best in manners and customs, in [social] arrangements and in interactions.” I don’t think that our imam, Ghazali, would object to such an addition [to his definition], for it conforms to his goals in [showing] the link between maslaha and the purposes of the

sharfa; and what we have mentioned is, without doubt, a part [of those purposes] (Qaradawi 2000: 84).£££</quote>

It is uncertain whether Ghazali would have concurred with Qaradawi on this extended list. A more pertinent issue is how maslaha is the cornerstone—as it was for Rida—of Qaradawi's vision of an ideal Islamic society and state. Maslaha, Qaradawi writes, is central to codification of the law as well as to legislation on matters not regulated by the sharfa but necessary for the proper ordering of a modern society. Discretionary punishments need to be legislated, he says, to curb usury, bribery, usurpation of the rights of the orphan, neglecting prayers, harassment or assaulting of women on the streets, and other evils. "Sermon and admonition is not a sufficient deterrent [against such evils], and it is known that God restrains with [political] authority what He does not restrain through the Qur"an [alone]. There are hundreds of sins, forms of opposition [to the divine law], and wrongs that the sharfa has forbidden, or has commanded doing the opposite of, but it has not established a specific penalty for them; and so they need legislation" (2000: 95–96). The distinction between sin and crime, and between moral and legal infractions, collapses here. Qaradawi seeks the regulation of both through new legislation, and he sees the justification for such initiatives in maslaha—public interest and the common good.

Public interest likewise requires the codification of the law, as was attempted, Qaradawi says, by the Ottoman Majalla (1869–1876). Unlike the nineteenth-century Majalla, however, which was a partial codification of civil law on the basis of the Hanafi legal tradition, Qaradawi seeks a codification that brings together the resources of the different schools of law, even opinions that are no longer part of any recognizable or existing school of law. Such resources would include matters not previously regulated by the sharfa in terms of definite penalties, but the imam is now to exercise his discretion in how to implement them (Qaradawi 2000: 96). Yet although maslaha falls, for Qaradawi, within the purview of things that are to be left to the imam or ruler, the overall impression is that the religious scholars, the 'ulama, determine whether considerations of maslaha can legitimately be taken into account in a particular legal issue. The purposes of the shari^ca guide considerations of maslaha, of course, but only if there are no explicitly contravening indications in the foundational texts against the resort to maslaha. The scholars of the sharia, he implies, are best qualified to determine this (see Salvatore 1997: 202–204).

The question of possible contradictions between maslaha and the purport of specific sharia rulings is important, and Qaradawi devotes considerable attention to it. It is in this context that he defends the medieval Hanbali jurist Tufi against the criticism that he had ranked maslaha above even the foundational texts. Though Tufi did not always make this explicit, it is clear, Qaradawi says, that maslaha can override indications in the foundational texts only when such indications are not a matter of certainty as to their meaning. When, however, they are, there

can be no question but that maslaha must be subordinate to them, and Tufi never asserted otherwise (Qaradawi 2000: 145—50).

Qaradawi’s reading of Tufi enables him to navigate between what he takes to be two extremes concerning maslaha. On the one hand, there are those who exclusively follow the literal meaning of specific rulings, ignoring their broader aims and thereby keeping the law frozen in time (Qaradawi 2000: 214—27). At the other extreme are those who profess to base themselves only on what they discern as the larger purposes of the law irrespective of whether such putative purposes contradict the explicit injunctions of the foundational texts. Tuffs views are taken, without justification, as a major justification by such people (Qaradawi 2000: 228—42).

The third group, among whom Qaradawi no doubt counts himself, comprises the “moderates.” They base themselves on the specifics of the law, without however, losing sight of its larger purposes; and they are guided by considerations of public interest, but only insofar as such considerations are not contradicted by the foundational texts. And it is here, with this group, that medieval scholars like Tufi and Shatibi are held to belong (Qaradawi 2000: 243—64). This is the group that, for Qaradawi, ensures the receptivity of the sharia to change and to the common good through the resources provided by the sharia itself rather than at its expense.

If Qaradawi thinks that his discussion of maslaha avoids Rida’s dilemma, he doesn’t say so. Indeed, Rida is conspicuously absent from Qaradawi’s discussion, even when he lists the names of the major modern scholars of Islamic law (fuqaha al-asr) who have written on matters of maslaha (Qaradawi 2000: 94–95).[13] This remarkable absence can scarcely be imputed to anything but Qaradawi’s distaste for Rida’s position on maslaha, whereby it had essentially become a none too subtle means of circumventing the legal tradition itself.

Rida’s name, however, is not the only thing missing from Qaradawi’s discussion. Given that Qaradawi’s book is on “governance according to shari^ca norms” (siyasa shaliyya), it is striking that he says so little on the question of how the ruler’s authority and his exercise of maslaha are regulated. Qaradawi would probably respond to this objection by noting that, unlike Rida, he sees considerations of maslaha firmly embedded in the foundational texts, and that this removes the dangers of willful manipulation on the part of the ruler or anyone else who wants to invoke maslaha for self-serving ends. More generally, and in the spirit of other writings, Qaradawi refers to the ‘ulama as a check on the ruler’s “governance according to sharia norms.” Yet, if sharia norms in themselves are not necessarily a check on the morals of society—as he himself acknowledges, and which is why he wants new penal laws to be enacted even where the sharia had previously done without them—the norms of the

sharia would be even less of a constraint on the ruler's authority.[14] And how far the 'ulama can constrain the ruler is anything but certain.

For all his apparent awareness of the danger that maslaha can become a plaything in the wrong hands, that is precisely the danger that lurks in Qaradawi's delineation of "governance according to sharia norms." It is this danger that has led other contemporary 'ulama to take a more stringent view of maslaha. The ambivalence toward maslaha comes out strongly in a detailed legal opinion on the legitimacy of land reforms by Mufti Muhammad Taqi 'Uthmani, a former judge of the Shari'at Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the Vice President of the Dar al-'ulum of Karachi, a major Deobandi madrasa of Pakistan ('Uthmani 1993a). With its categories of the lawful and the forbidden, Islam regulates the means through which property might be acquired or augmented, he says; but if property is acquired through lawful means, then there is no restriction on the amount acquired ('Uthmani 1993a: 20). Taqi 'Uthmani acknowledges that an "Islamic government" (Islami hukumat) would be within its rights if it were to impose some restrictions (for example, on the amount of landed property that one can own) in view of public interest. But such restrictions, or the usurpation of property beyond a prescribed limit, must only be temporary, not permanent. He writes that permanent restrictions of this sort would imply that the government was making forbidden something that was explicitly allowed by God ('Uthmani 1993a: 24–27). Furthermore, it is not enough merely to invoke "a vague justification in the public interest" for either the limitation on the ceiling within which one can own property or for the government's takeover of property beyond that ceiling; to be legitimately undertaken, such measures require a careful determination of "necessity" (darura), and this necessity is only applicable in life-threatening or other extremely desperate straits 'Uthmani 1993a: 115—16, 139; quotation from 116).

All this might suggest a deep-seated unwillingness to allow any substantial change in the legal tradition. Yet it is worth noting that Taqi 'Uthmani never explicitly says that more substantial change is inadmissible, just that such change does not seem to him to be necessary in the instances in question. The overall framework in which the Deobandi (and many other) 'ulama of South Asia typically operate is that of taqlid, adherence to the established doctrines of their own school of law—which in their case means the Hanafi school of Sunni law.[15] Yet while insisting on this overall framework, 'ulama like Taqi 'Uthmani are careful not to rule out possibilities of jihad—creative rethinking in light of the foundational texts to arrive at new rulings (cf. 'Uthmani 1993b). But unlike the "modernist" interpreters of Islam, who are typically in charge of formulating state policy in Pakistan, 'ulama like Taqi 'Uthmani are reluctant to invoke ijtihad or maslaha as an excuse for stepping outside the established juristic tradition except in the most pressing circumstances.[16] Their objections against the indiscriminate use of "necessity" are similarly motivated. This distrust is not merely a continuation of the ambivalence that even medieval jurists sometimes felt toward maslaha. It is, rather, a facet of the misgivings toward the state that many 'ulama feel, an attitude with deep medieval roots (Zaman 2002: 87–110). Considerations of public interest and the common good thus become suspect not just because their relationship with the foundational texts might be tenuous. To many 'ulama, they are also suspect because the state and its

modernist elite can easily wield them for their own ends. To Taqi ‘Uthmani, as to many others all the way back to Ghazali, the good in maslaha is defined by the sharfa. The sharfa’s good is meant for the people—and it is common or public in that sense—yet it is not the people who determine it. The importance of the common good in the overall vision of the sharfa is recognized and indeed stressed, but any such idea only holds inasmuch as it is grounded in the sharfa.

*** Contestation on the Common Good: Illustrations

Is there more to the ‘ulama’s conception of the common good than the assertion, on the one hand, that the sharfa is concerned with it and, on the other, that modernist constructions of the common good violate rather than further the sharfa’s concerns? Where, in other words, might we locate more specific discussions of matters relating to the common good? I argue that the ‘ulama’s general and often vague assertions on how the sharCa secures such good are not the primary site of their discussions on these issues—although such assertions, too, cannot be dismissed lightly. Instead, their conceptions of the common good, and their contribution to the further articulation of such conceptions, are to be located in how they seek to deal with particular issues and specific problems in their societies.

My first example concerns arguments about the dissolution of marriage in India. In colonial India, Muslims were a minority, and they remain so in contemporary India. In both contexts, issues relating to the laws of personal status (marriage, divorce, and inheritance) and especially the dissolution of marriage have caused severe controversies. In colonial India, the issue often centered on the absence of Muslim judges who, the ‘ulama believed, were required for the implementation of sharfa rules on matters of personal status. Many ‘ulama had argued that in the absence of such judges, even simple legal provisions of the sharfa about the dissolution of marriage could not be implemented. The implications of such a view were unbearable for many Muslim women in the Punjab. Because Hanafi law considered apostasy one of the grounds for the dissolution of marriage, many women apos- tasized in the 1920s in order to end undesirable marriages. Eventually the leading Deobandi scholar Mawlana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (d. 1943) devised a formula to make it possible for undesirable marriages to be dissolved by recourse to certain provisions in the Maliki (as opposed to the Hanafi) school of law, even as that formula closed the door of apostasy from Islam (Zaman 2002: 21—31). In the 1980s, issues of personal status again came to the fore with the Shah Bano controversy: the Indian Supreme Court ruled that a divorced Muslim woman had the right to demand alimony from her former husband, even though the sharfa made no such provision. This initiative of a Hindu-dominated court, which also involved the court’s venturing its own reading of the Qur”an in justifying its verdict, had considerable support from India’s Muslim modernists, but it was vigorously opposed by the ‘ulama; and it was the latter who played an important role in eventually having this decision reversed through parliamentary legislation (Zaman 2002: 167—70).

Neither of these instances does much to inspire great confidence in the ‘ulama’s concern with the general community good. Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi’s initiative made it easier for women to secure the dissolution of a marriage, but he took this initiative only after Muslim women had begun to renounce Islam in order to dissolve their marriages. And the Shah Bano case illustrated that safeguarding the sharfa norms was a greater good for the ‘ulama than protecting the rights of indigent women. Yet both of these episodes make better sense when we recall that the common good for the ‘ulama lies not just in following the sharfa but also in making the sharfa itself the arbiter of the common good.

If the ‘ulama’s common good is not a sum of individual interests, a recent initiative of the Indian ‘ulama reveals considerable recognition of the need to make a greater effort to reconcile the sharfa- centered common good with individual interests. The Muslim marriage contract is notorious for the ease, and indeed the arbitrariness, with which it allows the husband to divorce his wife. Many modern Muslim states have taken measures to restrict this arbitrariness, though the ability to end an undesired or undesirable marriage remains unequally distributed between women and men. In 1995, India’s Islamic Fiqh Academy gathered leading Indian scholars to deliberate on the question of whether it was permissible from the Islamic legal viewpoint to add specific clauses to the standard contract of marriages in the interest of ameliorating the rights available in a marriage to men and women (Qasimi n.d. [ca. 1992]). The ‘ulama freely recognized the social ills entailed by irresponsible resort to divorce, and they submitted formal responses to the questions posed to them in this regard by the Fiqh Academy. These responses, together with some of the ensuing discussion, were later published in the form of a book on the question of “a conditional marriage contract” (mashrut nikah).

Not all ‘ulama were equally eager to see much change in the existing contract, and they invoked different legal authorities to defend or criticize the various proposals. There was genuine debate on the matter; and many members of the seminar convened to consider the question eventually agreed that as long as the basic goals of marriage or the basic rights conferred by the sharfa on the spouses were not violated, additional conditions could validly be attached to the marriage contract. Not all ‘ulama agreed on what this meant in practice, although many took it to mean that a woman could add the condition that her husband would not object to her pursuing a career, that the amount of the dower payable by the husband to his wife would be substantially augmented if the husband divorced her without valid grounds, and that the right to end the marriage in certain circumstances would be delegated by the husband to his wife (or to local scholars or notables) at the time the marriage was solemnized. A model marriage contract, drafted for further deliberation, was sent to leading ‘ulama and also made part of the published volume in order to elicit further commentary and debate.

Debates of this sort do not necessarily lead to dramatic results. Even so, answers to a question such as the Fiqh Academy had set for itself are not necessarily predictable, and the ‘ulama of different contemporary societies or of the same society disagree among

themselves and with others on how to approach them. They often approach them, however, in the form of public or publicized debates, as in the case of the initiative to rethink the marriage contract, or by mobilizing public opinion, as in case of the Shah Bano controversy. The debates on such matters and the public contestation that they generate may be a more significant contribution to the discourses on the common good than the precise conclusions that emerge from them.

Examples of such public contestation—on where the common good lies and how to realize it—are varied. For instance, while Yusuf al- Qaradawi would like to see a ruler “governing according to sharfa norms” legislate penal laws even for moral infractions and thus extend the reach of the sharfa in new, unprecedented areas of individual and collective life, Pakistan’s Taqi ‘Uthmani resolutely seeks to restrict the scope of maslaha even when resorted to by an Islamic state. And Taqi ‘Uthmani’s elder brother, Muhammad Rafi’ ‘Uthmani, who is the president of the madrasa at which they both teach in Karachi, seeks to restrict the interference of the state in the lives of its citizens even further. The latter’s views, discussed below, shed further light on conceptions of the common good and the ‘ulama’s ambiguities in this regard.

Referring to the sharfa law of retaliation (qisas) and blood money for personal injury (diya), which Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had introduced as part of his initiatives toward the implementation of the sharfa during his first tenure in office (1990–1993),[17] Rafi’ ‘Uthmani argues that the state should have little to do with such matters. It is the right of the injured party or his kin to decide whether they want retaliation for a death or injury, or monetary compensation for it, or else that they want to forgive the offending party altogether. Such decisions belong to those who have been affected directly by a crime, Rafi’ ‘Uthmani argues, and it was one of the grave injustices of British colonial rule to make the state an arbiter in such matters. Having the state take up such matters means that the aggrieved party often gets no recompense: the corrupt and inefficient courts fail effectively to punish a crime, and there is no question of monetary compensation even if the aggrieved party should desire that option. Conversely, because the offender is thrown in jail, his family also loses what may well have been its sole breadwinner. Both families thus suffer on account not only of the crime itself but also of the state’s arrogation to itself of the right to settle it. But the sharfa laws of qisas and diya allow for the matter be settled among private individuals or by their ‘aqila. Traditionally, the ‘aqila has meant the family, kin, or tribe of the parties to a dispute; but, as Rafi’ ‘Uthmani notes, a labor union of which the offender (for example, a taxi driver guilty of involuntary manslaughter) might be a member, may equally be seen as an ‘aqila. Such an organization may well be made responsible for the payment of the blood money if the offender himself is unable to do so. Not only does this enable the payment to be effectively made, he writes, but the members of the trade union would now also come to have a vested interest in preventing crimes or acts of negligence for which they might end up becoming financially liable (‘Uthmani 1999:10–25).

This is a remarkable vision of the practice of the sharfa. It is remarkable for how little it concedes to the changed modern context in which the sharfa is to be implemented, except in such things as the innovative equation between the ‘aqila and the labor union. The state is, of course, the guarantor of the implementation of the sharfa: in the matter of qisas and diya, it sees that private claims are adequately settled between the parties concerned. But the state is otherwise external to such settlements and the common good is seen not just in the proper implementation of the sharfa but also in the state’s not intruding beyond what is essential for such implementation.

Rafi’ ‘Uthmani’s vision of the practical working of the sharfa is also remarkable for what it leaves out: the question of the abuses to which the private settlement of claims might lead. There have been cases in Pakistan where the killing of a girl by her own father—because the unmarried girl was suspected of pregnancy—was “forgiven” by the victim’s immediate kin (Dawn, July 27, 2002b). In another incident that took place in the Punjab province of Pakistan in July 2002, eight young girls were to be given “in marriage” to a rival family as part of a settlement—that also involved a large sum of money—in exchange for which the receiving family would forgive the murder of two of its members. Four members of the family providing the girls and the money were on death row for these murders. The understanding was that the state would not execute them provided that the plaintiff family forgave the defendants. This deal, brokered by local notables, was said to follow ancient custom in its surrender of virgin girls to the rival clan as part of the price of reconciliation. The state was expected to honor this arrangement as a form of blood money (diya). As it turned out, the state intervened as soon as the incident was reported in the national press, and the grooms of the rival clan were forced to divorce the young girls before the marriages had been consummated. Significantly, however, the state’s intervention was only against what was seen as the local custom involving the girls, not against the rest of the settlement, which the representatives of the state in fact endorsed. Thus, even as it voided the “marriages,” the state recognized the right of the parties to settle their own dispute privately, that is, to forgive the murderers on the basis of monetary compensation (Dawn, July 24–27 and 29, 2002; News, July 24 and 26–27, 2002).

Rafi’ ‘Uthmani would probably approve of the intervention of the state in the aforementioned incident and take it as indicating the proper limits of such intervention—in this instance, against custom so the sharia can do its work. But the ambiguities in the sharia’s own practice in such instances remain unaddressed. This practice not only divests the modern state of some of its basic functions; it also divests particular individuals—for instance, the girl who was murdered by her own father, or the eight girls who were part of the settlement agreement in the murder case—of recourse against their fate. How the common good is being furthered in instances such as these, apart from the fact that the sharia is supposedly in effect and that that is deemed to be a good in itself, remains unclear.

The question of the role that the state is to play in making and keeping a society “Islamic” is only one of the countless issues relating to the common good on which the ‘ulama disagree. Of these, I take as my final example in this section the question of what an Islamic society looks like—that is, a society which is the embodiment of the common good. Qaradawi (1996) addresses this question explicitly and at length in a book entitled Malamih al-mujtama^c al- islami alladhi nunshiduh (Features of the Muslim society that we seek).

Qaradawi writes that there are two sets of ideas of that Muslims ought to rid themselves on their path to an ideal Islamic society. The first kind are those which Muslims have acquired in the course of their intellectual decline. They include such things as confusing reliance on God with indifference to one’s condition, predestinari- anism, and a servile imitation of earlier legal opinions. The second set of ideas derives from the modern West, and they have come to define everything “relating to religion and the world, man and woman, [standards of] excellence and degradation, freedom and rigidity, progress and backwardness, the permissible and the forbidden” (Qaradawi 1996: 85–86). It is for the ‘ulama and the intellectuals of the “moderate school” to lay down properly Islamic norms to take the place of the prevalent non-Islamic ones. They ought to do this by “bringing together [ideas derived through] reason with [those drawn from] the transmitted tradition; religion and the world, the ordinances of the sharfa, and the needs of the age” (Qaradawi 1996: 86—87; quote from 87).

Qaradawi’s vision of Islamic society not only has a moral foundation, there is no real differentiation between moral and other norms in it. As he says with some emphasis, “There is no separation in this society between knowledge and morality (akhlaq), art and morality, economics and morality, politics and morality, or between war and morality. Morality is, indeed, an element that guards all facets of life—the small and the large, the individual and the collective” (Qaradawi 1996: 110). This idea returns us, of course, to his view that even moral infractions should be subject to penal regulation. Yet Qaradawi seems not to think that this vision of an Islamic society might scare some people away from it. On the contrary, despite the high degree of moral regulation in such a society, he is clearly at pains to depict it in what he considers appealing colors. His emphasis on moderation, and on combining the old and the new, is part of that effort. But unlike most other contemporary ‘ulama, let alone the college- or university-educated “Islamist” (or “fundamentalist”) activists, his vision of an Islamic society also includes attention to such things as forms of entertainment in that society. “Entertainment and the arts are among the most complex of issues relating to the Islamic society,” he writes, for people have fallen between the extremes of either imagining their society in ascetic terms or, conversely, of losing sight of all constraints in pursuit of pleasure (Qaradawi 1996: 265–66; quotation from 265).[18] Again, Qaradawi invokes a path of moderation, and suggests that such moderation has ample room for legitimate arts and acceptable forms of entertainment. Even listening to music, he argues, is not forbidden, so long as it is enjoyed within limits. The “ancient jurists”—of whom his prime example is Ghazali—were more permissive of music than latter-day jurists, and this reflects a general preference of the former for that which was easier for people to follow as contrasted to the inclination of the latter-day scholars for the more demanding course of action in all matters (Qaradawi 1996: 305). Extremes are forbidden

even in religious practice, he says, which makes self-evident the avoidance of extremes in matters such as entertainment (Qaradawi 1996: 301). As to where the limits lie in listening to music, and how to navigate the proper path in this respect, Qaradawi (1996: 298—301) cautions against anything that excites the passions, content that violates the teachings of Islam, or anything that is accompanied by such forbidden matters as drinking or the free mixing of the sexes. In other respects, he says, “every listener is his own jurist and his own mufti” in deciding where the precise limits of his action ought to lie (Qaradawi 1996: 301).

At least in Qaradawi’s extended and self-conscious attention to arts and entertainment, his vision of an “Islamic society” can be read as a rejoinder not just to Islamist views of a morally upright and puritanical community but also to scholarly depictions of what Olivier Roy (1996: 195—97) has characterized as Islamism’s “bleak society.” Yet many Islamists and ‘ulama would find Qaradawi’s Islamic society altogether too permissive, making every listener of music his own mufti simply too dangerous. Mawlana Taqi ‘Uthmani, for instance, is scarcely among the most stringent of the Pakistani ‘ulama, yet in his madrasa’s monthly journal, al-Balagh, he has repeatedly decried the media’s role in corrupting the country’s youth through music and film, and lamented the irony that an “Islamic state” should not just tolerate but promote them on national television (see ‘Uthmani 1994: 7—59). Again, what Qaradawi would see as part of the common good in his Islamic society is, in this respect, quite different from Taqi ‘Uthmani’s vision of either that society or of its goods.

*** Public Contestation, the ‘Ulama, and the Muslim Public Sphere

The ‘ulama usually agree—with each other and with their forbears— that the common good lies in following the sharfa, and that it is from within the resources provided by the sharfa that the common good is further defined and sought. Yet, as we have seen, the ‘ulama often have very specific notions of what the common good is or how it is to be realized in a particular situation. They differ not only with non-‘ulama but also amongst themselves, and not always with civility. Even if sometimes lacking civility, these debates are usually very public. The ‘ulama are not the only ones contributing to religious debates in Muslim societies and to discussions of the common good. Indeed, the “new” religious intellectuals are often more vocal and more prolific on these matters (see Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 13, 43—44, 77, 180). Nor do the ‘ulama’s contributions to public discourses alleviate the fragmentation of the public sphere. The public sphere remains an arena of contestation, with the ‘ulama’s discourses a part of it. But inasmuch as the common good itself is not ahis- torical—it is defined through contestation—the ‘ulama are important contributors to the public discourse about it.

I am not suggesting that this is necessarily how the ‘ulama themselves see their contribution to articulating common good. Their conception of how it is realized is not that ofJane Mansbridge or Craig Calhoun. The ‘ulama typically argue that the sharfa is ultimately the criterion of what counts as the common good, and that devices such as

maslaha merely extend, to better realize, what is already provided for in the sharfa. All this being so, the fact remains that they have constantly to debate with their peers and others over the meaning of “true” Islam, what Islam asks of people in any situation, the goods that Islam secures (beyond, say, the five fundamental values safeguarded by the sharfa, and how even these are to be ranked, or just how they are to be safeguarded). This is the sort of public discourse through which the common good becomes the site of contestation, an ongoing “social and cultural project”—even when the parties involved, especially the ‘ulama, have no desire to encourage contestation.

However, not all ‘ulama are equally wary of contestation. Indeed, Qaradawi has written a book (2001) whose title bespeaks its concerns in this regard: “How Should We Deal with the Heritage, with the Difference of Schools, and with Disagreement.” The “disagreement” to which he refers is primarily that of the jurists in their legal opinions, long a recognized and crucially important area of Islamic law. Such disagreement, Qaradawi writes, is a human necessity (Qaradawi 2001: 140). It can be a blessing, for some legal opinions suit certain times better than do others, and it is a “treasure” whose richness ought to be valued (Qaradawi 2001: 141, 144–47. That the sharfa’s record of earlier disagreements can relate to contemporary thought suggests that disagreements among present-day scholars ought to be tolerated as well, and the idea that every competent jurist can be right in his judgment even when jurists disagree on any given issue should be taken seriously (Qaradawi 2001: 148–209 and passim).

Yet Qaradawi is not inviting his audience to open or unconstrained public debate and contestation. Following Ibn Taymiyya, he distinguishes between disagreement that produces “variety” (ikhtilaf al- tanawwU) and that which amounts to “opposition” or “contradiction” (al-tadadd). The former is not merely acceptable but welcome; but the latter sort is forbidden (Qaradawi 2001: 210–15). Besides the disagreements of the jurists, those of the kind that constitute “variety” are all largely benign—for example, the differences in ritual practice or in readings of the Qur”an (Qaradawi 2001: 211–12). Qaradawi’s claims about the tolerance of difference are, however, more expansive than his own examples suggest:

<quote>£££Great civilizations are those that make room for variety in their midst.... For instance, the civilization of Islam, in the days of its flowering, accommodated religions and cultures within it, as well as different peoples, nations and races. Its slogans were “tolerance for all” and “deriving benefit from everyone.” Consequently, many different religions and customs participated in its formation and preservation; and they lived therein as honored [inhabitants] (Qaradawi 2001: 211).£££</quote>

In historical terms, this may not be an inaccurate picture of many societies in medieval Islam. But Qaradawi’s firm distinction between disagreement as variety and as opposition or contradiction does not allow much room for a similar present-day society. Significantly, he

does not enter into a discussion of disagreement as contradiction, even as he asserts that, for all their particular differences, committed Muslims are in agreement in their overall orientation (Qaradawi 2001: 213–15). The disagreement that Qaradawi lauds turns out, then, to be only among otherwise likeminded people, rather than a contestation among people committed to divergent epistemological assumptions.

Yet, inasmuch as ‘ulama like Qaradawi or Taqi ‘Uthmani challenge intellectuals representing divergent assumptions and orientations, they (as well as numerous other, less distinguished ‘ulama) help constitute and sustain the Muslim public sphere, just as they help constitute conceptions of the common good. Contestation between the ‘ulama and others, and among the ‘ulama themselves, keeps public discourse vibrant even in authoritarian states, where opportunities for debate are otherwise severely constrained. Conversely, as became strikingly apparent in Iraq with the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in the spring of 2003, even decades of severe repression had left the Shi’i ‘ulama with sufficient authority, appeal, resources, and networks to become major players in the effort to fill in the political vacuum resulting from the regime’s collapse as well as from the inability of the occupying U.S. and British coalition forces to quickly establish their own authority in the country. There continues to be severe rivalry for influence and authority within the ranks of Iraq’s Shi’i ‘ulama—to take this as our final example—just as there are competing views on the extent to which these and other ‘ulama ought to directly involve themselves in the effort to shape Iraqi politics.[19] Despite repeated expressions of the wish, or the need, to forge a new unity between Iraq’s Sunni minority and the long-repressed Shi’i majority, there remain grave fears that the latter would want to settle old scores (cf. al-Hayat, July 3, 2003); and there are many, and not just among the coalition forces, who find the ‘ulama’s influence and their attempts at mobilizing support menacing for prospects of a civil, pluralistic, and democratic society. Yet, for all that, the Sunni and the Shi’i mosque preachers of Baghdad and other cities and, in particular, both the high ranking as well as the young, low-level, Shi’i ‘ulama have been among the most prominent of those shaping or contesting conceptions of the common good and its loci in a time of radical change in Iraq.[20]

Such contestation was evident in a June 2003 fatwa by Ayat Allah ‘All al-Sistani, one of the most influential of Iraq’s Shi’i scholars, questioning the authority of the coalition forces to oversee the making of the new constitution for Iraq: there was no guarantee, he said, that a constitution drafted by appointees of the coalition forces, rather than by the people’s elected representatives, would “conform to the supreme interests (al-masalih al-ulya) of the Iraqi people and express their national unity, among whose basic pillars is the true religion of Islam” (al-Hayat, June 30, 2003). But this contestation was illustrated no less clearly in the assertion of Farqad al-Qazwini, the scion of a Shi’i scholarly family and director of a Shi’i religious college in al-Hilla, that strident fatwas by other Shi’i scholars requiring the veiling of women or permitting the burning down of liquor stores were based on “a lack of understanding of the real public interest of the country (al-maslaha al-waqi^ciyya li’l-bilad) at the present time,” a public interest and a common good that, he strongly implied, lay rather in working constructively with the coalition forces (al-Hayat, June 29, 2003). Some of al-Qazwini’s Shi’i opponents sought, for their part, to discredit him by alleging that he had once collaborated with the fallen regime—a highly incriminating accusation of which this, however, was

scarcely the only invocation (Tyler 2003; for other accusations, cf. al-Hayat, July 13, 2003).

Members of the Shi'i religious establishment and other, secular, contenders for political influence in the anarchic aftermath of Iraq's occupation also competed with one another in founding newspapers, sometimes testing the limits of the occupying coalition's own endurance for what the latter thought were especially strident voices. Furthermore, and like Islamist groups in many other countries, lower-ranking Shi'i 'ulama were at the forefront of efforts to oversee the provision of urgently needed relief work, but they were hardly averse to also probing ways in which they could extend their own oversight to newly emerging professional and civil society associations (cf. Shadid 2003; Moaveni 2003).

The contestation among the 'ulama, and between them and others—of which post-Saddam Hussein Iraq is but the latest instance— does more, however, than help constitute the public sphere. As we have seen throughout this chapter, this contestation also suggests that, within the larger and generally accepted framework of the sharfa's equation with the common good, there is in fact considerable disagreement among the 'ulama themselves on how the sharfa advances the common good. This is a point worth emphasizing for several reasons. It allows us to move beyond any simple equation of the sharfa with the common good, even from the perspective of the 'ulama, and it lets us hear them ask specific questions about how the common good is realized in specific situations. It also enables us to see that their opposition to any simple utilitarian approach to the sharfa does not necessarily entail a lack of responsiveness to the needs of their own local or larger communities.

*** Conclusion

In concluding this chapter, I would like to touch briefly upon two rival views of the role of public religion in modern Western societies as a way of further elucidating the 'ulama's conceptions of the common good. Neither of these views takes any account of Islam, let alone of the 'ulama, but they both have bearing on how we might better understand the modern 'ulama and the meaning and significance of their discourses.

The sociologist Jose Casanova has argued that the presence of religion in the public sphere "force[s] modern societies to reflect publicly or collectively upon their normative structures" (Casanova 1994: 228). "Public religions" bring moral and ethical perspectives to bear on issues of politics and economics, even as they shape public discourses in ways that reflect their conviction that the common good is more than the sum of individual interests (Casanova 1994: 228–34). A religion's public roles are acceptable, however, and indeed become valuable, only when they unequivocally recognize the functional differentiation of social spheres—that is, when they agree to operate within the framework of secularization. This sense of secularization is the only one (as opposed to secularization as either the

decline or the privatization of religion) defensible on both empirical and theoretical grounds, he argues, and this is the sense in which Catholic and Protestant traditions have become “public religions” since the late twentieth century (Casanova 1994: 11–39).

Casanova is highly optimistic about what public religions can, under his terms, contribute to modern societies and to discussions of the common good, but the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1998 [1997]) is equally pessimistic of any such prospects. MacIntyre argues that contemporary liberal societies tend systematically to exclude any serious discussion of the foundations on which those societies themselves rest, that the modern “compartmentalization” of society into particular spheres means in effect that professional politicians and big business interests are the only ones that make all the decisions that matter, and that, for this and other reasons, any shared deliberation on the common good has become impossible in such societies. Whereas Casanova (1994: 225) sees globalization as creating new prospects for public religions to contribute to discussions of the common good beyond national borders, MacIntyre thinks that the sheer scale on which modern societies operate makes any meaningful discourse on the common good an illusion. And where, for Casanova, the functional differentiation of modern societies is the precondition for an acceptable public role of religion, MacIntyre (1998 [1997]: 243) considers precisely this differentiation—or compartmentalization, as he calls it—as foreclosing opportunities for shared participation in “asking those questions that most need to be asked.” MacIntyre’s proposal is consequently to form small, local communities that have a shared commitment to their own traditions; and it is in such communities that he sees the best prospects of collectively devising understandings of, and of realizing, the common good according to values and criteria recommended by the tradition in question. He recognizes that “there can only be continuing conflict” (MacIntyre 1998 [1997]: 252) between such communities, on the one hand, and the modern state and the market, on the other, although he does not say how that conflict is to be mediated or resolved.

It is tempting to see the ‘ulama’s conceptions of the common good along lines sketched by MacIntyre. Elsewhere, I have argued that MacIntyre’s idea of “tradition” as an ongoing engagement with internal interlocutors and external critics over the practices and virtues that constitute that tradition can—especially as mediated by the work of anthropologist Talal Asad (1999)—lend itself well to understanding the world of the ‘ulama and their views of Islam (Zaman 2002: 3–11 and passim). In Mawlana Raff ‘Uthmani’s equation of the common good with the government leaving the people alone to work out their disputes according to sharfa norms, we might perhaps see a rough analogue to MacIntyre’s local communities in practice. From a different set of premises, Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s notion of the best sort of disagreements being those which arise among people committed to a shared larger worldview again puts us in mind of MacIntyre’s view that, if there is to be any meaningful discourse on the common good, local communities must have a shared commitment to a tradition and its attendant practices. If some of MacIntyre’s views seem to approach those of the ‘ulama, however, some of Casanova’s conditions clearly distance his public religions from what many ‘ulama would like to see as Islam’s public roles. Irrespective of the ways in which a functional differentiation of spheres is often accepted by the ‘ulama in practice (Zaman 2002: 60–86), their theory does not allow for such differentiation, that is,

for the sort of secularization Casanova requires for any acceptable role for a religion in a modern society.

It should be clear from the foregoing that the ‘ulama bring to public discourse many of precisely the sort of issues—the moral and religious dimensions of public policy, the normative foundations of the polity, and the common good—that Casanova commends modern religions for representing in the public sphere. Casanova’s argument requires, of course, that issues of this sort be brought to the public sphere within a larger framework that is defined by certain other agreements over the structure and orientation of society. Yet others would contend that such agreements—over the public and the private, for instance, or over the proper role or scope of public religions—are in fact much more elusive even in contemporary Western societies than Casanova allows (cf. Asad 1999). It is not my intention to force Casanova’s criteria onto the ‘ulama, any more than it is to commend what the latter do or say in the Muslim public sphere. It is simply to suggest, once again, that the ‘ulama’s discourses and the contestations they provoke or sustain are constitutive of the public sphere, and that they bring to this sphere issues similar to what public religions and their representatives do anywhere else. It is from such issues and the contestation on them that ideas of the common good emerge—in contemporary Islam as elsewhere.

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** Chapter Seven: When Disputes Turn Public: Heresy, the Common Good, and the State in South India

Brian J. Didier

This chapter explores how a religious conflict became transformed as it was propelled into the public sphere. I take it for granted that when any debate or conflict goes public, public opinion will alter its course. Here I will consider whether “going public” exacerbated tensions inherent in an enduring religious conflict that has weighed heavily on the Muslim community of Androth Island, one of ten inhabited atolls of India’s Union Territory of Lakshadweep. What started as a benign dispute between the island’s ‘ulama and a nascent Sufi brotherhood known as the Shamsiyya over questions of ritual practice became increasingly acrimonious during the 1980s as the participants experimented with new forms of disputation. Their use of heresy accusations (takfr), public debates, shan‘a protection committees and fatwas of condemnation—all familiar instruments in the arsenal of South Asian sectarian conflict—signaled that Islam on Androth, mirroring trends throughout the Muslim world, was “going public” (Casanova 1994). The fact that island Islam was not merely going public but was doing so in disconcerting ways became all too apparent in 1986 when the Androth ‘ulama decided to forfeit the civility of persuasion for unprecedented and violent coercion. Unsatisfied with the rhetoric embodied in the fatwa, the ‘ulama felt compelled to enforce their condemnation with social sanctions including mosque expulsion and a modest degree of violence against the alleged kafirs (infidels), the Shamsiyya. When their members attempted to enter the island’s only Friday mosque, fights broke out around the island. In order to avoid any additional post-fatwa confrontations and to maintain civil order, the island police simply shut the mosque while the local administration pushed the parties to resolve their dispute through the civil courts.

A conflict such as that described here offers insight into the dynamics of the public sphere. If the public sphere is defined generally as an intermediary site between the individual and the state—yet excluding neither—where disputes are conducted over both the definition of the “common good” and those virtues required to implement such a conception, then it follows that the presence of some form of a public sphere is culturally ubiquitous, yet often amorphous and evanescent (see Eickelman and Salvatore, Chapter 1, this volume; also Calhoun 1998: 20, and Freitag 1989: 177–96). One of the best ways of illuminating the public sphere is to highlight precisely those moments when the political atmosphere becomes charged by the collision of competing conceptions of the common good. A public debate, a

fatwa of condemnation, a fight over mosque entry, and a high court ruling mark some of the more significant episodes of a conflict that foreground the island public sphere. By tracing the trajectory of the island conflict as it evolved from private dispute to public conflict, we can explore in detail both the emergence of a public sphere around the issue of what constitutes good Islam and the consequences that follow when such a debate becomes public.

In this chapter I will focus on one of the conflict's most critical episodes: the public debate of 1980. If the violence that followed the 'ulama's fatwa in 1986 marked the end of civility, then it was the public debate six years earlier, I argue, that represents the fulcrum upon which the balance of this conflict tipped from civility to incivility and from "private" interaction to "public" performance. Although certainly not inevitable, the intolerance and acrimony of the fatwa and its violence were the culmination of a process that found public expression in the debate of 1980. I use the metaphor of a tipping balance here intentionally, for I do not want to give the impression of a sudden and comprehensive shift in the nature of the conflict. The public debate was a novel form of disputation for the islanders, but elements of publicness and acrimony can certainly be detected in the quarreling that came before it. The public debate thus represents more the "intermeshing of public and private spheres" than a clean break between them (Casanova 1994: 7).

My assertion that the island situation gradually became public implies that conflict and contention often extend beyond the limits of the public sphere. Logically, our conception of the public sphere presupposes something that it is not. Empirically, we know that the origins and trajectories of conflicts often lie outside the public sphere in the sense that they are not always about the common good, or that they command only limited attention. Whether or not we categorize such phases or spaces as "private," it remains the case that if the cluster of concepts relating to publicness is to have analytic value, then there must be something that they do not encompass. As I have argued elsewhere (Didier 2004), the histrionics of public sphere activities should not obscure from view the routine, unspectacular, and often discreet negotiations of difference that make up much of the conflict process. Private or "less-than-public" forms of disputation are certainly more difficult to document, but they must be known to appreciate the genesis of conflict.

The trajectory of the island conflict also allows us to paint a more detailed picture of political Islam in the subcontinent. We know much, for instance, about the debates produced within and among South Asia's prominent Islamic movements, including the Deoband, Farangi Mahall, the Ahl-e Sunnat and the Jama'at-i Islami (see Metcalf 1982, Robinson 2001, Sanyal 1996, and Nasr 1994). Unfortunately, we know relatively little of the analogous discourse produced by less distinguished and "peripheral" 'ulama administering Islam beyond these centers of grand intellectual production (see Zaman 2002: 131). Equally, we know little of how the caustic discourse of the 'ulama, prominent or otherwise, alters the social relations and religious behavior of attentive audiences at the local level. Usha Sanyal, for example, provides a rich account of Ahmad Riza Khan's condemnation of fellow clerics. Urging his followers to shun Muslim opponents and kafirs, he demanded: "If they fall ill, don't ask about them, if they die, don't join their funeral. ... Don't sit near

them, don't drink or eat with them, don't marry them" (Sanyal 1996: 205). It is uncertain, however, if any of his followers were listening and willing to put into practice what he was preaching. If inconsequential in terms of wider political or intellectual impact, we do know that the discourse of the island 'ulama produced serious local repercussions in the form of mosque expulsion, social ostracism, and physical assault. That the 'ulama sought to render their theological verdict into collective social action thus allows us to explore the relationship between religious discourse and practice.

Finally, there are a few points regarding the relationship between conflict and violence that need reiterating, particularly in light of a world transformed by the horrific violence committed recently in the name of Islam. The first is that conflict in any society or religious community is normal, quotidian, and often productive. The second is that not all religious politics are contentious or coercive. The question that arises, therefore, is not why Muslims engage in religious conflict but rather how are religious conflicts are transformed from civil engagement to coercive force, from routine politics to "transgressive contention" (Tarrow 2001: 7). Muslims engage in religious disputes all the time, be it with coreligionists or non-Muslims, and they are hardly unique in this regard. It is certainly not the case that such conflicts invariably involve coercion or violence. Unfortunately, a myopic focus on the public sphere, or on the contentious politics and violence performed in the public sphere—an astigmatism shared not only by the popular media but also by many of us who study religious politics—risks distorting the picture of how Muslims engage in conflict. As I intend to show, by the time conflicts enter the public sphere serious transformations have already occurred: publics have become involved, legitimacy is at stake, disputational strategies have changed, and the state is usually extra vigilant. I am not suggesting that all public politics are tainted by incivility, or that politics conducted outside the public sphere are idyllic. Rather, my point is that contentious and violent religious politics generally are found in the public sphere. Therefore, if we want to appreciate the conditions under which conflicts become more contentious and if we want to explore how disputes are often conducted without the use of violence, then our purview must extend beyond the public sphere. In short, in order to understand the unfortunate outcomes of religious politics, Muslim or otherwise, we must consider the full trajectory of the religious conflicts that produce them. The islanders' conflict is compelling precisely because they made use of both civility and coercion, thus providing a unique window onto the world of Muslim politics "going public."

*** Private Admonishment: The Androth Conflict's Early Phases

Because such events occurred some time ago and outside the "public" eye, there is a dearth of detailed information regarding the nature of the initial confrontation between the 'ulama and the Shamsiyya. We do know that the dispute began before the public debate in 1980, and that the 'ulama expressed concerns before making their allegations so forcefully in public. Less clear is how the 'ulama expressed this initial discontent.

In order to shed indirect light on the conduct of the early conflict, consider a more recent and unrelated confrontation involving the island ‘ulama and the shaykh of Androth’s oldest and largest Sufi brotherhood. As we consider this and the Shamsiyya confrontation, two points should be kept in mind. The first is that virtually all of the island ‘ulama are themselves members of a Sufi brotherhood. In fact, all of the leading ‘ulama whom I interviewed—many of whom signed the fatwa against the Shamsiyya—were quite explicit about the fact that every Muslim ought to complement the path of the sharia with that of the tariqa. In reference to the potential banality of faith tied exclusively to the law, one island ‘alim quipped: “La illaha illallah... it only makes you a Muslim, like a light bulb with low voltage.” Although many island clerics were affiliated with the more sober and “orthodox” of the island brotherhoods, they were willing not only to tolerate but also to defend the ecstatic and intercessionary ritual practices of their island coreligionists. Among other things, these “howling dervishes” performed dramatic and boisterous rituals of drumming, chanting, and self-mortification that emphasized the Rifa’i side of their spiritual legacy (see van der Veer 1992). According to most of the ‘ulama, as long as such things were done in a pious frame of mind, they were legitimate and salutary forms of worship (‘ibadat). We should keep in mind, therefore, that the clerics’ opposition to the Shamsiyya was not part of any resolute antiSufi reform movement. Such movements, though common throughout the Indian subcontinent and much of the Muslim world, did not exist in any institutional form on Androth during the course of this conflict.

All the Androth Sufis I interviewed (which included the shaykhs of all three island brotherhoods) confirmed that although tariqa supplemented the sharia, it never took priority over the sharia. Moreover, in recognizing the primacy of the sharia, the Sufis also acknowledged the authority of the ‘ulama when evaluating the practice of Islamic law. When the Shamsiyya agreed to take part in the public debate with the Androth ‘ulama, their interlocutor was not the shaykh but a follower from the mainland who was also a trained ‘alim.. As we shall see, this cleric did not challenge the place of ‘ulama at the top of the island religious hierarchy. He did, however, question the integrity of the Androth men who held such office. A consequence of this obeisance on the part of the island Sufis was that while they often disputed the details of the ‘ulama’s allegations, they never questioned the nature of their authority to nurture and defend island orthodoxy. Thus when the shaykh of Androth’s oldest brotherhood, known as Shattariyya ul-Qadiriyya wa Rifa’iyya, recounted his spat with the ‘ulama, he readily admitted: “As ‘ulama, it is their job to see that we Sufis do not exceed the limits of the shan^ca.”

Part of the legacy of the Shamsiyya conflict was the closing of the Juma Masjid in 1986. Given this closure and the subsequent dispersion of the congregation to various smaller mosques around the island, the shaykh of Shattariyya ul-Qadiriyya wa Rifa’iyya decided to conduct Friday prayer by himself at home. When the ‘ulama noticed that he had been absent, they approached him for an explanation. The shaykh was told that if someone missed Friday prayer too often, he would be considered a kafir (an unbeliever). The shaykh’s response was to tell the visiting ‘ulama a story of when the Prophet Mohammed demanded that a mosque be destroyed. As the story goes, some people of

suspect loyalty invited the Prophet to their newly built mosque and begged him to consecrate it with his prayers and presence. When he discovered that this group represented a potential threat to his young community, the Prophet sent men to burn the structure and condemned those who built any mosques out of opposition (see the Qur”an, Sura 9). The shaykh’s simple reply to the ‘ulama was: “If the Prophet came to Androth he would surely destroy all the mosques, since they too were built out of opposition. And if the Prophet would destroy them, why should I go?”

The dynamics of this exchange and the nature of the accusations are important, particularly in contrast to those that emerged in the public debate and later stages of the Shamsiyya dispute. Of particular interest is that the two sides met face-to-face in an informal encounter. While the ‘ulama expressed their concerns in person, the shaykh was also given a chance to defend himself in what appears to have been a creative and civil dialogue. The ‘ulama’s suggestion of kufr (disbelief) was indirect and private. The scene was not played out in the company of the shaykh’s followers, which would cause some embarrassment, but took place in the relative privacy of his home. They did not demand that the shaykh justify his absence from the mosque in a public forum, nor did they make formal, by means of pulpit preaching or publication, their accusation against him. They certainly did not call a meeting of the shan‘a protection committee to issue a collective fatwa of condemnation against him.

Much the same can be said of the shaykh’s reply. He neither returned the accusation nor paraded his defense in public. Obviously, the shaykh was not hesitant to engage the ‘ulama on the shared ground of the sharfa and its sources. He neither denied his actions nor attempted to justify his behavior through the exposition of some esoteric Sufi doctrine. Instead, he defended himself with a clever yet straightforward interpretation of the orthodox sources of Islamic law. Regardless of whether the ‘ulama found his defense theologically convincing, it appears that they left without further confrontation. Having made their respective points without offending one another, the issue appears to have been dropped, or at least tabled. Perhaps what was most important from the perspective of the ‘ulama was that the shaykh offered a legitimate defense of his position and yet did not recommend that others adopt his position. Both parties knew that not attending Friday prayer was at best unorthodox, and at worst a serious threat to the principle of solidarity behind the congregational prayer. The ‘ulama’s quiet challenge served as a warning that such behavior ought not to be emulated, whereas the shaykh’s defense preserved a sphere of personal religious expression. At the time of my interview, no further confrontations regarding this issue had taken place, and the shaykh continued to conduct Friday prayer at home.

With regards to the accusations made, it is clear that ‘ulama were exhibiting not a kind of “zero orthodoxy” in which the slightest deviations from recognized orthodoxy requires an explicit accusation of heresy and firm application of repression. Instead, they exhibited a rather more flexible “orthodoxy-in-the-making” that accommodates the kind of minor deviations, individual or idiosyncratic expressions of piety, and minor tinkering that we see in the case above (see Knysh 1993: 64—65). An equally compelling example of this kind of

flexible orthodoxy can be found in the ‘ulama’s willingness to indulge the local system of matrilineal descent and inheritance, which they recognize as unorthodox, in order to prevent social disarray (see Dube 1967). As one prominent cleric argued, the social disadvantages and chaos that would surely result from an attempt to uproot customary matriliny in favor of Qur”anic patriliny far outweigh the benefits of strict adherence to the shan^ca. Moreover, “the Prophet would surely disapprove of such a social disturbance.” The ‘ulama here do not act as aggressive morality police and do not seize every opportunity to confront “un-Islamic” behavior. Recognizing that the shaykh’s behavior was neither persistently nor outrageously deviant, the ‘ulama put into practice the Augustinian principle that “not every error is a heresy” (Kurtz 1983: 1088). Were the early confrontations between the Shamsiyya and the ‘ulama of the same character? It appears that during the early days of the Shamsiyya’s emergence during the 1960s, the ‘ulama had no reason to approach them in anything but a quiet and nonconfrontational manner.

In the dispute’s initial stages, we know that the nascent brotherhood and its founder, Shaykh Attakoya, found themselves under the suspicion of numerous island ‘ulama almost immediately after the group’s establishment in the mid 1960s. Having left the islands to undertake a spiritual journey, Attakoya returned a “shaykh” with the license (ijaza) to initiate his own followers and thus establish a distinct Sufi tanqa. Members of the Shamsiyya claim that the ‘ulama’s opposition was the result of jealousy; apparently Shaykh Attakoya attracted many island followers at the expense of the other island brotherhoods. Other islanders confirm that Attakoya met with immediate success, but offer a more intriguing explanation for this achievement and his subsequent troubles. Shaykh Attakoya, it seems, had some novel ritual techniques to offer his new followers. The exact nature of these practices is difficult to determine. Virtually all of his opponents agreed that Shaykh Attakoya’s early followers would lie on the beach during mid-day and “worship” the sun; hence the derogatory name “Shamsiyya” applied to the group and grudgingly tolerated by its members (shams is the Arabic word for sun). More neutral voices assured me that it was only “sun-staring”—an innovative if hazardous form of meditation. A few followers of the Shamsiyya reluctantly admitted that it was a misguided, yet innocent healing technique for those who suffered eye disorders.

Whatever the exact nature of the practice, it seems that Shaykh Attakoya made use of some rather curious ritual or healing methods that soon drew the attention of a number of the island ‘ulama. His innovations upon an already unconventional repertoire of religious practices (including the self-mutilation rituals and matrilineal descent patterns noted above) were apparently more than the ‘ulama could countenance. But what kind of attention did the shaykh receive? One of the authors of the 1986 fatwa impressed on me that at this early stage he only “advised” Attakoya to abandon the practices.

Another cleric I interviewed claimed that he wrote a fatwa against the Shamsiyya in the late 1960s, but he had no copy of the fatwa and claimed no co-authors. (The ‘ulama did not form their shan‘a protection committee until much later, in 1986.) Although the exact nature of the encounters remains unclear, it seems the case, given the lack of evidence to the contrary, that this dispute, like the one over Friday prayers discussed

above, required no dramatic public airing, no collaborative opposition on the part of the ‘ulama, and no aggressive condemnation.

*** Public Debate

At the time of Attakoya’s death in 1980, the dispute between him and his opponents had failed to escalate into anything more than a tedious pattern of informal allegations. For the ‘ulama in particular, such a situation ought to have been acceptable. Given that the Shamsiyya’s island membership had been decimated by lingering suspicions of un-Islamic tendencies, they no longer formed a thriving island brotherhood. What is more, it appears that the practices in question (the sun-staring/sun-worship) had been abandoned years before. A feeble island brotherhood suffering the loss of its charismatic founder seems hardly worth the risk of a bitter and public confrontation, let alone of incurring the wrath of an irritated Indian state. Within a year of the shaykh’s death, however, this initial period of tolerant coexistence came to an abrupt end as the ‘ulama’s restrained warnings of unorthodox practices turned to provocative accusations of infidelity, and the Shamsiyya’s compliance turned to resentment and angry recriminations.

A number of factors appear to have disrupted the fragile detente between the Shamsiyya and the loose collection of concerned ‘ulama. Foremost was the death of Attakoya. For one reason or another, this eccentric shaykh never gave in to the temptation to combat his accusers vigorously. His successor, however, was not so willing to endure the persistent ridicule. According to many of the islanders who knew him, Shaykh Pookoya had high ambitions for the faltering brotherhood. The nagging questions regarding ritual orthodoxy needed to be addressed and the defensive strategy of non-confrontation adopted by Attakoya apparently had done little to stem the flow of allegations. The strategy that the Shamsiyya adopted is vital for explaining the shift to public debate and acrimony. As the situation on Andro th remained tense, Shaykh Pookoya focused much of his attention on the less hostile environment of Muslim Malabar, and met with great success. While island membership declined, the set of followers in Kerala (the Indian state nearest the islands) expanded dramatically. A number of this Kerala-based cohort were trained ‘ulama, and it appears that they were the ones chosen to lead the Shamsiyya’s defense. The confrontation that served as the immediate catalyst for the public debate occurred in an island mosque when one of these well-trained followers became embroiled in a debate with an island Sufi of another brotherhood, Qadiriyya Sufiyya. Crucially, this was the brotherhood to which many of the opposing ‘ulama were affiliated. Their debate, which apparently entailed each accusing the opposing shaykh of associating with God (shirk) and of cataloging the ritual innovations (bida) of the other, soon spread. In consultation with the administrative officer on the island, it was decided that a more formal public debate should take place.

The public debate as a forum for airing disagreements within the religious community—although an apparent innovation upon the island repertoire of collective behavior—has been

a prominent mode of religious disputation in the subcontinent for some time. Barbara Metcalf's (1982) detailed account of the emergence of these debates during the nineteenth century provides us with useful points of comparison. Such debates, she argues (1982: 216), were "part of the general trend toward increased public role for Indians," and in particular became a forum in which rival interpretations of Islam could compete for recognition. To borrow the words of Sandria Freitag, these debates formed part of an "alternative world" of collective activities that provided "legitimacy and recognition to a range of actors and values denied place in the imperial order" (Freitag 1989: 6). Apparently, this was especially true for South Asian 'ulama. Suffering from the decline of the Mughal Empire, and having lost the benefits it bestowed on its courtly class, the 'ulama took advantage of the public debates as an instrument for boosting their own religious and political fortunes, and for forging a sense of religious identity among their followers in colonial India.

In stark contrast to the decorous debates of the Indian courts, and any idealized version of dialectical exchange in the public sphere, the nature of interaction in these debates was not only "intense and

bitter" but provided little "occasion for serious intellectual exchange" (Metcalf 1982: 215). As the participants engaged in verbal sparring, "the spokesmen tended to argue within their respective ideological systems and to develop a series of stereotyped points that satisfied their supporters more than their opponents" (Metcalf 1982: 232). More combative than collegial, the new style of religious debates emerging in this period minimized dialogic exchange among interlocutors, circumscribed communities while confirming the differences between them, and thus propelled disputes down a path of incivility.

Well over a century later, the public debate continues to serve many of the same functions. Of course the island 'ulama had experienced no precipitous fall from imperial heights, but their use of the public debates coincides with a period of political uncertainty. Their choice of an unconventional mode of disputation can be explained in part by the fact that as the conflict escalated during the 1970s and 1980s there was little political convention on which to rely. Although nominally under external authority from the Ali Rajas (and Bibis) of Cannanore in the eighteenth century and the Malabar Collector and the Madras Presidency in the twentieth century, the islanders' remote location afforded them a degree of political autonomy. Such "indict rule" ended in 1964, when India's centrally imposed island administration shifted from its home on the coast (in Calicut) to its permanent location on Kavaratti Island (see Bhargava and Samal 2001). By the late 1960s, we see the traditional land tenure system decline and the fortunes of the landowning class diminished. They had previously held a monopoly on positions of local administration and adjudication. Island councils (made up of elite family heads) were disbanded and replaced with a centralized bureaucratic administration, a professional judiciary, and a police force that left few islanders in positions of authority. With so little political authority left to contest, it seems that the remaining contests became more intense and required new arenas.

Although the Indian state imposed itself quite heavily on most spheres of island life, it left considerable room for the expression of authority in the religious sphere. Like the colonial state before it, the Indian state withdrew itself from the “alternative cultural space” in which local expressions of cultural or religious value could flourish (Freitag 1996: 213). In fact, one could argue that the religious sphere on the islands is even wider than that of other Muslim communities in India. Due to the peculiar administrative design of this Union Territory and the government’s desire to tailor judicial and bureaucratic policy to fit a strategic border area, the Shari’at Act of 1937, which defines the realm of personal law for most Indian Muslims, does not apply on the islands.[21] The state largely abdicated the authority to adjudicate on matters concerning Islam. Thus, when the opportunity arose to debate the nature of good Islam and to identify the kafir, those endowed with religious authority seized it.

No transcript of the islanders’ debate exists, but witnesses’ accounts confirm that in many ways it resembled that of their nineteenth-century coreligionists and was in stark contrast to their own period of discreet and unprovocative negotiation. The debate was well attended, but without a moderator or formal means for determining an outcome. It was conducted openly and forcefully by competing sets of ‘ulama who presented their respective cases in the form of monologues delivered to the audience. Although certainly aware of the events taking place, the tanqa shaykhs neither participated nor attended. The result of the islanders’ debate, like those described by Metcalf, was inconclusive. Both sides claimed victory in what was an aggressive exchange of insults and reciprocal accusations of kufr.

A significant difference between the early phase of private admonishment and that of public debate is audience participation. The public’s role is largely incidental in the case of private or discreet admonishment, although a wider audience beyond immediate participants may come to know of a confrontation by means of gossip, and thus indirectly participate. Public debate, however, is obviously designed to reach or create wider audiences. In their reliance on “the public” or “public opinion,” those who participate in the public debates confirm Talal Asad’s crucial observation that religious authority is “a collaborative achievement between narrator and audience” (1993: 210). Reflecting this collaboration, those engaging in the oral debates offer arguments less to their interlocutors than to those in attendance. The public’s presence, therefore, is hardly inert and rarely neutral. There is little doubt that those debating hope to bring the weight of public opinion or public humiliation to bear on their opponents. In this sense, the public becomes an instrumental and potentially coercive force. What makes this public terrain hazardous, however, is the fact that public opinion is not easy to manipulate. When making strong arguments and allegations in public, those responsible also face the scrutiny of the audience and can be held to account. With regards to the island conflict, many were convinced by the arguments made against the Shamsiyya, and in this sense the ‘ulama’s persuasion was successful. Such success, however, would not last forever when discourse was combined with what many perceived an inappropriate means of coercion. Although many islanders believed that those involved with the Shamsiyya were indeed kafirs, and ostracized them on account of this, they were not willing to convert that alienation into violence. Such indifference on the part of so many islanders is an illuminating example of the public exercising its own power as a third party.

When the ‘ulama resorted to more extreme forms of disputation and accusation, they did not anticipate that their intemperance would stimulate alternative sources of religious authority.

*** Accusations of Heresy

Given the nature of the islanders’ debate, it is hardly surprising that little resolution was achieved as a result. The gross allegations alone indicate that resolve for persuasive reconciliation was waning and that a moral divide was being constructed, rhetorically at least, between the Shamsiyya and the island ‘ulama. In seeking to construct this divide, the islanders relied not only on the public debate but also on the shared idiom of heresy accusations or takfir. Publicly accusing an opponent of heresy is a popular and provocative tool that Muslim clerics in the region use to denigrate their rivals. Curiously, however, the nature of takfir and its role in buttressing the ideological and social divide between Muslim factions and constructing exclusive sectarian identities in the subcontinent remains unappreciated.[22]

Recent studies on medieval Islam and Christianity suggest that heresies and heretics serve a number of religious and political functions.

One the one hand, heresy plays an integral role in forming any religious orthodoxy by forcing religious authorities “to define its doctrines and to anathematize deviant theological opinions” (see Lambert 1992: 3). Although it is obvious that Islam has no Church or ecclesiastical council invested with the authority to determine or enforce a universally accepted dogma, it does have a consensual orthodoxy. Moreover, religious authorities in Islam are perfectly capable of producing—and here coercion is sometimes needed to reach consensus—layers of thick local orthodoxy to which their audiences subscribe. Islam has had its own heresiologists and has a rich vocabulary for distinguishing degrees of infidelity (see Lewis 1953, Taylor 1967, Peters and De Vries 1977, and Knysh 1993). As Knysh (1993: 52) notes, the polemics that surround the definition and identification of kufr and kafirs often result in a “reformulation” of disputed beliefs. The dispute over the Shamsiyya’s ritual innovations resulted in a public statement of the alleged unbelief during the debate, and a published account of kufr in the form of the 1986 fatwa of condemnation. Thus, the debate was the first step in the ‘ulama’s attempt to produce an explicit conception of the “common good” defined in terms of their own version of Islamic orthodoxy. It is no surprise, however, that not everyone shared this interpretation of the common good.

In addition to intellectual or theological functions, heresy debates also serve as a vehicle for identity politics and organizational power. Heresy is a particularly effective way of creating or maintaining the religious identity of a community through the identification of a dangerous internal threat. One can, of course, use external “others”— such as Hindus, Christians, foreigners, or the secular state—as the negative standard against which to

construct affiliation. But with few of these others present or available on the island, the internal dissident represented an available option. Heresy accusations can also serve institutional elites by allowing them to fortify their authority by taking the lead role in the identification and suppression of a common enemy (see Kurtz 1983: 1085–87). Following this pattern, accusations of kufr catapulted the island ‘ulama into public prominence. As discussed above, those making public accusations of heresy are at some risk if the accusations are seen to be unjust or the application of punishment excessive. This is particularly true when the public is invited to serve as a participant and witness in public debate.

The island debate was about more than sun-staring and other alleged innovations of the Androth brotherhoods. Behind their lofty concerns over sacred matters and the spiritual well-being of fellow islanders lies a more profane dispute about religious authority that appears to confirm the heresiologist’s hypothesis that “what is immediately at stake in any specific incident of heresy is the authority to judge the Truth” (Asad 1986: 355). Not every ritual error warrants a provocative and public accusation of kufr. We also know that the island ‘ulama can admonish without making use of the forceful condemnation of heresy. Why then the need to go public and caustic? When the Shamsiyya were compelled to defend themselves after the death of their founding shaykh, they employed mainland ‘ulama to go on the offensive against their local counterparts. Rather than explaining or justifying their own rather ignominious ritual past, the Shamsiyya ‘ulama attacked the religious integrity of their accusers by pointing out their own ritual infidelities and kufr. It was a brave and provocative strategy, but ultimately a conservative one designed to preserve their own orthodoxy. They did not, for example, employ a strategy adopted by many Islamic reformists who condemn the ‘ulama as authoritarian and mired in legal tradition, and thus unqualified to lead the Muslim community. The Shamsiyya recognized that if you attack the role of the ‘ulama as those most qualified to interpret Islamic law and their place atop the island interpretive hierarchy, the whole concept of island orthodoxy would tumble, and with it the legitimacy of the Sufi brotherhoods. Such a strategy coming from a brotherhood would have been self-defeating. Instead, the Shamsiyya questioned the integrity of the incumbent Androth ‘ulama in two different ways. First, they invited outside ‘ulama with identical ideological stances to conduct their debate, thus hoping to send the message that these were more qualified and competent clerics. Second, by accusing their Androth opponents of jealousy, political motivation, and kufr, the Shamsiyya called into question their moral integrity to act as ‘ulama. These two tactics together constituted a serious assault on the intellectual and moral qualifications of the incumbent island ‘ulama, but not of ‘ulama in general.

Two clues offered by the Androth ‘ulama themselves help confirm that what tipped the balance toward acrimonious accusation was the Shamsiyya’s challenge to their religious authority. In the fatwa of condemnation issued in 1986, the ‘ulama list the ritual and doctrinal errors of the Shamsiyya. The final allegation is explicit in stating that part of what constitutes kufr was the Shamsiyya’s contempt for the ‘ulama and their accusations. According to the fatwa, the Shamsiyya had “declared, without proper reason, that the recognized scholars were kafirs.” In conversation, one of the prominent island

‘ulama also admitted to me that it was only when “they introduced ‘ulama from Kerala” that the Androth clerics became resolute in their opposition.

The combination of the public debate and takfr served multiple functions. The public’s subsequent debate over what constitutes heterodoxy and what counts as an appropriate response has helped create a religious identity or religious self-consciousness that did not exists before their conflict. Moreover, by anathematizing the Shamsiyya, the island ‘ulama were able to reformulate island orthodoxy, making it more impervious to novel innovations and threats. In the short term at least, the debate and accusations of heresy also served to highlight the authority of the ‘ulama. In their attempt to impose a version of the “common good”—defined in terms of Islamic orthodoxy—the ‘ulama made a claim for a more public and prominent role in the public sphere. In would be inappropriate, however, to mistake function and consequence for cause. There is little or no evidence to suggest that behind the shift in strategies lie grand ambitions, and this is particularly true for the ‘ulama. It would be easy, for instance, to strip them to their naked political ambitions, as many islanders did when arguing that the conflict was not about religion but “politics.” Although it may be true that “few heresy accusations were ever launched out of pure concern for purity of doctrine” (Lambert 1992: 15), one cannot exclude the possibility that such concerns form part of the conflict equation. The fact that many of the Androth ‘ulama maintained their case against the Shamsiyya in spite of a later Indian Court ruling that seriously circumscribed their authority to impose religious conformity suggests that piety was mixed with religious politics.

*** Conflict, Community and the State

The Indian state was virtually absent during the early stages of this conflict. Only at a later date did the administration, police, and courts intervene. Between the inception of the dispute in the mid-1960s and the violence following the fatwa in 1986, the state was apparently willing to let the islanders resolve the conflict on their own. An equally plausible explanation is that the minor bureaucrats and policemen posted on the island from Kerala would have known little of the conflict until it boiled over. Given the lack of earlier island religious conflict, they did not expect the islanders to resort to acrimony and violence. One can certainly argue that the state left the islanders bereft of “traditional” means of adjudication. The conflict, however, took place in an environment largely determined by the state that—in both the private and public spheres—kept the possibilities wide enough to allow the islanders to conduct their own conflict and inflict their own damage. To suggest that the state was somehow responsible for the escalating conflict through its own inaction ignores the agency and actions of the islanders themselves.

When the state and its agencies eventually weighed in after the modest violence, they did so heavily. The police closed the contentious mosques in 1986, and years later were responsible for the shooting deaths of two islanders during a confrontation at the Juma Masjid. Opposing the police in the aftermath of the mosque expulsion, the island

administration, through its Androth magistrate, tried to keep the contentious sites open while referring the matter to the Kerala High Court. In a compelling decision, the Muslim judge argued, relying on court precedent, that a Muslim could worship in any mosque, regardless of “sect” (see Shamsuddin 1987: 762). Since followers of the Shamsiyya fulfilled the minimum requirements for being a Muslim—which according to the Court entailed embracing the principles of the shahada—they could not be banished from Androth religious sites. Having overruled the ‘ulama’s decision regarding the Shamsiyya’s kufr, the High Court Justice then turned to the ‘ulama’s authority to “excommunicate.” In a remarkable aside from the immediate issues of the case, the judge argued that for Sunni Muslims the “power of ex-communication” is not an integral part of the faith (Shamsuddin 1987: 768). The High Court’s decision thus reveals the ultimate irony of this conflict: despite the intentions of the island religious authorities to preserve the integrity of island Islam and to leave the religious hierarchy intact, a source of authority critical of the existing orthodoxy emerged in the form of the Indian state.

Viewed from this post-fatwa perspective, one might be tempted to see this contest between the ‘ulama and the Indian state as an inevitable collision, virtually predetermined by the hegemonic inclinations of those involved. On the one hand we have a religious conflict propelled into the public sphere by religious men who see themselves as representatives of Islamic law and who either don’t recognize the distinction between religious and political spheres or intend to shape the public sphere with their own narrow interpretation of the common good. On the other, we have an ever-expanding, centralizing, and interventionist state seeking to impose its authority on the public and private lives of its constituent communities and individuals. Thus, any attempt by the ‘ulama to exercise public authority necessarily represents a threat to the state’s apparent hegemony (see Das 1995: 91), while any attempt by the state to limit the conflict and make its own claims on Islam necessarily represents a threat to the authority of the ‘ulama. Meanwhile, somewhere in between lie individuals and communities squeezed by the aspiration to authority of the others.

The island conflict presented here paints a complicated picture of the relationship between religious authority, community, and the state as played out in the public sphere. First, the islanders’ conflict reveals that the state is neither monolithic in its objectives nor hegemonic in its power to implement its objectives. To assume that the modern bureaucratic state is either willing or able “to establish a monopoly over ethical pronouncements” (Das 1995: 92) or “to bring all areas of life under its regulation” (Zaman 2002: 1) is to overestimate its power and misinterpret its multiple and often contradictory objectives. Arguing for a more nuanced approach to the state, Robert Hefner has noted that “Postmodern and Foucauldian theories greatly oversimplify our world when they assert that modern politics has involved no more than the ever-greater intrusion of a ‘panopticon’ state into the public sphere and our private lives” (Hefner 1998: 10). The Indian state’s hesitant, inconsistent, sometimes coercive, often magnanimous behavior throughout the conflict belies this popular model of a one-dimensional and voracious institution. Instead, the state appears more like the inchoate institution sketched by Alasdair MacIntyre (1998 [1997]): “a large, complex and often ramshackle set of interlocking institutions” (236), which he argues “needs and has a ragbag of assorted values, from which it can select in an ad hoc way what will serve its purpose in this or that particular situation with this or that particular group” (245).

Ultimately, the Indian state intruded on the public and religious spheres of the island, but it did so haltingly. Moreover, what prompted the imposition was neither that the ‘ulama were exercising their authority on matters of orthodoxy nor that they were asserting political authority in the public sphere. Rather, what induced the police, the administration, and the courts to act was the ‘ulama’s decision to forego civility for violent coercion.

A conflict between the islanders and various state agencies regarding the use of violence and the abuse of religious authority was also a conflict within the community. Exhibiting the competitive and often nasty politics of local community, the island conflict leaves little room for what Veena Das has called the “nostalgic rendering of the community” (1995: 51). Although there was scant disagreement over the nature of local orthodoxy defined by the ‘ulama, and little local opposition to the attempt by the ‘ulama to fuse religious orthodoxy with the common good, their exercise of authority within the public sphere did not go unchallenged. From the Shamsiyya came challenges to the Androth ‘ulama’s integrity in the form of alternative and combative ‘ulama from Kerala and civil court litigation. Perhaps most surprising was the challenge from the public itself, as many opposed the more extreme methods used by the ‘ulama when enforcing orthodoxy. Exercising their own religious authority, many chose a strategy of indifference or nonparticipation.

Finally, the islanders’ conflict reveals a compelling picture of the ‘ulama themselves. Often portrayed as impulsive and reactive, steeped in static tradition and intolerant of doctrinal or liturgical innovation, the ‘ulama of Androth reveal a striking degree of patience, tolerance, and latitudinarian thought with regard to dissent and religious innovation. Even when confronting un-Islamic behavior, they proved capable of doing so in unprovocative ways. Unfortunately, when faced with the challenges posed by the Shamsiyya, the ‘ulama chose the path of incivility. Their fatwa and attempted mosque expulsion were actions of last resort designed to maintain religious orthodoxy and their own authority to define it when other less provocative modes of disputation proved ineffective. The consequence of their decision is that their authority to act in the public sphere has been severely circumscribed by both the state and the community. The ‘ulama, however, have not disappeared. If not a “resurgence of great moment,” it seems likely that their performance in this conflict was only the first step toward a more public and prominent role in the religious and political life of this Muslim community (Zaman 2002: 1).

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* Part IV: Ambivalence in the Practice and Public Staging of Islam

** Chapter Eight: the Limits of the Public: Sufism and the Religious Debate in Syria

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Sufism constitutes one of the main forms of social expression of Islam in contemporary Syria, attracting followers from all social strata. The social relevance of Sufi identities make them an important element in the constitution of the public sphere in Muslim majority societies such as Syria, where religious identities often provide the conceptual and practical framework for public participation (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 108–31). The notion of "public sphere," defined by Jurgen Habermas (1989 [1962]: 27–30) as a space of disputes and negotiations structured by rational discourse, was historically connected with the emergence of open and inclusive spaces for debate in the bourgeois milieus of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe.

Habermas's focus on the European genesis of the modern public sphere must be put into perspective by the fact that Middle Eastern societies also had spaces for social participation in which "contests take place over the definition of 'common good,' and also of the virtues, obligations and rights that members of society require for the common good to be realized" (Eickelman and Salvatore Chapter 1). Furthermore, Habermas's emphasis on the rational aspects of the public sphere overlooks the importance of religious identities in the creation and organization of the public sphere. The role of religious identities in the production of the public sphere became evident with the rise of "public religions," that is, of religious communities engaged in what Jose Casanova defined as the "repoliticization of the private religious and moral spheres and renormativization of the public economic and political spheres" (Casanova 1994: 5—6). This process of "deprivatization" happened within various religious traditions, including Islam, and in societies with different cultural, political, and economic realities, such as the United States, Brazil, and the Middle Eastern societies (Casanova 1994: 6).

This chapter has two goals. The first is to explain how Sufism contributes to the production of the public sphere in Syria. The second is to understand the constraints and possibilities created for public debate among Sufis in Syria when their religious identities are defined by their emotional attachment to the persona of their shaykh, or religious guide. The answer to these questions highlights important issues connected to the emergence of "public religions" on modern public spheres.[23]

There are several levels of Sufi participation in the organization and dynamics of the public sphere in Syria. Sufi identities provide its adherents with cognitive, emotional, and practical dispositions that shape their understandings, perceptions and actions in the public sphere. These dispositions, which constitute what Pierre Bourdieu (1997 [1972]: 78–95) calls habitus, are expressed in forms of presentation and use of the body, affective ties, and moral feelings. Sufism offers normative models of what constitutes the “common good” and how social relations and individual lives should be managed and organized. The Sufis understand and experience their communities as an experiential path embodied in the affective links between the Sufi master (murshid) and his disciples (murid, pl. muridun). Sufism also constitutes one of the main topics in public religious debate in Syria, where the polemics over the Islamic credentials of Sufi doctrines and practices reflect the disputes over the definition of the boundaries of Islam as a religious system.

*** Public Limits: Syria under the Ba^cth

The political order that emerged after the independence of Syria in 1946 was plagued with structural instability due its limited social support beyond the small urban elite that controlled the state (Ahsan 1984: 302). After there were a series of coups and a brief political union with Egypt, military officers linked to the Ba’th, a socialist- oriented Arab nationalist party, seized power in 1963. Ba’th rule was marked by its struggle against the economic and political power of the traditional elite. Land reform was implemented, and banks and factories were nationalized (Ahsan 1984: 306–308, Picard 1980: 163–64). A 1970 coup d’etat brought Hafiz al-Asad to the leadership of the Ba’th party and the presidency of Syria. Asad started a policy of limited economic liberalization, and he increased state control over Syrian society by institutionalizing the surveillance and intimidation of actual or potential opponents by the security services (mukhabarat) (Le Gac 1991: 124—43).

The control of Asad’s regime over Syrian society was implemented both through repressive measures and the cooptation of many social sectors. The institutions of civil society, such as trade unions, were transformed into instruments for coopting the working class into a corporatist framework controlled by the state. In addition, the inefficiency and corruption of the state bureaucracy made more necessary the resource to bribery and personal mediation (wasta) to provide access to resources and services; this facilitated the integration of individuals and communities into clientelistic networks under state patronage (Perthes 1995: 133—203).

The loss of substance of political debate under Ba’th rule, which reduced debate to the repetition of empty slogans (Le Gac 1991: 118—23), enhanced the role of public debate on religion as an instrument of participation and open dispute. Discourses of dissent and discontent could be publicly voiced—even if opaquely—as the moral condemnation of the

regime and its policies, while direct political debate offered a much narrower range of discursive possibilities. Furthermore, the political and social mobilization of large strata of Syrian society through their Muslim identities was facilitated by Asad's use of 'Alawi sectarian ties for assuring a cohesive social base for his regime (Van Dam 1996: 62–74).[24] The combination of sectarian mobilization and political repression was the breeding ground for Islamic militancy against the regime. The Islamic opposition attracted members from widely differing social backgrounds ranging from traditional artisans and the trading bourgeoisie to the professional middle classes, including lawyers, engineers, and doctors (Batatu 1988: 129).

Although the Muslim Brothers (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) had a leading role in the Islamic opposition, Sufi shaykhs and their followers also joined the struggle and mobilized militants across class divisions.[25] The Syrian Muslim Brothers had close links with Sufism, and some Muslim Brotherhood leaders had a Sufi background, such as the late Sa'id Hawa (Geoffroy 1997: 13). In the late 1970s, the various groups that composed the Islamic opposition united under the Islamic Front of Syria and began to carry out violent acts against the regime (Le Gac 1991: 138–39; Seurat 1989: 72–83). The conflict degraded into a spiral of violence that culminated in the military defeat of the Islamic Front after a major confrontation with the Syrian army in the city of Hama in 1982, resulting in the destruction of most of the city and the massacre of many of its inhabitants.[26] The destruction of Hama marked the end of an organized political Islamic opposition and reaffirmed the state's control over Syria. After Hama, Asad slowly adopted a more accommodating position toward the public expression of Islam and started a gradual liberalization of the regime. The hopes for faster reforms that rose with the accession of Asad's son, Bashar al-Asad, to the presidency of Syria in 2000 have not been met, however, and the political debate remains under tight state control.

*** Sufism and the Production of Public Islam in Syria

After the tragedy of Hama, the overtly political and militant Islam fostered by the Islamic Front sharply declined in Syria. Nevertheless, in the last two decades in Syria there was a visible increase in the public display of individual signs of Muslim piety and religiosity, such as mosque attendance and veiling. This phenomenon is particularly present in cities such as Aleppo, where religious and local urban identities are combined as an affirmation of difference and resistance toward the secular order of the state and the dominance of Damascus (Seurat 1989: 103–109). Although most Sufis in Syria come from the rural or urban working class, there are clear signs of the internal renewal and social expansion of Sufism and sharia-minded Sufi orders attract many followers from the professional middle classes as well as state cadres. The appeal of Sufi disciplines to the professional middle classes and the economic and political elite resides on their possibility of channeling individual expectations and anxieties while accommodating to the hierarchical structures that frame Syrian society.

Women have been important carriers of Sufi identities into the urban middle classes, for Sufism offers several channels and forms of female religiosity. Sufi identities also provide women with a culturally and morally legitimate channel to engage actively in the religious public sphere. The participation of women in Sufism was enhanced among the sharia-minded Sufi orders, such as the Kuftariyya, which created female branches in which women can participate as disciples or even as deputies (khalifa, pl. khulafa^) of the shaykh (Bottcher 1999: 129—30). In Syria there are also female Sufi orders leaded by female shaykhas, such as the Qubaiysiyya. The importance of reading circles and religious education as instruments of socialization in these female orders expresses their orientation toward a highly educated public of women from the urban elite (Geoffroy 1997: 16).

The continual production of a “public Islam,” understood as the objectification and systematization of Islamic values and practices as a normative model for the moral order of society (Salvatore 1998: 91), based on the display of individual piety, has a pervasive influence on the public sphere in Syria. This framework for the creation of an Islamic society as the cumulative effect of the moral reform of each individual has a strong doctrinal and practical influence of Sufism (Roy 1992: 102—17). The relative indifference of this religious trend toward political projects centered on the state allowed for an easier accommodation with the Ba’th regime, which started to encourage pietistic forms of religiosity in order to channel and coopt the production of a public Islam into its political agenda. The production of state-sanctioned piety in Syria parallels similar strategies of cooptation of public Islam used by the Egyptian state (Salvatore 1998: 91). The policies of the Syrian regime range from sponsoring of the Kuftariyya Sufi order (Bottcher 1998: 137) to broadcasting on state TV programs that emphasize social order, national cohesiveness, and religious morality during the month of Ramadan

(Christmann 2001). Nevertheless, this diffuse form of public Islam is difficult to control and effective in spreading its conception of the “common good” throughout Syrian society.

Sufism is one on the main sources of this individualistic and pietis- tic public Islam, for it is centered on the individual mystical search for the dissolution in God (fana fi-llah). The emphasis that Sufism places on the control of the self (nafs) and the devaluation of the external, or manifest (zahin) truth in opposition to the esoteric, or hidden (batini) one in the path toward the divine reality (haqiqa) are powerful mechanisms for subjectification, meaning the production of a morally and socially bounded individual self through a process of inward reflexivity (Asad 1993: 165—67; Foucault 1998 [1978]: 17—35). The individualized social actors thus produced can cope with the challenges posed by a society that it changing and mobile, albeit authoritarian and crossed by traditional values, such as contemporary Syria. Furthermore, Sufi identities are produced and expressed in a hierarchical framework based upon the personal relation between shaykh and murid, which gives to individuals community support as well as an effective mechanism to fit into the clientelistic networks that structure Syrian society.

A possible parallel can be traced with the emergence of the romantic model of individual in nineteenth-century Germany, in which the core of the “true” self was an emotional and intellectual inner life that had no place for expression in the authoritarian structures of society (Elias 2000: 5—35). Another useful comparison is with contemporary Iran, where traditional themes of poetic self-awareness and social righteousness are being transformed into an individualizing social ethic (Adelkhah 2000: 18—46). The psychological and moral models of individualization present in the German romanticism and in contemporary Iranian ethics are very similar to the mystical one present in Sufism, for they consider individuals to be constituted by a reflexive, emotional, and moral “inner self” that is only partially expressed through their “social self,” due the constraints imposed by the social order. In all these cases, individualistic values and social actors can emerge from and articulate with hierarchical and/or traditional social structures without necessarily causing their disappearance or fragmentation.

The model that arises from these examples gives a view of “modernity” as a process in which traditional and modern values and structures are differently articulated and confronted according to each particular social context, thus going beyond the dichotomy between tradition and modernity that pervades the main anthropological theories on Sufism. For example, Ernest Gellner (1993 [1981]: 56–69) considered Sufism as inherently incompatible with modernity, which according to him can only coexist with Salafi Islam. A more complex approach can be seen in Michael Gilsenan’s analysis of Sufism in Egypt, which pointed to the shan^ca-minded, centralized, and bureaucratized Sufi orders as adaptations to the rationalization of modern Egyptian society (Gilsenan 2000 [1982]: 237—50). Gilsenan’s analysis was still informed, however, by a static model of modernity and tradition, for while reformed Sufi orders survived and expanded throughout the all strata of Egyptian society the same occurred to “traditional” orders such as the Burhaniyya, which became the fastest growing Sufi order in Egypt in the 1990s despite its heterodox practices and doctrines (Luizard 1991: 40—46). Similar patterns can be seen in Syria, where both reformed and traditional expressions of Sufism take part in the production of local and national forms of public Islam.

In Syria, the Sufi conceptions of the self are confronted not only with other moral constructions of Muslim identities but also with the secular “civic self” that the Ba’thist regime tries to mold in the individuals in order to construct its secular moral order. The Ba’thist political project is centered in the creation of the material basis for the expression of the Arab nation through the transformation and modernization of the Syrian society. The production of social agents committed to the Ba’thist ideology has a central role in this political project, which can be seen in the political and ideological investment of the Syrian regime in the control of the educational system. While in the primary and secondary schools the curriculum is filled with Ba’thist ideals and the teachers are compelled to join the party, in the universities party membership and ideological correctness are as important as intellectual excellence for achieving academic success (Le Gac 1991: 141—42; Seurat 1980: 137—39).

The production of the “civic self” of the Ba’thist project also required the organization of individuals in corporate groups that could harmonize and direct individual efforts toward the construction of the nation. The innumerous Ba’thist organizations, such as those destined to assemble workers, peasants, youth, or women, have the role of creating groups with a definite and complementary role to perform in the larger nationalist project (Perthes 1995: 170—72).

These organizations therefore have a role complementary to that of the educational system in disciplining the “civic self” of individuals as carriers of the Ba’thist project by providing them roles and expectations that are connected to their social persona.

In Ba’thist ideology, the Arab nation is not the political result of social and political processes that different social groups create through their actions, but rather a transcendent reality that can only be achieved through submission to the political leader. Thus, as the Sufi shaykh embodies the path toward esoteric truth, the Ba’thist the leader embodies the political and social path toward the “true” Arab nation. Another similarity between Sufism and the political metaphysics of the Ba’th is the opposition between an imperfect reality that is manifest and a perfect one that is hidden from our ordinary senses. This means that the social and political realities of Syria do not reflect the actual potentialities of the Arab nation, which can only be fully expressed in a social and moral order constructed under the enlightened guidance of the leader.

The role of the leader in connecting the “civic self” of the individuals with the supreme reality of the Arab nation in the Ba’thist system can be seen in the metaphysical epithets that are still used to designate Bashar al-Asad, such as “our eternal leader” (qa’iduna ila al-abad) or “the great leader” (al-qa’id al-a^im), which can be seen repeated in the posters and banners that covered much of the surface of public buildings in Syria. Similarly the existential character of the relationship between the individuals and the leader is expressed in emotional terms. For example, an inscription painted on an arch over one of Aleppo’s major streets stated that “in our hearts there is love for our eternal leader and devotion to the nation” (f qulubina hubb ila qa’idina ila al-abad wa ikhlas ila al-watan), showing how belonging to the nation is fused with emotional attachment to the leader in the Ba’thist political discourse.[27]

The anthropologist Abdellah Hammoudi (1997: 150—58) suggested that the homologies between the hierarchical moral order of Sufism and the authoritarian political order in the Morocco could be the expression of a cultural model present in all Arab societies. Analysis of the Syrian case reveals, however, a picture more complex than the political replication of cultural models originated from Sufi notions of authority. Although there are many points of convergence and articulation between the Sufi communities and the Ba’thist regime, there are also important differences and contradictions that can be potential sources of conflict between them. Despite all the ideological emphasis on the creation of a “new man,” the Syrian regime focused its efforts on the insertion of social groups into its web of patronage

as a way to implement its project of social governance. The allegiance with traditional social groups allowed for a more accommodating relation between regime and society, which was needed for the stabilization of the regime after the conflict with the religious opposition.

On the individual level, this meant that the regime required the performance of the outward signs of allegiance to the regime and its leader. This can be seen in the innumerable forms of devotion to the figure of Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad that the Syrians of all social strata ostentatiously express. All commercial establishments in Syria have a picture of the president, all public speeches start with a formulaic praises to the leader, and even in personal conversations in public settings one often hears ritualized flattering comments on the president's intelligence, strong will and character. Despite the pervasive presence of the personality cult elaborated around the figure of the president, and the hyperbolic and sometimes absurd character of many of the slogans and images that constitute it, however, there is no monitoring of the effect of these ideological devices on the subjectivity of the individuals. The simple enunciation of the slogans and the display of the pictures of the president are signs of allegiance to the regime accepted as sufficient by the security forces (Perthes 1995: 189).

The emphasis on the strictly public forms of allegiance to the regime has allowed individual Sufis as well as Sufi communities to negotiate their insertion in the Ba'thist political order. The compromise between the moral order fostered by Sufism and the political order of the Ba'th regime is based on the outward and performative level of the social identities of their adepts, which is devalued by the Sufis as being part of the deceptive universe of appearances (zahiri). This compromise leaves untouched the realm of the inner self, which constitute the core of Sufi identities. The structural similarity between the Sufi and the Ba'thist two-layered construction of reality is crossed by their practical emphasis on distinct levels of the individual subjectivity as the main focus for the normative investment of their disciplinary mechanisms, creating a large margin for practical accommodation between the two systems. Indeed one can find Sufi shaykhs and their communities integrated in all levels of the networks of power relations that connect the Ba'thist regime with Syrian society. The Sufi engagement with the regime can range from the establishment of semi-institutional links with the state apparatus by Sufi orders such as the Kuftariyya, to the participation of Sufi shaykhs in diffuse webs of reciprocity and patronage that connect the neighborhoods in Aleppo to the power centers of the regime, ensuring local support to state policies.

The participation of Sufi communities and their leaders in the networks of patronage that structure local forms of social governance does not mean, however, their complete incorporation into the state apparatus. The relation between the Sufi communities and the Ba'th regime in Syria is marked by a constant tension over the boundaries that define their areas of cooperation, indifference, and opposition, with the Sufis jealously guarding their autonomy and social status from state control. Even among the Sufis who are integrated in the state-sponsored networks, the commitment to the Ba'thist order is less imbedded their identities than the allegiance to their shaykh. This means that the Sufi communities that participate in the structure of governance of the Ba'thist regime may

distance themselves or even break their ties with it if they become alienated by or dissatisfied with state policies. I could see this process of rupture going on in some zawiya s in Aleppo in May 2002, during the height of the Israeli repression of the Palestinian upheaval, when many of their members expressed harsh comments of dissatisfaction and criticism of the government’s inaction in the face of what one of the shaykhs called “the murder of our Muslim brothers.”

By keeping its internal autonomy, the network of Sufi leaders and their communities have the capacity to survive the fall or disintegration of the regime and to emerge as the main producers of order and meaning in the local level. This seems to be the case of the Shi’i religious leaders in Iraq, who appeared as major political and social actors with a strong local and regional constituency immediately after the destruction of Ba’th regime by the Anglo-American war against it in 2003. These religious leaders were probably already working and gathering followers within the state-sponsored networks of patronage much before the war, which explains the short amount of time they needed to emerge as an organized social and political force, and the fact that they passed unnoticed by most observers of the situation in Iraq before the war.

*** Sufism and Public Religious Debate in Syria

The debate over the Islamic legitimacy of particular doctrines and practices has effects on the definition of the “common good” in Syrian society, for it aims to define which traditions will constitute the normative framework of society and who has the full rights to implement it. Sufism is a central object of religious debate in Syria, with Its critics arguing that Sufi doctrines and practices are “blamable” innovations (bid ^ca) created by the founding saints (wall, pl. awliya.’) of the Sufi orders (tarlqa, pl. turuq) which should be eliminated in order to restore Islam to its original purity.

The polemics over Sufism reaches a vast audience beyond the restricted circle of religious specialists, such as the ‘ulama or Sufi shaykhs, through books, TV programs, and religious preaching. In order to answer their critics, many Sufis try to make more clear and explicit, thus more public, the connections between their doctrines and practices and the texts of the Qur”an and the hadlth, or sayings of the Prophet. The contemporary resonance of the accusations against Sufism with the religious consciousness among literate social milieus requires more than simple apologetic responses by the Sufis (Eickelman 1995: 261–66). This challenge pushed some shaykhs to engage in the publication of the mystical literature produced by their tanqa. For example, the Damascene branches of the tanqa Rifa’iyya have published both classical and new texts (Jong 1986: 215), in particular doctrinal treatises. The emphasis on doctrinal texts can be understood as a strategy to fight the widespread image of the Rifa’iyya as a heterodox order that thrives among illiterate and popular milieus.

This effort of making accessible the doctrinal basis of the various Sufi traditions and incorporating them into the public religious debate was paralleled by a process of self-criticism and reform within Sufism itself which led to the “objectification” of the Sufi religious consciousness (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 37—45). In Syria, reformed versions of Sufism are currently promoted by major figures in the national religious scene, such as Shaykh Ahmad Kuftaru, the mufti of Syria as well as the leading shaykh of the Naqshbandiyya Kuftariyya order, which carries his family’s name. He uses his dual identity as religious scholar (‘alim) and Sufi shaykh to foster an Islam that is both centered on the textual tradition and open to Sufi moral and mystical concerns. Kuftaru tries to reshape Sufism into a moral system subordinated to the doctrinal and ritual principles systematized by the sharia and the Qur”an (Habbash 1996: 264–68). This textcentered mysticism is responsible for spreading Sufism among the upper and middle classes.

Although there are national and transnational dimensions in the public religious debate, the understanding and appropriation of the ideas and values that they convey is always done within local social and cultural conditions. Therefore, the prestige and the relevance of authors and texts in the public debate varies from one local community to another despite the fact that there are figures of undisputed national or international reputation. In Aleppo, where Muslim identities are connected to both traditional forms of urban sociability and political militancy, the main promoter of a reformist Sufism was ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Isa, the shaykh of the tanqa Qadiriyya Shadhiliyya Darqawiyya ‘Alawiyya (‘Isa 1993: 627—29), and imam at the ‘Adiliyya mosque in Aleppo. ‘Isa’s commitment to a socially engaged Sufism led to his involvement with the Islamic opposition to the Ba’th regime and to his exile in Jordan after 1982.

‘Isa’s major book, Haqa’iq ^can al-Tasawwuf (Truths about Sufism), is widely read in Aleppo by the followers of all trends in Sufism as well as non-Sufis. ‘Isa presented his book as a systematic explanation of Sufism, in order to combat the “deliberate calumny” (al-ta^cn al-maqsud) and the “violent aggression” (al-hujum al-anif) directed against it by secular and Salafi critics (‘Isa 1993: 8). The esoteric dimension of Sufism was played down in ‘Isa’s model because he defined Sufism as the moral consciousness of the Islamic community, which he considered as defined by the principles of the sharia (‘Isa 1993: 473—77).

‘(sa was clearly thinking of the construction of a large community of moral agents able to act in society and transform it according to the principles of Islam, which required the codification of religious experience in a doctrinal discourse (see Whitehouse 2000: 3—5). It is not surprising, therefore, that he constructed his exposition of the principles of Sufism as a “disciplinary” text in the sense of producing an impersonal and reflexive tool through which the religious discourse can ‘“regulate, inform and construct religious selves” (Asad 1993: 125). The moral qualities required from the Sufis, such as tawba (repentance) or sidq (righteousness), and their function in the Sufi path are explained in a very clear and pedagogic way (‘Isa 1993: 284–310) that differs significantly from the metaphorical or poetic exposition present in Sufi classical treatises or in the hagio- graphic literature. The text in ‘Isa’s book follows modern editorial

style, including footnotes and an index that allows readers quickly to locate the desired information. These editing techniques suppose a reading public that has had modern schooling, allowing the use of the text without any supervision and according to personal needs. This style was one of the causes of success of this book beyond Sufi milieus.

The emergence of reformed forms of Sufism changed the configuration of forces in the public religious debate in Syria by presenting a form of Sufism easier to integrate with the sharia-centered Salafi definition of Islam. As a result of this new challenge, many Sufi shaykhs in Aleppo started to make explicit the connections between their practices and doctrines and the Qur”an by doing commented readings of Sufi texts and organizing study groups after Sufi gatherings (hadras). Sufi ritual practices that had no direct reference in the Qur”an, such as the darab al-shish (body piercing with skewers), were discontinued in many zawiiyas of Aleppo, in particular those in which the participants had a higher educational level and thus were more exposed to the polemics concerning these rituals.

The convergence of Sufi and non-Sufi reformist positions encourages the rise of a Sunni consensus in the definition of the common good. This process is similar to the creation of a shared legal and ritual universe through the downplay of the differences among the four Sunni legal schools (madhhab, pl. madhahib) that occurred during the last century. Such a phenomenon could be easily replicated in Syria today, where there is no sharp division between Salafi and Sufi practice, with many practitioners fusing the two religious identities. Sa’id Hawa, the later leader of the Syrian Muslim Brothers who was also a Sufi, proposed the creation of a “Salafi Sufism” as a necessary step in the creation of an Islamic society that can effectively respond to the challenges posed by secularism (Hawa 1979: 217—18). These ideas find echo in the preaching of Shaykh Kuftaru, who proposes the transformation of Sufism into the moral consciousness of the sharia and the change of its name to ihsan (Geoffroy 1997: 14).

Nevertheless, such a consensus is not likely to be created in the nearby future. Important divergences still exist between reformist Sufis and other Muslims. Reformed and traditional Sufis alike see the hierarchical relationship between master and disciple as the pivotal element in Sufism. Shaykh Kuftaru is the absolute leader of his tariqa and his followers are personally committed to him and his deputies. Similarly, ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Isa’s writings defend the religious primacy of the Sufi shaykhs, saying that “the legalistic [zahir] ‘ulama guard the borders of the sharia, while the Sufi scholars guard its morals and its soul” (‘Isa 1993: 476—77). Furthermore, Sufis consider the power of their shaykhs to be connected to the baraka (grace) that they receive from God and express in their karamat (miraculous deeds), but many other Muslims see this as bid‘a (blamable innovation) and shirk (polytheism).[28]

The reproduction of the hierarchical relationship between Sufi shaykhs and their disciples as the defining element of Sufi identities in the public sphere shows a different trend in the constitution of a “public Islam.” The hierarchical links between master and disciple are not based on the monopoly of doctrinal discourse by the former, but rather on the capacity of the shaykh to discipline as legitimate mystical experiences the emotional and sensory elements that are induced by the performance of Sufi rituals. The analysis of the role that Sufi identities play as constitutive elements of the Syrian public sphere must therefore take into account the effects of the power relations that they embody and reproduce as emotional attachments.

*** Individual Limits: The Experiential Character of Sufi Identities

The Sufi path is constituted by experiential states that are based on a set of bodily sensations and emotions, such as love (hubb), which are induced and disciplined according to the Sufi concepts linked to each mystical stage (maqam) reached by the disciple. Therefore, the mystical experiences that define the Sufi path consist of emotional and sensorial elements that are induced, combined, and mobilized in social contexts and for cultural purposes legitimized by the Sufi tradition. Sufis base their doctrines on the distinction between the manifest and hidden dimensions of reality, with the latter being closer to the divine truth. The epistemological consequence of this conception of knowledge is that the “real” meaning of things can only be unveiled by those who had a direct experience of the divine truth.

The process of Sufi initiation (tarbiyya) starts with the study of the manifest zahin tradition, which consists of the sharia and the doctrinal and ritual basis of Sufism. It presents a version of the Sufi path in close connection with the religious rules prescribed by the sharia and slowly moves to texts with a deeper esoteric (batin) message. The importance of the Sufi textual tradition in providing adepts with the conceptual apparatus for constructing their mystical experience suggests how higher degrees of literacy can change power relations. Nevertheless, the Sufi conception of religious knowledge requires the tutorial figure of the shaykh because it values existential over intellectual understandings of religious truth. This point was nicely summarized by a Qadiri shaykh who, after showing me some volumes from his private library, told me that “it is one thing to be knowledgeable on Sufism, studying it from books, and a very different thing to be a Sufi. ... The haqiqa is something that you feel in the heart (tash^caruha fi-l-qalb). ... I can read five hundred books on Sufism, but if after that I am still the same, I am not a Sufi” (personal communication, June 2000).

This statement shows how the transformation of the self is the core of Sufi initiation. Such an existential transformation is the result of mystical exercises with both physical and spiritual implications, which can only be effective if performed under the continuous supervision of the shaykh. One of the first tasks that the disciple has to accomplish in the process of

initiation is to purify his heart through repetition of the devotional formula (wird) received during the performance of his oath of allegiance (bayl) to the shaykh. The repetition of the wird is a form of performing the dhikr, or mystical evocation of God, which is one of the main Sufi rituals. The mystical exercises that constitute the Sufi path aim at producing mystical states (hal, pl. ahwal) that are experienced as God's presence in the heart of the faithful. Therefore, the disciple must concentrate not only on performing the task but also on a search for the emotions and physical sensations that inform him of the success of his effort in "engraving the name of God in his heart," as a disciple of a Rifa'i shaykh in Aleppo explained.

A shaykh's guidance is fundamental in shaping the efforts of the disciple into effective mystical practice. Most shaykhs have weekly meetings with their disciples, where they address the whole group and each disciple individually. During these meetings the shaykh usually explains the features of one mystical exercise—the kind of sensations one should expect to attain by performing it, and the relation between these sensations and the stages of the Sufi path. Once I witnessed a meeting between a Shadhili shaykh and his disciples. The shaykh delivered a sermon on the importance of "fighting against the nafs (self)" in order to avoid the sin of kibr (pride) that led Satan to revolt against God. He concluded by saying that one only begins to win this fight when he attains the state of dhikr from the heart. Then he invited all the present to perform the dhikr, repeating Allah while moving the head back and forth. During the ritual the shaykh sat in front of each one of the disciples in turn, pressed his finger on the heart of each one, and said "This is your heart; you will feel God here. At the beginning you will feel nothing, but love (hubb) will open your heart to him. You will feel it like life coming out from an egg." While still pressing his finger on the disciple's heart, he repeated Allah, Allah, Allah, Allah, Allah, and then moved on to the next disciple.

This example shows how the teachings and the ritual guidance of the shaykh induce in his disciples the anticipation of a sequence of sensations that will allow them to recognize their success in performing the dhikr correctly. The shaykh made sure that the description in words of mystical emotional sensation and love was accompanied by the physical sensation of pressure over one's heart while the name of God was repeated. In resembling the pressure that a newly formed life makes on the egg that contains it, this sensation reveals in an experiential way the meaning of one of God's name, Hayy (Living One). '

The emotional and physical intimacy that pervades the relationship between the Sufi shaykh and his disciples raises some problems when there are female disciples of male shaykhs, which is the usual situation in traditional zawiya s. The love and complete submission that the disciple must devote to the shaykh stand in opposition to the shared understandings of female honor and gender roles that prevail in Muslim religious milieus. Although these tensions are minimized in Sufi orders such as the Kuftariyya, which have a female branch in which female deputies of the shaykh mediate between the world of privacy

and honor and the universe of public devotion, they are only completely solved in female orders that have a female shaykha, such as the Qubaysiyya. The relation between these shaykhas and their murida s has a strong emotional drive of devotion and dedication constructed within a framework of puritanical piety and strict discipline. The Sufi path fostered by shaykhas tends to combine the public observation of the norms of veiling and modesty with practices of self-accountability and reflexivity. For example, in Aleppo it is possible to recognize the disciples of a famous shaykha linked to the Naqshbandiyya order because, besides being fully veiled in black, they carry a small counting machine where they register every wird they recite. The goal pursued here is the establishment of a permanent connection to the shaykha in a perpetual state of dhikr, and the total number of prayers achieved in lifetime is expected to count as a proof of good deeds and pious thoughts on Judgment Day.

Similar efforts to achieve complete control over the self (nafs) are pursued in male zawiya s within the framework of ascetic practices, such as spiritual retreat (khalwa). The khalwa is a traditional practice among many Sufi orders, consisting of a period during which a shaykh's disciples engage in a total retreat from the world, living in the zawiya in complete isolation, meditating, and fasting in order to advance on the mystical path. Although the khalwa has been adapted to the constraints of modern life—its period has been shortened from forty to four days—it still is performed in many zawiyas in Aleppo. During the periods of seclusion in individual cells or rooms, the shaykh assigns specific positions or body movements to the disciples to perform while meditating on their personal wird.

The khalwa contributes to the embodiment of the power relations that constitute the Sufi community via the emotions and bodily sensations that it produces in the Sufi neophytes, thus inscribing the hierarchical relationship between shaykh and disciple into the corporeal dimension of the latter. For example, a middle-class professional from Aleppo who is the disciple of a Shadhili shaykh told me that he had to perform the khalwa for four days: "[I was] in complete isolation in a dark room. On the wall there was a picture of the shaykh and there was a light over it. I had to stay there for hours staring at the picture and reciting the tasbih (prayer beads) over my heart and repeating Allah with my tongue pressing on the palate. After a while I could feel God's presence and I felt that the shaykh was the link between Him and me. ... The same love that I felt for God I could see in my shaykh and I could feel that he [the shaykh] was part of the haqiqa."

This example reveals how the sensations produced in the disciples by the disciplinary practices of Sufi initiation relate to symbols and images in order to produce an emotional and physical experience of the divine nature of the shaykh's authority. The shaykh has a central role in inculcating the mystical formulas of training, so that the emotions and experience associated with it are reworked from the ordinary experience of the disciples until they execute the normative models transmitted by the Sufi tradition. This is a fundamental element in the incorporation of the shaykh's authority as part of the emotional

basis of Sufi identities, for it leads the disciple to identify the affection that he has toward his master with the love that he devotes to God.

The disciplinary efficacy of continuous training and exercising in body techniques—the culturally determined ways of using the body to achieve expected social and physical results (Mauss 1995 [1934]: 371–72), which are transmitted by the mystical path—is constantly tested during the collective performance of the dhikr at the weekly hadra. The organizational principles of the dhikr also produce and reinforce emotional attachments to the figure of the shaykh among the participants, even beyond the circle of the initiated. The shaykh is the focal point of the ritual, the efficacy of which is attributed to his baraka. The hierarchical organization of the ritual centered on the shaykh's mystical persona produces the notion that the differences among individual experiences come from the degree of personal attachment and physical proximity that each participant has to the shaykh. Furthermore, karamat (miraculous deeds) performed by a shaykh or attributed to him by his followers create a sense of respect and awe among those who hear the accounts of these acts or see them happen during the ritual practices. Thus, the religious persona of the Sufi shaykh is experienced by his followers as the main element in the production and definition of their Sufi identities, which means that the power relations that exist in their relationship are fused with affective ties of love, gratitude, and devotion.

*** The Limits of the Public: Sufi Identities and Forms of Participation in the Public Sphere

The various biographic and hagiographic accounts of living and dead shaykhs that are published and circulate among Sufi groups in Syria show how Sufis consider their shaykhs as central to their own religious identities. Some of the texts downplay their miraculous deeds and emphasize their religious and legal knowledge or their moral virtues. However, when these texts circulate within the Sufi communities, they are complemented by oral accounts of karamat that shift the base of the shaykh's persona from his knowledge and piety to his baraka (see Chih 1997: 32–34). This apparent contradiction between the biographical texts and their use by Sufis is the result of a strategy displayed in the composition of these narratives, which aims at facilitating the acceptance of the authority of Sufi shaykhs among non-Sufi Muslims in public religious debate.

The emphasis on textual and doctrinal aspects of the religious authority of Sufi shaykhs is the result both of the strategies of the Sufis and the structure of the public religious debate itself. This debate in Syria is centered on the doctrinal aspects of the Islamic textual tradition, showing that the doctrinal challenges posed by the reform-minded trends in Islam have a social appeal strong enough to define the central topics of public religious debate. Although this phenomenon affected certain areas of Sufism, it left untouched elements that constitute the core of Sufi identities, such as the emotional attachments that link Sufis to their shaykhs. The absence of public discourse on the emotional and experiential elements of Sufi identities in Syrian religious debate is not the result of their supposedly idiosyncratic

nature but of the bodily nature of the disciplinary mechanisms used to produce them. Furthermore, although it is true that doctrinal texts are not particularly suitable to convey emotional states or individual experiences, this can be done by other literary genres, such as autobiographical narratives. For example, the vast circulation and consumption of novels, romances, and confessional autobiographies in nineteenth-century Europe delimited and disciplined an experiential universe of emotions and sexual impulses as the “inner self” that defined the bourgeois individual (Foucault 1998 [1976]: 17—35).

There are no equivalent literary genres among the Sufi texts produced in Syria. The biographies and hagiographies follow formulaic rules of composition that prevent a deeper description or analysis of the emotional universe of the individual. Traditional Sufi poetry and literature is too allegorical to provide the readers with reflexive disciplinary mechanisms that could work independently from the tutelage of a shaykh. Even the mystical manuals, both traditional, such as the Dala’il al-Khayrat, and modern ones, such as the Haqa’iq ^can al-Tasawwuf, which are widely read in the Sufi circles of Aleppo, are not suitable to create mechanisms of “rationalization” of the mystical experiences. These manuals give access only to the basic elements of the Sufi path. Anyone wishing to pursue it further needs to search for the guidance of a Sufi shaykh.

The differences between the individualization of the Sufi self and the forms of individualization present in modern European traditions are based on the fact that the former combined in each individual the notion of idiosyncratic uniqueness with that of community belonging, whereas the latter separated or emphasized these features as distinct conceptions of individuality. Although the construction the Sufi self is pursued through the cultivation of an emotional and experiential inner life, it can only be fully achieved and expressed through the constitution of a community. The connections between the individual selves in the Sufi communities are done not through the construction of shared normative discourses about the self, as in the French and Anglo-American bourgeois tradition, but by the dissolution of all individual differences in the emotional attachment to the shaykh. The fact that the emotional dimension of the power relations inscribed in Sufi identities was not objectified in the public debate allows them to be unconsciously reproduced as affinities and dispositions within the practices and worldview of Sufi adherents.

The Sufi idea of common good is centered on the concrete reality of the Sufi communities as the guardians of the values of an abstract umma, allowing for many different ways to reach accommodations with an authoritarian public order. This attitude facilitates understanding the variety of the Sufi reactions to colonial occupation in various Muslim societies, ranging from fierce resistance to active collaboration (Gellner 1993 [1981]: 221—30; Gilsenan 2000 [1982]: 157—63). A recent example of the potential radicalization of Sufi communities when faced with foreign threat was seen during the Anglo-American war and occupation of Iraq. Sufi shaykhs and their followers in Syria considered the military campaign an attack on Arab and Muslim society, with which they have strong personal and religious ties. Many Sufi shaykhs in Aleppo trace their genealogical origins to Iraq, and the most important Sufi saints, ‘Abd al- Qadir Jailani and Ahmad al-Rifa’i, are buried there.

On the other hand, the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the war against the Taliban and al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan had little mobilizing effects on the Sufi communities in Syria, for it involved a foreign power set against groups whose interpretation of Islam that was perceived to be deeply hostile to the Sufi worldview. The American support to Israel during the second intifada and the war against Iraq strengthened the perception among the Sufis in Syria, however, that the American government is inherently hostile to Muslims and Arabs. The political and economic pressure and the threats of a military attack against Syria that were done by the American administration during and after the war in Iraq transformed political antipathy into mobilization for resistance. This process culminated with the statement by shaykh Kuftaru in March 2003 that all forms of resistance to occupation, including "martyr operations," were legitimate and necessary to combat the "American, British, and Zionist invaders,"[29] showing the degree of radicalization that can be reached in Sufi communities if faced with threats from a power perceived as inimical to Islam.

The final picture shows the existence of spaces and mechanisms of both accommodation and confrontation with those power hierarchies that try to control the public sphere and shape the official public discourse. Whereas Sufism contributes to the reproduction of certain aspects of the Syrian authoritarian public order, the Sufi communities can also pose limits to state authority. Sufi models of the common good tend to favor hierarchical forms of social organization and participation by defending the charismatic authority of shaykhs in public religious debate. Nevertheless, the emotional attachment of the Sufis to their shaykhs is also linked to the idea of the existence of multiple individual paths toward the divine truth, preventing the imposition of an easy consensus on public debate. This creates a degree of plurality and even a space for individual autonomy in the Syrian public sphere.

This analysis of the public religious debate in Syria shows that the limits that determine the dynamics of the public sphere are not simply imposed by the state or set by institutional structures, for they are also produced by the power relations embodied as emotional and habitual dispositions in the identities of the agents. So the public sphere cannot be reduced to a homogeneous space of rational exchanges where objective interests are pursued through calculated strategies, for the logic of discourse is contradicted and modified by affective attachments and emotional dispositions inscribed in the agents' identities. However, the notion of alternative or multiple rationalities does not give an accurate idea of the dynamics of the public sphere, either, for it still supposes that the limits of rational debate are given by equivalent, albeit distinct, logical and normative principles.

In order to grasp the limits of the public sphere one has to look to the processes of subjectification displayed by the various groups, for they connect power relations with emotional elements in the constitution of public identities. The production of emotional attachments toward particular forms of authority limits the possibilities of the construction of shared ideals of the "common good" through public debate. The embodied character of these dispositions keeps the basis of power legitimacy dependent on personally established emotional ties that remain beyond the reach of public argument. This is clear in relation to

the consensus on the necessity of implementing Islamic values as the normative social model that was built in the public religious debate in Syria, but that was fragmented by personal attachments to conflicting structures of authority inscribed in the various Muslim identities. Thus, the emergence of “public religions” does not mean the simple incorporation of new perspectives into public debate, but rather the organization of distinct normative universes defined by power relations that are inscribed as emotional dispositions in the public identities of their adherents. This process can either lead to the failure of public debate or allow for the emergence of a more inclusive configuration of the public sphere, the outcome depending on the possibilities for the objectification and public challenge of the forms of power that define and support its limits.

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** Chapter Nine: Islam and Public Piety in Mali{3}

Benjamin F. Soares

Since the late nineteenth century and the onset of colonial rule in West Africa, scholars, including colonial scholar administrators, have devoted considerable attention to the study of what has been assumed to be the main institutional form for the practice of Islam in West Africa: the Sufi orders, the mystical paths. In an almost unending stream of studies, various scholars—political scientists, sociologists, geographers, historians, and those in religious studies—have focused on Sufi orders in various countries of the region. It is important to note, however, that Sufi orders have never had the importance in large parts of West Africa—in Mali, Niger, Cote d'Ivoire—that they may have had, say, in Senegal or elsewhere in the Muslim world (cf. Soares 1997, 1999). When scholars in West Africa have not focused on Sufi orders, they have tended to study the critics of the Sufi orders—so-called "reformists," Salafis, or, more recently, Islamists (for example, Rosander and Westerlund 1997). Most West African Muslims I have encountered during the course of my research—and, I claim, many of those I have learned about through reading colonial archives—are neither formally affiliated with any of the Sufi orders present in West Africa nor are they "reformists" or Islamists. Moreover, many West African Muslims categorically reject such appellations. This is not to deny the importance of Sufi orders, Sufism, or "reformism" in Mali. Rather, since all of these objects of study are so thin on the ground, it would seem to follow that we should shift our attention away from preoccupations with such presumed forms of Muslim social activism, not least since the events of September 11, 2001.

In this chapter, I do not privilege such categories in my analysis. During the course of fieldwork in Mali in the 1990s, it would have been difficult to avoid, let alone ignore, the many discussions Malian Muslims were having about Islam. Some of these discussions focused on questions of doctrine and "correct" ritual practice—for example, whether Friday communal prayers had to be performed in a mosque. Others focused on Muslim politics—for example, whether Muslims should be opposed on principle to the Gulf War and subsequent U.S. and British air strikes against Iraq in the 1990s. However, many of the discussions about Islam in Mali centered on more general questions of piety and the "correct" ways of being a pious Muslim. Indeed, there seemed to be considerable concern with—and often debate about—the public signs of piety.

On numerous occasions during my fieldwork, Malian friends and informants asked me whether I had noticed the mark or sign on a particular person's forehead. They used the term seere in Bamana/Bam- bara, Mali's most important lingua franca (or seede in Fulfulde/Pulaar), which some of my informants told me derives from

the Arabic, shahada, meaning testimony or witness, as in the Muslim profession of faith. This term, seere, refers to the sometimes circular spot or mark on some people's foreheads. Many Malians note that such a mark indicates regular prayer—even beyond the obligatory five ritual daily prayers—and presumably appears from touching the forehead to the ground. For many, such marks index piety. By all accounts, these marks are much more prevalent that they used to be. I myself have noticed the appearance of the marks on the foreheads of several friends and acquaintances between different periods of fieldwork in Mali, sometimes to my astonishment. What follows is an attempt to make sense of such signs. However, I must first present quite a bit of background information in order to understand the link between piety and some of its public signs in Mali.

*** Islam in Malian History

Although Islam has been practiced in Mali for at least a millennium, it was only in the twentieth century that Islam became the religion of the majority. It has largely been through the development of a public sphere that this Islamization has occurred. Arguably, a public sphere has been developing in Mali that differs considerably from the idealized bourgeois public sphere described by Habermas (1989 [1962]; cf. Calhoun 1992), in which there is a space for so-called rational critical debate, and religion clearly has no place. Elsewhere, I have traced some of the elements of such a public sphere in Mali back to the colonial period, when the spread of newspapers, publications, political parties, associations, and organizations opened new spaces for political and social debate and deliberation (Soares 1996, 1997). Following John Bowen, who has written about Aceh in Indonesia, I would argue that in Mali there is a "public sphere of discourse that combines religious, social, and political messages" (Bowen 1993: 325). By considering the development and contours of this public sphere, I explore here some of the enduring paradoxes that have accompanied the spread of more standardized ways of being Muslim in Mali.

First, let us examine briefly the features of Islam in the region (cf. Launay and Soares 1999). Although it is difficult to speak with great precision about the nature and extent of Islamization before the twentieth century, we do know that in the precolonial and early colonial periods (at least until the first decades of the twentieth century), religious practices often reflected membership in hereditary social categories. That is, whether people practiced Islam and the way in which they did so often had to do with their hereditary social status. Certain lineages were known as Muslim religious specialists or marabouts in French colonial parlance. They historically had control over Islamic religious knowledge, education, and sometimes trade. The hereditary transmission of both learning and sanctity has been historically very important here. Members of lineages of religious specialists and their descendants were generally those who performed the ritual daily prayers, fasted during the month of Ramadan, and abstained from consumption of alcohol. In short, they exhibited some of the outward signs of the practice of Islam. Other lineages, sometimes even members of the political/military elite who were Muslims, did not —nor were they expected to—conform to the standards of piety that were typical of clerics.

If before colonial rule Muslim elites had almost a monopoly on Islam, transformations of the entire political economy during colonial rule would change this. The increased movement of persons and commodities rendered some of these elites obsolete and helped to facilitate the Islamization of large segments of the population. Indeed, the period of French colonial rule in West Africa—from the late nineteenth century until 1960—witnessed the rapid spread of Islam in new areas and among groups that had historically not been Muslim. Many non-Muslims, including urban and agricultural laborers, conscripts to the army, students in colonial schools, and increasingly their village kin were converting to Islam. At the same time, more standardized ritual norms were spreading among virtually all Muslims, including those Muslims who had previously not been expected to conform to such norms. Thus, people from all sectors of society (members of the precolonial political/military elite, recent converts to Islam, and those of marginal social status—hereditary “caste” and servile status) began to emulate the religious practices of Muslim clerics. Religious practices, such as regular prayer and fasting during the month of Ramadan, became ritual norms for all Muslims regardless of social distinctions, hereditary or otherwise. This helped to make the practice of Islam—especially in its public ritual forms—more uniform across space and time. It is striking that today one of the most commonly used terms for Muslim in Bambara, selibaa (most likely from the Arabic, salat), means quite literally “one who prays.” To ask “do you pray?” or “does he pray?” is the ordinary way to inquire whether someone is a Muslim.

Although it is important to look to the colonial era to understand such changes, there are also generally overlooked antecedents for the public sphere in nonsecular discursive forms in this part of West Africa. Prior to colonial rule, debates between Muslim religious figures—a small educated elite for whom classical Arabic was the main language of written communication—often centered on such questions as the legitimacy of rule by particular Muslims and non-Muslims, including the French, the licitness of trade with non-Muslims, and so forth.[30] We have evidence of such debates in the form of various treatises in Arabic and oral histories and narratives from the precolonial and early colonial periods.[31] During the colonial period, the French administration sought the “loyalty” of virtually all Muslim clerics to whom ordinary Africans were assumed to owe allegiance.[32] Although during colonial rule some Muslims migrated for politicoreligious (not to mention economic) reasons to areas beyond French control and argued that others should do the same, most did not. Most Muslim elites accepted the fact that they were living under non-Muslim rule and did not deem flight or migration (hijra) from such rule necessary.[33] Acceptance of French rule occasionally came enthusiastically and, at other times, grudgingly. As the decades of French rule passed, for those least enthusiastic about the French presence there was resignation if not acceptance. Debate and deliberation between Muslims about political and economic issues such as the legitimacy of non-Muslim rule was, on the whole, attenuated during the colonial period. This was more or less the case until the 1950s, the decade leading up to independence.

*** Muslim Preachers and Public Sermons

There was an important development in the propagation of information about Islam during the colonial period that is useful for helping us to understand the emergence of more uniform ways of being Muslim. Drawing upon preexisting discursive forms and particularly written forms, Muslim preachers during the colonial period began to address sermons on specifically Islamic themes to the public outside the context of the mosque. Such preachers came to constitute in effect a new category of religious personality. In large parts of French West Africa, public sermons came to be known in various vernacular languages as waaju (or warate in Wolof) from the Arabic wa'z, meaning sermon (cf. Launay 1992). Such sermons became an increasingly popular form of communicating to large groups of people, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Although it is not possible to date the arrival of this discursive form in West Africa or to trace its relationship to developments elsewhere in the Muslim world, it certainly existed prior to colonial rule. The expanded public sphere under colonial rule facilitated the spread of public sermons, however, and they became one of the principal means for facilitating the spread of Islam and for the standardization of Islamic practices, with implications for public piety in Mali.

It is important to note that there were various kinds of Muslim preachers who used the public sermon. In fact, preachers from the colonial-authorized Muslim establishment sometimes gave public sermons on subjects of interest to the colonial administration. French colonial attempts to use Muslim clerics to exert influence over Muslims in this part of Africa are perhaps best exemplified in the career of one religious personality, Seydou Nourou Tall. From the 1930s onward, Seydou Nourou Tall was the Muslim religious leader in West Africa closest to the French, perhaps even the embodiment of the colonial-authorized Muslim establishment.[34] A grandson of al-Hajj 'Umar Tall, the leader of a nineteenth-century state who had clashed militarily with the French, Seydou Nourou traveled thousands of kilometers across French West Africa on behalf of a succession of colonial administrations, encouraging colonial subjects not only to obey the French and its representatives but also to pay taxes, to work in colonial projects, to ignore calls to strike, to use colonial health facilities, not to immigrate to neighboring colonies, and to perform their Islamic "religious duties."[35] Many of Seydou Nourou Tail's public pronouncements—usually in the vernacular language of his audience—took the form of a public sermon in which he related the topic at hand to the discursive tradition of Islam, and especially the Qur"an and the hadith. In one of his sermons in the 1940s, he spoke about such "civic" duties as obedience to French authority and the need to fulfill one's religious obligations as Muslims, which he stressed were much easier given the conditions of colonial rule (see also Chailley 1962). In any case, this new form of public sermon—waaju—that sometimes linked Islam with the objectives of the state spread throughout French West Africa. Such public sermons also helped to spread a more standardized Islamic culture premised on the notion that all Muslims should have similar duties and ritual obligations. Eventually, such preachers would widen their appeals to encourage those who could afford to do so to perform the hajj and to contribute funds toward the construction of new Friday mosques in colonial centers, such as Bamako, the Malian capital.[36] But these public sermons were not to remain the preserve of the colonial-authorized Muslim establishment, nor were members of this establishment the only ones to use such sermons to promulgate the idea that regular prayer and fasting during the month of Ramadan were to be ritual norms for all Muslims.

Paradoxically, the new colonial public sphere created a space in which various kinds of Muslim preachers flourished and made public pronouncements about the practice of Islam that were nonpolitical (at least from the perspective of the French). That is, they did not contest French authority. In colonial archives, one can read about individual Muslims—I want to call them freelance Muslim preachers—who gave sermons and sometimes traveled around to do so. Many of these preachers actively sought to convert non-Muslims to Islam; they also admonished people to give up their un-Islamic practices. In many reported cases, they tried to get people to relinquish or to destroy their allegedly un-Islamic ritual objects —“fetishes” in the colonial lexicon. It was usually when such preachers disrupted the colonial “public order” that they came to the attention of the French and were sometimes arrested and even sent into exile—hence traces in the colonial archives. Indeed, colonial reports document numerous cases in which conversion to Islam and the destruction of ritual objects in various places led to open conflict, often along generational lines.[37] That is, younger people, frequently migrants, contested the authority of non-Muslims, who were quite often their elders. Issues of gender were also important here, since most of the first converts seem to have been men. There are also reported cases of certain preachers haranguing those who considered themselves Muslims for failing to practice Islam correctly. For example, some preachers openly criticized African colonial civil servants for drinking alcoholic beverages and/or for exceeding the maximum of four wives permitted according to the rules of Islamic jurisprudence.[38]

Many of these freelance preachers, some not discussed in detail in the colonial archive or discussed only in passing, carried out the work of spreading Islam. Sources here include triumphalist oral narratives and hagiographic accounts in Arabic (and sometimes in French). One of the freelance preachers frequently discussed today, who also left considerable traces in the colonial archives is Cheikh Salah Siby (ca. 1888—1982), a Dogon convert to Islam, largely credited with spreading Islam among the Dogon.[39] Although those familiar with the Griaule school of French ethnology might find the idea of a Dogon Muslim an oxymoron, Cheikh Salah is just one of many such Dogon converts to Islam. During the colonial period, Cheikh Salah actively began to instruct people in what he took to be proper Islamic religious practice—ritual daily prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, getting people to slaughter animals according to the rules of Islamic jurisprudence (halal), and so forth—some of the outward signs of Islam. From the 1940s on, he mainly directed his attention to two groups of socially marginal people: first, his fellow Dogon, many of whom took him to be a living Muslim saint, and second, some of the many former slaves in the region. These were sizeable groups whom their Muslim neighbors often treated with disdain. In any case, such people—mostly recent converts to Islam—were beginning to emulate the conventions of religious practice, as well as standards of piety, of those with claims to Islamic religious authority—the Muslim elites. Most of the newly Islamized also abandoned other public signs—such as long braided hair for men and certain forms of facial scarification for their children—that indexed them as nonMuslims. In any case, this particular preacher was helping to facilitate the emergence of a more generally shared way of being Muslim. Such developments were only possible given the complex transformations occurring under French rule and with the expansion of the public sphere.

It would be hasty, however, to assume that the adoption of outward—indeed public—signs of Islam meant that allegedly un-Islamic traditions were no longer important. Over time, various kinds of such “traditions” were desacralized and made into local and regional folklore. In some cases, the therapies or medicines of non-Muslim healers were also desacralized and, therefore, rendered licit for Muslims who might seek to use these along with or as an alternative to the increasingly available Western biomedicine. Other “traditions,” such as certain masking traditions, were not so much desacralized as made into children’s games held at certain points in the Islamic calendar, and, therefore, rendered “harmless.” Still yet other allegedly un- Islamic “traditions”—forms of spirit possession and the use of certain non-Islamic ritual objects—have been increasingly relegated to private or at least semipublic venues, that is, out of the view of potential critics, Muslim or otherwise. [40] It is here that one can see some of those excluded from the expanding public sphere in which Islam dominates.

*** Muslim Associations and New Muslim Intellectuals

In contrast to the freelance Muslim preachers, new Muslim associations were founded in urban areas, increasingly from the 1930s onward. These new Muslim associations ostensibly admitted all Muslims as members, but tended to attract those who were colonial civil servants, former soldiers, and others involved in the new colonial urban centers of economic activity (cf. Loimeier 1999; Meillassoux 1968; and Gomez-Perez 1991, 1997). Some of these early associations sought to encourage and facilitate the hajj, which increasingly became a goal of an expanding and aspirant African Muslim bourgeoisie.[41] Several of the associations organized public meetings where invited speakers, including prominent African Muslim intellectuals, talked about such topics as Muslim unity and morality.[42] Working with one association, Fraternite Musulmane, Mahmoud Ba, a West African educated in Mecca in the 1930s, gave public addresses in which he condemned Muslim youths for being more drawn to drink and pleasure than to practicing religion.[43] According to French accounts, such meetings were decidedly nonpolitical or at least generally avoided political issues. In 1948, however, after developments in Palestine, one organization made public statements that “this dispute” did not concern West African Muslims living under French rule.[44] It is noteworthy that the public meetings of these associations generally ended with speakers thanking France for her “civilizing mission,” however perfunctory such statements might seem.[45]

By the early 1950s, certain West African Muslim intellectuals began to enter the public arena in new ways. In contrast to those Africans who had engaged in French-language secular schooling, such as many of the members of the early Muslim associations, these intellectuals were part of a newly emergent, highly educated Muslim elite, who had undergone advanced Islamic education, whether in Mali, elsewhere in West Africa, or abroad, at institutions like al-Azhar in Cairo or the Dar al-Hadith in the Hijaz. Inspired by the nationalism sweeping the Arab world, the independence of British colonies, most notably, India and Pakistan in 1947 with their large Muslim populations, and the independence of Libya from Italy in the early 1950s, some of these Muslim intellectuals sought to connect anticolonialist ideas with more reformist ideas about Islam. Given that their activities were

under constant surveillance, they were not able to act as freely as the colonial-authorized Muslim establishment. Indeed, some “reformist” preachers were subject to harassment after making their own public pronouncements that were deemed insulting to the French or other Muslim clerics; they sometimes had their schools closed and were occasionally imprisoned for allegedly disrupting public order (see Brenner 2000; Kaba 1974).

In the early 1950s, “reformist” Muslim intellectuals[46] in what is present-day Mali (together with intellectuals from the neighboring French colonies of Senegal and Guinea) founded the Union Culturelle Musulmane (the UCM, Muslim Cultural Union), a voluntary organization whose stated objectives included “the establishment of a reformed Islam [un Islam renove], education, and the liberation of the African Man [IHomme Africain]” (cited in Chailley 1962: 46).[47] Some of these reform-oriented intellectuals also published pamphlets in French and Arabic that explicitly expressed anticolonial views. In the introduction to one such pamphlet, Cheikh Toure boldly identified “the trio” of the “Capitalist, Marabout [Muslim cleric], [and] Colonialist,” who “exploited, misled, and oppressed” people in West Africa (Toure 1957: 1). This author even decried “the collaboration with the [colonial] authorities carried on even in our mosques, meetings, and [during] religious holidays” (Toure 1957: 9—10; see also Diane 1956 and Chailley 1962). In 1954, after the outbreak of war in Algeria, some of these intellectuals demanded that West African Muslims not be sent to serve in North Africa. In some of their public pronouncements and published writings, these reformists criticized certain Muslim clerics for what they considered to be un-Islamic practices. They condemned in particular their use of the Islamic esoteric sciences, those areas of secret or mystical knowledge (“magic” by most anthropological definitions), as well as for the pedagogical style of “traditional” Islamic education centered on the memorization of texts. In general, these new Muslim intellectuals sought to change the way Islam had long been practiced in West Africa in order to bring it more in line with what they deemed to be more “correct” practices, modeled on the presumed center of the Islamic world, the Arab Middle East. Toward this end, a number of them set up their own “modern” Islamic educational institutions in some of the largest towns, borrowing their pedagogical style from the colonial French-language secular schools (see Brenner 1991, 2000).[48]

When these “reformists” entered public debate, they helped to animate discussions about what it meant to be Muslim—what was the proper way to be Muslim. And since the 1950s, some of the ongoing debates and sometimes conflicts about Islam in Mali have been between the heirs of some of these urban-based reformists and those we might call “traditionalist” Muslims, who are more closely identified with Sufi orders and traditional Islamic education. Over time, there have been heated debates between these groups about religious doctrine and practices—for example, about whether to cross one’s arms across the chest during prayer. What is remarkable, however, is the actual convergence between such reformists and those they criticize about the practice of Islam and piety over the past few decades. In fact, “reformists” and “traditionalists” generally agree that all Muslims should practice a more standardized Islam—regular prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the hajj whenever possible. They are frequently in agreement about the kinds of “traditional” or “magicoreligious” practices—most notably, spirit possession and the

use of un-Islamic ritual objects—that they find objectionable (Soares 1999). Moreover, they are also sometimes united in their opposition to the secularism of the postcolonial state.

*** The Public Sphere, Standardization, and Difference

The public sphere that developed under colonial rule and through which public sermons spread has only continued to expand in the postcolonial period, in which the Malian state is ostensibly committed to the principle of laicite. Today the public sphere is animated by religious education, sermons, print and audio-visual media, and the country's Islamic organizations, all of which have been influenced by transnational and global interconnections (cf. Bowen 1993; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; and Anderson 1991). This public sphere has helped to make information and ideas about Islam (not to mention other areas of knowledge), including that from beyond the immediate area, more readily available to the public. Although this public sphere is perhaps more vibrant in urban areas, it also extends into some of the far reaches of the country where for many people to be Malian means to be Muslim. The public sphere has, if anything, helped to foster a supralocal sense of shared Muslim identity in Mali, an imagined community of Muslims often linked to the Malian state whose members are to varying degrees attentive to the broader Islamic world that lies beyond the state boundaries.[49] There are of course those excluded from such a sphere, most notably, Christians and other non-Muslims in Mali. Although some Malians see themselves as participating directly and unambiguously in the global Islamic community—the umma—many other Malian Muslims recognize differences between themselves and others that cannot be elided in the imagining of such a transnational community.[50] This imagined community of Muslims in Mali helps shape the way ordinary Muslims practice Islam. This public sphere has helped to create pressures to standardize Islamic practices, especially in their public ritual forms.[51]

With the shift to more standardized norms of piety and the rise of an ostensibly more uniform way of being Muslim, what Eickelman has called a "generic Islam" (1989b), one might suspect that there would no longer be any place for the hereditary transmission of learning or hereditary sanctity or charisma. This is not, however, the case. In many places in Mali, including western Mali, lineages of religious specialists have been able to retain control over Islamic religious education and leadership positions such as imam, not to mention roles in the various Sufi orders. This has also been the case in some urban areas where people have objected to recent converts to Islam and even their descendants acting as imam.[52] Members of lineages of religious specialists continue to have reputations for their knowledge and use of the Islamic esoteric sciences.[53] Almost without exception, Muslim saints and other esteemed living or deceased religious personalities come from these same lineages thought to have access to such secret knowledge. In some cases, certain living Muslim saints have flourished along with the expansion of the public sphere (Soares 1997, 1999, 2000a).

If these might seem to be examples of all that is “traditional” in contemporary Mali, it is useful to consider one of Mali’s—may I dare say—more postmodern religious personalities to understand how differences between Muslims continue to be so important. Cherif Ousmane Madani Haidara (b. 1955) is the head (or “spiritual guide”) of Anfar Dine (in Arabic Ansar al-din), one of the more successful of the many new Muslim organizations that have proliferated in Mali since the overthrow of President Moussa Traore’s authoritarian regime in 1991 (see Hock 1999 for an extensive, though necessarily incomplete, list of such new organizations). He is perhaps Mali’s most controversial and flamboyant Muslim media personality. Ever since being arrested and banned from preaching on several occasions in the late 1980s for allegedly insulting remarks, Haidara has managed to garner considerable public attention.[54] He states quite emphatically that he fashions himself after the Egyptian preacher ‘Abd al-Hamid Kishk (see Kepel 1986), and that Kishk’s sermons have provided inspiration for his own. Haidara appeals to a mass public—including many who are illiterate—in Mali and among Malian migrants elsewhere in Africa and in Europe largely through his sermons (in Bamana/ Bambara) on audiocassette and video that circulate widely.[55] Haidara has received considerable media attention for provocative public statements he has made about the immorality and dishonesty of politicians (much like Kishk), merchants, and other clerics, as well as for his interventions in debates about public morality and the correct practice of Islam. His is a project focused on the shaping of moral subjects in the public sphere, a very public Islam that also includes a social agenda. In this way, he is not unlike such colonial-era Muslim preachers as Seydou Nourou Tall. In his sermons and other public pronouncements, Haidara has insisted that Malian Muslims—many of whom know little Arabic—can perform the ritual daily prayers (salat in Arabic) in whatever vernacular language they speak. The discussions and controversy about this and other subjects raised in his sermons have undoubtedly helped to spread his reputation, even notoriety.

Although the media have been central to the making of Haidara’s career, his ability to receive a forum—even to enter public debate about morality and Islam—seems to relate in no small part to his status as a member of a lineage claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad. In fact, his patronym, Haidara, indicates sharifian descent here, as it does in large parts of Muslim West Africa. However important his personal charisma, which includes his skills as a talented orator and his media savvy, authoritative hereditary charisma seems to be the condition of possibility for the making of his career. Furthermore, Haidara—whom some consider an Islamist—is often venerated much like a “traditional” Sufi saint. I have watched as people have approached him to kiss his hand or be touched by him, that is, in exactly the same way many Malian Muslims approach descendants of the Prophet Muhammad or other saintly Muslim figures. Although I have witnessed Malian “reformist” and “modernist” Muslims react to such displays toward Haidara with dismay, sometimes even utter disbelief, most Malians do not find the veneration of Haidara in any way surprising.

*** Islam in Public

Ritual daily prayer and particularly communal Friday prayer have become perhaps the most public of all signs of piety in contemporary Mali. Fasting during Ramadan and the breaking of the fast at sunset have increasingly become public acts, especially in urban Mali. The hajj—the pilgrimage to the Holy Cities—is also a public act, when pilgrims embark on their voyage and upon return. Such public signs have not, however, guaranteed the probity of everyone's piety. It is interesting to note that those of "caste" and servile status and recent converts to Islam were among the first to finance the construction of large and imposing mosques in their natal villages throughout Mali. Even these acts, perhaps the most visible and therefore public acts of piety, have not erased individual actor's marginal status in relation to Muslim elites—clerics and marabouts—as far as matters Islamic go. Even today, when such people have been able to perform the hajj their motives have been questioned. More generally, as the number of those from broad sectors of the society going on the hajj has increased, so have suspicions that many ordinary Malian Muslims might have less than pious motives for performing the hajj. Many Malians joke about their compatriots performing what they call "the business hajj," that is, traveling to the Holy Cities under the pretext of the hajj with the real objective being commerce—to purchase consumer items such as electronics, jewelry, and so forth to resell at a substantial profit in Mali.

At the beginning, I mentioned one public sign of piety that is especially important. This is seere, the dark, sometimes circular, spot or mark on some Muslims' foreheads. As I have noted, some state that the mark indexes regular prayer beyond the obligatory five ritual daily prayers and presumably appears on the forehead from touching the ground during prayer. Many Malians readily note that the Prophet Muhammad's close companions had such a mark. Those with formal Islamic education can easily identify textual sources where this mark and those close people to the Prophet Muhammad are discussed—most importantly in one of the sura s in the Qur"an (al- fath, 48: 29).

It is instructive to focus on these publicly visible signs of piety not only because they were the subject of considerable discussion in Mali but also because they are not limited to any one group of Muslims. That is, they are not limited in the way that, say, beards and black veils might be limited to reformists or so-called Islamists. In a sense, they concern all Muslims and the more standardized set of norms that have become widespread in this setting.

When some of my Malian informants and friends spoke about the marks on people's foreheads, they did so as a way to refer to how much a particular person apparently prays as a Muslim. In this way of thinking, the mark indexes piety. Or, at the very least, it indexes performance of prayer that is regular, even out of the ordinary in its regularity. Many Malians think and state otherwise, however; they note that many of the most pious Muslims they know do not have this mark, though admittedly some do. Some refer mockingly in French to those with the dark spot as having le tampon noir, the black stamp—the ubiquitous bureaucratic seal the French colonial state introduced—on their foreheads. Many state that certain Muslims will go to great lengths for people to think they are pious. Indeed, some even speculate that many Malians will rub something on the forehead—even a stone—

until such a mark appears. Several people told me that they too could easily have one of these marks if they wanted.

Over the course of my fieldwork, I began to notice these marks on various people's foreheads, almost all of whom were adults. They were from all sectors of society, from schoolteachers and civil servants to market traders, the unemployed, and Muslim clerics. They included some of my male friends in their thirties and forties, and relatives of my informants, including a few adult women. Although some of those who have these marks were esteemed religious leaders, including some with saintly reputations, they were clearly not the overwhelming majority. In fact, the overall pattern was, at least for me, entirely unexpected.

Prominent Muslim religious leaders aside, many of the Malian Muslims whom I know with these marks fall into two categories (what follows draws on conversations with some of my more sociologically minded informants). First, there are those of relatively marginal social status, who, despite the performance of the practices of a standardized Islam that has become more widespread through the public sphere or even the financing of new mosque construction, are not readily accepted as Muslims on par with the descendants of the hereditary Muslim clerics. For example, former slaves, members of "castes," and descendants of recent converts.[56] A subcategory here would be some of the ordinary Muslim women I know who are childless and have these marks. The exemplary piety of such women and the mark that indexes this piety, I suspect, relate to their inability to bear children in a setting where childbearing is greatly valued. Second, there are various persons from all sectors of society whose moral character is in question, usually because of charges of corruption, embezzlement, or illicit sexual activities; or because of the amassing of considerable wealth under economic conditions that are very precarious. For example, I know several civil servants— some of whom are members of prominent lineages of Muslim religious specialists—who have been charged with stealing public funds upon whose foreheads the marks have appeared. In one case, the mark appeared after a period in prison. Similarly, there is the case of one friend accused of embezzling money from his father's prosperous import company who also had a mark appear. I also know young well-to-do businessmen—French-educated in some cases—with reputations as notorious womanizers with these marks.

One might read the appearance of such marks as attempts to clear one's name after public embarrassment or to safeguard one's reputation. But it is perhaps unwise for the anthropologist to speculate about the intentionality of actors. Indeed, it might even be churlish to read these signs as acts of deliberation—that is, actions of mindful bodies. Be that as it may, it is clear that there is no better way to prove one's piety than through signs that are publicly recognized as valid.[57] Whether the individual actor uses such signs consciously is perhaps beside the point. What is important to note is that actors exhibit their piety according to certain accepted norms and they do so publicly, that is, in ways that the public sphere encourages. As I have suggested, some of these signs of piety, and the marks in particular, are not unlike what linguists have called hypercorrection in language use, or the quest for what Bourdieu (1984) has called "distinction."

Unlike Habermas’s view that “public opinion” is key to the public sphere (1989 [1962]), the “consensus” (ijma^c) of the Muslim community is what seems to be of paramount importance in Mali. After all, on the one hand, there does seem to be “consensus” about proper Islamic religious conduct, the appeal of a more “generic Islam,” and identifiable processes of the standardization of religious practice and public piety. On the other hand, there are real differences, which belie the existence of any such publicly proclaimed or tacitly accepted “consensus.” As I have argued, hereditary sanctity and distinction remain very important factors in how Islam is practiced in postcolonial Mali. Moreover, the “consensus” about proper public conduct and piety excludes all of those whose actions in private or in semipublic venues do not partake of the consensus. It is the much- discussed seere that helps to illustrate some of the paradoxes of the “consensus” about public piety within the broader public sphere in Mali. Some of those Muslims with such an ostensibly visible sign of piety on their foreheads actually risk publicly betraying their inauthenticity—in short, their very lack of piety—to other Muslims. This has been a topic of much discussion, both in public and in private, among many, if not all ordinary Malian Muslims for whom piety and its public signs have become in recent years matters of considerable concern.

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** Chapter Ten: Framing the Public Sphere: Iranian Women in the Islamic Republic[58]

Fariba Adelkhah

It is possible to understand the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic that emerged from it in terms of the formation of a public space. The successive crises that the regime experienced should then be read according to the splits that such a process creates. Major political scandals, such as the trial of the former mayor of Tehran, Gholamhossein Karbashi (1998), or more recently the Sharam Jazaeiri Arab affair (2002), originated with the private appropriation of public funds, although the distinction between private and public was hardly clear from the perspective of the different protagonists. The repression of Islamic

intellectuals critical of the Republic, such as Mohsen Kadivar or Hassan Yossefi Eshkevari, was justified not for what they thought but because they expressed their views in public rather than within the “qualified” circles of the clerical establishment. Not all truths are good to say in public. The conflict between “conservatives” and “reformers” turns in large measure on the definition of public space and the modes of legitimate action within it. The polemics and repression engendered by student demonstrations, the use of satellite dishes, and women’s presence in sports stadiums exemplify this conflict.

For over forty years the relation between the private and public spheres has been a subject of constant debate in Iran. It was shaped by the issue of social being (adam-e ejtemai), characterized by committing oneself to others in the public domain and redefining one’s relations with others. Secular and religious thinkers, as well as social movements, have been major contributors to this process. Beginning in the 1960s, this theme was developed in the struggle over what has been called the “modernization” of Iran. It has concerned the socially recognized means for citizens to deal with one another as “enlightened” and distinguished authorities in both the public and private spheres.

From the outset, it involves thinking of the private and public spheres as a continuum and not as polar opposites. From this perspective, these ongoing debates over social being have worked against the partitioning or atomization of social life in the residential quarters that characterized urban life prior to the oil boom, demographic growth, and the emergence of a “middle class.” This theme is threaded though the “modernization” of the 1960s, the calls for liberty at the time of the revolution, the necessity of territorial defense during the war with Iraq, and throughout the period of liberalization under Rasfanjani (1990–1997). It is equally at the core of the transformations under way since the electoral victory of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and the concept of zabeteh, or rule of law (as opposed to that of rabeteh, or clientelism) that Khatami sought to foster. The terms of this aspiration have changed from one period to the other. Simply put, the accent in the 1970s was on enhancing the value of the public sphere. For example, this period witnessed the double process of the individuation of space—with the appearance of separate rooms for parents and for their children—and the opening up to the outside world; rooms for receiving guests henceforth became living rooms situated near the entrance of homes. After the revolution—again simplifying—a new value was placed on the private sphere. People sought to enhance and protect the private sphere through a public and rational discourse, that of rule of law, in which each person is treated as an equal.

Forms of sociability multiplied in the wake of the Islamic Republic— religious meetings, sport, and cultural events. They took their legitimacy from legal demands, but informally thrived to the extent that they could evade formal registration or state control. These new forms of sociability developed in family space, among neighbors, and in professional milieus. Two examples are the funds for interest-free loans and women’s religious meetings (jaleseh). The at least partially private conduct of public practices facilitates their appropriation and control by actors in a mass society. These practices are a factor of trust and predictability in an otherwise uncertain environment, be it from the declining value

of currency or the fluctuations in parity between the Iranian rial and the U.S. dollar, or in the context of a minimalist state.

Whatever the continuity between the public and the private, their imbrication is of major significance. One of the political weaknesses of the reformers since 1997 is not to have understood the importance of this permeability. They relied instead on a stereotyped and dated conception of public space hardly understood by those who voted for Khatami in 1997 and 2001. This lack of understanding is suggested by the high rate of abstention in the 2003 municipal elections in the larger towns. At issue is less the weight of legitimacy of religious authority in politics, as is often thought, than the exclusive and unidimensional nature of this authority and its claims to a monopoly in a society that has become complex, differentiated, and open to foreign influences. This continuum of public and private is based on the use of reason in both the public and private spheres, and in the passage from one to the other by means of a multiplicity of small activities. The goal of this chapter is to show this through analyzing the social and political participation of women in society.

Women played a crucial role in the major protests against the imperial regime in 1978, a mass mobilization that gave birth to an Islamic feminism (Adelkhah 1991). Many women resisted when Imam Khomeini indicated his preference for the wearing of the headscarf, and the left and the “democrats” refused to support them, giving priority instead to the “anti-imperialist struggle.” Although some Islamic feminists took the side of the protestors in the name of the freedom of choice inherent to belief in Islam, the obligation of wearing the headscarf (hejab) gradually emerged, and the women’s movement appeared gradually to split, asphyxiated by the rising political violence, the increasing state repression, and the exigencies of the war against Iraq. The involvement of Islamic feminists in public activities, which rose with the appointment of some women to high government posts immediately after the revolution, subsided with the increasing intensity of the war against Iraq and authoritarianism.

This interpretation is corroborated by the problematic nature of the role of women in society, an issue that remains unresolved by the process of democratization in Iran. A genuine women’s social movement continues to smolder in Iran, somewhat like the embers under the cooling brazier of the revolution. This does not involve a systematic confrontation with the state, although there are occasional conflicts with institutions or authorities. Moreover, the emerging power of this feminist movement springs in part from the war with Iraq and the recurring economic crises of the 1970s.

Our interest in the growth of the women’s movement in Iran stems less from the exemplar of the mobilization of women at the time of the revolution than from the continuity and vigor of a women’s movement burrowed deep in the undercurrents of the Islamic republic. To understand this growth, we must avoid a linear or strictly political vision of this movement. In the Iranian case, it consists of a form of regulation and of reshaping of the relationship between the private and public spheres. In outlining the mobilization of women on themes

pertaining to the public sphere (such as debates about polygamy, divorce, and dowry), their public presence— in the media, in courts, and in Parliament—has made a major contribution. Inversely, this participation in the public sphere has allowed women to change the balance of power in private family space to their advantage. In this perspective, this social movement draws its force less from the confrontation between state and society than from the inevitable articulation between private and public.

*** The Participation of Women in Public Space

The election of Mohammad Khatami to the presidency of the Republic appeared to mark a new era for Iranian women, said to be obstinately subject to and closed within the archaic and phallocratic Republic of the Ayatollahs and the misogyny of Islam. Many women supported his candidacy, and his victory was seen as one for women as well as the younger generation. In November 1998, many saw the demonstration of several hundred female sports “fans” in Tehran’s Azadi stadium, where crowds had gathered to celebrate the triumphal return from Australia of the national soccer team and to defy the prohibition against demonstrations, as a confirmation of this evolution of women’s public roles.

This evolution of women’s public roles antedates the Khatami era and is integrally linked to the history of the Iranian revolution and the Islamic Republic. Since the end of the 1980s it was clear that the new order could not be reduced to a binary opposition between dominators and the dominated, including women. Paradoxically, the veil permitted many women of the lower middle and middle classes, as well as those from working class families and the countryside, to occupy public space and to play active economic and social roles, especially during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.

The mobilization of women to support the Islamic revolution and the ideology of at least some Islamic thinkers, such as Ali Shariati, Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, and Mehdi Bazargan, contributed significantly to widening women’s sphere of action. Broadly speaking, the status of women was more profoundly transformed by the Islamic revolution than it had been by the superficial authoritarian modernization of the Shah. Nonetheless, the achievements of the old regime were largely preserved, at least after the tense first stage of the revolution, thanks to the resistance of women themselves—Islamic militants among them—to efforts to turn them away from public roles. The support of women for the Islamic Republic, or at least certain of its policies and practices, cannot be underestimated. It is based on moral convictions; notwithstanding the obligatory nature of the wearing of the veil (hejab), wearing it signifies the rejection of fesad, corruption signified by social disorder. In this way, it legitimates the presence of women in the public sphere.

After the Iran-Iraq war and with the politics of liberalization led by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rasfanjani, the presence of women in public space grew throughout the 1990s. Once again,

the decisive contributing factors were socioeconomic, including increased women's access to education, accelerated urbanization, the spectacular transition to lower birth rates (Ladier 2003), and, facilitated by the economic crisis, women's role in informal trade with the other Gulf states, Turkey, and Syria, often combined with pilgrimages to holy places (Adelkhah 1999). The salient feature of these practices was the nearly systematic blend of trading activities—mostly in contraband—with religious and welfare ones.

In these contexts, translation into politics was almost inevitable. After 1979, Parliament had only a handful of women (only four women deputies in the first three legislatures of 1980, 1984, and 1988), and in the government women were noted for their absence. The turning point was the 1996 parliamentary elections. Women candidates were more plentiful than before (82 in 1992, 324 in 1996—and 504 in 2000). During the campaign, women were highly active and often formed "propaganda fronts" (setadhah-ye tablighati) that paralleled those that men organized. This mobilization was not limited to the large cities. Finally, the electoral campaign in 1996 was marked by unexpectedly strong support for certain candidates, such as Jamileh Kadivar, Nahid Shid, Bibik Qodsyeh Alavi, Elaheh Rastgou, Iran Ahou Riya, and Faezeh Hashemi (Adelkhah 1998: 138–39). By her spirited style even more than her status as daughter of the president of the Republic, Hashemi Rasfanjami became a media presence and gave a new look to Islamic feminism. In the end, the results of the balloting did not equal the visibility of the candidates and the intensity of the electoral campaigns that they conducted, since only twelve women were elected. But the roughnecks of the populist organization nostalgic for the original revolutionary values, the Ansar-e Hizbollah, recognized the significance of the strong showing for women. Several weeks after the second round of balloting, they attacked women bicycling in Tchitgar Park, which was opened to them for recreation by Tehran's reform-minded neighbor, Gholamhossein Karbastshi, politically close to Faezeh Hashemi.

The local elections of February 1999, the first of their kind since the revolution, confirmed for the first time that women were fully exercising their rights under universal suffrage, The number of women candidates rose to 7,000 out of a total of 300,000. This number may appear small, but the political significance was real. In spite of the disproportionately low numbers of female compared to male candidates, women became candidates in the holy cities, remote provinces, and rural areas—for example, Qom, Sistan-Baluchistan, Hormozgan, and Khuzistan—confirming that the social or political participation of the "second sex" was not merely an appendage of the large metropolitan areas or the privileged classes. Only 781 women were elected (out of a total of 200,000 municipal councilors), but this should not negate the fact that women's political participation has taken root in society. Out of 781 women elected, 484 were from rural regions.

We stress that this change in women's status has been brought about by transformations in the "objective" conditions of women— employment opportunities, education, reduction of birth rates—and by a lively press and publication opportunities for women. Likewise, women represent more than 40 percent of the student body of universities and have obtained a more than 60 percent success rate in university entrance examinations since 2000.

Under pressure from the participation of women in society, political and legal debates concerning them, and women's specific cultural contributions, including those in the religious field, men's discourse has had to change. Ayatollah Khomeini, who challenged the legitimacy of the right to vote that the Shah gave to women in 1963, did not reopen the issue after the Islamic revolution and regularly received delegations of women. Nowadays no one has doubts about the necessity for women to participate in social and political life, not even the conservatives. Whatever their political inclinations, politicians and administrators have women as collaborators and advisers, and they deal with issues concerning women like any other public issue. They do not evade the obligatory discussion of the role of women in the Islamic Republic, celebrating the annual women's day that coincides with the anniversary of the Prophet's daughter, Fatima, and giving awards to "outstanding" women. As for women, theoretically exercising their civic rights as equals of men, it is noteworthy that none of the clerics has tried to enforce within the Parliament a rule that female votes shall count for half that of men, since the Qur"an states that woman's testimony is worth half of that of a man (Ebadi and Zeymaran 1375/1996).

The Islamic Republic is built around a balance. It recognizes and even promotes the social and political discourse of women, which is omnipresent in its discourse, even in its silences, but strict limits are imposed on them at the same time. One limit is veiling, which no one officially calls into question. Its sacred character is the regime's last defense, both in terms of domestic and international politics.

*** The Questions of Women and the Contingencies of the Political Order

The municipal elections of 1999 and the parliamentary elections of 2000 showed the weakness of the women's movement, including the strictly Islamic one mentioned earlier. Recall that women were only 781 of 200,000 candidates, less that one percent, in the 1999 elections. The 2000 Parliament had only thirteen women, as opposed to fourteen in the prior session and, even more troublesome, these are all teachers and doctors. Six of them are from Tehran, and the others from the major regional cities with the exception of a delegate from Dashtestan in Boushehr province. What appears as an element of progress in the view of some observers—the fact that these deputies belong to the reform movement—in our view shows instead how narrow is the social representation of politically active women. At the same time, women show themselves highly active in other domains, including informal business, certain service professions, in welfare activities, and in religious ones. There is no woman, however, who has been minister in the government for the more than twenty years since the revolution, even if since Hashemi Rafsanjani the presidency of the Republic has had women advisors; there are no women prefects, mayors, or diplomats, even if no law blocks this possibility. Finally, women continue socially and often juridically to be subject to discriminatory practices that the Committee on Human Rights of the United Nations calls into question year after year.

In this respect, Mohammad Khatami has done no better than his predecessors, and he has not adopted for women's rights the same words and deeds that have characterized his reformist activities in other fields. In his words, women remain idealized in the image of the Prophet's daughter, Fatima Zahra. Women are encouraged to be mothers and guarantors of the well-being of the society that men continue to manage. The leftist press is very timid on this theme. If it took part in the juridical debates in favor of improving women's status, or rather that of mothers, it has refrained from arguing such issues in explicitly political terms. It has shown no fear in opening debate on the constitutional principle of the government by clerics (velayat-e faqih), but it is silent concerning the obligation of veiling, which is stipulated neither by the constitution nor by law.

The feminist movement, including Islamic feminists, is not politically autonomous, and female political candidates are not emancipated from the factional struggles that remain dominated by men. In this context, the reformers continue to ask women to scrupulously wear the hejab and to show moderation in their demands to avoid giving ammunition to their adversaries. The conservatives stress strict adherence to veiling in order to set themselves apart from the political tendencies that from their perspective betray the revolutionary principals of the Islamic Republic. Taking into account how the factions loyal to the regime ejected the independents imposed on them by the 1996 elections, and again in the 1999 elections, it is easy to doubt that a specifically female political voice can take hold at the core of the existing political institutions. The determination of those holding on to power to protect "the honor of the system"—according to the consecrated formula, that is, its unity—leaves little place for a more gender-balanced politics.

Politically active women are themselves ambiguous in this regard. The principle of hejab appears internalized and sustains a near-unanimous adherence. The declarations of the most prominent women candidates in the February 2000 elections illustrate this. On the question of whether the hejab could be the subject of a referendum, Jamileh Kadivar, the woman with the second strongest showing on the Tehran electoral list, told us: "On the basic idea of the hejab, absolutely not, but as to its exact form, there has never been full agreement. Today you can find many forms of hejab. The deputies who were elected were chosen on the basis of their religious faith. They are believers and do not want to call into question such a basic Islamic principle" (interview with the author, February 2000). Moreover, a main current in Islamic feminism, represented particularly by Mrs. Taleghani and her magazine, Payam-e Hajar, explicitly challenges a gender-based approach that, from her point of view, marginalizes women by distancing them from the real social problems.

At the extreme, the social and political participation of women also emanates from elaborating on the famed "honor of the system," rather than subverting it. The feminist movement does not go beyond its cliches and rituals. The political liberalization that unleashed social debate in so many other domains has not really addressed women's issues. The hejab question, which does not contradict a real movement, and which is largely accepted since it has created a "thrust"— as it is often worded—between sexes, is

nowadays stuck in a narrow but legitimate conception of women's condition. It has not permitted more "audacious" claims. Under the veil, women are confined to tactical issues and have not succeeded in developing a genuine "strategy" specific to them. In certain ways, Faezeh Hashemi, in stressing participation in sports and new forms of hejab better suited to a modern, active life and contemporary tastes, has obliquely felt the importance of the women's movement and the need to transform the status of women. However, in the heat of the February 2000 electoral campaign, the significance of her activities was lost. The principle of the hejab is always susceptible to being used by men as a means to delegitimize women's conduct, as the former are reluctant to give up their privileged status. Some say that this is evidence that the hejab creates social exclusion. But a complication stems from the fact that historically there never was an exact time in the history of Iran when the hejab did exclude women, and to the contrary, hejab favored the access of women to the public sphere, often against the will of their father, husband, brothers, and some religious authorities. Many religious dignitaries consider the presence of women in the public sphere, raising their fists outside their chador, shouting slogans, and marching alongside men as the epitome of corruption, leading society directly to the gates of hell. We emphasize this point. It is only after having provided room for the massive presence of women in the social realm that the hejab as a mobilizing tool was neutralized because of the internal weakness of the women's movement, the escalating political crisis, the war, and the resulting coercive policy of the regime.

This seeming contradiction between first encouraging the participation of women in public life and the subsequent hardening of the regime against women's rights dissipates by looking at a case study, the electoral district of Fariman in the Khorassan region, where we observed the 1996 legislative elections. In February 2000, we did not see women participating in the core electoral activities, as we witnessed in the "propaganda fronts" four years earlier. In 1996, of course, there was no woman candidate in this town, which was largely conservative and traditionally-minded in spite of a solid leftist presence. In this context the candidacy in 2000 of Amenah Beyraghdar—the sister of a martyr, married, and in charge of religious training in a secondary school—could appear to reaffirm the general tendency of the growing political presence of women. The circumstances of her participation, however, make us hesitate to reach this conclusion. Hossein Ghazizadeh, historically the leftist leader in the region, asked several of his supporters to declare themselves candidates in order to replace him in case the Council of the Guardians of the Constitution prohibited him from running. Amenah Beyraghdar was one of these surrogate candidates.

The Council of Guardians denied Ghazizadeh the right to run in the election. He asked for Jafar Afghani to represent him and campaigned for him. Mrs. Beyraghdar chose nonetheless to remain in the race, hoping to keep the left alive and take advantage of its networks. Despite her courage, dynamism, and family support—her husband went so far as to sell his house in order to pay her campaign expenses—she found herself isolated. The local notables refused to endorse her campaign and instead supported Jafar Afghani or, rather, the virtual candidate that he represented, Hossein Ghazizadeh. Lacking financial support and campaign workers, she had trouble making her voice heard. Moreover, to limit campaign costs, the

electoral law limits the number of campaign posters that a candidate can post in small towns. It was not possible for women to meet with men, so women stayed away from campaign rallies, limiting their activities solely to women’s religious meetings (jaleseh) and family visits.

Moreover, the Fariman electoral district includes the electoral district of Sarakhs, mostly Sunni, noted for violent incidents pitting farm workers against one of the most powerful institutions of the Republic, the pious foundation (vaqf) of the Astan-e Qods, which today manages a free-trade zone devoted to the transit of goods between Dubai and Central Asia. It was unthinkable for a woman candidate to campaign four hours away from her home and to sleep in communal places such as mosques, where men were able to stay. As an anthropologist, I also had problems of this sort in following the electoral campaign. The candidates did not think of offering me a place in their vehicles and immediately raised the objection that I would have no place to stay or I would be in the company of men. Women were unable to compete as equals outside the main towns. At the most, they campaigned by proxy, through their male relatives.

In the light of the low number of votes obtained by the majority of female candidates, we can ask whether the real objective of the candidacy of some of them was to gain recognition in order to improve their professional standing, especially in the state educational system, or to acquire symbolic capital for other goals. Nonetheless, the obstacles that women face in electoral politics derive less from Islam or current legislation than from economic constraints, local customs, and factional rivalries among local notables in contexts profoundly marked by the control of property and people.

These conditions are different from those prevailing in the larger towns. Even in this context, however, Islamic feminism lacks wide- ranging leaders, with the exception, for a brief period, of Faezeh Hashemi, who was defeated in the last elections. She may have paid for her audacity, or perhaps was a collateral victim of the violent campaign targeted against her father. Would Faezeh Hashimi have won in 1996, or been defeated in 2000, if she had not been the daughter of the president of the Republic? Can we not say the same of Jamileh Kadivar, the wife of Ayatollah Mohajerani, the highly visible minister of guidance and Islamic culture, and sister of the dissident theologian Mohsen Kadivar? They did not rely on family support alone, but it is clear that their activities were facilitated by family connections, making their candidacy different from that of candidates without such a base.

*** Conclusion: I Get Around, Therefore I Am

In sum, the social participation of women, for which the Islamic Republic remains the paradoxical vehicle, remains largely outside of politics. Above all it reflects the structural mutations of Iranian society, such as urbanization, schooling, the opening of the labor market to women because of the crisis, and the professional segregation of sexes as in

health and national education. It is only marginally dependent on political ideology in the strict sense of the term, in spite of the role that women played in the 1979 revolution and the stereotyped homage regularly offered to them. Women's energies are directed instead to informal commerce, welfare activities, and the religious sector, ending fourteen centuries of male monopoly on religious expression.

In practice, the Islamic state is shaped largely by surviving traditional norms capable of reproducing or accommodating local elites and major social forces. These Islamic principles have a highly flexible relation to concrete social practices. The difficulties that Iranian women encounter are due less to the ideology or legislation of the Islamic Republic, which are constantly reformulated, than to the heavy hand of cultural structures and representations that encourage conformity.

From this perspective, the democratic process in turn reflects ambivalence about women's conditions in Iran. The implementation of a genuine Islamic democracy depends more on the inclusion of women in debates about democracy than on the factional fights and rivalries of an elite concerned with safeguarding the "honor of the system" that favors their interests. One of the challenges facing the Islamic Republic is the adaptation of its institutions and forms of political transformation to very rapid social transformations. The women's movement is one such movement, and soon it will have to be recognized politically. Mrs. Beyraghdar placed the following slogan in the space reserved for her posters in the main square of Fariman: "We do not want guardians." Her slogan could be taken to mean Jafar Afghahi standing in as a candidate for Hossein Ghazi- zadeh. But her allusion to other forms of guardianship—of notables over political life and men over women—was clear. Mrs. Beyraghdar was defeated electorally, but she called social norms and power relations into question, calling for an end to the male monopoly on the political scene of this small, conservative provincial town.

This movement of women has hardly had an impact on the political sphere. Nevertheless, its erosion of the guardianship powers of men over women must be taken seriously. It is above all a movement in the strict physical sense of the term, and most of the social practices of women in the private sphere, as in the public one, affirm it. In contemporary Iran, women travel unsupervised from one place to another and sometimes over long distances. Their right to drive automobiles has never been challenged and many do so, especially in large towns. Elsewhere they move about, generally in groups, both in Iran and in neighboring countries, visiting religious shrines, trading, touring, and visiting family. These images of women traveling alone or together among towns, taking the bus to Damascus, or forming contraband "caravans" are common today, reflecting a largely new situation compared to twenty years ago. Such movement among women benefits several types of economic activity, including travel agencies, transport companies, and hotels. Men's guardianship of women is absent de facto, although the rule requiring a husband's or father's authorization to travel abroad is still in effect.

In addition, women active in the formal or informal market place high value on activities requiring such movement and on the social visibility of their customers. Many women have opened beauty salons and body-building studios or become dressmakers, video photographers of family occasions, cosmetic sellers, or teachers, health workers, and salespeople. It is ironic to note that Islamic morality and regulations have rehabilitated, legitimated, and systematized women's employment in many of these domains. But it is even more important to recognize the fact that these women are now in the workforce, making it easier for other women to do the same. Clothing, beauty products, and sports celebrate women's activities and presence in public. In this respect, the women's social movement becomes a series of "embodiments" (Marcel Mauss) learned by apprenticeship and that facilitate women's socialization. This is crucial, as these practices are not limited to particular places, times, or specific social categories. They have become facts that assure the presence and visibility of women in the public sphere.

Movement, the body, and words about women's bodies and practices and their relation to others are all matters of concern in these activities. This is in terms not only of public policies set into motion by the state but also of personal activities and claims. The fact that this women's movement takes place and is "registration phobic"— by definition contraband activities and also most of the service activities in which women participate are without administrative authorization or the paying of taxes—is no reason to underestimate their importance. They form part of a continuity of Islamic feminism from the first years of the Republic and in some ways consecrate the movement, even if their specific Islamic and revolutionary form has been largely dissipated or made banal. There decidedly has not been a stalemate of political Islam (Roy 1994). To the contrary, it has spread far beyond the narrow circle of the first generation of militants. These are not the only activists; ordinary women also are. It is true that the social mobilization of women is for a large part limited to the private sphere rather than politics or trading. This is for good reason: women's inequality before the law occurs essentially only in the sections of the civil code pertaining to the family, notably in matters of divorce, the custody of children, polygamy, parental or marital authority, and succession. (The disposition of the penal code concerning "blood money," in which the value placed on a woman's life is much less than a man's, fortunately concerns only few women!) With these exceptions, women enjoy the same rights as men, particularly in the domain of business.

That which appears as a shortcoming—the fact that women's mobilization is occurring in the private sphere—actually shields them from regime control and coercion. This is because the regime respects the private sphere and because the women's movement thus averts political confrontation. In contrast men, who have priority in public space, are more vulnerable, as is shown by the offensive of the Ministry of Justice against reformers, including their newspapers and their candidacy in different elections. We should not underestimate the potential for change emanating from transformations in informal economic and social activities, including those in the private sphere, as some historians see in the origins of the French revolution (Chartier 1991). Without assuming that the same factors are at play in Iran, we can nonetheless see in the women's movement one of the basic vectors of change, less spectacular but more effective than many explicit social movements. Anthony Giddens poses this crucial question, more important to our eyes than

any other gloss defining social movements: “Is the expansion of a diversity of different forms of organization—in which the conditions of reproduction are reflexively monitored—a medium of emancipation from preestablished modes of exploitative domination?” (Giddens 1984: 206). The movement of

Iranian women today meets this criterion, at least in part, because it is progressively setting into motion a codification of rules and even laws, a necessary if not sufficient condition for democracy to take hold.

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** Glossary

Terms are defined according to local usage. Many terms, especially religious ones, appear in slightly different form in each of the major languages of the Middle East and Asia; not all variants are given here. Spellings, consequently, often reflect local usage and not the conventions of the major literary languages. Pages where the terms are explained in context are indicated below. A = Arabic; T = Turkish; H = Hindi; U = Urdu; P = Persian.

<biblio>

adab (A), adab (T): advice literature, 18, 122

akhlaq (A): morality, 145

‘Alawn (A), Alevi (T): Shi’i religious sect found in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, 183, 192

‘alim, pl. ‘iilama’ (A): knowledgeable person; religious scholar, 3, 21, 38–39, 54, 59, 62—64, 67, 121, 129—53, 157—76, 191—92, 194

‘aqila (A): family, kin, or tribe or any group of agnatic relatives corporately liable to pay blood money under sharia; in general, party to a legal dispute for blood money, 143

baraka (A): grace, supernatural blessing; abundance, especially as transmitted by a Sufi shaykh, 194, 198—99

Ba’th (A): literally “awakening”, name of the ruling socialist-oriented nationalist party in Syria (and, with separate leadership, in Iraq until March 2003), 13, 102, 182—83, 185, 187—90, 192

batini (A): hidden, concealed; esoteric, 186, 195

bay^ca (A): oath of allegiance given to a Sufi shaykh, or to a caliph or, as in Morocco, a religiously legitimized monarch, 3—5

bida (A): unlawful ritual innovation, 166, 191, 194

garaf (T): veil donned by women, as mark of the private; literally “sheet” of fabric, 110—11, 115, 117, 120—21

darshan (H): sacred seeing, 44—46

darura (A): necessity, requirement, according to sharia, 136

Dar ul-Islam (T): the abode of Islam, the territories inhabited by Muslim majorities and governed by Muslim rulers under the sharia, 112

dawa (A): outreach, proselityzing, 62, 64

dhikr (A): Sufi practice of mystical evocation, consisting in the repetition of certain words or phrases in praise of God, 195–98

diya (A): blood money for personal injury under sharia, 142–44

edibane (T): cultured and civilized, modern and progressive, 106, 123
fana fi-llah (A): dissolution in God, final stage of the Sufi path, 186 fatwa (A): legal opinion delivered by an expert upon a legal question, 59–60, 63, 149—50, 157—58, 161, 163—65, 169—73, 177

fesad (P): corruption, 231

hadith (A): saying or deed of the Prophet Muhammad, 191

hadra (A): mystical gathering of a Sufi brotherhood, 193

hal, pl. ahwal (A): mystical state of exaltation, 195

halal (A): Islamic legal category meaning “lawful,” “permitted,” 212

hejab (P): veil or headscarf, 229

hodja (T): religious leader, 117

haqiqa (A): divine reality; absolute truth; God, 186

hijra (A): flight, migration, including the Prophet’s migration from Mecca to Madina, 209

hubb (A): (divine) love, 188, 194

‘ibadat (A): religious obligations, mainly concerning liturgical practice, 161

ijaza (A): license to teach, or to initiate a Sufi group, 164

ijma^ (A): consensus among ‘ulama’, 223

ijtihad (A): procedure in Islamic jurisprudence consisting in creative reasoning in light of the foundational texts to arrive at new rulings, 62, 138

imam (A): ruler; also spiritual leader; prayer leader, 95, 135, 192, 218, 229

Islam hukumat (U): Islamic government, 138

jaleseh (P): women’s religious meetings, 228, 236

kadi (T): judge, 90

kafir (A): unbeliever, 157

karamat (A): miraculous deeds, 194, 198—99

khalifa (A): deputy of a Sufi master; also caliph, 185

khalwa (A): Sufi practice of retreat from the world, 197

kufr (A): disbelief; heresy, 157, 162, 168—73

madhhab, pl. madhahib (A): legal school, 193

madrasa (A): Islamic college, usually attached to a mosque, 10—11, 38, 53—54, 59, 137—38, 142, 146

Majalla (A), (T): Ottoman codification of civil law based on the Hanafi legal school (1869—76), 135

maqam (A): each mystical stage reached by a disciple of a Sufi master, 194

marumakkathayam (Malayalam): a system of matrilineal descent and inheritance found in south India, 168

maslaha (plural: masalih); maslaha ‘amma (A): public interest, 131, 149 muhassil (T): centrally appointed tax collector, 89–90

mukhabarat (A): intelligence services, 183

murid (A): disciple of a Sufi master, 182, 186, 197

murshid (A): Sufi master, 182

nafs (A): self; soul, 186, 196–97

pravacan (H): sermon, 44

qalb (A): heart; physical source of love; corporeal link with God, 195 qisas (A): law of retaliation under sharia (lex talionis), 142–43

rabeteh (P): clientelism, 228

salafiyya (A): Islamic reform movement, 184, 187, 192–93, 203

sancak (T): administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire, 88

sangathan (H): (Hindu) unity, 45

satsang (H): devotional gathering, 44

shahada (A): declaration of faith, 173, 206

sharia (A): the revealed, or canonical, law of Islam, 12–13, 41, 131–47, 150, 152, 161–63, 168, 185, 187, 192—95

shastrarta (H): religious polemic, 48

shaykh (A): religious leader; Sufi master; (lay) personality endowed with social and sometimes charismatic power, 11, 15, 21, 27, 38, 60, 63—64, 71, 166, 168, 171, 184—86, 188, 190—201, 203

Shi’i (A): belonging to a major subdivision in Islam that only recognizes as legitimate the authority of the descendants of the Prophet through the lineage of ‘All and his successors, the imams, 183

shirk (A): impiety consisting in associating with God, “polytheism,” 166, 194

shravaka (H): “listener,” Jain devotee, 43

sidq (A): righteousness, 193

Sunni (A): belonging to the mainstream, orthodox division in Islam that recognizes as legitimate the authority of the consensus within the religious community: some 90 percent of the world’s Muslims are Sunni, 59, 63, 149, 155, 173, 193, 237

sura (A): chapter of the Qur”an, 162, 220

takfr (A): accusation of heresy, 157, 169, 172

tariqa, pl. turuq (A): mystical path, Sufi order, 161, 164, 168, 191—92, 194

taqlid (A): adherence to the established doctrines of one’s own school of law, 138, 155

tarbiyya (A): (mystical) upbringing, initiation, 195

tasawwuf (A): Sufism, Islamic mysticism, 200

tawba (A): repentance, 193

tesettur (T): veiling, 110, 116

vaqf (P): pious foundation, 237

velayat-e faqih (P): constitutional principal of government by clerics in

the Islamic Republic of Iran, 234

waZ (A): sermon, 210

Wahhabi (A): followers of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, more properly known as al-Muwahhidun, or “the Unitarians,” 64

wall (A): saint, 191

wall al-amr (A): ruler, 134

wasta (A): personal mediation; intercession, 183

wird (A): mystical devotional formula, 195, 197

zabeteh (P): rule of law, 228

Zahirl (A): manifest, external, unconcealed, exoteric, legalistic; generally opposed to batinl, 186, 189, 194

zawiya (A): Sufi lodge, 182, 190, 193

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[1] Horkheimer refused to accept Habermas's The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere as a Habilitationsschrift, so Habermas submitted it instead in Marburg under Wolfgang Abendroth. See Calhoun 1992: 1–5.

[2] Habermas (1973) has sharply criticized Koselleck's view that totalitarianism finds its roots in the dialectic between absolutism and Enlightenment critique.

[3] The documents in question are located in the Cevdet classification and the (radeler (1255–1309 Yillari (radeleri, Dahiliye—herafter ID) section of the Prime Ministry's Ottoman Archives in Istanbul, Turkey. The documents in the Cevdet classification are neither signed nor dated. Their contents reveal, however, that they were produced in 1840 and 1841. The documents in the (radeler section are catalogued with a date and cover the period between 1840 and 1845. The specific reports used in this article are cited in the following pages.

[4] My goal is not to prove the existence of "public opinion," but to trace its working through individual opinions uttered in the public sphere in the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. The notions of "public" and "public opinion" are contested notions in recent historical literature. Especially after Habermas's (1989 [1962]) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, these terms have come to acquire a meaning related to the development of the notions of democracy and citizenship. The relationship between the state and "public opinion" as posed by Habermas is essentially an antagonistic one. Influenced by Habermas, historians, in particular those of eighteenth-century France, have almost unanimously agreed that public opinion emerged as a powerful force in the second half of the eighteenth century in Western Europe, which is characterized by the growing literacy, developing press, and people's increasing awareness about politics. They argue that it is from this antagonistic relationship that political consciousness developed and transformed the established order by reform or revolution. The elusive nature of the notion

of public opinion, however, may lead to serious anachronisms (Gunn 1995: 6–7; Kaiser 1998: 189–206) not only in arriving at an understanding of the development of democracy and citizenship in Europe but also in understanding the relevance of these concepts in Ottoman political culture. First, since the term is strongly associated with the birth of a literary public in eighteenth-century Europe, the existence of public opinion in Ottoman society and in the rest of the world alike is implicitly ignored. Second, the discussion that frames the notion of "public opinion" tends to equate the emergence of the concept with the criticism of absolutism in Europe. For examples of the abundant literature on the development and politicization of public opinion in France, see Ozouf 1988; Baker 1990, esp. 167—99; Baker 1992; Chartier 1991; Darnton 1995, esp. 232—46; Darnton 2000; Farge 1995; and Gunn 1995. For England, see Gunn 1983. For Germany, see Bodecker 1990.

[5] I have come across only one instance involving punishment, ID 1038 (September 28, 1840). However, the punishment was not given because of political sedition or insolent talk about the higher state officials, but because the persons mentioned in the report were soldiers. The case involved a military servant who shot a captain in the hand over a prostitute. A note written just above the report orders the transfer of the matter to Daruura-i Askeriye (Military Council) for the proper punishment of the soldiers involved.

[6] By print culture, I refer to the compound of economic and intellectual capital and, for the purposes of this chapter, the producers and consumers of print materials, state regulation or attempted regulation of publication and circulation of print materials, and the active formation of debates among publishers, journalists, illustrators, and their readers.

[7] Mansbridge and Calhoun are both concerned with examining the implications of the fact that "public good" is a contested concept (Mansbridge 1998) and that it ought to be seen as a "social and cultural project" (Calhoun 1998). Whether or how "public good" is to be differentiated from the "common good" is itself a matter of some disagreement among sociologists, though the distinctions are not crucial for my discussion in this chapter. Suffice it to note that, although my discussion of the common good is indebted to Mansbridge and Calhoun, it does not presuppose the identity of the common and the public good any more than it presumes the concurrence of Mansbridge and Calhoun with how I draw on some of their insights in examining the thought of the contemporary 'ulama.

[8] I am indebted to Weiss 1998: 116 and passim for the formulation "foundational texts." For helpful discussions of the five fundamental values or "purposes" of the sharfa, see Weiss 1998: 78–87, 145–71; Hallaq 1997: 89–90, 112–13, 168–74. On "inductive corroboration," see Hallaq 1997: 166–70.

[9] For a study of maslaha in medieval juristic thought, with detailed attention to Tufi and Shatibi (among others), see Opwis 2001. For the text of Tufi's treatise on

maslaha, see Zayd 1964: 205–240. Among legal theorists who attended to maslaha prior to Tufi and Shatibi was the famous jurist al-Ghazali. For his discussion of maslaha, see al-Ghazali 1995, I: 257–66.

[10] Rida published Tufi's work on maslaha in his journal, al-Manar, in 1906 (see Kerr 1966: 206; and cf. Zayd 1964: 194). He also edited and published al-Shatibi's al-Ftisam (Shatibi 1914).

[11] For a pioneering overview of the significance of al-Qaradawi, see Salvatore (1997: 197–209). '

[12] For a brief description of this series, see Qaradawi (2001: 5–9; the quotation describing the purpose of the series is from 5.

[13] Qaradawi does, however, mention Rida in other writings, and with approval.

[14] Qaradawi's position here is no less circular than was Rida's on the question of how disagreement on the interpretation of the foundational texts was to be resolved. Such disagreement, he had suggested, ought to be resolved with reference to those texts themselves (see Kerr 1966: 201).

[15] Deobandi 'ulama—whose designation derives from their association with the parent madrasa at Deoband, founded in 1867, or with any of the thousands of other Deobandi madrasas in South Asia—represent one of the major religious orientations in modern South Asia. On the Deobandi 'ulama and their discourses and politics in contemporary South Asia, see Zaman 2002.

[16] On the different ways in which the 'ulama, the modernists, and the Islamists view the Islamic tradition, see Zaman 2002: 3–11, 31–37. On the difficult relations between the modernists and the 'ulama in Pakistan, see ibid., 74–93.

[17] For the provisions of the law of qisas and diya, put into effect through sections 299-338H of the Pakistan Penal Code in 1993, see Waqar-ul-Haq 1994.

[18] For Qaradawi's discussion of "entertainment and the arts," see 1996: 265–76; on music, 277–312; on pictorial arts, 313–30; on humor and comedy, 331–45; and on sports, 347–51.

[19] For an account of the rivalries and the contestation among the Shi'i 'ulama, with particular reference to Mutada al^adr, one of the most strident of the Shi'i leaders to emerge with the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, see the six-part series by al-Amin 2003.

[20] On the mosque preachers, see: al-Hayat, April 19, 2003; ibid., June 28, 2003.

[21] One of the consequences of the application of the Shari'at Act in India was that customary practices "contrary" to the sharfa were legally abolished. Given that the system of descent and inheritance on many of the islands is a complex mix of matrilineal (marumakkathayam) and Islamic law, any application of the Shari'at Act would have serious social and legal consequences.

[22] Both Metcalf (1982) and Sanyal (1996) note that a prominent part of the fatwa wars between factions of nineteenth-century 'ulama were these accusations of kufr, but neither isolates takfir as a common strategy.

[23] The data used in this text were collected during sixteen months of field research from 1999 to 2001 at Arab and Kurdish Sufi zdwiyas in Aleppo and in the villages of the Kurd Dagh region of northern Syria. For an account of this research, see Pinto (2002).

[24] The 'Alawi are a Shi'i sect that comprises an estimated 15 percent of the Syrian population. Many Sunni Muslims regard their beliefs and practices as heretic. The Asad family and a large portion of Syria's political and military elite are 'Alawi (Chouet 1995: 106–11).

[25] The Muslim Brothers, an Islamic political movement founded in Egypt in 1928, combined Sufi conceptions of truth and authority with Salafi religious doctrines (Mitchell 1969: 14; Geoffroy 1997: 12—13).

[26] The number of victims varies with the sources of each author. Hanna Batatu (1988: 129) attributes the lower figure (5,000) to Western diplomats and the higher one (25,000) to eyewitnesses of the massacre. Umar Abd-Allah (1983: 192) estimates the number of deaths as 25,000. Nikolaos van Dam (1996: 111) estimates between 5,000 and 25,000 victims, suggesting that the higher figure is probably more accurate.

[27] I thank professor Nasr Abu Zayd for his insightful comments on my paper in the Fourth International Conference on Islamic Legal Studies on May 2003 in Murcia, Spain, highlighting

the parallels between the secular transcendance of the Ba’th party and the mysticism of the Sufi path.

[28] Sa’id Hawa accepted the religious reality of baraka, but he considered that the ‘ulama had social primacy over the Sufi shaykhs (Hawa 1979: 219—20).

[29] Agence France Presse, March 27, 2003.

[30] For examples of such debates in the precolonial period, see Mahibou and Triaud 1983 and Hunwick 1996. For discussion of one such debate under French colonial rule, see Soares and Hunwick 1996.

[31] Many from the region can be found at the Centre de Documentation et de Recherches Ahmad Baba in Timbuktu and in private collections. See Hunwick 2003 for an extensive list of some of the extant documents and published works from the region.

[32] On French colonial policy toward Islam and Muslims in West Africa, see Harrison 1988; Launay and Soares 1999; Robinson and Triaud 1997; Brenner 2000; and Soares 1997, 2000b.

[33] Certain Muslims did migrate, for example, to the Middle East. See Ould Cheikh 2000 for a discussion of a West African living in Palestine who condemned West African Muslims for accepting life under French “infidel” rule.

[34] Seydou Nourou Tall’s colonial-era activities are discussed in documents throughout colonial archives in Mali, Senegal, and France. See, for example, the collection of documents compiled upon his behalf in the Archives Nationales du Senegal (Dakar), 19G 43(108), Oeuvres de Seydou Nourou Tall en AOF, 1923—1948. For discussions of his career, see Garcia 1994, 1997; Soares 1997; and Seesemann and Soares n.d.

[35] See, for example, Archives Nationales du Mali, Koulouba (hereafter ANM), 4E 2382 (I) Traduction des conseils donnes par El Hadj Seydou Nourou Tall a tous les musulmans, June 25, 1941.

[36] See Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France (hereafter CAOM), 1 Aff. Pol. 2259/4, L’Islam au Soudan, Rapports Trimestriels 1954.

[37] Documents in ANM and CAOM list many cases from the twentieth century that are too numerous to mention here. For example, see CAOM 75 APOM 4/4, Haut-Senegal-Niger, Internement de Fode Ismai'la et consorts, Rapport, September 25, 1911. Early published colonial accounts include some of Paul Marty's writings (for example, Marty 1920), whereas later colonial accounts include one of Griaule's rare discussions of the spread of Islam in West Africa (1949) and Cardaire 1954. See also Manley 1997.

[38] See, for example, ANM, 1B 150, Letter, Fama Mademba, Sansanding, to the Administrator, Segou, April 23, 1909. I am grateful to Richard Roberts for bringing this document to my attention.

[39] See, for example, CAOM 1 Aff. Pol. 2259/4, Soudan franpais, Direction Locale des Affaires Politiques (hereafter Aff. Pol.), Bulletin No. 2 (Confidential), November 1953, "Note sur l'Islam au Macina."

[40] Since such "traditions" are often not public or are only semipublic, the analytical optic of "counterpublics" is arguably applicable here.

[41] On the hajj', see Cardaire 1954 and Chailley 1962.

[42] For example, in the late 1940s, a new organization, Fraternite Musulmane (founded in 1936), organized "des reunions publiques ou les memes themes de morale, sociale et religieuse, sont developpes: condamnation du gaspillage a propos de manage; union des musulmans, respect du Coran; condamnation de la fre- quentation des salles de bal." See CAOM, 1 Aff. Pol. 2259/1, L'Islam en AOF, Aff. Pol. Musulmanes, Rapport Trim., 2d & 3d trim., 1948. These same themes are among those discussed by many Muslim associations in Mali today.

[43] See CAOM, 1 Aff. Pol. 2259/1, Aff. Pol. Musulmanes, Rapport Trim., 2d trim., 1950; see also Kane 1997: 447ff. for a discussion of Mahmud Ba's preaching from the 1940s onward, and Brenner 2000.

[44] See CAOM 1 Aff. Pol. 2259/1, L'Islam en AOF, Aff. Pol. Musulmanes, Rapport, 2d & 3d trim. 1948.

[45] See, for example, CAOM 1 Aff. Pol. 2259/1, Aff. Pol. Musulmanes, Rapport Trim., 3d trim., 1950.

[46] During the colonial period in West Africa, French colonial administrators used “Wahhabi” rather loosely to refer to “reformist” Muslims, and this terminology continues to be used there today in both French and in the region’s vernaculars. On such “reformists” in Mali, see Kaba 1974; Hames 1980; Amselle 1985; Triaud 1986; Niezen 1990; Brenner 1993, 2000; Soares 1997; and Hock 1999.

[47] Mali’s first postcolonial socialist regime of Modibo Keita disbanded the UCM. Following the overthrow of the regime in 1968, the UCM was allowed to reorganize, but disbanded a second time in 1971. On the UCM in Soudan/Mali, see Kaba 1974 and Amselle 1985.

[48] See Brenner’s discussion of the colonial-backed “counterreform movement” (2000). There were also other Muslim intellectuals whose perspectives might be called pro-French “modernist” Muslim.

[49] This formulation of a Muslim community has been influenced by van der Veer’s (1994) discussion of religious nationalism in India.

[50] This is not in any way to suggest the existence of anything like the African Islam (“Islam noir”) of the colonial imagination.

[51] The debate about “orthopraxy” in Islam is relevant here. Cf. Smith 1957; Asad 1986; and Eickelman 1989a.

[52] See Chailley (1962: 29–31) for a discussion of a case from the mid-1950s when groups of Soninke and Toucouleur founded their own mosque in Bamako rather than accept an imam who was Bambara. I learned about similar contemporary cases during field research.

[53] Such knowledge and its use are no less important to what it means to be Muslim for many whose lives are increasingly associated with the modern—here higher rates of literacy and secular schooling.

[54] Some of the Malian newspaper coverage of Haidara and his followers include Sidibe 1993; Traore 1996; Coulibaly 1999, 2000; and Diarra 2003. He is invariably mentioned as among the country’s most influential preachers in recent newspaper coverage of “Islamic” issues in Mali.

[55] In 1999, Haidara told me that he had been making sermons on audiocassettes for more than sixteen years.

[56] See Ahmed 1981, who discusses low-status Bengali Muslims whose strategies of “upward mobility” included claiming descent from high-status Muslim groups in Bengal and emulating their practices. I am grateful to Naveeda Khan for bringing this source to my attention.

[57] Cf. Salvatore’s discussion of “staging virtue” in Egypt (1998) and Hirschkind on the ethics of listening (2001).

[58] Dale F. Eickelman translated this chapter from French into English, and Gene R. Garthwaite provided assistance in transliterating Persian technical terms.

{1} An earlier version of this chapter was published as Dale F. Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, “The Public Sphere and Muslim Societies,” European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 1 (2002): 92—115.

{2} This chapter was conceived while we were visiting faculty at the Summer Institute on “Public Spheres and Muslim Identity,” sponsored by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation at Dartmouth College in August 2002. We particularly appreciated the opportunity to read and discuss the work of the institute’s fellows. It stimulated us to synthesize our thoughts and research from the past decade on new media technologies and the publics associated with them in the countries of the Middle East where we have worked. These include Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

{3} Various parts of the research for this study, including field and archival research in Mali, Senegal, and France in 1991, 1992, 1993–1994, and 1998–1999, were funded by the U.S. Department of Education (Fulbright-Hays), the Fulbright Program of USIA through the West African Research Association/Center, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, and Northwestern University. The NIMH Program on Culture and Mental Health Behavior at the University of Chicago Committee on Human Development and the National Science Foundation-NATO provided funds in the form of postdoctoral fellowships for the writing. Portions have been presented to the European and American Young Scholars’ Summer Institute, “Public Spheres and Muslim Identities” in Berlin; the Department of Anthropology, the London School of Economics; the conference, “L’Internationalisation du religieux” at the Institut d’Etudes de l’Islam et des Societes du Monde Musulman, EHESS, Paris; the West Africa Seminar, UCL, London; the Islamwissenschaftliches Kolloquium, Universitat Bayreuth; and the Third Mediterranean Social and Political Meeting, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence. I am grateful to those audiences. As always, I am

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Introduction

On the Eastern Edge of Europe: Christianity, Islam, and the Bulgarian Political Imagination 1

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*** Note on Transliteration

Any book that draws on materials in Arabic and Turkish in combination with Bulgarian, among other languages, poses considerable challenges for transliteration, especially as we incorporate colloquial alongside literary usages. For Arabic and Turkish, with as much consistency as possible, we use the system adopted by the International Journal of Middle East Studies for Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu, using ‘ to represent the Arabic ‘ayn, and ’ to represent the Arabic hamza. We drop the initial hamza.

In general, we use the following spelling and transliteration from Cyrillic:

| а – a | е – e | к – k | п – p | ф – f | щ – sht |

| б – b | ж – zh | л – l | р – r | х – h | ъ – a/ u |

| в – v | з – z | м – m | с – s | ц – ts | ь – y |

| г – g | и – i | н – n | т – t | ч – ch | ю – yu |

| д – d | й – y | о – o | у – u | ш – sh | я – ya |

When persons or writers are known to have a preferred spelling of their name in a European language, we generally use this form.

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** Introduction

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For centuries, religion has been the cornerstone of communal identities in the European East. Particularly in the Balkans, social cohesion based on religious affiliation and loyalty has challenged the coexistence of different groups, engendering much of the socio-political conflict in the past and present. Modern politics in the ethnically and religiously diverse

Balkan countries, erstwhile provinces of the Ottoman Empire, had historically replaced Byzantine influence in the region. Underlying issues of believing and belonging continue to underpin contemporary public policy and debate. The downfall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the violent conflicts, especially in the Western Balkans,[1] brought about the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and strengthened religious affiliations and identities —even among non-believers. Today, the political imagination of a large number of people evokes historical antecedents of religion-related conflicts as a response to new challenges across Southeastern Europe—a term often used interchangeably with “the Balkans.” Two contested easts and pasts—Christian Byzantine and Muslim Ottoman— entangle and intertwine with concepts of nationalism and modernity to shape notions of religion, politics, and identity in contemporary Bulgaria and a large part of Eastern Europe with which the country has shared its cultural and social experience.

*** 1. Historical and Religious Underpinnings of a Secular Modernity

Historical memories of continuity and belonging to or competing with a distant Byzantium encounter traces from the more recent Ottoman past, when Muslim domination was eventually contested by the Christian subjects of the Sublime Porte and the European powers. One of them—Russia—pursued its imperial project drawing its legitimacy against the Ottomans on Orthodox Christian identity. This combined with the linguistic proximity between the Russians and the Slavic-speaking peoples in the Balkans to turn Moscow, imagined in the sixteenth century as “the Third Rome,”[2] into a symbol of Christian solidarity. Yet, after the Christianization of the First Bulgarian Empire (6811018) through Eastern Orthodoxy adopted by Prince Boris in 864 ad and the Golden Age during the reign of his son Simeon the Great (893–927), praised in the sources as a “Christ-loving soul,”[3] in the first half of the thirteenth century, the state ideology of the Second Bulgarian Empire (1185–1396) included the idea of its capital Turnovo as the “New Constantinople”—the “Third Rome” and the major center of Orthodox Christianity.[4] Medieval Bulgaria thus expanded the doctrine of translatio imperii and Roma aeterna in the European East, securing its state legitimacy against the threats posed by both the Latin Empire and Byzantium (restoring from the Latin invasion in 1261) until the Ottoman conquest in the second half of the fourteenth century.

By 1396, the Ottoman Empire conquered the entire territory of medieval Bulgaria and in the next two centuries expanded further beyond the Balkans throughout Eastern and Central Europe. Bulgarian independence was announced only after almost five centuries of Ottoman rule—on March 3, 1878, at San Stefano following the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). Subsequently, modern Bulgaria was officially founded on former territories of the Ottoman Empire a few months later, in July 1878, as a state of and for the Bulgarians under a “Christian government”[5] at the Congress of Berlin. The pecking order in Bulgaria and the other nation states emerging from the former Ottoman provinces in the Balkans was upended.

Untangling from empire, Muslims in Bulgaria transformed from Ottoman subjects belonging to the larger imperial society into a minority community within a nation-state. On the one hand, many Muslims declined to sign up as Bulgarian subjects and wanted to register as “Ottomans.” On the other hand, trying to achieve national homogeneity, the new Bulgarian state elaborated policies toward the Muslim population ranging from educational and cultural measures to forced assimilation.[6] The post-1878 decades to the turn of the twentieth century evidenced major demographic changes. If before the Congress of Berlin about 40 percent of the population in the future Bulgarian state (i.e., the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia before 1885) were Muslim, half a century later the Muslim population in the Kingdom of Bulgaria decreased to 14 percent.[7] After 1913, thousands of Muslims left Bulgaria while Christians of Eastern Thrace immigrated to the countryside. However, even with those 14 percent, Bulgaria was the first modern state in the Balkans that emancipated from the Ottoman Empire but—unlike countries like Greece or Serbia—maintained such a large Muslim population.[8]

Before the First World War, however, the Muslims under non-Muslim sovereignty in the new Balkans remained linked to the Ottoman Empire—even in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The attempts of the nation states to break these links were partially successful. Muslims in Bulgaria thus observed the official Ottoman celebrations supporting campaigns initiated by Istanbul. As in the rest of the Southeast European countries, Muslim revered the Ottoman sultan as their protector.[9] Before the Second World War, Islamic law (the shari’a), continued to be partially applied in Bulgaria—mostly in family and inheritance law. This situation resembled the Greek “neo- millet” model in which the functions of the Ottoman Mufti issuing Islamic legal opinions (fatwas) and the judge (qadi) “were fused into a new Mufti.”[10] In Bulgaria, those rules remained in force until the establishment of the Communist regime in 1944 which restricted the rights of all religious communities.

The Communist policies of the so-called Revival Process (vuzroditelen protses) in Bulgaria were only the culmination of the assimilationist approaches adopted in the twentieth century. The Revival Process took place as a set of policies by the Communist regime for the assimilation of the Turkish minority, including through a forceful change of their Arabic-Turkish names, between 1984 and 1989. Some 360,000 people left Bulgaria, around 40,000 of whom returned within the three-month period of their visas in 1989.[11] By the end of 1990, the number of the returnees reached 150,000. In the post-1989 period, the religious freedoms in Bulgaria were restored but the coexistence of Christians and Muslims has faced new challenges, some of which are posed by global, transnational factors.

The complex and ambivalent Christian-Muslim encounters in Bulgaria and the European Southeast have been eventually reshaped and transformed after more than a century of persistent de-Ottomanization following the paths of modern nation building, state development and fluctuating geopolitical (re-) orientations east and west. When the Lebanese civil war erupted in 1975, it was described by many observers as “Balkanization”, while the 1992 war in Bosnia was labeled as “Lebanonization” whereby Sarajevo was portrayed as the “Beirut of the Balkans”.[12] The common Ottoman legacy, often associated with postimperial ethnic and religious conflicts, looms behind such characterizations but its

effects, especially as regards the historical trajectories and understanding of the modern national states, demonstrate significant differences between Southeast Europe and the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

Whereas Arabism in the Middle East was not meant to supersede the wider Islamic solidarity or undermine the Ottoman authority,[13] in much of the Balkans modern statehood emerged as a result of bloody wars against the Ottoman state enmeshed with Russian, Habsburg, and other imperial interests, whereby its legacy—whose primary component is Islam—came to be overwhelmingly portrayed as alien to the “authentic” local national traditions and embedded as a traumatic topos in the collective memory. The so-called millet system as the structural organization of subjects of the late Ottoman Empire’s according to their religious affiliations goes a long way in explaining the major role of religion in shaping collective identity and managing religious diversity in the region.

The Ottoman term millet denotes, first, a community, a group of individuals deriving their identity from a shared religious affiliation. In this sense, millet can be synonymous with the Islamic umma or, in the Ottoman case the “ruling millet” (millet-i hakime). The classical Ottoman non-Islamic millets, along with Muslim ones, made up the traditional four major communities (millet- i erbaa): Muslims (administratively not organized in a millet), Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and Jews. During the nineteenth century Latin, Catholic Armenian, Protestant, and other denominations were recognized. Millet was sometimes used as an adjective designating the doctrine and practice shared by one of these religious communities, e.g., millet worship, ritual, and law, particularly the law of civil status. Finally, millet could also refer to a formal organization of a religious community with an ecclesiastical hierarchy, clerical and judicial organs.[14] The core underpinnings of the millet pattern for accommodating diversity thus refer to milletism with its twofold potential—an integrative social force and a venue for a communal extrication, or emancipation.[15]

During the Bulgarian national renaissance (vuzrazhdane), the movement for church autonomy in Bulgaria thus resulted in the rise of a Bulgarian Church in the Ottoman capital (1851). Together with the activity of Bulgarian intellectuals and traders competing with the Greek Phanariots in Istanbul, these efforts succeeded in gaining in 1871 the official status of a Bulgarian millet (eksarhhane- i millet- i bulgar) embracing all subjects of the Ottoman state who belonged to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (the Bulgarian Exarchate). From a Christian point of view, the Bulgarian Exarchate was “a sad story” as it broke the postByzantine “Orthodox commonwealth” in Southeastern Europe to achieve nationalist purposes.[16] Nevertheless, these events opened up the way to the Bulgarian national emancipation and prepared the establishment of the modern Bulgarian state. After Ottoman rule and the rise of the modern Bulgarian state in the post-1878 era, the new rulers upended the priority of privileged subjects, putting Orthodox Bulgarians at the top of the pecking order. The millet-type of relations has thus been socially

transformed and mixed with modern European conceptions, such as nation-building[17] and secularism.

In Southeast Europe, there exists an intimate, sometimes interchangeable (as in the case of the Bosnians) understanding of religion and ethnicity by most of the Balkan communities. Religion remains an essential part even of many non-believers' identity, often seen as one of its distinguishing features and affecting the spread of violence and extremism rise that shape and intertwine transnationally. This explains why many ethnic conflicts in the Balkans have been perceived by the participants as "religious," and vice-versa. Today, the specter of religion-based violence and identity conflicts has not vanished and some observers are thus apprehensive about the revival of Islam across Eurasia and the Balkans.

From 2001, after the end of these wars and the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the image of the Balkan Muslims as victims was to a large extent superseded in Western public discourse by their perception as radicalized fundamentalists involved in terrorist networks.[18] Contributing factors today include the mass migration of Middle Easterners and other Muslims from Africa and Asia via the so-called Balkan route, the increased number of Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe, and the significant number of over one thousand foreign fighters from Western Balkan countries who joined the ranks of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (isis) in Iraq and Syria, and other violent extremist Muslim groups, such as various al-Qaeda affiliates.[19] As a consequence of the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere, the analysis of Islam in this part of the European East was, as Elbasani and Roy note, left to the "tender mercy" of nationalism and postconflict studies. In these studies, religion continues to be interpreted along the lines of "ethnic splits and static national categories."[20] This tendency permeated discussions of the Orthodox Church that, in turn, became enmeshed with nationalism and politics.[21]

Having followed its post-Ottoman path without taking part in supranational state structures as former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria has shared much of the modern developments in the Western Balkans. Through Orthodox Christianity, Bulgaria has been culturally and religiously entangled with Greece and Russia under whose domination it fell as part of the Eastern bloc during the Cold War. The emphasis on Bulgaria in the present book brings to the fore the case of a country that until 1989 was among the "firmest" allies of the Soviet Union within the former Eastern bloc during the Cold War but which in January 2007 became a full member of the European Union (EU). This was the result not only of transnational developments but of long-term aspirations after the independence from the Ottoman Empire. Although sentiments may have often inclined Bulgarians to look eastward to Moscow, pragmatic considerations gave preference to a look westwards. The cultural similarities notwithstanding, Russia had little excess capital to invest in the modernizing economy and army of Bulgaria. Thus, post-independence Bulgaria "gradually became more integrated into the European mainstream."[22]

Within the EU today, Bulgaria—together with Greece—remains predominantly an Orthodox Christian country, but it also has the largest autochthonous Muslim minority. Bulgaria's Muslim population has varied from 21 percent in 1887, less than a decade after the establishment of the independent modern Bulgarian state, to 10 percent in the early 21st century, according to the census of 2011.[23] In Eastern Europe, only Kosovo and Albania have a clear statistical Muslim majority, for even in Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims are just over half of the population. The size of Muslim minorities in other countries var- ies—one-third in the Republic of North Macedonia, one-fifth in Montenegro and one-seventh in Russia, while Bulgaria has one-twelfth of its population with Muslim identity.[24] Ethnically diverse, these 10 percent (ethnic Turks and Bulgarian Muslims, or Pomaks, and also Roma) of the Muslim population in Bulgaria identify themselves as (predominantly Sunni) Muslims against the backdrop the rest of the Bulgarian population: 76 percent Orthodox Christian, 0.8 percent Catholic, 1.1 percent Protestant, and 0.2 percent "other." In addition, 7 percent of the population indicates "no religious affiliation" while 7.1 percent do not identify themselves in terms of religion.[25]

In sum, Bulgaria's predominant majority religion, Orthodox Christianity, together with the prevalent minority faith, Sunni Islam, underpins communal life, shaping modern secularism and governance. By foregrounding Bulgaria as a context in flux, the contributors to this book thus seek to expand knowledge of the European East as a whole, traversing the relationship of religion, politics, and society in a transregional and cross-cultural perspective. This does not mean that we seek to conceptualize the Eastern, Southeastern Europe or Bulgaria as following a Sonderweg[26]—a "special path" of inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts based on "incompatible identities." Rather, our aim is to indicate comparisons with other countries and regions, drawing on contextually informed case studies.

*** 2. At the Crossroad of Entangled Regions and Religions

Focused on Bulgaria to amplify its experience at the intersection of religion and politics in the last half century, the present book considers three partially overlapping although different historical and contemporary types of regionaliza- tion—the Balkans (and Southeastern Europe), the "cultural" notion of Eastern Europe and the more recent "geopolitical" idea of Eastern Europe referring to the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. While the fundamental conceptual division of Europe in the Renaissance was South versus North, in the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment, Western Europe invented Eastern Europe as its "complementary other half" thus entangling the notion with evolving Orientalism. The uncertainty of boundaries constructed Eastern Europe as "Europe but not Europe", inventing it as "an intellectual project of demi-Orientalization."[27] On "cultural" lines, that earlier bipartite division effectively identified Eastern Europe with the domain of Orthodox Christianity.[28] Later, in the second half of the twentieth century during the Cold War, Eastern Europe became a catchword for the Soviet bloc thus encouraging area studies encompassing even the post-communist era after the collapse of state socialism.[29] This division in the era of the Iron Curtain excluded Greece from geopolitically conceived Eastern Europe—a paradox given that Greece was historically the heart of the Byzantine commonwealth.[30]

The cultural notion of Eastern Europe as the domain of Orthodox Christianity thus encompasses a region the south of which was subsequently dominated by the Ottoman Empire dramatically clashing in the Balkans and elsewhere with the “Third Rome” of Moscow. Bulgaria’s religious and political history has been uniquely entangled being categorized in various ways. Apart from belonging to Eastern Europe both culturally and geopolitically, Bulgaria was part of what was formerly designated as the “Near East”[31]—a term still based on a “fundamentally bifurcated view and on a reified interpretation of civilizational spheres as self-contained monoliths.”[32] Until the end of 1958, for example, Greece and Turkey were included in what was labeled Aegean and Middle East Division in the U.S. Department of State,[33] and historically for American strategists the Balkans were part of the “Near East” referring to the area of Ottoman Muslim domination after whose downfall the emerging Balkan nation states have been increasingly regionalized as “new Europe.” The European East to which Bulgaria belongs is thus a region of entangled and contesting Orthodox/Byzantine and Islamic/Ottoman continuities. This book contributes to understanding how these continuities compete in shaping modern secularism in Bulgaria, invoking parallels to Orthodox-majority Greece and Russia—countries that symbolize the Orthodox Christian legacy against various types of relationships to Islam, the Ottoman heritage, and the Near East.

A recent survey confirmed that almost a quarter of a century after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, “religion has reasserted itself as an important part of individual and national identity in many of the Central and Eastern European countries where Communist regimes once repressed religious worship and promoted atheism.”[34] The Balkan countries, sharing social and cultural trends with neighboring areas in the Eastern European region and elsewhere, had their own patterns of religion in society, secularism, and national belonging well before the advent of Communism and after its fall.

Vyacheslav Karpov’s useful discussion of “desecularization” suggests the multiple forms that it can take.[35] He suggests three major components: a rapprochement between secular and religious institutions, a resurgence of religious beliefs and practices, and the return of religion to the public sphere.[36] His invocation of “multiple desecularizations,” in the sense of the many paths that the return of religion to the public sphere can take, provides a framework for making sense of the multiple ways in which desecularization can take place, or even be reversed. Karpov builds on the earlier work of Peter Berger, not least by offering an explanation of why sociologists have been slow to overcome a cultural lag in recognizing how and why individuals and societies, from the bottom up of cultural movements to the top-down of state-imposed transformations (think of Stalin and Ataturk) accept or resist major transformations in belief and practice. As Galin Tihanov has argued, Central and Eastern Europe has been a shatter zone for literary criticism because of the clash of cultures, historical traditions, and current practice.[37] The same reasoning contributes to our focus on Bulgaria as a crossroad of regions and religions, which turns the country into an indicative case in the Orthodox-majority world accounting for how history and religious legacies intertwine with and underpin secularism.

*** 3. Religion and the Political Imagination: Structure of the Book

Our contributors look beyond immediate events. They situate the ongoing developments and public talk about religion in the longue duree of the continuities and breaks in the relationships between religion and politics. Much of the analysis is centered on Bulgaria, although we include historical and contemporary comparisons with neighboring countries, and—when necessary to indicate important entanglements—with the Middle East and Russia.

This volume builds on a convergence of interest between the co-editors. Evstatiev is an historian who—shaped as a scholar of Islam and the Middle East in the 1990s and the early 2000s—benefited from a strong training in Oriental languages and the text-based tradition of Bulgaria which combined both Eastern and Western European intellectual perspectives. He has since complemented this approach, immersing himself in longue duree social history and anthropology while also adding to his interests religion in the Balkans. Eickelman, an anthropologist who has worked extensively in both North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, also has a strong interest in social history. In the late 1980s he initiated a project with his Soviet—who transformed into Russian—colleagues to compare the implicit and often unexamined assumptions underlying their respective approaches to making sense of North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia.[38] When writing from a Balkan point of departure, Evstatiev has similar interests in the historical and contemporary entanglements between the Middle East and Europe.

In Chapter 1, we tackle the patterns of religion and identity in the Balkans with a special emphasis on Bulgaria to foreground the concept of secularities rather than the “fixed” notion of a single path of secularism matching the classical Western ideal. Discussing the religious underpinnings of Balkan seculari- ties and the lack thereof (as in the Albanian case), we are inspired by Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, which marked a new way of using the term “imagined” in understanding politics and political action.[39] Anderson’s concept is straightforward, arguing that ideas of political community are not given but are actively constructed, and contested, by those who hold them, and historically situated. Thus, for example, when adherents of a nation or religion assert that their sense of “belonging” is timeless and enduring, Anderson looks at the historical contexts in which these claims are made. A political scientist best known for his writings on Indonesia, Anderson based much of his work on the emergence of nationalism in nineteenth-century Latin America in order to reach a wider audience by exploring his ideas elsewhere. His sense of “imagined” was concretely grounded in political, historical, and economic contexts, adding senses of how people, both elite and non-elite, shape and experience shared ideas of self and community.

When Anderson first introduced his insightful term, he could hardly have been aware of how it influenced later adaptations of the concept. It was readily expanded by analogy from

describing how nations took shape to the analysis of religious experience—not only for Christians and Muslims but also for other faiths.[40] There has been resistance to use of the term “imagined” because it suggests to some an unreality. However, the term highlights how social and political forms get shaped by individuals and collectivities to become social facts. The notion of politics as centered on power relations and interests alone cannot account for how members of a society interact, cooperate, and sustain social cohesion. Politics is also, to use the striking phrase of Kyosti Pekonen, “a struggle about people’s imaginations.”[41] Overt political struggle is framed by implicit understandings of belonging and, of course, the arbitrary enforcement of what is permitted and forbidden. Pursuing this struggle about people’s imaginations, we delineate the contours of the two concepts invoking both Byzantine and Ottoman concepts implicitly underpinning modern politics—symphonic and milletic secularism, illustrated in detail by the case studies in the next two chapters.

Kristen Ghodsee’s Chapter 2 assesses the changing relation between religious identities, state authority, and secularism from the unusual—at least for non-Balkanists—perspective of three transnational court cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between 1996 and 2011. In all three cases, the ECtHR assumed a distinctly Western norm of secularism, which it imposed on a society that had a different trajectory of relationship between religion and politics. Ghodsee sees the reasons for this different underpinnings of secularism in the long history of church-state collaboration, a doctrine known as symphoenia, in which temporal and spiritual powers worked together to promote religious pluralism—hence her term symphonic secularism. On a doctrinal level, this view of church-state relations has been imagined as an ideal of Eastern Orthodox Christianity since the time of the Byzantine Empire. Since then, she argues when introducing the concept of symphonic secularism, “Tsars, Sultans, politburos or prime ministers have consolidated their power over ethnically or linguistically diverse populations, by promoting national identity through a church (or a mosque or synagogue) that instills loyalty to the state as part of its ecumenical dogma while also granting autonomy to other religiously defined communities.”[42]

In spite of the doctrine of symphoenia, which at least for Bulgaria can be traced back at least to 1054 and the schism between Western Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Ghodsee claims that the court imputed the doctrine to the more recent non-democratic side of the Iron Curtain. Even more, she argues that the ECtHR imposes a specifically Protestant conception of religion on predominately Eastern Orthodox countries. Ironically, Ghodsee concludes, the universalism of Western human rights discourses may have more in common with the supra-national universalisms of some Islamic doctrines than with the modern ethno-national “particularisms” of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

In Chapter 3, Simeon Evstatiev explores the competition of “traditional” (Balkan Hanafi, as well as religiously syncretic) Islam versus “Arab” (mainly Salafi) Islam. In a context with a widely spread religious syncretism,[43] this “Arab” Islam is perceived to have arrived in Bulgaria via Saudi and other Middle Eastern, including Turkish, channels beginning in the

1990s and often through Bulgarian-trained preachers and religious scholars who studied overseas. “Arab” Islam, as labeled by its detractors, claims to lead a return to Islam’s doctrinal roots and also strengthens a sense of belonging to the “imagined community” of Sunni Islam. Tackling the perceptions of “traditional” versus “alien” Islam in the political imagination and public debates, Evstatiev builds on the concept of “milletic secularism”[44] through a case study of Salafism in Bulgaria. The chapter draws on Evstatiev’s regular study visits to Muslim-majority villages and towns in different regions of Bulgaria and to community leaders. He offers an interpretation of a major court case in which thirteen Muslim lead- ers—most of them imams some of whom foreign-trained—were accused of propagating “anti-democratic ideology” in the form of violent Salafi Islamism.

The notion of milletic secularism and Ghodsee’s symphonic secularism are complementary here in that they both trace the religious and historical underpinnings of secularism in a Balkan context thus helping explain the specifics of the issues in the next chapters. Unlike Ghodsee’s symphonic secularism, however, milletic secularism suggests that the post-Ottoman pattern of secularism in the Bulgaria and Southeastern Europe should be seen rather as a reversed form of milletism that upends the model of the Ottoman millet system. It builds the trajectory of modern Balkan secularism as combined with European ideas of nationalism that in the late Ottoman Empire first developed among Christians who, as unlike Muslims they maintained closer contacts with Europe.[45] This approach evokes both mainstream secular discourse and discussions within Bulgaria’s Muslim community, including the state-recognized chief mufti and his Muftiship as the official institution of the Muslim community.[46] Sometimes the foreign-inspired “Arab” Islam is labeled as “radical,” as opposed to the pre-existing and often taken-for-granted local religious understandings.

Max Weber’s classic triptych of forms of political authority remains useful as a point of departure, but it also has its limitations as developed by early modernization theory, which implicitly assumed that societies since the European Enlightenment were on steady progress, replacing generally unquestioned “traditional” assumptions about authority with greater reliance on rationality. Unfortunately, “traditional” is often used as a residual category that blocks attention to how conventional understandings change incrementally over time—and sometimes with great speed. Thus Islamic law, the shari‘a, is sometimes portrayed as immutable and a product of religious extremism, but on close examination can also be characterized as flexible and responsive to diverse historical situations.[47]

Evoking the afterlife of entangled Christian/Byzantine and Muslim/ Ottoman pasts in the modern political imagination also entails how syncretic “local” and global “universal” Islam meet in a specific East European context, offering insight into how court cases contribute to the objectification of religious knowledge and practice—the codification of religious doctrine into formal categories of “religion” and “ideology.” “Objectification” is the process by which large numbers of people explicitly ask questions such as “What is my religion?” “Why is it important to my life?” and “How should beliefs guide my conduct?”[48] Such questions get explicitly discussed. In actions such as court proceedings, how beliefs are characterized is a

distinctly modern process that shapes how people think in public about faith, practice, and society.

Momchil Metodiev (Chapter 4) draws attention to parallels between “Communist atheism” and “Western secularism,” in which the European Court of Human Rights in a 2009 legal case upheld 2009 that the mere presence of a crucifix in an Italian classroom “violates the rights of secular people.” The Moscow Patriarchate responded in June 2010 with the statement that “modern militant secularism” as exemplified by the court decision, like “Russian Communism,” was “not neutral and indifferent to the Christian faith, but frankly hostile.” In refreshingly clear language, Metodiev cautions against facile assumptions of congruence between secularism in Communist Bulgaria and the same process in Western Europe to spell out the differences. The different social historical experiences of Eastern Europe under Communist domination and the West necessitate a “local knowledge” of understanding secularism in its historical contexts. State socialism—which like other grand narratives of modernity and was determined to obliterate religions that were supposed to remain in the past—can thus be viewed as a “secular religion”[49] clashing with the established monotheistic faiths and identities.

Daniela Kalkandjieva’s Chapter 5, on “Caesar and God in Public Space,” complements Metodiev’s chapter by exploring how abstract distinctions such as secular and sacred, and historical/cultural and religious are made in practice. Not long after the end of the Communist regime in Bulgaria in 1989, legal changes resulted in the return of economically valuable lands and property that the Communist regime had seized from the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Muslim community. Yet some of these assets had been converted into “monuments of national history and world cultural heritage,” and legal cases challenged the right of the state to return some properties, including monasteries converted into museums that religious authorities were not prepared adequately to maintain. As in earlier chapters, legal cases—as well as journalistic exposes of the misappropriation of religious tangible properties—fuel arguments for and against the control of religious properties and the extent to which representations are part of the contemporary public sphere.

In Chapter 6, Galina Evstatieva tackles Muslim views on headscarves, comparing the opinions on veiling as proposed by Bulgaria’s Sunni religious authorities, domestic cultural codes, and how Muslim women in the country themselves perceive the use of headscarves. She reviews two periodicals with the same name issued by the Chief Muftiship of the Muslim Denomination in the Republic of Bulgaria between 1999 and 2016—the newspaper and the above-mentioned magazine Myusyulmani (“Muslims”). Around 20 percent of the articles deal with topics related to Muslim women, about only one-third of which are written by women.

The views contained in the publications on the role of women remain seemingly stable and unchanged over long periods on such matters as how women should display their piety in accordance with a required return to “true” Islam as understood by the Chief Muftiship. In

contrast to the Communist era, which included a period of forced unveiling in public space and of course in schools, many Muslim women and men see re-veiling as a positive act of community expression. Some Bulgarian political parties see the headscarf as a way of propagating Islamic radicalism. The Turkish-speaking Bulgarian population and the Pomaks, the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, are divided on the issue of headscarves and the use of full-face veils. As Evstatieva concludes, the hijab maintains a social distance between genders and symbolizes the acceptable role of women in religious law.

Yet, apart from an objectification, the hijab also represents an essentially contested concept, to use the term of Oxford philosopher Walter Gallie,[50] that pits some Bulgarian Muslim religious leaders against upholders of the social norms and moral codes of the secular order of Bulgaria. The revival of Islamic normative teachings is thus seen by the mainstream society as challenging the implicit symphonic and milletic patterns for regulating religious freedoms and public expression. Yet, the centuries of mutual coexistence have shaped shared practices, even though contested as illegitimately syncretic by devout believers and religious specialists.

Ilia Iliev (Chapter 7) argues that over several centuries of cohabitation, Muslim and Orthodox Christian communities in Bulgaria have shared important implicit notions of belief, community, and religious practice, even while many believers deny the parallels in how their ideas of community and faith are structured. The extent of these parallels are not as wide as elsewhere. In Bangladesh, for example, Bengali villagers in the late nineteenth century did not know whether they were Muslim or Hindu, and had to be “taught” by modernist Muslim (and Hindu) preachers who instructed them how to identify themselves explicitly as Muslims or Hindus.[51]

Among the Pomak Muslims of Bulgaria during Ramadan, the month of fasting, not all Muslim villagers fast. The ramazanlii, those who practiced the Ramadan feast are thus pursuing a version of Grace Davie’s model of “vicarious religion.” This term refers to an active minority that implicitly performs religious obligations on behalf of a larger community that understands and approves of their behavior.[52] Iliev’s ramazanlii are analyzed in different groups roughly divided by age cohorts. What they largely shared in common was commitment to fasting for the benefit of a wider community of kinship groups or community members. Iliev accounts for some community members fasting for the good of a collectivity rather than for individual spiritual gain. He concludes with the observation that in the evenings during Ramadan, where both Muslims and Christians gather in coffee-houses and pubs to discuss matters of common interest, the heterogeneity of the collectivity places limits on claims to “privileged access to religious truth or religion-based authority” in the public sphere. Cohabitation over hundreds of years places limitations on both Muslims and Orthodox Christians on the use of exclusive religious arguments. Their objectification of faith entails flexibility and stability alike—despite the current social and political pecking order, they are aware of the “rules of the game” established by the complementary models of symphonic and milletic secularism.

Another form of objectification beyond the Bulgarian context is present in Angeliki Ziaka's Chapter 8 on how religious education for Muslims and primarily Orthodox Christians in Greek state and religious schools has been revised according to European Union (EU) guidelines in order to promote tolerance and understanding among religious communities. As in the Bulgarian and EU court proceedings described in Chapters 2 and 3, Ziaka explains a give-and-take between the creation of European guidelines on religious education, compulsory religious education as implemented by the Hellenic Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, and the often acerbic public discussions in Greece concerning how open religious education should be to encompass diverse religious confessions. Ziaka narrates how a secular paradigm of tolerance and understanding is negotiated among religious groups. The process becomes even more complex when local, political, ethnic, and religious and non-religious identities, the Orthodox Church's opinion on religious diversity, and the many different voices within the Church are taken into consideration. The focus is on Western Thrace, where Muslims account for about a third of the population. Formulating policy guidelines to improving religious curriculum in Muslim- minority and public schools, Ziaka offers suggestions on how to increase the public significance and visibility of religious education in an Orthodox-majority society, bringing Muslim and Greek citizens together through teacher training.

Ivan Zabaev and Daria Oreshina (Chapter 9) add another valuable comparative perspective. They deal with the seeming paradox of the growing visibility of the Russian Orthodox Church at the federal level versus its local-level concealment. This paradox can be explained, they argue, by the fact that the Church strengthens its position by not explicitly stating the motivation of some of its members to participate in "secular" society. For a comparable example from the Muslim world, we think of Turkey's Hizmet ("service") movement, inspired by Fethullah Gulen. Hizmet was a widely popular movement outlawed after the attempted Turkish coup d'etat in July 2016. Participants in it, like the supporters of the Russian Orthodox Church, are motivated by their interpretation of faith. However, they do not explicitly mention their motivation and adhere to strictly secular norms. This lack of explicitness also blurs the line between religion and ethical conduct. Yet it would be hard to believe that the majority of their clients (including the parents of schoolchildren in the Turkish case and advising women seeking abortions about alternatives in Russian one) are not aware of or suspect the motivation of the practitioners. In the case of the Orthodox Church, by not explicitly identifying themselves beyond their clinical role, they extend their influence more effectively and fold into the mainstream of contemporary society.

Plamen Makariev (Chapter 10) offers an in-depth analysis of informal and formal participation in civil society and the public sphere in Bulgaria. His argument has remarkable parallels with Zabaev and Oreshina's analysis of the Russian Orthodox Church. Makariev distinguishes between the formal participation of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in public sphere activities—allow- ing gay parades, abortions, and the participation of individual believers in three crucial ongoing debates: gay parades, conception and contraception, and the teaching of religion in schools. Makariev demonstrates how far Habermas' discussion of the public sphere permeates Bulgarian discourse. He also indicates that most accounts of the public sphere in Bulgaria have moved beyond earlier, mid-twentieth century discussions

of modernity in which religion was consigned primarily to the private sphere. Jose Casanova's work appears to have been especially influential in shaping the thinking about religion in modernity, and religion in the public sphere in Bulgaria.[53] Makariev, as Zabaev and Oreshina in their chapter on Russia, distinguishes between the formal statements of Church authorities—and by extension their Muslim counter- parts—and the "informal" statements of people assumed to hold certain views on the basis of who they are. Debate is vigorous and inconclusive insofar as the moral and public values under discussion are best characterized as essentially contested concepts, and Makariev indicates how the more abstract notion of the public sphere joins the rough and tumble of the post-1989 Eastern Europe.

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* Part 1: Secularism in Bulgaria and Its Region

** Chapter 1: Byzantine and Ottoman Pasts, Modern Politics

Religious Belongings and Balkan Secularities

Simeon Evstatiev and Dale F. Eickelman

Abstract

The chapter tackles the patterns of religion and identity in the Balkans with a special emphasis on Bulgaria to foreground the concept of secularities instead of the “fixed” notion of a single path of secularism matching the classical Western ideal. Discussing the religious underpinnings of Balkan secularities and the lack thereof, we draw on Benedict Anderson’s notion of imagined communities, which marked a new way of using the term “imagined” in understanding politics and political action. Anderson’s concept is straightforward, arguing that ideas of political community are not given but are actively constructed, and contested, by those who hold them, and historically situated. Anderson’s insightful term was readily expanded by analogy from describing how nations took shape to the analysis of religious experience—not only for Christians and Muslims but also for other faiths. There has been resistance to use of the term “imagined” because it suggests to some an unreality. However, as the chapter argues, the term highlights how social and political forms get shaped by individuals and collectivities to become social facts. The notion of politics as centered on power relations and interests alone cannot account for how members of a society interact, cooperate, and sustain social cohesion. Overt political struggle is framed by implicit understandings of belonging and, of course, the arbitrary enforcement of what is permitted

and forbidden. Pursuing this struggle about people’s imaginations, the chapter elucidates the relevance of two concepts invoking both Byzantine and Ottoman notions implicitly underpinning modern politics—symphonic and milletic secularism.

Keywords

secularism — multiple secularities — Byzantine — Ottoman — political imagination — agency — structure — the Balkans — Bulgaria

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Religion in Eastern Europe, particularly the Balkans, officially marginalized throughout the Communist era, has returned to play a major role in society and politics. Since the late nineteenth century, various political movements asserted hegemony in succession, and no single dominant cultural or political force has taken lasting hold. As Galin Tihanov argues, emigres, exiles, and transnational forces in the region have always been available to counter claimed hegemony in ideas and practices.[54] The multiplicity of languages, dialects, and peoples, and the convergence or awareness of overlapping or competing religious, intellectual, and political traditions from Byzantine and Ottoman pasts in combination with Western modernity make the Balkans a region of bricolage, as Claude Levi-Strauss might have said.

*** 1. Balkan Secularities: Religion, State Atheism, and Public Space

Beginning in the 1960s, the work of Jurgen Habermas on the “public sphere” and “public space,” anchored primarily in the historical experience of Western Europe, was a touchstone for considering the intersection of religion, society, and politics in the Balkans.[55] With the advent of Facebook, Twitter, and other forms of activity, the fragmentation of authority that one of us described as parallel with the “new media” of the 1980s and 1990s suggests a break with the former “Enlightenment” model that leaves behind the salon, the coffee house, and the commons. The erosion of authority threatens more radical transformations than “public negotiation over the rules and discourse that morally bind the community together.”[56] As Tarek El-Ariss argues, it leads us into the domain of leaks and scandals, where faith and belief remain important, but truth and falsehood are less the basis for discussion in public space and the quest for authority is elusive.[57] Nonetheless, the concept of public space as invoked by Habermas, even if overly idealistic, inspires the exploration of intermediate connective spaces between the state and local communities. The conceptions of public sphere and public space developed by Habermas hew closely to an idealized Europe-based ideal, but nonetheless inspired others to adapt it to Muslim-majority societies, including its religious component.[58]

Although religion in Bulgaria, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, has been politicized and used as an instrument to achieve political goals,[59] secularism should not be apprehended as a monolithic utopian ideal. The “separation wall” between the domains of the religious and secular is significantly more porous in social practice than conventionally assumed. Even under the Communist regime, religious affiliations, although transformed, did not fade away. The official place assigned to religion in public life under a certain political system does not necessarily reflect the actual role of faith in individual life and collective identities. The Communist period in Bulgaria (19441989) was dominated by an overwhelming ideology, in itself a political religion.

Marxism, especially in its Communist form, can—like National Socialism— be analyzed as referring to religious and ecclesiastical structures, having an overwhelming ideology that draws on a consistent set of rituals, symbols and images, religious metaphors related to an eschatology and “revolutionary mes- sianism.”[60] Socialism itself, from which Marxist-Leninism is a specific totalitarian offshoot, can be viewed as part of religious history—in Europe and elsewhere.[61] In a similar vein, Raymond Aron called Communism a “secular religion.” He advanced the concept in 1944, relating it to socialism—and particularly to its totalitarian form, Marxism-Leninism, which developed its own theology and sacred order.[62] This Marxist-Leninist “sacred order” included proselytism and messianism, the deification of leaders, scriptures, ideas of absolute truth, canon, rituals, iconography, evil and salvation until eventually “[t]rue believers became extinct dinosaurs, while the numbers of nonbelievers and atheists (i.e., dissidents) were growing, as well as a number of those who preferred the capitalist hell to the socialist paradise.”[63] In that sense, Communism was a secular religion attempting not so much to politicize religion but rather to replace it by adopting a radical interpretation of earlier socialism and Marxism.

Until the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the opportunities for social and anthropological research on religion in the former countries ruled by Communist regimes, where most of the Orthodox Christians lived, were lim- ited.[64] Under these regimes and thereafter, the Balkan states regulated and supervised the religious scene in various ways, ranging from enforcing homogeneity to “safeguarding a plural democratic home.”[65] Nonetheless, there was a scholarly trajectory that quietly continued a genuinely academic tradition, mostly in Ottoman studies.

In Bulgaria, this field was maintained by scholars with different views, styles, and from different generations, including Vera Moutaftcheva (1929–2009), Strashimir Dimitrov (1930–2001), and subsequently Tsvetana Georgieva (b. 1937). The observed revitalization of various forms of religions in everyday life attracted the attention of scholars, particularly ethnographers who in countries like Bulgaria continued a tradition of studying “folk religion,” describing the social world around seers, clairvoyants, and healers.[66] The most notable example of these studies were dealing with Vanga (1911–1996) known as Baba Vanga.[67] Anthropologists, who brought to the fore new “ethnographies of religious revival,” have chosen “an actor-oriented perspective on ‘religion’” rather than “a church-oriented one” to

study the “revival of Orthodoxy through the eyes of the local actors.”[68] Historians of Orthodoxy, in turn, have focused on the study of the Church during the totalitarian regime and its relationships with the Bulgarian Communist Party.[69] Others examined the Communist policies known as the “Revival Process,” which aimed at assimilating ethnic Turks and the other Muslims in Bulgaria,[70] often using repressive measures.

After the collapse of Communism, new underpinnings for social cohesion were needed and religion was again brought to the fore in public and social life. After half a century of secular religion, a new form of secularism based on a combination of national and historical religious identities gained ground. The earlier close correlation between religion and ethnic or national identity, a legacy of the millet system in the Ottoman Empire,[71] was reasserted anew— notwithstanding that recently some scholars tend to see the Balkan nationbuilding policies not so much as an upended continuation of the Ottoman experience but rather as a “manufactured legacy.”[72] Whether or not an elite choses to intervene or perpetuate a particular feature of the millet-like pattern is, however, not the main question here, as we bring to the fore the implicit, structural underpinnings of the entanglements between religion, nationalism, and identity, which entails how they—elites and commoners alike—have rather re-imagined their communities.

In the post-1989 period, national and religious identities began explicitly to function as entwined, evoking historically continuous, albeit fluctuating, patterns of communal and political identity. Analyzing this reemergence of religion in society, Kristen Ghodsee suggests the term “symphonic secularism” related to the region’s Byzantine past and its imagined model of religion and politics thus exploring the Bulgarian conception of religion through “an Orthodox ideal of state-church relations.”[73] In the modern Balkans, the interest in the Byzantine past and its long-term significance has been directly enmeshed with the search of medieval antecedents of the emerging nation-states. Most of the national pasts have their historical roots in the Byzantine cultural and political sphere, and the knowledge of this empire has become increasingly important for Balkan national historiographies.[74] Dimitri Obolensky’s notion of the “Byzantine Commonwealth,”[75] frames a cultural notion embracing the entire European East and appropriated by modern nations differently for various purposes. As Diana Mishkova writes, there are two central themes at the core of these different and warring systems of appropriating Byzantium and Byzantinism: one is related to national identity while the other—to national expansion, or the nation’s mission. Whence, the “Byzantine factor” is found in various areas of intellectual activity.[76]

Re-imaging Byzantium and its role as a Christian Empire gets contextualized according to the type of nationalism and identity, including in countries that in the past have had competitively shared and sustained the notion of the Second or the Third Rome[77]—from Greece through Bulgaria to Russia.[78] This “commonwealth” was implicated from the beginning with religion, and when applying it to the post-Byzantine period the notion gets even more closely associated with Orthodoxy.[79] Entangled with the subsequent Ottoman experience, Byzantium or rather multiple Byzantiums take part in shaping Balkan political imagination and secularism.

Considering these re-imagined Byzantiums, the concept of “milletic secularism” invokes the Ottoman millet system to refer to divergent and competing transnational collective identities, loyalties, and frames of reference coexisting within the same nation-state. These identities are conceptualized as resembling the way religious communities functioned under the Ottoman millet system but in a reverse, upended way, as today Muslims are the minority in a pluralist society and secular state governed on the basis of non-Muslim procedures and values symbolically overarched by Orthodox Christianity. The concept of milletic secularism thus seeks to explore why and how “implicit,” taken-for-granted understandings prevail in long-term understandings of politics.[80] Juxtaposed but complementing one another in this volume, the concepts of symphonic and milletic secularism suggest socio-theoretical models for approaching the ideological underpinnings of Balkan secularism. Drawing on Clifford Geertz’s notion of “thick description,”[81] the idea of milletic secularism invokes the continued role of the Orthodox Christian identity and the changing, “reversible” Christian-Muslim entanglements in Ottoman and, subsequently, post-Ottoman social experience.

The notion of milletic secularism also indicates that secularism, an ideal type, always takes the form of cultural and historically specific meanings that can look paradoxical at first sight insofar as millet originated as an Islamic religious term. There is no single pattern of secularism but “multiple secu- larities”—a term that complements Shmuel Eisenstadt’s notion of “multiple modernities.”[82] Recently suggested, the concept of multiple secularities[83] transcends the scope of the classical Western idea of secularism with its focus on the relations between religion and politics (“God and Caesar”). It can be applied to distinctions between the religious and non-religious, making it relevant to the study of the Balkans, where religion remains important even in the non-believers’ identities. As can be observed in the case of Bulgaria, its model of secularism and the policies it entails implicit notions as the Byzantine sym- phoneia and the Ottoman millet, thus not fully matching the classical Western ideal of secularism.

The idea of a nation on the basis of a common language has never fully gained ground in the Balkans. The reason is rooted in the “millet mentality,” as Bernard Lory puts it to emphasize that the millet legacy underlies a set of phenomena—from the formation of distinct national identities even when speaking a common language, such as in the cases of the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians, as well as the difficult integration of the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) into the national community of modern Bulgaria.[84] However, even a widely-spread phenomenon as the Balkan milletic pattern of secularism and identity is not necessarily a single model for the entire region. There is a notable exception—the Albanians whose nationalism lacks the resort to religion as a mark of identity.[85] From the outset of their nation building, Albanians have pursued the slogan “the religion of the Albanians is Albanianism.” If the other Balkan nations sought revenge on previously oppressed Christians over Muslims, who remained a minority in the new states, Albanians did not use the end of the Ottoman era in that way. After all, the population of post-Ottoman Albania’s was roughly 70 percent Muslim, 20 percent Catholic and ten percent Orthodox.

During Enver Hoxha’s regime, Albania was the only Communist state prohibiting all religious practices.[86]

According to recent studies, in today’s Eastern Europe there is evidence that many citizens with Muslim family background no longer self-identify as Muslims—at least according to consecutive official censuses. In his attentive large-scale recent survey of Islam in twenty-one post-Communist Eastern European countries, Egdunas Racius rightly points out the unreliability of these censuses and mentions in passim an intriguing tentative hypothesis that these developments might perhaps indicate a new “return of the secular.”[87] Even if this proves to be a change in the tendency of a “return of the religious” during the first years after the collapse of Communism, it is too early to say whether there is a move to categories such as “non-religious,” “agnostic” or “atheist.” Such a trend, if correctly reflected by the censuses, rather signals a new way in which the elements of multiple identities are accentuated, contextually rearranged and brought to the fore under certain circumstances. First, given the data from available sociological surveys, according to which more Pomaks increasingly self-identify mainly as Muslims, even when asked about their “ethnicity,”[88] other trends seem to unfold on the ground. These trends accentuate the Islamic component as increasingly overarching multiple identities.

Second, there is a new parallel dynamics of mobility and transnationalization of Muslim lives and discourses, as many stricter adherents of Islam constantly travel and sometimes migrate east and west while keeping a connection with their previous homelands.

*** 2. Transnational Religious Identities and Ethno-Religious Belonging

Today more than ever, religious identities are increasingly transnational.[89] In the predominantly Orthodox Christian countries of the Balkans during the post-Communist period, Orthodox identity has been revived—certainly in terms of religious devotion but also in the sense that the majority population assimilates it to national identity. Contemporary Bulgarians thus manifest not a Western pattern of “believing without belonging,”[90] but rather “belonging without believing.” Others add the category of “behaving without believing or belonging” where, for example, in China many citizens neither believe in a supreme transcendent deity nor self-identify as followers of any specific faith but visit Confucian or Buddhist shrines and take part in rituals.[91] Against the backdrop of such paradigms, Central and East Europeans are described also as “believing and belonging, without behaving” insofar as most people in the region claim to believe in God and self-identify as Orthodox Christians despite the low levels of religious observance and church attendance.[92]

Muslim identity has likewise coexisted with various ethnicities but has sought to overarch them as a basis for collective and political identity long before the current globalized era. The Balkans are no exception in that Muslim identity has proved highly resilient to rapidly

take advantage of the development of modern communications, and enabling transnational mobilization.[93] In the Islamic case, modern conditions have facilitated a variety of struggles over religious ideas and the increasingly fragmented authority in which different voices compete for recognition. Transnational Islamic ideas and movements facilitate “the existence and legitimacy of a global public space of normative reference and debate.”[94] Internet and the “cyber-Islamic environment”[95] create a “theatre of the ‘street,’ making evident the multiple connections of this expanding public sphere.”[96] Although Islamic studies scholars have written little to date about transnational Islam in the Balkans, the theme has attracted the attention of an increasing number of works in religious stud- ies, [97] political science,[98] sociology, and social anthropology.[99] With the immigration of Muslim newcomers, the transnationalization of Islamic discourses reached even countries in the broader Central and Eastern European region like Moldova, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia which seems to remain the only European country without a mosque.[100]

In the Balkans, particularly Bulgaria and former Yugoslavia, the mass post- 1989 influx of religious emissaries and evangelizers from different denominations did not lead to the emergence of a “free market of religions” (Hann 2006).[101] The majority of believers have, instead, returned to “traditional” religious denominations, strengthening their collective identities. Some observers, especially Westerners, are often surprised at the high number of the Bulgarians self-identifying as “Orthodox Christian” without even going to church regularly or being devout Christians. As a Western Christian interested in missionary activities in Bulgaria, James Hopkins, for example, perceives the Orthodox Church as “willingly becoming an instrument of Bulgarian geopoliticism, allowing itself to get used by the government.”[102] Emphasizing that religion in Bulgaria has a different genealogy, Ghodsee has criticized Hopkins’s assertion that Bulgarian Orthodoxy is not a “true” religion, but simply a marker of ethnic and national identity “based on a series of carefully crafted nationalist myths.”[103]

Despite the conventional assumptions of Orthodox Christianity as a spearhead of nationalism,[104] the relation between religious affiliation and national identity in the Balkans is more subtle and differs not only among Orthodox Christians and Muslims but also between the various groups subsumed under the categories of “Orthodoxy” or “Islam.” However, the ethno-religious belonging of both communities relates to divergent political imaginations and communal anticipations. Christians and Muslims, no matter their “actual” religious observance, share elements of an implicit social knowledge which is “what moves people without their knowing quite why or how, with what makes the real real and the normal normal, and above all with what makes ethical distinctions politically powerful.”[105] In this sense, religion in postOttoman Southeastern Europe is an essential part of non-believers’ collective and national identity, and this distinguishes Balkan from Western patterns of religion and secularism.

The Balkans may well be seen as fitting into a paradigm of “belonging without believing.” Nonetheless, the Balkans share with some parts of Western Europe the model of “vicarious religion,” a notion that sociologist of religion Grace Davie uses to designate the phenomenon of an active minority implicitly performing religious obligations on behalf of a larger

community that understands and approves of their behavior.[106] Davie focuses on the process by which churches, church leaders, and churchgoers perform ritual on behalf of others, believe on behalf of others, and embody moral codes on behalf of others. In this view, churches provide space for debating the unresolved issues of modern societies.[107] The model of “vicarious religion” seems well-represented in the Balkans as, for instance, the research on the fasting among Bulgarian Muslims during the Ramadan indicates.[108]

Within the evolving post-1989 situation in the Balkans, this pattern, however, functions differently, particularly in public space. In Bulgaria particularly, a religiously dedicated minority can act on behalf of an approving an often silent majority. However, instead of providing space for debating socially significant issues in their churches, Orthodox Christians tend to prefer using the churches for strictly religious ceremonies while staging their faith-related demands in public sphere. This “staging virtue”[109] is the product of various individuals and groups acting on behalf of the community in a deinstitutionalized manner, unfolding informal strategies of communication and public legitimization. Post-Communist Muslims, for their part, have rapidly learned how to couch their demands in “universalistic terms”[110] in the context of the mainstream society of non-Muslims and irreligious people. This pattern may be designated as “proxy religion” by which religious claims are publicly staged in “universalistic” language through the explicit or quietly condoned actions of representatives perceived as acting for the common good of the entire community and on its behalf.

*** 3. Agency and Structure, Divergence and Convergence

Public entanglements between religion and politics produce differing results in social practice contingent on two sets of factors. The first set of factors relates to recurrent social rules and conventions. The second set of factors relates to “agency,” understood as “the socially constructed capacity to act.”[111] The tension between agency and structure entails the question of how they relate to each other in what Antony Giddens has called structuration.[112] Despite the recent prevalence—at least in the study of religious communities, and particularly Islam—of approaches according to which nations are humanly constructed, imagined and invented, some scholars have insisted that the “primordialist” view on nations and ethnicities as historically given entities should not be abandoned. This is a highly politicized theoretical issue because primordial- ism has been heavily criticized partly due to the fear of justifying racism and nationalism despite the obvious difference “between explaining and justifying a phenomenon.”[113] As a ubiquitous topic in anthropological, historical and sociological research, the concept of agency provides a convenient “localizing toolkit” that helps avoid falling back unreflectively on supposedly essentializ- ing[114] generalizations.

In introducing the subject of Islam in the Balkans, Arolda Elbasani and Jelena Tosic, for example, write that “localized Islam [provides] an analytical lens that aptly captures the input of various interpreting agents, competing narratives, and choices of

faith.” They claim that the use of an agency-focused approach allows them to “transcend essentialized readings of Islam.”[115] Behar Sadriu argues that in the post-Communist period and the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the recent Syrian war has accelerated a process, whereby “Muslim Albanians in the Balkans are being ‘reconnected’ with a more cosmopolitan vision of their past.” On the other hand, he claims in his conclusion that Muslims are not just “passive recipients of nationalized categories of belonging—they are active agents shaping their own identities.”[116] Similarly, Laura Olson discusses the revitalized shared identity of Bulgarian Muslims, providing a vivid account of how “a new pious Islamic identity distinguishes itself sharply from local custom” to emphasize that “Muslim communities are not fixed or set apart.... Community is imagined, mediated by ideologies, images, and information.”[117] Such statements, however contradictory they might seem, follow a prevalent trend in contemporary social thought requiring from scholars an almost obligatory account on the role of agency. These developments are intertwined with the contested conceptualizations of unity and diversity, convergence and divergence.

More than four decades ago, the Egyptian social scientist Abdul Hamid el- Zein, equally devoted to interpretive anthropology and to Islam,[118] analyzed the views of Clifford Geertz and suggested the use of the plural islams instead of “Islam.”[119] Inspired by structuralism, el-Zein argued that “Islam,” “religion,” “economy,” “politics,” and even “saints”[120] do not really exist with any inherent meaning. “Islam,” he wrote, “without referring it to the facets of a system of which it is part, does not exist.”[121] Other scholars, such as Aziz al-Azmeh, pursued this line of reasoning to emphasize the multiplicity of Islamic experience and even claim that “there are as many Islams as there are situations that sustain it.”[122] More recently, some authors promote the “global history” approach by even suggesting that the “Muslim world” likewise has never existed and that “the construction of the Muslim world was a product of Muslim subjecthood under empire and a means to criticize European racism.”[123]

Shahab Ahmed, in turn, proposed anew the question “What is Islam?” but he was more cautious than others. Along with the classical views of Islam as law, he likewise rejected what he called the “islams-not-Islam” approach.[124] The problem with such approaches which seek to fully de-compose religion, and in this case Islam, is that they fail to propose any definition. Shahab Ahmed himself eventually suggests that to conceptualize Islam as “meaning- making for the self in terms of hermeneutical engagement.”[125] But if Islam is any “hermeneutical engagement,” as Frank Griffel observes, “there is nothing left in societies dominated by Muslims that is not Islamic.”[126] Indeed, Ahmed is not convincing as to why we should embrace exactly this conceptualization of Islam among other classical and more recent views but he manages to produce one remarkable effect. Struggling against “essentialism,” he suggests a total generalization in which there is no difference between idea and fact, religion and culture, norm and practice.

The study of “little traditions,” and particularly Islam in local contexts, faces the challenge “to describe and analyze how the universalistic principles of Islam have been realized in various social and historical contexts without representing Islam as a seamless essence on

the one hand or as a plastic congeries of beliefs and practices on the other.”[127] The distinction between norm and practice, “great” and “little” traditions initially helped scholars to analyze different connections between the religious traditions as known through their normative texts and exegetical paradigms and their interpretations in a given local or “popular” context. Subsequently, the use of the notion of the “local” has often led to a misleading mixture: “local” has been equated with the “provincial” vulgarizing of the beliefs and practices conceived of as coming from an “authentic” high culture. Therefore, without neglecting the role of agency, individual choice, and diversity in social practice, we suggest refreshing the search for a middle ground in order to grasp how the universalistic elements of Orthodox Christianity and (mostly Sunni) Islam are communicated in practice and of how modes of communication affect religious “universals.”[128] Linking all individual believers to God, Islam is not only normatively defined as the “firmest tie” (al-‘uirwa al-wuthqd),[129] but—as Orthodox Christianity is for Balkan Christians—functions as a major vehicle of collective identity, communal belonging, and social cohesion.

The analysis of religion today, particularly Islam, bristles with well-intended dicta, such as the phrase that “Islam is what Muslims do” or the claims that identities are “not fixed but fluid, changing according to subjective evaluation by individuals and groups of circumstances at a given time and place [as they] are not primordial or a fixed essence.”[130] However, the ubiquitous and persistent re-confirmation of such assumptions, even if theoretically coherent within their own conceptual paradigm, does not suffice anymore for the understanding of the complexity of religion and collective identities. The fear of “essentialism” is turned into a standardized accusation, particularly by scholars who say they adopt an “activist approach to studying cultural and historical heritage.”[131] But seeking to avoid stereotypes “produced in the West,” should not result in creating “counterstereotypes of the West.”[132] As William Hagen has remarked regarding “violence and cruelty” in the Balkans, “[a]lthough journalists ... tend to ‘essentialize’ Balkan violence—that is, to treat it as inherent in Balkan cultures—it is postmodern orthodoxy in the academy to insist that it is “socially constructed.” Neither perspective is very enlightening.”[133]

Religion is far from being a timeless, ahistorical and monolithic whole. At the same time, it is not, as many imagine it, “putty in the hands of exegetes—as if a heritage could successfully be interpreted to mean whatever one wanted and all interpretations were equally plausible to one’s fellow believers.”[134] One can drown in diversity even though the many voices claim to speak for Islam or Christianity, not just some part of them. Religious traditions change but in a time-consuming and gradual way. Charles Taylor notes that belief in God has had a different meaning in the years 1500 and 2000. The same goes for creedal suppositions. He writes, “this emerges as soon as we take account of the fact that all beliefs are held within a context or framework of the taken- for-granted, which usually remains tacit, and may even be as yet unacknowledged by the agent, because never formulated.”[135] Therefore, some structural underpinnings of “staging virtue”[136] at the interface of religion, politics, and identity remain socially implicit.

*** 4. Conclusion

In the long-run, taken-for-granted understandings of belief and practice change, but often in incremental ways so that actors are not aware of what is gained and what is lost. Background understandings are just that. As Taji- Farouki and Poulton write, “Islam in the Balkans has never been monolithic, having always had a broad variety of forms and expressions,”[137] and the same is likewise perfectly true for Orthodox Christianity. These “implicit” forms and expressions of intertwined religion, politics, and identity in the Balkans that traversed do change but within a time-consuming process rooted in the social structure.

After the collapse of Communism in Bulgaria and the splintering of Yugoslavia, Muslim and Orthodox Christian identities have been revitalized, with Christians and Muslims evoking different religious and historical antecedents symbolically represented in the Byzantine and Ottoman past of the Balkans. Today, the transnationalization of religious identities marks certain processes of convergence observed against the backdrop of the otherwise predominant diversity in Southeastern Europe. That convergence does not mean that religious communities are “monolithic” or altogether bound up to a “fixed” identity. Identities remain multiple but their religious component gains an increased public significance. Developments in Bulgaria and the Balkans, as well as some comparisons with regions as the Middle East and phenomena as transnational Salafism or hijab controversies, signal that such homogenizing forces are at work differently among Muslims and Orthodox Christians, including when they pursue religious arguments in a secular public space.

Orthodox Christians stage their religious affiliation in multiple ways of believing and belonging, albeit with an emphasis on bringing religion to the fore in terms of belonging—even without believing. From the perspective of national identity, the Balkan pattern of continuing and transforming the Ottoman organization of communal life in a millet-like model under the emerging modern nation-states shows that even in this respect there is not necessarily a single model of secularism, as indicated by the notable exception with the emergence of the Albanian nation. Due to this multiplicity of experience and forms of modern identity, it is appealing to think of Balkan secularities rather than of a single type of secularism embedded in the classical Western ideal.

The overall Balkan model of milletic secularism, as well as the exceptions from it, prove that the role religion—be it Christianity or Islam with their respective Byzantine and Ottoman legacies—has been transformed by modernity but have not vanished at all. Even the most dedicated communist states in Eastern Europe had to build their ideology on an attempt to replace these “old” religions with “secular religions” based on Marxist revolutionary messianism to try trump Christianity and Islam altogether. These phenomena indicate that secularities—in re-imaging communal life by evoking religious heritages and historical antecedents—entail a traceable longue duree beyond Europe and beyond modernity.

For Muslims in the post-communist period, the transnationalization of religious experience, the ease of travel, internet, Facebook and Twitter have fostered a different type of a higher level of belonging to the global imagined Muslim community—the umma. More mainstream, observant Muslims are increasingly abandoning local syncretic practices and seek to share the universal, core beliefs and rituals with their coreligionists in Turkey, the Middle East, and elsewhere. However different Orthodox Christianity and Islam are in terms of doctrine and ritual, the identities of their adherents need to be further studied comparatively in a search for the implicit religious underpinnings of political imagination and secularism.

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** Chapter 2: Regulating Religious Freedoms in the 21st Century

Nationality, Religion, and Symphonic Secularism

Kristen Ghodsee

Abstract

This chapter interrogates Western attempts to render Eastern Orthodoxy as a fundamentally “undemocratic” religious tradition. While contemporary scholars have critiqued the ontological imperialism of Western human rights discourses, they do so only with regard to Islam. This chapter provides a close examination of three cases against Bulgaria at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between 1996 and 2011: the case of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria (application no. 30985/96—judg- ment 2000), the case of Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria (application no. 39023/97—final judgment 2005), and the case of Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and others v. Bulgaria (applications nos. 412/03 and 35677/04—final judgment 2009). In all three of these cases the ECtHR assumed a distinctly Western norm of secularism, which it imposed on a society that has a long history of church-state collaboration wherein temporal and spiritual powers work together to promote religious pluralism. This doctrine is referred to as symphoneia, and has been a core theological principle of Eastern Orthodox Christianity since the time of the Byzantine Empire.

Despite the long history of symphoneia, however, the ECtHR repeatedly roots the “Eastern” tendency for states to regulate religious communities to the Communist past, and it is convenient that most Eastern Orthodox majority states fell on the non-democratic side of the Iron Curtain (with the notable exception of Greece). The particular conception of religion that underlies the contemporary Bulgarian understanding of the appropriate relationship between the church and state reaches as far back as 1054 and the Great Schism between Western Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Thus, rather than simply promoting a European conception of human rights and the legal framework necessary to maintain a “democratic” society, the ECtHR imposes a specifically Protestant conception of religion on Eastern Orthodox countries, in the same way that it imposes a Protestant-infused secularism on Islamic countries or upon Muslim minorities in Western Europe. In the end, the

chapter suggests that the universalism of Western human rights discourses is perhaps more compatible with the supra-national universalisms of Islam than it is with the ethnonational particularisms of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

Keywords

Bulgaria — European Court of Human Rights — Eastern Orthodoxy — Symphoneia — religious freedom — Eastern Europe

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Since the democratic transitions of 1989, the protection of religious freedom has been a core component of post-Communist constitutions, and almost all states are signatories of the European Convention on Human Rights (echr). Article 9 of the Convention guarantees citizens within the signatory countries the freedom of religion and allows individuals the possibility to sue their own governments in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, France, if they believe their human right to freedom of conscience has been violated. Although the echr allows for states to regulate religious affairs, if they are deemed by the Court “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others,”[138] the Court has consistently found Eastern Orthodox states such as Bulgaria, Greece, Moldova, etc. in violation of Article 9 for not maintaining a proper separation of church and state.

This chapter is a close examination of the three cases against Bulgaria at the ECtHR between 1996 and 2011: the case of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria (application no. 30985/96—judgment 2000), the case of Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria (application no. 39023/97—final judgment 2005), and the case of Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and others v. Bulgaria (applications nos. 412/03 and 35677/04—final judgment 2009). I argue that in all three of these cases the ECtHR assumes a distinctly Western norm of secularism, which it imposes on a society that has a long history of church-state collaboration wherein temporal and spiritual powers work together to promote religious pluralism. This doctrine is referred to as symphoneia, and has been a core theological principle of Eastern Orthodox Christianity since the time of the Byzantine Empire.

Despite the long history of symphoneia, the ECtHR repeatedly roots the “Eastern” tendency for states to regulate religious communities to the Communist past, and it is convenient that most Eastern Orthodox majority states fell on the non-democratic side of the Iron Curtain (with the notable exception of Greece). The particular conception of religion that underlies the contemporary Bulgarian understanding of the appropriate relationship between the

church and state reaches as far back as 1054 and the Great Schism between Western Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Thus, rather than simply promoting a European conception of human rights and the legal framework necessary to maintain a "democratic" society, the ECtHR imposes a specifically Protestant conception of religion on Eastern Orthodox countries, in the same way that it imposes a Protestant-infused secularism on Islamic countries or upon Muslim minorities in Western Europe. In the end, I suggest that the universalism of Western human rights discourses is perhaps more compatible with the supra-national universalisms of Islam than it is with the ethno-national particularisms of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

*** 1. Talal Asad's Critique

The anthropologist Talal Asad has called for a more historicized examination of the meaning of religion and secularism in different states, critiquing secularism as an Enlightenment-based political project that assumes a very limited view of religion.[139] He argues that secularization projects, whether externally imposed or willingly imported, inevitably privilege a Western European ideal of religion because they seek to subsume conceptions of religion that place an emphasis on embodied practices and rituals in the public sphere. Asad roots the contemporary concept of religion in post-Reformation Western Europe and emerging distinctions between the public and private sphere, viewing secularization process as the "forcible redefinition of religion as belief, and of religious belief, sentiment, and identity as personal matters that belong to the newly emerging space of private (as opposed to public) life."[140]

This new understanding of religion derives from Christianity and the struggles in Western Europe to replace faith and superstitions with science and reason in the public domain. In other words, the secular imperative of keeping faith in the private sphere is a smoke screen for establishing the hegemony of a distinctly Protestant conception of religion.[141] This critique of secularism has become the template for recent explorations of liberalism and secularization processes in the post-colonial context, particularly those that wish to explore the inner logics of Islam.[142] Asad's critical analysis of secularization in the Muslim world demonstrates how the demands of Western conceptions of church-state relations can amount to a form of ideological cultural (i.e. Christian) imperialism. But his critique is based on a very selective genealogy of Christianity, a genealogy that excludes the Eastern Orthodox Church and conflates Christianity with Western Christianity.

Although there are obvious theological differences, Islam and Eastern Orthodoxy have traditionally been othered by the West—orientalized and essentialized as fundamentally non-European and non-modern. From the earliest days of the Enlightenment, Orthodox symphoneia was derided as a pejoratively Byzantine form of government. In his 1689 "A Letter Concerning Toleration," John Locke condemned state interference in Church dogma, comparing Henry viii and his self-serving heirs in England to the Orthodox, "caesaro-papist" Emperors in the East.[143] More recently, Samuel Huntington relegated the Eastern

Orthodox world to the status of a completely separate civilization from the West because the East did not benefit from, “the separation and the recurrent clashes between Church and State.”[144] In its 2009 decision, even the European Court of Human Rights explicitly stated that “democratic societies” should not have governments that interfere with religious communities, even if those religious communities have always been intertwined with state authority.[145]

*** 2. Symphoneia in Bulgaria in Historical Perspective

The long history of Eastern Orthodoxy in Bulgaria is an essential foundation for the close reading of the ECtHR cases that I propose to do in this chapter, but I have engaged with these historical discourses and their modern cultural manifestations elsewhere.[146] The key point is that for centuries those self-identifying as Bulgarians have been taught that Bulgarian ethnic (and later national) identity is intimately bound up with the establishment and the maintenance of an autocephalous Bulgarian Orthodox Church. This church, from its inception, had close links with the head of state, be it a Tsar, a democratically elected prime minister or a Communist General Secretary. Moreover, this historical link between temporal and spiritual authorities is one of the key reasons informing the Great Schism between Eastern and Western Christendom in 1054; Eastern Orthodox Churches refused to subsume regionally based patriarchates to the authority of the Pope in Rome. In Bulgaria, it was ironically the Communists who went the furthest away from Bulgarian traditions in their attempt to separate the church from the state and vice versa.

When Bulgaria achieved its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, the Turnovo Constitution established Bulgarian Orthodoxy as the traditional religion of the new state.[147] This gave the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (boc) a privileged position in Bulgarian society, but this also meant that it was fused with the Bulgarian state during the years of Bulgaria’s alliance with Germany in wwi and wwii. When the Communists took power in 1944, state officials began the process of removing all religious education from public schools in an attempt to impose secularism.[148] The boc strongly opposed the secularization of education, but the Communist government closely followed Soviet antireligious policies, believing that religion would undermine the modernization process. In 1946, the government passed laws only recognizing marriages performed by civil authorities and nationalizing church properties and many charitable foundations.[149]

Named after Bulgaria’s first Communist premier, the 1947 Dimitrov constitution firmly established the separation of church and state by removing the language that had once recognized Orthodoxy as the traditional religion of Bulgaria. Exarch Stefan (the spiritual leader of the boc at the time) opposed these changes, and was forced into retirement by the Communist government in 1948. State officials replaced him with a church leader more favorably disposed to their agenda. At the end of that same year, the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided to take a firm stand against the lingering “bourgeois” and religious influences on society by nationalizing monasteries and seminaries. During this

time, many priests who opposed the regime were also imprisoned or sent to work camps.[150]

But the Bulgarian government did not want to destroy the church. Their goal was to control it as a tool of the state. The passage of the 1949 Denominations Act placed the Bulgarian Orthodox Church under the authority of the Communist government. Although Article 1 of the 1949 Denominations Act states that "[a]ll people in Bulgaria are given the opportunity of freedom of religion and conscience,"[151] the law heavily proscribed the activities of all religious groups in Bulgaria, including that of the boc. Article 12 of the Act allowed the state (through the Directorate of Religious Denominations) to dismiss any clergy member who was suspected of working against the "democratic order of the country" or of jeopardizing the "public safety" or "good morals" of the population. This in effect gave the Bulgarian state regulatory control over the religious establishment of all denominations, a tradition that was not in contradiction with the internal canons of the boc.

After Stalin's death, there was a relaxation of religious persecution in Bulgaria and many of the priests who had been sent to labor camps were granted amnesty. Still, religion was frowned upon in public life and social mobility was tied to atheism. All life cycle rituals previously performed by the church (baptisms, marriages, funerals) were replaced by socialist rituals created by the state.[152] Although the Communist government was certainly heavy handed in its regulation of spiritual affairs, it did not invent such statechurch collaborations. Instead, the government was building upon a long tradition of symphoneia whereby temporal leaders and spiritual leaders work together for the purported good of society.

Toward the end of the Communist era, the government of Todor Zhivkov approved the election of the religious leaders of its two largest denominations: the Patriarch of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Chief Mufti of all Bulgaria's Muslims. Patriarch Maxim was elected in 1971 for a life term as the uncontestable leader of the boc. In pre-1944 Bulgaria, it was the Tsar (the official head of state) who traditionally convened the ecumenical council to elect the Patriarch, and by canon law the Tsar and Patriarch should work together in a symphonic relationship. Although the Communist government had officially abolished the monarchy, the continuing cooperation between church and state followed this long tradition of symphoneia. In the case of the Chief Mufti, members of the Muslim denomination came together for a national conference in 1988 and elected Nedim Gendzhev. He was accepted for this position with the support of the Zhivkov government.

Patriarch Maxim and Chief Mufti Gendzhev were not only responsible for the spiritual needs of their faith-mates, but were also in charge of all of the properties and incomes of their respective denominations: the churches, mosques, monasteries, houses and flats, charitable trusts, schools and in the case of the boc, a candle factory which produced all candles for Bulgarian churches and was the largest source of income for the denomination. Although Maxim and Gendzhev were sympathetic to the Communist leadership, for those Bulgarians

who remained theists between 1944 and 1989, there was nothing in their selection that contravened church doctrine or the statute regulating the organization of the Muslim community. Both of these men were the accepted spiritual and financial leaders of their religious communities in November 1989 when Zhivkov suddenly resigned and the nation began its unexpected transition to democracy and free markets.

*** 3. Religion and the Bulgarian Political Scene after 1989

The spiritual liberalization that followed the collapse of Communism could have led to a healthy revival of Bulgaria's traditional faiths. After 1989, however, when the freedom of religious expression for Bulgaria's theists was restored after more than forty years of state-sponsored atheism, those who had remained devout emerged to find themselves facing bitter internal disputes over who their leaders should be. In the fifteen years that followed the onset of Bulgaria's political and economic transition, the leadership of the Eastern Orthodox and Muslim communities spilt into rival factions vying for power and control over each community's properties and resources. These rivalries plunged both postsocialist religious communities into chaos, and ultimately led to three lawsuits against the Bulgarian government before the ECtHR for human rights violation of Article 9 of the echr.

With the help of West European and American legal advisors, the Bulgarian constitution was rewritten to reflect new, post-authoritarian, democratic values and was adopted in 1991. Article 13 of the new Constitution declares that:

1. The practicing of any religion shall be unrestricted.

1. Religious institutions shall be separate from the State.

1. Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria.

1. Religious institutions and communities, and religious beliefs shall not be used to political ends.

Article 37 further expounds on these provisions:

1. The freedom of conscience, the freedom of thought and the choice of religion and of religious or atheistic views shall be inviolable. The state shall assist the maintenance of

tolerance and respect among the believers from different denominations, and among believers and non-believers.

1. The freedom of conscience and religion shall not be practiced to the detriment of national security, public order, public health and morals, or of the rights and freedoms of others.[153]

Thus, the new democratic Bulgarian state retained the right to “assist” with the “maintenance” of tolerance and respect, leaving the door open for direct state intervention in the spiritual affairs of its largest religious denominations, particularly with regard to Eastern Orthodoxy, now once again enshrined in the Constitution as the traditional religion of Bulgaria. Again, these constitutional provisions (allowing for state regulation of religion) were not a continuation of Communist policies (as the European Court would later have it), but rather the continuation of a centuries old practice of church-state collaboration to maintain national security and public and moral order. And it was in precisely this moment of political and economic transition that public and moral order was in very short supply. Bulgaria’s religious schisms occurred during the most tumultuous period of Bulgaria’s recent history.

The immediate post-1989 decade was a time of unprecedented social insecurity. There were food shortages and temporary rationing because Bulgaria’s hard currency deficit did not allow for the importation of food or consumer goods to make up for the shortfalls.[154] Between 1990 and 1997 the economy was choked with hyperinflation, banking collapses, and rampant unemployment. In the first seven years of democracy, Gross Domestic Product declined in real terms by almost 25 percent; consumer prices were twenty times higher in 1997 than they were in 1990.[155] Bulgarians experienced real poverty for the first time in decades.

As the economy went into free-fall and one government fell after another, American and Western European funds to support the creation of political pluralism and civil society also flooded the country, as did foreign religious workers promising salvation and hoping to poach would-be believers faced with internal schisms in their traditional denominations. As early as 1991, the Jehovah’s Witnesses registered themselves in Sofia.[156] The Pentecostal/ Charismatic international missions began work in Bulgaria in 1992.[157] By January 1992, Bulgaria was already home to the Mormons, the Hare Krishnas, the Religious Community of the “White Brethren,” The Children of God, and the Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon.[158] The first American missionaries from the Church of the Nazarene arrived in May 1994, reaching Bulgarians through “sports evangelism.”[159] The Presbyterian Church in America began its “church-planting” missions in 1996.[160] According to the Presbyterians, the Mormons sent over 5,000 missionaries to Eastern Europe in the summer of 1991 and had bought over 1000 apartments in Bulgaria to house their religious workers by the late 1990s.[161]

The Bulgarian population did not always welcome these religious workers, but they were better organized, had access to greater resources and were often the only proponents of a moral discourse.[162] The boc and the Muslim leadership could have reasserted themselves as moral leaders in a rudderless and increasingly immoral society characterized by corruption and organized criminality. Instead, they fell apart. At the exact moment when members of the former security services and Communist elites violently began carving up state-owned assets, religious leaders were preoccupied with internal divisions and a crass competition for material resources and political power.

*** 4. Postsocialist Schisms in the Muslim Religious Denomination

Immediately after the events of November 1989, Nedim Gendzhev remained Chief Mufti and should have continued in that office until 1994 under the then existing statute for the Bulgarian Muslim denomination. Gendzhev saw himself as a spokesman for Bulgaria's Muslim community and openly supported of the continued rule of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (bsp), assuring the world that Bulgarian Muslims now enjoyed freedom of religion and no longer faced state oppression.[163] Gendzhev was not neutral in his political allegiances, and believed that the Bulgarian socialists would be best suited to manage the transition to democracy. His lack of political neutrality soon precipitated a call for his resignation from the Western-supported Union of Democratic Forces (udf).[164]

By the end of 1991, the udf won the parliamentary elections and they formed a coalition government with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (mrf), a political party primarily representing Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish minority. As soon as the udf/mrf were in office, their government began orchestrating Gendzhev's removal from the Chief Muftiship. In January 1992, Muslim clergy demonstrated in the southeastern town of Kardzhali, a stronghold of the mrf, and students in Sofia called on all Bulgarian Muslims to demand Gendzhev's removal.[165] At the same time, the udf launched an investigation into whether or not Gendzhev's election as Mufti in 1988 was legitimate (and found it was not) as well as into his alleged misuse and embezzlement of funds given to the Chief Mufti's office in 1991.[166] At that time, Gendzhev claimed that the allegations against him were all coming from the mrf in a bid to take control of the Muslim community for political purposes.[167]

Ahmed Dogan, the leader of the mrf, had a great interest in who was in control of the spiritual life of Bulgaria's Muslim communities. Even though many of the top politicians of the mrf, including Dogan, were atheists, they understood that control of the Chief Muftiship could translate into representation in parliament. The majority of Bulgaria's Muslims were poor and rural, and despite the heavy-handedness of the name changes and the forced emigration of Turks in 1989, they were still sympathetic to socialist principles. Furthermore, mosques served as the political and social centers of most Muslim villages, and the imams and hodzhas (local religious teachers) were greatly respected for their education and mastery of the Qur'an. If the Chief Muftiship remained under the control of Gendzhev and the bsp, many Muslims would continue to vote for the

socialists in local and parliamentary elections, effectively cutting into the mrf's constituency. The Muftiship also had access to rents and other revenues generated by Islamic charitable trusts. These could (and would) become a useful source for campaign funds. Since the Chief Mufti was elected by a national conference of Muslims, the mrf could convene a new national conference and elect a new Mufti.

In February of 1992, the udf/mrf government invalidated Gendzhev's election to the post of Chief Mufti in 1988. He was ordered to leave the offices of the Chief Muftiship in Sofia. The government appointed three people to serve as a temporary governing body of the Muslim community until a national conference to elect a new Mufti could be held.[168] Gendzhev appealed the decision and the Bulgarian Constitutional Court supported him, arguing that the government had no grounds upon which to void the 1988 election. In June, Gendzhev and his associates re-occupied the building of the Chief Mufti's office. One day later, Muslims bussed in from Kardzhali protested outside of the building, and the police (on orders from the udf/mrf government) helped to forcibly evict Gendzhev.[169]

In September, Gendzhev issued a statement claiming that his was the only High Muslim Council, and that the alternate Council that was trying to convene a national conference to elect a new Chief Mufti was illegitimately created by the mrf.[170] Since the entire Muslim clergy associated with Gendzhev was suspected of collaborating with the Communists and subsequently of being allied with the bsp, new delegates for the conference were being sought, particularly those who were sympathetic to the udf and mrf. On September 19, 1992, a national conference was held, attended by 665 delegates chosen by the alternate High Council.[171] Fikri Sali Hasan, the mrf's chosen candidate, was elected as the new Chief Mufti. Hasan was only 29 years old, and the existing statute of the Muslim denomination forbade the election of anyone under 35 years old. Nevertheless, the udf/mrf government recognized Hasan's election.

During 1993 and 1994, the dispute between the Hasan faction and the Gendzhev faction continued. In effect, there were two Supreme Muslim Councils that claimed to represent all of Bulgaria's Muslims, and who could convene national conferences by choosing their own delegates to elect a Chief Mufti of their liking. Gendzhev and his supporters convened yet another national conference,[172] and not surprisingly, Gendzhev was elected the President of the High Muslim Council, with a close associate of his elected as Chief Mufti. Gendzhev and his followers immediately applied for recognition from the Directorate of Religious Denominations, the government body in charge of registering new religions. At the same time, Gendzhev tried to form an ethnic Turkish political party, the Democratic Party of Justice, to challenge the mrf's near monopoly of the Turkish vote in the 1994 parliamentary elections (which he failed to do).

A socialist government returned to power in 1994, and one of its first acts was to issue a decree recognizing Nedim Gendzhev and his followers as the legitimate leaders of Bulgaria's Muslims. Gendzhev took over the Sofia headquarters of the Chief Muftiship by force. Hasan

and his followers protested their removal from office. They submitted a complaint to the Chief Prosecutor's Office that Gendzhev and his followers were squatters in the Chief Mufti's office. But the bsp authorities disregarded the complaint, stating that Gendzhev and his High Muslim Council had been recognized by the appropriate authorities and therefore had the right to be in the building. Hasan appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that his High Muslim Council was the rightful leadership of the Muslim community. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

In 1995, Hasan and his supporters convened yet another national conference with their own delegates which re-elected him as Chief Mufti. They re-applied to the Directorate of Religious Denominations for recognition as a separate religious organization, but the government refused to consider the application since the Muslims already had a Chief Mufti. Hasan appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that the government had no right to impose one leadership on a religious community. Twice the Supreme Court agreed with Hasan, but the Directorate still refused to recognize him. Following these events, Hasan filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights against the bsp government, claiming that his religious rights as a Muslim had been violated by the Directorate's refusal to allow him to register a religious denomination of his own.[173] This case will be discussed in detail below.

In 1996, the Bulgarian economy imploded on the socialist's watch and a udf/mrf government was returned to power in 1997. Hasan immediately petitioned the new Directorate of Religious Denominations demanding the immediate removal of Gendzhev and his Chief Mufti. Gendzhev tried to preempt his removal under the udf/mrf government by proposing a "unification conference" where the two rival High Muslim Councils would convene a national conference together and elect a new Chief Mufti. Elections were held throughout the country to select representatives to the national unification conference, and local mayors were supposed to certify the election results. Many local mayors, however, were party members of the mrf, and Gendzhev claimed that the election process had once again been influenced by mrf activists who were supporting Mustafa Alish Hadzhi, a close colleague of Hasan's as Chief Mufti.[174] In two instances, Gendzhev claimed that mrf representatives had threatened local mayors to take possession of the ballot boxes before the votes could be properly counted. He also claimed that at least 100 of the delegates to the conference were mayors elected on mrf tickets.

Gendzhev and some of his allies in the Muslim community pulled out of the supposedly rigged unification conference at the last minute, and the congress was convened without them. Hasan's High Muslim Council regained control of all of the organizational aspects and assets of Bulgaria's Muslim community, and Mustafa Alish Hadzhi became Chief Mufti. The now udf/ mrf-controlled Directorate of Religious Dominations accepted the results of the unification conference and removed Gendzhev from his position. The new leaders also voted to begin a criminal investigation into the alleged unlawful activities of Gendzhev. Gendzhev protested his removal, and appealed the Directorate's decision through the Bulgarian courts all the way up to the Supreme Administrative Court. But the udf/mrf government accepted the results of the unification conference, dismissing numerous appeals. Gendzhev followed Hasan's example and filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights.

What is important to remember is that neither of the Muslim factions had differences in belief or in their practice of Islam. Each side was openly allied with a political coalition and each change in the control of the Chief Muftiship occurred after an election where one political group or the other took power and reappointed either Hasan or Gendzhev as spiritual leader of all Bulgarian Muslims. Religion was politics and politics was religion, and few involved in the dispute saw a problem with the synergy between the two. In both cases, the applicants to the ECtHR were strategically deploying the human rights language as a way to supersede the authority of a Bulgarian government controlled by an opposition party. The Court, however, would insist on seeing these disputes through the lens of human rights because the applicants were members of religious communities. If they had applied as members of different factions of rival political parties, the ECtHR would not have heard their cases.

Lawyers for the Bulgarian government went to great lengths to convince the Court that this was not a case about religious freedom, but rather a struggle for power within which the Court had become a pawn of both sides. According to one of the official ECtHR judgments:

In the [Bulgarian] Government’s opinion, the applicants [Hasan’s faction] were pursuing their own personal career by falsely presenting before the Court the events complained of as involving human rights issues. If their logic was followed, every leader of a religious community who had lost the confidence of the believers could lodge an application. That would create a dangerous precedent. The Government urged the Court to distance itself from such essentially political disputes.[175]

The first case, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria (application no. 30985/96), moved through the Court for almost four years and was finally decided in 2000. Despite the continuing evidence of political rivalry between the two religious factions in Bulgaria, the ECtHR insisted on seeing the forcible removal of Hasan from the Chief Muftiship by the bsp government as a violation of religious rights. The Court defended its decision by arguing that:

the believers’ right to freedom of religion encompasses the expectation that the community will be allowed to function peacefully, free from arbitrary State intervention. Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society. [my emphasis]

Here the Court openly asserts that there cannot be pluralism without religious communities that are autonomous from the state, even if those religious communities are themselves intricately involved in determining the leaders of the state. Even though the divide between Hasan and Gendzhev had nothing to do with spiritual matters, the Court claimed that a religious community must have the right to choose its own leaders free from state

intervention, disregarding the fact that both Hasan and Gendzhev were hand-picked by political leaders and then elected by opposing politicized religious constituencies.

The ECtHR would have to revisit its own decision again in the Case of Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria (application no. 39023/97), which was Gendzhev's complaint against his own removal by the udf/mrf government in 1997. In this second case, the Court also questioned whether the Bulgarian government had the right to force the Muslim denomination in Bulgaria to have a single, unified leadership. According to ECtHR's case-law, "State measures favouring a particular leader or group in a divided religious community or seeking to compel the community, or part of it, to place itself under a single leadership against its will would constitute an infringement of the freedom of religion," and the Bulgarian case was certainly one where the government was favoring one religious leader over another, just not always the same government and not always the same religious leader.

In Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR challenged the udf/mrf government's right to enforce the election results of the so-called unification conference, and especially the role of the police in forcibly evicting Gendzhev from the offices of the Chief Muftiship. As in the Hasan case, the defending lawyers for Bulgaria argued that the Court was involving itself in an internal dispute that had nothing to do with religious freedoms. Since both factions of the Muslim rivalry shared the same religious beliefs, the government saw no reason in registering two separate Chief Muftis and adjudicating a just division of property between the two groups. The Bulgarian government also invoked its responsibility to maintain public order, arguing that the divisions in the Muslim community had destabilized society.

The [Bulgarian] Government stated that the divisions within the Muslim religious community in Bulgaria since 1989 had been caused by conflicts of a political and personal nature. In 1997 efforts had been made to overcome these differences and unify the community.... The Government also underlined that the case did not concern a process of putting two religious communities under a single leadership but a situation where one religious community had two leaderships. Contradictory decisions of the authorities during the period 1992–1997, including those criticised by the Court in its Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria judgment, had resulted in confusion as to the leadership of the Muslim community. Unlike in previous years, however, in 1997 the State had not interfered in the internal affairs of the community but had only assisted it in its efforts to achieve unification, as part of the authorities' duty under the Constitution to help maintaining a climate of tolerance in religious life.

The Court admitted that Hasan had been unlawfully removed from office by the bsp government in 1995, and that the udf/mrf's forcible removal of Gendzhev in 1997 was an action taken to rectify what the Court had already deemed a previously unlawful action by a previous Bulgarian government. In this regard the Court agreed that the actions taken

against Gendzhev by the state did pursue the legitimate goal of restoring the unlawfully removed Chief Mufti to his offices, and that “the interference with the internal organisation of the Muslim community was in principle aimed at the protection of public order and of the rights and freedoms of others.” In the end, however, the Court found that the actions of the Bulgarian government were unnecessary in a “democratic society.” The following extended passage from the 2005 judgment of the ECtHR captures the essence of the Court’s decision to rule against Bulgaria:

The Court reiterates that the autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society. While it may be necessary for the State to take action to reconcile the interests of the various religions and religious groups that coexist in a democratic society, the State has a duty to remain neutral and impartial in exercising its regulatory power and in its relations with the various religions, denominations and beliefs. What is at stake here is the preservation of pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy, one of the principal characteristics of which is the possibility it offers of resolving a country’s problems through dialogue, even when they are irksome.… It is true that States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in the particularly delicate area of their relations with religious communities. The Court reiterates, however, that in democratic societies the State does not need in principle to take measures to ensure that religious communities remain or are brought under a unified leadership. The role of the authorities in a situation of conflict between or within religious groups is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other.

In both cases involving the Muslim community, the ECtHR assumes a separation of Church and State that did not reflect the reality of the Bulgarian situation and may have been in direct conflict with a local conception of religion, which accepts that spiritual and secular leaders should coordinate their efforts for the good of society. The facts on the ground were that religious leaders were directly involved in political machinations and were using their control of the Chief Muftiship to aid their political allies in Parliament. When the other side came into power, the religious leaders could go to the ECtHR and claim that their religious freedoms had been violated because the State had interfered in the internal dispute of a religious community. But what the Court failed to recognize, and what became even more apparent in the Court’s ruling on the schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, is that the Bulgarian religious tradition of both its Muslim and Christian communities is one that has never required a divide between the spiritual and temporal institutions.

*** 5. Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) v. Bulgaria

The religious studies scholar Janice Broun has well chronicled the ongoing schism of the boc after 1989,[176] and the boc schism followed a very similar pattern as that of the Muslim denomination, with religious leaders and clergymen affiliated with the “democratic forces” opposing the leadership of the Patriarch Maxim. The Alternate Orthodox Synod (aos) never

asserted a different set of religious beliefs, but rather questioned the legitimacy of Maxim's leadership. As in the Muslim case, the primary issue was that of property, with the aos wanting to gain control of many church buildings, monasteries and most importantly, the lucrative candle factory in Sofia.

The schism continued throughout the 1990s as power shifted back and forth between the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Union of Democratic Forces. Then in 2001, Bulgaria's pre-Communist Tsar declared his intention to run for Parliament. Simeon Saxecoburgotski formed a new political movement called the National Movement for Simeon the Second (nmss), and won the 2001 parliamentary elections in a landslide. Saxecoburgotski withed to end the schism in the boc and in 2002, the Bulgarian Parliament passed a new law on religious denominations, a law that would enrage human rights activists in Bulgaria and fell afoul of the ECtHR because it seemed to continue what the West Europeans claimed was a Communist attitude regarding the organization and regulation of religious communities.

The Parliamentary Assembly of Europe openly criticized the 2002 Denominations Act[177] and local human rights advocates claimed that it was even worse than the Communist law.[178] In it, the Bulgarian state's ability to regulate religious affairs in order to protect national security and public order was reaffirmed and the Directorate of Religion Denominations (which had been established by the Communists to replace the spiritual authority of the abolished monarchy) was kept in place. Furthermore, all religious groups in Bulgaria were still required to register with the Directorate if they wanted to engage in public activities. Finally, the status of the boc was further reified by exempting it from all of the formal registration procedures imposed on all other denominations, thereby affirming its status as the traditional religion of Bulgaria. In this section of the law, the Bulgarian Parliament asserted that the rightful Patriarch of the boc was Maxim, following the recognition of Maxim by all of the Patriarchs of the other Eastern Orthodox Churches and the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. After the implementation of the 2002 Denominations Act, all of the property of the boc fell under the control of Maxim and his followers. Police evicted the clergy associated with the aos from their churches.

Perhaps learning from the case of the Muslim denomination, the Bulgarian government under Saxecoburgotski invited the members of the Alternate Orthodox Synod to register their own new religious denomination provided that they make no claim on the property or resources of the Holy Synod under the leadership of Maxim. The goal of the government was to ensure that it was not forcing a religious community to have one leadership, thereby ensuring religious freedoms, while at the same time protecting the property rights of the Holy Synod. The aos sought legal remedies through the Bulgarian courts, but the judiciary upheld the 2002 Denominations Act. The aos eventually filed two complaints at the ECtHR in 2003 and 2004.

Once again the Court heard a Bulgarian applicant claiming a violation of Article 9 of the Convention. As with the Muslim denomination, the Court recognized that the Bulgarian

Orthodox community was divided; many believers sided with the aos for political (rather than theological) reasons and the members of the aos were longstanding clergymen in the Church who politically disagreed with Maxim’s continued leadership. Although the government represented the aos as a bunch of usurpers after Church property, the Court insisted that this was an issue of religious freedom and the right of believers to choose their own religious leaders, assuming that pluralism required an absolute separation of Church and State.

But unlike the Muslim statute which allowed for the election of a Chief Mufti every four to six years, all of the accepted canons of the Orthodox Church provided that a Patriarch is elected for life. Moreover, there is no canonical allowance for challenges to a Patriarch’s legitimacy. As far as canon law was concerned, Maxim was chosen to be Patriarch for the rest of this life, and he was thus recognized by the entire Eastern Orthodox world, which submitted opinions to the Court in favor of the Bulgarian government. Furthermore, since Maxim was elected for life by the very canons that the members of the aos claimed to believe in, the Bulgarian state was technically not interfering within an internal religious dispute. From the government’s position, “To accept the contrary would be tantamount to considering that by recognising the Pope as head of the Roman Catholic Church, the member States of the Council of Europe interfered with the rights of believers who did not recognise his leadership.”

From the Bulgarian government’s perspective, Maxim was the true Patriarch and the state had a responsibility to protect the rights and freedoms of those Bulgarians who believed that he was the legitimate leader of the boc. It is important to reiterate here that the government did not prevent the registration of a new Eastern Orthodox denomination by the aos, but rather worked to ensure the property rights of Maxim and his followers. The government argued that this violated no religious freedoms, but rather protected public order. Moreover, the Saxecoburgotski government was technically impartial to the disputes between the bsp and the udf that had caused the schism in the first place. The Prime Minister believed himself to be upholding the canons of the boc, and undoing the illegal occupation of churches that had occurred during various udf-controlled governments. Finally, in the Bulgarian government’s opinion, the Court had no jurisdiction to determine the legitimate leader of a religious faith, particularly a religious faith where canon law recognizes the authority of a designated temporal leader to intervene in internal disputes. With beautiful historical irony, the intervention under question had been made by the government of a man who was both the rightful heir to the Bulgarian throne and a democratically elected Prime Minister.

Since an ECtHR ruling against Bulgaria would set a dangerous precedent for all Eastern Orthodox majority countries, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew took a particular interest in the Court’s proceedings, submitting opinions to the Court in defense of the Bulgarian government. First, Bartholomew concurred that the boc was an ecumenical church administered by the Holy Synod. In accordance with its own internal statute, undermining the unity of the Church was a serious offence punishable by excommunication and anathema, and therefore the members of the aos were considered schismatics by their own

canons. Second, Patriarch Maxim had been elected and recognized worldwide as the head of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in 1971, including by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and all Orthodox Churches, and all Orthodox Churches had officially condemned the actions of the aos as an attempt to divide and weaken the boc. Third, the Ecumenical Patriarch submitted information to show that the aos had seized control of church properties with state assistance in the 1990s, and quoted local human rights activist reports that concurred that the members of the aos had been supported by the then Mayor of Sofia and other influential "democratic" politicians. As a result, the actions of the Bulgarian state after the 2002 passage of the Denominations Act were merely efforts to restore illegally gained properties in full accordance with Bulgarian law.

While the Court admitted that the case was not about religious beliefs but rather about the choice of leadership in a religious community, it still maintained that the situation was a case of human rights violations on behalf of the Bulgarian state, stating: "Were the organisational life of the community not protected by Article 9 of the Convention, all other aspects of the individual's freedom of religion would become vulnerable." Furthermore, although the Court recognized that States have the right to regulate religion to maintain public order and protect the rights of others, this regulation must pursue a legitimate aim, which is considered necessary for the smooth functioning of a "democratic society." The Bulgarian government claimed that protecting the property of the boc was a legitimate aim, and that it was necessary to maintain public order. The Court disagreed with the government's ability to decide what is considered a legitimate aim and argued that its "approach is not unusual, in particular, in cases concerning complex situations arising in the unique conditions of transition from a totalitarian State to democracy and the rule of law." The final decision of the Court used familiar language, stating:

The State's duty of neutrality and impartiality, as defined in the Court's case-law, is incompatible with any power on the State's part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs. Furthermore, in democratic societies the State does not need to take measures to ensure that religious communities remain or are brought under a unified leadership. The role of the authorities in a situation of conflict between or within religious groups is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other. State measures favouring a particular leader of a divided religious community or seeking to compel the community, or part of it, to place itself under a single leadership against its will would constitute an infringement of the freedom of religion.

The Bulgarian government tried to make these arguments before the Court, claiming that, "the unity of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was an important national goal of historical significance, with ramifications affecting the very fabric of the Bulgarian nation and its cultural identity. The Government believed that these considerations justified the impugned interference with the applicants' "rights." The applicants (the aos), however, claimed that the Bulgarian government had imposed unity on the religious community by recognizing the authority of Maxim and protecting his rights to all church properties.

The following quotation captures the Court’s thinking in its final judgment:

In the Court’s view, the fact that policies and actions interfering with fundamental rights have been undertaken in the pursuit of goals viewed as being of primary national importance is relevant in the analysis of the interference’s legitimate aim and proportionality but cannot be regarded as a justification in itself. The aims of the interference and the means for achieving them must be scrutinised for conformity with the Convention, which enshrines fundamental principles indispensable for the existence and functioning of the democratic societies that make up the Council of Europe. … Pluralism, which is the basic fabric of democracy, is incompatible with State action forcing a religious community to unite under a single leadership. As the Court has stated in the context of Article 11 of the Convention—also relevant here—the fact that what was at issue touched on national symbols and national identity is not sufficient. The national authorities must display particular vigilance to ensure that national public opinion is not protected at the expense of the assertion of minority views, no matter how unpopular they may be.. It follows that the unity of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, while it is a matter of the utmost importance for its adherents and believers and for Bulgarian society in general, cannot justify State action imposing such unity by force in a deeply divided religious community [my emphasis].

Based on this reasoning, the European Court found against the Bulgarian government and the Bulgarian taxpayers once again paid damages to the individual applicants (the members of the aos). The Bulgarian government, with the support of all other Orthodox Churches and the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, moved to appeal the decision of the Court in 2009. No appeal was allowed.

The situation with the schism in the boc and the ECtHR’s decision to hear the case of alleged state interference within the boc could be seen as a modern revisitation of the Great Schism of 1054. The case pitted the Court in Strasbourg against all of the Eastern Orthodox churches in the world as well as the ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople (Istanbul). Saxecoburgotski’s recognition of Maxim upheld the boc’s doctrine that Patriarchs are elected for life and reaffirmed the symphonic principles of Eastern Orthodoxy, the very principles that had been at least partially responsible for precipitating the Great Schism over a thousand years ago. Back in the 11th century, the Western Europeans believed that no temporal authority (king, emperor, tsar) should have precedence over spiritual affairs and that all Christian churches should recognize the authority of the Pope in Rome over their local sovereigns. How ironic that in 2009, the Western Europeans were once again arguing that spiritual affairs should be free from the influence of sovereign states. Replacing Rome with Strasbourg, it appears that the Western Christians are once again trying to tell the Eastern Christians how to organize a morally sound society and to root the ultimate source of moral authority in the West.

*** 6. Conclusion

This essay is not an argument against the value of human rights and their role in protecting basic political freedoms nor is it an uncritical defense of symphoneia. Instead, I interrogate Western attempts to render Eastern Orthodoxy as fundamentally “undemocratic.” Many contemporary scholars have gone to great lengths to point out the hypocrisy and ontological imperialism of Western human rights discourses, but only with regard to Islam. Indeed, many liberal scholars want to defend the religious rights of the post-colonial other against the “Protestanization” of all religions. The irony is that the East European ‘other’ is rarely is extended the same courtesy, even for infringements as relatively minor as having too cozy a relationship between temporal and spiritual authorities.

The reasons for this remain unclear. Perhaps it is the lingering effect of Cold War politics. Or it could be that universalistic religious fundamentalisms are more easily understood than particularistic ethno-religious nationalisms. Perhaps the collective, Enlightenment-based, Western proclivity toward uni- versalisms informs a European willingness to embrace the cultural differences of the universalistic other (Islam) while at the same time rendering the cultural differences of the particularistic other (Eastern Orthodoxy) intolerable, a subject for further research.

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** Chapter 3: Salafism Is Coming

“Balkan” versus “Arab” Islam in Bulgaria under Milletic Secularism

Simeon Evstatiev

Abstract

The chapter analyzes the dichotomy between “traditional” versus “non-traditional” Islam, widespread in the post-1989 Balkans, by foregrounding the case of Bulgaria where the latter has been referred to as “Arab” and increasingly as “radical Islam,” Wahhabism, and Salafism. The public deliberations around that dichotomy are juxtaposed as a twofold and complex social phenomenon differently impacting mainstream secular discourses and the discussions within the Muslim community. Demonstrating how “Arab Islam,” or Salafism, has been discussed as a “radical ideology” as opposed to “traditional religion,” the chapter brings to the fore ethnographic evidence from two Bulgarian localities, Ribnovo and Madan. It then analyzes a judicial case—a high profile lawsuit against thirteen Muslims at Pazardzhik Regional Court, which has foregrounded Salafism as a new subject of public discussions in Bulgaria seen as “unfitting” for the country’s pattern of communal coexistence. In Bulgaria and the Balkans, the dichotomy “traditional”—“Arab” Islam ensues from a specific neo-millet pattern of managing ethnic and religious diversity termed “milletic secularism.” A socio-the- oretical concept, milletic secularism evokes the Ottoman millet system and refers to divergent and competing contemporary transnational collective identities, loyalties and frames of reference coexisting within the same nation-state. The pattern of secularism in modern Bulgaria thus depicted resembles the way religious communities functioned within the Ottoman millet system but for both Muslims and non-Muslims in a reverse, upended way. Today, Muslims are a minority in a pluralist society and secular state governed on the basis of non-Muslim values and political procedures. The ongoing revitalization of Islam and the public discussions inspired by the increasingly transnational Muslim identity are analyzed against the backdrop of the tensions among the varieties of local Muslim religious experience (“little traditions”) and the increasing pursuit of a religious convergence through returning to doctrinal roots and strengthening the sense of belonging to the imagined community of Sunni Islam (“the great tradition”).

Keywords

Islam — re-Islamization — Salafism — tradition — Bulgaria — the Balkans — neo-millet — milletic secularism

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*** 1. Introduction: The Spread of a Dichotomy

Perceptions of a “traditional” as opposed to “non-traditional” Islam ranging from “Arab,” through Wahhabi or Salafi, to “radical” forms of Islamic experience inspired mostly by the Middle East is ubiquitous in Bulgaria and the Balkans. Such perceptions are spread in regions

where Muslims have for centuries been either a large minority or even a majority subjected to historical changes that brought about different types of religious syncretism, secularism, diminishing religiosity, or even state-sponsored atheism as in the case of the former Soviet realm dominated by Marxist-Leninism. Russian discourses of “Wahhabism” and some new trends in Central Asia indicate that many representatives of the official Muslim religious establishment in Russia, including the Supreme Mufti, dismissed “Wahhabi tenets” in the late 1990s and the early 2000s as contrary to the “traditional” Islam of the Muslim communities in Russia, describing them as an “Arab” influence with “foreign roots.”[179]

Such dichotomous narratives and divisions also characterize the political imagination of many people throughout Southeastern Europe, where the revival of Islam is further seen in “national” categories by contrasting “traditional” (moderate) and “external” (radical) forms of Islamic experience. These categories “capitalize upon notions of local Islam as being challenged by incoming foreign networks.”[180] Since the nineteenth century, the ongoing modernization throughout Eastern Europe entailed a de-Ottomanization of the former provinces of the Sublime Porte paralleled by a process of deIslamization related not only to the waves of forced emigration of Muslims to the Ottoman lands and subsequently to Turkey but to the comprehensive and often forced secularization pursued by the new nation-states.[181]

Islam did not vanish in Eastern Europe during the Communist period, but religious observance significantly diminished. In the course of recent decades, the inherited Muslim faith has been linked to practices that more mainstream observant Muslims increasingly perceive as superstition. Not surprisingly, the deep post-1989 social changes brought a re-Islamization[182] marked by striving towards a Muslim convergence. Under the conditions of a revitalization of Muslim identities, the dichotomy between “traditional” (or local) versus “Arab” (or alien) Islam has rapidly proliferated in Bulgarian public space.

In 2005 Selim Mehmed, formerly Bulgaria’s Chief Mufti (2000–2003), told me: “Before, we [Muslims in Bulgaria] did not know the word jihad—we learned it from Bulgarian media.”[183] Yet, in the early 2000s, a few years prior to our conversation and during his tenure as Chief Mufti, Selim Mehmed undertook various steps to enable Bulgarian Muslims to increase their knowledge of Islam. For example, he formulated a series of questions for foreign scholars, more knowledgeable of Islam, so that they could instruct Muslims in Bulgaria as to what is “right” or “wrong” in their understandings of the religion. Mehmed thus asked Professor Yakub Qgek from the Faculty of Theology (ilahiyat) at Istanbul’s Marmara University a series of questions in which he responded to the Muftiship’s concern about the spread of Wahhabism among Muslims in Bulgaria. In one of the questions, Mehmed directly asked: “Is there fundamentalism and terror in Islam? In Bulgaria, the phrase ‘traditional Islam’ is used to define the Hanefi mezheb.[184] Is that wrong?” After opining that “there is no extremism and terror in Islam” which requires Muslims to behave justly with both their coreligionists and non-Muslims, the Marmara Islamic scholar stated:

It is absolutely not right to equate the term Hanefi with “traditional Islam.” Likewise, the allegation that traditional Islam and the Hanefi [mezheb] are wrong is erroneous. Islam was the true religion in the past ... and it will continue so in the future? [185]

Such theological clarifications signalled a turning point, as Muslims in Bulgaria increasingly seek to adjust their beliefs and practices to what they learn as demanded from them by Islam’s “great tradition.” During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the process was gradual but has accelerated in recent years. By pointing out the inherited “traditional” practice and the well-known diversity of Islam in Bulgaria, anthropologist Kristen Ghodsee, for example, provided a vivid ethnographic account of Madan and Rudozem in the central Rhodope Mountains of Bulgaria’s south by observing a process in which “traditional practices of Islam” are replaced by “new forms of the religion imported from abroad.”[186] A similar observation, though with a different connotation referring to Muslim newcomers, is made by Konstantinos Tsitselikis who distinguishes among the Muslims of Greece “those who are Greek citizens on the basis of a ‘historical settlement’ (Old Islam) and those who are of alien citizenship— immigrants or their descendants (New Islam).”[187] Others point out the phenomenon of a “new” Islam opposing the “old” practices, introduced since the 1990s by young Bulgarian Muslims who studied Islam in Arab countries where they got acquainted with an Islam differing from that in Bulgaria and learned to perceive Bulgarian practices as already “distorted” by Ottoman influence.[188]

Many Bulgarian Muslims themselves who seek to preserve their locally inherited traditions refer to those “new forms” as “Arab Islam.” They perceive “Balkan,” or “Turkish” post-Ottoman Islam as a continuation of a “traditional” Hanafi Sunnism. In the eyes of many, this peaceful and adaptable “traditional”[189] or “Balkan” Islam is seen as a model of a supposedly tolerant “European” Islam. Such claims, as well as the one-sided insistence on the “fundamentalist threat” coming from the Arab world, equally neglect “the diversity of Balkan Islam and the complexity of the links, which, yesterday, just as today, bind it to the Muslim world.”[190]

Within the dichotomy of “traditional” versus “Arab” Islam, the latter component has been designated by a whole scale of terms, such as Wahhabism, Salafism, Islamism, and “radical Islam.” What matters here is that scholars and policy analysts outside of the field of Islamic history and Islamic Studies have in one way or another indicated the existence of two types of Islam in Bulgaria: “traditional” and “new,” the latter taking fluid forms and denoted through a variety of terms. As Egdunas Racius recently confirmed, forms of Islamic religiosity that may be subsumed under “revivalist Islam” proliferate in “practically all Eastern European nation-states.”[191] Not only the media but many policy analysts regard such phenomena as contributing to the radicalization of Muslim youth in the age of the Islamic State (isis) or terrorism. Here, the dichotomy “traditional” versus “non-traditional” also takes many forms but “non-traditional Islam” is markedly linked to “radical Islam,” “Islamism,” “Wahhabism,” and “Salafism.”

Recommendations and opinions based on the assumption that “rich Arab countries from the Persian Gulf” compete to spread “the most retrograde current in Islam, Salafism,”[192] are abundant in public discourses and implicitly draw on the same dichotomy between a “safe” and familiar “traditional Islam” versus a “dangerous” and alien “Arab,” or “radical Islam,” the culmination of which supposedly is today’s Salafism. As a historian of Islam, I have always been confused by the misleading and vague meaning of “traditional” (as opposed to “radical”) Islam in such dichotomies. Nevertheless, the division has increasingly dominated public discourse as well as some practices of state, law enforcement and judicial institutions.

What does the dichotomy “traditional-Arab Islam” actually mean? Is it an expression of a novel “politicization” of religion, or are there continuous, deeper socio-structural underpinnings that enable such dichotomous distinctions? Is “being Muslim” in the contemporary Southeastern Europe, and particularly in Bulgaria, mostly a “very local affair” that does not stipulate a “common Muslimness” based on collective identities beyond the boundaries of today’s nation-states?[193] Or are Muslims in the Balkans, like Muslims elsewhere, “culturally more homogeneous than might be expected?”[194] If so, is the course towards a higher degree of religious convergence only an elite undertaking by muftis and the established ranks of religious specialists, or there is a broader Muslim movement for “mainstreaming Islam” that “signals a major change from below?”[195]

In what follows, I demonstrate how “Arab Islam,” or Salafism, has been discussed in Bulgaria as a “radical ideology” juxtaposed to “traditional religion,” bringing to the fore ethnographic evidence from two Bulgarian localities, Ribnovo and Madan. I then analyze a judicial case—a high profile lawsuit against thirteen Muslims at Pazardzhik Regional Court, which has foregrounded Salafism as a new subject of public discussions in Bulgaria seen as “unfitting” for the country’s pattern of communal coexistence. In the Balkans, the dichotomy “traditional”-“alien” (or “Arab”) in relation to Islam ensues from a specific neo-millet pattern of managing ethnic and religious diversity which I term “milletic secularism.” This dichotomy indicates that there are perceptions of a locally embedded “Balkan Islam” but in a sense different from Alexandre Popovic’s L’Islam balkanique,[196] His idea was to reposition Balkan Islam in what was then conceived as the “peripheral Muslim world” against the backdrop of the “central zone of Islam” in the Middle East or, as another scholar put it, “Balkan Islam” has come about as a part of Europe, a “cultural bridge.”[197]

I tackle the ongoing revitalization of Islam and the public discussions inspired by the increasingly transnational Muslim identity against the backdrop of the tensions among the varieties of local Muslim religious experience (“little traditions”). In this way, I juxtapose the variety of Muslim religious experience in an indicative Balkan context against the backdrop of increasing pursuits of a religious convergence through returning to doctrinal roots and strengthening the sense of belonging to the imagined community of Sunni Islam (“the great tradition”).

*** 2. The Neo-Millet Pattern and Milletic Secularism

Using the term “traditional” Islam, policy analysts, public intellectuals, and state institutions de facto designate a post-Ottoman alloy of normative Islamic teachings embedded in and heavily transformed by contextual cultural traditions, forced secularization, and supposedly syncretic local rites. This designation is part of a broader social phenomenon related to what I have elsewhere defined as “milletic secularism.”[198] This term evokes the Ottoman millet system and refers to divergent and competing contemporary transnational collective identities, loyalties and frames of reference coexisting within the same nationstate. These identities resemble the way religious communities functioned within the Ottoman millet system but for both Muslims and non-Muslims in a reverse, reciprocal, way. Today, Muslims are the minority in a pluralist society and secular state governed on the basis of non-Muslim values and political procedures. Milletic secularism implies a structural link between religious affiliation and collective identity as objectively existing and in constant tension and entanglement with individuals’ agency.

As a recent vast sociological survey indicates that, unlike in Western Europe, “religion has reasserted itself as an important part of individual and national identity in many of the Central and Eastern European countries where Communist regimes once repressed religious worship and promoted atheism.”[199] In Bulgaria, the contemporary “upended” emphasis on Orthodox Christian identity as integral to national identity brings to the fore the Orthodox Church, including mention in the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991). Major politicians have drawn upon Orthodoxy for the sake of social cohesion. For example, Boyko Borissov, prime minister of three Bulgarian governments (2009–2013, 2014–2017; and 2017–2021), labelled “a master of political discourse” by a political scientist,[200] once even called God “the Big Boss.” Right after the 2017 snap elections, upon Borissov’s assumption of office for a third mandate, he thus reasserted the importance of God for him, his party (gerb),[201] and the Bulgarian people: “Let God save us, walk with us and we behind Him.”[202]

Bulgaria is a secular state—the principle of laicite clearly underlies Art. 13.2 of the Constitution: “Religious institutions shall be separated from the state.” However, while all “religious denominations are free” (Art. 13.1), “the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria is Orthodox Christianity” (Art. 13.3). The Constitution explicitly imposes a ban on identity politics by stressing that “religious communities and institutions as well as faith convictions cannot be used for political purposes.”[203] The state thus differentiates the adopted principles of secularism and religious pluralism from the historical and cultural underpinnings of society. The dichotomy between “traditional” and “other,” i.e., “non-traditional” religions which are often perceived in the social practice as alien, foreign and even dangerous for the Bulgarian nation and the social cohesion is part of that differentiation.

Noticing that public manifestations of the recognized religious communities designated as “traditional” in the Balkan countries, including Bulgaria, are free as long as they do not challenge or oppose government primacy, Ghodsee coined the insightful term “symphonic secularism.” Explaining the “genealogies of secularism” in Bulgaria, she sees them as evolving from an inherent “symphonic secularism” in which “Tsars, Sultans, politburos or prime ministers have consolidated their power over ethnically or linguistically diverse populations, by promoting national identity through a church (or a mosque or synagogue) that instills loyalty to the state as part of its ecumenical dogma while also granting autonomy to other religiously defined communities.”[204] “Symphony,” however, even as an ideal-type, does not provide enough scope to accommodate religious diversity, particularly when a large minority is Muslim. Even in the more distant past, Orthodox symphony seems to have been an utopian idea of Justinian (d. 565)[205] and, subsequently, there was rather what Hovorun calls “Ottoman symphony,” as the Byzantine church “developed a new kind of symphony with the Ottoman state.”[206] As part of the shared collective social experience of Christians, Muslims, and other communities, the milletic pattern in post-Ottoman times became entangled with modern European conceptions, including secularism. The result is what I have termed “milletic secularism”—a contextually shaped paradigm of social relations which today no longer refers to its original religious content.

When introduced to or adopted by Muslim countries, the nation-state system generally imposed a dominant identity paradigm centered around an ethnicity. Yet such identities have not removed the Islamic identity, intensified by contemporary Muslim movements.[207] In Bulgaria as in other Balkan countries, the centuries of Ottoman rule and the millet system meant that religion rather than ethnicity or language defined communal identity. This sustained a deep sense of belonging along religious lines—a phenomenon reinforced in Ottoman times by “[t]he cohesive nature of Islam as a social force emphasizing the notion of a universal Islamic community or umma.”[208]

Milletic secularism refers to milletism—a concept with a twofold heuristic potential. In Ottoman times, despite its integrative potential for the sake of social cohesion and integration, “milletism eventually was the ground on which non-Muslim identities would grow, divide, separate and burgeon.”[209] The leaders of the millets remained loyal to the Ottoman state but nonetheless the millet was the point of departure for claiming rights along linguistic and religious lines. As Maria Todorova writes, Balkan nationalism preserved a frozen, unchangeable, and uniform image of Muslims, consistently dealing with it in millet terms.[210] Whatever the role nationalism in sustaining such an “image,” the transformation and continuation of those “millet terms” is traceable in countries other than Bulgaria. For example, the legal status of Islam in Greece, particularly of the contemporary Turkish/Muslim minority of Thrace, allows for using the term “neo- millet”—“a system which keeps alive pre-modern legal divisions based on religion and inserts them into the larger framework of modern citizenship.”[211] In Bulgaria today, no religious minorities are officially recognized as such ex lege, but implicitly the pattern of accommodating the Muslim minority is still millet-like. It is embedded in a neo- millet pattern of managing diversity.

Transnational Muslim identities today challenge milletic secularism as an integrative force by foregrounding its emancipatory potential. These identities are reshaped through a dynamic process of an increasing access to the basic normative teachings, principles, and texts of Islam. The tendency sharpens the older tensions between “little” and “great” traditions in which the latter seek powerfully to overarch localities, rapidly eroding the earlier autonomy of the “little” traditions. The complex dynamics of seeking convergence challenge the established pattern of milletic secularism, provoking reactions by state authorities, public intellectuals, various individuals, and groups. Within the set of concepts utilized for “oth-ering,” the “new” religious identities, Salafism increasingly takes a central place.

*** 3. What Is Salafism? A Very Short Definition of a Contested Concept

Salafism has turned into a contested concept that stirs up heated debates in Muslim circles as well as among Western scholars, analysts and policymakers. The Arabic-Islamic term Salafi and the phenomenon of what is known today as Salafism, refer to a religious—mostly theological but also legal—orientation within the Sunni spectrum of Islam that is embedded in a specific mode of scriptural engagement. Salafism is primarily identifiable theologically—through the creed (‘aqida) that extends over the Salafi perception of Islamic law. The methods by which that specific combination of theological and legal views is implemented in religious practice entails varying implications for the socio-political engagement or disengagement of those who belong to the different branches of Salafism. [212]

In ‘aqlda, Salafis privilege beliefs such as the return to the beliefs and practices of the first three generations of Muslims, the “pious ancestors” (al- salaf al-salih), a generation that covered around 80 years in the first Islamic century; a particular understanding of tawhtd (God’s oneness and unity) which does not simply deny anthropomorphism; fighting unbelief, particularly all forms of “associating other beings or things to Allah’s oneness” (shirk); claiming that the only valid sources of authority are the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad (equated by Salafis with the six canonical hadtth collections). Believing that after the Prophet his sayings are best understood by the consensus of his Companions (sahaba), Salafis seek to purify Islam from any reprehensible innovation (bid‘a).[213] The Salafis emphasize the idealized experience and practices of the Prophet and the early umma. For this reason, the designation Salafi is prestigious among Muslims, even among those who disagree with the Salafis on some secondary beliefs and methods.

Salafis self-define through a set of specific views of Islamic law and tend to promote la madhhabiyya (“non-schoolism”),[214] meaning that Muslims knowledgeable of Islam should seek to transcend the boundaries of each of the four established traditional Sunni schools (madhhab s) of Islamic law, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, or Hanbali. The

Salafi adoption of Hanbali views is often mistakenly equated to their presumed following of Hanbali law. Another ubiquitous confusion is to equate Salafism with Wahhabism, using the two terms interchangeably while, by which within so-called “security studies” especially, the latter term is equated with violence.[215] What is labeled Wahhabism is only one branch of the broader Salafi orientation in Sunni Islam. If all Salafis share a set of common basic views, they differ over the method (manhaj) of applying that creed, particularly over the manhaj related to worship (‘ibada) and the manhaj of dealing with society and politics, while the method of dealing with the sources of Islam is probably “universally agreed upon among Salafis.”[216] Salafis are thus diverse by their sociability and varying views of society and politics that underlie the scholarly attempts to classify and categorize the branches of Salafism.

The most widely accepted classification divides Salafis into three categories: “purists,” “politicos” and “jihadis,” shaped as a result of what Wiktorowicz calls their different contextual readings of a shared creed.[217] Since all Salafis are “purists” in terms of seeking to purify Islam, scholars have tended to prefer the term “quietists.”[218] “Jihadis,” for their part, are increasingly known as Jihadi- Salafis.[219] Like Muslims from various other branches of Islam, all Salafis consider jihad legitimate as a basic religious duty. Jihadi-Salafis, however, distinguish themselves by privileging and strongly emphasizing the notion that religiously motivated war “should not just be waged against invading or aggressive nonMuslim enemies but should also be used in a revolutionary way against the ‘apostate’ rulers in their own midst.”[220] Thus, quietist, or “apolitical” Salafis “are fundamentalists in many of their beliefs and practices, but they are not Islamists”[221] like the “politicos” or the Jihadi-Salafis. These social and political aspects of the categorization of Salafism are important, but the blurred lines between the different groups that enable a former quietist to join the JihadiSalafi movement suggest that one cannot overemphasize the importance of the classification. Hence, the most distinctive features of Salafism remain discernible not in the classification but in the specific shared creed that makes it more attractive to Muslims over other Sunni religious orientations.

*** 4. Ribnovo and Madan: Glimpses of Traditional “Balkan” and “Arab” Islam

In April 2016, I visited several localities inhabited by Bulgarian-speaking Muslims,[222] or Muslim Bulgarians (Pomaks)[223] in the mountain areas of the Rhodopes in South Bulgaria. Along with my conversations with people whom I knew from earlier visits, I visited two mosques important to the local Muslim communities—one in Ribnovo and the central mosque of Madan. Geographically isolated from the larger urban centers, Ribnovo is an alpine, densely populated, and entirely Pomak village of around three thousand inhabitants in the Southwestern Rhodopes, the municipality of Garmen—an area whose regional center is Gotse Delchev, district Blagoevgrad. The village is considered a stronghold of local Muslim traditions passed down from generation to generation since Ottoman times. Its picturesque hills and old pinetrees, in combination with its local color and preserved cultural rites, among them the unique Ribnovo wedding, impress tourists who visit the village.[224] Madan, for its part, is a small city formerly known for its mining industry.[225] It is in a different locality—the Central Rhodopes, Smolyan district. In both areas, Islam was revitalized in the

postcommunist period but this re-Islamization has taken different forms related to local, national and transnational factors.

The fall of the Communist regime put an end to the so-called Revival Process (vuzroditelen protses)—a set of policies implemented by the Communist regime to assimilate the Turkish minority and Muslims, including by a forceful change of their Arabic-Turkish names between 1984 and 1989. As a result of those dramatic events, some 360,000 Turks left Bulgaria for Turkey, which opened its borders while the Communist government in Bulgaria provided tits citizens with three-month “touristic” visas to leave. Hence, the ironically used term “the Big Excursion.” Around 40,000 of the emigrants already returned to Bulgaria within that three-month period before the collapse of Communism in 1989. Until the end of 1990, after the fall of the Communist Party, the number of the returnees reached 150,000, i.e., 40 percent of those left.[226]

In the post-1989 period, Madan has distinguished itself as one of the local centers of a revived Sunni Muslim identity and learning. It also has a well- known School for Memorization of the Qur’an (Kursza hafuzi) opened in 1999. In contrast to Madan, heavily dominated by Communist ideology and industry before 1989 and since then experiencing rapid religious revitalization, Ribnovo is usually depicted as a place that has always had distinct local traditions. These local traditions are sometimes hard to reconcile with normative Islam or the “great tradition.”[227] The Bulgarian writer and ethnographer Evgeniya Ivanova rightly highlights the image of Ribnovo as “a conserved Pomak reservation,” quoting a women from Rudozem, not far from Madan, who said: “I am angry that—when it comes to Pomaks, [the media] go all the time to Ribnovo. Why don’t they at least once visit our place here?”[228]

In Ribnovo, I had a conversation with Imam Nezmi Gurdal, whose father was an imam, put in jail for ten years during the Communist period, and whose grandfather was an imam, too. During the talk, he confirmed what I already knew from our previous meetings, when the imam also invited us to his home for coffee and fruits while preparing for the next ritual prayer. Again, Gurdal carefully expressed his concern that the controversies between “young” and “old” Muslims nowadays sometimes cause believers to miss or shun the “main message of Islam” which, according to him, is “love to the other people”: “Those who studied abroad in the Middle East, think that since they know Arabic, they know Islam better than we do via our old Ottoman way.” He continued: “Good, they really know the original Islamic sources in Arabic, but I think that, properly understood, they do not, in fact, contradict our way, they shouldn’t do so.” Imam Gurdal has found his own way to preserve the “old” Ribnovo tradition of transmitting religious knowledge. He showed us handwritten sheets of paper from a school-type notebook on which he had written down his lessons, including the passages from the Qur’an and the Prophetic hadtth., which he gave personally to his pupils at his mosque’s Qur’an school. Thus, in the era of internet, he makes sure that the young boys will not deviate from the “true tradition.”

“The young,” however, were intensely spreading the message they have learned in the Arab world. Among them is the Salafi-minded preacher, Hussein Hodzha, who studied at the Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia. During the recent years, Hodzha has been active throughout the Rhodopes, not only in the Pomak villages of his native Velingrad area where he currently is. Not far from Ribnovo and Gurmen, Hodzha has for years been preaching in Satovcha. According to Khayri,[229] a young and well-educated Muslim from the area who had been also a graduate student in Turkey, Hodzha has managed to “salafize” (selyafizira),[230] or make Salafism prevail over what used to be considered the traditional Islamic practice there. Often following “a style based upon story-telling,”[231] Hodzha skillfully evokes antecedents from early Islam and connects them to the contemporary life of his fellow Muslims. He insists that those who deviate from true Islamic teachings “commit a dalavera,[232] acting not in accordance to what Allah wants [them to do] but according to what they like [to do]. However, Islam is not a religion which we like but a religion as Allah likes it. So, we have to conform to the laws of Allah the Almighty.”[233] Hodzha is one of the most widely popular young Muslim preachers on YouTube and maintains a website with a special emphasis on Muslim women.[234] As a Salafi preacher, he gained a nation-wide following of young devout Muslims.

When the time for the sunset ritual prayer (salat al-maghrib) came, imam Gurdal invited us to the mosque. It was full of people, including many teenage boys, some of whom were his students at the Qur’an course. The other participants in the namaz[235] represented various age groups but most were elderly and middle-aged men. A small group of women was praying in the women’s section on the second floor. At the beginning of the prayer, a thirteen-year old boy performed the call to the dzhemaat[236] for starting the prayer. This created an intimate atmosphere of cordiality and informality, although it was of course performing a standard ritual prayer of three rak‘as containing the set recitation of the Fatiha (the Opening Qur’anic chapter) and the Qur’an in a loud voice. At the end, the imam came to us smiling while his pupils ran to surround him. The same thirteen-year-old boy, who in the beginning performed the call to prayer, was eager to tell us a story. After reciting several memorized verses of the Qur’an, the boy told us a story about a recent trip to a Qur’an school in Ustina, Plovdiv region, concluding: “But they do not know the proper Islamic rites as we do, they do not have the same strong tradition like us in Ribnovo.” The imam approvingly looked at him—his community was preserving the real tradition as passed down from one generation to another.

There was confusion in Madan when I arrived at the Central Mosque right before the midday prayer (salat al-zuhr). This mosque is one of Bulgaria’s largest, opened in 1999 at the premises where the earlier-mentioned Kurs za hafuzi is located. We were first received by Bayram Ushev, a young preacher who previously was imam of another Madan mosque and now a teacher at the Kurs za hafuzi. He graduated from the Islamic University in Medina, where he studied for seven years (2001–2008) and professes discernible Salafi creedal views. Although claiming to respect the local Hanafi tradition in Islamic jurisprudential matters, Ushev demonstrates in conversation, as in his sermons and lectures, his preference to the teaching that a religious scholar (‘alim) should never fall in blind emulation (taqlld) but rather try

to identify the most relevant proof-text (dalll) from the Qur’an and the Sunna for any religious judgement he would make.

After a discussion, we entered the mosque. The prayer had already begun with the soft voice of the imam. One could hear only the bowings of the worshippers who quietly repeated the ritual phrases. The atmosphere was disciplined, rigorous, and dedicated to the prayer, with no additional moves to distract the worshippers from the ritual. I quietly remained several meters from the sufuf (rows) of men worshipping Allah. No women were on the second floor. This created an atmosphere different from Ribnovo. After the prayer, Bayram Ushev and the Imam of the mosque came to ask how the experience was. I said: “Interesting and very different from Ribnovo.”

That statement served as a signal for a joint reaction by my two Muslim interlocutors: “Why different? We follow the same ritual pattern.” Bayram Ushev explained that “everybody comes and tells us that we are promoting a different faith, an Arab Islam, while we, in fact, simply follow the normative Islamic ritual.” The young preacher specified: “Did you attend the same daily prayer, the midday one? It just ritually differs from the sunset prayer.” I knew that the midday prayer, unlike the sunset one, consists of four rak‘as and includes a recitation of Fatiha and the Qur’an in whisper. However, I did not mean a normative difference. “Sure,” I replied, “I only meant the atmosphere, the people and the setting without implying anything of what you just guessed.” Ushev smiled and both of them seemed relieved and we continued with a detailed conversation on Islamic sources and education here and in Saudi Arabia. So many people have already come to Madan and the area to search for the spread of an “Arab Islam” or Wahhabism alien to the “traditional Islam” that local Muslims have become very sensitive to such comparisons, particularly with Ribnovo.

*** 5. At the Court: Defending “Traditional Islam” against “Salafi ideology”

Given the broader context, the confusion in Madan was not surprising. These were understandable reactions of people who more than once have attracted the attention of media, state institutions, and law enforcement agencies, such as the State Agency for National Security (sans) and the Prosecutor’s Office, including in a high profile court proceeding accusing thirteen Muslims from various southern regions of Bulgaria. The thirteen, among them the Smolyan Regional Mufti, Nedzhmi Dubov, and Bayram Ushev, were accused under Article 108, Paragraph 1 of “propagating antidemocratic ideology manifested in opposing the principles of democracy, the separation of power, liberalism, statehood and the rule of law, basic human rights as the equality of men and women, through propagating the ideology of the Salafist current in Islam and the imposition of a shari’a state.”[237] Confusingly for such a judicial text, the indictment contains the term “liberalism”—a political ideology not necessarily coinciding with “liberal democracy” as a constitutionally embedded social and political order in post-Communist Bulgaria.

Nonetheless, “liberalism” is defined by the Prosecutor as “a conception and political tradition, as well as a philosophy and a current engaged with freedom, social progress, the free exchange of ideas, the transparency of government and also the restrictions on the authority of the church (and similar religious institutions) as its basic political values. Liberalism completes democracy and democratism.”[238] What united the defendants under the Indictment, was the “leadership/membership in the legally non-registered in Bulgaria organization al-Waqf al-Islami, a branch of the Saudi foundation of the same name, active on the territory of Smolyan, Blagoevgrad, and Pazardzhik districts.”

According to the Prosecutor’s Office, the “organization” was supposedly directed by the accused Said Mutlu and its members were the other defendants, and has adopted the aim at conducting a crime under Chapter 1 from the Penal Code, namely “propagating an antidemocratic ideology.”[239] Said Mutlu, pointed as the “leader of the organization,” is imam in the Peteltsi neighborhood of the small city of Surnitsa. He used to direct a notorious School for Imams (Shkola za imami) of a Qur’an course type, and is considered the first Muslim from Bulgaria who, after the collapse of the Communist regime, acquired a degree in Islamic law at Medina, Saudi Arabia. For many Muslims throughout the Rhodope Mountains, he is “one of the three major Islamic scholars and preachers in Bulgaria who are academic Salafis.”[240] The other two “academic Salafis,” both among the defendants in the Pazardzhik case, are the imam of Luzhnitsa, Muhammed Kamber, and the preacher Ahmed Abdurrahman(ov) from the village of Pletena, who previously served as imam in Satovcha.

Among this predominantly Pomak group of defendants was the charismatic Salafi Muslim leader and preacher Ahmed Moussa from Iztok neighborhood in Pazardzhik. In mid-1990s, when Moussa went to work in Vienna, he re-discovered Islam and eventually adopted a strictly Salafi orientation. In 1999, he attended the one-year course of study at the Shkola za imami in Surnitsa. In 2004, Moussa was given a three-year suspended sentence by the Pazardzhik Regional Court for spreading anti-democratic ideology and religious hatred. He became widely known as passionately calling for the establishment of a caliphate after earlier arrests around which the media wrote that “in the prayer house established by him radical Islamic literature has been found, and he put an Islamic flag on the roof of his house.”[241] Many of the defendants were working within the system of the Chief Muftiship as either muftis or imams, so during the entire lawsuit they enjoyed the unequivocal support of that institution.

As anthropologist Lawrence Rosen wrote more than half a century ago, scholars and university teachers can play different roles in society and it happens that they are called by the judiciary as expert witnesses at the court which, he claims, will increase in frequency sometimes turning into a real “battle of the experts.”[242] Thus, the Dutch scholar of Islamic law Rudolph Peters, in turn, was an expert witness in the trial against Mohammed Bouyeri who killed the Dutch filmmaker and publicist Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004 and is now serving a life sentence. After the trial, Peters published his expert witness report within

the analysis in a book chapter.[243] More recently, another Dutch scholar who studies Salafism offered a vivid account of his participation as expert witness in a trial, raising important ethical issues and a critical self-reflection that I largely share.[244] Different court cases involving Muslims in various European countries increasingly demand the academic expertise of specialists in Islamic studies, Middle Eastern politics and culture—from the headscarf scandals in France to the demands for having prayer rooms in German schools. The Balkans, including Bulgaria, could not have been passed over within such a trend.

Together with other scholars, I had been called as an expert to the District Court in Pazardzhik and was one of the two academics[245] whose expert witness report, while being used by the prosecutor, was not challenged by the lawyers for the defendants who even extensively used my evidence. In turn, the report was incorporated into the larger “Complex Expert Witness Report.”[246] Our “Expert Report in the Field of Arab Studies” consists of 70 pages, subdivided into a 56-page description of the evidence (books and documents seized from the defendants) plus a 14-page expert conclusion.[247] We had to respond to six questions, the first of which required a statement on the type of literature and its thematic scope and relation to a “current,” “philosophy,” and “religion.” On the basis of the books and other written materials given to us for expert opinion, we categorized the bulk of literature and handwritten documents as related to the version of Sunni Islam’s Salafi current, officially supported and internationally spread by Saudi Arabian institutions and charities.—.known among Western observers and some Muslim adversaries as Wahhabism.

Among the questions we had to answer was whether the written materials contain “new rites and services falling outside of traditional Islam.” Our answer entailed that Salafism is, indeed, a “new” phenomenon in the sense of recently making its way in Bulgaria, but currents unknown until recently are observable within other major denominations, and not only among Muslims. As to the so- called “traditional Islam,” it has been tellingly described by one of the defendants, the Surnitsa Imam Said Mutlu, as follows: “The most important conflict was among the students who learned and graduated in Arab countries who draw upon the Salafi method (al-manhaj al-salafl) and the old imams resorting to the Ottoman [and] Sufi method (al-manhaj al-‘uthmanl al-sufl).”[248] The handwritten documents by Said Mutlu we had to review explicitly mentioned the “right creed” (al- ‘aqlda al-sahlha) several times, so it was first and foremost the creedal matters which made a difference in pursuing the Salafi missionary activities (da‘wa).

The court oddly entitled our part of the proceedings “Expertise in the Field of Arabic Studies.” That title was perhaps chosen due to the fact that within the academic tradition in Bulgaria, “Arabic Studies” has by default always embraced likewise the study of Islam, its history and religious doctrine. The title’s choice was also probably related to the institutional name of our Sofia University Department of Arabic and Semitic Studies which, however, is an interdisciplinary body combining faculty with credentials in Arabic linguistics and literature, as well as in political, religious and cultural history of the

the descriptive Part One we divided the labor of reading the materials but afterwards each of us checked the materials seen by the other and we always reached a full consensus in terms of phrasing. After having established the “current” on the basis of the textual evidence, within Part Two, I authored the first chapter “Analysis of the Main Doctrines and Terms” (pp. 77–84) with which my colleague has agreed. As to the second chapter “Expert Conclusions” (pp. 84–90) of Part Two we also worked closely together.

Middle East and Islam.[249] Indeed, these taxonomic subtleties can be a subject of a separate study, even as related to the various social dimensions of the lawsuit, for they were used by various actors who, in pursuit of their own agenda, deliberately ignored or simply tried to shun the content and scope of our academic field in order to involve their own experts.—.at the court but also in the public debates around the developments involving Islam.

The lawyers for the defendants, including some human rights and social activists, persistently promoted “additional experts” in “Islamic theology” by which they actually meant confessional Muslim religious scholars as opposed to secular, non-Muslim scholars. Many times, I have been asked by media, social activists and human rights-driven researchers to “tell my story” about the case. During the entire lawsuit and until now, I have refrained from any public talk on the subject.[250] Here, I focus on the concept of “traditional” versus “Arab” Islam, and not on providing an in-depth analysis of the entire lawsuit.

In the public sphere, the Pazardzhik case became widely known in the public sphere as “the case against the 13 imams” or “the case against radical Islam” though neither phrase was used in the judicial text of the Indictment or the statements of the Prosecutor as the legal grounds of the offence. Nevertheless, those public labels, in combination with other factors, urged some researchers to argue that “the Bulgarian government has repeatedly signaled its equation of Islamic activism with violent political Islamism.”[251] The public metaphor of “radical” Islam as opposed to a moderate “traditional” Islam has been so powerful that even some academic researchers speak of “Islam on trial” somehow taking for granted that “the trial in Pazardzhik institutes legal proceedings against propagating radical Islam and imposing sharia law.”[252] In the course of the lawsuit, a social scientist from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Alexey Pamporov, compared Salafism to Protestantism and claimed that “within legal proceedings instituted against radical Islam […] experts in theology must come” prognosticating that “no sentences will be passed namely because of the applied definition, for the term radical Islam does say absolutely nothing and there is no such Islam.”[253] Not only were such opinions a part of the public discussions, but the Prosecutor herself persisted that “nobody denies the right of religious confession in the current proceeding [. and] subject of the trial is not the religion of Islam.”[254] This argument, however, could hardly be listened to by many others.

“Radical” Islam was foregrounded in public discussion partly due to some of the expert witness statements. For example, the conclusion by the Orthodox Christian theologian Klara Stamatova[255] qualified the materials and books to be evaluated as containing “formulations underlying the religious theory of radical Islam which in itself is an anti-democratic ideology inciting to violence.”[256] She defines part of the content of the Islamic literature analyzed by her as “blasphemous,” explaining that she views the texts from a Christian theological perspective “given that 76 percent of the population in Bulgaria is Christian.”[257] Asked by the lawyers during the court session what she actually means by “traditional” Islam, she defined it as “the traditional Islam in Bulgaria which manifests itself mainly on folk-style holiday level, which has a positively styling role, which is a powerful educational factor within the Islamic community, which does not succumb to participation in political actions and influences and which expresses tolerance to members of other faiths.”[258]

The pursued dichotomy between “traditional” versus “non-traditional” Islam became even more misty because of the insufficiently clear distinction between “religion” and “ideology” adopted by the Prosecutor’s Office. The Prosecutor insisted that the defendants propagated and spread not “a faith” but an “ideology” which “is related to elements of Salafism”[259] as opposed to an imagined and perceived as highly distinct “traditional Islam” of “Sunni-Hanafi type.”[260] This core thread within the trial based on the dichotomy “traditional (religion)”—“non-traditional (ideology)” provided the ground for one lawyer to draw upon my statement that in other countries and regions the Salafi orientation has for a long time been part of the intra-Muslim debates by sarcastically noting: “The experts Evstatiev and Dyulgerov explicitly underscored [...] that Salafism was until recently unknown in Bulgaria but likewise unknown until recently were other religious confessions, not only among Muslims. Answering a Prosecutor’s question, Evstatiev stated that he cannot designate one of the two positions as the right Islamic creed.[261] The Prosecutor probably has adopted the right systematic approach.”[262] The lawyers used that to unyieldingly pursue their demand for an “Islamic theologian” and finally involved Sefer Hasanov, a Muslim religious scholar of Qur’anic exegesis (tafslr) with a Ph.D. degree from Turkey who teaches at the Sofia Higher Islamic Institute under the jurisdiction of the Chief Muftiship. Hasanov was called to analyze nine texts in Turkish and opined that the viewpoints expressed by the authors of the seized books are of “dogmatic nature.” He concluded:

The materials are related to Islam by reflecting the position of some Islamic currents as the Jihadi-Salafis (dhzihadskite selyafu) about the existing political situation in the Muslim world. [...] The texts are addressed to the inhabitants of the Muslim countries emphasizing the fact that the certainty in the supreme power of Allah is part and parcel of the belief in Him, so the inhabitants have the duty to fight against the governors imposing on them laws and political systems contradicting with their religious convictions and their social relationships established on the basis of Islam. [.] Given the political and historical circumstances under which they have emerged, those texts do not have a direct relevance to Muslims in Bulgaria while they certainly have an enlightening character providing a better knowledge of Islamic dogmatics and the contemporary problems of faith in the Muslim world.[263]

Hasanov thus pursued a claim strengthening the argument of the defense lawyers: what some of the accused propagated or drew upon as texts was an “Islamic current” and not an “ideology,” moreover those materials had only an “enlightening” (educational) role for Bulgarian Muslims, as they live in a country not governed by Islamic law. On the one hand, according to him, the materials were relevant to the “political situation in the Muslim world.” Hasanov was reluctant to speak of “Wahhabism”: “I am not a political scientist and am unable to say against what Wahhabism is directed, because this is a political movement.”[264] On the other hand, the textual materials were analyzed by Hasanov as legitimately increasing the religious awareness of Bulgarian Muslims as part of what the Muslim religious scholar calls “Islamic dogmatics.” Sefer Hasanov seems to have adopted or at least publicly promoted an interesting, perhaps somewhat idiosyncratic and “localized,” approach to what Islamic law (sharl’a) is. It is somehow seen by him as not actually relevant to Muslims in non-Muslim states, such as Bulgaria: “We cannot claim that as a system of laws [the sharl’a] is something eternally valid. [...] That [i.e., the implementation of sharl’a] could be done only by a state institution which currently does not exist. In the moment sharl’a is not applied. And as far as in the moment there is no sharl’a, we cannot speak of the position of sharl’a towards secular laws but about the position of Islam, of the sacred sources of Islam toward secular laws.”[265]

The legal proceedings at the Pazardzhik court of first instance ended with the imposition of one enforceable prison sentence, two conditional sentences and ten administrative penalties by which Moussa was deprived of liberty for one year and fined for his participation in an unregistered organization, disseminating an antidemocratic ideology, and inciting hatred on religious grounds.[266] Although he was supposed to serve his earlier three-year sentence along with the new one, he appealed the verdict and remained at large. The other convicted persons and their defense lawyers also appealed the sentences bringing at a higher court instance an appeal which drew on my expert statement that Salafism is a current within Sunni Islam, among a bulk of other conclusions and evidence, to emphasize that “the subject of the legal proceedings is not related to an antidemocratic ideology but to an investigation of religious disputes within Islamic religion.”[267] At the Court of Appeal in Plovdiv, Yordan Peev, an emeritus professor of Arabic and Islamic history at Sofia University, was involved as an expert. His conclusion was:

The message [of the reviewed textual evidence] is archaic in its essence and content, backward in its character and hostile to all who share views different from those of its [i.e., of Wahhabi Salafism] holders—Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Every success of the local followers and propagators of that activity imported from abroad threatens the ethno-religious peace and harms our national unity and democratic order.[268]

These views were explained in greater detail during the hearings at the court session where one of the lawyers, Vasil Vasilev, repeated the demand for an additional expert in “Islamic theology” due to the “religious content” of the materials. Instead of replying by emphasizing

the secular character of the proceedings or even pointing out that this is not a shari’a court where the final expert say belongs to Muslim religious scholars (‘ulama’), Prosecutor Popova answered:

From the outset of his statement, Professor Peev said that this [Wahhabi Salafism] is actually an ideology dressed as religion. Here, it is not about religion. […] I consider that with the appointment of this expertise the tasks you [the court] has assigned are absolutely performed and in no way here we speak of religion, so we ask a theologian.[269]

The Prosecutor thus seems to have been entrapped by the dichotomy between (traditional) “religion” and (non-traditional) “ideology”[270] she herself has pursued during the entire case for the sake of her argument under the existing Bulgarian legislative terms.

On July 1, 2015, the Appeal Court of Plovdiv increased the sentence of Ahmed Moussa to a two-year imprisonment while, on the other hand, Said Mutlu and the Pazardzhik regional mufti Abdullah Salih were discharged from the accusation of propagating “antidemocratic ideology” and included to the group of the other defendants by imposing them fines, too. Moussa, nevertheless, appealed his sentence at the Supreme Court of Appeal. It repealed his sentence in July 2016 on the following grounds:

The prosecuting power pointed out, and the court uncritically agreed, that the antidemocratic ideology propagated by Moussa is called Salafism. However, that “ideology” is not among those which are indisputably recognized as antidemocratic. Moreover, Salafism has been expertly defined as a religious current. Due to that specific religious ground of it, the most serious problem in the right application of the material law remains unsurmounted —whether the propagated ideas and views are not part of the freedom of religion fixed in the international acts on which the Republic of Bulgaria is a side, in the Constitution and in other normative acts of our internal law.[271]

Therefore, the dichotomy between “traditional” religion and “new” (religious) ideology widely used in the public sphere was judicially untenable at the Supreme Court.

The Chief Muftiship was engaged with the Pazardzhik trial not only through the direct involvement of Hasanov who was asked by the Chief Mufti to prepare an expert witness statement on behalf of the Higher Islamic Institute. During the entire legal court investigations, high-ranking officials of the Chief Muftiship supported the defendants publicly and attended the court sessions. Ahmed Ahmedov, the then spokesmen for that official Muslim institution, clearly stated:

The position of the Chief Muftiship and the [the institution of the] Muslim Denomination is explicit from the outset of the trial. It defends its servants, those have we authorized to preach our religion which is a right provided to us by the Law of Denominations in Bulgaria, so there is no way that we doubt in their abilities. Their preaching activity is under control. [….] They are servants of the [Muslim] Denomination, therefore they have passed a serious casting in order to achieve their positions.[272]

Indeed, all of the defendants not only have kept their positions as muftis, imams, or preachers but some of them have been gradually promoted or rewarded.

At the 2016 Conference of Muslim Elections, which re-elected the Chief Mufti Mustafa Hadzhi, the Imam of Luzhnitsa Muhammed Kamber became a member of the Supreme Muslim Council (Vissh Myusyulmanski Suvet) at the Chief Muftiship, and from the beginning of 2017, he is member of the Editorial Board of the official monthly magazine of the Muslim institution, Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar. Another defendant during the Pazardzhik trial, the Imam of Rudozem Khairi Sherifov, won the prize “Imam of the Year” in 2014.[273] Until early 2021, Abdullah Salih remained at his office as Regional Mufti of Pazardzhik District responsible for the area of Velingrad largely inhabited by Muslims in mixed or entirely Pomak localities.

During recent years, the development of the inter-related trials involving Muslims accused of spreading “anti-democratic ideology” initiated at the Pazardzhik District Court and passing over various court instances, continued to attract public attention. Prosecutor Nedyalka Popova declared in a 2018 interview that Muslims are a “threat to national security and the future of the nation.” Explaining her views following the court proceedings, she called for measures to reduce the number of Muslims and to limit their civil rights.[274] This caused the reaction of the Supreme Muslim Council at the Muslim Denomination—the Chief Muftiship. It called an extraordinary meeting of all former chief muftis in the post-1989 period and took a decision to declare Popova’s statements as hate speech punishable by law. This Muslim complain was forwarded to various authorities and institutions, including the Prosecutor General Sotir Tsatsarov, who announced that the case would be examined by the Inspectorate of the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office, and the then President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, who sent a written response reassuring Muslims that the case would be considered by the EU Justice Commissioner. Thus, Prosecutor Popova herself was accused by Muslim institutions, media, and human rights activists of having made an “Islamophobic statement.”[275] Due to the high-profile of the trials involving Muslims and inter-related through Ahmed Moussa, they are regularly observed by the U.S. State Department’s reports on religious freedom, including the most recent one of 2020. [276]

Meanwhile, in neighboring Turkey under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi, akp), the government body of the Presidency[277] of Religious Affairs (Diyanet i§leri Genel Mudurlugu) gained an unprecedented

role in domestic, regional, and international policies of the state. The Diyanet has been increasingly active among the Muslim communities in the Balkans where, along with other Turkish foundations competing with the influence from the Arab world and different Salafi circles, it “can operate in a cultural climate to which they are more accustomed.”[278] Bulgaria, where the Diyanet has funded major Islamic activities and educational centers of the Chief Muftiship, is no exception. Increasingly stronger with the support of the Diyanet, the Bulgarian Chief Muftiship seeks to effectively embrace all Sunni Muslims under its umbrella and has achieved much of this goal. It seems that the reemerging “Muslim consensus” embraces the quietist Salafis, particularly the Pomaks, adopting the Salafi ‘aqdla which in this case remains in the background by privileging the revitalized “common Muslimness” around the “great tradition.”

It was only Ahmed Moussa and his following who seemed reluctant to follow the Chief Muftiship by privileging their distinct Salafi ‘aqdla as not allowing them to follow the Mufti as their imam.[279] According to the Chief Mufti Mustafa Alish himself, a group of Roma followers of Ahmed Moussa (then in custody) from different localities were recently invited to a common Muslim event in Velingrad. The Roma attended the event but when the time came for the ritual prayer, they refused to pray behind the Chief and left to pray on their own insisting: “We have a different ‘aqdla .”[280] Among the local Muslims in the Rhodopes, the rumor was spread that “Ahmed Musa, and respectively his followers, accused the Chief Mufti of unbelief thus applying to him takfr ,”[281] Mufti Mustafa Alish himself confirmed this evidence although he used another phrasing, explaining that “the dhemaats following Ahmed Moussa refused to accept the Chief Mufti as their Imam, because he is to them a representative of the unbelieving state and, as such, of the “satanic evil” (taghut).”[282] These new tendencies require further confirmation and research attention but they do not contradict and even strengthen the process of Muslim convergence around the “great tradition” observed among the more mainstream Sunnis in Bulgaria.

Meanwhile, Ahmed Moussa and his following, unlike the Pomak defendants in the Pazardzhik trial, have lost the institutional support of the Chief Muftiship. This is, however, not a real split, as the Roma have never reached full recognition by mainstream Muslims in the Balkans as their equals. The social separation of Gypsies (Roma) dates back from the Ottoman era in which Muslim Gypsies did not enjoy the full rights provided by Islamic law to the ruling Muslim millet, although they enjoyed a higher status than “unbelievers” (kuffar), i.e. Christian Roma.[283] Both Muslim and non-Muslim Gypsies were thus “legally and socially marginalized due to their distinct culture”[284] in Ottoman times, and the Muslim Roma, including in Bulgaria, have not been fully embraced by the post-Ottoman Muftiship either.

This continuing ambivalence toward Balkan Gypsies may contribute to the turn of an increasing number of today’s Roma in Bulgaria toward Salafism. Indeed, Pomak Salafis likewise seek to strengthen their sense of authenticity and religious certainty through Salafism but their other identities allow them to integrate more easily into the more

mainstream Muslim community and the society at large. The overall trend among the various Muslim groups, however, is the rediscovery of “true” Islam and the “great” tradition of Muslim faith as opposed to the syncretic, supposedly superstitious “little” traditions held by local Muslims from Ottoman times to the present day.

*** 6. Conclusion

The Pazardzhik trial has two major implications. First, it corresponds directly to the model of milletic secularism as a socio-structural phenomenon related to the accommodation of diversity in the post-Ottoman Balkans, particularly Bulgaria. In line with this historically continuous pattern, the court case unfolded various categorizations along the dichotomy between “traditional” versus “alien” presuming a suspicion to “new” or “alien” transnational religious identities and loyalties that challenge the established social hierarchies.[285] Second, the lawsuit against the thirteen Muslims has been a key event indicating that after a period of fragmentation of communal Muslim identity a new, opposite process suggests an ongoing Muslim convergence. A similar conclusion regarding the developments among the stricter and more mainstream Muslims can likewise be drawn from field observations in a set of Pomak localities in Bulgaria, including Ribnovo and Madan. The traditional post-Ottoman “Balkan” Hanafi-Maturidis and the “Arab” Salafis both take charge of faith by bringing to the fore the notion of a “shared Muslimness” vis-a-vis the non-Muslim majority in Bulgaria. More devout Muslims increasingly seek to (at least temporarily) overcome the divisive lesser doctrinal differences for the sake of reviving what they perceive as Islam’s “great” tradition by removing the supposed superstitions characteristic for the local “little” tradition.

This process of religious convergence entails intensifying a shared Islamic identity and strengthening communal cohesion. The ongoing convergence will hardly eradicate the existing diversity and a certain degree of context-related heterogeneity will remain. However “localized,”[286] Islam is nonetheless being rapidly transformed and overarched by the normative power of the “great tradition.” A certain level of “unity in diversity” will continue to characterize the life of observant Sunni Muslims in Bulgaria, but shifting stress on “unity” makes an increasing number of them aware of what their general commitment to Islam requires them to believe and do. As any religion and overwhelming doctrine, Islam has always been diverse and will remain so. Nevertheless, the many voices compete to speak for one Islam. The analysis of Muslim cases from Bulgaria shows that relatively rapid changes can be forcibly imposed and lead to heterogeneity or even an uprooting from the “great” Islamic tradition but they also can be rapidly reversed.

Once the members of a community are free to profess and practice their faith, they are likely to initiate a change in reshaping their identity. The ongoing changes foreground a greater attention to religious contents, practices, and values that are often perceived by both mainstream society and “traditional” Muslims as “new” and “foreign,” Arab, Wahhabi, Salafi or even “radical.” Hence, the observed chaotic, often confusing and misleading reactions of policy analysts, state institutions, and law enforcement. More recently, after having resorted

to terms such as “Arab,” Wahhabi, and Salafi, the attempts to “prevent radicalization” increasingly resort to the phrase “radical” as opposed to “traditional” Islam.

This dichotomy is a context-specific social construct ensuing from the pattern for accommodating diversity along religious identity lines that I have termed milletic secularism. Rooted in the shared implicit social knowledge, milletic secularism is based on religion as a major element of collective identity and a powerful socio-structural force. In that sense, the notion of “traditional” Islam refers to an attempt to maintain the integrative potential of milletic secularism. As evidenced in the dichotomy “traditional-alien” Islam, milletic secularism is not simply a manifestation of politicizing religion, though it can be instrumentalized in such a way. The dichotomy is a principle woven in the social fabric and functions as a double paradox. First, it evokes religion without necessarily implying religiosity or any particularly high degree of religious observance. Second, the initial principles of milletism as developed in the Ottoman milieu and secularism as it came into being in the West have lost much of their “original” meaning, as these principles are adapted to new, Balkan circumstances.

From the analytical perspective of Islamic studies, “traditional Islam” makes sense only if it is understood as historically established in a variety of local contexts and passed down from generation to generation within the local tradition. If in the Balkans the Hanafi-Maturidi Islam, and in some areas Sufism, were undoubtedly “traditional,” in other regions, such as the Arabian Peninsula, many Salafis themselves can be qualified as “traditional” despite their otherwise “fundamentalist” (as opposed to “conservative”) stance on various questions of Islamic theology and law. On the other hand, the religious purism and military-political activism of the Taliban, for example, draws heavily on a specific form of Deobandi Islam, a branch of Sunni Hanafi Islam related to the Jam’iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam (jui) in Pakistan.[287] So, how does such a “traditional Islam” in the sense of the phrase used by policy analysts, security experts or law enforcement in Bulgaria and elsewhere fit into the idea to privilege the local Hanafi tradition as the prosecutor in Pazardzhik was pleading during the analyzed court investigation?

My objection to the dichotomy does not imply that terms such as “traditional” or “radical” can not be adopted to describe Islamic experience.[288] As this study showed, such concepts, however, make sense mostly in terms of local knowledge. In Bulgaria as in other parts of the Balkans, “traditional” Islam should be grasped not so much as an analytical but as a social con- struct—a public discourse which often does not refer to a clearly defined specific content. Likewise, the public use of Muslim terms, such as Salafism, does not necessarily denote what the concepts designate within Islamic tradition. “Traditional” Islam thus implies that there are local citizens with Muslim identity who are well-integrated into society, as well as the apprehension that the “new” currents and “ideologies” are incompatible with the established, and in this sense traditional, pattern of communal coexistence.

Nevertheless, no matter how untenable the concept might be as a generally applicable analytical category, due to the historically continuous pattern of milletic secularism, the communal belonging of those well-integrated citizens will probably continue to be referred to in public discourses as “traditional” Islam and opposed to the “alien” forms of Muslim faith for a long time ahead. International observers and institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights or the U.S. Department of State will, in turn, continue to be suspicious to Bulgaria’s privileging institutionally the Bulgarian Orthodox Church which, however, is not a result of any “de-secularization” in the sense of Peter Berger or Karpov[289] but a contextual pattern of Balkan secularity elucidated here under the notion of milletic secularism. “Tradition” can thus be seen as not just something from the past, but a set of concepts and practices that most people take for granted. As dramatically documented in the discussed Pazardzhik court case, the education of some of the new Muslim religious leaders overseas and the complexities of Bulgarian politics make “tradition” not only a concept for sociological analysis but also a term that takes on a distinctly local and politically charged meaning.

Therefore, “tradition” and “radicalism” can be dealt with at two levels. At one level, an abstract one, as Max Weber uses the terms, “tradition” is a fascinating and effective research tool. In this sense, “traditional” and “radical” are “experience-distant” concepts similar to Weber’s ideal types. “Traditional” at that level means an accepted way of getting things done or of understanding something. Because people in a given locality do things in a given way, it needs no particular explanation. Similarly, “radical” signifies the departure from a tradition by referring to the fundamental tenets in pursuing a complete reform. The same concepts, however, can and do acquire an “experience-near” meaning functioning as terms that make sense only in a specific locality. At the level of practice, as in courts, they take on a different set of meanings that are integrally linked to local knowledge. The judges and those making the legal arguments may not for the most part be Muslims, but what they say has the effect of influencing how these terms are understood in the society at large. From such a perspective, there is nothing wrong with terms such as “traditional” and “radical,” provided that one understands the possibility to use them at different levels of analysis.

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* Part 2: Christian and Muslim Men and Women under State Atheism and Postsocialist Secularism

** Chapter 4: Symbols and Identity in Bulgaria

Parallels between Communist Atheism and Western Secularism

Momchil Metodiev

Abstract

Is it legitimate to draw a parallel between the atheistic policy of the Communist states of the second half of the 20th century and the secular policies of some European countries in the early 21st century? The issue became relevant in recent years, especially in the context of the Lautsi case that was lodged in the European Court of Human Rights on the right of public schools in countries with centuries of Christian traditions to have Christian symbols on display. Drawing on the experience of the Bulgarian Communist era, the chapter considers the correctness of such parallels, comparing the policies of forced and “natural” secularization in both parts of the European continent and the ensuing results.

Keywords

totalitarianism — secularism and atheism — desacralization — social engineering — Bulgarian orthodox church — Bulgarian communist party

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Is it correct to draw a parallel between the atheistic policy of the Communist regimes during the second half of the 20th century and the secular policies of some European countries and European institutions in the early 21st century? This issue has gained currency in recent years, especially in the context of the Lautsi case in the European Court of Human Rights, which stirred up emotions on the subject of secularism and the place of Christians in Europe. The parallel between Communist atheism and Western secularism has influential supporters:

The militant secularism that is rapidly gaining momentum in today's Europe is also a pseudo-religion with its own doctrinal principles and moral norms, and has pretensions to a global monopoly and brooks no competition. Modern militant secularism, like Russian Communism, is seen as a world view that came to replace the Christian view of the world. Therefore, it is not neutral and indifferent to the Christian faith, but frankly hostile.[290]

That statement was made by Metropolitan Bishop of Volokolamsk Hilarion Alfeyev, Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, on 9 June 2010 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. This is one of a series of statements he made in which the atheistic policy of the Communist regime is seen as effectively in parallel with the secular policies followed today by many European countries. The argument was developed in the context of the Lautsi case, brought before the European Court of Human Rights by Soile Lautsi, a Finnish-born Italian member of the Italian Union of Atheists, who argued that the presence of the crucifix in Italian public schools contradicts the secular nature of education and violates the rights of secular people.

After every level of the Italian court system rejected her application, the case was referred to the European Court of Human Rights, which in November 2009 upheld her application, ruling that the presence of crucifixes in classrooms was contrary to the Convention on Human Rights. The decision sparked sharp resentment in Italy, the case gained worldwide attention, and many countries (including in Eastern Europe, among them Bulgaria) associated themselves with Italy's request that the decision be reviewed by a court of higher instance. This "militant secularism" in the West prompted the Moscow Patriarchate to call for the creation of a "strategic alliance" between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches with the aim of "jointly promoting public awareness of traditional Christian concepts" of the family and other values.[291]

The experience of modern secular policies aligning with the practices of the totalitarian atheistic Communist countries of the 20th century is worth examining also because of the specificity of secularism developed in the two different parts of the European continent as a result of their differing historical experiences. Indeed, Metropolitan Bishop Hilarion, in the abovementioned speech to Russian Foreign Ministry in 2010, while drawing a parallel between the two processes, also sought to make some distinction between them:

It is necessary to distinguish between two types of secularism. On the one hand, there is aggressive militant secularism, which is a kind of pseudoreligion. It is precisely this kind of secularism that we had operating in the Soviet Union (...) At the same time, we should distinguish this type of secularism, the essence of which is the protection of the principle of neutrality regarding religious beliefs, from other worldviews and principles towards religious practice. Unlike the state atheism of the Communist regimes, this type of secularism is not aimed at the complete destruction of religion, but at pushing it out of public view.[292]

Despite these distinctions, the question remains: Is it correct to draw a parallel between the secular practices in modern European states and the attitudes towards religion that were followed by the Communist countries? What is the “purpose” of these two policies and what are the similarities and differences between them? What lies behind the idea of these two policies being subsumed under the common denominator of “pseudo-religion?”

This chapter aims to address these issues in the light primarily of the Bulgarian experience of the Communist era—an experience that differs from the experience of other East European countries only in the details, but not in the principles on which it is based. Its only purpose is to outline some possible similarities and many important differences between the secularization policies and to consider the sides of an argument about the idea of a possible parallel between them. In what follows, the term “atheism” is used to describe the policy of social engineering carried out by the Communist authorities and aimed at the elimination of religions in foreseeable future, while the term “secularism” refers to the historical process of gradual decrease of the social significance of religion.

What is the basis for the argument that the parallel is possible? Visual similarities. Almost at the same time that the Lautsi court proceedings began, British Airways cabin attendants were forbidden to wear crosses in the workplace. On the shortest of strolls around any major Western European cities, one sees many abandoned churches which fortunate coincidence have been converted into museums or concert halls. On the face of it, this is reminiscent of what happened to some churches in the Communist era in Bulgaria, which were deemed to be cultural monuments and were converted into museums. At first glance, just as in the totalitarian era, in the European Union of today visible symbols of religious identity are under attack, and holding an opinion on public policy from a Christian perspective is often met with incomprehension or even ridicule and disdain. But as

significant as the similarities seem, in fact they portray the very different histories of the imposition of atheism in Eastern Europe and the development of secularism in the West.

*** 1. Atheism as an Imitation of Modernization

What were the reasons for the atheistic policy of the Communist countries? How rational and pragmatic were the reasons for persecuting or at least diluting one of the most powerful social institutions, the Christian church? This policy can hardly be explained solely by rational or pragmatic arguments. One rational explanation is that the Communist state saw the Church as an ideological opponent. However, even if this really was true up to the end of the 1960s, hardly anyone can argue persuasively that in the 1970s and 1980s the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was able to be a real ideological opponent of the Bulgarian Communist Party—and yet the expected administrative restrictions on the Bulgarian church grew in the 1970s and 1980s. Another rational argument is that the Church was sufficiently well organized and with its structure of local branches and parishes, was practically the only institution able to mobilize public opinion against the Communist Party. This argument sounds convincing—namely that their social influence and authority was the reason for the senior clergy of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to avoid the fate of the leaders of the Protestants and Roman Catholics in the late 1940s and early 1950s, who were subjected to show trials. In the later period, these particular concerns of the Communist Party were true in countries like Poland or East Germany, where it was precisely the church institutions (Roman Catholic in Poland, Protestant in East Germany) that became one of the points of resistance to power. It may be concluded that both arguments contain some justification, but they alone are not sufficient to explain the zeal with which the Communist Party and the state engaged in persecution of and limitations on Christian churches instead of seeking ways of coexistence and tolerance.

As is well known, the logic of totalitarian states often is not based on rational arguments, and policy towards the Church is a good example of this. Therein lies the central difference between the totalitarian states of Eastern Europe and contemporary Western European democracies—while the latter are constantly in need of legitimacy and rational explanations for their actions, totalitarian states do not put their public legitimacy in question and therefore can afford to develop policies frequently based on irrational opinions, prejudiced or ideological. Unlike democracies, totalitarian regimes did not develop systems of checks and balances between different institutions, which enable certain policies to follow their own logic of development.

Classical theory defines secularization as “progressive autonomization of societal sectors from the domination of religious meaning and institutions.”[293] Secularization is seen as a direct consequence of modernization with the important clarification that this process does not lead to atheism, but to “a weakening of the social significance of religion.”[294] The result is a loss of overall social morality dominated up to that point by religion, and its replacement by competing concepts, due to which religion retains its influence only among

certain social groups. Religion is no longer a matter of necessity, but of personal choice and preference.[295] The theory allows as an exception the possibility that under certain conditions, the Church and religion are converted into an instrument for preserving national identity.

Where culture, identity and values are subject to pressures emanating from foreign religion or extreme secularism, it is possible to see a resurgence of religion. Historically, Bulgaria also fits in those exceptions, given the role of Orthodox Church during the National Revival under the Ottoman rule in the 19th century and its active participation in the realization of the Bulgarian national project. According to Professor Archpriest Stefan Tsankov, the struggles at the time of the National Revival left a lasting impression on the way the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was perceived in society immediately after the Liberation from the Ottoman Empire in 1878.[296] At this time, the Orthodox Church often continued to be seen as a tool for the implementation of the national idea, as in it hopes were placed of preserving the identity of other ethnic Bulgarian territories that remained under foreign domination. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the Communist regime created the concept of the Church as the guardian of national identity. Rather it inherited it, developing and focusing on this plan to use the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as one of the "keepers of Bulgarian national identity" thus "justifying" the existence of the Church in a society otherwise turned to atheism. Unlike the previous period, however, the propagation of this idea was the result of a deliberate government policy, not a spontaneous reaction against an external threat from other beliefs.

Without neglecting this tradition, the atheistic policy of the Communist state was inspired by ideological cliches and irrational striving of the regime to look "modern." These were the ideological presuppositions, founded on the classics of Marxism, in prime place being that of the memorable phrase of Marx that "religion is the opium of the people." Today, that phrase may sound like a trite cliche, but these words were always present in the consciousness of all who pushed the atheistic policy at different levels in the Communist countries. This cliche, ideology or maxim builds on the general rationalist conception of the second half of the 19th century, shared also by the theory of secularism, that modernization and secularization go hand in hand. In this view, traditional and poor societies are religious, while modern, wealthy and prosperous societies are secular (atheistic). Religion is characteristic of traditional societies, and the more modern a society becomes, the less influence religion has in it. These are the basic assumptions of the theories of secularism, which remain influential today, with the difference that today's theorists of secularism—under the influence of the example of the United States—tend to allow a revival of religiosity in different isolated, albeit influential social groups. In this way, the theory of secularism really does unite the policies pursued in Eastern Europe during the second half of the 20th century and the policies with the upper hand in the countries of Western Europe in the early 21st century. But it remains the only similarity between them.

The differences, which are extremely critical, arise from the way in which this theory was developed and applied in practice in the two places. While in democratic societies, it is a

gradual process and the state by its nature is forced to comply with public sentiment in order to be legitimate, in a totalitarian state, this policy is implemented through coercion and social engineering.

Communism claims to be a modernization project and in this sense, the imposition of the expected results of this modernization successfully mimics real modernization. Once social engineers want to create a modern society, one of the tangible results has to be secularization and a weakened interest in religion. Just as frequently happened in Communism—after the plan is imposed, the entire bureaucratic machinery of the totalitarian state is harnessed to implement it, which at some point begins to follow its own logic of development to achieve, or at least to imitate, the implementation of the plan. The irrational ideology sets the target, the social engineering mindset mobilize resources to achieve it, and the totalitarian institutional machine gives prominence to this policy that attacks mainly the symbolic power of the Christian religion, with the ultimate goal of completely changing people's thinking.

*** 2. Practical Applications of the Policy of Atheism

The presence of strong irrational arguments in this policy creates problems in researching it. Its evolution can be traced with difficulty, only through the speeches of party leaders, the decisions of the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party, decrees of the Council of Ministers or other documents, as they almost always use cliches like "activation of atheist propaganda,"[297] without it being clear to the researcher whether this was a genuinely new policy or just a repetition of a well-worn ideological mantra. This means that the evolution of this policy can better be traced by looking at the practical actions of the lower levels of the state machinery.

The main objective of the Communist state is to turn the Church into an "invisible' institution —including in the literal sense, at least as regards the observance of rituals. The Church has the right to be seen only in regard to its status as "guardian of Bulgarian national identity through the centuries,' i.e. because of its already diminished historical efficacy. Another objective pursued precisely through "atheist propaganda' was the removal of the religious worldview as a way of thinking and even basic religious culture, which was achieved through the full monopoly of the Communist state on education, culture and media.

One of the visible results of this policy even today is the abandonment of a number of churches, particularly in rural areas. At first glance this is a gradual process, which again gives rise to demand for parallels to be drawn with developments in Western Europe. But even if indirectly, the desolation of the churches in Eastern Europe is also a result of the policy of social engineering. It is the result of forced industrialization, which requires swift urbanization, leading to abandonment of villages and in turn, their churches and the

destruction of parish life. And while the huge concrete panel apartment complexes were built in the new urban centers, there were no churches built to accompany them.

Another policy that also can partly be seen as a “natural” process is the establishment of the Church as “the guardian of Bulgarian national identity” and as a “monument of culture,” that is as a means to maintain and nurture the national spirit. In this regard, the Communist regime actively worked to transform the church into a museum piece. An expression of this policy is the nationalization of entire monasteries (such as the Rila Monastery—the main monastery in Bulgaria, in the period 1961–1968) and the conversion of monasteries into museums and tourist attractions (after the return of the monks to the Rila monastery, they shared the space with the Rila Monastery National Museum, with an agreement based on the philosophy that tourists would not be able to attend or even see liturgies or other sacraments and rituals administered by the monks[298]). An example of the same policy is the desacralization of icons and making them the subject of the work of museums. Even today, in Bulgaria there are cities in which the icons are set out in the town museum, not the church, which is located on the other side of the city square. There are other examples of a number of measures aimed at representing the Church as a “dying institution,” worthy to be represented only in museums.

But the most widespread, most subtle and for this reason, most interesting policy was that of the substitution of religious rituals with civil versions and the formulation of a new system of public holidays to undermine the religious content of existing traditional holidays. This deliberate offensive by the state against church rituals from the early 1970s also was the cause of increased administrative repression of priests on the ground.

What provoked this policy? Again, the irrational desire that the state should appear modern. In 1968, a large-scale public opinion survey entitled “The Process of Overcoming Religion in Bulgaria” was published. It concluded, in the typical style of the era, that Bulgaria is among the leading countries in the growth of atheism and that only 35 percent of the population, mainly inactive social groups, identified themselves as religious. These data, however, portray a false picture, as compared with the data transmitted from the dioceses where church sacraments and rituals were celebrated, from which it is clear that religious marriages made up 36.11 percent of all marriages, 52.42 percent of all newborns were baptized or circumcised, and religious funerals accounted for 80 percent of all funerals, which means that Communist party members also had religious funerals.[299]

These surprising results led to a change to the policy conducted up to then. If until then the emphasis was on “atheist propaganda,” the results of the study forced the government to take practical measures against the high level of religious observance. Most easily solved was the problem of church marriages, which were the most underrepresented, because already at the end of the 1960s they have effectively been replaced by the form of civil marriage made obligatory in 1945. This can be explained, on the one hand, by marriage being seen as a family event that can occur without religious consecration, and on the other

—because married people are the most active part of the population and the most vulnerable to possible administrative measures.

[[i-c-islam-christianity-and-secularism-in-bulgaria-1.jpg][figure 4.1 Religious marriage, 1981 the bulgarian telegraph agency caption to the photo reads: “moments from the old tradition—a religious church wedding, which has become increasingly rare and is simply a custom, a ritual which is more than anything else decorative.” source: pressphoto bta]]

This is not the case, however, with the question of religious funerals. In fact, the main goal of the state was to limit funerals conducted with religious rites. Again, this was sporadic and with administrative coercion to enforce it—in 1968, a Council of Ministers decree made funeral services available for free, but the manufacture of coffins and other items for a funeral ritual was banned for the church administration, if these were part of free funeral services. This decision made possible a wide scope for administrative arbitrariness, as local authorities often refused free services to relatives of a deceased person, if a religious ritual had been performed. The most visible result of this Council of Ministers decree was the artificial replacement of the cross as a grave marker with a pyramid with a pentagram, which was widely used as a grave marker under Communism.[300]

[[i-c-islam-christianity-and-secularism-in-bulgaria-2.jpg][figure 4.2 Scene from a civil funeral (in the foreground, a typical burial pyramid)
source: central state archives, buigarian photography album 545, N° 68-4638-7]]

Another ritual actively imposed by the state from the early 1970s, was the ritual called “naming the child.” In essence, the new rite followed the marriage rituals that already had been imposed, was performed in the same ritual halls and with the same “administrative state employees” and was intended to be a substitute for church baptism. Instructions, stored in the archives, explain how young families should be “officially invited” to take part in the ritual, how the hall should be decorated (the room must have a portrait of the first Bulgarian Communist leader Georgi Dimitrov with a group of children, as well as a portrait of the president of the Council of Ministers at that time, i.e. Todor Zhivkov). The culmination of the ritual occurred when the mother passes the child to “an official person” who in turn “officially” announces the name of the “new citizen of our socialist motherland.”[301]

[[i-c-islam-christianity-and-secularism-in-bulgaria-3.jpg][figure 4.3 Scene from the civil ritual “naming of a child,” 1975
source: central state archives, bulgarian photography album 77-
vi, N° 76-2304-8]]

From one point of view, the new rituals can be seen as an example of comic excess by the authorities. From a Christian perspective, they can be seen as truly demonic rituals, given

the ample Communist symbolism involved. Whatever the perspective, however, the new civic rituals were indicative of a deliberate and large-scale intervention by the authorities in the most intimate moments of human life, including the choice of a funeral rite for the nearest and dearest.

What were the results of this policy? In the years that followed, with civil marriage imposed as virtually the only form of marriage, the baptisms of children dropped significantly and while religious funerals remained the most popular religious ritual, their rate also dropped dramatically.

Table 4.1 Statistical information for religious rituals perfomed in Bulgaria in the period 1968–1980.

| Year | 1968 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |

| Baptized children (of all newborns) | 52 % | 40 % | 40 % | 47 % | 40,7 % |

| Weddings (of all marriages) | 36 % | 6,59 % | 5,53 % | 4,72 % | 4,52 % |

| Religious funerals | 80 % | 49 % | 49,1 % | 49,6 % | 47,9 % |

Source: zhivko oshavkov and others, procesat na preodolyavaneto na religi- yata v balgariya. [the process of overcoming religion in bulgaria. 1968. sociological research] (sofia: bulgarian academy of science, 1968). p. 270 (data for 1968).

Archive of the ministry of foreign affairs (amfa). fund 10, list 14, file 589 (data for 1977–1980).

However, statistics cannot show the extent of this policy and the intervention of the state in people’s private lives, which was met with various forms of resistance or looking for ways to circumvent the new rules. For example, in the early 1970s practice appears to have been for children to be baptized by their grandmothers, formally without the knowledge of the child’s parents. In the archives, there are many cases of attempts to bypass the ban on religious funerals, the priest officiating over the funeral service in the home or after the civil ceremony.

Measures to enforce civil rites were upgraded in the late 1970s with the idea of building an entirely new “socialist civil calendar.” The principle was that traditional religious calendar holidays would be listed as dates to be celebrated, but would be filled with different elements related to life in the socialist state. In the same move, there were attempts to disparage the “Spring traditional series of religious holidays” (Palm Sunday and Easter) and to displace them with different holidays based on something else.[302] The policy of desacralization of major religious holidays was reflected in the “assimilation” of the feast of Saints Cyril and Methodius and its transformation into the Day of Slavonic Culture and Education. While the celebration of the holy brothers shifted from May 24 to May 11 with the change of the church calendar, the day of Slavonic Culture and Education continues to be celebrated on the old date.

The new policies were accompanied by administrative pressures, with parish priests making up the most victims. The general principle valid for almost the whole period of Communism is that priests should limit their activities to within the church building. Any further activity than that on their part was liable to punishment—most often by local authorities and in a way not subject to review by another institution. The biggest disputes and cases throughout the Communist period were caused by ringing of the church bells (especially at the time of major holydays), the performance of processional marches, and especially religious ceremonies performed by priests in the homes of believers.

*** 3. Who Implemented These Policies and How?

As with the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the principle of freedom of religious denominations was also present in the Religious Denominations Act, although the law contained a number of limitations in the application of this principle. Was it possible for these principles to be implemented in reality?

As might be expected, the answer is no. The central institution charged with making policy for the Church was the Committee for Church Affairs. The committee aimed to maintain the connection between church and state, which is why it is the recipient of all possible complaints regarding limitations on religious freedom. The Committee also had so-called representatives, employees of local administrations of county towns. The other structure relevant to the policy of the Church was State Security, which also had representatives on the ground.

The initiator and main contractor of administrative repression against priests was the local administration. They were familiar with the general political line of imposing civil ceremonies and limiting religious rituals as much as possible—in 1984 an employee of the Committee for Church Affairs told its local representatives that “the best work of the priest is to do nothing.”[303] Concentrated in the hands of local authorities, the practical implementation

of this policy amounted to a veritable administrative arbitrariness, to which parish priests were subjected and from which they could not defend themselves.

As might have been expected, the administrative restrictions forced the priests to complain to their metropolitan bishops, and so a bureaucratic correspondence started that shows the desperate situation in which they were. The reasons for the penalties against the priests listed in the files vary greatly— from tolling the bells on great feast days, visiting the homes of the faithful on Epiphany (without obtaining consent in advance), officiating at religious funerals, among many other offences. In some cases, the repression of priests amounted to a fine, in others, purely local threats and penalties. In 1967, a village priest complained to his metropolitan bishop that he was threatened by the local party secretary that his children will not find a job if he did not change his behavior.[304]

All these complaints from the priests were sent to the metropolitan who in turn forwarded them to the Committee for Church Affairs. In some cases, the Committee genuinely investigated, which amounted to referring the case to its local representatives—an employee of the same administration, who punished the priest. So the bureaucratic procedure came to a conclusion, and its outcome is clear. The result was that over the years such cases declined, but at the end of the 1970s the Synod attempted to exert some pressure, carefully summarizing these cases in a joint letter and sending all the files to the com- mittee.[305] The outcome was again the same.

Contrary to expectations, administrative pressure against priests increased rather than declined through the time of the regime. In the 1950s and 1960s, priests subjected to administrative repression could still count on some protection from the Committee on Church Affairs trying to work within the existing legislation and to limit the most shocking cases of administrative arbitrariness. The archives of these decades include many cases in which appeals to the Committee did not go unheard. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, this led to a real bureaucratic war between the Committee for Church Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Committee repeatedly opposed the party leadership on the new policy of imposing civil ceremonies, highlighting potential problems that it could lead to.[306] In the early 1970s, all of this passed as the Ministry of Interior won the bureaucratic battle, the membership of the Committee was changed and it became an instrument to advance the new policy.

The reason for the deepening repression of the priesthood lies in the autonomous life of the totalitarian bureaucracy. Until the 1970s, after which it was decided to impose civil rites, policy towards the Church gradually slid down the agenda of higher party authorities and was delegated entirely to the efforts of secondary institutions—the Committee for Church Affairs, State Security and local authorities. Once the bureaucratic machine was restructured, it began to push administrative repression, which was essentially uncontrolled.[307]

All this can only happen in a totalitarian state, in which there is a lack of any bureaucratic constraints on the different centers of power. For this reason, the experience of Bulgaria, and possibly the whole of Eastern Europe, is completely unique and cannot be compared with the experience of the societies of Western Europe during the Cold War, and even less with the institutions of the European Union at the beginning of the 21st century. As secular as today's Western European countries are, they have developed systems for balancing the interests of different social groups and institutions which prevent uncontrolled propagation of a line of conduct (even if it has political support) so that it becomes an unstoppable avalanche. The best proof of this is the decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the Lautsi case, which ruled that countries with well-established Christian traditions, such as Italy, have the right to keep crucifixes in the classrooms of public schools.[308]

*** 4. Symbols and Identity

No matter how tempting, the claim of parallels between atheistic policies under Communism and the secular policies pursued by European countries or institutions in the early 21st century is completely incorrect. Although the results of the two policies seem similar, this is only at first glance, given the different historical experiences of the two parts of the continent. A careful look shows that a parallel can hardly be drawn even in terms of the visible effects. Abandoned churches in Western Europe are often located in the centers of large cities, a sign of secularization of parts of the urban population or declining popularity of certain denominations (typical of some Protestant communities in Western Europe). Abandoned churches in Eastern Europe are located mostly in rural areas and are a sign of deliberate social engineering during the years of Communism, while there are insufficient churches in big cities today, despite the decreased level of church attendance. Today, Eastern Europe, especially Bulgaria, has no problem with visible Christian symbols—neither with wearing of crosses nor with religious rituals. In the countries of Eastern Europe, at least for now, cases like Lautsi seem at very least incomprehensible.

This is because the final battle between the Communist authorities and society was conducted precisely in the terrain of religious symbols and basic rituals—and that in this field, the Communist state lost the battle. In Eastern Europe the point of conflict under Communism was exactly about symbols— wearing a cross, reading a Bible, participation in religious rituals marking key moments of community life. Thanks to "atheist propaganda," Communism succeeded in dislodging the religious worldview in the "private sphere," but failed to come to grips with the symbolic force of Christianity. Today, countries such as Bulgaria have no problem with church symbolism, but have a problem with Christian identity, such as lacking knowledge of basic Christian principles as a result of deliberate education policy during Communism.[309] In this sense, a problem can be seen in the lack of a clearly defined secular public opinion— the debate in countries like Bulgaria runs along the lines of the grey area of "tradition" in which everyone applies whatever he wants.

Unlike Communist regimes, the societies of Western Europe have experienced a gradual process of secularization. The result of this “natural secularization” is the presence of secular public opinion which is strong, active and that has a clear identity, which influences the state and which is opposed to the existing strong and clear identity of religious public opinion, even to the extent that in some countries it has become a minority, which also requires the state to ensure their rights. In this context, the state is trying to regulate the relationship between religious and secular communities, the manifestation of which is the legal battles over the place of Christian symbolism in the public domain. However, the state neither can nor wants to somehow regulate the conscience of its citizens by imposing one or another view of the world, in so far that this does not prejudice other community groups. In this sense, whether people like it or not, Christians in Western Europe are part of a competitive social environment, seeking for the state attention and rights. It is highly likely that with the fall of Communism and the democratization of the societies of Eastern Europe, the differences in experience between “old” and “new” Europe are decreasing.

This does not alter the fact that today the differences between Eastern and Western Europe remain relatively large, and that the problems faced by Christians in both parts of the continent are quite different. The attempts to submerge these differences under a common denominator are actually a disguised attempt to “normalize” the Communist regime, showing it as producing identical results with the democratic regimes in Western Europe. This argument may sound strong and assist in achieving a fleeting success, but is insufficient for the long-term protection of the Christian identity.

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** Chapter 5: Caesar and God in the Public Sphere

Religious and Secular Discourse in Post-Atheist Bulgaria

Daniela Kalkandjieva

Abstract

On 10 November 1989, the removal of Todor Zhivkov from the state and party leadership in Bulgaria marked the end of its Communist regime. In the religious sphere, the political change shook the decades-old monopoly of militant atheism, thus creating conditions for a return of religion to the public square. Among other things, this process stimulated a restitution of buildings and real estate which the Communist regime had taken away from religious communities. A set of laws adopted in the early 1990s instigated the mass return of arable lands, forests, industries as well as office and residential buildings to physical persons and judicial entities. Being major landholders before the Communist rule, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Muslim community benefited the most from this process.

In 2012, the restitution of the economically valuable tangible assets to religious denominations was over. Regarded as part of the restoration of historical justice, this process was generally welcomed by society in post-Communist Bulgaria. In 2013, however, people opposed the attempts of some political forces to spread the restitution over religious edifices ‘nationalized’ by the former totalitarian regime under the pretext of their preservation as monuments of national history and world cultural heritage. In this regard, Bulgarians faced difficulties that many contemporary secular societies have experienced in dealing with their religious cultural heritage. As this heritage bears special cultural and historical value for both the public and the sacred realms, the questions of its ownership and management often provoke tensions and conflicts between the corresponding religious institutions and the state authorities. In the case of post-atheist countries, this process is additionally complicated by the legacy of the totalitarian past. By presenting the debate of Bulgarian society over its religious cultural heritage, the chapter sheds light on this particular national case.

Keywords

religious-secular divide — Bulgarian Orthodox Church — Chief Muftiship in Bulgaria — religious property restitution — religious cultural heritage in post-atheist societies

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On 10 November 1989, the removal of Todor Zhivkov from the state and party leadership in Bulgaria marked the end of its Communist regime.[310] In the religious sphere, the political change shook the decades-old monopoly of militant atheism and created conditions for a return of religion on the public square. Among the other things, this process stimulated a restitution of buildings and real estate that the Communist regime had taken away from religious communities. A set of laws, adopted in the early 1990s, facilitated a massive return of arable lands, forests, and industries as well as office and residential buildings to physical persons and judicial entities. Major landholders before the Communist rule, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (boc) and the institutionalized Muslim community benefited the most from the restitution. According to some sources, by the end of 2012, i.e., when the restitution was over, the Orthodox Church received back 120,000 hectares of arable lands and forests, and

the Muslim institutions—80,000 hectares.[311] Altogether, these Muslim and Christian institutions repossessed 5 per cent of the agricultural area of Bulgaria.[312] In parallel, the same religious organizations had their property rights restored to many office and residential buildings, excluding churches and mosques. Until today, however, there is no register of the restituted tangible assets. Nor is there official information about their value. Attempts to estimate are additionally impeded by the lack of official data about the taxes paid by the Orthodox and the Muslim administrations for their properties, both the newly restored and those previously owned. For that reason, different authors give divergent figures.[313]

In the process of restitution, no objections were made to the property rights of religious denominations on the grounds of the constitutional principle of church-state separation (1991 Constitution, Article 13 §2). Instead, the attention of society was focused on the internal struggles and divisions within the Orthodox and Muslim leaderships which erupted with the start of the restitution in the spring of 1992. In the second case, these struggles did not last long. In the case of Muslims in Bulgaria, their close association with one political party—the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, regarded as a natural defender of their liberties after the fall of Communism—helped the Muslim institutions to avoid an additional politicization of internal conflicts and to achieve a unified leadership in 1997.[314]

The Orthodox Church, for its part, needed more time to do the same. In 1992, its supreme spiritual leadership split into two rival bodies: the Synod of Patriarch Maxim and the so-called Alternate Synod. The involvement of external factors in the schism increased its negative effect. If the Alternate Synod was created with the assistance of the Union of Democratic Forces,[315] Maxim’s Synod received the support of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Correspondingly, the restitution of church properties followed the zigzags of the Bulgarian political life, i.e., the former benefited from it during the rule of democrats, while the latter thrived when socialists were in power. As a result, it was not clear, which synod had legitimate rights over the boc’s properties. A way out from this vicious circle was suggested by the centrist government of Simeon Saxecoburgotski (2001–2005), the former Bulgarian king. In the end of 2002, it supported the adoption of a new Denominations Act that recognized the Synod of Patriarch Maxim as the legitimate representative of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Then, in 2004, on the grounds of this law, all properties of the Alternate Synod were confiscated by the State and entrusted to the church administration of Patriarch Maxim.[316] The attempts of the former to get back the lost material resources failed and in 2012 it ceased to exist.

Under the new conditions, public attention was focused mainly on cases of misuse of restituted property assets by metropolitans from Maxim’s Synod. Still, there were no objections to the boc’s right to return back its property taken away by the Communists. In the case of the Muslim community, some reserves were expressed. Most often they were provoked by the disproportion between its relatively small membership[317] and the size of owned lands. At the same time, the Holy Synod and the Chief Mufti were not satisfied by the restitution and after 2012 called for its continuation. In this regard, some Orthodox hierarchs pretended that 25 per cent of the church lands had not been returned.[318] In parallel, the Chief Mufti filed 52 lawsuits for 83 waqfs[319]- properties.[320] Their list

includes not only the mosques and the other buildings that are used for religious services, rituals and education, but also purely secular objects.[321]

*** 1. A New Wave of Restitution

In 2012, the restitution of economically valuable tangible assets such as arable lands, forests, and office buildings was over. Yet, the interest of religious denominations in this process did not disappear. Now, however, it is concentrated on religious edifices confiscated by the former totalitarian regime under the pretext of their preservation as monuments of national history and world cultural heritage. This new wave of restitution entails a twofold challenge. On the one hand, Bulgarians share the same difficulties that the contemporary secular societies experience in dealing with religious cultural heritage. As the religious sites and items are “interlinked with both Ius publicum and Ius sacrum, the issue of their protection and management can be a potential source of (practical and legal) disputes between heritage stakeholders, i.e., the competent State authorities and the relevant religious institutions.”[322] On the other hand, the restitution of religious edifices is additionally complicated by the legacy of the totalitarian past.

In their pursuit to build an atheist society, the Communists encroached upon the right of religious denominations to own and manage their places of worship. In contrast to the interwar Bolshevik practice of destroying them, however, the Bulgarian rulers used softer methods. In fact, they destroyed only few churches and prayer houses. Moreover, these acts were not presented as fight against religion. Instead of ideological arguments, this postwar generation of Communist rules advanced legally justifiable social motives, i.e., the destruction of religious edifices was deemed necessary due to such reasons as their compromised construction, corrections in the city plans, and the building of new roads. In case of mosques, the Communist regime destroyed mostly their minarets. Therefore, after 1989 the renovation of Muslim prayer houses was almost always accompanied with the erection of minarets.[323] In parallel, some monasteries were transformed into social institutions, e.g., sanatoria or madhouses. This practice was especially popular in the first postwar decade.

In the 1960s, the Communist regime launched a systematic nationalization of monasteries and churches under the pretext of their value as monuments of culture.[324] In this way, the state reduced the places of worship without being accused of suppressing the freedom of religion. Indeed, some of the nationalized sacred edifices needed special care, while the corresponding religious institutions were not able to provide it due to the shortage of finances and lack of cadres with the corresponding professional skills. At the same time, under the pretext of care for the historical and cultural heritage, the atheist regime achieved a multifold goal: it ceased the religious services in many churches, monasteries, and mosques; turned them into state property; and used this cultural heritage for polishing its image abroad by the means of various exhibitions.[325]

In this regard, the most shocking one was the case of the Rila Monastery. In October 1961, the Council of Ministers issued a special decree for its nationalization and transformation into a regional museum. As a result, the monk brotherhood was dismissed and no religious services were held there. The situation changed in 1967, when, under the pressure of international public opinion, the Bulgarian Communist Party allowed the establishment of a small monastic community and the performance of restricted religious activities.[326] Correspondingly, after the fall of Communism in 1992, the Union of Democratic Forces restituted the property to the Rila Monastery in an attempt to revive this most prominent site of worship and pilgrimage for Orthodox Bulgarians. In general, however, the fall of Communism did not bring about a change in the ownership of religious sites that had been transformed into state museums before 1989.

In recent years, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church filed many lawsuits to restore its control over such religious museums. The Chief Mufti did the same for 13 mosques which have the status of monuments of culture.[327] At the same time, there are cases where state ownership seems a better option. On the one hand, a restoration of the religious activities in some instances would endanger their cultural value, e.g., the preservation of centuries-old frescoes requires the maintenance of certain levels of humidity, temperature, and light. One of these examples is the famous Boyana Church, declared by unesco part of the world cultural heritage. On the other hand, the administrations of the religious denominations are not prepared to take care of such museums. This task requires not only enormous financial resources, but also professionally trained staff, such as restorers, archivists, and librarians. In this regard, there are a number of cases when the renovation of churches initiated by clergy ended with damages to valuable objects of religious art, e.g., the old frescoes in St. Marina Church in Plovdiv were destroyed when new paper-printed ones were glued on them.[328]

The most intensive debates, however, were provoked by the case of St. Alexander Nevski Patriarchal Cathedral in Sofia. The decision for its construction was taken immediately after the Liberation of Bulgaria by the Constituent Assembly in Veliko Tarnovo (1879). According to that decision, this had to be a memorial church dedicated to the saint-patron of the Russian emperor Alexander ii, then esteemed as the Liberator of Bulgaria.[329] Built on donations from Bulgarian people and state subsidies the temple was considered to belong to the whole nation. Yet, the public value and the religious nature of this monument provoked different attitudes to it among the state and church authorities. While the government included the adjective “allnational” [vsenaroden in Bulgarian] in the official name of the new temple, the Holy Synod placed the emphasis on its ecclesiastical status. The boc’s Holy Synod stressed that the cathedral could not serve as a parochial church, but deserved a stavropegial status.[330] In correspondence to this status, St. Alexander Nevski Cathedral was placed under the direct supervision of the Holy Synod, and not under the supervision of the Metropolitan of Sofia in whose diocese it was situated.[331]

In 1924, this status was additionally confirmed by the Synodic Regulations on the Management of the Stavropegial Memorial Church St. Alexander Nevski.[332] At the same time, they leave no doubt about the public character of the cathedral. The Regulations

allowed only public religious services there, while strongly forbidding the performance of any private services and sacraments (Article 9). They also envisioned the participation of a state representative in the cathedral’s board (Article 5). In a similar way, the financial costs of this memorial church had to be covered by own revenues as well as by annual state subsidies (Article 7). This mixture of civil belonging to the Bulgarian nation with a religiously motivated stavropegial status of the cathedral did not raise questions under the Tarnovo Constitution (18791946). On the one hand, the constitutional status of Eastern Orthodoxy as the dominating religion in the Bulgarian Kingdom (Article 37) made the property issue irrelevant or at least diminished its significance. On the other hand, the Tarnovo Constitution stipulated that, in the sphere of ecclesiastical affairs, the Bulgarian Kingdom was subjected to the boc’s Holy Synod (Article 39).

Meanwhile, none of the currently available documents provides information about the ownership status of the cathedral before the Communist takeover. Moreover, luckily avoiding the nationalization campaigns of the former atheist regime, the St. Alexander Nevski Church has not become a subject of restitution. Correspondingly, it used to be treated as state public property, e.g., the gilding of its domes in 1955 and 2002 was paid from the state budget. In 2012, on the eve of the 100th anniversary from the construction of the cathedral, however, the Holy Synod raised the question of its property. A year later, the Holy Synod officially referred to the state authorities with a request this “symbol of the autocephalous Bulgarian Patriarchate” to be placed under the ownership of the Orthodox Church.[333] In October 2014, the Council of Ministers transferred the property right over the St. Alexander Nevski Cathedral to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.[334]

*** 2. Towards a Revision of the Religious Denominations Act

An analysis on the recent debates on the legal possession of religious edifices reveals that the interest in this issue appeared in the moment when Bulgarian secular and religious institutions received opportunity to use European funding for their reconstruction. The first steps in this direction were made in the end of 2011, when four village churches were renovated within the framework the Rural Development Program of the European Commission.[335] Simultaneously, a joint committee with the participation of representatives of the state, the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Chief Mufti of the Muslim community was set up with the task to prepare applications for the European programs for the period 2014–2020.[336] Without a clear ownership status, however, no religious site was eligible for European funding. Meanwhile, the two main religious communities in Bulgaria—the Orthodox Christian and the Muslim, lacked property certificates for many churches and mosques.

To solve this issue in July 2013, a group of deputies from the 42nd Bulgarian Parliament (May 2013—August 2014) proposed a revision of the Religious Denominations Act, which had to settle the status of religious edifices that lacked certificates of property.[337] The envisioned amendments also had to guarantee the rights of registered religious

denominations over their places of wor- ship.[338] More specifically, the draft law proposed a new paragraph to be added to the “Transitory and Closing Regulations” of the Religious Denominations Act. It reads: “the monasteries, churches, and prayer houses that have existed by the time of enforcement of this law and that have been designated as places of worship, together with the plots on which they are built, are property of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church—Bulgarian Patriarchate or correspondingly to other registered religious denominations and their local branches.”[339] This rule was not valid, if the religious objects were used or had been used for nonreligious ends.

The proposed changes were justified by principles and norms embedded in European and Bulgarian national legislation. The first of them is Article 10 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights[340] (which is consistent with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights).[341] The second group includes guarantees of the freedom of religion embedded in the Bulgarian Constitution:

The practicing of any religion shall be unrestricted (Art. 13.1);

The freedom of conscience, the freedom of thought and the choice of religion and of religious or atheist views shall be inviolable. The State shall assist the maintenance of tolerance and respect among believers from different denominations, and among believers and non-believers (Art. 37.1).[342]

The initiators of the legal innovations also referred to the separation of the religious institutions from the state (Constitution, Art. 13.2; Denominations Act, Art. 4.1) and the autonomy of the former (Denominations Act, Article 4.2) in national legislation.[343] According to them, these principles required the elaboration of additional legal norms which to arrange the ownership of religious institutions over their places of worship. Besides, they considered that the immovable and movable assets that served the purposes of liturgy and worship were functionally linked with and of essential importance for the exercise of the right of freedom of religion.[344]

In this regard, the authors of the draft law pointed to cases when religious communities lacked certificates of ownership. Indeed, many such documents were destroyed or disappeared during the years of Communist rule. At the same time, although the religious denominations received an opportunity to solve this problem after 1989, they showed little enthusiasm about it. According to the initiators of the discussed amendments, the reason rooted in the fees and payments for these procedures, which “exceeded the financial resources of the religious denominations.”[345] Therefore, they suggested a solution based on Article 25.1 of the Religious Denominations Act. According to it, the state is allowed to grant financial and economic allowances to registered religious denominations (which then counted about 130).[346] Correspondingly, the draft law envisioned the certificates of ownership for churches, monasteries, and prayer houses to be issued for free.

Finally, the draft law foresaw parallel amendments in the Civil Procedure Code, the Law of Local Taxes and Fees and the Law of State Taxes. All of them planned to exempt the churches, monasteries, and prayer houses from any taxes, fees and financial debts.[347] The adoption of this text would be especially beneficial to the Orthodox Church and the Muslim community which central and local administrations have not paid their garbage fees for years.[348] In 2013, St. Alexander Nevski Patriarchal Cathedral in Sofia owed annual garbage taxes of over 200,000 Euro[349] and the grand mosque—about 225,000 Euro.[350] At the same time, some religious leaders openly refused to spend money on this purpose. In 2015, Nikolay, the Metropolitan Bishop of Plovdiv, appealed to the city churches not to pay off their municipal debts.[351] In contrast, the smaller religious denominations used to pay their taxes on a regular basis.

Furthermore, the initiators of the amendments stated that the creation of favorable conditions for the restoration, arrangement, and exercise of the rights to possession of monasteries, churches, and prayer houses were “an indirect act of fulfilment” of Article 10 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Bulgarian Constitution, i.e., they would provide material support for the right of worship.[352] When approached from a broader perspective, however, the proposed full-scale exemption of religious denominations from the state and local taxes and fees raises questions. On the one hand, there has been no such exemption before the Communist rule. Moreover, the proceedings of the Holy Synod from those times bear witness that the Holy Synod as well as the Orthodox metropolitanates, monasteries, and parochial churches used to pay municipal waste taxes. On the other hand, if adopted, the proposed act will discriminate those non-profit public structures, which are not engaged in religious activities.

Another key motive for the proposed legal changes stemmed from the definition of churches, monasteries, and prayer houses as a special category of immovable property. Once consecrated these buildings become res sacrae, i.e., things dedicated to God. According to the authors of the draft law, this quality of religious edifices requires their exclusion from the civil realm. Consequently, their protection needs to be carried out by legal mechanisms which differ from those used in the case of the non-religious subjects of private law.[353] The same was considered also valid to such movable objects as holy antimensions, sacred vessels, and relics. This approach, however, also raises serious questions. First, it is not clear to what degree the ancient concept of res sacrae is compatible with the contemporary notions of sacred and secular. According to David Wagschal, “a modern legal-doctrinal exposition of the distinction between the civil and ecclesiastical laws seems neither present, nor possible.”[354] The competence of contemporary secular bodies to define one or another object as religious or non-religious is also questionable. Furthermore, the proposed approach is far from the contemporary European practices in the field of religious cultural heritage. In the case of those res sacrae that “are deemed to be of national (or international) importance, ... are protected for enjoyment and public access as integral parts of a wider heritage works.”[355] In this sense, they also belong to Ius publicum and thus are treated as res mixtae, i.e., they not only serve religious worship and but also a greater

public interest. In this way, the model of res mixtae opens a space where the protection of specific rights of religious communities can be balanced with the general welfare at national and international level. From this perspective, the State, together with religious communities, bears responsibility for the proper handling of religious heritage assets.[356] At the same time, there is no direct relationship between the mode of ownership of religious cultural heritage and the autonomy of religious denominations. If the property rights over the old historical cathedrals in France belong to the state, in the United Kingdom they are placed under the ownership of religious communities.[357]

From a strictly religious point, the concept of res sacrae, as defined by the authors of the draft law, may also provoke problems. It is unclear whether such an approach is equally applicable to all religious denominations. Some faith communities do not need special edifices for their worship but use private houses or simply rent the necessary premises. Finally, the historical experience of the Orthodox Church worldwide as well as of its Bulgarian branch does not give grounds for the proposed exclusion of res sacred from the secular/civil realm. In this regard, the medieval history of Byzantium, Serbia, and Bulgaria keeps well-documented evidence of churches and chapels, owned by lay members of aristocracy, e.g., the famous Boyana Church near Sofia.

Another practice that became especially popular in the tenth century was the so called haristikia. It served as a mechanism for avoiding the bankruptcy of monasteries by placing their properties under the protection of lay digni- taries.[358] At the same time, there were also modes of private ownership during the centuries of the Ottoman rule when the Orthodox guilds sponsored the construction of churches dedicated to specific patron-saints and owned these sites, e.g., St. Petka Samardzhiyska Church in Sofia. Some Muslim sultans also referred to this tradition. For example, in 1849, Abdulmecid i (1839–1861) proclaimed the prominent Iron Church of St. Stefan in Istanbul as a property of the local Bulgarian community.[359] In short, it seems that the quality of res sacrae has not presupposed an exclusive ownership of the Orthodox Church over religious edifices, but rather delegated special rights to its clergy to perform religious services there and to organize the religious life of the local religious community in accordance with Orthodoxy’s teaching, dogmas and canons.

Furthermore, the authors of the draft law claimed that the proposed changes addressed future eventualities. According to them, the exclusive property right of religious denominations over the buildings designed to serve and used as their places of worship was the only way to prevent such acts of sacrilege as the selling of temples.[360] For this reason, the primary goal of the discussed amendments was to make the property rights of religious denominations imprescriptible, i.e., nobody else except for the registered religious denominations had the right to own churches, monasteries, and prayer houses.[361] Meanwhile, the authors of the motives did not present any evidence in support of their thesis. Instead, they preferred to refer to cases of monasteries and churches without certificates of ownership and thus declared as state or municipal property. In their view, these acts give green light to a mass “occupancy” of religious edifices without clear ownership status.

The proposed approach, however, is debatable. In fact, it does not make any difference between the contemporary “nationalization/municipalization” of religious sites and the Communist policy of their confiscation. In contrast to the latter, which primary goal was entirely to eradicate religion, the former does not present an attack against the freedom of religion. On the contrary, it provides cure for the complicated ownership situation created as a result of the five decades of atheist rule. In fact, the post-1989 acts of nationalization/ municipalization offer an effective way to rescue abandoned religious sites with unclear ownership status. On the one hand, they offer a mechanism to avoid the time consuming procedures for the arrangement of their ownership status. This is especially important in the case of old churches and mosques endangered to pull down. On the other hand, the same nationalization/munic- ipalization provides legal grounds for the state and municipal authorities to allocate money for their reconstruction. In addition, the declaration of a religious edifice as national or municipal property is not an irreversible act. The restoration or renovation of religious sites on money from the national or municipal budget does not prevent their transfer to the corresponding religious communities. In this case, the change of ownership can be promulgated by a special law, an administrative act, or by a court judgment.

Finally, the motives to the draft law raise questions about the retroactive effect of the proposed amendments. According to their authors, the adoption of the draft law would demonstrate that “the State de jure recognizes a genuine status of the temples, monasteries and prayer houses, many of which have existed before the [establishment] of the contemporary Bulgarian State [in 1878].” They even referred to the Middle Ages, arguing that “part of the properties of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church have been granted by special acts [hrisovul] of the Bulgarian medieval tsars.”[362] It means that the retroactive effect of the discussed amendments is spread over a period which starts with the baptism of Bulgaria in 864. Such an approach sounds unrealistic, counterproductive, and far from historical truth. In particular, it suggests that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has never ceased to exist, thus never losing its ownership. Such a hypothesis, however, can be easily refuted on historical grounds. For example, the stavropegial Bachkovo monastery, currently owned by the Bulgarian Church, was set up under the auspices of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1083. At the same time, many churches and monasteries that today are the boc’s property used to belong to the Patriarchate of Constantinople until the late nineteenth century. In addition, there are also cases of conversion of Orthodox churches into mosques during the centuries of Ottoman rule. After the liberation of Bulgaria (1878) some of them were transformed again into Orthodox temples (1878), e.g., the churches of St. Sophia and St. Sedmochislenitsi in Sofia, or became secular public buildings, e.g., the Bulgarian national archaeological museum.

The most striking feature of the discussed motives is the absence of any reference to the previous totalitarian regime which bears primary responsibility for the current chaos in the ownership status of religious sites in Bulgaria.[363] In fact, their nationalization under the pretext of being preserved as part of Bulgarian historical and cultural heritage was a Communist invention. While in the 1960s and 1970s this campaign targeted religious

edifices, in the 1980s, it gave priority to sacred vessels, holy relics, and icons. As a result, many of them were appropriated by state and regional museums and today continue to be part of their exhibitions.[364] In this regard, it is worthy to mention that the status of religious cultural heritage provoked the most heated debates in Bulgarian society. This discussion also revealed the failure of the authors of the draft law to take into account key issues connected with the non-Orthodox religious communities (primarily Muslims, Jews, and Catholics).

*** 3. The Ownership Debate

The ownership of religious communities over their sacred buildings and prayer houses provoked heated public debates in Bulgaria. Initially concentrated on the boc's properties, they also concerned the restitution of building that used to function as mosques before the Liberation of Bulgaria in 1878.[365] The draft law was warmly welcomed by the leaderships of religious communities. Especially enthusiastic was the boc's Holy Synod, which issued a special statement on this occasion on 22 July 2013.[366] The document stressed the unanimity of the initiators of the legal change, who despite their belonging to different political parties, had acted in tune with Jesus Christ's words: "For where two or three come together in my name, there am I with them" (Matt. 18:20). Such an association, however, is confusing, because it is inappropriate in the case of the Muslim deputies who were co-authors of the draft law.

The Holy Synod's statement reveals deep concern over the ownership of Orthodox churches and monasteries. It points out that these "sacred edifices" have to be open for everybody who searches to pray or serve God and thus they cannot be used for anything else, but for religious services only. In the same document, the Holy Synod also admits that Orthodox religious sites may have had a cultural value. In its view, "the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has always had an understanding that there are some state legal requirements for the architectural appearance of temples with a cultural value which have to be respected." Yet, the Orthodox hierarchs insist that these religious sites have not obtained a cultural value by the means of formal state acts, but had been created as such. According to them, "the status and treatment of some of our [boc's] temples as 'cultural valuables' has no connection with and no influence on the exceptional, centuries long property rights of the Church over them as an institution and organization of believers."[367] Furthermore, the Orthodox hierarchs claim that the Bulgarian Church has preserved these temples without any certificates and has taken care of them long time before the state has started doing it.

In fact, the above discussed statement repeats a view, expressed earlier by Patriarch Neophyte in an interview for Bulgarian media. There, he stressed that temples have been built as houses of God and their present functioning as museums or tourist attractions is of secondary importance.[368] Following this reasoning, the Holy Synod also argues that secular law stems from the Divine one and thus the latter has priority over the former. In this regard, the metropolitans have admitted with sorrow that the contemporary world tends to

deviate from this principle. Still, the Holy Synod accepts that churchmen bare responsibility to God in all religious matters, while respecting civil legislation in the rest. In the end of its statement, the Holy Synod declares that the Church has always given what is Caesar's to Caesar and that the time has come "to be seen whether the Caesar is ready to give to God what is God's." (Matt. 22:21).

Quite similar was the position of the jurist, Borislav Tsekov, a former mp and author of the 2002 Religious Denominations Act. According to him, "the temple belongs to God and serves Him, and not to society, archaeologists, academics or donors. Only the corresponding religious community has the right to possess this property, with or without certificate of ownership."[369] In his view, the Church must get back also those temples that have been declared monuments of culture. In this case, however, it is obliged strictly to observe the restrictions aimed to secure their preservation. At the same time, Tsekov considers that religious denominations should pay taxes for their temples, but only after having the necessary property certificates.

On 17 and 18 July 2013, the draft law was approved by the parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Religious Denominations and Parliamentary Ethics.[370] Few days later, however, the representatives of the parliamentary group of the extreme nationalist party, "Ataka," changed its attitude to the draft law. They continued to support it only as a means for solving the problem with the boc's ownership rights over the St. Alexander Nevski Cathedral, but were against the possible benefits of the Muslim and Jewish communities. Ataka opposed to the claims of the Chief Mufti to religious buildings from the Ottoman times which have functioned as museums since the nineteenth century. Such is the case of the National Archaeological Museum in Sofia, which has ceased to function as mosque after the two earthquakes in 1818 and 1858, i.e., during the Ottoman rule.[371] In their turn, Ataka required a ban of the restitution of formerly religious buildings which now have the status of monuments of culture.[372] In this regard, they pointed that religious denominations lack experts in maintaining monuments of culture. In addition, they also argued that the performance of religious services in such religious sites would endanger their cultural value, thus causing their exclusion from the unesco's list of the world cultural heritage.[373] The draft law was also questioned by the vmro.[374] According to this nationalist political organization, the proposed amendments would open the doors for radical Islam. Therefore, it also called its revision, especially in regard to the non-Orthodox registered religious denominations.[375]

Some of these arguments left their imprint on the decision of the Parliamentary Committee on Culture and Media. During its meeting on 24 July meeting, none of its members agree the draft law to be put forward for voting in parliament.[376] Looking for a compromise, the Chairman of the Parliament proposed the disputable religious monuments of culture to be included in a special category as a guarantee that this historical heritage will be protected.[377] On this occasion, Hussein Havuzov, then a deputy from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms and a former Chief Secretary to the Office of Chief Mufti, commented that though he personally does not insist on the return of the property rights over the building of the National Archaeological Museum to the Muslim community, the very fact that this former

mosque does not belong to this community is unjust. In his opinion, Muslims feel disgrace when hearing that alcohol has been served during cocktails there. In this regard, he has suggested a compromise: the Muslim community will not claim property rights over former mosques as the National Archaeological Museum and the Seven Saints Church [St. Sedmochislenitsi], if permitted to build a second mosque in Sofia in exchange.[378] In another interview, he emphasizes that the refusal to recognize the property rights of religious denominations over buildings of their faith is a violation of the will of donors.[379]

On 5 August 2013, the Bulgarian Academy of Science also protested against the draft law. On behalf of his colleagues, its Chairman, academician Stefan Vodenicharov, sent a letter of protest to the Parliament. The document criticizes the use of the criterion “designated for liturgy/religious services” as a means of determining which buildings have to become property of one or another religious denomination.[380] According to the scholars, the purpose for which a building has been constructed cannot justify a title of ownership of “prayer houses” which have lost their initial designation long time ago and today are functioning as museums or galleries, for example. In this way, scholars, tend entirely to neglect the res sacrae quality of religious edifices and vessels. At the same time, they point to multiple medieval temples which have been discovered in archaeological excavations, organized and financed by the state, that need special care and expertise to be preserved for the next generations. Moreover, some of them used to serve various religious cults throughout the centuries, e.g., the Museum of Religions in the city of Stara Zagora is situated in a building which used to serve as a temple by the ancient Thracians, then as a Christian church, further converted into mosque during the Ottoman rule. From such a perspective, the proposed amendments do not offer clear criteria which religious denomination is entitled to own such buildings. Furthermore, the academic community raised the question about the destiny of religious valuables such as the medieval ceramic icon of St. Theodor of Patleyna, found in archaeological excavations and restored on state money. In this regard, it refers to the practice of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court which considers that “in the case of cultural movable and immovable valuables the property rights cannot be treated on a common basis, as they concern the realization of the cultural rights of every citizen and they are guaranteed by the State’s duty to take care of the preservation of cultural heritage which stem from public law.”

Many journalists also supported the position of scholars. In fact, Bulgarian media have been active in drawing public opinion to cases of mismanagement of religious cultural heritage. Thanks to journalistic investigations, society is well informed about the damages which clerics have caused to churches with the status of monuments of culture due to the lack of competence in the preservation of cultural heritage. The most scandalous case was the reconstruction of St. Marina church in Plovdiv where seventeenth century frescoes were destroyed as a result of the decision of the local metropolitan to stick the temple walls with paper-printed frescoes.[381] The opponents of the draft law also reminded the inability of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to protect its old icons many of which were stolen and sold on the black market in the last years.[382] The archaeologist Todor Chobanov, a former Vice-Minister of Culture, pointed that this Church had been set up by the state and defined as nonsense the Holy Synod’s attempt to refute any property rights of the state over churches.[383]

Not less important are the financial arguments against the proposed amendments of the Religious Denominations Act. It is a public secret that the Orthodox Church has insufficient resources to maintain and reconstruct its places of worship. In this regard, the National Alliance of Municipalities warned that the change of the ownership status of some churches which have been reconstructed on European funding will break clauses in concluded contracts and probably they have to return the money. In addition, they are concerned that the tax exemption of religious denominations will reduce their incomes and some pseudo-religious structures will be set up to avoid the payment of local taxes and fees.[384] In parallel, it was estimated that the vote for the draft bill will deprive the Ministry of Culture of an income of 350,000 Euro which is paid by the visitors of museums situated in former or present places of worship.[385] Some publications also accused the Orthodox hierarchs of being greedy.[386] As a result, the draft law was not voted by the parliament. Meanwhile, the destiny of religious edifices that have not remained under state ownership continue to provoke tensions in Bulgarian society. The decision of the Council of Ministers to transfer the St. Alexander Nevski Patriarchal Cathedral to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, taken in October 2014, is contested as unlawful in the Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria in 2015.[387]

*** 4. Conclusions

The ownership of places of worship remains a sensitive and extremely complicated issue in former socialist societies dominated by state-imposed atheism. The Bulgarian public debate reveals several problems. The first stems from the view that religion (religion in general) was a major victim of the Communist rule and its militant atheism. From such a perspective the arrangement of the property rights of religious communities over their places of worship is considered to be an act of a retroactive justice. Another group of problems concerns the implementation of the principle of separation of religion/church and state. On the one hand, society tends to give priority to res publicae over res sacrae in cases of churches and prayer houses that have acquired the quality of monument of culture. On the other hand, the theological understanding of “what is God’s” tends to absorb the whole public sphere, especially in the case of places of worship. All this points to the lack of an agreement in Bulgarian society whether and to what a degree the sacred is part of the contemporary public sphere.

The next set of problems, which seems to have special importance in Southeastern European countries with religiously mixed population, has been provoked the interplay between the religious and the national and reflects a rivalry between religious leaderships for their shares in the public sphere. In Bulgaria, this rivalry inspires a strong opposition of religious and secular nationalists (both of Orthodox background) against the claims pretensions of religious minorities to owe buildings where their adherents used to pray in the past. This resistance is especially strong in the case of Islam due to the erection of multiple minarets which quickly changed the country’s religious landscape. Instead of entrenching an interreligious partnership, this development tends to evoke associations with the centuries

of Ottoman rule which assist the spread of nationalist claims about a re-Islamization of Bulgaria.

Furthermore, the debate on the property of religious denominations reveals tensions between the theologically motivated instruction “to render God what is God’s” and the human rights’ principle of freedom of religion and conscience. To reconcile them in a religiously non-homogenous society as the Bulgarian one means to elaborate a mode of distribution which balances the interests of the different religious communities. Sometimes, however, it seems impossible to avoid arbitrary solutions, e.g., when a place of worship used to serve different religions. From such a perspective, the allocation of annual state subsidies to religious communities seems more promising. In 2013, these communities received 1.5 million Euros (10 percent of this amount is for the reconstruction of religious buildings). According to the preliminary budget, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has to receive €830,000 for its domestic needs and €350,000 for the salaries of its clergy abroad, the Muslim community—€90,000, the Armenian community—€20,000, and the Jewish community—€15,000. Meanwhile, until 2014, the Catholic Church did not receive any financial support from the state budget.[388] At the same time, the most recent amendments of the Law on Local Taxes and Fees that exempts the churches and other places of worship from such duties put under question the need for state subsidies to religious denominations in the future.[389]

Finally, the property right over churches and prayer houses turns to be not only a theologically relevant issue, but also one of economic significance. On the one hand, as tangible assets these properties need to be maintained and this costs money. In this regard, the two major religious communities in Bulgaria, the Orthodox and the Muslim, rely on European and national funding as well as on private donors. Their religious leaderships, however, tend to omit the rule “to render the Caesar what is Caesar’s” which resulted in lawsuits filed against their representatives by municipalities. On the other hand, although the places of worships are non-profit entities they still receive incomes from selling religious items and candles, performed rites and rituals, voluntary donations, etc. Currently, however, they do not keep, at least officially, any record of their revenues. In fact, this makes a big difference in comparison with the pre-Communist practice when the Bulgarian Orthodox Church maintained bookkeeping at all levels of its ecclesiastical administration, i.e., it was done by every parish, every diocese, every monastery and the Holy Synod. Even St. Alexander Nevski Cathedral, the ownership status of which is an object of heated debates, kept strict balance of its revenues (from own sources and state subsidies) and all expenses. In this regard, it seems that the pre-Communist past offers useful models of financial and social accountability of religious denominations that may provide solutions for the present dilemma how to proceed with the things of Caesar and the things of God in the public square.

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** Chapter 6: The Hijab in Contemporary Bulgaria

Muslim Views on Veiling

Galina Evstatieva

Abstract

Muslims in Bulgaria—male and female—struggle over the “authentic” meaning of hijab against the backdrop of modern secular society by explaining it as a religious duty. My aim is to reveal the role of major Sunni Muslim views on hijab as part of the ongoing broader process shaping a shared Islamic identity in post-Communist Bulgaria. The chapter traces its multiple meanings among interpretations proposed by Sunni religious authorities, domestic cultural codes, and the perceptions of veiling by Bulgarian Muslim women themselves. The

study analyzes two types of evidence. First, it brings to the fore the discourses as documented by two periodicals with the same name, issued by the Chief Muftiship of the Muslim Denomination in the Republic of Bulgaria—the newspaper and the more recent bilingual magazine Myusyulmani/ Muslumanlar (“Muslims”), issued simultaneously in both Bulgarian and Turkish. The examination of this magazine’s issues 1999–2016 indicates that nearly 20 percent of the articles deal with topics related to Muslim women, with one-third of the publications written by Muslim women or representing their opinions. The second type of evidence is ethnographic, drawing on fieldwork among Bulgarian Muslims in several localities of the Rhodopes Mountains. Finally, the chapter highlights attitudes toward the parliament’s passage of the 2016 Law Prohibiting the Wearing of Clothing Concealing the Face (known as the “burqa ban”). In sum, the study shows how Muslims are seeking to rediscover what they believe is the authentic meaning of hijab through a process of re-Islamization—a “piety movement” for stricter observance of Islamic rules. The need to return to “true” Islamic teachings is often publicly explained as a fundamental human right for practicing religion without state interference.

Keywords

Islam — Bulgaria — veiling — hijab — face veil — burqa — Muslim women — Pomaks

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Bulgaria’s indigenous Muslim communities of ethnic Turks, Pomaks[390] (Bulgarianspeaking Muslims) and Roma date back to Ottoman times[391] and make up about 12 percent of the country’s 7.2 million population. In January 2009, a decade after the fall of the atheist Communist regime, the official periodical of the Chief Muftiship Myusyulmani (“Muslims”) issued a programmatic editorial on religious identity of Muslims in Bulgaria. The Muslim leadership declared that Bulgarian Muslims have “an Islamic and Turkish identity” while only from a “civil point of view, can one speak of a Bulgarian identity” though in recent years, the text states, Bulgarian Muslims have also obtained a “European identity.”[392] The Muftiship further specified that Muslims in Bulgaria are predominantly Sunni of the Hanafi madhhab and that there is only a small Alevi community. Such an announcement is part of the evidence that, along with the post-1989 transition to a democratic political system, Muslims in Bulgaria have been increasingly reviving their shared religious identity. The institution of the Muftiship claims to play the leading role in that process. Thus, Muslims invoke the normative Islamic teachings of public morality, including rules for proper Islamic veiling and clothing for women seeking to be “true believers.”

The public discourse of the Muslim leadership has been integral to promoting the Islamic concept of hijab and female modesty after decades of state- forced national modernization and what was pursued as an emancipation of the “socialist women.” Within that

“emancipation,” female Muslims were involved in a process of social engineering in which veiling was rejected and perceived as a form of a “reactionary” tradition. Yet it is an open question whether veiling represents an ongoing process in secular post-Communist Bulgarian society towards re-Islamization, “resuming” the authority of the shari’a in the everyday practices and public life of Muslim women through a return to a stricter adherence to Islamic norms. In so doing, I trace the polysemy of the Islamic concept of hijab on the basis of intersection between the interpretations by the Bulgarian Sunni religious authorities, domestic cultural codes, and the perceptions of veiling by Bulgarian Muslim women themselves.

My focus is on contemporary Islamic discourses of “proper” veiling and dress practices among Muslim women.

One source to follow the public debate comprises two periodicals with the same name issued by the Chief Muftiship of the Muslim Denomination in the Republic of Bulgaria—the newspaper and the above-mentioned magazine Myusyulmani. After the 1989 changes, the Muftiship launched its own newspaper (1999–2004), and in 2005 this official publication was replaced by the monthly bilingual magazine, Myusyulmani in Bulgarian and Muslumanlar in Turkish. From 1999 through 2016, nearly 20 percent of the articles dealt with topics related to Muslim women. Muslim women wrote one-third of the stories or their opinions were represented in the form of interviews. In general, the two publications are devoted to the teachings of Islam on women’s roles, duties and rights, the explanations of religious beliefs, practices, and the moral observance and behavior in accordance with the Islamic faith. However, the most frequently discussed topics are related to the appropriate Islamic covering, women’s public behavior, education, inheritance, the Muslim woman as a wife and mother, the right choice of a husband, or religiously acceptable woman’s work outside of the home. Those subjects are linked to the hijab, which illustrates the particular importance of this topic.

The second type of evidence is ethnographic and draws on field research among Bulgarian Muslims in several localities of the Rhodopes Mountains since 2003. Along with the observation of practices, this chapter is based on interviews and conversations with several representatives of younger Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, born in the early 1970s, who have received their Islamic education in Bulgaria or abroad in the Arab world. I focus on the Islamic views of two respondents active on the local and national level who articulated female and male Pomak views—Hatije Tiber and Muhammed Kamber.

Married with two daughters, Hatije lives in her native village of Avramovo, Blagoevgrad region, although the place is culturally and geographically closer to Velingrad. She wears hijab and modest attire. Hatije received a bachelor’s degree in Primary School Pedagogy from Blagoevgrad University and in 2005 graduated the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia as an expert in Islamic theology. She also holds a master’s degree in Public Administration from Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski. Between 2000 and 2007, Hatije worked as a teacher at

the primary school in Avramovo. Although she was an experienced teacher with extensive abilities and knowledge, after the relocation of that school she was asked to unveil if she wished to continue her career in the national publicschool system. Hatije refused to unveil. Now she is regularly engaged in her family’s agricultural work and teaches in the summer Qur’an school—a course organized for the children in her village.

Muhammed Kamber, for his part, graduated from the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, where he studied for seven years. Since 2008, he has been imam in his native village of Luzhnitsa in the Gotze Delchev region of the South-Western Rhodopes. Kamber was among the defendants in “the trial against the thirteen imams” which after the pre-court investigation was carried out at the Pazardzhik District Court between 2012 and 2015. He was accused of propagating “antidemocratic ideology,” but the Plovdiv Court of Appeal discharged him from those accusations. During the lawsuit, Kamber received strong support from the people of his village, who were convinced of his innocence. In 2016, he was elected to the Supreme Muslim Council at the Chief Mufti’s Office. Both Hatije and Muhammed participate in various activities and seminars organized by the Muftiship. Hatije has contributed to Myusyulmani as a guest author. Since early 2017, Kamber has been a member of the editorial board of the highly read Myusyulmani magazine.

*** 1. Veiling as Public Performance of Faith according to the Mainstream Islamic Tradition

The religious justifications for veiling in its classical meaning are to be found in the Qur’an and the Sunna and refer to the concept of hijab (hijab).[393] For Muslims, the wearing of the hijab is closely related to some passages from the Qur’an (especially Q. 24: 31; 33: 53–55, 59) and sayings of Prophet Muhammad from the hadith collections that enjoin women to dress modestly and to cover themselves.[394] Islamic exegesis (tafslr) and jurisprudence (fiqh.) has not fixed certain religious prescriptions for a specifically Islamic type of clothing but focused on the interpretations what parts of the woman’s body have to be covered in public (‘awra, pudendum or, literally, genitals)[395] rather than what she needed to wear to cover her pudendum (satr al- ‘awra). One internal division among the four established traditional Sunni schools (madhhabs) of Islamic law was whether a woman’s face should be classified as 1 awra and therefore is the full veiling compulsory/duty (wajib/fard), recommended (mustahabb) or permissible (mubah). However, there is a clear and decisive scholarly consensus (ijma’) on the mandate of hijab. It is considered a religious duty (fard) of expressing Islamic moral virtues through covering of the female body and head. According to the religious regulation of veiling in Islamic normative textual tradition, hijab denotes not simply an element of garment worn by a woman outside the home but also signifies her proper appearance in public and entire manner of social behavior as a believing Muslima.

This approach to veiling as a public performance of faith is clear-cut and linked to the religious duty of observing the gender division incumbent on the Muslim community (umma) through the medium of dressed gendered bodies. Female modesty transforms into a collective social concern in order to publicly preserve the divinely ordained physical boundaries between men and women.[396] The veiling of Muslim women as a means to maintain social distance between the genders became a de facto institution regulating social relationships in accord with Islamic sacred law (shart'a). Furthermore, as Julianne Funk emphasizes, covered Muslim women have the power to form clear boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims and sustain the code of conduct that accompanies the hijab.[397] Paradoxically, veiling, which Muslims do not perceive as a religious symbol, acquires symbolic dimensions in the ideologically neutral public space of modern secular societies: an outer expression of personal faith marks the woman clearly in public as a devout Muslim, no matter what her reasons to cover.

*** 2. Muslim Veiling in the Bulgarian Context

Most of the ethnic Turkish population in Bulgaria today is secular and the Islamic headscarf during the recent years is less common among the younger generation compared to the increasingly massive expression of religious identity via hijab-veiling among the Pomaks.[398] Yet this diversity among the Muslim community in Bulgaria does not cause any intra-Islamic debates on whether the veil is mandatory or not. The study of the official periodicals of the Chief Mufti's Office clearly shows that all authors who wrote about Muslim women are unanimous that believing women have to cover their heads and not display their beauty.[399] Thus the Muslim leadership asserts their community in a clearcut manner that there is an existing scholarly consensus in Islam on the mandate of hijab. This unanimity is also a reaction to the various campaigns for "de-veiling" Muslim women by the Bulgarian state, which earlier had pursued strong secularist policies, sometimes by force.

In Bulgaria, the Muslim veil is denoted by words such as zabradka, bulo, kurpa, feredzhe, hijab, yashmak, shamiya, kyulbe, or djar, all of which are used to describe particular parts of the clothing covering woman's body, head or face when she leaves her home and appears in public spaces. The terms are with Slavic, Arabic or Turkish roots and represent a Balkan contextualiza- tion and Ottoman interpretation of the women's garment in accordance with the Islamic moral rules for decency and modesty. Neuburger claims that in Bulgarian writings on the practice, these terms are used interchangeably.[400] However, etymologically the Bulgarian words zabradka (headscarf), bulo (veil) and kurpa (kerchief) refer to different types of headscarves worn by Christian women. The naming of the hijab as zabradka by Muslims, especially in the 20th century, is a domestic cultural contextualization and involves an attempt to protect Islamic veiling norms by adapting mainstream terminology under the conditions of a modern secular state with a predominantly Christian population, where most of the elderly Christian rural women wore kurpi or zabradki. The other terms are originally Arabic or

Turkish and are not interchangeable. They denote separate items of Muslim clothing for covering not only the head, but also the neck, body and conceivably the face.

The Bulgarian government carried out campaigns against the Islamic veil during the early consolidation of the modern nation-state building in 19121913, included an assimilationist policy for a forced Christianization (pokru- stvane) of the Pomaks, who were claimed to be “Bulgarians in their blood.”[401] In the period 1937–1944 active members of the state-supported Pomak movement Rodina played an important role in this process of de-veiling called razferedzhavane (removing the feredzhe) of Pomak women. Muslim women intermittently shed and re-donned their veils and shalvari,[402] whether out of modernist affinities or as a survival strategy. Although the majority of Pomaks were opposed to Rodina and its de-veiling program, state support ensured that pro-Rodina Muslims held an increasingly large measure of local control.[403]

Feredzhe is the most well-known garment, traditionally worn by Muslim women in the Balkans during the Ottoman period and until the first decades of the 20th century.[404] It is a long dark (most often black), modestly cut robe that covered all the body to the throat. Women also covered their heads and faces with a variety of veils or wraps. Hatije explained that in the past, Muslim women from her region put the shamiya over their heads and, while in public, additionally covered the faces and chests with a piece of cloth called kyulbe. Muhammed Kamber specified that until 1912 his female ancestors worn the feredze and covered their heads and faces with the yashmak (an Ottoman type of veil analogous to niqab) that only expose the eyes and the nose. He insists that Muslim women wore “all sorts of clothes including wide shalvar for the purpose of covering every part of the body that must be hidden in public and before unrelated men.” He said that “the leading reason for such clothing was [women’s] willingness to dress according to Islam. The same religious reason motivates them today.”[405] Thus Muhammed confirms that for the Islamic dress code it is much more important to guarantee the covering of the women’s ‘awra rather than what type of clothing she wears.

In spite of the assimilationist Communist policies of forced name-changing or the activities of the regime to modernize and emancipate women through unveiling, many Muslim women continued to veil during the so-called “Revival Process” (Vuzroditelen protses) when the Arabic-Turkish names of the Pomaks (in the 1970s) and Turks (in the 1980s) were forcibly changed to sound “more Bulgarian.”[406] However, women continue to express their Muslim identity through the veil. The attempts of the Bulgarian state to impose restrictions on religious garments and to force Muslim women with administrative measures and fines to take off their headscarves is a sensitive topic in Myusyulmani magazine. A 2012 editorial emphasizes that the Muslim veil was viewed by the Communist authorities as a clear demonstration of foreign Turkish nationalism and religiosity: “The Turkish woman was not allowed to wear a yashmak because it was a representation of both national and religious clothing. The deveiling policies of the regime proclaimed that it is not acceptable for a socialist woman to hide as a ‘scarecrow’ behind sheets, burqu, or feredzhe.”[407] Because of the prohibitions against wearing a veil at work, in shops, in

public transport, or during public events, many Muslim women, especially in the cities, removed the headscarves.

When I asked Muhammed Kamber to explain how the Pomak women from his region kept veiling during this period, he answered: “Our women did not occupy administrative or governmental positions in the towns. They were ordinary farmers and herders living out in the fields and in mountain villages. In fact, this circumstance facilitated and helped them to dress according to Islam.”[408] The lack of desire for a professional career in the Communist governmental and public administration as well as the avoidance of the urban public spaces encapsulated and selfmarginalized the more observant Muslim women, who remained in rural areas where they could practice veiling. Hatije’s comments on the subject confirm that the feredzhes were completely abandoned during the Communist regime when Muslim women started to wear wider simple handmade gowns and dresses. They also continued to cover their heads, although she clarifies that headscarves have little to do with the hijab because they did not completely cover the hair and the neck according to Islamic rules.[409] Thus, the authorities perceived veiling as an element of rural folk costume rather than as a fulfillment of a religious duty.

Nonetheless, modified Islamic veiling unsanctioned by the Communist authorities worked only in the closed environment of the village and particularly in agricultural fields. As Hatije pointed out, over time the economic reality of rural life changed with the opening of different economic opportunities (for example, sewing, weaving carpets, and the assembly of low-current relays) in nearby villages where the Pomak women could find well-paid jobs but were obligated to abandon the shalvars, to wear trousers, and to remove their headscarves inside this “public” workspace. Veiled Muslim women were also forbidden to attend gatherings and festive events in public urban or holiday places. Many of them gave birth at home to avoid going to a hospital where they were obliged to take off their headscarves.[410]

Since 2012, Hatije Tiber maintains her own blog, Muslimabg, where she publishes poems, essays, reflections on Islamic celebrations and seminars, and personal stories about pilgrimage (hajj) or veiling.[411] Her memoir, “My First Hijab,” was republished by the magazine of the Muftiship in 2014.[412] In this narrative, written in the form of personal confession, Hatije denies the allegations that Muslim women are oppressed and deprived of decision-making on whether to cover. She shares memories from the past to show that her forcible unveiling by activists of the Communist Party, when she was fifteen-years old, did not liberate or emancipate her but rather generated only pain and intensified her anger. She is convinced that unveiling deprived her of her core identity. After the democratic changes in Bulgaria, Hatije pursued her studies covered with hijab in the universities. She admits that she was proud to be judged on the basis of her virtues as Muslima, as well as her academic knowledge, and not according to her beauty. Hatije prefers to remain veiled and not to fulfill her career aspirations in the secular educational system, where she would have to lift her veil. She thinks she has already chosen her own way of “achieving the satisfaction of the Creator.” She writes, “This way of life does not allow for compromising with my faith.”[413]

*** 3. Return to the “True” Rights, Duties, and Responsibilities of Women in Islam

Hatije represents the Islamic piety movement among Pomaks that emerged in Bulgaria since the 1990s. This movement has succeeded in “attracting believers who seek a new kind of Islamic knowledge, distinct from official religion or the folk Islam passed down by their elders.”[414] For her part, Hatije characterizes the 1990s as “a very favorable period for exploring Islam and a stricter observance of its commandments.” In an informal conversation, she underlined that a lot of things have changed during the past twenty years: “Indeed, there was a period of a strong conflict between the old hodzhas and the young ones who graduated from Saudi Arabia but gradually the community began to accept the need for a better understanding of the religion. Beginning in the 1990s, lectures were held extensively, especially for women, because as key figures in the family they had to learn more about Islam, and they likewise began to attend the Qur’an school to learn how to read the Muslim Holy Book in Arabic.”[415]

This call of the piety movement for an “authentic” return to the “true” Islamic teachings as revealed in the Qur’an and exemplified by the Prophetic Sunna have over time been gradually integrated into the discourse of the “official” religion. The newspaper, and subsequently the magazine Myusyulmani, provided a platform for publications of young Muslim women who acquired their Islamic education in the Arab world. Some expressed the opinion that the knowledge of Islam, duties, responsibilities, and rights of Muslims as a whole are extremely important, because the “predominant Islam in Bulgaria today is perverted and irrespective of the meaning of the Holy Qur’an.”[416] Moreover, as Gyulgyun Saitova stresses, this local tradition is not related to the Prophet Muhammad’s legacy, and many of their rights as Muslim women were taken away.[417] Numerous articles argue in an apologetic manner, pursuing the conviction that local culture and the “misperceptions” of Islam among the Christian majority have led to a misrepresentation of the social status and role of Muslim women. Different authors assert that Islam gave women more rights than European women have enjoyed in the Christian civilization.[418] In addition, the magazine published an editorial which explains to the Muslim community that in Islam “the rights and responsibilities of a woman are equal though not necessarilty identical with those of a man.”[419]

Important contributions to promoting such a discourse can be found in articles clearly emphasizing the fundamental role of the Muslim woman as a mother for the care and upbringing of future generations in order to preserve the Islamic standards of morality in society,[420] since “the best reward on the Day of Judgment will receive the woman who has fulfilled all her duties as a wife and mother.”[421] That is why some authors have brought to the fore not only the “necessity” but the duty of every Muslim to build a strong family. For example, Hatije Ismail, a then student at the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia, reviewing the sources and principles of Islamic family law, concluded that “the marriage is a religious obligation, a moral fortress and a social duty for Muslims, because as a religion and a socio-political system, Islam recognizes the family as the basic unit of society.”[422] Opinions

expressed in the official publications of the Muftiship have the purpose of reminding Bulgarian Muslims that the family is a core Islamic value and the basic element and the cornerstone of the umma. Therefore, religiously prescribed gender roles preserve the Islamic social order. In this clearly outlined paradigm of social relations, the roles of Muslim men and women are considered equal but not identical, as men are, in general, responsible for the well-being of family members, while women take the responsibility for managing of household affairs and raising the children as good Muslims.

Based on the Islamic notion of family, some articles in Myusyulmani criticize European secular societies for the tendency to ruin the traditional family by encouraging family planning and birth control, or by promoting the cohabitation and tolerating some forms of same-sex civil unions or marriages.[423] In 2008, one of the Islamic leaders in the Muftiship and currently a Deputy Chief Mufti, Vedat Ahmed, published an article criticizing a new draft Bulgarian family code which intended to reform the law related to cohabitation. According to him, the legalization of same sex marriages or arrangements by two nonmarried individuals to live together, “implies a high risk as a danger [leading to a] moral degradation of society.”[424] There was considerable objection to the bill, mainly from the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Chief Mufti’s Office, and, consequently, the Bulgarian Family Code which was passed in 2009 did not recognize the legal status of cohabitation as a valid form of marriage.[425] Its existence has been recognized by various regulations, but only civil marriage has legal validity.

Some editorials of Myusyulmani express a negative attitude towards female emancipation and the gender equality in the West. These achievements of modernity are seen as unacceptable for Muslim women because burdening women with roles extrinsic to them makes any aspiration for imitating the Western pattern condemnable from an Islamic perspective.[426] In this regard, the current (since 2005) Chief Mufti, Mustafa Alish Hadzhi, explains that, in Islam, women enjoy certain privileges of which man is deprived. She is financially secure from her birth and for the rest of her life by her husband, if she gets married, or by her male relatives, if she remains single. Hence, Muslim women are not obliged to work and it is a Muslim man’s responsibility to look after his family.[427] Family life is a social life, writes the Chief Mufti, and social life, accordingly, requires leadership. Islamic law loaded the man with additional responsibilities to provide the livelihood of women and the families, so “he deserves more to take the leadership role in the family.” In this way, the balance between rights and duties is maintained in the shari’a. Further, Mustafa Alish adds: “The family is a constructive element of society. It should be governed by reason rather than by feelings. I do not mean that women have less intellectual capacity than men, but it is a fact that women are more emotionally sensitive than men. Therefore, taking into account the respective capabilities and the physiological factors, the social roles in Islam are well-defined and fairly distributed between the sexes.”[428]

Despite the observed diversity of local traditions and practices among Muslims throughout the country what is remarkable since the collapse of the Communist regime is that the views on the role of women in wider society promoted by the Chief Muftiship and expressed in their two major journals indicate a movement from the inherited “local” Muslim traditions to

the “great” Islamic tradition and normativity. Defending the validity of Islamic doctrine, the systematic argumentation and discourse of the publications present the gender roles as static and enforced by the religious structure regardless of space and time. For example, along with the saying that Muslim women are not bound to carry out any career outside the home to make a living, as the classical Islamic texts stress, the Regional Mufti of Gotse Delchev, Aydin Mohammed, criticizes the changing roles of women in the contemporary Bulgarian society: “The main role of the Muslim woman today seems to be based solely on her work in order to provide support to improve the family’s livelihood. She works in manufactories, in the fields, on a farm, in the kitchen, or wherever money can be earned.”[429] In reality, he adds, this leads to unfulfillment of her maternal and marital family obligations. Aydin Mohammed is convinced that neither the public kindergartens, nor the schools and universities but the mother plays the most important and leading role in the early training, upbringing, and educating children in Muslim families.[430] The enormous increase in the number of working Muslim women, encouraged by state emancipation policies, is a matter of concern for many believers because this can significantly change family patterns and roles.

The views constantly expressed by leading Bulgarian religious leaders aim effectively to persuade return to a “purer Islam” closer to the classical shari’a norms. Ghodsee, for example, observed that gender roles were starting to be redefined locally “so that the ideal family had a husband who worked to support a pious, stay-at-home wife whose primary responsibility was the proper Muslim education of her children, and this is, indeed, a radical departure from the Communist past.”[431] The evidence from the Myusyulmani newspaper and magazine documents ongoing theological and judicial[432] activity for legitimizing that broke with the recent past, especially among the Pomak community in Bulgaria.

Along the same lines, an editorial about the education of young Muslim girls and women encourages education but places faith-based restrictions on subject areas. These constraints, it is argued, are placed “with respect to women in order to preserve their dignity and moral values.” Permitted are all the sciences and knowledge “beneficial to the nature and belief of the woman.”[433] For example, it is considered unacceptable for a women to practice professions or activities which may damage her body (such as military service, construction, or metallurgy), contrary to her feminine nature (engaging in affairs obstructing her main roles as a wife and mother), requiring a strong character (e.g., working as a judge) [434] or violating of her honor and dignity, such as gender mixing in the workplace.[435] This outline socially unacceptable roles and professions for women pits claimed Muslim objections squarely against the value of gender equality in the workplace.

The official Islamic discourse as represented by Myusyulmani magazine is also concerned about women’s careful and informed choice of a husband. For example, the magazine elaborates on guidelines to instruct today’s Muslim youth in Bulgaria on how to make the “right choice” of a spouse in accordance with the principles of Islamic law, since building a strong Muslim family is essential for achieving happiness both in this world and in the afterlife. The Qur’an and the Sunna are the main reference points. The ideal Muslim

woman has to be pious, virgin, of decent origin, good-tempered, and willing to give birth. She should not be a close relative of the husband. Beauty is preferable, although it is emphasized that the concept of beauty is subjective and one must not forget the soul's beauty.[436] The most proper measure of choice is a woman's piety and wish to veil.[437]

When Hatije Tiber explained the massive return of the Pomak community to religion and its values, she specified that the veiling of women constitute an indispensable part of this process: "There are two tendencies in the veiling: a small percentage of women wear a headscarf simply because they follow the local traditions, while the larger group of women made a conscious decision to wear hijab and to cover themselves in public."[438] Arguing that in the near past Bulgarian Muslim women did not properly understand the Islamic requirements to dress in the appropriate way, Hatije gladly notes that she belongs to the second group which strives to fulfill religious requirements and not follow the local tradition in which women's clothing does not entirely meet the standard for "real" Islamic dress.

Hatidje Ali Ibrahim,[439] also from the Islamic piety movement from Avramovo, wrote one of the first articles in Myusyulmani that provided detailed instructions about Islamic clothing requirements for women. The dress code, she pointed out, "is of particular importance because through clothing the Muslim woman increases her dignity in society and preserves her virtue, while a woman who does not respect the clothing prescribed by Allah loses her honour and the respect of others."[440] Proper dress and covering the body in public with a wide opaque "head-to-toe" modest garment that does not show the woman's figure, does not emulate the dress of the opposite sex and is not perfumed, provides Muslim women with dignity, purity, chastity, and nobility as understood in the Islamic tradition. For Hatije Ibrahim, women must veil. Nonetheless, "Islamic clothing does not make the believing woman unpleasant nor humiliate her but makes her much more valuable. Accordingly, she must be proud of having a dignity and a value higher than non-Muslim women."[441]

The periodicals of the Chief Muftiship promote Islamic rules for women's dress code by publishing articles from a female perspective. For example, Gyulgyun Saitova, who was studying by that time at Faculty of Shari'a of Zarqa University, Jordan, explains her belief that clothes can serve as flirting tools that can lead to illicit relationships. Therefore, in Islam the woman should be well dressed, wear makeup and perfume only for her husband, and not show her beauty in public spaces. She adds that according to Islamic law, a Muslim woman's beauty should be primarily for her husband and her close relatives (mahram), with whom marriage is permanently unlawful by kinship or foster relationships. She reassures her readership that this religious command effectively eliminates the problem of infidelity in the Muslim family as the husband believes that his wife will preserve her purity and honor by observing the Islamic dress code and modesty in public.[442]

*** 4. Public Perceptions: Religious Requirements vis-a-vis the Secular Rules

The hijab polarized public opinion in Bulgarian society at large, because its wearing challenges the secular concept of neutrality, a debate that has also galvanized France now for several decades.[443] In 2006, a lively national public debate about Islamic veiling ignited in Bulgaria when two Muslim girls in a Smolyan high school wearing headscarves refused to un-veil and to wear the school's uniform after the director of the school banned the veil in classrooms. A local non-governmental organization, the Union for Islamic Development and Culture, filed a complaint on their behalf against the Ministry of Education with the Commission for the Protection against Discrimination. The complaint claimed that headscarves were mandatory for Muslim women and that the human rights of the two girls were being violated. This case provoked the Minister of Education to propose changes in the future law on education, forbidding the use of religious symbols in schools.[444] The Minister made a statement on the official government policy and declared that the public schools in the country are secular, and that Islamic headscarves could not be worn in the classrooms. In August 2006, the Commission issued a decision rejecting the complaints about religious discrimination and fined all parties in the dispute for their attempt to "incite discrimination." The two girls had to decide either to remove their headscarves or to become private students. They chose the second option.[445]

Right after the Commission's decision, the Chief Mufti Mustafa Hadzhi made a statement against it and declared that the headscarf is a religious duty divinely incumbent upon Muslim women.[446] Actually, since the fall of the Communist regime in Bulgaria, the Chief Muftiship has clearly argued that there is a consensus position on the mandatory nature of the headscarf. However, the Smolyan case provoked almost all members of the Muftiship to actively engage in a campaign to protect wearing the hijab in public and girls' rights to wear it in public schools. Hussein Hafuzov, the then secretary-general and spokesman for the Chief Muftiship, gave an interview to the editor of Myusyulmani magazine in which he affirmed that the headscarf (zabrad- kata) is not "a religious symbol" but "a religious duty" by quoting the Quran 24:31–32 and 33:59. Furthermore, he said that "Muslim women are prohibited from leaving their homes without wearing a headscarf and this is a definitive requirement by God. Otherwise, they are committing a sin."[447] The ban on headscarves in Bulgarian schools and universities, according to him, would put the Muslim women in the situation to face the dilemma of whether to commit a sin, for which they will be punished on the Day of Judgment, or to deprive themselves of an education being not useful for themselves and the society. Thus, Hafuzov clearly indicated that the administrative and legal regulations of the Bulgarian secular state contest the Islamic concept of public morality and violate Islamic law and the religious beliefs it regulates.[448]

In the same time, the Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council, Vedat Ahmed, also defended the veiling of schoolgirls.[449] He briefly outlined the textual proofs for wearing hijab, explaining Islamic scholars label the area that should be covered ('awra), arguing that within the Hanafi school of law the face and hands are excluded from the 'awra and women may therefore uncover them. In so doing, Ahmed used two terms interchangeably to denote Islamic veiling: hijab and tasettur. The last term, also of Arabic origin, means "covering." Due to the fact that it was widely used by Ottoman Hanafi jurists, it became widespread in the Balkans through Ottoman Turkish—tesettur. Further, the fulfillment of this religious duty is an obligation incumbent upon all Muslim girls who have

entered puberty and that an exception to go out in public uncovered for the gaze of men can be made only for old women. To him, “covering women’s private parts and beauty is an expression of praise and obedience to the Creator” aiming “at ensuring the chastity and honor of women, as well as the honor of men who are often tempted by the beauty of women.”[450] Still, Vedat Ahmed concludes by arguing that the Muslim veil per se guarantees the affiliation of the woman to the definitive divine religion.[451] In this sense, hijab functions as a means of visible expression of her Muslim identity and faith in the public space.

The Islamic arguments for veiling as observed in the periodicals of the Chief Muftiship have contributed to an increasing number of young Muslim women wearing the hijab. However, during the last decade, the presence of veiled women in public spaces was often interpreted by nationalist circles in Bulgarian society as facilitating the public re-emergence of Islam and disrupting the established boundaries between the religious and the secular. The degree and the type of Muslim veiling was a subject of heated political and public debates on the eve of adopting a law banning the full-face veil. In Bulgaria today, the face veil is not considered a “traditional” dress for native Muslim women. Since the first decades of the 20th century they have generally worn different local types of modest attire and headscarves to cover their hair. But recently there has been a rise in the number of fully veiled women wearing the niqab, the long Jilbab gowns or khimar-like garments among Muslim communities of the Roma minority in Bulgaria, around a third of whom are Muslim. In fact, these Roma are almost all members of a tiny community in the Iztok neighborhood of the southern city of Pazardzhik.

In the past several years, the community has been at the center of media attention and public controversy after its Salafi preacher, Ahmed Moussa, was put on trial three times, accused of spreading “religious hatred.” Pazardzhik became the first Bulgarian city to ban full-face veils in public. On 27 April 2016, the Pazardzhik Municipality Council voted an amendment to the Ordinance on Public Order prohibiting wearing of any clothing or accessories that completely cover the face and obscure the identity of the wearer. The facial veil is perceived as a potential security threat because it allows one to hide one’s features. People who do not follow the ban face fines ranging from 300 Bulgarian leva[452] to 1,000 Bulgarian leva for repeated offences.[453] Following Pazardzhik, several Bulgarian towns prohibited the wearing of full-face veils in public. Along with bans on the local level, on 30 September 2016 the Bulgarian parliament approved a nationwide law outlawing face-covering veils in public—at state institutions, schools, areas of administrative, and public services.

This legislation was pushed by members of the vmro Party (within the nationalist Patriotic Front coalition).[454] The argumentation included in the bill was based on many complex factors: face covering impedes identification and poses a security risk; it is an unacceptable form of propagating “radical Islamist ideas” that have nothing to do with the “traditional” Muslim community in Bulgaria; it imposes a disrespectful attitude towards the values of secular Bulgarian society, and violates the principle of equal treatment of men and women. After the submission of this proposal to the parliament, the acting Secretary General of the

Chief Muftiship, Dzhalal Faik, stated officially that “the bill limits the rights of Muslims and can be dangerous.” He added that the headscarf is commonly used in “traditional Islam” and “in principle, the face must be uncovered. However, Muslim women have the right to make their personal choice.”[455]

The bill has been also harshly criticized by members of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (mrf), whose principal electorate is mainly the Muslim community in Bulgaria. Initially, when discussing the proposed draft in the parliamentary committees, the main criticisms were not related to the violation on religious rights. During a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee of Legal Affairs, the member of the parliament from the mrf, Chetin Kazak, noted: “The Bulgarian version of the Muslim religion and the Bulgarian Muslim tradition do not require the wearing of such clothes. Therefore, it is ridiculous to adopt a special extraordinary legislation because of two dozen fully veiled women from the Roma neighborhood in Pazardzhik.”[456] Basically, there are no statistics in Bulgaria on the exact number of Muslim women covering themselves with different types of niqab and “Arab” style khimar. Estimates on the media provide information about 20 to 40 women from the Roma community in Iztok neighborhood of Pazardzhik.[457] Representatives of the State Agency of National Security stated during the deliberations on the draft law that there are few women in the Roma neighborhoods of the cities of Plovdiv and Asenovgrad who wear full-face veils, too. Neither the Bulgarian press, nor members of parliament or the Chief Muftiship publicly mentioned during deliberations the practicing of full-veiling “Arab” style in some areas of the Rhodope Mountains, and especially in the town of Rudozem by the younger generation of newly devout Pomak women and girls who had studied Islam in Saudi Arabia.[458]

Despite the opposition from the mrf, on 30 September 2016, Bulgaria’s parliament approved the Law Prohibiting the Wearing of Clothing Concealing the Face.[459] The mrf, together with six independent mp s,[460] former members of the parliamentary group of mrf who founded a new Political Party dost,[461] accused other Bulgarian parties of “demonstrating religious intolerance” and refused to take part in the vote. In fact, the full-face veil issue put the secular leadership of the mrf into a dilemma, forcing them to take a stand on a controversial issue that divided their electorate. The vast majority of the mrf’s supporters are secular Turks, and even the headscarves are rarely an element of the women’s dress in public. Nevertheless, the politicians from the mrf and dost were strongly opposed to the face veil ban law, saying it infringes on the freedom of religion guaranteed by the constitution. When, for example, ten years ago, during the national debate about wearing headscarves at public schools, “mrf, in accordance with the official policies of the Turkish government, did not support headscarves in schools. On the other hand, the mrf had good networks in the non-Turkish Muslim population in Bulgaria (both Pomak and Roma), and this issue could serve to drive a wedge between the mrf and the growing number of devout Muslims in the country, particularly among the Pomaks.”[462] Now, however, the mrf has to take into account the current political realities of a changed Turkish policy towards veiling and the emergence of dost as a viable political alternative for Muslim voters, as the members of the new party explicitly use Islamic rhetoric in their political statements.

The law was approved by a majority of the votes. Immediately afterward, the independent member of the parliament Hussein Hafuzov,[463] the former Secretary General of the Chief Muftiship, made an emotional statement, asserting that the “law limit[ed] women’s ability to wear religious garments in conformity with the Islamic dress code.”[464] He declared firm opposition to the law, claiming that it was “the first step towards a complete ban of Islamic clothing.”[465] He also recalled earlier attempts by the Bulgarian state in the 20th century to de-veil (razferedzyavane) Muslim women. According to Hafuzov, the definition of the burqa as “non-traditional” clothing of Muslim women in Bulgaria is “absolutely untenable from a religious point of view,” because “the feredzhe is a kind of burqa, dear colleagues, and what the burqa covers is covered alike by the feredzhe.” At the end of his speech, Hussein Hafuzov emphasized that this legally imposed restriction on Muslim women’s clothing was “an attempt [to damage] the reputation and honor of Muslim women” and “the Bulgarian parliament offends not only the Muslims who are living in the country but also the entire world Muslim community.”[466]

Hafuzov intensified his criticism of the law by including religious reasons in his public political discourse; he defined veiling as a means of preserving the dignity and honor of woman. He defended the right of the Muslim community to draw and maintain the divinely ordained (according to Islamic doctrine) gender boundaries in the public space of the Bulgarian secular society. For the first time since the democratic changes in 1989, it was not a representative of the Muftiship but a Bulgarian mp who explicitly stated that the full veiling of Muslim women in Bulgaria is not a manifestation of “foreign influences.” Public face covering was a long-standing practice in Ottoman time to which some devout Muslim women have returned. Bringing to the fore the claim that “what the burqa covers, is covered alike by the feredzhe”, Hussein Hafuzov stressed that these two kinds of Islamic clothing are, in fact, contextualized cultural manifestations of the religious interpretation that the entire female body is ‘awra. Although it is not compulsory or recommended in terms of Islamic law, it is still permissible in the interpretations of the hijab concept according to the Hanafi School of law. Unlike the politicians of the mrf, Hafuzov’s main argument was that a full-body and face covering is a legitimate form of dress in the tradition of Muslims in Bulgarian lands.

Shortly after the official approval of the Law Prohibiting the Wearing of Clothing Concealing the Face, the Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council and Deputy Chief Mufti Vedat Ahmed published a critical analysis of the Bulgarian state policy to “modernize” Muslim women during the last century by dictating how to dress and practice their religion. Instead of resorting to the common term razferedzavane, or re-dressing,[467] he used a much stronger, emphatic expression when symbolically calling the forced de-veiling campaigns “a struggle for ‘undressing’ the Muslim woman in Bulgaria.”[468] This phrase indicates how significant the hijab issue is for the religious leaders of the Muslim community in Bulgaria. Vedat Ahmed noted that the struggle for “undressing” is not typical only for Bulgaria, “the Bulgarian mark, nonetheless, is stable in this process.”[469] Summarizing some evidence on the topic and referring to documents from archival sources and historical studies, the Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council concluded that from the first years of the modern independent Bulgarian state (after 1878) until today, the most successful governmental actions towards de-veiling were the campaigns of the atheist Communists.

Ahmed highlights that despite all those state efforts and pressure over the last one hundred and thirty years, the attempt to “undress” the Muslim women have failed in reality which shows that it will not succeed in the future, “except if the believing women ‘undress’ themselves or if the Apocalypse comes.”[470]

When in December 2016 I asked Hatije Tiber and Muhammed Kamber to express their opinions about the “burqa ban,” they both said that this is a “discriminatory law.” Although Muhammed pointed out that there are no fully covered women in his region, and Hatije stressed that she would never wear a burqa, the two Muslims share the conviction that some Muslim women in Bulgaria are deprived of their right to dress according to their choices. And the choice of the veiling, Hatije added, is of existential importance for the Muslim woman, as it is a public demonstration of her Islamic identity. This must be understood by the Bulgarian society not as a challenge, she said, but rather as a religiously defined external expression of our inner convictions.

*** 5. Conclusion

There is an ongoing process of “re-Islamization,” which stipulates active promotion of a stricter observance of the commandments of Islam among an increasing number of Muslims in Bulgaria. The official Muslim leadership, as well as the representatives of the younger, more devout generation of Pomaks, make efforts to spread more widely the “true” Islamic teachings as revealed in the Qur’an and exemplified in the Prophetic Sunna. The analysis of the periodicals issued by the Chief Muftiship indicates that the call for a return to the rightful rules of the Islamic faith and the public proclamation of the religious norms and values is tantamount to the assertion of their shared Muslim identity.

The observed higher degree of adherence to the norms of the “great” Islamic tradition against the backdrop of “local” tradition and practices in the everyday life is publicly justified and explained as a fundamental human right for practicing religion without state interference. The Muslim veil is seen as a genuine public expression of a woman’s piety, modesty, and high moral standards as embedded in Islamic textual religious tradition. Yet, the hijab maintains a social distance between genders and outlines the acceptable roles of women in accordance with Islamic law. It also generates social tension as this inherently Islamic religious commitment in public space is perceived by the society at large as an attempt to impose social norms and moral codes contradicting the secular order of Bulgaria.

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** Chapter 7: Fasting and Aging in a Bulgarian Muslim Community

Ilia Iliev

Abstract

The Muslim community in Bulgarian Muslim villages share many of the characteristics of local Orthodox communities. It encompasses both explicitly religious people and more secular ones. The non-believers and the distant members get involved due to the symbolic sacrifices of their more religious relatives, while the virtuosi of religion get entangled and tempered in the small everyday practices of deference and respect offered by other villagers. After several centuries of cohabitation, Muslim and Orthodox Christian communities in Bulgaria share some important implicit notions about the ideal religious community.

Keywords

Ramadan — fast — ageing — symbolic limits of community

The central square of Skrebatno, a Bulgarian Muslim village in the Western Rhodopes, does not change its daily rhythm during the month of Ramadan. In the early morning, a few men drink coffee in the neighboring shops and exchange a few words while waiting for the bus. These men are followed in the mid-morning by women shopping for bread or cooking oil and exchanging the latest news. By noon come men and women who have been picking tobacco from sunrise until the sun was too hot and the tar too sticky for collecting tobacco leaves. By the early afternoon youngsters show up. They finish arranging the tobacco leaves for drying, and a couple of hours later the commuters began arriving with the afternoon busses.

Each human wave leaves a few customers in the shops. They order coffee or soft drinks, rarely beer, and are seemingly unconcerned with the prescriptions of the holy month, when each Muslim is supposed to abstain from drinking from sunrise to sunset. Yet at the same time the everyday activities of both those who follow the prescribed practices during Ramadan and those who do not, are shaped by the holy month.

In this chapter, I investigate the mechanisms binding religious and apparently non-religious people into one community in the village of Skrebatno. I argue that the fasting during the Ramadan was treated as a moral experience, shared by all the members of the community, regardless of their actual behavior, and I will try to demonstrate how religion provides all the village's inhabitants with tools and language for expressing moral judgments.

*** 1. The Community

The integration of believers and non-believers, distant and present, is related to the study of identity, a major topic in the research on Pomaks. The discussion began in mid-19th century and the most recent monographic studies on Bulgarian Muslims continue to add valuable insights.[471] Most authors agree that religion is a constitutive element of the ethnic identity in Bulgaria, and that this religious element does not necessarily require participation in religious practices. Less studied are the ways that religion manages binds believers and non-believers together, and the question becomes increasingly interesting with the growing number of non-believers. This apparent lack of religious fervor is quite typical for the Pomak villages in the Eastern and Central Rhodopes, where the mosques are frequented mostly by elderly men[472], but apparently lukewarm believers like the inhabitants of Skrebatno are quite common also in the Western parts of the region. Still, the village is reputed for its freethinking among the neighboring Muslim villages. The young imam who led the religious services during the Ramadan in 2013 said that he was sent there under a naryad—a term used in the Bulgarian army for unpleasant but necessary everyday chores. The village is relatively small, with 350 inhabitants, 30 of them Christian, mostly elderly couples or widows, and a vibrant Bulgarian-speaking Muslim community with some 90 children of school or preschool age. In the summer, they were joined by other children from migrant families ('Spaniards', 'Americans,' 'Belgians,' as they called them). This age structure is quite typical for Muslim villages from the Rhodope

Mountains. What sets Skrebatno apart is its relative wealth. The village was predominantly Christian until the urban exodus in the third quarter of the 20th century. The landowners were almost exclusively Christian shepherds, who controlled large grazing fields. Nowadays part of the village lands has been restored to their heirs, but the bulk of the land — the former grazing lands and the commons—remains municipal property. Nowadays Skrebatno, with its 350 inhabitants, controls an area four times larger than Breznitsa with its 4,200 inhabitants, or Ribnovo, to cite only the best-known villages in the region. Actually, the villagers cannot cultivate all these lands and the municipality rents it to households from neighboring villages. Maybe this could explain why Skrebatno is the sole Muslim village in the area with a Socialist mayor (instead one from dps, the political party that gathers the bulk of Muslim votes, or one from the center-right gerb). The villagers from Skrebatno keep some distance from their poorer Muslim neighbors and often tell jokes about laziness, promiscuity, and inevitable abundance of children in other villages, jokes of the sort that richer villagers often say about the poor.

To finish with preliminary remarks about the region, this was not my first field trip to Skrebatno. I went there for the first time in 1993 as a student, and since then I have regularly visited the village and the region under different projects of my own or, in lean times, as an interpreter and a field assistant for Western anthropologists. The field trips in the period between 2010 and 2013 were like visiting old friends, but, of course, I will always be identified as an outsider, a Christian from the city, and I will never pretend that the local people accepted me as one of their own, even if they call my five-year-old son, who helped me with the fieldwork, Ali—a shorter version of Alexander.

*** 2. Ramadan: Who Fasts and Why

My most recent visit was the first time that I did systematic fieldwork during Ramadan, picking tobacco with my hosts. I knew that a good half of the villagers do not fast during this month—it has always been quite obvious—but I expected that the division would follow the lines of families and households. Such were the explanations which I received in the past, when I asked whether or not someone was fasting. “She is from such a family, in which nobody fasts”, or “they are old-fashioned people; they fast”. Actually, it turned out that no family or household observed the Ramadan strictly in its entirety, but also all Muslim households had at least one person who fasted, ramazanliya as they called them. The people who fasted— ramazanlii (in the plural)—were of three main types.

First were young men and women, usually nearing the end of high-school studies, 17–18 years old, who wanted to demonstrate their self-control and reliability. In the 1990s, these were mostly young women who wanted to marry immediately after graduating and wanted to show the traits of a responsible adult. I was younger then and somehow all the young men knew that if a girl fasts, this is more or less a sign of serious intentions, at least from her side. Now, several years later, the proportion of fasting young men has increased. It

seems related to the end of the mandatory military service in Bulgaria. In the 1990s, going to the army was a necessary stage of man’s life and the definite step towards adulthood. Now mandatory military service has been abolished, but in the afternoons, when men gather for some joint activity—for example in 2010 we were digging a common well—older men were telling stories from their army service to the fasting boys, thus symbolically incorporating them into this experience. Both for young men and women it was more or less understood that fasting is an effort clearly limited in time—they were not expected to keep fasting the next year, nor to demonstrate religious fervor after the end of Ramadan.

The second group—and most numerous type of fasting people—were elderly men and women. All of them did something, which, as far as I know, does not fit exactly into the framework of normative Islam—they accredited their efforts and transferred the virtue coming from fasting, to somebody else. An adult person who fasts only for his or her own salvation would be considered selfish, because they would not be fit to work to their full potential for a whole month. The rest of the household would be assumed to rearrange its daily rhythm just for the sake of one single member. Hard work was a usual— and fully acceptable—excuse for breaking the fast, more acceptable than, for example, health issues. Sometimes the elderly people would fast for the sake of the health and prosperity of the whole household. Very often this would be a distant member or distant branch of the family. It was quite common for a grandmother to fast for the sake of her grandchildren living in Spain, the USA, or Northern Europe. Old men tended to fast for the sake of distant branches of the family, living abroad. Thus, the elderly people by the virtue of their sacrifice reunited distant members and branches of the family during the holy month.

The middle-aged men and women were the less numerous group of fasters. They also tended to accredit their efforts for the sake of something or somebody else, but unlike the old people they tended to choose some specific issue, especially important for the well-being of the family or the community—for example the village mayor was making obvious hints that, if the village men find water in the well they were jointly digging each afternoon, this should be attributed to a certain degree to his self-sacrifice. Another man was fasting for the sake of his wife, who was applying for a state job. In all three cases, these were individuals who fasted, not whole families, and their efforts both reaffirmed their respective positions within families, households, and community, and strengthened its social cohesion. The act of dedicating one’s spiritual and physical sacrifice to somebody else also helped integrating the non-believers in a common religious experience.

*** 3. The Ramazanlii and the Rest: Daily Rhythm

The people who did not fast also were also involved in Ramadan. Both Ramadan and the efforts of the ramazanlii dominated the daily rhythm of the village. Special men— telali—circulated through the village beating a drum well before sunrise, so the ramazanlii were able to wake up in time to get their morning meal. A joint contribution from all Muslim households paid for the telali. Of course, all

adult members of the family woke up together with the ramazanlii—to prepare the breakfast, if they were women, or to share it. During the daytime, the presence of the ramazanlii was both permanently taken into account and politely omitted.

In the first days, I made a faux pas and stopped drinking water when I saw a ramazanliya approaching. The man politely but firmly insisted that I should finish my glass. By hiding my eating and drinking, I would demonstrate a lack of confidence in his strength. The proper behavior was to avoid food and water when there were ramazanlii around, but if you should eat and drink—for example while feeding a child—you have to do it in a way that demonstrates full confidence in the ramazanlii's inner strength. Everywhere there were dozens of small signs reminding and acknowledging ramazanlii's presence, for example the bottles of cold water which housewives put in the most obvious places in refrigerator. Ramazanlii are believed to suffer more from thirst than from hunger, and in the hot summer they break their fast each evening with a glass of cold water. So everybody pillaging the refrigerator was seeing first the bottles of cold water, put there as a polite reminder. The same rule applied at work, while picking tobacco or digging a well. There were several variations, of course. For example, young ramazanlii boys insisted on digging more than the adult men in the well hole (it was a deep hole and only one or two persons were able to dig at a time, the rest of the men stayed around and chatted while waiting their turn), but it usually happened that they were not allowed to do this because some older man had just started an edifying story about his army experience, a story which younger ones must hear, and a story heard dozens of times by the older men—so it was somebody older going to dig. In the evening, the customers of the village pub left empty places on the tables at 9 p.m., when the ramazanlii were allowed to break their fast and then everybody flocked to the pub. The ramazanlii boys were allowed to leave the tables of their coevals for a while to sit with the adults, and join the discussions, and even to say their opinion on some important topic. Unfortunately, I was not able to observe what happened in the women's part of the pub. On 19 August, there was a guitar concert in the village, scheduled for 7 p.m. It was postponed to 8 p.m. and then the mayor started an interminable speech in order— as he explained latter—to postpone it even further, so the ramazanlii could join.

The respect, genuine and sometimes exaggerated, paid to the ramazanlii had a less obvious side. The constant deference demonstrated by the rest of the community set the ramazanlii apart as spiritual champions. Yet by the same motion, the rest of the villagers implied that common people should not be expected, let alone required, to follow the example of these special men and women who sacrificed their well-being for the others. The small everyday acts of gratitude and admiration set the few fervent Muslims in the village apart in a special and well bounded category, safely wrapped in deference and appreciation. After all, a common mark of the champions, including the spiritual ones, is that the commoners should not be expected to act like them.

The exclusion of less privileged categories followed another pattern. The villagers were less tolerant towards their neighbors whose daily life was organized around Ramadan, too. The

people from Ribnovo, who rented land in Skrebatno area, tended to take their breakfast near the tobacco fields, just before the start of their work, and at the margin of the allowed time for fasting. The reasons seemed quite obvious—the ramazanlii from Skrebatno were able to take their meals earlier at home, because their fields were at a relatively short distance, while those from Ribnovo had to travel sometimes for hours, especially if they used horse carts instead of cars. Still, the villagers from Skrebatno tended to explain their neighbors' late—by Ramadan standards— breakfast as yet another proof for their lack of self-discipline. The people from Ribnovo usually avoided working on Friday during Ramadan, while those from Skrebatno did, and preferred to interpret their neighbors' choice as yet another demonstration of their laziness, if needed at all, because everybody knows that the poor are lazy and lack self-discipline. At least most of the well-off people "know" this.

*** 4. Among the Ramazanlii

The month of Ramadan in Skrebatno ends with three ritual distributions: arife, when food and especially sweets are donated to honor the death; fitre or fitri— a charity, traditionally equated to the price of five loaves of bread; and Sheker Bayram (from Tr. §eker Bayrami), when junior families of a lineage offer sweet meals to their elders. All these distributions are concentrated in three days— the last two days of Ramadan and the first day of Bayram, and are skillfully used by the villagers to mend broken social ties, to negotiate new ones, and to renegotiate or confirm old ones. Moreover, the people who did not fast use these distributions to demonstrate their respect and support for the ramazanlii.

My host belonged to a junior branch of the same lineage as the village mayor, but quarreled with him. The official pretext was that the mayor was rebuilding his house and was expecting—and more or less requesting—the voluntary help of my host. However, 15 years ago, when my host was building his house, the mayor, then a young man, offered some plausible pretext to not help. My host decided to voice his displeasure with the mayor, but to keep the conflict limited, had been quietly biding his time for 15 years. When the proper time came, he refused to help the mayor, thus demonstrating that he had not forgotten the insult. But on the last days of Ramadan, he urged his wife to prepare especially generous sweat meals for mayor's family, in order to honor the common dead grand-fathers and grand-mothers on the arife day. Then he had to choose to whom he should give the ritual charity, which the local people call fitra. Traditionally, one has to give fitra to five persons amongst several categories like poor ones, complete strangers or travelers, orphans, elderly, people who study the Qur'an, etc. The favorite choice for recipients were the younger ramazanlii. The principles could be extended and it is quite common to give fitra to children who perform well at school, even if their studies are not exactly focused on the Qur'an. For example, the mayor gave fitra to a strong fellow who acted as his bodyguard and who technically was an orphan since he had recently lost his father. Oddly, the mayor—who was fasting and was because of that technically eligible for ramazanliya, also received several contributions.

My host decided to give generous fitra to the mayor’s sons, who were both graduate students, so technically they could be considered schoolchildren and, by extension, part of the same category to which the students of the Qur’an belong. The mayor was not the only one able to bend the rules. But on the Sheker Bayram day, when my host was supposed to pay a ritual visit to the mayor himself, as the latter belonged to a senior branch of the lineage, he chose instead to go to a neighboring village to visit the family of his wife’s elder sister. In a patrilineal society, this was obviously an excuse, but still some formalities were observed. My host was not in his house at the time when he was supposed to pay a visit to the mayor. Using the opportunities provided by arife, fitri, and Bayram, my host had clearly indicated his position—he had a quarrel with the mayor, but not with mayor’s family, since he demonstrated his respect for the common dead ancestors, and gave fitra to the boys.

One of the categories entitled to fitra and arife was strangers. This was an occasion to give charity to the local Muslim Roma who came from neighboring villages. The villagers were careful to demonstrate that they were giving fitra to the beggars precisely in their quality of complete strangers, people who are accepted in the village only on this special occasion. I did not notice any sense of Muslim community, transgressing ethnic and social borders, in this act. Actually, some villagers preferred to give fitra to me, another stranger in Skrebatno. The villagers also made a clear distinction between zakat— the local term for charity at the end of Ramadan, an act subjected to stricter rules, and the less formalized fitra. It seems that, at least in this village and the neighboring area, zakat is mandatory only for rich people or people who significantly improved their well-being during the previous year. Nobody in Skrebatno considered himself rich or significantly better, and nobody gave zakat during my field research. Each Muslim household and several individuals gave money to the mosque by the end of the month but did not classify this as zakat. There were some precedents, for example, I was told that a man who won 30 thousand Euro (approximately 60 thousand Bulgarian Leva) in a lottery, gave zakat to the mosque, and so did a Turkish son-in-law who wanted to pay respect to his wife’s village, but they rather confirmed the distinction between fitra—a charity distributed within the community, according to individual strategies or sense of justice (because the few real orphans in the village were universally chosen as recipients), a charity regulating community life and marking its borders by excluding the strangers, and zakat—a charity related to the symbolic Muslim community. As a rule, the villagers of Skrebatno did not pay zakat.

Another strategic use of fitra was for demonstrating moral position. In 2011, most villagers agreed that a local woman was wronged by her brother. She had taken care of their elderly mother for years, but when the old lady died, her brother apparently took a larger part of the inheritance, regardless of the common understanding that the heir who takes care of an elderly parent is entitled to additional portion. As a good sister, she did not protest, but the case became known in the village and many villagers gave her a fitra on the last day of Ramadan. The woman was staying with her hands full of

small white pieces of paper with money inside—the fitri (as they Bulgarize the plural of fitra)—and the moral verdict of the community was quite clear.

*** 5. Ramadan as the Public Sphere in Skrebatno

The high point of the daily rhythm in Skrebatno during the month of Ramadan was the evening, when most villagers gathered in the pubs around the central square. Men, women, and young people of both sexes usually sat on different tables, with the notable exception of young ramazanlii who were allowed to stay with the seniors, if they wanted. This was the moment when matters of general importance were discussed, consensus was achieved on some topics, and new quarrels were started.

Since the aim of my field research was to investigate the relations between religion and the public sphere in a community, I was particularly attentive to arguments related to religion. It turned out that such arguments were used rarely, always by men of relatively high status (elders, rich men, or the village mayor), and my female interlocutors told me that the situation was similar among the women. As a rule, the discussions quickly switched to another topic after the use of a religious argument. Yet religion was far from a conversation-stopper. The religious argument was rather used when a consensus was achieved on some particular topic, and the invocation of Qur'an came to seal the final verdict. For example, when discussing a new community fountain, where local corruption, irresponsible behavior, and a dry summer combined to bring a disaster, the village mayor summed the discussion with a quotation from Qur'an, and an elderly man added a list of the signs witnessing the end of the world, the lack of water, and the general immorality being prominent among them. This was a crown, closing argument, which sealed the unanimous accord and the harmony achieved.

In a brilliant article on secularism in Bulgaria Kristen Ghodsee, following Talal Asad's critiques of Western-biased theories of secularism[473] claims that the specific way in which the Eastern Orthodox religion operates today in Bulgaria is based on the orthodox Christian conception of symphony, which requires the church to act together with the state for the common good.[474] I would argue that in its original use, the concept involved also the unity of lay and clerical people in an ideal Christian community. The highest authority in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is the so-called "congregation of the church and the people", or tsarkovno- naroden sabor, which includes representatives of the church and the lay people. This body elects a new patriarch and votes the statutes of the church. The perfect subject of the Christian church as understood in the symphony concept was, and still is, a greater body, encompassing monks, priests, and laymen. In the concept of sobornost, literally meaning "togetherness," the nineteenth-century Russian theologians further elaborated this aspect of symphony to include even the dead members of the community. This understanding of the church body and religious authority postulates the involvement of people with different degrees of religious activities, and requires a consensus among them. It precludes a

monopoly over the religious truth by any category of specialists, be they priests or highly educated specialists. Yet, the very inclusivity of this model makes difficult the involvement of religion in the public sphere. A collective all-encompassing subject that specifically insists on the heterogeneity of its members makes dubious any particular claims for a privileged access to religious truth or religion-based authority. An ideal, which prizes above all harmony and consensus among clerics and laymen, easily tempers any radical or simply controversial claims.

The Muslim community in Skrebatno shares many of the characteristics of this ideal Orthodox body. It encompasses both those who fast during Ramadan and those who do not. The non-believers and the distant members get involved due to the symbolic sacrifice of their more religious relatives, while the virtuosi of religion get entangled and tempered in the small everyday practices of deference and respect, paid by the common villagers. After several centuries of cohabitation, Muslims and Orthodox Christians in Bulgaria share important ideas about the ideal religious community, and face similar limitations to the use of religious arguments in the public sphere.

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* Part 3: Religion, Publicity, and Concealment in Orthodox-Majority Societies

** Chapter 8: Parallel Paths

Christian-Muslim Symbiosis and Religious Education in Greece

Angeliki Ziaka

Abstract

The present chapter discusses religious education and whether it advances co-existence, cultivates critical thinking in childhood and youth, and facilitates religious diversity. Its fundamental proposition is that religion and the co-existence of religions in the public sphere is again becoming imperative due to rapid changes in Europe and throughout the world, the “return of religion”—mainly through Islam—and the growing impoverishment of many regions. Religion as a subject matter in public schools has become the focus of heated debate. The chapter focuses on the Greek case against the backdrop of other major

European models of religious education. It looks at the political and ideological debates on religious education, the new curricula and teachers' study-guides, and the place of Christianity and Islam in the public and educational domains. Subsequently this chapter provides a brief presentation of the teaching of Islam in Western Thrace, an area of Greece where various Muslim groups account for about a third of the population, focusing on the way Islam is taught in Muslim- minority schools, mosques, and lately in public schools. It proposes an innovative operational program for education and lifelong learning that would benefit Christian and Muslim teachers of religion and religious officials in Thrace and elsewhere. This learning program is designed to bring Christian and Muslim Greek citizens together through the course of religious education (re) and joint training in an intercultural process of religious education.

Keywords

Christianity — curriculum development — Greece — Islam — Islamic studies — religious education (re) — secularism and religion

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The question of the role of religion in public space has re-emerged with a new sense of urgency in recent years due to the marked rise in incidents in which religions and world cultures have been both victims and offenders in the Middle East, Europe and the United States. The Greek program in which the present writer has been involved eschews Huntington's "clash of civilizations" model as a construct of doubtful validity that has sown the seeds of suspicion of the cultural and religious "other" in citizens throughout the world. Rather, a re-negotiation of coexistence in religiously and culturally diverse societies needs to be sought to achieve communication between religions in shared public spaces. The program was based on the idea that every citizen should have the opportunity to acquire the tools of critical thinking in the highly sensitive matter of religion, which is sometimes monopolized by certain secular and religious circles with their respective conflicts and obsessions, while the potential and the role of a critical Religious Education (re) within the framework of the state system is underrated. It was thought that the primary aim of critical religious thinking would be to protect religious freedom and ensure respect for an individual's decision on whether to practice religion or not, but also to ensure the harmonious co-existence of all pupils—future citizens with different religious and cultural identities.

While the secular structures of European states guarantee religious freedom, the co-existence of different religions as factors reinforcing the cohesion of the social fabric is often ignored. Instead of finding solutions in negotiating and managing religions, religious communities are often isolated and even segregated within these secular structures. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe only recently included the term

‘interreligious dialogue’ in its vocabulary as a supplement to “intercultural dialogue.” The committee seemed to have politically prioritized intercultural dialogue. Recommendations for the management of religion and interreligious education and for the provision of satisfactory intellectual skills in this area to both teachers and pupils, date no further back than 2001–2002. These recommendations were aimed at defending human rights, furthering respect for the religious and non-religious beliefs of every European citizen as well as those of citizens in neighboring states, promoting solidarity and helping to prevent conflict within the framework of formal and non-formal education.[475]

Respect for religious difference in EU member states, the acceptance of religious diversity in contemporary societies, the defense of religious rights and the obligations of citizens both to their fellow-citizens and to the state as bearers of beliefs, ideologies and identities, are the main starting points of our inquiry. The old dividing lines between public and private space need revision and the entrenchment of religion in the private sphere abrogated, so that every dimension of the religious phenomenon, and everyday religious practices and needs, be cared for continually, in dialogue with the state.

The protection of public space from extremist manifestations that use religion and diversity as a vehicle for alien aims is a central theme. We look upon Religious Education as a constructive instrument enabling religious and non-religious citizens to understand and relate to each other, while remaining critical towards models that seek the complete exclusion of religion from education or aim at using religion to support the state. The project seeks to forestall extremist uses of religion and fanaticism that may lead to dangerous conflicts in public space by prioritizing an open and dialogical re, guaranteed by the constitution of each country.[476] The chapter thus focuses on the importance of Religious Education at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels as a source of social cohesion, through the development of critical thinking through a variety of subjects such as history, languages, literature, art and architecture. It is also intended as a potential tool to avoid conflict and forestall closed and authoritarian religious approaches in the thinking of children, teenagers and young adults.[477]

Greece, our case study, is a secular state that maintains traditional ChurchState relations. It is also a country with an indigenous Muslim minority. This minority’s role and religion had until recently been confined by the boundaries of the geographical area it covered. Education took place mainly in Muslim minority schools and the madrasas. From the late 1990s, however, rapid changes have taken place. Mass immigration, the economic crisis, and structural changes and upheavals in the neighboring Middle East and Europe undermined “old certainties” and created new social conditions and needs. Social cohesion is thus demanded of every citizen in the country in the face of these new challenges, and Religious Education in state institutions, including Islamic religious education, has become part of a new reality.

The learning program advocated here promotes re in public schools while maintaining a critical attitude towards it. This style of Religious Education involves an objective presentation of religious phenomena, eschewing the manipulation of religious ideas by religious communities, where there is rarely ever a meeting of religions and their respective cultures in shared public space. In what follows, the question of re is discussed with reference to ongoing discussions in religious, theological, and political circles, as well as to the shaping of public opinion on the relationship between Christianity, Islam, and secularism in Greece.[478] The analysis thus provides a broad view of the political claims, personal rivalries and of the preservation of divisive secular and religious narratives in public space.[479]

*** 1. Theoretical Approaches to Religion and the Public Sphere

The functional differentiation and emancipation of the secular sphere from religious institutions constitutes the core of secularism and a point of reference and agreement among most scholars. Functional differentiation means the ‘segmentation’ of modern society into a number of semi-independent systems—such as economic, political, legal, and educational—each of which has its own logic and rules of operation. So the sectors of society that had historically been under the control of religious authorities gradually emerged as separate and autonomous spheres removed from the influence of religious institutions. Within this functional differentiation, it is particularly important to distinguish between the political and religious spheres and to see how a certain type of political power was derived from religious legitimization and given ‘meaning’ by it in traditional society.[480]

New nation-states derive their legitimacy from secular structures such as the nation or the people. These factors played a role in the gradual weakening of the legitimizing role of religion in the public sphere, reducing its social influence, and relegating it in principle to the private sphere. The concepts of ‘private’ and ‘public’ refer to the traditional dichotomous model of social relationships that presupposes a distinction between the domestic/private sphere in an individual’s life and the common life of individuals or society, as also expressed in economic, legal, and political institutions. This distinction goes back to Aristotle, who distinguished between the economy of the ‘house’ or household and the organization of the functions of the city (polis) or state. Hannah Arendt stresses that the term public sphere denotes “two distinct but interrelated dimensions,” the space of appearance, which has the widest publicity, that includes all who belong to or are included in this area, and secondly, the common world, that is the world common to all those who live together and share in common or public affairs.[481] This distinction led to the conclusion that the interaction and communication between people in shaping ‘public opinion’ in the public sphere also shapes various political opinions. Habermas considers the public sphere to be the place where people meet to discuss common problems and potential solutions, emphasizing that “access is guaranteed to all citizens.”[482]

By the 1970s and even the early 1980s, the view that religion belonged in the private sphere was still widespread among sociologists, philosophers, and students of humanities in general. With the end of the Cold War, and the consequent emergence of all kinds of collective identities, including religious ones, the impression was created that religion had re-awakened in the public sphere in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.[483] This raised the question of the place of religion in the public sphere. Thus we arrive at one of the main questions: did religion really cease to cause political and social reactions in the modern era? Religiosity continues to permeate everyday life and the intensity of religious feeling is increasingly a cause of concern for the global community.[484]

A chain reaction to post-colonial politics in the Middle East and the massive migration that began after the 1900s, continuing after 2010 with the ‘Arab Spring,’ changed the balance, real and imaginary, within traditionally Christian European countries. Religion came to be used by rival political interests that call for the ‘re-Christianization’ or the Islamification of Europe as the case may be, employing over-simplified and obsolete terms that are exceedingly divisive for society as a whole.[485] In numerous cases, the demands of Muslims within European countries have instigated antagonism with local churches but also with the state, which has reopened the debate on the place of religion in public space. The secular countries of the western hemisphere thus now face new dilemmas in the management of religious diversity, not least due to the demands of Islam for inclusion within these states.[486]

*** 2. European Public Spaces and the Role of Religious Education

A response to these new conditions may come in part from education, particularly from a renegotiation of the style and role of Religious Education. It appears that the various models so far implemented, such as laicite in France or the granting of re rights to religious communities in the Netherlands and Austria, show many gaps in the understanding of the religious phenomenon in the public space.[487] At first glance, the freedom of religious communities to train their youngsters with no state interference gives the impression of a secular management of the religious phenomenon, these models have in practice shown themselves in most cases to be inadequate, failing to foster the ‘interpenetration’ and encounter of religions in the public space, and keeping the children of minority religious communities, especially of migrants and economically vulnerable groups, isolated in a unidimensional identity and cut off from the rest of the social fabric. These models, furthermore, intensified the antagonism between “authentic” and “scientific” religious instruction, an antagonism that appears to spring from the field of education but in reality has substantial political, ideological and national ramifications.[488]

Where there is full separation of church and state, the state’s involvement is limited to guaranteeing the religious freedom of its citizens and does not extend to the provision of instruction in religious topics in a school environment. This is a possibility afforded to private schools, denominational schools and religious communities and their functionaries. The

question in this case is whether young people develop a cultural awareness in religious matters permeated by a critical attitude, and what this may entail for the commonality. If re is provided exclusively in private religious institutions, lessons may be divisive in religious or national terms, and the state may be unable to ensure that the mode of instruction guarantees the corporeal, intellectual and spiritual integrity and well-being of the students.

In countries where the teaching of religion is compulsory, such as Greece,[489] Denmark,[490] and Sweden,[491] the question arises as to what extent Religious Education is conducive to an impartial acquaintance with the religious 'other', incapable of following those unfolding developments that render public space multi-racial and religiously diverse. At this point, the question emerges as to what extent individual societies are ready to go beyond a traditional understanding of religious identity and of its relation with national identity. The fear of forfeiting religious and national identity solidifies into an ideology fostered by religious and political circles that nurture extreme and monolithic political and religious identities.

The return of religion to the public space, with all its demands and controversies, is a reality that needs to be faced urgently. The varied examples of re in European states principally reflect their historical development and identity. The turn towards "critical religion" and the abandonment of the extreme denominational character of education have been prioritized for some time by the Council of Europe, and this educational paradigm has begun to materialize at a national level, preserving to varying degrees the 'cultural particularity' of the individual national states.

The question becomes even more complex when, in the case of Greece, we have to take into consideration the opinion of the majority within the state, the local, political, ethnic, and religious and non-religious identities, the Church's opinion on religious diversity, and the many different voices even within the Church that range from the extremely conservative to the very progressive. The very orientation of the accompanying theological discourse, which encompasses many different attitudes and directions, is, in itself, noteworthy. Views range from a zealous—almost fundamentalist—belief in the Orthodox faith as the "only truth," to a more moderate and open position based on the rereading of Orthodox theological texts on the "other"—mainly drawn from the patristic tradition[492]—and to the position of contemporary theologians who consider and examine the phenomenon of religion in purely academic and secular terms.[493]

*** 3. Ideological Controversies: "Religion vs. Secularism and Secularism vs. Religion"

Discussion in recent years on whether re in state schools should become a subject more open to diversity or be mainly confessional, perfectly encapsulates the tendencies in Greek society since the late 1980s and early 1990s, reflecting the wider view of Greek society in this regard.

Religion is a compulsory subject in elementary (after 3rd grade) and secondary education. In 2010–2011 the Hellenic Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs decided to compile a new curriculum for compulsory education. According to Stavros Yangazoglou, an advisor at the ministry and supervisor of New Curricula for the Institute of Educational Policy:

The new curriculum in re, just like the curricula of all the other subjects, mainly constitutes a process Curriculum, one which focuses on the process of teaching and learning in a context of participatory practices, teamwork activities and interactive approaches. According to this proposal, re as a subject is expected to transcend the traditional notion of transmitting ready-made knowledge from the teacher to the students through teacher-centered methods of teaching. It is expected to serve a different pedagogical dimension and function according to which the student is provided with the opportunity to 'learn how to learn' and to participate actively throughout the learning process.[494]

These initiatives became the target of several attacks, even though the proposed pilot re program did not alter the Christian Orthodox character of religious education. These were channeled through the internet and theological networks and organizations. Their common elements include the eschatological content of their proclamations and their conspiratorial tone. Moreover, they made unjustifiably harsh attacks on colleagues in the theological profession who had worked for the compilation of the new curricula and the writing of the new "Teacher's Guide for the Curriculum for re."[495] This was the beginning of a dispute in theological quarters which was subsequently opened up to the wider public through the internet. Persons with no previous acquaintance with the matter championed "the preservation of the Orthodox faith," or came down in favor of the complete abolition of re, for the sake of "protecting human rights and civil liberty."[496]

"Traditionalists" argued that the new course would be one of religious studies, a theology of multiculturalism, and that by approaching religions in this way it would eradicate the faith of the students. How can such a course be considered Orthodox, they argued, when Christ is not presented as the God-Man, as Savior, and Redeemer? Religious literacy, they said, has no relationship to the mono-religious, Christian Orthodox tradition of Greece. The school of 'religious literacy' they saw as a product of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School that would devalue faith and give precedence to religions, in the plural. Respect for diversity can only be achieved through the already familiar Orthodox religious tradition and education. Religious pluralism cannot be the foundation of a country's educational program. In view of the difficult period Greece is now facing, it is not the time to attempt such a radical change in Greek religious education. Through these attempts at religious literacy, 'they' are trying to impose a Barlaamite (sic) and post-patristic theology. The pilot program's contents assume a level of perceptiveness that is quite beyond the students. Small children can be taught things about other religions, but only after an experiential development of their own religious faith.[497]

The reply of experts and the authors of the new program textbooks was that despite the fact that several of the critiques were either based on misunderstandings or completely unfounded, it is a useful reminder that these critics need to be better informed, since they are not really commenting on the program itself, but something else that they themselves have imagined and constructed, either because they are not able to understand or because of their insistence on a particular form for the course. [...] Even the most superficial reading of the curriculum makes it clear that the main body of the proposed topics is devoted to Christianity. Judaism and Islam are approached secondarily, while the eastern religious traditions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism) fall into a third tier.[498]

In the maelstrom surrounding the subject of re, the highest administrative organ of the Church of Greece, the Holy Synod, chose a middle path at the beginning. As Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Messenia advocated in his letter to the Archbishop of the Church of Greece and the other hierarchs in the Holy Synod (5/11/2012), the Church should not interfere in the debate “between the two extremes—in terms of content—of superficial modernization, on the one hand, and traditionalism on the other.” Even though this letter was first made public in November 2012 on the internet, it represents today, in 2016, the only official statement on the issue. Summarizing the Metropolitan of Messenia’s motion, the Holy Synod stated among other things that the course should, first of all,

<quote>

begin with and have as its focus the local Greek Orthodox tradition, which has crystallized as ethos, articulated as a way of life, and is inscribed in the pillars of our culture. [.] The second part of the course should then treat of the great Christian traditions outside Orthodoxy, which can be found in Greece and more generally throughout the world, such as Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. The third part should include some information about the great religions with particular reference to those that hold special interest for Greek society, such as the monotheistic traditions of Judaism and Islam, as well as Hinduism and Buddhism, so that students gain a working knowledge of them.[499]

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The criticisms became even more acerbic in the school year 2016–2017 when the new programs began. A tough political conflict took place behind the scenes with the Archbishop of Athens and of all Greece Ieronymos ii declaring the new re curricula to be ‘unacceptable and dangerous’[500] and the left-wing government replying, after a short debate, positively to the demand of the church for the resignation of the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs, Nikos Filis. This year, however, the new study programs are being implemented despite great difficulties, with two main characteristics: the cultivation of critical thought and the updating of the lesson to the requirements of today with clearly greater emphasis on Orthodoxy but with creative elements and ways of understanding other religions, cultures and societal reality.

Perusing the new curricula offers new pedagogical tools, such as interaction between student and teacher, and many other positive developments in comparison with the older textbooks. These gave an account of interesting facts but in an outdated and old-fashioned way, in which both the teacher and the student are subordinated to the static approach of the book, which was often unclear and tedious. The pedagogical methods employed in the new curricula are much friendlier to both pupils and teachers. They provide more than one interactive choice per course, the possibility of independent study on the part of the students with the supervision—rather than the obligatory interven- tion—of the teacher, the students' recollection of other information sets, experiences, and skills related to the world, to geography, ecology, the environment, and to other fields which are rightly associated with the course on religion. Additionally, dogmatic theology and the history of the Church are rendered in an innovative way. Unit 4 of the textbook for the first grade of secondary school, entitled "How Decisions are Made," provides an indication of these innovations, critically examining the phenomenon of religious conversion.[501] The student is invited to learn about the many trends within the Judeo- Christian and Judeo-Hellenic environment, and to become more knowledgeable about the rifts between believers and churches over the course of history. The significant difference from previous textbooks is that the 'religious other' is not projected deterministically as a "heretic." On the contrary, the students learn—using the same texts of church history and scripture—about the doctrinal and other differences that emerged in the early Church, with the ultimate goal of being able to seek out and identify examples of religious division, diversity, and conflict in other world religions. This form of religious instruction can contribute to a positive cooperation between students of different religious beliefs and denominations within the same classroom, and even overcome the constrictions placed by both political and religious elites who seek to manage, and sometimes manipulate, multiculturalism and conflicting religious trends within the public sphere. Thus, respect for the social equality of students with different religious backgrounds, be they Greek citizens or immigrants, will receive a solid foundation in the school environment and even in Religious Education. Angelos Vallianatos, an advisor for re teachers, characteristically sums up these contemporary demands by saying that the "special need today is for theology to go beyond modernity and accept plurality and diversity, since it is not a problem but rather a tool to explore one's identity further."[502]

In order to give a complete account of the new Curricula, I must also note some difficulties that came up in its implementation. First, the new material is interspersed with quite a few references to other religions which the teachers and theologians working with it may not have the academic level to handle. Second, extra time is required for the teachers, already underpaid, to get acquainted with the new curricula and to operate in an experimental pilot program, and thirdly there is a need for training in the accompanying pedagogical methodology. The members of the expert committee who co-wrote or supervised the pilot textbooks are making small but substantive changes in response to the public discussions and training sessions, the results of which are not immediately visible but contribute decisively to the steady and effective dissemination of the new program. These difficulties are compounded by ideological resistance reflecting a broader conflict between "traditionalism" and "modernization," "fundamentalism" and "modernity,"[503] which also divides theologians and university teachers into two camps. A few years ago, such

controversy was rather mild, but in recent years it has grown and come to dominate Greek society.[504] With economic and employment difficulties dragging on and the welfare state sliding rapidly into decline, it has been easy to manipulate the religious identity of its citizens, many of whom seem to fear that the economic crisis and the international monitoring of their economy will lead to the loss of what is ‘holy’ to them.

It is clear that re can easily be used by the political establishment to exercise pressure on the ecclesiastical establishment and vice versa, and how debate surrounding this topic can become an ideological conflict. A substantial part of the contemporary political Left, including some socialists, assume a negative attitude towards re pressing either for its complete removal or its re-configuring in terms of the discipline or the Study of Religions in addition to the possibility of making it optional. Many devotees of this perspective have France in mind as it was in the 1960s and 1970s, when they themselves were studying there. They have not been following, however, the way laicite subsequently developed there, especially the debates from the 1990s onwards on the necessity of religious-cultural education and of incorporating a certain kind of ‘religious literacy’ into the school system, nor the discussions that took place on the kind of teaching staff that would be suitable nor the questions posed by the return of religion itself, mainly through Islam, to French public space.[505] In this context it is interesting to observe that the prioritization of human and civil rights originates on the left of the political spectrum, whilst right-wingers, despite their roots in the freedoms of liberalism, do not extend such freedoms to spiritual/religious matters, identifying with the traditional values of nation and church, and often ignoring human rights issues in order to promote very specific geopolitical and economic hegemonic strategies as for example in Syria and Iraq.[506]

*** 4. Islamic Religious Education and a Program on Intercultural Religious Education in Western Thrace

In the context of religious freedom, equality before the law and equal political rights, the Hellenic Ministry for Education and Religious Affairs initiated a law in 2007 which enabled the Muslims of Western Thrace to be taught Islamic religious Education in public schools. These schools have witnessed a steady growth in the number of Muslim students in recent years. The subject was introduced as an optional module and for the same number of contact hours the other pupils were taught re, two hours throughout Primary and Secondary School.[507] The same law also made a number of imams public functionaries, granting them the same status as that enjoyed by priests.[508]

After this law came finally to be applied in 2013, the School of Theology of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki assumed responsibility for implementing a program of training for imams (ierodidaskaloi), viewing it as an opportunity to showcase the importance and necessity of the school class on religion in the Greek public sphere.[509] The School also saw it as an opportunity to connect with the local community of Thrace, a

key geographical region where Christians and Muslims have lived together for centuries.[510]

Table 8.1 Numbers of Muslim students in primary and secondary education/chool year 2014-2015a

| | minority schools | | state schools |

| | primary | secondary | primary |

| xanthi | 2621 | 614 | 654 |

| rodopi | 2452 | 1001 | 602 |

| evros | 429 | — | 611 |

| total | 5502 | 1615 | 1867 |

These statistics were provided in November 2015 by the Regional Education Directory of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Office of Minority Education.

The program had to be flexible and address the trainees in a broad and objective way that was easy to understand, attractive, conciliatory, and useful. It could not employ obscure academic terms, nor could it have a narrow dogmatic theological content, since it was intended for both teachers and religious persons in the region, Christian and Muslim, from a variety of educational and language backgrounds. At the same time, it addressed two groups of teachers of Islam: imams in area mosques and teachers who graduated from the former Special Pedagogic Academy for Muslims Teachers (e.p.a.th.) who, for the past two years, had taught Islam for the first time in Greek state schools.[511]

For the project to succeed, networking between ‘educational workers’ in the region through education and, more specifically in the context of intercultural religious education, had to be encouraged. Promoting feedback and communication between the university and the teachers of religion who are active in secondary education and providing equal training for all and access to programs for ‘education and lifelong learning’ would further enhance the project’s prospects of success. At the same time, this was not to be a purely theological training but rather a method by which religions could share their historical wealth and act as agents of reconciliation in the public sphere. This would be Intercultural Religious Education, fortified, however, with a satisfactory knowledge of the religions in the region and of their cultural contributions.

*** 5. Implementation and Prospects

An extensive and ambitious training program was designed, and implemented within just 16 months, with 460 total hours of training in the main cities of the region of Thrace (Xanthi, Komotini, Alexandroupolis, Didymoteicho, and Soufli). The number of participants reached 150, of which 66 were teachers of Christianity and 84 teachers of Islam. There were 21 instructors the majority of whom were drawn from the Department of Theology of the University of Thessaloniki, but also included members of staff from the Universities of Athens and Thrace, as well as Ph.D. graduates in Islamic theology and Ph.D. holders who work as theologian advisors and supervisors in the public school system.

After reviewing the overall training process, internal and external evaluations of the program, discussions with interested parties, and the other trainers and trainees, the following conclusions emerged: The most significant outcome was social and educational. The training sessions established communication, institutional and academic, between two groups dealing with the issue of religion—an issue of vital importance for social cohesion—but which is nevertheless considered by many to be either taboo or outdated, and as such a matter of indifference or a marginal issue to be isolated within the religious communities. For this reason, even though Christians and Muslims have lived together in the region of Thrace for centuries now, and even though we were addressing teachers of religion and people who deal with religious practice and its spiritual dimensions, we realized that the Muslims knew little about Christianity and what they did know was very general and without any specific understanding or knowledge of Orthodoxy and the historical process. The Christians, meanwhile, knew more about Islam, but what they knew was often warped, stereotypical, and sometimes even phobic. The trainings' final effort was precisely to remove these limitations and prejudices, to begin the process of networking, to debunk stereotypes, and to work together to highlight the positive contributions of the religious and cultural diversity of the region as well as to improve social cohesion. Of great help, to this end, were the joint discussions. We also found that trainees needed to acquire greater familiarity with pedagogical methods that employed practical approaches and modern models of teaching, so that they could present the class on religion interactively, rather than statically. We believe that it is possible to develop dialogue between the teachers of re through the creation of joint projects that relate to the cultural monuments in Thrace and Intercultural Religious Education. Through the teachers and students, the broader community will come to know the common monuments and learn their history. The monuments themselves will then become objects of research and respect as the common spiritual and cultural heritage of the area.

*** 6. Religions, Secularism, Ethnicities and Politics in Western Thrace

Initially, the program was not welcomed by part of the Muslim minority, nor also by part of the political left.[512] For some of the minority, the introduction of Islamic religious

education into public schools and its teaching in Greek—in madrasas and minority schools teaching is done in Turkish—was perceived as a violation of the religious rights of Muslims. In the mind of a part of the left there lingered a distrust of anything religious, including religious education which they conceived only in terms of a divisive potential for students. For the sake of human rights, as we have already remarked, they continued to envisage the French secular education model. The possibility of a “meeting” of religions in conditions of respect and within the framework of public education became a gaping void to be filled by further initiatives. This was virgin territory for Greek reality and the program attempted to explore some of this territory.

It became increasingly apparent that society on both a local and regional level had ceased to be so wary and many fears arising from the program and its objectives had been overcome. It also became evident that Muslim Greek citizens could be allowed to express their thoughts and feelings on their religion in the language of the country they live in without any need for political or religious mediators. In left wing quarters, there seemed to be space for a more dialectical attitude and wider rethinking, a tendency towards a redefinition of initial theoretical positions when transferred into a practical level.

On a political level, antagonisms will of course continue. Turkish interest in the area is well known and Turkish antagonism with Greece on controlling the religion of Muslims in Thrace, their political and religious officials, and their national orientation and conscience. Turkish interest in the area forms part of its broader hegemonic policy toward Balkan Muslims who are understood as flesh of its flesh, following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of national states in the region.[513] The results of these long-standing ties of Balkan Muslims with Turkey and of the antagonisms with the states in which these minorities live show in the assimilation of Muslim citizens into their states of origin, their linguistic incompetence in the official language of the state they live in, and a selective isolation from the broader public space of the countries in which they live. At the same time, these populations turn their gaze towards “Mother Turkey” for instructions and the ways and means of actualizing the national and religious identities of Balkan Muslims.

However, it is also true that the policy of the national states themselves towards minorities (including Jews and Muslims but also other denominational communities such as Catholics and Evangelicals) exacerbates the isolation of these minorities.[514] In the case of Greece, nationhood was inextricably intertwined with Orthodox religious identity which, in both the popular and learned versions of its configuration, identified the Ottoman Turks with Islam and Orthodox Christianity with the struggles of the nation and of the “most august and holy church” for liberty and national well-being.[515] This historical dimension was re-articulated as a national and religious narrative during the Greek dictatorship of 1967–1974 (also known as the Colonels’ Junta). After long national division of the Civil War (1946–1949) and the subsequent fear of Communists and Communism, the Turkish national identity of Muslims was further reinforced by the policy of the Greek state to monitor, control and suppress Communism. In terms of geography, the mountainous areas across the Greek- Bulgarian border—Bulgaria being Communist at the time—are inhabited throughout their length and breadth by Muslims, the so-called Pomaks, Slavic Muslims who speak a distinctive linguistic

idiom.[516] Even though geographical space was available for these Muslims and no problems were observed in areas co-inhabited by Christians and Muslims, no “space” could be created for them in the national narrative.[517] Similarly, the Church of Greece and particularly the Metropolitan Dioceses of Thrace were inactive for many decades in undertaking initiatives to establish communication and promote amity between the two religious communities. Certain ecclesiastical voices had sparked off tension and divisive speech and actions. It was not until very recently that the situation changed for the better with the consecration of new Metropolitan Bishops in these areas. Much work remains to be done on multiple levels towards establishing a better rapport and solidarity in the public space. The role of the Office of Mufti in the area Thrace remains inward-looking, though not divisive in the common public space.[518]

In general, there is a wide and changing variety of modes of social behavior within the public sphere in the region of Thrace and among the Muslim minority. What we see in the public space in the region of Thrace is quite different from elsewhere in Greece. Streets have both churches and mosques; women in traditional dresses that cover their entire body can be seen side by side with women in fashionable ‘provocative’ attire; men pass their time in the old-fashioned kafenia (cafes), while women and men sit together in the crowded and noisy coffee shops and bars. This variety pertains also to the Muslim citizens themselves, especially young people and children, both in their customs and manners as well as in their relationship with religion (or lack thereof), their political beliefs, and their national sentiments. It is readily apparent, however, that the political climate, political interactions with Turkey, and the politics in this region also affect part of the public sphere, which creates a sense of continual change and spawns a vicious cycle of claims by certain dominant internal groups (the elite). Sometimes the national and the religious compete, and sometimes the religious is identified with the national—such as in the case of the election or appointment of the Mufti and the great debate that began after 1980 about the application of shari‘a law—and other, similar issues.[519]

In the words of Kristin Fabbe:

when state elites reinforce certain social categories over others in the state consolidation process, these categories become reified and later ‘resurface’ in contemporary policy dialogues about the relationship between state security and national values. From the historical record in Greece and Turkey it is apparent that state elites in both countries historically privileged religious categories over potential alternatives [...] in the state consolidation process.[520]

Thus, when foreign observers in the region try to understand all this exclusively in terms of ‘human rights’ and look for the ‘beginning at a precise time’ of the conflict between Greece and Turkey and how this affects minorities, the understanding of space—public, political, and religious—seems even more absurd and tenuous and hardly conducive to arriving at valid and objective conclusions. It is even to some extent also demeaning for the subjects

themselves, the local residents, and how they feel about and live out the concepts of security, dignity, and self-motivation, or their continual dependency on other players in the region.

*** 7. Conclusion

It is evident that Greek society faces the necessity of a deep change in diversity management within the public schools. This is clearly demonstrated by the experience gained over the last few years through ongoing research and educational initiatives, particularly in Northern Greece. The domain of education is a constant guarantor of the prioritization of equal legal and political rights for all students and teachers without exception. The most appropriate way to eschew extremism and ensure the dissemination of social and political benefits among all citizens without mediating elites and “enlightened” avant- garde groups is to enhance various initiatives inducing citizens to become active and assume responsibilities in the common public space.

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** Chapter 9: The Russian Orthodox Church

Federal Visibility Versus Local-Level Concealment

Ivan Zabaev and Daria Oreshina

Abstract

In Public Religions in the Modern World, Jose Casanova showed that secularism as deprivatization foregrounds religious organizations into the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society. This type of public religion, as opposed to state religion and religions on the level of political community, shows the greatest compatibility with the conditions of modern society. This transition occurs when religion, through religious actors, performs some actions in the field of civil society, brings them out for rational discussion and thus makes them visible, reaches a consensus with other actors, and changes the situation on the local level together with the agents of the state in accordance with the consensus reached. The present chapter analyzes the activities of Christian Orthodox actors and organizations—representatives of civil society, and shows that the entry of religion into the public sphere does not automatically imply desecularization in the sense used by Casanova. The example of Christian Orthodox work in abortion prevention and the support of women, families, and childbirth illustrates a situation in which a religious actor can contribute to the common good, acting along with other actors of the civil sphere, provided that the religious identity is not publicly visible. Religious actors do not refuse to work in the civil sphere and apply a variety of tactics, successfully adapting them to the conditions of modern society. Our analysis shows that the claim of deprivatization as an indicator of desecularization requires further elaboration, since in the same country in respect to one and the same denomination there may simultaneously occur both an increase in visibility (or publicity) at the level of state religion and a decrease in visibility (or publicity) at the level of the civil society, which does not make it possible to speak of an ongoing process of secularization or desecularization in that country.

Keywords

public and private religion — public sphere — Orthodox Christianity — common good — deprivatization and desecularization — faith-based social work

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*** 1. Introduction[521]

Discussion of the place of religion in the public sphere became popular after the appearance of the book by Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (1994). Casanova showed that if we speak about secularism as a deprivatization or transfer of religion from the private sphere into the public sphere, a foregrounding of religious organizations in the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society[522] means exactly such a deprivatization. Moreover, exactly this type of public religion (as opposed to state religion and religions at the level of political community) shows the greatest compatibility with the conditions of modern society.[523] This problem was formulated in the context of a discussion on how religion can manifest itself in the public sphere.[524] John Rawls insisted that religious actors most certainly have the right to be represented in the public sphere along with any other actors, yet, for doing that their communications had to be translated from the language of comprehensive doctrines into the neutral language of the public sphere.[525] Without emphasizing the problem of translation, Casanova implied the preservation of explicit religious identity when a religious actor entered the public sphere of civil society. In other words, even if the message was translated, the religious actor still presents himself to others as religious. By and large, such preservation of identity while leaving the private sphere for the public sphere may precisely be a sign of desecularization.

In this study, we understand desecularization as deprivatization and not as activization of religiosity or as overcoming functional differentiation.[526] By analyzing the activities of Orthodox actors and organizations—representa- tives of civil society—we intend to show that the entry of religion into the public sphere does not automatically imply desecularization in the sense used by Casanova. Using the example of the Russian Orthodox Church as well as organizations and actors associating themselves with the Russian Orthodox Church in one of the spheres of public life, namely, in countering the increase in the number of abortions in Russia, we will show that (1) such major religious organizations as the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia may enter the public sphere in all three ways proposed by Casanova—as state religion, as religion on the level of political community, and as religion being a part of the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society; (2) This entry may be of a multidirectional kind; thus, increased activity on the level of state religion may lead to more pronounced difficulties for activization of religion on the level of civil society; (3) The development of the federal pro-life agenda leads to difficulties for small organizations on the level of civil society, at least in a country which underwent a massive forced secularization; (4) These transformations are reflected in the need to conceal religious identity for maximizing the impact of an organization. Such a situation shows that the claim of deprivatization to be an indicator of desecularization requires further elaboration, since in the same country in respect to one and the same denomination there may simultaneously occur both an increase in visibility (or publicity) on the level of state religion and a decrease in visibility (publicity) on the level of the civil society, which does not make it possible to speak of an ongoing process of secularization or desecularization in that country.

Analyzing the processes of secularization and desecularization of religion in the late twentieth century, Casanova insisted that we can understand the term “secularization” in

three distinct ways. Following one of these understandings, secularization means that religion left the public sphere for the private sphere and, accordingly, desecularization turned out to be identical to deprivatization of religion (or its exit from the private sphere and entry into the public sphere).[527] Analyzing the conditions for compatibility of religion and modern society and elaborating the typology of public religions, Casanova believed that we had to distinguish between public religion in the sense of a state religion, religion at the level of political community, and religion present in the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society. According to Casanova, it was the latter role of religion, which had the best chance for existing in the modern society. Casanova himself did not clearly elaborate what religion in the undifferentiated public sphere of the civil society was; however, a certain variant of such an implementation may be deduced from Casanova's study.

In introducing his distinction between public and private, Casanova relied on the studies of several authors, the most important of which for our purposes was that of Jurgen Habermas, who defined the public sphere as follows:

By "the public sphere" we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body. They then behave neither like business or professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions-about matters of general interest.[528]

It is important to add that public opinion as mentioned by Habermas is formed in the process of rational discussion, "the opinion of humankind is seen as (1) unreflective, (2) unmediated by discussion and critique, and (3) passively inculcated in each successive generation. Public opinion, by contrast, is meant (1) to be the product of reflection, (2) to emerge from discussion, and (3) to reflect an actively produced consensus."[529]

There are several critical studies analyzing both the concept of "public sphere" and specific features of various religions operating in the public sphere.[530] However, we may generally say that the normative view expressed by Habermas (and a number of other scholars) on the importance of the public sphere is still relevant today. One may agree with Charles Taylor, who noted that

the public sphere is not only a ubiquitous feature of any modern society; it also plays a crucial role in its self-justification as a free self-governing society, that is, as a society in which (a) people form their opinions freely, both as individuals and in coming to a common

mind, and (b) these common opinions matter: they in some way take effect on or control government.[531]

It should be stressed that the concept of public sphere is important in bringing the judgments and practices of specific actors to public display in order to reach consensus, and in establishing a strong link between the micro level of specific local practices and the macro level of country, state, and the public sphere. It is important that people rationally discuss various options, reach varying degrees of consensus, and then adjust their positions, local practices, and activities of different actors in accordance with that consensus (with the help of the state or some other instruments). No less important in the concept is its claim that it is exactly the public use of reason (Immanuel Kant, Jurgen Habermas) that provides the gradual improvement of life at a local level. It is a public use of reason which helps specific actors to avoid the problems they face in their private life or in local situations.

Thus, if the theory of Casanova is correct, it means that we may speak about desecularization (compatible with modernity) as the transition of religion from the private sphere to the public sphere in the best way possible, that is, through the entry of religion into the public sphere of undifferentiated civil society. This transition occurs when religion (religious actors), performing some actions in the third sector, brings them out for rational discussion thus making them visible, reaches a consensus with other actors, and changes the situation at the local level together with the agents of the state in accordance with the consensus reached.

In this study, based on the analysis of the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church in the prevention of abortion, we will try to show that the entry of religion into the public sphere does not automatically imply desecularization in the sense used by Jose Casanova in his book.

The current situation with the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia is a good example for analyzing the processes of deprivatization of religion for the following reasons. There is a significant increase in the number of Russians who identify themselves with Orthodox Christianity over the past twenty-five years, rising from 31 to 70 percent.[532] Russian legislation involving religious organizations is generally in favor of the Church; examples include the laws and regulations on the restitution, and the teaching of “the Basics of Religious Culture and Secular Ethics” in secondary schools. Presidential candidates meet with the representatives of traditional religions. There is a growth of media coverage of the Russian Orthodox Church, and agreements between the Russian Orthodox Church and State Agencies on cooperation in the field of health, education, and other fields. However, in our opinion, such an obvious picture representing the entry of the Russian Orthodox Church into the public sphere does not automatically imply the desecularization of the Russian society.

*** 2. Orthodox Pro-Life[533] Organizations in Russia. A Sociological Analysis

In this section, we present the results of our own empirical investigation. We will view the work of Orthodox pro-life organizations in Russia in the context of the problem of public religion and the capacity of the Orthodox community to operate in the civil society bypassing the public sphere.

First, we describe the dynamics of Orthodox pro-life organizations over the past twenty years, which will illustrate the importance of the issue for the Russian Orthodox Church and for the parishioners of the Russian Orthodox Church involved in the work of such organizations.

Next, we analyze the activities of Orthodox pro-life organizations. Orthodox work in defense of life in Russia has its own specific nature: it is carried out in two completely different ways. The first is represented by the actions of Orthodox hierarchs as well as organizations which publicly express the position of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox community. The second is the work done by many organizations which do not emphasize their Orthodox nature in the working process. Many organizations do not conceal their Orthodox identity; usually these include diocesan or monastery crisis centers and Orthodox centers of assistance to mothers for example. However, pro-lifers' work in medical institutions (prenatal clinics) or work with a large number of calls through professional psychological "hot lines" implies that the religious affiliation of an organization or a professional is not openly manifested, and in communicating with the client the specialist does not recourse to religious arguments.

The religious component can be embedded in various aspects of an organization's work and not in all cases is this component expressed publicly. We intend to show that the public display of religion is a conscious choice of the organization depending on the purpose and terms of its work.

In order to achieve our objective, we will describe, first, the trends and impacts of the organizations which demonstrate their religious (Orthodox) identity and use religious arguments in the discussion on abortion. The same description of trends and impacts will be presented for the organizations which rely on denominational resources, but consciously line up their activities in a manner that would conceal their religiosity both when dealing with an individual "client" (with families or women in crisis situations), and when entering the public sphere (websites, publications of specialized literature, etc.).

The comparison of the two types of organizations will allow us to show that the Russian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox community have a capacity to act towards the improvement of life in the country in various ways, including activities alongside with non-denominational civil society organizations.

*** 3. Research Methodology: Sources of the Data

We used data from the empirical research done in the Laboratory, “Sociology of Religion” at Saint Tikhon’s Orthodox University in 2011–2013. The study consisted of a survey of pro-life organizations and in-depth interviews with the leaders and volunteers of such organizations, their supervising clergy, as well as demographers and representatives of the Russian Family Planning Association. A total of seventeen interviews (each lasting 40–100 minutes) were made in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Murmansk, Orenburg, Nizhnevartovsk, Vladivostok, and Yekaterinburg, following a snowball sampling (since it was almost impossible to find many of the organizations, in particular those which conceal their Orthodox identity in the open sources). Interviews in Moscow and St. Petersburg were conducted in person; in other cities via Skype. The interviews were recorded on voice recorders and transcribed for later analysis.

A survey was conducted at the Second Annual International Festival of Social Technologies in Defense of Family Values “Pro Life”[534] in June of 2012. The Festival was supported by the Synodal Department for Church Charity and Social Ministry of the Russian Orthodox Church and united like-minded people from organizations in defense of traditional family values from Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and other countries. The scope and interest of those organizations was associated with protecting traditional family values, supporting motherhood and childhood, and opposing abortion. The participants of the Festival included not only religious organizations and representatives of the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church, but also representatives of government agencies, non-denominational non-profit organizations, as well as volunteer organizations. One hundred and fourteen organizations from various cities of Russia and about twenty organizations from the cis countries were surveyed. The geography of the organizations included such cities and towns as Arkhangelsk, Astrakhan, Belgorod, Chita, Dalmatovo, Dnepropetrovsk, Elista, Ivanovo, Izhevsk, Kaliningrad, Kamenka, Kataisk, Kirzhach, Kolomna, Kostroma, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Kurgan, Lipetsk, Maloyaroslavets, Moscow and Moscow Region, Murom, Nizhny Novgorod, Novomoskovsk, Novosibirsk, Norilsk, Omsk, Orel, Orenburg, Penza, Perm, Pervouralsk, Petrozavodsk, Polotsk, Rostov-on-Don, Ryazan, St. Petersburg, Samara, Saransk, Smolensk, Stavropol, Syktyvkar, Tuimazy, Tula, Tver, Tyumen, Ulan-Ude, Ulyanovsk, Veliky Novgorod, Vladivostok, Volgograd, Voronezh, Yaroslavl, Yekaterinburg, and Yuriev-Polsky. The questionnaires were processed in spss.

*** 4. Orthodox Pro-Life Movement in Russia: Dynamics of the Number of Organizations

According to the data of demographers, Russia in 2011 showed the highest abortion rate in Europe. The Russian Orthodox Church has a proactive position in respect to the problem of abortions in Russia. The so-called pro-life movement (movement against abortions) operates worldwide; it is represented both by religious (mostly Christian) associations, and secular associations, initiative groups, and organizations.

In Russia, the Orthodox pro-life movement began to develop in a significant way after 2010. An important factor for consolidating the efforts of individual groups of Orthodox activists and several organizations, which by 2010 had accumulated serious experience in the area, was the support (including coordination) on the part of the Synodal Department for Church Charity and Social Ministry, as well as the decision to open centers for maternity protection in all dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church (2010), adopted by the Synodal Department. In 2010, the Orthodox Network, “Social Technologies in Defense of Family Values “Pro Life””, uniting pro-life organizations in Russia and other countries, started its work. A part of the Network’s activities is exchanging experience and training (in the form of regular webinars) as well as hosting an annual international festival. Orthodox pro-life organizations are a dynamically developing network. New organizations are often created as units or branches of experienced organizations, and effective experience becomes replicated in other cities and dioceses (see Figure. 9.1).

Next, we will describe the activities and impacts of two types of pro-life Orthodox organizations: those which openly use religious arguments and symbols in the discussion about abortions and at public events, and organizations which conceal their religious affiliation.

*** 5. Organizations Manifesting Their Religious Identity

The following activities are pursued by the organizations which openly recur to religious arguments and publicly express the position of the Russian Orthodox Church on abortions: presentations and publications on abortions made by Orthodox clergymen and hierarchs in Orthodox media, on the internet, in blogs and social networks; public events such as the International Festival of Social Technologies in Defense of Family Values “Pro Life”, as well as a number of more local events: exhibitions and information campaigns (placement of banners, stands, leaflets) in schools, universities, libraries, birthing centers, and prenatal clinics. Public actions include social advertising for the protection of life (such as placing banners and stickers on transportation in the urban space).[535] We should point out that the official social advertising in support of traditional family values and childbirth does not always contain references to the religious nature of the organization which placed the posters. Awareness actions also include information campaigns of the so-called Orthodox activists (such as putting up posters, distributing leaflets, performances, and car rallies), [536] as well as picketing and exposing actions.[537] Another type of activities is open training events for Orthodox pro-lifers in the form of webinars[538] and methodological work, such as designing and publishing methodological recommendations and guidelines. Other practical measures include the organization of shelters and crisis centers for women in difficult life situations at churches and monasteries. Individual leaders of Orthodox pro-life organizations try to advocate for their position, in particular, concerning a ban on abortions through participating in meetings of state commissions, committees, and the Public Chamber.

[[i-c-islam-christianity-and-secularism-in-bulgaria-4.jpg][figure 9.1 The number of Russian Orthodox pro-life organizations founded from 1992–2011]]

Public statements of the official position of the Russian Orthodox Church on ethical issues in general and on abortion in particular can be considered to be a part of the latter type of activities. Some examples include the “Proposals on the Improvement of the National Policy on Family and Childhood (2011)”[539] or publication of such statements as “Patriarch Kirill calls abortion a national disaster (2012)”;[540] “Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Jozef Michalik: Abortions and euthanasia are the disgrace of modern civilization (2012)”[541] as well as the signing of a formal Agreement on cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ministry of Health and Social Development of the Russian Federation on 8 July 2011. According to Article 1 of the Agreement, “The Parties shall cooperate in the areas of social development, health, labor, social protection, and other areas of mutual interest, including ... prevention of abortions.”[542]

Public speaking by Orthodox hierarchs and clergy in the media on abortions has an ambiguous effect. Very often such statements rather cause a negative reaction on the part of those who are not practicing Orthodox parishioners. There is no data on the impact of social advertising on the decision to keep a baby. According to some pro-life activists, aggressive social marketing and presentation materials (made in the rhetoric of infanticide) [543] may cause an unpredictable response. Not all Orthodox pro-lifers support aggressive media campaigns, and many adhere to the “positive agenda” (with the message that “a child is happiness”). “I would not want my children to see blood and the inscriptions of ‘death’ or ‘legalized child murder’ in the Metro or on banners” (an employee of a pro-life organization, Yekaterinburg, 2011). As far as specific actions are concerned (shelters and counseling centers for women), according to the survey, 78 percent of Russians want the Church to set up centers of help for mothers and children.[544] This practice is most certainly very useful;[545] however, firstly, it has a very limited capacity (due to the limited number of places in such shelters), and, secondly, it was designed for the so-called “motivated client”—a woman who has already decided to keep her child and turned for help as a result of her decision. However, the most difficult aspect in the work of the pro-life organizations is exactly to convince a woman or family not to make an abortion, after which she may be referred to a shelter, clothing warehouse, receive cash assistance, consultation with a social worker or lawyer, and so on.

*** 6. Organizations Concealing Their Religious Identity

We now consider the work of Orthodox organizations which do not publicize their affiliation with a religious community. Orthodox pro-life activists can act as professional psychologists or social workers without revealing their affiliation with the Church. Moreover, activities initiated by a priest or a parishioner such as consultations for pregnant women may be carried out by hired professionals (psychologists or professional consultants) regardless of

their relationship to the Church and belonging to a parish. The organization is registered as an ngo; the specialists receive a salary. The source of the funding is grants from state or private foundations, as well as donations of benefactors.

Such organizations engage in the following activities. Firstly, there are “crisis lines” by which women may receive a free consultation of professional psychologists (by telephone, e-mail, icq, or Skype—that is, using all modern means of communication). The information about a hotline can be printed on the packaging of a pregnancy test, on a women’s website, or in a women’s magazine (without any reference to Orthodoxy). Consultations are given by professional psychologists regardless of whether they are practicing Orthodox Christians or not. The task of the psychologist is to help the woman to make a decision on keeping the baby, to help her to resolve a difficult situation, and to find resources to overcome it such as renewing relations with her relatives and finding sources of financial support.

<quote>

You see, we meet the woman when she is deciding what to do: keep her pregnancy or have an abortion ... at a time when we are ready to provide support, when this support is most needed. The lack of such support is obvious, because before the social institutions that provided such a support—family, parents’ family, the child’s father, the immediate social environment—used to be able to provide this support, primarily, I believe, following the reasons embedded in their worldview—these are the importance of a person, importance of family, importance of parenting; they were a part of community; they were present in the public consciousness, but now it is a time of universal fragmentation and atomization of society, when family ties are severed. Thus it is a kind of speculation that a woman should make a decision on her motherhood on her own.

Creator of an organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Moscow, 2012

</quote>

The consulting psychologist also helps the client to connect with other professionals and organizations, depending on what type of assistance the woman or the family needs: legal advice or consultation of a social worker, assistance with things, a shelter for temporary accommodation, and so on (that is, making a referral for the woman depending on her specific problem).

<quote>

And we not only do this with pregnant women; we have a whole range of problems associated with the crisis of the family institute. We encounter problems with alcoholism and drug abuse, problems which are faced by families with many children, and so on and so

forth. Thus, a family entails a whole set of problems ... problems that we also somehow are trying to solve by our own volunteer, communal, or church efforts.

Creator of an organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Moscow, 2012

</quote>

One of such “crisis lines” was organized by one of the Moscow Orthodox prolife groups. In 2011, it provided about 5000 consultations to those who asked “for social and psychological help due to unplanned pregnancy.” In regular psychological counseling practice, it is believed that “the client should be motivated; he has to make a request for counseling. For example, it is not allowed to call back from a hotline to the woman, etc.” (female creator of an organization and a parishioner of a church in Moscow, 2012). The specific nature of an Orthodox “crisis line” is that the psychologist precisely reaches out to the client, “on the contrary, some kind of intervention is needed.” This approach makes it possible to evaluate the effectiveness of their work. According to the data from 2011, the telephone crisis line had a 35–40 percent success rate; ic q — consultation, often used by teenagers, since it is possible to make contact from a mobile phone at any time of day, had a 60 percent success rate.

According to our survey, 35 percent of pro-life organizations indicated that they had a “crisis line.” We can assume that not all of them operate nation-wide and have 5000 calls a year. Nevertheless, even one or two effective hotlines carry out important consulting work. Another area is organization of consultations by psychologists in prenatal care clinics and maternity hospitals, that is, in the places where women would come to have an abortion.

One of the functions of women’s prenatal care clinics is to provide psychological support. Thus, the current legislation recommends counseling for the women who apply for termination of pregnancy.[546] The structural organization of the prenatal care clinic recommended by the law includes the position of a psychotherapist, clinical psychologist, or psychologist on the staff. According to the testimonies of respondents from different regions, such consultation offices of psychologists were in fact absent from prenatal clinics, primarily due to the lack of funding,

<quote>

Well, no one is going to work for 8000 rubles. Naturally, no one can work for 8000 rubles. Even if money was available, it would probably be distributed among them for some other work. Psychologists are now in private practice anyway; who would work for 8000 rubles?

Head of a pro-life organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Yekaterinburg, 2012

</quote>

<quote>

Yes, first of all, these salaries are very low. Nobody goes to work there. A bad psychologist is worse than none at all.... There were some attempts in the days of Zurabov [the former Russian Minister of Health—I.Z., D.O.] to give the Health Service a kind of a gentle social face. I think it was a completely arrogant claim to easy success because there was no funding in the budget anyway.

An expert of the Russian Family Planning Association, 2011

</quote>

Thirty eight percent of pro-life organizations in our survey responded that they have been creating or are attempting to create such psychological counseling rooms in maternity hospitals and prenatal care clinics. Provided that it is possible to reach an agreement with the administration of a medical institution, pro-life activists pay for the work of the specialist,

<quote>

I offered them to fund a position, so we would pay extra from our organization. We were given the green light, went to the chief doctor, and the chief doctor said—I have no money for them. So they were not included this year. Right now we are considering the problem. We are hoping to get a grant to provide funding for psychologists in prenatal clinics.

Head of a pro-life organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Murmansk, 2012

</quote>

Sometimes pro-lifers find devoted psychologists who are willing to spend few hours a week on consulting for free or for a very small fee. “No, of course we cannot pay a salary to psychologists in prenatal care clinics. But we give them a bonus every now and then; their salaries are very small” (head of a pro-life organization an Orthodox parishioner from St. Petersburg).

The third way to implement the consulting function in the institutions of health care is when the employees of the prenatal care clinic themselves share an Orthodox worldview and try to carry out consulting work in order to persuade women to give up the idea of abortion.

There [in the prenatal care clinic] was a nurse who was a believer, an Orthodox person. She said that she does this, talks women out of it. The head of the clinic is aware of it. He does not forbid it, yet does nothing to somehow boost this work.

Head of a pro-life organization and an Orthodox parishioner from St. Petersburg

It turns out that every prenatal clinic depends on the person who works there. In one clinic there was a head doctor which herself consulted before abortions. It is the head doctor who prescribes an abortion, not the doctors who would send women to her. She receives about forty people a year. And about 70 percent decide to keep the child.

A head of a pro-life organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Yekaterinburg, 2012

As a rule, such work in health care facilities excludes any appeal to religion and religious symbolism (of course, there may be a different situation when the presence of icons or stands with Orthodox content in a health center or prenatal care clinic depends on Church affiliation and the personal position of the chief doctor). Firstly, a religious, Orthodox organization has problems with entering a medical facility,

When you come to a chief doctor, you cannot say the word “abortion” because there is immediately a storm of indignation and emotions: For example, “Oh, you are against women’s freedom!” In no way can a religious organization enter into this discussion. At the moment we were negotiating, they screamed and tried to throw us down the stairs: “You will force our women not to transfuse blood,” that is, they confused us with the Jehovah’s Witnesses. One really needs to follow a positive approach to this conversation, “We will help women,” “We will lessen the burden of your doctors from solving social problems, the problems of these women.” That is, one needs to get the administration interested that we can help them to somehow solve their problems and take the burden off their shoulders.

Head of a pro-life organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Moscow, 2012

Secondly, even if the administration and the staff of the facility are regular Orthodox parishioners or are sympathetic to Orthodoxy, establishing a trusting relationship with a woman on the part of a professional specialist may require a “pro-lifer” to either hide his Orthodox identity, or at least, to not resort to the arguments of a religious, Orthodox type in the context of professional communication.

People can go to church for years, light candles, and not understand what is happening. At the same time they can say to the consultant who came from the Church that you will now

recruit us and take away our apartments. These fears and anxieties were directly expressed to us when we at first came from the Church to medical facilities.

A head of a pro-life organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Voronezh, 2012

According to various estimates, the impact of consultations in medical facilities is relatively low (compared to crisis lines)—only about 10 percent of women give up their decision to have an abortion after the consultation. Yet, the organization of such counseling is very tedious. Entering a medical facility requires great effort, and an organization, successfully working by phone may enter in no more than 2–3 institutions in the city. Full-time counseling is also a complex and emotionally demanding job which requires professional training and a professional environment, which means that it cannot be entrusted to volunteers,

One of the greatest challenges is that after all only one woman out of ten who came to the hospital for an abortion, and who were offered every- thing—money and all kinds of support and care—only one out of ten keeps the baby, and nine out of ten go where they were going. At first it is very difficult to cope with, and, of course, even more so for a volunteer. If a psychologist has some professional environment where he can conduct supervision or individual counseling—he already has such experience; some colleagues will support him, and support him professionally, it is very difficult for a volunteer, if he is faced with such a situation. This is why we try to involve volunteers already when the crisis is over, when the woman has made a decision and is keeping the baby.

Head of a pro-life organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Murmansk, 2012

In the cases when the pro-life organizations are able to enter a medical facility and find funding for establishing a consulting room, these organizations in fact compensate for the missing function of state medicine, stipulated by the law but not supplied with budget and personnel. Along with the on-site and off-site (telephone, internet) consulting, pro-lifers are engaged in publishing magazines on motherhood and childhood as well as other materials without religious content.

Orthodox pro-life organizations deliberately choose to “hide” their Orthodox identity for two reasons: firstly, as we have already said, the religious component seriously hampers contact with clients and entry into medical facilities. Secondly, and this understanding is also common, some specialists consider it unethical to assist a person in a difficult situation and at the same time engage in religious activities:

We cannot say anything at all about faith. Even later. We cannot speak, I say it again—she will immediately close up and we will lose the opportunity to support this woman and thus

save the life of the child. We cannot speak to her about faith and that we are from the Church at the time when she is receiving material help, because in this case it is not an entirely ethical situation. It would turn out that we pay her money, and she would feel obliged to listen to us about faith. And this is an ambiguous situation, right? It is simply not entirely ethical, I think. She is dependent on us at this moment, very dependent. A woman in general at the time of pregnancy and after the baby is born is very socially vulnerable and vulnerable in every other way. And later too, when the child is born, she feels indebted to us, and this is not a free situation.

Head of a pro-life organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Moscow, 2012

Restraint in the use of religious arguments can be caused by factors such as education and professional training of a psychologist (or other specialist, involved in the process). Also, it may be affected by the geographical factor: in big cities (like Moscow) psychologists often try to stick to religiously neutral, professional discourse, while in small towns one can more often find examples of appealing to spirituality and the principles of faith in a conversation between a psychologist and pregnant women.

*** 7. Conclusion

We have described the activities of two types of organizations. The activities of the first type are for the most part public speaking, recommendations, information and awareness campaigns made by the Russian Orthodox Church and various activist groups on different levels (country, city, parish), advocating for a law with a ban on abortions. The second kind mostly involves practices aimed at working with a “client”—a woman (a family) which happens to be

in a difficult life situation. The findings of our research suggest that Orthodox organizations can very professionally work with “clients”, excluding any religious elements from their work.

However, if work can be done by specialists who are not necessarily regular church parishioners, and the organization does not declare itself to be Orthodox, is it possible to speak about any role of the Church and Orthodoxy in the efforts to help women and families in crisis?

The link between pro-life counseling (as well as assistance to women who decide to keep the child) and the Church is manifested on several levels. Firstly, through personal involvement of leaders or participants in Church life: people themselves (as a rule, organizers, heads, and

leaders) are practicing Orthodox Christians—they regularly go to church and participate in the sacraments of confession and communion.

Secondly, the parish can provide the infrastructure for work: the office of the organization can be located on the territory of a parish; a parish often houses a storage place for things to help women with babies (such as clothes and food).

We simply did not have room to conduct supervision. The psychologist cannot split in two and be at the same time a social worker and a volunteer who brings cribs. Psychologists have their narrow task, and, of course, the support of the parish was very great, because they helped us to find accommodation.

Head of a pro-life organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Moscow, 2012

The parish provides resources in a situation when the local authorities refuse to support non-profit pro-life organizations,

They said: “We provide help to families; we have centers for social support, where families can receive help; send your applicants there.” Of course, we cannot send people we are taking care of there, because they will be given a package of sweets once a year and that’s it.

Head of a pro-life organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Moscow, 2012

Thirdly, pro-life activities can be fostered through the parish community, when the parishioners are engaged in assisting the work of a pro-life organization.

The parishioners are involved even if they do not have special psychological education or social work and lack the needed professional skills. They can simply work as volunteers, as carriers. For example, to bring a stroller and a crib to a woman who decided to give birth, to keep the child, and she has no other support. To meet her with a car in the birthing center with flowers, if no one else meets her. Then, to help, for example, while the woman is in the birthing center with older children, that is, to take home a small child, a preschooler, while the mother is in the birthing center with the second child.

Head of a pro-life organization and an Orthodox parishioner from Moscow, 2012

For collecting money and material resources, the social network of the parish—personal ties of the parishioners—is employed.

Fourthly, an important role in the organization or group is played by the so- called spiritual resources—meetings, conversations with a priest and spiritual advisor who gives guidance to the group, which may involve both practicing Orthodox Christians and non-practicing employees of the organization.

In such a morally sensitive area as opposition to abortions, public activity of the Church has an ambiguous effect. Political steps, such as the agreement of the Russian Orthodox Church with the Ministry of Health on cooperation (one of its aspects is work on abortion prevention), in fact, do not bring practical outcomes: the likelihood of establishing working contacts between Orthodox organizations and medical institutions much more depends on the personal attitude of the personnel to the Church and Orthodox values of life rather than on formal regulations or ministerial instructions. Open statement concerning the position of the Church in the media (on the need to ban abortions in the country) is perceived by society as attempts to infringe on personal rights and freedoms. Such statements can be perceived in a positive way only by a deeply Christianized part of the population, which is not the target group of the antiabortion campaign, since by virtue of their association with the Church such people are not in the risk group. It turns out that the Church reaches the goal of reducing the number of abortions by refusing to make public statements and focusing on the implementation of Christian principles (in particular, the principle of the value of life) in practices which exclude any religious aspects and rhetoric, having the form of professional psychological and social assistance.

The work of Orthodox organizations, aimed directly at helping the “cli- ent”—a woman or family in a crisis situation—in most cases implies that the Orthodox nature of the organization will be hidden, or at least will not be publicly emphasized. In the meantime, these activities are reinforced by the resources of the Church in several respects, including a spiritual resource that stimulates the creation of such organizations, provision of parish infrastructure to pro-life organizations, and the use of the parish community capacity (volunteers, material and financial aid, contacts, a network of support and community resources).

Orthodox pro-life activists are primarily guided by moral principles, first of all, the absolute value of life. However, in their practical work they are compelled to give up the open appeal to moral standards and base their work, for example, psychological counseling, on the model of other non-profit organizations, minimizing or even altogether removing the moral component. Otherwise, they risk making it impossible to continue communication with clients (women and their families), causing irritation and rejection.

Thus, returning to the point in the beginning of this article, we cannot with certainty say whether Russia is undergoing a process of secularization or desecularization. In the moral and sensitive areas, publicly visible activities of religious actors may cause very diverse reactions on the part of the population, ranging from acceptance to criticism to the extent of rejection. At the same time, the invisible network of support and social projects, developed by religious actors with the assistance of the Church and by reason of their religious motivation, is in demand by the categories of the population which are in need of such help and support. The example of Orthodox work against abortions and in support of women, families, childbirth illustrates a situation when a religious actor can contribute to the common good, acting along with other actors of the civil sphere, provided that the religious identity is not publicly visible. It turns out that religious actors do not refuse to work in the civil sphere and apply a variety of tactics, adapting them to the conditions of modern society for the sake of achieving success. The question of whether such a strategy of religious work is evidence for secularization or desecularization in the country remains open and requires, among other things, further discussion on the concept of secularization and desecularization for theoretical clarification of specific characteristics manifested by these processes in the countries with forced secularization experience.

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** Chapter 10: Religion and the Challenges of Public Legitimization

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church

Plamen Makariev

Abstract

This chapter assesses the opportunities for the religiously-minded in Bulgaria (especially the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and its congregations) to participate—both as believers and through religious institutions that organize their collective activities and represent them—in the country’s public life. The theoretical problem addressed relates to the contrast between the manner of public legitimization characteristic of religious institutions and communities, on the one hand, and the patterns of such legitimization common to the public sphere in modern and “late-modern” societies, on the other. I hypothesize that the ways in which a religious “public” is persuaded that a given social norm (e.g., a law) or practice (e.g., a public policy) is legitimate or illegitimate are not necessarily convincing to the general public. The challenge is to find a common language between religious publics and their non-religious counterparts in order to avoid unnecessary antagonisms. I claim that this challenge is met in the case of East Orthodox Christianity differently by two types of religious public—a formal one (representatives of religious institutions) and an informal one (lay members of religious communities and rank and file clerics). I test this distinction through three case studies, comparing the formal and the informal Orthodox discourses concerning three major public issues in Bulgaria during recent years: gay parades, in-vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood, and the teaching of religion at public schools. I use the internet versions of those discourses—the official websites of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church

and the Bishoprics for the formal, and two major Orthodox web portals for the informal ones. I argue that informal religious publics demonstrate a greater capacity to speak a “common language” with the general public.

Keywords

Bulgaria — Orthodox Church — public sphere — public legitimization — concealment

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This study explores how religiously-minded groups in Bulgaria (especially Orthodox Christians) participate—both as individuals or communities of believers and through the religious institutions which organize their collective activities and represent them—in the country’s public life. My interest in the subject has been drawn by the desecularization debate. In recent years, despite all theoretical and ideological objections, this debate has rendered obsolete the simple solution offered by the secularization paradigm: that the only “territory” where religion is allowed to exert influence on the hearts and minds of the citizens of a liberal democracy is their private lives. One can often hear or read questions such as “How far is it safe to go in this direction?” and “With liberal tolerance and multiculturalist recognition of the value of cultural identities, do we not risk opening the door to religious conflict, the spread of fundamentalist and radical religious ideologies, and the misuse of the electoral mechanisms of democracy by indoctrinated, fanaticized members of our polities?”

Seeking answers to such questions, we should take into account also the specific circumstances of each society. The problems can be quite different, depending on the traditions and history of religious groups, doctrinal specificities, the cultural background, and the democratic political experience of the citizenship. Referring to the Bulgarian case, I reflect on the issue in question on the basis of the normative model of the public sphere, rooted in Kant’s idea about the Publizitat as a mediator between morality and politics, and articulated by Jurgen Habermas in his Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere ,[547] and his later Between Facts and Norms.[548]

The theoretical problem that this chapter addresses relates to the contrast between the public legitimization characteristic of religious institutions and communities, on the one hand, and the patterns of such legitimization common to the public sphere in modern and “late-modern” societies,[549] on the other. The problem is that the ways in which a religious public can be persuaded that a given social norm (e.g. a law) or practice (e.g. a public policy) is legitimate or illegitimate, often are considered to be not convincing by the general public. The challenge here is to find a “common

language” between religious publics and the general public in order to avoid unnecessary social tensions and antagonisms.

John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas have different conceptions of the public sphere, and these differences shed light on the problem of common language between believers and non-believers. A common feature of the solutions that Rawls and Habermas propose is that religiously motivated claims concerning public issues should be formulated in such a way as to be universally accessible, so that they can become the subject-matter of proper public debate. The difference between the two conceptions is that Rawls puts the task of this reformulation to the claims’ authors, i.e. to the religious people, whilst Habermas relies on the cooperative efforts of religiously-minded and secularly-minded citizens within the public sphere to do this job.

Both solutions have serious shortcomings. In order to avoid some of them, I turn my attention to the differences between two types of religious discourse on public issues—the formal one, as practiced by the institutions of a denomination, and informal discourse, as practiced by the religious public made up by lay people and rank-and-file clerics not involved in institutional decision making. My thesis is that the challenge of “finding a common language” with the public at large is met in substantially different ways by the formal and the informal religious publics and that this difference should be taken into account when we seek ways to facilitate the participation of religious groups in public life.

I offer case studies comparing the formal and the informal Orthodox discourses concerning three major public issues in Bulgaria which were subject to public debate in recent years: the gay parades which have been organized annually since 2008; the in-vitro fertilization and the surrogate motherhood; and the teaching of religion at public schools. Those discourses were conducted on the internet and appeared on the official websites of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Bishoprics (the formal ones), and on two major Orthodox web portals[550] (the informal ones). As a result of an analysis of the means of persuasion which were used within the two types of discourse, I argue that the informal religious public demonstrated a much greater capacity to speak a “common language” with the general public.

*** 1. The Model

The public sphere model on which the present chapter is grounded traces its origins to Immanuel Kant. In his Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, among other works, Kant formulated the idea that politics and morality are interconnected through the Publizitat. In an appendix to that work,[551] Kant introduces the concept of a “transcendental formula of public law”: “All actions relating to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent with public- ity,”[552] and further down the page: “All

maxims which stand in need of publicity in order not to fail their end, agree with politics and right combined."[553]

Almost two centuries later, another German philosopher—Jurgen Habermas—presented a model of high- and middle-class public communications from the 1670s to the 1820s, for which the term he uses in Structural Transformation is Offentlichkelt (known in English as "public sphere"). The chief characteristic of the public sphere according to Habermas is an unharnessed communication on the issues of importance to society as a whole. The result is that societal rules and public policies are legitimized (or the reverse). The influence of the Frankfurt School on the early Habermas is visible in his claim that at the time of the publication of the Structural Transformation, the public sphere was being eroded by the deliberate and inadvertent manipulations of the media in favor of persons or institutions, by the commercialization both of media and of the modern mass society at large. The consumerist culture and the welfare state, by being unfairly influenced by clandestine figures, combine to make the public sphere unreliable, and thus unable to legitimize the norms of social life. Several decades later, in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas formulated the model more clearly and effectively by dropping the connection between the public sphere and a particular period in history.

In Habermas' terms, the public sphere mainly exists to legitimize or delegitimize rules that govern society and eo ipso influence their design and enforcement by the authorities. According to his model of the public sphere, norms and policies cannot be regarded as legitimate if they are not approved by all whom they affect. Therefore, the debate on their legitimacy should be open for all who can provide relevant input. Hence the very terms "Offentlichkeit" and "public sphere".

This "openness" underlies Habermas' idea, as well as the problems many commentators find with it. The broad consensus is that such an open public communication can exist only within a unitary public sphere. However, the separate participants in public communication may have different understandings of what the justification of a norm or policy should look like. While for some observers a passionate appeal to the heart by a charismatic orator may have great legitimizing effect, those from a different background may be struck by this as demagoguery and find legitimacy only in a calm and collected appeal to reason. The medium of the debate, or the discursive resources (after Nancy Fraser's expression), such as officially recognized idioms, vocabularies, paradigms of argumentation, narrative conventions, and modes of subjecti- fication, that are used can also produce very different effects among participants from different backgrounds.[554]

This variability in public communication patterns can in effect shut out potential participants from taking part in the discussion of issues of common concern. If bearers of important information are prevented from accessing the discussion because their means of

communication are disregarded as unconvincing or irrelevant by the other participants, this can have devastating effect on the legitimacy of the outcome.

Most authors in this field reject the notion that the public sphere is unitary. “Twenty years after the translation of Structural Transformation, nearly all scholars of the public sphere agree that our social world is composed of multiple, overlapping, and unequal publics. It is more accurate to talk of publics and public spheres than to refer to the public sphere.”[555] There are outliers according to whom it is class differences that form an impermeable barrier between citizens and thus there are a “bourgeois” and a “proletarian” public sphere existing side by side.[556] The vast majority, however, see cultural differences as the chief factor for the constitution of separate publics —differences of creed, ethnicity, race, and gender.[557] Especially important is the possibility that a social group can establish communicative domination over others (Antonio Gramsci calls this “cultural hegemony”)[558] by utilizing its economic or political domination for establishing a monopoly over the discursive resources and imposing a discourse which is specific for it as an allegedly universal one. Consequently, other co-existing groups will also consider that discourse as their own, despite the fact that it may not reflect their true interests and/or serve to oppress them. As Gramsci would put it, these hegemonic relations sustain the division into superior and inferior groups.

To prevent that type of relation in the public sphere, Fraser and others[559] have developed the theory of “counterpublics.” Within the counterpublic (for instance within a racial or religious minority group) a new group-specific discourse can have a “petri dish” in which to develop on its own, uninfluenced by the hegemonic one. Whether such a plethora of publics is at all compatible with the public sphere model of Habermas, however, is an issue which puts the applicability of that model in doubt. Habermas states the public sphere ultimately produces a political effect through the change in public opinion, but it is far from clear that the multitude of publics can ever speak in one voice on an issue of common concern. To achieve legitimacy and thus change public opinion and policies, “a series of autonomous public spheres is insufficient. There must be a single public sphere, even if we might want to conceive of this single public sphere as made up of a series of subsidiary public spheres, each organized around its own political structure, media system, and set of norms and interests.”[560]

The diversity of the patterns of public legitimization does not necessarily compromise the Habermasian model of the public sphere—a model that shows convincingly the ways in which ordinary citizens can, via their “communicative power,” complement (and correct if necessary) the functioning of representative democracy.

*** 2. Religious Groups as Publics

Public legitimization has been one of the main functions of religions since the very beginning of their existence. The question that I try to answer here is: how can the specific forms of such legitimization, which are characteristic for the activities of the Orthodox religious community in Bulgaria, fit into the model of the public sphere which is characteristic of modernity. In general terms, my answer is that the relationship between these forms of legitimization and the Habermasian model is problematic. The reason is that their typical traits are at odds with this model's criteria for legitimization which is properly public, i.e. protected against manipulations.

In the Bulgarian case—the religious activities in the public sphere are problematic because the patterns of legitimization which are typical for them do not correspond to the predominant understanding of legitimacy in Bulgarian society. The latter understanding has been influenced greatly by the secularist and even atheist tendencies in the country's public life during almost half a century of a socialist political regime, and is influenced nowadays by the values of late modernity which are widely regarded as a "guiding light" in the process of the "Westernization" of Bulgarian society. Under these circumstances a claim by a religious group for a change of certain public policies, for example, which is being justified by emotional appeals referring to the authority of the Scripture, has little chance to be taken seriously by the general public.

Therefore, if we are to use the Habermasian model in order to make methodological conclusions about the opportunities of religious groups in Bulgaria to take part in the country's public life, it would be best to regard them as distinct publics, which serve as arenas where issues of general concern can be discussed among like-minded people in substantive terms and without procedural restrictions. When it comes to attempts to legitimize or delegitimize national policies or legal norms, however, the "rules of the game" of a modern public sphere should be followed. It is important for the de/legitimizing effect of such interventions that they respect the self-awareness of the addressees of legitimizing or delegitimizing messages as modern citizens who know what they are doing when they make their choice whether or not to accept a norm or a policy as justified.

And here, in my opinion, we should distinguish between the role of the religious "establishment" and the one of the ordinary congregation members. In order to substantiate this claim of mine, I propose to turn our attention to the relationship between a citizen's cultural (in our case this should be her/his religious) identity and her/his civic identity. The relationship between them has been traditionally of a modus vivendi type. This tension has made, for example, some outstanding philosophers of religion criticize Rawls's proposal that religiously motivated claims should be advanced into the public sphere only if accompanied by a universally accessible "translation."[561] The critics insist that such a reformulation would be a too great burden for people of faith who would have to split their personality into a religious and a civic "half"[562]—a somewhat schizophrenic endeavor.

In my opinion the tension between the cultural and the civic identity of a religious person can be explained, at least partially, by referring to the fact that the interventions of religious publics in the public sphere are directed in most cases by the leadership of the respective religious institutions. Consequently, these interventions are “designed” to correspond first of all to the interests of the religious “establishments”, and not so much to the visions and ideals of the rank and file members of the religious communities. Consequently, a necessary condition for a non-competitive, “synergetic” relationship between a citizen’s religious and his/her civic identities would be a direct involvement of the members of a religious public in the communicative interaction with the public sphere. By “direct involvement” I mean one not mediated by the community’s leadership.

Ordinary religious people are most interested in the existence of a healthy social environment. They live as citizens in their societies and bear the negative consequences of social and cultural conflicts. The case is quite different with the religious institutions. Their interests are intertwined with the ones of the other institutions in a modern society, especially with the interests of the political powers, in intricate ways. The cause of maintaining and even promoting the social prestige and influence of a religious institution as an organized entity does not necessarily include as its element the maintaining of a healthy balance between the realization in public life of the ideals of the members of the religious community, on the one hand, and social peace and harmony, on the other. In some cases certain antagonisms between the leadership of a religious community and society at large benefit this group’s establishment, invigorating the latter’s ties with the rank and file members of the community, stimulating its organizational life and possibly demonstrating its strength to the other big institutional “players” in public life. As Henri Tajfel and John Turner point out, group conflicts of whatever sort “not only create antagonistic intergroup relations but also heighten identification with, and positive attachment to, the in-group.”[563]

I do not claim that there is necessarily a systemic contradiction between the interests of the ordinary people of faith and their religious institutions. I simply propose not to regard religious publics as homogeneous wholes, and instead differentiate between a formal and an informal component within a religious public. I qualify as “formal religious public” the religious institutions of a particular Christian denomination, and as “informal” one—the community of laypersons and rank and file, ordinary clerics who belong to this denomination. Further, I argue that public claims and argumentations advanced by an informal religious public are more likely to be an expression of a balanced relationship between the cultural and the civic identities of their authors than claims and argumentations which are presented publicly by religious institutions. Therefore, it is more likely that an informal religious public finds a “common language” with the public at large.

*** 3. Case Studies

**** 3.1. Methodology

I compare the two types of religious public discourse -formal and informal—in three case studies. As formal discourses I regard the formulation and argumentation of the positions of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Bishoprics. As informal ones I take the positions and argumentations of ordinary clerics and of Orthodox laypersons as expressed in the discussions on the two major Orthodox web portals in the country: “Dveri na Pravoslavieto” (Gates of Orthodoxy)[564] and “Pravoslavie.bg” (Orthodoxy.bg).[565]

**** 3.2. The Two Criteria

When issues of common concern are publically discussed (usually with the aim of legitimizing or delegitimizing norms and practices), i.e. when the public sphere is “at work,” a rich variety of means of communication is used. A large part of them are rhetorical in nature, i.e. they aim at exerting influence on the public’s “hearts and minds” by acting on people’s emotions, prejudices, tastes, even subconscious preferences for styles of expression, and other personal idiosyncrasies. However, a clear priority of argumentative communication as a means of public legitimization belongs to the modernist ideal of a public sphere. The authors who hold this view insist that only communication which addresses the reason of the interlocutor can convince him/her that a given norm or practice is legitimate or illegitimate, without a risk of manipulation. The argumentative communication “respects the freedom of the interloc- utor.”[566] The information provided in a argumentative manner may happen to be wrong, incomplete or misleading in some other way for the addressee, but it is the latter’s responsibility to assess critically its reliability.[567] Argumentative communication recognizes the interlocutor’s agency, which is a characteristically modernist value.

This approach to public legitimization has been extensively criticized by postmodernist authors.[568] They argue that the modernist prioritization of argumentative communication presupposes certain assumptions about the nature of truth, of logical inference, of critical thinking which are dogmatic, naive, simplistic, and even—at least in some cases—manipulative, i.e. aiming at social domination via cognitive means.[569] It is not my task here to comment on this controversy. For our purposes it suffices to clarify the place of rational communication in the modernist model of the public sphere. From this follows that the more argumentative a religious discourse is, the better its chances to produce claims that are convincing for a (late-) modern public at large.

The other criterion has been comprehensively discussed by authors dealing with the challenges of the participation of representatives of religious communities in discussions within a modern public sphere.[570] This is the so called “universal accessibility” requirement, and it complements the “rationality” criterion. Even a perfectly constructed argumentation cannot convince a public if it refers to norms (and/or facts), which are not recognized by its addressees as valid (or really existing, or having existed). A classical example in this respect would be to substantiate a claim concerning public policy by

referring to the Bible. However cogent and meaningful this argumentation may be, it would be worthless for the interlocutors who do not regard this text as authoritative. That is why the rationality of a particular discourse is not sufficient by itself as a condition for the latter's integration in a modern public sphere. The argumentations used should be universally accessible.

In his The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, Rawls proposes an answer to the question whether reasons, which aim at de/legitimizing political (i.e. public) norms and practices, can be convincingly presented from non-public positions. This is a more general formulation under which our problem with the role of religions in the public sphere can be subsumed. The answer is Rawls's famous "proviso": "reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussions at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons—and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines—are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support."[571]

In other words, the reasons, which support a given claim that is being introduced into the public sphere from a non-public source (e. g. from the positions of a religious community) should be presented together with their "translation" from a culture-specific (or, if we use Rawls' terminology—"doctrinally specific") language into an universally accessible one.

Commenting on Rawls's view about the role that religion can play in the public sphere, Habermas does not deny the necessity of such a "translation." He objects only to the requirement that it should take place "in advance," i. e. before the claim has left the non-public domain. He agrees with the critics of Rawls[572], mentioned above, that in the case of the participation of religious communities in public discourse, it is not morally justified to put the whole burden of "translation" onto the members of these communities. In his opinion this task should be regarded as a common challenge for both the "authors" of claims which originate from non-public domains and the general public. It should be a cooperative undertaking and an element of complementary learning processes.[573]

**** 3.3 Gay Parades

3.3.1. The Institutional Discourse

Annual gay parades have been organized in Bulgaria since 2008. They have been the subject-matter of heated public discussions, especially in the beginning. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church argued vehemently against them. Most characteristic in this respect are two official statements of the Church's Holy Synod—of 2009 and of 2010.[574] The former one qualifies the Gay Parade as "a shameful and disgraceful demonstration of this heavy deadly sin which brings harmful consequences for society and especially for the young

people.”[575] The latter says that the parade “nullifies the God-like dignity of the human personality, the lofty meaning of the family love between man and woman, the foundations of morality.”[576] Both statements end in prayers to “Almighty God” for “reasonability, penance and reformation of persons who have been possessed by this deadly sin.”[577]

The other allegations against the gay parades in the two texts are in the same rhetorical style. The case is similar with the official position of Nikolay, the Metropolitan Bishop of Plovdiv,[578] regarding the gay film festival organized in this city in June 2013. He claims that these movies “praise the vice and encourage the disintegration of the family.”[579] They are “‘modern’ shameful demonstrations of decadence and sinfulness.” The Metropolitan’s main argument against the festival is that “Society is not obliged to tolerate some people’s eagerness to make public their perversity. It is not obliged to observe passively how someone is destroying the souls of our children. How he poisons the very idea of the sanctity of the family union between man and woman on which the state’s bases rest.”[580]

Apart from an attempt to find reasons supporting the idea that gay propaganda should be regarded as a public enemy (pointing out that it aims at ruining the family, and the family is of basic importance for the state), the Metropolitan’s attack against the gay film festival makes use mainly of “artistic” means to influence the public opinion. Passionate, emotional messages, strong words like “decadence,” “sinfulness,” “perversity,” “destroying the souls,” and “poisoning the sanctity of the family union” aim at acting not on the public’s reason, but on the people’s feelings. The same is valid also for the statements of the Holy Synod. I am presenting just a few examples here, but the other two texts are similar in form. Instead of substantiating a claim that gay parades are not acceptable for Bulgarian society by presenting reasons which should be convincing for the public at large, the authors of these declarations rely on the condemnation of homosexuality as a deadly sin. If we try to reconstruct some sort of argumentation at this point, it may be of the sort of “gay parades should be forbidden because they try to legitimize a behavior which is proclaimed to be sinful by the Bible.” But even if we recognize this as a rational attempt to convince the interlocutors, it is doctrinally specific. It can have no effect on the general public, because many of its members do not consider the text of the Scripture as authoritative.

The situation is somewhat different with the statements on this matter of the Varna[581] Bishopric. Generally they follow the same rhetorical communicative strategy as the declarations of the other Church institutions. For example, “the Church regards homosexuality as a lust, illness and unnatural state of mind, being a consequence of the Fall.”[582] However, certain argumentative considerations are also presented. “We protest against the attempt to achieve, via parades of this sort, a change of public opinion, so that the unnatural would pass as natural and would gain acceptance.”[583] Here we have a critique of the gay parades as a form of manipulation of the public. If a practice which is at odds with widely accepted values and norms becomes—in some way, in spite of public resistance—a routine, after a certain time the public gets somehow accustomed to it and little by little adapts its value system to it. This is a widely used manipulative technique and

by presenting the event in question as an instance of its application, the Bishopric addresses the general public in an argumentative way.

**** 3.4 The Informal Discourses

The two Orthodox web portals presented here have been an arena of discussions on a multitude of topics of public interest for quite a few years. Long before the gay parades started, homosexuality was subject-matter of informal virtual debates. The author Polina Spirova, for example, posted a text on “Gates of Orthodoxy” on 24.04.2005 commenting the wish of gay people to adopt children. In her opinion this is a manifestation of the striving of Evil to reproduce itself. “Demons are evil and that is why they want to lead with themselves to ruin as many people as possible. In the same way the homosexuals not only lead a sinful life themselves but wish to reproduce their model of behavior through ‘their’ children.”[584]

Here we witness the same rhetorical style of persuading public communication which is characteristic of the formal statements of the Orthodox Church’s institutions. However, a different pattern of communication prevails in the two portals. For example, the theologian Dr. Klara Stamatova published on the “Gates of Orthodoxy” (26.08.2005) a text in which she argued that “We have to take into account the difference between the sin and the sinner, i.e. we have to respect the personality of the sinner but at the same time to condemn the sin—in this case the spiritually and physically harmful nature of homosexual- ity.”[585] Here the author refers to a conceptual commonality between Christian theology and modern philosophy—the separability of human personality from its particular characteristics (which in Kant’s philosophy has the form of the differentiation between the intelligible and the empirical character). It looks worthwhile, in this frame of reference, to employ the energy of the Christian struggle against homosexuality not for the demonization and ostracism of gay people, but for their reformation. Another author, Tsvetomira Antonova, presents on the same portal (27 May 2005) a Russian Orthodox internet site which offers spiritual help to homosexuals.[586] It comprises mostly texts by Church Fathers, Orthodox clerics, psychiatrists. Antonova comments that “if we despise these people and turn away from them, we increase their sufferings and contribute to their further sinking into the abyss of sin ... Instead, we should encourage them not to lose hope on the difficult journey of their struggle with passions and lust.”[587] The idea that the human personality is not necessarily bound to any of its particular characteristics, which is associated in modern philosophy with the reason’s capacity to exercise self-reflection, is an important element of the modern conception of the agent’s capacity for selfcontrol and his/her moral and legal responsibility. Approaching in this way the challenges of dealing with homosexuality from the positions of Orthodox Christianity, the two authors of the “Gates of Orthodoxy” develop a strong universalistic argument in favor of a more respectful attitude to the personalities of the gay people. One may argue, of course, that the idea to cure homosexuals from their “sinful” passions by winning them for the moral and religious values of Christianity is not realistic and even not “politically correct”, but still this would be a debate which fits easily into the mainstream public sphere.

Comparing the two types of discourse, the formal and the informal, it is worth noting that they do not differ in terms of their basic message—that homosexuality is bad, but rather in the ways in which this message is presented. In the former case the authors concentrate their efforts on condemning this sin by rhetorical means, doing their best to persuade the general public that it must oppose policies that tolerate homosexuality. In the latter case attention is focused on the fact that intolerance towards non-standard sexual practices does not have to be directed also against the persons who exercise them. The differentiation between sin and sinner is characteristic for Christianity in general, but as a matter of fact it was not mentioned in the formal discourses as presented in our case by the Holy Synod and the two Bishoprics, whilst the two lay authors directed the attention of the public precisely toward the separation of the attitude toward homosexual behavior from the attitude toward the persons who behave in this way, thus giving the addressees of their message reasons to reject uncompromisingly the homosexual practices without the uneasy feeling that this amounts to treating the gay people in an inhumane manner. In both cases the aim of the authors is the same, but the means are different. The representatives of the religious institutions try to incite their public against the gay parades directly by emotional appeals. The “Gates-authors” point out to their readers that condemning homosexuality may be done without stigmatizing the homosexuals as persons. In the latter case the readers who belong to the general public are offered a rationale to adopt a Christian-type stance in regard of homosexuality without conflicting with their modern mentality.

Another contribution to the gay-parade-discussion which is characteristic for the informal Orthodox discourse on the two web portals is the comment of Andrey Romanov, published on “Pravoslavie.bg” (22.06.2009).[588] It referred to a demonstration of theology students from Sofia University against the planned annual gay parade. More specifically, the author defended the students who were criticized by the mass media for displaying slogans and posters whose content was of the nature of hate speech. Romanov did not deny that these messages were not politically correct. However, he qualified them as a manifestation of common sense and traditional morality. “Because in the contemporary society you need courage in order to dare protest against a perversity which pretends to be a norm. You break the silence, you tear down the veil of the universal hypocrisy.”[589] The author regards the public condemnation of homosexuality as an act of civic courage directed against an officially fortified conformism. He justifies the behavior of the students by referring to the modern value of the autonomy of the individual. In this case, just as in the former one, we have here a very controversial public position, which is defended, however, in a universally accessible argumentative way.

**** 3.5 The Debate on the Advanced Methods of Human Biological Reproduction

3.5.1. The Institutional Discourse

Bio-ethical issues including in-vitro fertilization, surrogate motherhood, cloning, euthanasia, are subject-matter of heated philosophical and theological discussions in many countries. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church has been especially active in its resistance against so called assisted reproduction (mostly in-vitro fertilization) and surrogate motherhood. There is an official statement on this matter of the Holy Synod, published on its web site on 16.09.2014. I refer to several of the most characteristic theses.

One of them is that human conception and birth-giving are Divine Sacraments and that is why any manipulative intervention is a sacrilege. “The Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is extremely opposed against any human intervention, not authorized by God’s will, concerning the basic existential aspects of human life.”[590] The family relationship is regarded as something more than ordinary relations between two individuals. “The original relationship between a man and a woman and hence all further husband— wife relationships are of ontological and sacramental nature.”[591] Consequently, in-vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood are a perversion of the order of human reproduction, established by God, and, besides, are a violation of the Sacrament of the family relationship. “These medical practices disrupt the unity of the family ties and involve the activity of third, usually entirely strange, persons in the most intimate spheres of the husband—wife relations and in the life of the forthcoming child.”[592]

Another important thesis is that Christian humility justifies a “humble acceptance of the infertility of the husband or the wife, so that it would not jeopardize the unity and the happiness of the family.”[593] Proceeding from these considerations, the Holy Synod appeals to the families which have reproductive problems “to try to overcome their pain and to direct their love to children who have no parents.”[594]

A third characteristic point in the statement of the Holy Synod refers to the undeniable fact that the methods of assisted reproduction and surrogate motherhood are not based on absolutely comprehensive and reliable information, so there is no guarantee that they will produce results which will be in the best interest of the families involved, including future children. “Because of the inevitable limitations of the available technologies, medical skills and intellectual capacities, no one can be fully confident that he can predetermine in an absolutely safe way the life of other human beings. Only God knows perfectly well the depths of our hearts, our needs, our worldly and spiritual destinies.”[595]

The critiques against the advanced methods of reproduction are inferred logically from basic elements of Christian doctrine. However, this argumentation is not universally accessible. It cannot be recognized as valid by members of the general public who do not share the Christian faith.

Another official document of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church which concerns surrogate motherhood is Metropolitan Nikolay’s address to the clerics and laypeople of the Plovdiv

Diocese issued in July 2012.[596] He claims, first of all, that surrogate motherhood introduces a commercial element into such an intimate sphere of human life as the parent—child relationship. The author of the address refers here to the fact that in most cases the surrogate mother receives a substantial financial compensation by the would-be parents of the child to whom she will give birth. In this respect surrogate motherhood is similar to other practices which are treated as morally and legally unacceptable. The Metropolitan Bishop asks what would happen if we legitimize such a motherhood. “How can we justify, then, our struggle against prostitution, procuring, sex slavery, human trafficking?”[597] These practices combine business with intimate human relationships.

The analogy used by Nikolay as an argument against surrogate motherhood may not seem quite convincing. We may point out substantial differences between this practice and prostitution, for example, but still we cannot deny that the Metropolitan’s thesis is substantiated in a universally accessible way. However, this is not the case with the other important claim of his address. In the concluding paragraph he qualifies surrogate motherhood as one of the numerous attempts to “cheat God.” While “the Holy Orthodox Church teaches that children are a Blessing from God. This is known by any woman who has become mother, because she has understood and felt that there is something in motherhood which cannot be explained by science and cannot be formulated in words. This is a Divine miracle.”[598] Instead of seeking ways to solve reproductive problems by ourselves, we should rely on faith. Genuine faith can produce miracles.

This manner of persuading the public is in blatant contradiction with the standards of legitimization characteristic for the (late-)modern public sphere. Instead of argumentative communication we have emotional appeals and references to miracles.

3.5.2. The Informal Discourses

Remarkably, the “Gates of Orthodoxy” web portal published on 14.09.2012 a comment on Metropolitan Nikolay’s address.[599] The author, Kalin Yanakiev, professor at Sofia University and one of Bulgaria’s foremost Christian intellectuals, shared the Metropolitan’s negative opinion about surrogate motherhood but criticized the address in a methodological aspect. The target of this critique was precisely the inability of the representatives of the Church’s institutions to find “common language” with the general public. “A moderate presentation of the arguments which refer to the risks associated with the surrogate motherhood—risks to produce greater suffering than the suffering which it aims to cure—would have made the Church’s position much more authoritative and much less vulnerable to the criticism by the mass media”.[600] As nothing of this sort was done, another opportunity was missed to initiate a serious bioethical debate between the Church and Bulgarian liberal society, which could have enriched the country’s public sphere.

Another author, Andrey Romanov, reflects in a linguistic aspect on the official statement of the Holy Synod which was cited above. On “Pravoslavie.bg” he writes (09.03.2012) “The simplicity of language and thought are not among the virtues of our Bishops. The way of thinking and expressing one’s opinion which are characteristic for the modern person are absolutely terra incognita for them. They simply cannot understand that with such a pompous, archaic language which they have learned 50 years ago in the Seminary they have no chance to reach the consciousness of modern society.”[601]

**** 3.6 The Debate on the Teaching of Religion at School

3.6.1. The Institutional Discourse

The debate on the teaching of religion at Bulgarian public (municipal[602] and state) schools is the most extensive and significant one in which the Orthodox institutions and informal web portals take part. Religion is taught as an elective discipline (the students are obliged to choose a fixed number of disciplines among a greater number of offered ones) and in a confessional way (either as Orthodox Christianity or as Islam, depending on the denominational composition of the student population). Due to the negative influence of a number of factors (insufficient funding of education is the most important of them) the school authorities generally do not encourage the students to choose this discipline and at present only about 2% of the schoolchildren study religion. This, in its turn, influences negatively the training of teachers in religion at the theological faculties of Bulgarian universities and at the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia (there is little interest among the students in theology to get such training because of the negligible chances to get a job as a teacher) and as a result the teaching of religion at school is in steady decline.

In order to overcome this tendency two alternative strategies have been proposed. Both aim at a mandatory status of a religious discipline at school. One of the options which are being discussed is a non-confessional subject of the type of Religion Studies or History of Religion which would deal with the general traits of world religions (this conception was prepared by a working group, appointed by the Ministry of Education and Science in 2007 and called “Public Council”), and the other option is a confessional subject, similar in content to the “Religion—Christianity” and “Religion—Islam” which are taught now, but accompanied by an alternative secular subject (according to some of the versions of this conception it should be Ethics, according to others—History of Religion) for the schoolchildren who do not want to study religion in a confessional way.

So, there are three “parties” in the present discussion: supporters of the status quo (elective confessional subject), supporters of a mandatory nonconfessional subject, and advocates of a mandatory couple of, alternatively, a confessional or a secular subject. The religious institutions in the country (the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Grand Muftiship) support the third option.

The most authoritative official document of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in this respect is the “Conception of the Holy Synod Concerning the Status of the Subject ‘Religion’ at the Bulgarian School”. Proceeding from the typology which we use here, we can find three types of statements in this text.

There are some ambivalent ones in the sense of being to a certain extent, or implicitly, argumentative. Let us consider, for example, the claim that the main objective of school education which is defined in the Law of National Education (article 15, paragraph 1) as the “formation of autonomous, moral and socially active personality”[603] cannot be attained without “raising the students in the spirit of the Orthodox Christian faith, of the traditional moral virtues and culture of our ancestors.”[604] This statement implies that Orthodox Christianity is an important element of the traditional moral culture of the Bulgarian nation and this message is a strong universalistic argument in favor of the mandatory study of religion. If the enculturation of the students into the traditional virtues of the Bulgarian people is a necessary condition for the attainment of the main objective of school education, and Orthodoxy is inseparable from this culture, then how can the main objective be attained without the study of religion? This is almost a syllogism.

The second type of statement is explicitly argumentative. They are not many, but they occupy an important place in the Conception. One of them is the assertion that a mandatory confessional study of religion at school would not jeopardize the secular[605] character of public education, because there is a number of precedents in other European countries of such study of religion which have not brought about any religious conflicts. “There is study of religion at school in 20 member-states of the EU (in 16 of them exclusively confessional, in two both confessional and non-confessional, and in two—non-confessional) … These facts are an evidence that the studying of religion at school in various forms nowhere contradicts the secular character of education and human rights.”[606] Besides, the authors of the Conception refer precisely to universal human rights in order to substantiate their claim. “One of the basic human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the UN is the right to information.”[607] Would a restriction of the teaching of religion at school not infringe also the right to information?

The third type is statements which are expressly rhetorical or doctrinally specific. What about the following instance of persuading communication: “The Church is linked with the world through its human nature and spiritualizes it through its Divine essence. It is through its Divine nature that it influences beneficially the life of society.”[608] It is thus inadmissible for the Church to isolate itself from mass education. This would deprive “the children and the adolescents from its blessing.”[609]

Another example of the same rhetoric: “The Church reminds the people who work in the field of education and culture that their calling is to perfect the souls of the humans, including

their own—to be of use and help to the people by restoring in themselves the image of God which has been darkened by sin."[610]

3.6.2. The Informal Discourses

The contrast between the positions of the authors of texts on the two Orthodox web portals and the official discourse is not so much in terms of content— most of the participants in the informal online debates favor the Church's maximalist demand, that religion should be studied as a mandatory confessional subject. The difference is methodological. The informal discourses are mostly argumentative and universally accessible.

The most popular argument in favor of a mandatory study of the confessional school-subject "Religion-Christianity" is that it does not preach values and ideals which are doctrinally bound, i.e. which divide the people and antagonize groups against each other, but on the contrary—teaches mostly universal ones. According to Evgeni Gyunov (text published on "Gates of Orthodoxy" on 18.11.2006) "The Biblical statements about the eternal struggle between Good and Evil in society and in the interpersonal relations, about the lofty and spiritual beauty, attract people's minds with their universal[611] meaning."[612] Yordanka Vassileva (same portal, 9 May 2006) maintains that "The subject 'Religion' is the only school discipline which motivates the child to seek the Good in her/ himself and in the Others."[613] On the "Gates" portal one can also find an interview with a young teacher in Religion, Ivaylo Stoyanov, which was published originally in the educational weekly Azbuki on 3 July 2013. He asserts that he is trying to teach his students to do Good to the people who have done Good to them, and that from the first moment in class he talks with them about "human virtues—humility, kindness, respect, reverence to the elderly."[614]

A less common approach to the challenge of the integration of a confessional study of religion into a generally secular school curriculum is demonstrated by Smilen Markov. He claims ("Gates of Orthodoxy," 25 September 2010) that the debate on the teaching of religion should take into account the specific traits of European Christian culture. In his opinion these characteristics preclude indoctrination as an element of the confessional study of the Christian faith (the author refers here to the concerns of the opponents of the confessional study of religion at school, that it would be indoctrinating the children). "No, this cannot be done, because in the European Christian traditions we have a norm of critical conceptualization of the faith-content."[615] In other words, if some teacher in "Religion-Christianity" indoctrinates his/her students, this would not be due to the nature of Orthodoxy, but the incompetence of the teacher insufficiently familiar with his/her own religious tradition.

Another trend in the publications on the two web portals concerning the status of the teaching of religion at school is the critique against the approach of Church institutions to

this issue. The professional journalist Yavor Dachkov, a theologian by education, for example, maintains (“Gates of Orthodoxy,” 4 March 2008, the original publication was in the Monitor newspaper) that it is too early for a reform in the teaching of religion. The reason is that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is in a severe spiritual crisis itself and “the place of religion is firstly in the family and in the church and until it starts to sound authentically from the mouths of the priests themselves, there is no way for it to be propagated among the larger public.”[616]

One of the few authors who favor the status quo (“Religion” as an elective subject) is Polina Spirova (“Gates of Orthodoxy,” 10.10.2010). She does not do this because she is pleased with the present state of affairs, but because she thinks that it is too early to press the public with maximalist demands. In her opinion the discourse of the Church institutions concerning the introduction of “Religion” as mandatory looks coercive and therefore counterproductive. In order to entrust someone to take care of their children, the parents should trust the person. The token for the success of religious education at school is public trust. However, the Church can work in this direction even under the present conditions, i.e. “Religion” taught as an elective subject. “The Church must make efforts not only for the introduction of mandatory religious education, but also for the formation of a public of younger as well as of mature people, present and future parents, who would willingly back the Church’s claims for mandatory religious education for their children. The Church should advance into society and change its disposition so that it becomes more sensitive to the Church’s demands.”[617]

*** 4. Conclusion

The above analysis of the three public debates shows substantial differences between the discourses led by the institutions of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the ones via which the informal public of rank and file Orthodox Christians takes part in the formation of public opinion on religiously relevant issues. The ways in which the authors try to persuade their interlocutors are different. Rhetorical and doctrinally specific patterns of public communication characterize the institutional discourse, while within the informal discourses mostly argumentative communication, which is open for discussion and objections from various points of view, takes place. In other words, the legitimizing communication on the institutional level is substantially different from the one in the public sphere, while the informal religious public speaks more or less the same language as the public at large. This gives the informal religious public better chances to legitimize the positions of the religious group to which it belongs in properly public debates and so to promote the capacities of this group to participate in the exercising of “communicative power,” i.e. to exert influence on legislation and public policies.

Why is there such a difference? It would not be correct to assume that the informal religious public is generally more secularly minded, which facilitates its communication within the public sphere. My observations on the two web portals do not provide evidence in support of

such a hypothesis. Unconditional religious convictions are manifested in a great part of the texts posted. A more plausible explanation—at least partially true in my opinion—is that such publics provide space where people of a religious and of an entirely secular mindset can mingle. This can be observed on the web portals in question. In that aspect, the informal religious public is very much like the informal, “weak” public described by Habermas in “Between Facts and Norms.”[618] Following Habermas’s model, one could expect some kind of cooperative, dialogical activity to produce “translations” of rhetorical and doctrinally specific claims into universally accessible argumentative ones on a reciprocal basis. Nothing of this sort is happening on the Orthodoxy.bg and “Gates of Orthodoxy” portals. What is happening is that participants who express and defend deep religious convictions are trying to do their best to formulate—monologically, so to say—their claims in the “language” of the general public sphere. So, this real picture corresponds much more to the standards of Rawls’s “proviso,”[619] than to the Habermasian model of deliberative democracy.

What motivates these genuinely religious people to use such means of public communication which are not typical for a religious discourse but provide better opportunities for them to persuade the general public why this or that matters so much to them, thus publically justifying their claims concerning legislation or public policies? I differentiate two types of relationship between a religious person’s cultural and civic identities—one of competition, or even conflict, and one of mutual complementarity. The former type obtains when such persons’ awareness of their civic obligations is one of compliance with external requirements. The latter type results from an awareness of these obligations as a duty.

It is more likely for the rank and file member of a religious group, whose well-being depends directly on the well-being of the society in which s/he lives, to develop an authentic civic allegiance than a representative of a religious institution whose relations with society are mediated by the interests of the establishment to which he belongs. Therefore, in such a frame of reference, we can expect the member of an informal religious public to be more prepared to recognize the “rules of the game” of the general public sphere, even if this would curtail to a certain extent his/her capacities to advance and substantiate claims which follow immediately from his/her unconditional religious convictions. However, such a person has no reason to experience compromises of this sort as a betrayal of his/her faith,[620] as long as they are necessary in order for him/her to maintain a healthy balance between his/her cultural and civic identities.

Of course, participants in the discourses on the two web portals which I have studied do not represent all the members of their denomination. First of all, they are educated people, with well-articulated civic awareness. Besides, the virtual environment in which they argue with each other, i.e. the web portals, provide ideal conditions for public discussions. Most importantly, they are free from the influence of political and commercial interests. The present status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (not only as a religious institution, but also as a community of believers), being predominantly apolitical,[621] leaves the Orthodox online-forums free from political manipulations, which cannot be said about many other

kinds of internet discussions. Last but not least, there is a clear demarcation line in the Bulgarian Orthodox denomination between Church institutions on the one hand, and the informal religious public, on the other.

This line is much more diffuse among Muslims. Certain international Islamic foundations, for example, exert significant influence on the functioning of the Muslim public in Bulgaria. Should these ngo s be regarded as informal structures, or as religious establishments of a particular kind? There is ample empirical evidence that some of these allegedly non-governmental organizations are involved in strategic[622] political “games” and consequently the participation in public discourses of ordinary citizens who are under their influence cannot be regarded as motivated solely by people’s religious convictions and civic allegiances. There is no hard and fast line between the institutional voice and that of the informal Muslim religious public.

The majority of this chapter has concerned the distinction between the institutional voice of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, constrained to speak in the name of Church doctrine based on scripture, and the informal voice of the religiously-minded followers of the Church. The senior Church hierarchy pronounces doctrine on critical issues, but its voice is limited in its ability to persuade because the leadership uses doctrines and sources that in principle persuade the believers alone, and them not always. In contrast, what I have termed the informal voices of the religiously minded can draw on a wider range of arguments that persuade, inspired perhaps by the teachings of the Church but not limited by it.

There is an additional “gray area” to consider, beside the question about the participation of religious people in public communication—whether it is mediated by the interests of religious leadership and/or institutions, or not— which was raised above. On “hot button” issues such as the acceptance of homosexuality, in-vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood, and the teaching of religion at public schools, there are common sense understandings shared by the religious and non-religious alike. Attitudes toward homosexuality, in-vitro fertilization, and surrogate motherhood go beyond formal religious practice, and formal religious doctrine is often consonant with accepted common-sense understandings. These unwritten, and often not fully articulated, understandings change over time, but not always by doctrines from above, whether from the Church or a half-century of socialist rule. One can be strongly motivated by religious beliefs and practices, and these often are consonant with the understandings of a wider public.

Speaking as an institution, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church can have a powerful voice, but it is also constrained by its very authority over its own parishioners. However, individual articulate believers are those likely to exchange views on websites and in other public media. These voices are “informal,” but in this sense they hew most closely to Kant’s notion of public discourse, persuasive statements considered irrespective of the rank of the speaker —ruler or priest, general or professor. In the examples provided here, the identity of many of the speakers/authors is fully known, but they are empowered to speak only for themselves.

The task of their readers or listeners is to impute authority or persuasiveness to them. Kant, Rawls, and Habermas have provided us with powerful critical tools to understand how the public sphere works.

In earlier versions of modernity, there has been a tendency to relegate religious understandings and practices to private understandings outside the public sphere. Yet the state takes a great interest in formal religious institutions and their leadership. Our examples show a great deal of flexibility in how the “informal” voices advance arguments in the public sphere, and the challenge in making sharp delineations between formal and informal voices —or for that matter indicating a sharp divide between modernity and, for want of a better term, pre-modernity. The public sphere is a useful concept, but its composition might best be considered one of Walter Gallie’s “essentially contested” con- cepts.[623] There can be agreement on the concept, just as there can be an agreement on what is soccer. However, there may not be agreement on how success in the game is evaluated. Few real-life situations are as simple as the games philosophers play, but the concept of “essentially contested concept” allows us to acknowledge that uncertainties about the contours of the “public sphere” do not constrain us from assessing the what works and does not in the changing contours of the Bulgarian public sphere.

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[107] Ibid., 23.

[108] See Chapter 7, this book.

[109] Armando Salvatore, “Staging Virtue: The Disembodiment of Self-Correctness and the Making of Islam as Public Norm,” in Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam, ed. Georg Stauth, vol. 1 (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 1998), 87.

[110] Kristen Ghodsee, Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Transformation of Islam in Postsocialist Bulgaria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 156.

[111] Chris Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice, Foreword by Paul Willis, 3rd ed. (London: sage Publications, 2008), 234.

[112] Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984). For a more detailed discussion of these theoretical debates, see Sherry B. Ortner, Anthropology and Social Theory: Culture, Power, and the Acting Subject (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 134.

[113] Murat Bayar, “Reconsidering Primordialism: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Ethnicity,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 32, 9 (2009), 1639–57.

[114] As one scholar explains, “[e]ssentialists equate traditions to fixed essences to which they ascribe variations” while “[t]raditions are not fixed entities people happen to discover. They are contingent entities people produce by their own activities.” See Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 201–3.

[115] Arolda Elbasani and Jelena Tosic, “Localized Islam(s): Interpreting Agents, Competing Narratives, and Experiences of Faith,” Nationalities Papers 45, 4 (2017), 499–510.

[116] Behar Sadriu, “Grasping the Syrian War, a View from Albanians in the Balkans,” Nationalities Papers 45, 4 (2017), 540–59.

[117] Laura J. Olson, “Negotiating meaning through costume and social media in Bulgarian Muslims’ communities of practice,” Nationalities Papers 45, no. 4 (2017), 560–80. doi: 10.1080/00905992.2017.1303470, published online: 16 June 2017.

[118] For an account of the intellectual development of el-Zein, see Dale F Eickelman, “A Search for the Anthropology of Islam: Abdul Hamid el-Zein,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 13, no. 3 (1981): 361–65.

[119] Abdul Hamid El-Zein, “Beyond Ideology and Theology: The Search for the Anthropology of Islam,” Annual Review of Anthropology 6 (1977): 242–43.

[120] Ibid., 251. The quotation marks are el-Zein’s.

[121] Ibid., 251.

[122] Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2009), 1.

[123] Cemil Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 131.

[124] Shahab Ahmed, What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 148. In his review, David Nirenberg ("What is Islam? What is Christianity? What is Judaism?" Raritan 36, 2 (2016): 1–14) rightly notes the politicized connotations of defining Islam from some perspectives of contemporary thought (pp. 3–4) by emphasizing that "the Wahhabism that Ahmed frequently criticized is just as 'true' an experience of Islam as the Sufi-philosophical pluralism he celebrated" (p. 14).

[125] Ahmed, What is Islam? 405, author's emphasis.

[126] Frank Griffel, "Contradictions and Lots of Ambiguity: Two New Perspectives on Premodern (and Postclassical) Islamic Societies," Bustan 8, no. 1 (2017): 13.

[127] Dale F. Eickelman, "The Study of Islam in Local Contexts," Contributions to Asian Studies 17 (1982), 1–2.

[128] Ibid., 11.

[129] Qur'an 2: 256.

[130] Ali Eminov, "Social Construction of Identities: Pomaks in Bulgaria," Journal on Ethnopolitics & Minority Issues in Europe 6, no. 2 (2007): 1–2.

[131] For example, Fatme Myuhtar-May, Identity, Nationalism, and Cultural Heritage under Siege. Five Narratives of Pomak Heritage—From Forced Renaming to Weddings (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), 6–7.

[132] Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, updated ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), ix.

[133] William W. Hagen, "The Balkan's Lethal Nationalisms," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (1999): 62–63.

[134] Cook, Ancient Religions, Modern Politics, xv.

[135] Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 13.

[136] In the sense of Armando Salvatore, “Staging Virtue: The Disembodiment of SelfCorrectness and the Making of Islam as Public Norm,” in Islam—Motor or Challenge of Modernity, Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam 1, ed. Georg Stauth, Hamburg: Lit Verlag; New Brunswick: Transaction, 87–120.

[137] Suha Taji-Farouki and Hugh Poulton, “Introduction,” in Muslim Identity and the Balkan State, ed. Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki (London: Hurst, 1997), 2.

[138] European Convention on Human Rights, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/The+Convention+and+additional+protocols/The+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights/ (accessed 11 November 2020).

[139] Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, 1st ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); idem, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 1st ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

[140] Asad, Formations of the Secular, 207.

[141] Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, 1st ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (eds.), Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors, 1st ed. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006).

[142] Mahmood, Politics of Piety.

[143] John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, http://www.constitution.org/jl/tolerati.htm (accessed 10 April 2020).

[144] Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1st ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 70.

[145] European Court of Human Rights, Press release issued by the Registrar: Chamber Judgment, Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) v. Bulgaria, 52, 22 January 2009, 4.

[146] 9 Kristen Ghodsee, “Symphonic Secularism: Eastern Orthodoxy, Ethnic Identity and Religious Freedoms in Contemporary Bulgaria,” Anthropology of East Europe Review 27, 2 (2009): 227–52.

[147] 10 Ghodsee, “Symphonic Secularism,” 227–252; Daniela Kalkandjieva, Bulgarskata Pravoslavna Tsarkva i Darzhavata [The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the State], 19441953 (Sofia: Albatros, 1997); Stefan Chureshki, Pravoslavieto i Komunistite v Balgaria (1944- 1960) [Orthodoxy and Communists in Bulgaria (1944–1960)] (Sofia: Prosveta, 2004); Momchil Metodiev, Mezhdu Vyarata i Kompromisa: Bulgarskata Pravoslavna Tsarkva i Komunisticheskata Darzhava [Between Faith and Compromise: The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Communist State], (1944–1989). (Sofia: Ciela, 2010).

[148] See Pamela Ballinger and Kristen Ghodsee, “Socialist Secularism: Gender, Religion and Modernity in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, 1946–1989,” Aspasia: The International Yearbook of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European Women’s and Gender History 5 (2011): 6–27.

[149] James Lindsay Hopkins, The Bulgarian Orthodox Church: A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Evolving Relationship between Church, Nation, and State in Bulgaria, 1st ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 196–97.

[150] Tzvetan Todorov, Voices from the Gulag: Life and Death in Communist Bulgaria (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

[151] People’s Republic of Bulgaria, Durzhaven vestnik [State Gazette], no. 48, 1 March 1949, http://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Bulgaria/Bulgaria_Denominat_Bulgarian .htm (accessed 21 January 2019).

[152] Klaus Roth, “Socialist Life-Style Rituals in Bulgaria,” Anthropology Today 6, 5 (1990): 8–10.

[153] Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Durzhaven vestnik [State Gazette] no. 56, 13 July 1991. See Article 13, http://www.parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=en, (Accessed 15 February 2020).

[154] Steven Chiodini, “Bulgaria: An East European Revolution in Suspension,” Harvard International Review 13, 1 (1991).

[155] Emil Giatzidis, “Bulgaria on the Road to the European Union,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 4, 3 (2004): 434–57.

[156] European Commission of Human Rights, “Hristiyansko Sdruzhenie ‘Svideteli na Yehova’ (Christian Association Jehovah’s Witnesses) against Bulgaria,” Application # 28626/95.

[157] “Bulgarian Freedom Books—Bringing the Reformation to Bulgaria,” the Bulgarian Reform Ministries, http://bulgrefsite.entrewave.com/ (accessed 30 March 2011).

[158] J. Maxwell, “New Kingdom for the Cults,” Christianity Today 36 (1) (1992): 37–40.

[159] Howard Culbertson, “God’s Bulgarian Tapestry,” e-book, http://home.snu.edu/~hculbert/ tape1.htm (accessed 30 March 2021).

[160] “Mission to the World Bulgaria,” http://www.mtwbg.com/ (accessed 30 March 2021).

[161] “Mission to the World Bulgaria,” http://www.mtwbg.combgmissions.htm/ (accessed 30 March 2021).

[162] Kristen Ghodsee, “Minarets after Marx: Islam, Communist Nostalgia and the Common Good in Post-Socialist Bulgaria,” East European Politics and Societies 24,4 (2010): 520–42.

[163] “in brief: Chief Mufti says Muslims Life Returning to Normal,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in English 1735 gmt 20 October 1990, in bbc Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 October 1990, Part 2 Eastern Europe; B. Internal Affairs; Bulgaria; ee/0902/b/1.

[164] “in brief: Movement for Rights and Freedoms Demands Bulgarian Chief Mufti’s resignation,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in English 2238 gmt 22 January 1991, in bbc Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 January 1991, Part 2 Eastern Europe; B. Internal Affairs; Bulgaria; ee/0979/b/1.

[165] “in brief: Muslim Clergy in Kurdzhali Demand Chief Mufti’s Resignation,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in English 1953 gmt 29 January 1992, in bbc Summary of World Broadcasts, 31 January 1992, Part 2 Eastern Europe; B. Internal Affairs; Bulgaria; ee/1292/ b/1.

[166] “Bulgaria: udf mp’s Accuse Chief Mufti of Misuse of Funds,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in English 0907 gmt 31 January 1992, in bbc Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 February 1992, Part 2 Eastern Europe; B. Internal Affairs; ee/1296/b/1.

[167] “Other reports in brief: Muslim Theological Council Votes Confidence in Chief Mufti,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in English 1914 gmt 4 February 1992, in bbc Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 February 1992, Part 2 Eastern Europe; Bulgaria; ee/1298/b/1.

[168] Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Case of Supreme Theological Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, Application no. 39023/97, Judgment, Strasbourg, 16 December 2004; and Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Case of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, Application No. 30985/96, Judgment, Strasbourg, 26 October 2000.

[169] “Police Intervene in Dispute Over Chief Mufti’s Office in Sofia,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in English (i) 2004 gmt 16, (ii) gmt 17 June 1993, in bbc Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 June 1992, Part 2 Eastern Europe; B. Internal Affairs; Bulgaria; ee/1411/b/1.

[170] “Nedim Gendzhev Replaced as Chief Mufti,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in English 1722 gmt 13 September 1992, in bbc Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 September 1992, Part 2 Eastern Europe; B. Internal Affairs; Bulgaria; ee/1487/b/1.

[171] “in brief: National Muslim Conference Elects New Chief, Mufti Legitimacy Disputed.” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in English 1947 gmt 19 September 1992, in bbc Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 September 1992, Part 2 Eastern Europe; B. Internal Affairs; Bulgaria; ee/1491/b/1.

[172] “Internal Affairs: Muslim Clerics Elect New National Leadership,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, Sofia, in English 1710 gmt 2 November 1994, in bbc Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 November 1994, Part 2 Central Europe and the Balkans; Balkans; Bulgaria; ee/2144/b.

[173] European Court of Human Rights, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 2000.

[174] European Court of Human Rights, Supreme Theological Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, 2004.

[175] European Court of Human Rights, *Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria*, 2000.

[176] Janice Broun, “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church: The Continuing Schism and the Religious, Social and Political Environment,” Religion, State and Society 32, 3 (2004): 20945; idem. “The Schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Part 2: Under the Socialist Government, 1993–97,” Religion, State and Society 28, 3 (2000): 207–38; idem. “The Schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Part 3: Under the Second Union of Democratic Forces Government, 1997–2001,” Religion, State and Society 30, 4 (2002): 365–94.

[177] Religious Denominations Act 2002, https://legirel.cnrs.fr/spip.php?article540&lang=fr (accessed 30 December 2021)

[178] Krassimir Kanev, “The New Bulgarian Religious Law: Restrictive and Discriminatory,” European Yearbook of Minority Issues 2, 3 (2002): 655–73; Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, “Address against the Pending Approval of the Final Version of the Draft Denominations Act,” 14 November 2000, www.bghelsinki.org/index.php?module=news&lg=en&id=275 (accessed 10 February 2010).

[179] Alexander Knysh, “A Clear and Present Danger: ‘Wahhabism’ as a Rhetorical Foil,” Die Welt des Islams 44, 1 (2004): 19–20.

[180] Arolda Elbasani, “Introduction: Nation, State, and Faith in the Post-Communist Era,” in The Revival of Islam in the Balkans: From Identity to Ideology, ed. Arolda Elbasani and Olivier Roy (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 9.

[181] Kerem Oktem, “Between Emigration, De-Islamization and the Nation-State: Muslim Communities in the Balkans Today,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 11, no. 2 (2011): 157.

[182] Xavier Bougarel and Asma Rashid, “From Young Muslims to Party of Democratic Action: The Emergence of a Pan-Islamic Trend in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Islamic Studies 36, nos. 2/3 (1997): 539.

[183] Personal communication during a focus group with Bulgarian Muslim Turks from the area of Plovdiv, Asenovgrad, 16 September, 2005. The meeting was part of a research program, “The Muslim Community in Bulgaria: Facing the Global Challenges,” of the Center for Intercultural Studies and Partnership, Sofia.

[184] From Arabic madhhab (pl. madhahib), or school of Islamic law. Under the influence of Turkish language, Muslims in Bulgaria usually pronounce the Hanafi madhhab as Hanefi mezheb. When relevant, I give the Arabic terms established in Islamic normative textual tradition, otherwise using a transliteration from Bulgarian to provide a description ethnograph- ically closer to local practice.

[185] Profesor Yakub ^igek Otgovarya na Vuprosi na Glavniya Myuftiya [Professor Yakub Qgek Replies to Questions by the Chief Mufti (continues from issue 6)], Myusyulmani / Muslumanlar (official bilingual monthly magazine of the Chief Muftiship in Bulgarian and Turkish) 7 (112), October 2002.

[186] Kristen Ghodsee, Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Transformation of Islam in Postsocialist Bulgaria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 14–15.

[187] Konstantinos Tsitselikis, Old and New Islam: From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers (Leiden and Boston: Brill, Nijhoff, 2012), 19.

[188] Evgeniya Troeva-Grigorova, “ ‘Traditsionen’ i ‘Nov’ Islam v Bulgaria [‘Traditional’ and ‘New’ Islam in Bulgaria],” Bulgarski Folklor [Bulgarian Folklore] 38, no. 3–4 (2012): 11.

[189] Muslim societies have often been also categorized by distinguishing between “peaceful” Sufis and “militant” reformers described in monolithic terms as “fundamentalist,”

“orthodox”, “puritan” and usually “outlandish.” See Roman Loimeier, Islamic Reform in Twentieth- Century Africa (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 47–48.

[190] Nathalie Clayer and Xavier Bougarel, Europe’s Balkan Muslims: A New History, (London: Hurst, 2017), 7.

[191] Egdunas Racius, “Experience of Muslims in Eastern Europe,” in Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Lives, ed. Mark Woodward and Ronald Lukens-Bull (Cham: Springer, 2019), 14.

[192] Alexandra Tsvetkova, “Rolyata na Bulgaria v Sigurnostta na Evropeyskiya Suyuz v Kontexta na Blizkoiztochnata Realnost [The Role of Bulgaria in the EU Security in the Context of the Middle Eastern Reality],” Savet po Otbrana i Sigurnost [Council of Defense and Security], December 2012, 2–3, https://www.president.bg/cat138/Stanovishta-ucha stnitzi-savet-otbrana-sigurnost (accessed February 2019).

[193] As it was claimed, for example, by Kerem Oktem, “Between Emigration, De-Islamization and the Nation-State,” 165.

[194] Michael Cook, Ancient Religions, Modern Politics: The Islamic Case in Comparative Perspective (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press), xvii, incl. fn. 13.

[195] Dale F. Eickelman, “Media in Islamic and Area Studies,” Oriente Moderno xci, 1 (2011): 13–22.

[196] Alexandre Popovic, L’Islam balkanique: les musulmans du sudest-europeen dans laperiode post-ottomane. Berlin: Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien Universitat Berlin: Berlin, 1986.

[197] Norris, H.T. Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993, 3.

[198] Simeon Evstatiev, “Milletic Secularism in the Balkans: Christianity, Islam and Identity in Bulgaria,” Nationalities Papers 47, no. 1 (2019): 87–103.

[199] Pew Research Center, Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe, 10 May 2017, 5, https://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-natio nal-belonging-in-central-and-eastern-europe (accessed 15 December 2021).

[200] Anna Krasteva, “Religion, Politics, and Nationalism in Postcommunist Bulgaria: Elastic (Post)Secularism,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 21, no. 4 (2015): 428.

[201] GERB—abbreviation of Grazhdani za evropeysko razvitie na Bulgaria (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria). The word “gerb” in Bulgarian means otherwise “coat of arms”.

[202] “Ministur-predsedatelyat Boyko Borissov: Demokratsiyata ne e Samo Privilegiya, no i Zadulzhenie [Prime-Minister Boyko Borissov: Democracy is not Only a Privilege but also a Duty],” 4 May 2017, Website of the Bulgarian Government, https://www.gov.bg/bg/pres tsentar/novini/ministar-predsedatelyat-boiko-borisov-demokratsiyata-e-ne-samo-priv ilegiya-no-i-zadalzhenie (accessed 20 December 2021).

[203] Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1991, as last amended 2008, https://www.parliament.bg/en/const (accesed 15 February 2021).

[204] Kristen Ghodsee, “Symphonic Secularism: Eastern Orthodoxy, Ethnic Identity and Religious Freedoms in Contemporary Bulgaria,” Anthropology of East Europe Review 27, no. 2 (2009): 242.

[205] John Mayendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes (New York: Fordham University Press 1987), 216.

[206] Cyril Hovorun, “Is the Byzantine ‘Symphony’ Possible in Our Days?” Journal of Church and State 59, no. 2 (2017): 293–6.

[207] Muhittin Ataman, “Islamic Perspective on Ethnicity and Nationalism: Diversity or Uniformity?” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 23, no. 1 (2003): 89.

[208] Suha Taji-Farouki and Hugh Poulton, “Introduction,” in Muslim Identity and the Balkan State, ed. Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki (London: C. Hurst, 1997), 3.

[209] Mary Neuburger, The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 33.

[210] Maria Todorova, Imaging the Balkans, updated edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 177.

[211] Konstantinos Tsitselikis, “The Pending Modernisation of Islam in Greece: From Millet to Minority Status,” Sudosteuropa 55, no. 4 (2007): 355.

[212] Simeon Evstatiev, “Salafism as a Contested Concept,” in Knowledge, Authority and Change in Islamic Societies: Studies in Honor of Dale F. Eickelman, ed. Allen James Fromherz and Nadav Samin (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2021), 182–3.

[213] Bernard Haykel, “OntheNatureofSalafi Thought andAction,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 38–39.

[214] See Frank Griffel, “What Do We Mean by “Salafi”? Connecting Muhammad Abduh with Egypt’s Nur Party in Islam’s Contemporary Intellectual History,” Die Welt des Islams 55, no. 2 (2015): 205.

[215] Meijer, “Introduction,” in Global Salafism, 2.

[216] Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al- Maqdisi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 8.

[217] Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29, 3 (2006): 208.

[218] For example, Daniel Lav, Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2012, 9, where he distinguishes “quietist” from “radical” Salafis.

[219] See, e.g., Bernard Haykel, “ISIS and al-Qaeda—What Are They Thinking? Understanding the Adversary,” annals, AAPSS 668 (2016): 71–81.

[220] Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi, 9.

[221] Cook, Ancient Religions, Modern Politics, xix.

[222] This more recent part of my research has been made possible thanks to the Gerda Henkel Foundation.

[223] For a discussion on the historical origin of the Pomak population, see Tsvetana Georgieva, “Pomaks: Muslim Bulgarians,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12, no. 3 (2001): 303–16.

[224] On the Ribnovo wedding as part of the village’s cultural heritage see Fatme Myuhtar-May, Identity, Nationalism, and Cultural Heritage under Siege: Five Narratives of Pomak Heritage—From Forced Renaming to Weddings (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), 175–213.

[225] On the role of the mining industry in Madan and the area, see Ghodsee, Muslim Lives, 56–85.

[226] Mihail Gruev and Alexei Kalyonski, Vuzroditelniyat Protses: Myusyulmanskite obshtnosti i Komunisticheskiyat Rezhim [The Revival Process: Muslim Communities and the Communist Regime] (Sofia: Ciela, 2008), 23.

[227] On the distinction between local and “great traditions” that require from the researcher to search for a “middle ground,” see Dale F. Eickelman, “The Study of Islam in Local Contexts,” Contributions to Asian Studies 17 (1982): 1–16.

[228] Evgeniya Ivanova, Islyamizirani Balkani: Dinamika na Razkazite [Islamized Balkans: Dynamics of Narratives] (Sofia: New Bulgarian University, 2014), 139.

[229] Except when discussing well-known public figures, such as muftis, preachers, or imams, in the ethnographic part of my work I have changed the names of the people in order to protect their privacy.

[230] Most Bulgarian Muslims, including some of the Salafis who obtained their degrees in Islamic law (sharia) in Saudi Arabia, prefer using terms such as selef and self or selyaf and selyafi instead of salaf and salafi some of which are Turkish-influenced. Considering the special role of Arabic language in Salafi thought and practice, whether this preference is to be understood as referring to the local context influenced by other Islamic terms entering Bulgarian via (Ottoman) Turkish, is unclear.

[231] Laura J. Olson, “The Multiple Voices of Bulgaria’s Unofficial Islamic Leaders,” in The Revival ofIslam in the Balkans, 134.

[232] Dalavera (colloquial Bulgarian), a dishonest and unfair deal.

[233] Hussein Hodzha, “Prokletite ot Allah [The Cursed by Allah],” mosque lecture, posted online 13 March 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=7bCN3L3ftPg (accessed 12 December 2020).

[234] The website called “Muslimabg” is developed under the banner “The best gift for a man is the pious Muslim woman,” http://muslimabg.com (as to 16 December 2016).

[235] Among Muslims in Bulgaria, the ritual prayer (Arabic salat) is usually called namaz, a Persian word that entered Bulgarian though Ottoman Turkish language.

[236] From the Arabic word jama‘a, or community, in this case a community of worshippers gathering in a mosque.

[237] Press Release of the District Prosecutor’s Office (Okruzhna Prokuratura), Pazardzhik, 18 June 2012, www.prb.bg/bg/oppazardzhik/news/pressobsheniya/pressobshenie-18062012 (accessed 20 September 2018).

[238] Prosecutor Nedyalka Popova, Obvinitelen Akt po Dosudebno Proizvodstvo ^9/2009 [Indictment on Legal Proceedings No 9 2009], Correspondence Incoming Number in District Inventory 1122/09, District Prosecutor’s Office, Pazardzhik, 14 June 2012, 77.

[239] Press Release of the District Prosecutor’s Office (Okruzhna Prokuratura), Pazardzhik, 18 June 2012.

[240] Personal communication with Muslim informants from Gotse Delchev region, February 2016. Those definitions were provided by a member of the community knowledgeable of Islam and local traditions.

[241] “Koy e Ahmed Musa [Who is Ahmed Moussa],” 24 Chasa, 25 November 2014, https:// www.24chasa.bg/Article/4444874 (accessed 3 March 2018).

[242] Lawrence Rosen, “The Anthropologist as Expert Witness,” American Anthropologist 79, no. 3 (1977): 555–78.

[243] Rudolph Peters, “Dutch Extremist Islamism: Van Gogh’s Murderer and His Ideas,” in Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe, ed. Rik Coolsaet. London: Ashgate, 2008,115–30.

[244] Martijn de Koning, “ ‘For them it is just a story, for me it is my life.’ Ethnography and the Security Gaze: Academic Research with ‘Salafi’ Muslims in the Netherlands,” Journal of Muslims in Europe 9, no. 2 (2020): 220–39.

[245] I prepared the expert report in the field of Arabic and Islamic studies with the assistance of my colleague at Sofia University’s Department of Arabic and Semitic Studies, Ivan Dyulgerov, a specialist in Arabic linguistics.

[246] Kompleksna Expertiza ot Oblastite Bogoslovie, Sotsiologiya i Arabistika [Complex Expert Witness Report from the Fields of Theology, Sociology and Arab Studies], Reference Number within the Pre-Court Proceedings: No 9/2009, Expert Witnesses: Dr. Klara Stamatova, Associate Professor Dr. Antoniy Galabov, Associate Professor Dr. Simeon Evstatiev, and Assistant Professor Ivan Dyulgerov, Pazardzhik District Court, 2009.

[247] The so-called “Expert Report in the Field of Arab Studies” is divided as follows. Part One is entitled “Zaklyuchenie (literally “Conclusion” though this is, in fact, a description of the books and written materials seized by the Prosecutor’s Investigation Office),” pp. 1874. Part Two is “Zaklyucheniya na Veshtite Litsa ([General] Conclusions of the Expert Witnesses)” where our explanation, overall conclusions, and answer to the specific questions are given on pp. 77–90. Our expert report was prepared in the following way: within

[248] Said Mutlu, Three-Monthly Report (in Arabic) to Ghassan al-Rimal, Director of Da‘wa Division, Muslim World League in Mecca, court evidence—report No 27, 20.5.1426 ah/ 27.06.2005 ad, as mentioned by Simeon Evstatiev and Ivan Dyulgerov in the “Expert Witness Report in the Field of Arab Studies” included in the “Complex Expert Witness Report,” Part i, 50.

[249] Internationally, the area of my own academic expertise as a historian of Islam corresponds to what is known in Europe or North America as Islamic studies within which the knowledge of Arabic and the ability to work with Arabic sources is a basic requirement. Islamic Studies are explicitly part of numerous publications, the under- and post-graduate curricula and the various programs developed by our department at Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski and this is a well-known fact in Bulgaria and internationally.

[250] I did so on the grounds of two main reasons. First, I accepted to take part as an academic expert with the initial reservation that the possession of a book cannot be an offence in itself, so I wanted to remain as objective as possible. Second, the case was so highly politicized by various actors in the public sphere that any statement I would make outside my scholarly field would be used not only by the litigants but by various opposing individuals and social groups. Further, some of the accused were Muslims I have known for years from my fieldwork, teaching, or research. I was not aware of the identities of all the defendants when I was called to review tens of books and documents seized from some of the accused or the witnesses within the court proceedings.

[251] Laura J. Olson, “The Multiple Voices,” 124.

[252] Anna Krasteva, Elastichen (Post)secularism [Elastic Postsecularism] (Foundation Media Democracy: Sofia, 2014), e-book, 68 pages, here 47 and 48; available online at http://www .seminar-bg.eu/kontrasensus/item/423-elastichen_postsekularizam.html (accessed 20 December 2018).

[253] Alexey Pamporov, Interview for Plovdiv branch of Bulgarian National Radio, 30 October, 2012, http://bnr.bg/plovdiv/post/100385472/aleksei-pamporov---kulturen-antropolog (accessed 15 March 2018).

[254] Prosecutor Nedyalka Popova, “Pravo na Replika na Prokurora [Right to Answer of the Prosecutor],” in response to the objections by the defendant lawyers to her plea of 29 January 2014, 1.

[255] Later known also with a different family name, Klara Toneva.

[256] Klara Stamatova, “Conclusion of the Theological Expert Report,” in: “Complex Expert Witness Report,” Legal Proceedings No 9/2009, Pazardzhik District Court, 4.

[257] Protocol of Court Session on Legal Proceedings No 9/2009, Court Chair Iveta Parpulova, Pazardzhik District Court, 4 February 2013, 24.

[258] Ibid., 25.

[259] Prosecutor Nedyalka Popova, “Pravo na Replika na Prokurora [Right to Answer of the Prosecutor],” 8.

[260] Prosecutor Nedyalka Popova, Obvinitelen Akt po Dosudebno Proizvodstvo [Indictment on Legal Proceedings] No 9.2009, Correspondence Number within the Register of District Prosecutor’s Office 1122/09, 6. Here, the Indictment stresses that “the defendants have built their orderly system of views—an ideology drawing upon elements of Salafism which they presented in its radical version to their followers in Bulgaria” (p. 6). My statistical analysis of the indictment shows that the word “traditional” as denoting something positive and a legitimate “religion” in Bulgaria is used 19 times as opposed to the “ideology” of Salafism and its derivatives (Salafists, Wahhabi-Salafi, etc.) used, for its part, 188 times.

[261] My answer, in fact, implied that as a secular scholar of Islam, it is not my purpose to judge which one of mutually contesting Islamic currents is “right” or “wrong.” In so doing, I stressed that I do not have Islamic religious credentials, as in order to take, for example, a pro-Hanafi-Maturidi and thus an anti-Salafi stance, or vice versa, for which one had to be an Islamic religious scholar (‘alim) or a Muslim jurist (faqlh) which I am not.

[262] Protocol of Court Session on Legal Proceedings No 9/2009, Court Chair Iveta Parpulova, Pazardzhik District Court, 5 March 2014, 19.

[263] Sefer Hasanov, Zaklyucheniya na Veshto Litse [Expert Witness Conclusions], submitted to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office, Pazardzhik. Proceedings No 330/212, incoming number 4729/26, June 2013, 7.

[264] Sefer Hasanov, Expert Statement at the Court, Protocol of Court Session on Legal Proceedings No 9/2009, Court Chair Iveta Parpulova, Pazardzhik District Court, 4 July 2013, 23.

[265] Sefer Hasanov, Statement within the Academic Discussion “Za Religiyata, Politikata i Sekularizma sled Charlie Hebdo [On Religion, Politics and Secularism after Charlie Hebdo],” Sociologicheski Problem! [Sociological Problems], ed. Simeon Evstatiev, 1–2 (2015), 313–39, here 337–38.

[266] For a brief report on all thirteen sentences issued in Pazardzhik, see Galina Girginova, “Deystvie Purvo: Na Pritsel v Sudebnata Zala—Religiyata na 13 Imami [Act One: Target in the Court Hall—the Religion of 13 Imams],” Sudebni reportazhi [Court Reportages], 23 April 2014, http://judicialreports.bg/2014/04/ (accessed 15 November 2018).

[267] Supplement by defense lawyers Ina Lulcheva and Vasil T. Vasilev to the Notice of Appeal against the Sentence of the Regional Court Pazardzhik No 330/2012 addressed to the Appeal Court Plovdiv, incoming number 294/2014 scheduled for 27 January 2015, 30–31.

[268] Yordan Peev, Expert Witness Report, Assigned by the Plovdiv Court of Appeal, Second Penal Committee, incoming number 2053/18, March 2015, 9.

[269] Protocol of Court Proceedings 294/2014, Court Chair Evdokiya Kemalova, Plovdiv Court of Appeal, 7 April 2015, 25.

[270] To strengthen the case for an “antidemocratic ideology” as opposed to “traditional religion,” the prosecuting power drew on the so-called “Lexicographic Expert Witness Report” prepared by the emeritus professor Agop Garabedyan, historian by discipline and former Director of the Institute of Balkan Studies at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. See Prosecutor Nedyalka Popova, Obvinitelen Akt [Indictment], 75 where the “antidemocratic ideologies” are seen as a version of the “fascist” ideology directed towards “destroying the existing parliamentary-pluralist order.”

[271] Vurhoven Kasatsionen Sud [Supreme Court of Appeal], Decision No 71/28.07.2016 on Penal Legal Proceedings No 123/2016, http://www.vks.bg/vks_p02_0345.htm (accessed 29 January 2018).

[272] Ahmed Ahmedov, “Myuftiystvoto Zastana zad Obvinenite v Propovyadvane na Radikalen Islyam [The Muftiship Backed the Accused of Propagating Radical Islam],”

Interview for bTV, 19 September 2012, http://btvnovinite.bg/article/bulgaria/glavno-myuftiistvo-zastana-zad-obvinenite-v-propovyadvane-na-radikalen-islyam.html (accessed 15 November 2020).

[273] “Obyaviha Khairi Sherifov za Imam na Godinata [Khairi Sherifov Was Announced Imam of the Year],” Smolyan 24, http://www.24smolian.com/2014/04/blog-post_8807.html (accessed 12 February 2019).

[274] Parashkeva Ivanova, Interview with Nedyalka Popova—“The Prosecutor at the Moussa Case with a Sinister Prognosis: When Muslims become 30 percent, the state is danger [Prokurorut po Deloto ‘Moussa’ sus Zloveshta Prognoza: Kogato Myusyulmanite stanat 30%, Durzhavata e Zastrashena],” TrafficNews, 22 March 2018, https://trafficnews.bg/ komentari/prokurorat-po-deloto-musa-sas-zloveshta-prognoza-kogato-99437 (accessed 22 November 2020).

[275] Aziz Nazmi Shakir, “Bulgaria,” in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, ed. Oliver Scharbrodt, Samim Akgonul, Ahmet Alibasic, J0rgen S. Nielsen, and Egdunas Racius (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2019), Vol. 11, 141–2. On the further events around Prosecutor Popova, who was not sanctioned by the Prosecutor General but even rewarded for exceptional juridical performance, which caused a new reaction by the Supreme Muslim Council, see idem, “Bulgaria,” in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 12, 2020, 144–5.

[276] U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Bulgaria, May 12, 2021, https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ bulgaria (accessed 15 May 2021).

[277] Also translated as Directorate.

[278] Kerem Oktem, “Global Diyanet and Multiple Networks: Turkey’s New Presence in the Balkans,” Journal of Muslims in Europe 1, 1 (2012): 57.

[279] These indicative developments need to be further confirmed and analyzed but they do not contradict, and even serve in their own way to strengthening the intra-communal ties among the majority of Bulgarian Sunnis towards a more explicit Muslim convergence.

[280] Personal communication with Mustafa Alish, Draginovo, Velingrad area, April 2016.

[281] Personal communication with Khayri, Gotse Delchev area, April 2016.

[282] Mustafa Alish gave an account on this event as a tendency among an increasing number of Roma Muslims categorized by him as “the dzhemaat of Ahmed Moussa” in various localities of south Bulgaria during the same conversation in April 2016. On the development of the normative Islamic teaching of takfir, see Simeon Evstatiev, “The Qadizadeli Movement and the Revival of Takfir in the Ottoman Age,” in Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic Perspective on Takfir, ed. Camilla Adang, Hassan Ansari, Maribel Fierro and Sabine Schmidtke, Leiden: Brill, 2015, 218–221.

[283] Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, Gypsies in the Ottoman Empire: A Contribution to the History of the Balkans, transl. Olga Apostolova (Hartfield, UK: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2001), 32–33; cf. Eyal Ginio, “Neither Muslims, nor Zimmis: The Gypsies (Roma) of the Ottoman Empire,” Romani Studies 14, 2 (2004): 117–44. For an account on the modern and contemporary developments, see Zoltan Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[284] Faika <Jelik, “Exploring Marginality in the Ottoman Empire: Gypsies or People of Malice (Ehl-i Fesad) as Viewed by the Ottomans,” eui Working Papers (Florence: European University Institute, No 39/2004), 1–2.

[285] Evstatiev, “Milletic Secularism in the Balkans,” 98–99.

[286] See Arolda Elbasani and Jelena Tosic, “Localized Islam(s): Interpreting Agents, Competing Narratives, and Experiences of Faith,” Nationalities Papers 45, no. 4 (2017): 499–510.

[287] See, e.g., Neamatollah Nojumi, “The Rise and Fall of the Taliban,” in The Taliban and the Crisis in Afghanistan, ed. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 106.

[288] For a relevant use, see, e.g., Walid A. Saleh, “Ibn Taymiyya and the Rise of Radical Hermeneutics: An Analysis of An Introduction to the Foundations of Quranic Exegesis,” in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, ed. Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 123–62.

[289] Vyacheslav Karpov, “Desecularization: A Conceptual Framework,” Journal of Church and State 52, no. 2 (2010): 232–70. See also Introduction to this volume.

[290] Hilarion, Metropolitan of Volokolamsk, “Sovremennye Vyzovy Globalnogo Mira: Sekularizm i Religioznoe Mirovozzrenie [Current Challenges to the Global World: Secularism and Religious Worldview]”, Statement to Foreign Diplomats and Staff of the Russian Foreign Ministry, 9 June 2010, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1178278.html (accessed 3 November 2018).

[291] Hilarion, Metropolitan of Volokolamsk, „Pravoslavno-Katolicheskie Otnoshenija: 20 Let Posle Padenija Berlinskoj Steny. [Orthodox-Catholic Relations: 20 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall]” Statement to the Fourth International Congress “Meeting place—Holy Church,” Wurzburg, 19 March 2011, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1433291.html (accessed 3 November 2018).

[292] Hilarion, Metropolitan of Volokolamsk. “Sovremennye Vyzovy Globalnogo Mira: Sekularizm i Religioznoe Mirovozzrenie [Current Challenges to the Global World: Secularism and Religious Worldview].” Statement to Foreign Diplomats and Staff of the Russian Foreign Ministry, 9 June 2010, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1178278.html (accessed 3 November 2018).

[293] Steve Bruce, God is Dead. Secularization in the West (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002), 2.

[294] Ibid., 42.

[295] Ibid., 14.

[296] Stefan Tsankov, “Bulgarskata Pravoslavna Tsarkva ot Osvobozhdenieto do Nastoyashhe Vreme [The Bulgarian Orthodox Church from the Liberation to the Present Day],” Godishnik na Sofijski Universitet—Bogoslovski Fakultet [Annual of the Faculty of Theology at Sofia University] 16 (1938–1939): 5–12.

[297] See several decisions of the party leadership, e.g., “Otnosno Merkite za Zasilvane i Podobryavane na Ateistichnata Propaganda v Stranata [Decision of the Politburo of 26 December 1957 “On measures to strengthen and improvement of atheist propaganda in the country’],’ in BKP v Rezolyutsii i Resheniya na Kongresite, na Plenumi i na Politbjuro na CK na BKP [The BCP—Bulgarian Communist Party— in Resolutions and

Decisions of the Congresses and Plenums of the Central Committee of the Communist Party], 1956 to 1962 (Sofia: cc of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 1965), 166–68; “Za Po-natatashno Podobryavane na Rabotata za Ateistichnoto Vazpitanie na Trudeshtite se’ [Decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 27 December 1966 “To further improve the performance of atheistic education of the working people’], in Spravochnik na Aktivista [Directory of Activists 1966–68] (Sofa: Bulgarian Communist Party, 1969), 274; and others.

[298] Decree N° 185 of the Council of Ministers of October 5, 1961—concerning the conversion of the Rila Monastery into a National Museum and Rules for the relationship between the Rila Monastery National Museum and the Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (amfa), Fund 10, List 12, file 180.

[299] Zhivko Oshavkov et al, Protsesat na Preodolyavaneto na Religiyata v Bulgaria: Sotsiologi- chesko Izsledvane [The Process of Overcoming Religion in Bulgaria. Sociological Research] (Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Science, 1968).

[300] Ivan Elenkov, “Kam Vaprosa za Vavezhdaneto na Traurniya Ritual i Socialisticheskata Praznichno-Obredna Sistema u Nas [On the Issue of the Introduction of a Mourning Ritual and a Socialist Holidays and Ritual System in Bulgaria], 1969–1971,” Hristiyanstvo i kul- tura [Christianity and Culture] 42 (2009): 88–99; Galina Goncharova, “Dehristiyanizaciya na Smartta v Evropa: Sluchaite na Velikobritaniya, Balgariya i Rumaniya [The DeChristianization of Death in Europe: The Cases of the UK, Bulgaria, and Romania],” Hristiyanstvo i kultura [Christianity and Culture] 73 (2012): 84–99.

[301] Instruktsiya za Sklyuchvane na Grazhdanskite Rituali [Instructions for Conducting Civil Rituals], 1971, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (amfa) Fund 10, List 12, File 189.

[302] Meeting of the State Council, “Osnovni Nasoki za Razvitie i Usavarshenstvane na Praznichno-Obrednata Sistema v NRB [Guidelines for the Development and Improvement of the Festive Ritual System in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria],” 12 April 1978, State Gazette 42, 30 May 1978.

[303] Protokol ot Saveshtanie na Komiteta po Tsarkovni Vaprosi [Minutes from a Meeting of the Committee for Church Affairs], Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (amfa), Fund 10, List 14, File 1198, 5.

[304] Correspondence concerning a Complaint about Priest Stefan Vasilev from the Village Letnitsa in Lovech, 1967, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (amfa), Fund 10, List 10, File 351, 1–6. In the end, under the influence of the Committee for Church Affairs, the Regional Committee of the Communist Party “turned the attention” of the party secretary of the village to “admitting his failings.”

[305] Correspondence concerning an “Abuse of Religious Freedom” in Lovech, Nevrokop and Varna Dioceses and Letter from the Holy Synod to the Committee for Church Affairs on This Issue, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (amfa) Fund 10, List 13, File 478, 1–29.

[306] Cf. Note from Mihael Kyuchukov, Chairman of the Committee for Church Affairs, to Todor Zhivkov in 1973, which concludes: “[...] irresponsible violation of established laws and principles [...] will lead to highly undesirable consequences, and above all, to a sharp conflict with the church, which actually will mean widespread discontent of a political nature among hundreds of thousands of citizens” (Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [amfa]), Fund 10, List 12, File 1004, 33.

[307] For more information on the policy of state administrative repression to the local priest see Momchil Metodiev, “The Best Priest is the One Who Does Nothing. Policy of Forced Secularization of the Bulgarian Society during the Communist Period,” in Prenasledovanie Cirkvi, ed. Martina Fiamova a Pavol Jakubcin (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2010), 357–69.

[308] For more on the decision of the Grand Chamber of the echr, see Grand Chamber judgment Lautsi and Others vs Italy, 18 March 2011, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press#{“fullt ext”:[“lautsi”]} (accessed 3 November 2018).

[309] Teodora Karamelska, “Naglasite kum Religiyata v Bulgariya spored Evropejskoto Izsledvane na Tsennostite” [Attitudes to Religion in Bulgaria according to the European Values Study], Hristiyanstvo i kultura [Christianity and Culture] 39 (2008): 28–35.

[310] This chapter has been influenced by my work within the framework of the collaborative research project “Religion and the Public Sphere”, realized with the financial support of the Bulgarian National Scientific Fund and under the scientific leadership of Professor Simeon Evstatiev. An earlier version of it was delivered as a paper at the conference “Faith in the Public Square” (6–9 November 2013, Chisinau), organized by St. Andrew’s Biblical Theological Institute (Moscow), the Filocalia Association (Chisinau) and the Development of Ecumenical Leadership in Mission Network.

[311] There is no official information about the land properties owned by the religious communities in Bulgaria. This issue has been subject of many journalistic investigations. The cited date is available in Stefan Stoykov, “Myuftiystvoto i Sinodat vzemat 10 miliona dekara [The Muftiship and the Synod Take Back 1,000,000 Hectares],” Presa Newspaper, 254 (605), 18 September 2013. A short version is available online at: http://epicenter.bg/article/archive/ 23626/11/0 (accessed 8 December 2018).

[312] In 2010, Bulgaria had 3,6 hectares utilized agricultural area. See the eurostat Statistics Explained, “Agricultural Census in Bulgaria,” November 2012, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Agricultural_census_in_Bulgaria&oldid=191149 (accessed 31 December 2021).

[313] Konstantin Sabchev, “Svetiyat Sinod Vse Ne Mozhe da Slozhi Red vav Vladeniyata si [The Holy Synod Is Still Unable to Put in Order Its Estates],” Newspaper Standart, 28 June 2006, 22.

[314] Yuliana Metodieva, “Antonina Zhelyazkova: Edinstveno DPS Vdahva Sigurnost u Myusyulmanite [Antonina Zhelyazkova: Only the MRF—the Movement for Rights and Freedoms—Inspires Certainty among Muslims],” Marginalia, 29 September 2014, http:// www.marginalia.bg/analizi/antonina-zhelyazkova-edinstveno-dps-vdahva-sigurnost-u -myusyulmanite/ (accessed 15 January 2019).

[315] The Union of the Democratic Forces was set up as a political coalition that opposed the former Bulgarian Communist Party, renamed to Bulgarian Socialist Party in 1990.

[316] Daniela Kalkandjieva, “The Consent of State and the Blessing of Church: A Case Study on the New Bulgarian Denominations Act,” Romanian Journal of Political Science 6, 2 (2006): 105–109.

[317] According to the Bulgarian National Census of 2011, 4 374 135 Bulgarian citizens (59.4 percent of the population) declared themselves as Orthodox and 577 139 (about 8 percent) — as Muslims. See “2011 Population Census,” National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria (Sofia: 2011), 4, http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf (accessed 8 December 2018).

[318] Diana Petrova, “Bednata Bogata Tsurkva [The Poor Rich Church],” Trud Newspaper, 1 July 2013.

[319] Waqf (Arabic; Turkish vaklf)—Islamic religious foundation, charitable trust.

[320] „Glavnoto Myuftiystvo e Zavelo 52 Dela za Vakafski Imoti [The Chief Muftiship Has Filed 53 Cases to Restore waqf Properties],” btv, 10 September 2013, https://btvnovinite .bg/bulgaria/glavnoto-myuftiistvo-e-zavelo-52-dela-za-vakafski-imoti.html (accessed 31 Decemebr 2021).

[321] Pravilnik za Upravlenieto na Vakafite [Chief Muftiship’s Regulations for the Management of the WaqfProperties], Proceedings of the Higher Muslim Council No. 3/19.092011, Appendix No.4. Article 2 of the Regulations defines as Vakifs (Waqfs) all tangible immovable and/or movable assets, which have been acquired by the Muslim Religious Denomination. The document is available at the official website of the Chief Muftiship in Bulgaria, http:// www.grandmufti.bg/images/phocadownload/NORMATIVNI_DOKUMENTI/PRAVILNICI/pravilnik_za_upravlenieto_na_vakyfite.pdf (accessed 7 April 2019).

[322] Theodosios Tsivolas, Law and Religious Cultural Heritage in Europe, (New York: Springer, 2014), 107.

[323] This observation is based on the author’s field research in the region of the Rhodope Mountains, conducted in the summer of 2007.

[324] Momchil Metodiev, Mezhdu Vyarata i Kompromisa: Bulgarskata Pravoslavna Tsurkva i Komunisticheskata Darzhava [Between Faith and Compromise: Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Communist State] (1944–1989) (Sofia: Ciela, 2010), 240–4.

[325] Ibid., 317–34.

[326] Yanko Dimov, Kiril—‘Patriarh Bulgarski’ [Cyril—‘Bulgarian Patriarch’] (Sofia: Sofia University Press, 2005), 208–209.

[327] Bilyana Rilska, “Glavnoto Myuftiystvo Vodi Dela za 13 Dzhamii—Pametnitsi na Kulturata [The Chief Muftiship Has Filed Lawsuits for 13 Mosques—Monuments of Culture],” Dnevnik Daily, 14 August 2013,

http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2013/08/14/2121549_glav noto_mjuftiistvo_vodi_dela_za_13_djamii (accessed 8 December 2018).

[328] “Intelektualtsi se Podpisvat protiv Tapetite v Hram Sv. Marina [Intellectuals Are Signing a Petition against the Wallpapers in St Marina Church],” News Site Darik Radio, Plovdiv, 18 January 2012, http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=839426 (accessed 8 January 2019).

[329] Rumyana Radkova, Hram-Pametnik “Sv. Aleksandar Nevski” [St. Alexander Nevski Memorial Cathedral] (Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences’ Prof. Marin Drinov Press, 1999), 12.

[330] The quality of stavropegial granted to a church or a monastery means that it is under the direct supervision of the Holy Synod and not under that of the corresponding diocesan metropolitan.

[331] Archives of the Church History Institute at the Bulgarian Patriarchate, Holy Synod’s Proceedings no. 7, 24 February 1912; no. 25, 31 May 1912, 59–61; 321–24.

[332] Holy Synod’s Proceedings no. 62, 15 September 1924, 86–8.

[333] Bulgarian Patriarchate, “Izyavlenie na Svetiya Sinod na Bulgarskata Pravoslavna Tsurkva—Bulgarska Patriarshiya otnosno Vneseniya v Narodnoto Sabranie Zakonoproekt za Izmenenie i Dopalnenie na Zakona za Veroizpovedaniyata [Statement of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church—Bulgarian Patriarchate regarding the Bill for Changes and Amendments of the Denomination Act Submitted to the Parliament],” 22 July 2013, Official Website of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church—Bulgarian Patriarchate, https://bg-patriarshia.bg/news/izyavlenie-na-svetia-sinod-na-balgarskata-pravoslavna- tsarkv (accessed 31 December 2021).

[334] Bulgarian Patriarchate, “VAS Dade Hod na Zhalbata na Druzhestvo ‘Buditel’ sreshtu Sobstvenostta na BPC—BP varhu PKSHP ‘Sv. Aleksandar Nevski’ ” [The Supreme Administrative Court Started Lawsuit Filed by Buditel Society against the boc—Bulgarian Patriarchate’s Ownership over the St. Alexander Nevski Cathedral], 7 December 2015, Official Website of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church—Bulgarian Patriarchate, https:// bg-patriarshia.bg/news/vas-dade-hod-na-deloto-po-zhalbata-na-druzhestvo-buditel-sre (accessed 31 December 2021).

[335] “Pet Proekta za Remont na Hramove shte Badat Finansirani po Evroprograma za Razvitie na Selskite Rayoni” [Five Projects for the Reconstruction of Temples Will be Financed by the European Rural Development Program], Orthodox Web-Portal Dveri na Pravoslavieto, 25 October 2011, https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/ id,14027/view,article/ (accessed 31 December 2021).

[336] Elena Staridolska, “Za Hair [As Donation],” Kapital Weekly, 2 August 2013, http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2013/08/02/2115095_za_hair/ (accessed 8 December 2018).

[337] Zakonoproekt za Izmenenie i Dopalnenie na Zakona za Veroizpovedaniyata [Bill for Changes and Amendments to the Denominations Act], Narodno Sabranie na Republika Bulgaria [Bulgarian Parliament], Signature 354-01-40, Date of Submitting: 16 July 2013, Official Website of the Bulgarian Parliament, http://www.parliament.bg/bg/bills/ID/ 14489 (accessed 12 April 2019).

[338] Ibid. See also “Zakonoproekt za Izmenenie i Dopalnenie na Zakona za Veroizpovedani-yata: Motivi” [Motives for the Amendments to the Denominations Act], 16 July 2013, 1, Narodno Sabranie na Republika Bulgaria [Bulgarian Parliament], http://www.parliament .bg/bg/bills/ID/14489 (accessed 8 December 2018).

[339] Ibid, 3.

[340] Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, 26 October 2012, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri =CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN (accessed 8 December 2018).

[341] European Convention on Human Rights as Amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, http:// www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (accessed 8 December 2018).

[342] Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1991, Official Website of the Bulgarian Parliament, http://www.parliament.bg/en/const (accessed 16 January 2018).

[343] Zakon za Veroizpovedaniyata [Denominations Act], 2002, Legal Web Portal Lex.bg, http://lex.bg/laws/ldoc/2135462355 (accessed 8 December 2018).

[344] Motives, 7.

[345] Ibid., 8.

[346] Staridolska, “Za Hair [As Donation],” Kapital.

[347] See the draft law for amendments to the Religious Denominations Act.

[348] Siyana Sevova, “Taksa Smet ne e Samo za Izvozvaneto na Kilogram Bokluk [The Garbage Fee Does Not Cover Only the Transport],” Bulgarian Municipalities’ Web Portal Kmeta. bg, 3 October 2013, https://kmeta.bg/taksa-smet-ne-e-samo-za-izvozvaneto-na-kilogram -bokluk/ (accessed 31 December 2021).

[349] Staridolska, “Za Hair [As Donation],” Kapital.

[350] “Darzhavata Podaryava na Tsurkvata Sv. Aleksandar Nevski [The State Offers the St. Alexander Nevski Cathedral as a Present to the Church],” Internet Portal Data.bg, 18 July 2013, http://news.data.bg/2/bulgaria/493301/ (accessed 8 December 2018).

[351] “Plovdivskiyat Mitropolit Zove Cherkvite da ne Plashtat Taksa “Smet”” [The Metropolitan Bishop of Plovdiv Appeals to Churches Not to Pay Garbage Taxes to Municipality],” Monitor, 6 August 2015, https://www.monitor.bg/bg/a/view/77597 (accessed 29 December 2021).

[352] Motives, 8.

[353] Ibid., 7–8.

[354] David Wagschal, Law and Legality in the Greek East: The Byzantine Canonical Tradition, 381–883 (London: Oxford University Press, 2015), 132.

[355] Tsivolas, Law and Religious Cultural Heritage, 106.

[356] Ibid., 108.

[357] About the cases of different European countries see Tsivolas, Law and Religious Cultural Heritage, 125–71.

[358] Bistra Nikolova, Monashestvo, Manastiri i Manastirski Zhivot v Srednovekovna Bulgaria, [Monks, Monasteries and Monastic Life in Medieval Bulgaria] (Sofia: Alfagraf, 2010), 271.

[359] The St. Stefan Church in Istanbul has became widely known as the “Iron Church” because of its construction made of prefabricated cast iron elements.

[360] Motivi, 9.

[361] Ibid.

[362] Ibid., 7.

[363] The “Motives” do not contain any of the words “Communism”, “socialism” or “atheism” and their derivatives.

[364] Metodiev, Mezhdu Vyarata i Kompromisa, 217–32; 240–44; 313–24.

[365] The term “Liberation” is widely used in Bulagrian historiography to denote the Liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule in 1878.

[366] Bulgarian Patriarchate. “Izyavlenie na Svetiya Sinod na Bulgarskata Pravoslavna Tsurkva—Bulgarska Patriarshiya otnosno Vneseniya v Narodnoto Sabranie Zakonoproekt za Izmenenie i Dopalnenie na Zakona za Veroizpovedaniyata.”

[367] Ibid.

[368] “Neofit: Balgarskite Detsa Tryabva da Poznavat Vyarata si” [Patriarch Neofit: The Bulgarian Children Have to Know Their Faith],” News Web Portal Vesti.bg, 1

May 2013, http://www .vesti.bg/bulgaria/obshtestvo/neofit-bylgarskite-deca-triabva-da-poznavat-viarata-si- 5735031 (accessed 8 December 2018).

[369] Borislav Tsekov, “Hramovete sa na Boga, a ne na Istoricheskiya Muzey [The Temples Belong to God, Not to the Historical Museum],” 27 August 2013, Slovesni Mozayki (Borislav Tsekov’s Blog), http://www.btsekov.com/?p=2246 (accessed 8 December 2018).

[370] Doklad otnosno Zakonoproekt za Izmenenie i Dopalnenie na Zakona za Veroizpovedaniyata [Report on the Discussion of the Bill for the Amendment of the Denominations Act], No. 354-01-40, Komisiya po Pravni Vaprosi [Parliamentary Committee on Legal Matters], 17 July 2013, Official Website of the Bulgarian Parliament, http://www .parliament.bg/bg/parliamentarycommittees/members/2067/reports/ID/4261 (accessed 8 December 2018); also Doklad otnosno Zakonoproekt za Izmenenie i Dopalnenie na Zakona za Veroizpovedaniyata [Report on the Discussion of the Bill for the Amendment of the Denominations Act], No. 354-01-40, Komisiya po Veroizpovedaniyata i Parlamentarnata Etika [Parliamentary Committee on Denominations and Parliamentary Ethics], 18 July 2013, Official Website of the Bulgarian Parliament, http://www.parliament.bg/bg/parliamentar ycommittees/members/2118/reports/ID/4241/ (accessed on 8 December 2018).

[371] The history of the museum’s building is available at the official website of the National Institute of Archeology with Museum at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, http://naim .bg/bg/content/category/300/54/ (accessed 8 December 2016).

[372] “ ‘Ataka’: Sgradata na Muzeya v Kardzhali da Vleze v Zabranitelen Spisak, zashtoto Myuftiystvoto Shte ya Vzeme [Ataka Party Calls for Placing the Museum in Kardzhali under Special Regime to Prevent Its Restitution by the Muftiship],” Local News Portal Rodopi, Rodopi24.blogspot.bg, 21 July 2013, http://rodopi24.blogspot.com/2013/07/blog -post_7729.html (accessed 8 December 2018).

[373] Silviya Nikolova, “Sinodat bez Evropari, ako Vzeme Boyanskata Tsurkva [The Synod Will Receive No European Funding, if It Takes Back the Boyana Church],” Monitor Newspaper, 25 July 2013.

[374] vmro is a contemporary political party in Bulgaria that took as its name the abbreviation of a historical Bulgarian organization that fought for the liberation of Macedonia, namely the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization.

[375] “Proektozakonat za Veroizpovedaniyata Dava Pat na Radikalniya Islyam [The Draft Law on Religious Denominations Gives Green Light to Radical Islam],” Online News Portal News. bg, 23 July 2103, http://news.ibox.bg/news/id_1035217611 (accessed 8 December 2018).

[376] Doklad otnosno Zakonoproekt za Izmenenie i Dopalnenie na Zakona za Veroizpovedaniyata [Report on the Discussion of the Bill for the Amendment of the Denominations Act], No. 354-01-40, Komisiya po Kulturata i Mediite [Parliamentary Commission on Culture and Media], 24 July 2013, Official Website of the Bulgarian Parliament, http://www.parliament.bg/bg/parliamentarycommittees/members/2080/ reports/ID/4252 (accessed 8 December 2018).

[377] Nikolova, “The Synod Will Receive no European Funding.”

[378] Staridolska. “Za Hair [As Donation].”

[379] Nikolova, “The Synod Will Receive no European Funding.”

[380] Stanovishte na ban otnosno zid na Zakona za Veroizpovedaniyata, Vnesen ot Grupa Narodni Predstaviteli v NS [Statement of the Bulgarian Academy of Science Concerning the Bill for the Amendment of the Religious Denominations Act], 5 August 2013, Website of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 0ld.bas.bg/aKageMUHHu-H0BUHu/cB6uTUH/6061 (accessed 31 December 2021).

[381] “Intelektualtsi se Podpisvat protiv Tapetite v Hram Sv. Marina.”

[382] Yasen Lyutskanov, “Kesarevoto—Kesaryu, Bozhieto—Bogy” [Render unto Caesar the Things that Are Caesar’s, and unto God the Things that are God’s], Tema Magazine, (610) 5–11 August 2013, http://www.temanews.com/index.php?p=tema&iid=774&aid=i7494 (accessed 11 December 2017).

[383] Staridolska, “Za Hair [As Donation].”

[384] Lyutskanov, “Kesarevoto—Kesaryu, Bozhieto—Bogy.”

[385] Staridolska, “Za Hair [As Donation].”

[386] “Tsurkvata Nay-Setne Nameri Polititsi, Koito da y Reshtat Imotnite Vaprosi [The Church Finally Found Politicians Able to Solve Its Property Problems],” Sega Newspaper, 8 August 2013, http://www.segabg.com/article.php?id=660390 (accessed 8 December 2018).

[387] Bulgarian Patriarchate, “VAS Dade Hod na Zhalbata.”

[388] “Deputati Predlagat Darzhavna Subsidiya i za Katolicheskata Tsurkva [Members of the Parliament Propose State Also to Subsidize the Catholic Church],” Orthodox Web Portal Dveri na Pravoslavieto, 18 September 2013, http://dveri.bg/xy9hy (accessed 8 December 2018).

[389] Zakon za Izmenenie i Dopalnenie na Zakona za Mestnite Danatsi i Taksi [Amendment to the Law on Local Taxes and Fees], adopted by the Bulgarian Parliament on 7 November 2013, Darzhaven Vestnik [State Gazette], 101, 22 November 2013, http://dv.parliament.bg/ DVWeb/showMaterialDV.jsp?idMat=80402 (accessed 8 December 2018).

[390] The traditional definition of the Pomaks denotes Bulgarian-speaking Muslims residing mainly in the Rhodopes, the southern border region of Bulgaria. More recently, the identity of the Pomaks has been studied by Evgeniya Ivanova, Islyamizirani Balkani: Dinamika na Razkazite [Islamized Balkans: Dynamics of Stories] (Sofia: New Bulgarian University Press, 2014) and Fatme Myuhtar-May, Identity, Nationalism, and Cultural Heritage under Siege. Five Narratives of Pomak Heritage—From Forced Renaming to Weddings (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014).

[391] The historical origin of the Pomaks is discussed by Tsvetana Georgieva, “Pomaks: Muslim Bulgarians,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 12, 3 (2001), 303–16.

[392] Editorial, “Religiozna Identichnost na Myusyulmanite v Bulgaria [Religious Identity of Muslims in Bulgaria],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 1/169 (2009): 2.

[393] Mona Siddiqui, “Veil,” in Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 5: 412–16; see also Jean Chelhod, “Hidjab,” in EI2, 3: 359–61; Gautier H. A. Juynboll, Encyclopedia of Canonical Hadith (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 166, 433–34; Lynda Clarke, “Hijab according to the Hadith: Text and Interpretation,” in The Muslim Veil in North America: Issues and

Debates, ed. Sajida Alvi, Homa Hoodfar, and Sheila McDonough (Toronto: Women's Press, 2003), 214–86.

[394] Muqatil ibn Sulayman, Tafsir Muqatil ibn Sulayman, 5 vols. (Beirut: D ar Thy a' al-Tur a th al- Arab i, 1423/2002), 3: 364.

[395] See Abu Jafar Muhammad ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, Jami' al-Bayan 'an TaWil ay al-Qur'an, 12 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1994), 5: 419; 'Abdallah ibn 'Umar al- Baidawi, Anwar al-tanzil wa-asrar al-ta'wil (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1416/1996); Burhan al-Din al-Marghinani, al-Hidayah fi Sharh Bidayat al-Mubtad, 4 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Salam, 2000), 1 109. For more details, see Baber Johansen, "The Valorization of the Human Body in Muslim Sunni Law," in Law and Society in Islam, ed. Devin Stewart, Baber Johansen, and Amy Singer (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), 75.

[396] Barbara Stowasser, Women in the Qur'an, Traditions, and Interpretation (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 168; Judith Tucker, Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 175–99; Susan A. Spectorsky, Women in Classical Islamic Law: A Survey of the Sources (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 50; As' ad Abu Khalil, "Gender Boundaries and Sexual Categories in the Arab World," Feminist Issues 15, 1/2 (1997): 91–104; Fadwa el-Guindi, "Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic: Egypt's Contemporary Islamic Movement," Social Problems 28, 4 (1981): 465–85.

[397] Julianne Funk, "Public Expressions of Bosnian Muslim Religiosity and Lived Faith: The Cases of Friday Prayer and Hijab," in The Revival of Islam in the Balkans. From Identity to Religiosity, ed. Arolda Elbasani and Olivier Roy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 213–16.

[398] Pomaks define themselves either as Muslims—to differentiate themselves from the majority Bulgarian Christian identity—or as a Bulgarian-speaking community in contrast to ethnic Turkish Muslims. As reported by Evgeniya Ivanova, the research leader of the sociological survey "Attitudes of Muslims in Bulgaria—2011," only 26 percent of Pomaks identify themselves ethnically as "Bulgarian," while the self-identification of 69 percent is "other." About 20 percent choose Islam as an ethnic marker. The survey is published in: Ivanova, Islyamizirani Balkani, 226–54, see also 130, 176.

[399] Mary Neuburger makes the observation that the Muftiship, in its post-1989 newspaper "Muslims," provides no women represented without veiled hair and necks. See Mary

Neuburger, “Re-Dressing of Bulgarian Muslim Women, 1878–1989,” in Anti- Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, Modernism and the Politics of Dress, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 263.

[400] Mary Neuburger, The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 118.

[401] Stoyu Shishkov, “Rodopskite Pomatsi [The Rhodope Pomaks],” Rodopski napreduk 8–9 (1911): 209–14.

[402] Baggy trousers made of colourful flowery fabrics that extended down to the ankle.

[403] See Neuburger, The Orient Within, 119–25.

[404] Behar Sadriu, for example, mentions that the full face-veil (Alb. pege /ferexhe) was also practiced among some Muslim women in Kosovo until the middle of the twentieth century (Behar Sadriu, “Rhetorical Strategies of Kosovo’s Imams in the Fight for Women’s Rights,” in The Revival of Islam in the Balkans, 189). Andreja Mesaric also considers in her study the practice of full covering of Bosnian Muslim women and points out that face veiling had been practiced by certain sections of Bosnian society well into the twentieth century. It first started declining under Habsburg rule (1878–1918) but only disappeared from practice in the 1950s. See Andreja Mesaric, “Muslim Women’s Dress Practices in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Localizing Islam through Everyday Lived Practice,” in The Revival of Islam in the Balkans, 108–9.

[405] Response to my questions, e-mail communication, 8 February 2017.

[406] See Mihail Gruev and Alexey Kalyonski, Vuzroditelniyat Protses: Myusyulmanskite Obsht- nosti i Komunisticheskiyat Rezhim [The Revival Process: Muslim Communities and the Communist Regime] (Sofia: Ciela, 2008).

[407] “Borba za Razferedzyavane [Struggle for Removing the Feredzhe],” Myusyulmani 4/208 (2012): 7.

[408] Muhammed Kamber, personal communication during a fieldtrip, April 2016.

[409] Hatije Tiber, personal communication, 15 April 2016.

[410] Personal Skype conversation with Hatije Tiber, 12 December 2016.

[411] Hatije Tiber’s Blog, http://muslimabg.blogspot.com (accessed 14 August 2018).

[412] Hatije Tiber, “Moyat Purvi Hijab [My First Hijab],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 12 (2014): 12–3.

[413] Ibid., 13.

[414] Laura J. Olson, “The Multiple Voices of Bulgaria’s Unofficial Islamic Leaders,” in The Revival of Islam in the Balkans, 122.

[415] Personal Skype conversation with Hatije Tiber, 15 December 2016.

[416] Gyulgyun Saitova, “Suvremennata Zhena v Islyama [Contemporary Woman in Islam],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar, 8/98 (2000): 5.

[417] Ibid.

[418] Emine Sheima, “Pravata na Zhenata spored Islyama [Women’s Rights in Islam],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar, 3/81 (February, 1999): 7; Mustafa Alish Hadji, “Zhenata v Islyama [The Woman in Islam],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 1/126 (2005): 10; Sadia Akhtar, “Progres ili Potisnichestvo? Islyam ili Svoboda [Progress or oppression? Islam or Freedom?],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 5/95 (May, 2000): 6; Hasan Mustanski, “Zhenata v Islyamskata Religia [The woman in the Muslim faith],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 7/151 (2007): 13.

[419] “Myastoto na Zhenata v Islyama [The place of women in Islam],” Myusyulmani 9 (September, 2014): 5.

[420] Hanife Musa, “Zhenata—Pazitelka na Doma i Semeyniya Uyut [The Woman—a Guardian of Home and Family Comfort],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 9/213

(2012): 6. See also Eyyub Ensar, “Dobroto Otnoshenie kum Zhenite [The Good Attitude towards Women],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 12/89 (November, 1999): 9.

[421] Saitova, “Suvremennata Zhena v Islyama,” 5.

[422] Hatije Ismail, “Islyamsko Semeino Pravo [Islamic Family Law],” Myusyulmani/ Muslumanlar 7/97 (July, 2000): 8.

[423] Safa Saigali, “Raboteshtata Zhena-Maika i Vuzpitanieto na Detsata [The Working Mother and the Nurturing of Children], Myusyulmani newspaper, 4 (94), April 2000.

[424] Vedat Ahmed, “Priema se na Eks Nov Semeen Kodeks [A New Family Code is Passed Very Quickly],” Myusyulmani 12/168 (2008): 4.

[425] Bulgarian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, “Family code”, https://www.mlsp.governm ent.bg/eng/legislation-1 (accessed 23 December 2021).

[426] “Zenata v Zapadnata Tsivilizatsiya [Woman in Western Civilization],” Myusyulmani/ Muslumanlar 11/88 (October, 1999): 6.

[427] Mustafa Alish Hadzhi, “Zhenata v Islyama [The Woman in Islam],” Myusyulmani/ Muslumanlar 1/126 (2005): 10.

[428] Ibid.

[429] “Islyamut Gree nad Rodopite: Intervyu s Aydin Mohammed—Rayonen Myuftiya na Gotse Delchev [Islam Shines over the Rhodopes: Interview with Aydin Mohammed, Regional Mufti of Gotse Delchev],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 4/136 (2006): 3.

[430] Ibid.

[431] Kristen Ghodsee, Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe: Gender, Ethnicity and the Transformation of Islam in Postsocialist Bulgaria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 172.

[432] Here, I use “judicial” in the sense of Islamic jurisprudence, and not of secular law.

[433] Editorial, “Kakvo Moje da Uchi Zhenata [What Can a Woman Study],” Myusyulmani/ Muslumanlar 10/87, (September, 1999): 7.

[434] The woman cannot become a judge and deal with criminal cases “because her nature is more compassionate and merciful rather than strong and hard”, as explained in an editorial. See Myusyulmani 8/113 (November, 2002): 3. Such sharta-based instructions differ from other Islamic interpretations of the issue, however, despite the diversity of opinions, they reach the same conclusion. For instance, the President of the High Judicial Council of Saudi Arabia stated that women are unfit to serve as judges because this would grant women undeserved authority (wilaya) over men (“Ma‘ Samahat al-Shaykh ‘Abd Allah bin Hamid,” al-Tawhid, Rabi‘ al-Awwal 1396/March 1976, 13).

[435] Editorial, Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 8/113 (November, 2002): 3.

[436] “Zhenata, za Koyato shte se Zhenite [The woman you will marry],” Myusyulmani/ Muslumanlar 2/182 (2010): 10. See also Esin Tyudjjar, “Izbor na Saprug/a [Choosing a Spouse],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 10/226 (2013): 8.

[437] Hasibe Turan, “Religioznostta na Zhenata i Otrazhenieto y Vurhu Obshtestvoto [Woman’s Religiosity and Its Impact on Society],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 1 (2015): 4.

[438] Skype conversation with Hatije Tiber, December 2016.

[439] Hatije Ali Ibrahim, “Islyamskoto Obleklo za Zhenata [Islamic Clothing for Women],” Myusyulmani 5/95 (May, 2000): 9.

[440] Ibid.

[441] Ibid.

[442] Saitova, “Suvremennata Zhena v Islyama,” 5.

[443] For more details about the French public positions on the necessity to limit religious freedom in secular contexts, see Valeri Amiraux, “The Headscarf Question: What is really the Issue?,” in European Islam: Challenges for Society and Public Policy, ed. Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur, and Michael Emerson (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2007)424–43; John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007); Joan W. Scott, “Symptomatic Politics. The Banning of Islamic Headscarves in French Public Schools,” French Politics, Culture & Society 23/3 (2005): 106–27. The headscarf issue as an example of the struggle over the control and interpretation of symbols is discussed by Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 9, 90–91. See also Joan W. Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[444] However, no changes in the legislation banning all religious symbols in schools were formally made. The official opinion of the Ministry of Education is that the issue of religious symbols in public schools is considered in the context of the Law on National Education stating that there shall be no privileges or restrictions of rights on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnic belonging, sex, social origin, religion, or social status. See Focus Information Agency, “Ministerstvo na Obrazovanieto: Religiozni Simvoli, koito Protivorechat na Tselite na Obrazovanieto, Sledva da Budat Ogranichavani v Suvremennoto Uchilishte [The Ministry of Education: Religious Symbols, which Contradict the Objectives of Education, Must Be Restricted at the Contemporary School],” Written Answer of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Science to Focus Information Agency with Reference to the Headscarf Affair in Bulgarian Public Schools, 30 May 2012, http://focus-news.net/opinion/0000/00/00/21351/ (accessed 10 January 2018).

[445] For more details, see Kristen Ghodsee, Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe, 176–82.

[446] “Myuftiystvoto shte se oplakva na Poslanicite na ES” [The Mufti’s Office Will Refer Complaints to EU Ambassadors],” Sega Newspaper, 1 August 2006, 4.

[447] Ismail Chaushev, “Islyamut kato Stil i Nachin na Povedenie: Intervyu s Hussein Hafuzov, Glaven Sekretar na Glavno Myuftiistvo [Islam as a style and manner of conduct: Interview with Hussein Hafuzov, Secretary-General of the Chief Muftiship],” Myusyulmani/ Muslumanlar 11/143 (2006): 3.

[448] Ten years after this case, Muhammed Kamber also expressed in a conversation during my field work in April 2016 his anxiety over the current situation of administrative restrictions though there is no formal ban of headscarves or religious symbols in schools. He

admits that many young Muslim women prefer to wear the hijab and to remain without education, if they are faced with the choice to de-veil.

[449] Vedat Ahmed, “Farut na Myusyulmanskoto Tselomudrie—Hidzhabut [The Light of Muslim Chastity—the Hijab],” Myusyulmani/Muslumanlar 11/143 (2006): 9.

[450] Ibid.

[451] Ibid.

[452] Approximately 150 Euros.

[453] See more at News.bg: “Pazardzik Zabrani Burkite [Pazardzhik Has Banned the Burqa],” https://news.bg/regions/pazardzhik-zabrani-burkite.html (accessed 18 November 2018). Before the approval of nationwide “burqa ban” twelve Muslim women were fined in Pazardzik in the period May-October 2016. See Nikolay Spasov. “Burkite sa na Put da skarat Kmeta i Obshtinskite Suvetnitsi v Pazardzik [The Burqas Cause a Dispute between the Mayor and the Municipal Councillors in Pazardzhik],” Trud Newspaper, 25 October 2016.

[454] Bulgarian Parliament, http://www.parliament.bg/bills/43/654-01-58.pdf (accessed 21 March 2018).

[455] “Glavnoto Myuftiistvo: Zabranata za Nosene na Burki Mozhe da Ogranichi Pravata na Myusyulmanite [The Chief Muftiship: The Burqa Ban May Limit the Rights of Muslims],” Dnevnik, 4 May 2016, http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2016/05/04/2754034_glavnoto _mjuftiistvo_zabranata_za_nosene_na_burki_moje/ (accessed 19 October 2018).

[456] Protocol of the Committee Meeting, 26.05.2016, 43rd Bulgarian Parliament, http://www .parliament.bg/bg/parliamentarycommittees/members/2331/steno/ID/4245, (accessed 11 July 2018).

[457] Kameliya Tsvetanova, “Kray na Burkite v Bulgaria—Litseto na Pokaz [End of the Burqas in Bulgaria—Face Must be Seen],” Dnes.bg, 15 June 2016,

http://www.dnes.bg/politika/2016/ 06/15/krai-na-burkite-v-bylgariia-liceto-na-pokaz.305812 (accessed 16 October 2018).

[458] Kristen Ghodsee (Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe, 162) makes the same observations: “When the ‘Arab style’ first started appearing more widely in 2005, I saw young women in Rudozem wearing the niqab (a face veil that shows only the eyes) as well as three girls dressed head to toe in matching white headscarves and gowns”.

[459] The law “bans wearing in public clothing that partially (mouth, nose or eyes) or completely covers the face”. According to the law, clothes hiding the face may not be worn in government offices, schools, cultural institutions and places of public recreation, but exceptions are allowed for health or professional reasons. Infringements carry fines of 200 leva (102 eur), rising to 1.500 (767 eur) leva for repeated offences. Darzhaven Vestnik [State Gazette], 80 (11 October 2016): 2, http://dv.parliament.bg/DVWeb/broeveList.faces, (accessed 23 November 2018).

[460] They were expelled from mrf for what it considered an excessively pro-Turkish government stance. For more details see Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, “Movement for Rights and Freedoms Chairman Mestan relieved from post, expelled from Party,” 24 December 2015, http://www.bta.bg/en/c/DF/id/1239526, (accessed 6 February 2019).

[461] Abbreviation of Demokrati za Otgovornost, Svoboda i Tolerantnost (Democrats for Responsibility, Freedom and Tolerance). The name of the new party was deliberately designed, so its abbreviation corresponds to the Turkish word dost (“friend”).

[462] Kristen Ghodsee, Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe, 178.

[463] Now Vice-president of the newly established dost party.

[464] See the verbatim report of the plenary session on 30 September 2016, 43rd Bulgarian Parliament, http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ns/51/ID/5704 (accessed 16 February 2018).

[465] Ibid.

[466] Ibid.

[467] Neuburger, The Orient Within, 116.

[468] Vedat Ahmed, “130-Godishnata Borba za ‘Sublichane’ na Myusyulmankata v Bulgaria [130 Years of Struggle for ‘Undressing’ the Muslim Woman in Bulgaria],” Myusyulmani/ Muslumanlar 12/264 (2016): 14–5.

[469] Ibid., 14.

[470] Ibid., 15.

[471] Bozhidar Alexiev, “Rodopskoto Naselenie v Bulgarskata Humanitaristika [The Population of the Rhodopes in Bulgarian Human Sciences]”, in Sudbata na Myusulmanskite Obshtnosti na Balkanite [The Fate of Muslim Communities in the Balkans], ed. Antonina Zhelyazkova (Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1997), 57–112; Evangelos Karagiannis, Zur Ethnzitat der Pomaken Bulgariens (Munster: Iit Verlag, 1997). Evgenia Krasteva-Blagoeva and Goran Blagoev, “Identichnost i Religiya: Balgarite Myusyulmani [Identity and Religion: Bulgarian Muslims],” Bulgarska Etnologiya 1 (2003): 44–54. Mihail Gruev, “Balgaromyusyulmanski (Pomashki) Identichnosti—Opit za Tipologizatsiya [Bulgarian-Muslim (Pomak) Identities— An Attempt for Typologization],” in Etnicheski i Kulturni Prostranstva na Balkanite. Sbornik v Chest na Professor Tsvetana Georgieva [Ethnic and Cultural Spaces in the Balkans. A Volume in Honor of Professor Tsvetana Georgieva], ed. Svetlana Ivanova, vol. 2 (Sofia: Sofia University Press, 2008), 335–54. Kristen Ghodsee, “Symphonic Secularism. Eastern Orthodoxy, Ethnic Identity and Religious Freedoms in Contemporary Bulgaria,” Anthropology of EasternEurope Review, 27 (2) (2009): 227–52; idem, Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe. Gender, Ethnicity and the Transformation of Islam in Postsocialist Bulgaria, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). Evgenia Troeva, Religiya, Pamet, Identichnost: Bulgarite Myuysulmani [Religion, Memory, Identity: The Bulgarian Muslims] (Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 2011); idem, “ ‘Traditsionen’ i ‘Nov’ Islyam v Bulgaria [‘Traditional’ and ‘New’ Islam in Bulgaria],” Bulgarski Folklor [BulgarianFolklore] 38, No. 3–4, (2012): 5–23.

[472] Troeva, Religiya, Pamet, Identichnost, 7.

[473] Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

[474] Kristen Ghodsee, “Symphonic Secularism,” 228.

[475] See “Recommendation cm/Rec(2008)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the dimension of religions and non-religious convictions within intercultural education (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 December 2008 at the 1044th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Europe […] The Committee of Ministers Considering the provisions of its Recommendation Rec (2002)12 on education for democratic citizenship in which the Committee of Ministers states that—that education for democratic citizenship is a factor for social cohesion, mutual understanding, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, and solidarity. […] Bearing in mind the Wroclaw Declaration on fifty years of European cultural co-operation (10 December 2004) which underlined the importance of systematically encouraging intercultural and inter-religious dialogue based on the primacy of common values, as a means of promoting awareness and understanding of each other, preventing conflicts, promoting reconciliation and ensuring the cohesion of society, through formal and non-formal education [.]” Recommendation cm/Rec(2008)12 of the Committee of Ministers. Last modified 10 December 2008, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1386911&Site=CM (accessed 1 November 2018). On the Toledo Guidelines and the relevant case-law of European and United Nations human rights bodies as well as the key guiding principles relating to re in state schools, see Carolyn Evans, “Religious Education in Public Schools: An International Human Rights Perspective,” Human Rights Review 8, 3 (2008): 449–73.

[476] At this point, a series of vital issues come to the fore that include protecting public education and equal access to it irrespective of gender, economic status etc., ascertaining the standards of private education through accountable and competent public institutions, maintaining standards in state education, ensuring that the kind and degree of autonomy of private education in curricula and elsewhere, is properly monitored, especially in primary and secondary education. There are also numerous other matters related to whether citizens are given equal opportunities through education, the future of education and society in countries with neoliberal economic frameworks, the impact of commercialized education on the rest of the world or the kinds of discrimination and postcolonial dependencies on the level of Human Resources generated through education. A shocking example is afforded by African countries where, though the general population is impoverished to an extreme degree and vulnerable to numerous diseases, access to secondary and tertiary education is a privatized good enjoyed by the privileged few. See N. V. Vargeese, Private Higher Education in Africa, International Institute for Educational Planning (iiep), Geneva: unesco, 2004.

[477] Serious questions are posed by the young female students from various European states (known as isis brides) who had partaken of European education and culture but were conscripted through virtual—for the most part—religious propaganda and secretly abandoned their European homes in search of an ideal “Islamic Caliphate.” The inadequacy of state or private religious education in forming a critical religious attitude in potentially freethinking future European citizens was thus demonstrated. They also disclose an inability to manage religious diversity and protect underage persons from extremist ideologies and

draw attention to the impact of virtual cultures. Michael Humphrey, “From Diaspora Islam to Globalised Islam,” in Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 107–23, as well as 114–15 on the de-culturalisation and re-Islamization, victimhood and virtual umma.

[478] See Marios Koukounaras Liagkis and Angeliki Ziaka, “Religious Education in Greece-Orthodox Christianity, Islam and Secularism,” European Journal of Social Sciences, Education and Research 5, 1 (2015): 44–53. On the recent changes and debates concerning re and ire in Greece, see Angeliki Ziaka and Marios Koukounaras Liagkis, “Islamic Religious Education and Teaching About Islam in Greece,” in Islamic Religious Education in Europe: A Comparative Study, ed. Leni Franken and Bill Gent (New York: Routledge, 2021), 162–178.

[479] Ibid., 44–5.

[480] I would like to thank my colleague in Sociology of Religion, Niki Papageorgiou, for her patience in reviewing the theoretical part of this article and helping me clarify some conceptual ambiguities.

[481] Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 50, 52.

[482] Jurgen Habermas, Sara Lennox and Frank Lennox, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964),” in New German Critique 3 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1974): 49.

[483] During the editorial process, Dale Eickelman has observed that the “Solidarity” movement in Poland (1980) suggests that religion never left the Polish public sphere, and the same goes for the role of liberation theology in Latin America. What wasn’t changing were the simplistic versions of “modernization theory” in the social sciences, perhaps too in the thrall of policy makers. Ole Riis, “Religion Re-Emerging: The Role of Religion in Legitimating Integration and Power in Modern Societies,” International Sociology 13, 2 (1998): 249–72.

[484] Grace Davie demonstrates that secularism does not necessarily entail the marginalization of religion to the private sphere, nor even a decrease in religious practice. See Grace Davie, Sociology of Religion (London: Sage, 2007), 224–43.

[485] An electronic search with the terms “Islamization of Europe” reveals an abundance of material fraught with neologisms and intense Islamophobic emotions, such as the term “Eurabia.” Statistics featured in Islamic websites on the “Fertility Rate for Muslims vs. Non-Muslims” in Europe enjoy high visibility along with other conspiratorial topics that create fear, uncertainty and conflict among readers. Most of these websites come near the top of search engine results and literally bombard individual readers, whilst many of these neologisms appear on websites, such as Wikipedia, which thus establishes their use and gives them legitimacy. (See for example the Wikipedia article on “Eurabia,” last modified May 16, 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurabia (accessed 29 Nov. 2016). On the notions of re-Islamization and victimhood in migrant Muslim communities, see also Michael Humphrey, “From Diaspora Islam to Globalised Islam,” in Islam and Political Violence. Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 107–23.

[486] On these new antagonisms and “the multiple ways in which the public sphere can be made transculturally feasible by encompassing the evolution of non-Western societies in which religion plays a vital role” see Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman, eds., Public Islam and the Common Good (Leiden: Brill, 2006). See also Daniel Bell, “The Return of the Sacred: The Argument about the Future of Religion,” Journal of Religion and Science 13, 3 (1978): 187–208.

[487] Maurits Berger, “Education in Islam for All. The Leiden Islam Academy” (paper presented at the International Scientific Conference Intercultural Religious Education and Islamic Studies. Challenges and Prospects in Greece and Europe, Kavala, October 10–11, 2015) in Intercultural Religious Education and Islamic Studies: Challenges and Prospects in Greece, Europe, USA, edited by Angeliki Ziaka (Athens: Maistros, 2016), 313–33. See also Maurits Berger, A Brief History of Islam in Europe. Thirteen Centuries of Creed, Conflict and CoExistence (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2014) and especially the last chapter where Berger contends that “Europe is still seeking a balance between the new freedoms for all, and the right to be different for particular communities.” For a brief legal presentation on Religious Education in Austria, see Georg Konigsberger and Louis Kubarth, “Religious Education in Austria,” in The Routledge International Handbook of Religious Education, ed. Derek H. Davis and Elena Miroshnikova (London: Routledge, 2013), 32–37. France, a country with a clear separation of state and religion, restarted a public debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s on the need to reintroduce religion in state schools, mainly as means of developing cultural awareness and of exploring “religious issues” connected to the role of religion in the shaping of the world civilizations, a field on which French students seemed to be weak due to the tradition of laicite. Later in the first years of the 21st century, the French Ministry of Education reignited the debate with a document entitled “Teaching religious facts in a laistic school.” See Anna van den Kerchove, “Teaching about Religions within the Renewed Laistic System in France,” Pedagogiek 33, 2 (2013): 153–65.

[488] See Berger, “Islam Education for All. The Leiden Islam Academy.” By “national ramifications” we mean those antagonisms that are immanent in various religious

institutions that pose as mediators of the “upright and authentic” faith and identity. Within Muslim communities, there is an antagonism between the representatives of “authentic” and “European” Islam, the latter expressed either through Salafism or Turkish Islam and their private religious institutions in several European countries.

[489] Nikos Maghioros, “Religious Education in Greece,” in The Routledge International Handbook of Religious Education, ed. Derek H. Davis and Elena Miroshnikova (London: Routledge, 2013), 130–37; Marios Koukounaras Liagkis, “Religious Education in Greece: A New Curriculum, an Old Issue,” British Journal of Religious Education 37, 2 (2015): 153–69.

[490] Paul Brodersen, “Religious Education in Denmark,” Religious Education, 24 (1929): 518–21. This article echoes slightly older Danish attitudes to re in public schools.

[491] Jenny Berglund, “Swedish Religion Education: Objective but Marinated in Lutheran Protestantism?” Temenos 49, 2 (2013): 165–84.

[492] See Emmanuel Clapsis, Orthodoxy in Conversation. Orthodox Ecumenica Engagements (Geneva: wcc, 2000) and Idem, “O AiaSpnaKeiaKo; AiaXoYo; Kai n nayxoayia awr^a [Interreligious Dialogue and Universal Salvation],” Theologia 84, 2 (2013): 81–104. George Martzelos, “H 6eoXoY^a tou anep^aTiKou Xoyou Kai n an^aala Tn; yia tou; SsoXoyikou; Kai SiaSpnaKeiaKou; SiaXoYOu; [The Theology of Seminal Reason and Its Importance for Theological and Interreligious Dialogues],” Theologia 84, 2 (2013): 69–80.

[493] Ioannis Petrou, “Modern Democracy and Religion,” Culture and Research (e-Journal of the School of Theology of auth) 2 (2013): 77–78, http://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/culres (accessed 14 December 2017). Ioannis Petrou, tdpqaxzia Kai Koivowa [Religion and Society] (Thessaloniki: Barbounakis, 2012), 281–83. Stavros Yangazoglou, “Religious Diversity and Intercultural Dimension of Religious Education in Greece Today” (Paper Presented at the International Scientific Conference Intercultural Religious Education and Islamic Studies. Challenges and Prospects in Greece and Europe, Kavala, October 10–11, 2015), in Intercultural Religious Education and Islamic Studies: Challenges and Prospects in Greece, Europe, USA, 89–100.

[494] Yangazoglou, “Religious Diversity and Intercultural Dimension of Religious Education.”

[495] “H KaTapYn^n tou XpiaroKevTpiKou ^aS^aro; t’jjv 0pn<7KeuTiKwv Kai n eiaaywy^ Tn; noz.uSpn’Kda; aro sMyviKC- ayoXeta [The Abolition of Christ-Centered re and the

Introduction of Pan-Religion in the Greek School],” 0pn<rKeuTiKa Blog (re Blog), http://thriskeftika.blogspot.gr/2015/12/blog-post_21.html (accessed 3 December 2017).The same blogger, among others, turned against the creation of an Islamic Studies strand in the School of Theology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. He associates the establishment of this strand with a maniacally persistent endeavour to impose the “pan-religious educational model in primary and secondary education through the proposed Curriculum for re in Primary and Secondary School despite the reactions, including those of the Holy Community of Athos.” This evinces that “these designs are systematically and methodically expanding not only to Primary and Secondary but also to Tertiary Education.” See “Yno^vn^a KaSnynT) HpaKM) PepaKn ayeTiKa ^e Tnv ano^aon ^8puon; MouoouX^aviKwv SnouSwv oTn ©eoXoyiK) SyoX) An© [Memorandum of Prof. Herakles Rerakis on the Decision to Found Muslim Studies in the School of Theology of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki],” Petheol Blog, http://www.petheol.gr/nea/ekpaideutikanea/ypomnemakathegeteeraklererakeschetikametenapophaseidrysesmousoulmanikonspoudonstetheologikescholeapth (accessed 3 Dec. 2018).

[496] In this case, some metropolitan bishops, catechetical organizations and other Christian “circles” as well as right-wing and far right-wing politicians championed the catechetical character of Religious Education. Left-wing political forces were partly—and mainly at the beginning of their governance—in favor of abolishing Religious Education altogether or else of promoting re as the “Study of Religions.”

[497] See Committee of Experts, “AvaoKeu) twv EniKp^ewv evavdov tou Neou npoypa^^aTo; SnouSwv yiaTa ©pnaKeuTiKa Tou An^oTiKou Kai Tou Fvpatdov [Refutation of the Objections to the New Religious Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Education],” in Ta Qpn^KEUTiKa aTO Zvyxpovo tyo^® [Religious Education in the Contemporary School], edited by Stavros Yangazoglou, Athanasios Nevrokoplis and Georgios Striligkas (Athens: Armos, 2013), 37–58.

[498] Ibid.

[499] Bishop of Messenia Chryssostomos, “Eia^Yn°n Yla Ta ©pnaKeuriKa arn AiapK^ lepa SuvoSo rn; ExxXnala; rn; E/A’iSo; [A Motion on Religious Education to the Standing Holy Synod of the Church of Greece],” in Ta OpncKSUTiKa aTO Xvyxpovo tyo^® [Religious Education in the Contemporary School], 175–82.

[500] Apostolos Lakasas “KoKKivn rpa^^^ Ta ©pn^KeuTiKa [Red Line—the Lesson of Religion],” Kathimerini Newspaper, 21 November 2016, http://www.kathimerini.gr/875680/article/ epikairothta/ellada/kokkinh-grammh-ta-8rhskeytika (accessed 30 November 2018).

[501] Operational Program “Education and Lifelong Learning”, New School, New Religious Education Curricula for Secondary Education (Gymnasium). Co-Financed by Greece and the European Union (2007–2013), Athens: Institute of Educational Policy (iep), see 1st Class, 2011, 33, http://www.iep.edu.gr/index.php/el/menu-erga/menu-co-financed/554 -thriskeftika-neo-10 (accessed 1 November 2018).

[502] Angelos Vallianatos, “1st Regional Debate on ‘The religious Dimension of Intercultural Education’,” in Council of Europe Program, Athens, October 8–9, 2007.

[503] Pantelis Kalaitzidis, “OpSoSoijiaKai Aia^wTiapo;. To Z^Tnpa Tn; AveijiSpnaxeia; [Orthodoxy and Enlightenment: The Issue of Religious Freedom],” in Orthodoxy and Modernity, ed. Pantelis Kalaitzidis (Athens: Indiktos, 2006), 80–1.

[504] Lina Molokotos-Liederman, “The Impact of the Crisis on the Orthodox Church of Greece: a Moment of Challenge and Opportunity?” Religion, State and Society, 44, 1 (2016): 32–50.

[505] On the origins of the mode of intellectual inquiry within French universities see Francois Boespflug, Frangoise Dunand and Jean-Paul Willaime, Pour une Memoire des Religions (Paris: La Decouverte, 1996).

[506] Shadi Mokhtari, “The New Politics of Human Rights in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy, October 30, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/30/the-new-politics-of-human-rights-in-the-middle-east/ (accessed 15 November 2018). See also Emel Akgali (ed.), Neoliberal Governmentality and the Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), and especially the contribution of Katerina Dalacoura on “Islamism and Neoliberalism in the Aftermath of Uprisings: The Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt and Nahda in Tunisia,” 61–83, where she critically demonstrates the relationship between Islamism and Neoliberalism. For a critical reading on the understanding of Human Rights by Samuel Moyn, see Robin Blackburn, “Reclaiming Human Rights,” New Left Review 69, 3 (2011): 126–38.

[507] On Muslim minority education and the operation of two madrassas in Thrace, see Marios Koukounaras Liagkis and Angeliki Ziaka, “Religious Education,” in Greece—Orthodox Christianity, Islam and Secularism, 45–53.

[508] The appointment of imams was announced with Law 3536/2007 but remained on paper until 2013 with Law 4115/2013, article 53 (Government Gazette (fek) No. 24/30-1-2013), entitled “Teachers of Religion of the Muslim Minority of Thrace, and the Improvement

of Education for Muslim Children in the Public Schools of Thrace.” On the political strife that erupted following the implementation of the Law, see Angelos Athanassopoulos, “H Tpo^oXoY^a yia tou; i^a^n§^; Six«Z£i Tnv Ku|3epvn<Tn [The Law Amendment on Imams Divides the Government],” To Vima newspaper, 15 January 2013, http://www.tovima.gr/ politics/article/?aid=493019, (accessed 15 November 2018). See also his more recent article “AYpio napaoK^vio yia Ti; 4^?ou; Tn; ^eiovornTa; [Ruthless Campaigning Behind Scenes for Minority Votes],” To Vima newspaper, 24 January 2014, https://www.tovima.gr/2015/01/ 23/politics/agrio-paraskinio-gia-tis-psifoys-tis-meionotitas (accessed 15 February 2019).

[509] Stamatis Sakelion, “H OpSoSo^a ex£i ^aKpatavn <7U|j|3ta<7n He TOv Kooyo Tou loXa^ [Orthodoxy and Its Longstanding Symbiosis with the World of Islam],” Avgi Newspaper, 1 June 2015, http://www.avgi.gr/article/5578100/aggeliki-ziaka-ep-kathigitria-theologi kis-apth-i-orthodoxia-exei-makraioni-sumbiosi-me-ton-kosmo-tou-islam (accessed 12 November 2018).

[510] The program was seen positively by the School of Theology at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, which systematically promotes an open and dialogical theology and which has included the teaching and study of religions and interfaith dialogue in its curriculum for many decades.

[511] The program’s homepage is http://religiouseduthraki.web.auth.gr/ (accessed 15 February 2019).

[512] Stamatis Sakellion, “SYPIZA EKM PoSonn;: H^ep^Sa yiaTn ^siovotik^ EKnaJSsu’n [syriza ekm Rodopis: One-Day Conference on Minority Education],” avgi Newspaper, 13 March 2013, http://www.avgi.gr/article/109502/suriza-ekm-rodopis-imerida-gia-ti-meionotiki -ekpaideusi (accessed 14 November 2018).

[513] Esra Bulut, “ ‘Friends, Balkans, Statesmen, Lend Us Your Ears’: The Trans-State and State in Links between Turkey and the Balkans,” Ethnopolitics 5, 3 (2006): 309–26.

[514] For an account which corresponds to our own line of inquiry on the case of Bulgaria, home to the largest Muslim minority in the Balkans, see Simeon Evstatiev and Plamen Makariev, “Islam and Religious Education in Bulgaria: Local Traditions vis-a-vis Global Change,” in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 2, ed. Jorgen Nielsen et al. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 635–61; Daniela Kalkandjieva, “ ‘Secular Orthodox Christianity’ versus ‘Religious Islam’ in Post-Communist Bulgaria,” Religion, State & Society 36, 4 (2008), 423–34; also Anna Krasteva, “Religion, Politics, and Nationalism

in Postcommunist Bulgaria: Elastic (Post)Secularism," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 21, 4 (2015): 422–45.

[515] Angeliki Ziaka, La Recherche Grecque Contemporaine et I'Islam, Ph.D. Dissertation, Strasbourg 2002, 106–220. See also my "Re-articulating a Christian Muslim Understanding. Gennadios Scholarios and George Amiroutzis on Islam," in Christianity and Religious Plurality: Studies in Church History, vol. 51, ed. Charlotte Methuen, Andrew Spicer and John Wolffe. Boydell and Brewer: New York, 2015, 150–65.

[516] Much can be said about the affinity of Pomak language with Bulgarian and about their respective national narratives, but these issues fall outside the scope of the present paper. See Vemund Aarbake, "Pomak Language Usage and the Spell of Nationalism: The Case of the Pomaks in Greece," Slavia Islamica: Language, Religion and Identity, Slavic Eurasian studies, no. 25, ed. Robert D. Greenberg, Motoki Nomachi, (Slavic Research Center: Hokkaido University, 2012), 149–77.

[517] "The emergence of new nation states also relied, particularly in the case of Greece, on collective memories and traditions about lost homelands, resistance to the efforts of Islamisation, the Orthodox faith's contribution to the preservation of Greek literature, language, culture, and identity" (Molokotos-Liederman, "The Impact of the Crisis on the Orthodox Church of Greece"). The consensus seems to be that the Greek state is a case in point in the matter of the secularization process—see E. Prodromou, "Democracy and Religious Transformation in Greece: An Underappreciated Theoretical and Empirical Primer," in The Orthodox Church in a Changing World, ed. P. Kitromilides and T. Veremis (Athens: eliamep), 99–153; Liagkis and Ziaka, "Religious Education in Greece," 45.

[518] There are several publications on the operation of the Office of Mufti and its jurisdiction, the application of shari'a law in a European country, the antagonisms between Greece and Turkey for the appointment of the Mufti, the Mufti's powers on a legal and economic level and its role in managing, with the accordance of the managing committee, the vaklf (Turkish, from Arabic waqf—land belonging to Islamic religious authorities foundation, charitable trust) land properties. On the vakfs see the Greek Law 3647/2008. For English language publications (the material in Greek is far more varied and contradictory) see Konstantinos Tsitselikis, Old and New Islam: From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers (Leiden and Boston: Brill, Nijhoff, 2012); Angeliki Ziaka, "Greece: Debate and Challenges," in Applying Shari'a in the West: Facts, Fears and the Future of Islamic Rules on Family Relations in the West, ed. Maurits Berger (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2013), 125–38; Liagkis and Ziaka, "Religious Education in Greece," 50.

[519] Ziaka, "Greece: Debate and Challenges," 125–38.

[520] Kristin Fabbe, “Historical Legacies, Modern Conflicts: State Consolidation and Religious Pluralism in Greece and Turkey,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 13, 3 (2013): 435.

[521] This chapter has evolved from a collaboration between the authors and the Bulgarian team resulting from Ivan Zabaev’s participation in the workshop “Religion and the Public Sphere” (Sofia, 2–5 July 2013). Otherwise, the chapter was prepared within the project “Russian Orthodox Church in the Public Sphere: Deprivatization of Religion in Contemporary Russia” made with the grant support of an Institute for Public Planning in 2014 (inop).

[522] According to Casanova, modern polity should be regarded as consisting of three arenas— state, political society and civil society, all having public sphere as a constitutive element. Public religions, correspondingly, may exist in each arena in relevant forms: (a) as church at the state level, (b) as a political party or political movement, mobilized against other religious or secular movements, in the arena of political society, and (c) in the form of public action in the arena of civil society. As far as modern anticlerical contestations have weakened, there is no need for churches to mobilize laity in social and political movements. This way of public action compatible with modernity and its liberal values Casanova calls the “entering of the religion into undifferentiated public sphere of civil society” (Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, 1st ed, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 55–61). Casanova does not give the strict definition of the term “undifferentiated civil society”, but—according to his arguments and the empirical evidence in his research— he speaks about public action and public communication of religious communities, faithbased organizations, religious movements, and networks usually aimed at changes in the societies in which they are embedded.

[523] Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, 218–19.

[524] Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Sphere: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996); Jurgen Habermas, “Notes on Post-Secular Society,” New Perspectives Quarterly 25, 4 (2008): 1729; idem., “Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the ‘Public Use of Reason’ by Religious and Secular Citizens,” in Between Naturalism and Religion, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 114–47; Cristina Lafont, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Remarks on Habermas’s Conception of Public Deliberation in Postsecular Societies,” Constellations 14, 2, (2007): 239–59.

[525] John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” University of Chicago Law Review 64, 3 (1997): 765–807; Melissa Yates, “Rawls and Habermas on Religion in the Public Sphere,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 33, 7 (2007): 880–91.

[526] Casanova, Public Religions, 211–12.

[527] Ibid., 221.

[528] Jurgen Habermas, Sara Lennox, and Frank Lennox, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964),” New German Critique 3 (1974): 49–55.

[529] Charles Taylor, “Modernity and the Rise of the Public Sphere,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. Grethe B. Peterson, vol. 14 (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1993), 223.

[530] Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” Social Text 25/26 (1990): 56–58; Audi and Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Sphere; Armando Salvatore, The Public Sphere: Liberal Modernity, Catholicism, Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Leslie J. Francis and Hans-Georg Ziebertz, eds., The Public Significance of Religion (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Miriam Hoexter, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Nehemia Levtzion, eds., The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); David Herbert, “Theorizing Religion and Media in Contemporary Societies: An Account of Religious ‘Publicization’,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 14 (2011): 626–48.

[531] Charles Taylor, “Modernity and the Rise of the Public Sphere,” 221.

[532] Yuri Levada Analytical Center, “Religious Faith in Russia,” a Press-Release dated 26 October, 2011, providing statistical information on levels of religiosity in Russia, http://www.levada.ru/26-09-2011/religioznaya-vera-v-rossii (accessed 18 June, 2018).

[533] The English term “pro-life” started to be actively used by the Russian Orthodox community after the 1990s. It is believed that the movement emerged in the United States in 1973 in response to the abolition of the ban on abortions in several states by the Supreme Court. The core of the pro-life movement around the world consists of Christians of various denominations: Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox Christians.

[534] Official web site of the International Festival of Social Technologies in Defense of Family Values “Pro Life,” http://prolife-fest.ru/content.php?id=18 (accessed 18 June, 2017).

[535] For example, the Foundation “For Life” designed a social advertising action “They Were Born Third (Sixth, Twelfth ...) in the Family,” which was implemented in many cities and towns of Russia. For examples of the banners see http://www.pravmir.ru/oni-rodilis - semnadcatymi (accessed 18 June, 2018).

[536] See, for example, Russian Orthodox Church, an anti-abortion campaign of the “Nashi” movement in Moscow, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/356101.html, (accessed 18 June, 2017).

[537] See, for example, Credo.ru online portal, anti-abortion campaign of “Warriors of Life” in Saint Petersburg, http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=83571, (accessed 18 June, 2017).

[538] International Festival of Social Technologies in Defense of Family Values “Pro-Life,’ “Defense of Family, Motherhood, and Childhood,’ an on-line course, http://prolife-fest .ru/users/distant (accessed 18 June, 2017).

[539] Russian Orthodox Church, “Proposals on the Improvement of the National Policy on Family and Childhood,’ 16 January 2011, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1386377.html (accessed 18 June 2017).

[540] Interfax News Agency, “Patriarch Kirill Calls Abortion a National Disaster,’ 12 July 2012, http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=46275 (accessed 18 June, 2017).

[541] Russian Orthodox Church, Department for Charity and Social Ministry, Church Social Projects Support, “Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Jozef Michalik: Abortions and euthanasia are the disgrace of modern civilization,’ 20 August 2012, http://old.diaconia.ru/ news/patriarkh-kirill-i-mitropolit-juzef-mikhalik-aborty-i-evtanazija-pozor-sovremenn ojj-tsivilizatsii (accessed 18 June 2017).

[542] Russian Orthodox Church, “Agreement on Cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ministry of Health and Social Development of the Russian Federation,’ 8 July 2011, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1556321.html (accessed 18 June 2018).

[543] Overall, presentation materials with aggressive content as well as events which use the rhetoric of “abortion-murder” are less common. “Bloody” and intimidating advertising has been less and less frequently used by the pro-lifers and does not always have the status of officially authorized public advertising: often it consists of stickers and posters illegally posted on the street or on public transportation, although there are some examples of

official events which recur to frightening imagery. For example, they include the lecturing and exhibition project “Silent Revolution,” which has been implemented since 2001 in many cities of Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova http://www.prolife-fest.ru/projects/ 2/ (accessed 18 June 2018).

[544] Research Seminar “Sociology of Religion,” The Research Project “Orthodox Monitor” Survey 2012, http://socrel.pstgu.ru/en/orthodoxmonitor (accessed 18 June, 2018).

[545] Russian Orthodox Church, Department for Charity and Social Ministry, Church Social Projects Support, “Decision to Open Centers for Maternity Protection in All Dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church,” 15 September 2010, http://diaconia.ru/news/pri-sinodal nom-otdele-budet-sozdan-koordinatsionnyjj-tsentr-zashhity-materinstva (accessed 18 June 2018).

[546] See “Procedure of Providing Medical Care in Obstetrics and Gynecology (with the Exception of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies),” approved on 1 November 2012 by the Order of Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation no. 572n. The previous document from 2003 contained a similar article, that is, such a practice was supposed to be introduced ten years ago (the Order of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation from 14 October 2003, no. 484, “Concerning Approval of the Instructions on the Permission of Artificial Termination of Late Pregnancy for Social Reasons and Conducting an Artificial Termination of Pregnancy” (registered with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation on 25 November 2003, registration no. 5260).

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Candidate Tsvetomira Antonova, who contributed to this research by providing materials from the web portals in question.

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[583] Ibid.

[584] “Grehat Nyama Obraten Znak [Sin Has no Positive Double],” http://dveri.bg/wxu9r (accessed 16 November 2016).

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[599] “Litsemeren Protest [A Hypocritical Protest],” https://dveri.bg/3p639 (accessed 18 March 2017).

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[602] More than 90 percent of the schools in Bulgaria are municipal.

[603] Kontseptsiya na Svetiya Sinod na Bulgarskata Pravoslavna Tsarkva otnosno Statuta na Predmeta ‘Religiya’ v Bulgarskoto Obshtoobrazovatelno Uchilishte [Conception of the Holy Synod Concerning the Status of the Subject ‘Religion’ at the Bulgarian School], http:// www.bg-patriarshia.bg/index.php?file=concepts.xml (accessed 3 March 2017).

[604] Ibid.

[605] Public education in Bulgaria is secular by law.

[606] Ibid.

[607] Ibid.

[608] Ibid.

[609] Ibid.

[610] Ibid.

[611] The word “universal” has a somewhat ambivalent meaning in this context. It may be understood differently by the Christian and secular participants in the debate.

[612] Osnoven Doklad na Natsionalniya Seminar po Povod na 10-ta Godishnina ot Vavezhdaneto na Predmeta ‘Religiya’ v Bulgarskoto Uchilishtno Obraznovanie [Keynote speech at the National Seminar Held on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Introduction of the Subject ‘Religion’ into Bulgarian School Education], https://dveri.bg/component/com _content/Itemid,101138/limit,5/limitstart,1630/view,featured/ (accessed 20 November 2016).

[613] Yordanka Vassileva, “Zhenite—Mirotvorsti na Nastoyashteto [Women Peace-Bringers of Today],” https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,101138/limit 5/limitstart,1710/ view,featured (accessed 15 November 2018).

[614] Galya Mladenova, “Uchitel po Religiya Uchi Detsata i na Starobulgarski [A Teacher in Religion is Teaching to the Children also Old-Bulgarian], https://dveri.bg/xqf4r (accessed 3 February 2019).

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[617] Polina Spirova, “Tri Suvremenni Mita za Religioznoto Obrazovanie [Three Contemporary Myths about Religious Education],” https://dveri.bg/98 (accessed 19 March 2018).

[618] In order to avoid a possible misunderstanding: the differentiation between formal (related to religious institutions) and informal Orthodox Christian publics which I make should not be confused with the one between a formal, “strong”, related to the institutions of political power public and informal, “weak” related to civil society publics, which Habermas makes within his “two-track model of deliberative politics” (see for example Between Facts and Norms, 304). In Habermas’s terms, all religious discourses are conducted within informal publics.

[619] John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” University of Chicago Law Review 64, 3 (1997): 780–807, 784.

[620] As the critics of Rawls’s “proviso” fear, see Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 105.

[621] This has not always been so. Until 2004, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was split, mainly for political reasons.

[622] “Strategic” in the Habermasian sense of “strategic action”, see Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984), 285.

[623] Walter B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (New York: Shocken Books, 1968).

Translation

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In the Name of God,

The Most Gracious the Most Merciful

Several months remain before the close of the century, yet do the Arabs have a plan to deal with the twenty-first century? The twentieth century has come to an end, yet the Arabs and Muslims have achieved only independence and modest economic growth. Arab unity is still an unrealized ideal and the projects of modernity have failed to deliver on their promises. Instead, they have entrenched oppressive regimes that hypocritically flaunt slogans of modernity, science, and development, while the Islamic revival is hopelessly lost in protest and bargaining over secondary issues such as the Islamic veil, the republication of ancient Islamic texts by the millions, and in perpetrating senseless acts of violence with obscure goals. So is there now an Islamic charter with which we can enter the twenty-first century with a comprehensive perspective that takes into account the diversity of all nations and peoples?—a workplan with which all can enter the twenty-first century?

I have been asked by the International Forum for Islamic Dialogue and others in the Arab and Islamic worlds to write a proposal for an Islamic Covenant which can serve as plan for Islamic action in the next century, which takes into account general Islamic principles. I answered the Committee’s request and I offer the reader the following proposal.

Dr. Muhammad Shahrur

Damascus

1 July 1999

In the Name of God,

The Most Gracious the Most Merciful

*** Introduction

A covenant is literally a tying together. It is a relationship that binds the two parties either by force or by reciprocal binding trust between the two parties. The first connotation appears in the Qur’an in the following context:

<quote>

“Therefore, that day, He will punish none as his punishment. And none will (He) bind with chains as his binding” (Sura 89, al-Fajr, v. 25–26).

“When you meet the disbelievers (in the battle fields), strike off their heads until when you have routed them; then tie (your captives) firmly ...” (Sura 47, Muhammad, v. 4).

</quote>

The second connotation appears in the following verses:

<quote>

“And remember when we made a covenant with the children of Israel (saying): ‘Do not worship but Allah ...’ “ (Sura 2, al-Baqara, v. 83).

“But because of their breach of their covenant, we cursed them and hardened their hearts ...” (Sura 5, al-Ma’ida, v. 13).

</quote>

A covenant can be a charter or an agreement that regulates the conditions of a relationship between two parties in the first meaning of the term. Hence necessity and obligation tie the two parties. But a contract can never be a covenant (mithaq). Thus God has willed that the relation between Him and humankind be a covenant and not a contract. If it were like a contract, then it would be a capitulation agreement in the sense that God is the more powerful other partner. The distinction between covenant and contract is not a matter of mere linguistic distinction or arbitrariness, as some might assume. It makes us understand the multiplicity of divine intentions. Without it, the multitude of these meanings is concealed from us. We see how God calls marriage a sacred, strong covenant. It is not just the marriage agreement or the “act of [sexual] pleasure,” as we call it today:

<quote>

“And how do you take it back after you have lain with each other, and they had taken from you a strong pledge?” (Sura 4, al-Nisa’, v. 21).

</quote>

Faith in the sovereignty of God (rububiya) is a covenant. It is based on the trust of the created in God, who created natural and cosmic laws. It also rests on the confidence of the created in the continuity and prevalence of these exact laws, identical for the compliant believer as well as the extreme disbeliever. All humankind attested to this sovereignty since they were only seeds in the loins of their fathers (and thus their testimony lies in their very existence):

<quote>

“And remember when your Lord took forth from the children of Adam, from their backs, their descendants and made them testify on themselves, (He asked them) ‘Am I not your Lord?’ They replied: ‘Yes, we do testify ...’ “ (Sura 7, al-A‘raf, v. 172).

</quote>

Even Satan, as a disobedient, could not deny God’s sovereignty (rububiya). The covenant of sovereignty is a coercive bond for which the created have no choice but submission to His laws and their natural manifestations (destiny). The covenant of Lordship (uluhiya) is a completely different matter. As mentioned earlier, it is based on mutual trust between the two parties, in which God trusts man and declares this trust to his angels before man’s creation, and before mankind knew of His announcement of trust:

<quote>

“Behold when your Lord said to the angels: ‘I will create a viceroy on earth ...’ “ (Sura 2, al-Baqara, v. 30)

</quote>

Man’s vicegerency of God (khilafa) on earth was exemplified in His breath (knowledge and legislation), in humankind’s possession of the Spirit of God, and freedom of choice (trustworthiness):

<quote>

“We have offered the trust unto the heavens, the earth and the mountains, but they refrained from bearing it, and were afraid of it. But manundertook this charge, because he was unjust and ignorant” (Sura 33, al-Ahzab, v. 72).

</quote>

Therefore vicegerency (khilafa) and trust (amana) are the objective and direct expressions of God’s trust in man. This was a given fact before man was commanded to do anything; and in that, the honoring of humankind over God’s other creatures:

<quote>

“And, verily, We have honoured the children of Adam and carried them on the land and the sea, and provided them with good and lawful things, and we have exalted them above many of those whom We have created ... “ (Sura 17, al-Isra’, v. 70).

</quote>

Thus what remains for man is to trust in God, a trust which stems from a conscious will, which believes in Him and submits to His orders and prohibitions.

From this point of departure, we declare that Islam is a covenant between God and the whole of humanity, and that faith (iman) is a covenant between God and the believers who specifically follow Muhammad’s prophecy. Hence we declare ourselves as Muslims first, and second as believers trusting in God, a conscious trust free from compulsion.

This leads us to talk next about freedom, knowledge, and legislation. No one has the right to claim a monopoly or exclusive possession of them, because these concepts belong to all the

peoples of the world, and without them any given society would descend to the level of beasts. Hence what distinguishes human society is knowledge, legislation, ethics, freedom as described in the Qur’an as vicegerency (khilafa), and trust (amana). All these are God’s gifts to humankind. Societies [in different historical periods] demand these things according to their levels of understanding. This [clear and simple] contractual relation between God and people, as described earlier, is distorted and badly explained in heritage literature (turath) and by those traditional jurists (fuqaha’) who were closed to the participation of the laity and satisfied with reductive notions of freedom. In this way, freedom was seen only as exemption from bondage, as if there was an implicit agreement among jurists to avoid serious discussion. It was a restricted preserve in many Islamic states, where no one is permitted to discuss the issue of freedom.

So the jurists were satisfied with an interpretation which preserved their well-being. They considered freedom as the opposite of bondage because slavery was a common and widespread practice at that particular period in human history.

All of this, however, in our opinion bears no relation to the divine intention and expectations of the people because God created all Adam’s children to be worshippers (‘ibad) and not miserable slaves (‘abid). In many Qur’anic verses he indicated to them their freedom to choose between belief and disbelief, obedience and disobedience, and then promised them an encounter on the Day of Reckoning to reward the worthy and punish the wrongdoers.

In His revelation, God took into account first of all his obligation and covenant between him and the people:

1) To have mercy on humankind and to provide them with sustenance:

<quote>

“Tell My servants that I am the oft-forgiving, the Most Merciful” (Sura 49. al-Hujurat, v. 49).

</quote>

He also pre-ordained the sustenance of people and the rest of living creatures on earth before humankind was present:

<quote>

“He set above it (the earth) firm mountains, and He blessed it and measured (the creation) its sustenance in four days alike for all who ask for it” (Sura 41, Fussilat, v. 10).

</quote>

2) To forgive them and pardon their sins:

<quote>

“Say: ‘O My servants who have transgressed against their souls! Do not despair of the Mercy of Allah, for Allah forgives all sins ...’ “ (Sura 39, al-Zumar, v. 53).

</quote>

3) To answer their pleas and lead them on the straight path:

<quote>

“When My servants ask you about Me, I am very near. I answer the prayers of every suppliant when he calls me ...” (Sura 2, al-Baqara, v. 186).

</quote>

4) To defeat the oppressor, relieve the oppressed and deliver victory to the just:

<quote>

“And remember when Allah promised you victory over one of the two bands, but you wished to fight against the unarmed one ... “ (Sura 8, al-Anfal, v. 7).

“The Word of your Lord is perfected in truth and justice. None can change His Words ... “ (Sura 6, al-An‘am, v. 115).

</quote>

In the covenant of Islam, God also expects people to fulfil their commitments, which include:

- To believe in God as the only God:

<quote>

“Say: ‘It is only inspired to me that your god is One God: Are you then Muslims?’ “ (Sura 21, al-Anbiya, v. 108).

</quote>

- To believe in the Last Day, the Day of Judgement:

<quote>

“... whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does righteous deeds, will have their rewards from their Lord, and they will have nothing to fear nor to grieve for” (Sura 2, al-Baqara, v. 62).

“Yea, he who surrenders himself to Allah, and does good deeds, shall have His Lord’s reward, and he will have nothing to fear or grieve for” (Sura 2, al-Baqara, v. 112).

</quote>

- To do right (ya‘malu salihan) among themselves and for the rest of mankind. This is an open article in the contract that touches openly on ethics and virtue, and does not relate to specific deeds:

<quote>

“... whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does righteous deeds, will have their rewards from their Lord, and they will have nothing to fear nor to grieve for” (Sura 2, al-Baqara, v. 62).

</quote>

This verse is immediately followed and supported by the following one:

<quote>

“Remember when We took your covenant and We raised the mountain (Sinai) above you ... “ (Sura 2, al-Baqara, v. 63).

</quote>

We understand that whoever commits himself of his own will and without coercion to these three principles is a Muslim in the eyes of God. This is regardless of the faith to which he or she is affiliated or the customs and rites practiced, whether a follower of Muhammad’s noble prophecy, Jewish, Christian, or other. So we see that the corpus of teaching and adherence to the noble precepts belongs to all of humanity, taking into account that these teachings have evolved from Noah to Muhammad by means of the various prophets throughout human history. So we understand the Prophet’s saying (hadith): “I was sent only to complete the noble traits of character.”

As for the covenant of faith (iman), it is a covenant between God and His prophets on the one hand, and the believers in these prophets on the other. It includes belief and conviction in the prophecies of all God’s prophets and messengers, and the observance of religious rites such as prayer (salat), fasting (sawm) and almsgiving (zakat):

<quote>

“The Messenger has believed in what has been sent down to him from his Lord, and the believers believed in Allah, His angels, His scriptures, and His messengers. ‘We do not

discriminate between any one of His messengers, and they say: ‘We hear and obey ...’ “ (Sura 2, al-Baqara, v. 285).

</quote>

The affirmation that there is no God but God is the foremost principle in the covenant of Islam and is required of all people, but the affirmation of Muhammad as God’s messenger stands as the foremost principle in the covenant of faith required specifically from all followers of Muhammad’s message. Just as Muslims fast and pray in accordance with what Muhammad had done, other religions practice these rites in their own distinct ways which are attributed to a particular prophet:

<quote>

“... We have ordained a law and assigned a path for each of you. Had Allah pleased, He could have made you one nation. But his will is to test you by what He had given you ... “ (Sura 5, al-Ma’ida, v. 51).

</quote>

Just as the rites of prayer and fasting vary from one religion to another, diversity in religious practices is a natural law affirmed by God Himself:

<quote>

“Had your Lord willed, He would have made mankind one nation: but they will not cease differing” (Sura 11, Hud, v. 118).

</quote>

The only issue that does not bear any form of alteration is the pillars of Islam (arkan al-islam) (faith in God and the Last Day, good deeds and adherence to the Straight Path) which is eternal and universal to all humanity till the Last Day of History. This is why we find two types of faith (iman) in the Holy Qur’an. The first concerns those who believe that there is no God but God (Islam—Muslims). The second concerns those who

believe that Muhammad is God’s messenger (faith—believers), as the following verses make clear:

<quote>

“O you believers! Believe in Allah and His Messenger and the Book that He had revealed before him. He who denies Allah, His angels, His scriptures, His Messengers and the Last Day has surely gone far astray.

Those who believed in Allah, then rejected their faith, and afterwards believed again, and then rejected faith and increased in disbelief, Allah will not forgive them nor guide them to the Right Path” (Sura 4, al-Nisa’, v. 136–137).

</quote>

We also find that God’s decrees and commandments are directed once towards those who believe in God and the Last Day, whom He refers to as “the people” (al-nas), and again to those who believe in Muhammad, whom He refers to as “the believers” (al-mu’minun). These examples relate to the first usage:

<quote>

- “Allah is the Protector of the believers, He brings them out from darkness into light. But the patron of unbelievers is Satan (Tagut), he takes them out from light into darkness ... “ (Sura 2, al-Baqara, v. 257).

- “O mankind! Fear your Lord who created you from a single msn (Adam) and from him he created his wife (Eve), and from them both he created many men and women, and fear Allah who will question you about your kindred (do not cut off relations with them). Allah is always a Watcher over you” (Sura 4, al-Nisa’, v. 1).

</quote>

Examples for the second usage are as follows:

<quote>

- “O you believers! Fasting is prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you, so that you may fear Allah” (Sura 2, al-Baqara, v. 183).

- “O you believers! Do not establish your prayers when you are drunken, but wait until you understand what you say ...” (Sura 4, al-Nisa’, v. 43).

- “The (true) believers are those who believe in Allah and His Messenger and, afterwards, do not doubt anything, and they strive in the cause of Allah with their possessions and themselves, and those are the sincere ones” (Sura 49, al-Hujurat, v. 15).

</quote>

In the light of this distinction—particularly since faith in the holy texts and the messengers can only occur after faith in the sovereignty, lordship, and unity of God—we can realize the importance of interpreting the Book in a contemporary way and of re-interpreting the divine decrees (ahkam) in contemporary circumstances. This is in order to deal appropriately with those who believe in God and the Last Day as well as with the followers of Muhammad’s message, without oppressing or discriminating against others.

Perhaps the best way to exemplify this point is to contemplate the opening verse of Sura al-Saff (the Battle Array):

<quote>

“All that is in the heavens and the earth celebrate the praises of Allah. He is the Exalter in Might, the Wise.

O you who believe! Why do you say what you do not do?

It is most hateful in the sight of Allah that you say what you do not do.

Verily Allah loves those who fight in His cause in battle array as if they were a solid cemented structure” (Sura 61, al-Saff, v. 1–4).

</quote>

Early Islamic scholars, in their interpretation of the occasions on which God sent down certain verses (asbab al-nuzul), agreed (ajmaʻu) that the verses concerning the followers of the Prophet in the Battle of Uhud. The scholars assumed that these verses were specific to this occasion and not relevant to others. So they overlooked how the opening verse refers explicitly to belief in God and how Jews and Christians could also fight for the cause of God, and they may say what they do not do. As for the verses that deal with the pilgrimage to Mecca, it remains for Muslim scholars to interpret:

<quote>

“... pilgrimage to the house is a duty decreed by Allah for every Muslim who can afford it. But he who disbelieves, Allah is not in need of all mankind” (Sura 3, Al ʻImran, v. 97).

“And proclaim unto mankind to come to the pilgrimage. They will come walking on foot or riding on every lean camel; they will come from every faraway place” (Sura 22, al-Hajj, v. 27).

</quote>

These verses pose a problem for Muslim scholars to solve. The traditional scholars regarded the Hajj (a pillar of Islam, like prayer, charity, fasting, and almsgiving) as specific to the followers of the message of Muhammad, despite the fact that these verses address all people.

*** A Proposal for an Islamic Covenant

1. Glorification of God is a mode of existence for all rational and non-rational beings. It expresses itself in their constant transformation. They praise God, who is not subject to the laws of transformation and development, leading to corruption and decay.

<quote>

“... everything will perish except Himself ...” (Sura 28, al-Qassas, v. 88)

“The seven heavens and the earth, and all the creatures in them, give glory to Him. There is not a thing but celebrates His praises, but you do not understand their praises ...” (Sura 17, al-Isra’, v. 43).

</quote>

2. All people are the responsibility of God, the believers and the unbelievers, conformists and dissenters, monotheists and polytheists; all were created from clay and made to be worshippers (‘ibad) and not slaves (‘abid). They obey Him of their own free will and disobey by their own choice and yet in both cases the fact remains that they are worshippers. Hence the right of a person to adopt or convert to any sect or religion, to enlist or resign from any sect, and the right to declare this without fear from assassination or oppression. People are the servants of God on all occasions, obliged to be committed to the social and human dimension of sacred teachings, the prohibition of suicide, false testimony, fraud, and lying. This fact of having no compulsion in religion is too fundamental to be subject to elections or debate, and cannot be altered by humankind:

<quote>

“There is no compulsion in religion. The true faith is now distinct from error. Whoever rejects Satan (Taghut) and believes in Allah has grasped a firm handhold of the truth that will never break ...” (Sura 2, al-Baqara, v. 256).

</quote>

3. Life is a gift from God to all the people and therefore no one has the right to violate it, and retribution is an eye for an eye, as the most extreme [permissible] form of punishment.

<quote>

“... and do not kill the soul which Allah forbade to be killed except by way of justice and law. This is what Allah has commanded you ...” (Sura 6, al-An‘am, v. 151).

</quote>

The shedding of blood is forbidden (haram). It is only exceptionally permitted where God specifies in His verses (or [to prevent] killing or corruption on the earth, such as crimes against humanity. Therefore every person has the right to defend his life and take care of his health with food, drink, and medical treatment. And he had the right to insist on it because the life of man is open and uncertain:

<quote>

“No soul will die except by Allah’s leave, at a postponed term. Anybody who wants his recompense in this world, We shall give him of it, and he who wants it in the hereafter we shall reward the grateful” (Sura 3, Al ‘Imran, v. 145).

</quote>

4. Freedom is the only form in which man’s worship of God can be embodied. Worship is not through the undertaking of ritual obligations such as prayer and fasting, as some assert. Rather, it encompasses all the deeds and actions that humans freely undertake and within the conditions of this earthly existence, as God has thus described:

<quote>

“Know that this worldly life is only a play and a pastime, adornment and boasting among you, and rivalry in respect of wealth and children: this is as the similitude of a plant that flourishes after rain: the tillers rejoice to see it grow, but then it withers and becomes yellow, and then it becomes worthless stubble …” (Sura 57, al-Hadid, v. 20).

</quote>

Thus the guarentee of the exercise of freedom is one of the most important political and economic precepts for society, because the progress and flourishing of any society is founded on this principle.

5. Knowledge and the process of law-making is the result of God’s breath in people. From this follows people’s right to gain knowledge (education) and their right to elect representatives to legislate (parliaments). These are sacred rights that cannot be violated, like freedom and life.

6. God says to Moses’s people:

<quote>

“We certainly gave Moses the scripture, but differences arose about it. Had it not been for a word that had gone forth previously from your Lord, the matter would have been decided between them ...” (Sura 11, Hud, v. 110).

</quote>

And he says to Muhammad’s people:

<quote>

“Mankind were but one nation, then they differed. Had it not been for a word that had already gone forth, their differences would have been settled between them” (Sura 10, Yunus, v. 19).

</quote>

This word has been the same for all nations and peoples. The Law of God is the absolute word of freedom for man; he may be faithful to it or choose to rebel and stand responsible for his own decisions (amana). It is the Word of Justice through which God metes out His justice fairly. In a just and open society, we find that God’s Law is superior, whereas in an oppressive society we find that God’s Law is suppressed and weak, regardless of the different names and slogans by which a particular regime chooses to call itself, whether it be Islamic, secular or national, a monarchy, a republic or any other type of rule.

7. Justice and freedom are absolute values which man practices in his society in a relative way. These values as expressed in the Qur’an include counsel (shura), the encouragement of good and the prohibition of evil (amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar). These are the integral, inseparable, and indivisible characteristics of shura:

A) Democracy is so far the best relative standard that man has achieved for the practice of shura:

<quote>

“And those who respond to their Lord, establish regular prayers, conduct their affairs with mutual consultation ...” (Sura 42, al-Shura, v. 38).

</quote>

Moreover, shura is a quality shared by all humanity, so that no society has a monopoly on it. With shura, genuine culture flourishes for the benefit of all people according to historically specific understandings of liberty.

B) Democracy, the best relative form of government in which humankind can practice shura, can exist only if it includes and allows genuine opposition. This entails political pluralism, freedom of opinion and expression, and the freedom to express ideas peacefully through the available means of communication, and unbribed and non-corrupt committees that can freely oversee state apparatuses. Unless this sort of opposition exists, one cannot adhere to the Islamic precepts of encouraging what is good and forbidding what is wrong, and consequently one cannot establish the optimal democratic government:

<quote>

“Let there be a nation from you calling people to righteousness, enjoining what is virtuous and forbidding what is vicious. Such persons will surely be triumphant” (Sura 3, Al ‘Umran, v. 104).

</quote>

And also as God says:

<quote>

“You are the best nation that has been raised up for mankind: you enjoin right conduct, forbid evil and believe in Allah ... “ (Sura 3, al-‘Umran, v. 110).

</quote>

C) There is no democracy without opposition, political pluralism, freedom of expression, and the right to criticize. This illustrates the importance of opposition as a tenet of Islamic society, which is a de facto civil society.

D) Although a framework for governance and life, democracy has both negative and positive aspects. However, this should not be perceived as an excuse for despotism, autocracy, oligarchy or any other form of absolutism.

8) Islam in its purest, abstract form exists only in the Revelation of God. The word of God is absolute in itself. Its authenticity can be realized only by its manifestation in nature and its practice through social decrees. In other words, God's Divine Revelation discloses itself in its entirety through human history and not, as presumed by some, through Arab or Arab-Islamic history alone.

9) Change and flux are a law (sunna), one of God's laws of nature. Human societies are evolving societies. From this derives the necessity constantly to reinterpret the legislative verses of the Qur'an (shari'a) in order to embody these principles as accurately as possible in reality.

10) Since the interpretation of the legislative verses and their application is a human activity, it is fallible and can only be relatively right. What is valid for one era may be irrelevant to another in spite of the fact that the sanctity of the legislative verses is eternal. For this reason, no human interpretation or practice ought to be accepted without discussion as it carries relative historical characteristics and will vary from one period to another, and differ from one society to another.

11) No one is above questioning or challenge, be it an individual, a political party, or an institution. The privilege of [unquestioned] supremacy is reserved for God alone:

<quote>

"He is not to be questioned about what He does, but they will be questioned!" (Sura 21, al-'Anbiya, v. 23).

"The Executor of all what He wills" (Sura 85, al-Buruj, v. 16)

“... They have no protector besides Him, and He does not share His command with anybody” (Sura 18, al-Kahf, v. 26).

</quote>

The Lord of the World alone possesses the qualities of divinity (uluhiyah) and sovereignty (rububiyah). He is the God of the people and none but He deserves total obedience and submission. The sovereignty of God to govern (hakimiya) is immutable whereas human rule is contingent upon time and place. Hence, anyone who claims that role is by necessity fraudulent and misleading, who conceals his oppression and violations of human freedom.

12) Democracy in society is a form of practice in which humankind expresses its freedom. Democracy has its principles and sources, the most prominent of which are the Islamic covenant and the covenant of faith (iman) The covenant of Islam (mithaq al-islam) is founded on the primordial teachings and sublime ideals stated in Sura 6, al-An‘am, verses 151–153. It requires that humankind must obey, conform, and submit without questioning. Belief in the unity of God cannot be submitted to referenda and voting. Faith in God, the Hereafter, and good deeds are not arbitrary values. Responsibility for parents, shunning suicide, avoiding obscenities, fairness to orphans, keeping promises and contracts without lying or fraud are all human values, unanimously agreed upon and not submitted to referenda, either in religious or secular states, with no place for objections from any sects, parties, or classes. In it, the sovereignty of Islam is manifested as expressed in the Qur’an:

<quote>

“The only true religion accepted by Allah is Islam (submission to Allah)” (Sura 3, Al ‘Imran, v. 19).

“Anybody who adopts a religion other than Islam, it will not be accepted from Him, and in the hereafter he will be one of the losers” (Sura 3, Al ‘Umran, v. 85).

</quote>

These religious tenets do not embody a legislative dimension because they are above law-making and parliamentary action. The doctrine of unity (tawhid) and faith in God and the Hereafter (iman) are tenets of a divine, absolute, and universal covenant and therefore can never be subjected to choice or will.

The covenant of faith, which comprises faith in the prophets and messengers and religious affiliation to a sect that believes in God, the hereafter, and in morality, are purely personal matters which are independent from politics or state intervention. In the same spirit, prayer, fasting and almsgiving (zakat) are not subject to any form of collective or legislative decision-making. This is why Islam (the way we have explained it and not the way the jurists have done) and Islamic societies, allow mosques to stand adjacent to Christian churches, Jewish synagogues, and Buddhist temples. The social, epistemological and aesthetic dimensions always vary according to different societies' abilities to define and articulate with local customs and their democratic capacities within a particular geographical area and a historical period.

Islamic jurisprudence (shari'a) is a legal system practiced within God's limits (hudud Allah). Islamic jurisprudence is flexible and contains its own internal constraints; it is not a stern, brutal and rigid system as commonly perceived. For example, cutting off the hand of a thief is [only] the outer limit of penalties for theft. From this we see that most legislation in civil society emanates from legislative bodies operating within God's limits (hudud Allah). In this it is understood that there are differences from one place and time to another. Every sound practice is accepted because it is within God's limits.

13) Islam is a creed that is not subject to time (history) or place (geography). It is unlike a state which is an institutional body conditioned by borders and historical pressures, like the Roman and Arab governments. Consequently a government is always in need of adaptive legislation that does not exist in the Qur'anic text, and this is precisely what the Prophet Muhammad accomplished at Medina in the seventh century Arabian peninsula. He established civil law within God's limits by taking the general Qur'anic outlines and adapting them to everyday use, taking into consideration the local aesthetic, social and epistemological dimensions, as exemplified in his practices (sunna).

14) Islam is the primordial and comprehensive religion. It is the only religion that God granted to humankind and preserved from alteration and fabrication from the time of Noah to Muhammad. Consequently, it is transcendent and unrelated to geography. So, for example, it is to the English as it is to the Arabs. The understanding of the state within its limits is a pure geographical understanding. Although the concept of state is a solely geographical concept, nationalism in that sense does not conflict with the Islamic conception of statehood. Citizenship can be perceived in two ways. First is that which refers to general human needs. The second is the local dimension. Islam is sufficient and relevant to establish human society, but not to establish a normal state with public, economic, geographic, military, and national policies.

15) One of the special prerogatives of God is the authority to make absolute prohibitions (tahrim al-haram), since these are all-inclusive and of unlimited duration. The Qur'an itself specifies no more than twelve fundamentally forbidden acts. Nine of them are

specified in Sura 6, al-An‘am, verses 151–53), in addition to the prohibition against incest (maharim nikah), usury (riba’), and the dietary prohibitions. This means that the forbidden is specified and cannot be extended by analogy to other things; the permitted (halal) is unrestricted. The basic principle is that most things are lawful, and the forbidden is exceptional. Thus, the function of the oral tradition (sunna) regarding other than cultic commands is to order the domain of the permitted. That is to say, a restriction on the otherwise unrestricted (al-mutlaq) which applies a circumstantial attribute (sifa zarfiyya), is not a [categorical] prohibition (tahrim). This clarifies the mention of the Messenger alone [without mention of God] in the verse:

<quote>

“... whatever the messenger gives you, accept it, and whatever he forbids you, abstain from it. And fear Allah, for Allah is stern in punishment” (Sura 59, al-Hashr, v. 7).

</quote>

It is clear and explicit that the above verse speaks of the state, operational procedures, and the Messenger [Muhammad] as a sovereign authority (state leader) [where] nonetheless this obedience to the Messenger is separate from obedience to God:

<quote>

“O you believers! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger, and obey those who are charged of authority among you ...” (Sura 4, al-Nisa’, v. 59).

</quote>

And this is a restriction on the otherwise unrestricted practice (mutlaq), because everyone agrees that the absolute is not affected except by a restrictive form, and it cannot [otherwise] exist except in [the state] of being permitted (al-halal).

This is the significance of parliaments in the majority of the world. They order, prohibit, and organize within the domain of the permitted yet they cannot categorically prohibit (tahrim) the permissible (halal) because that would give to themselves the unrestricted right of legislation or the permitting of that which is prohibited

(by God). We can say that parliaments are the contemporary forms of prophetic norms excepting in religious ([cultic] practice. They are the equivalent of the civil law for the state that the Messenger established. For this reason we now need plebiscites rather than religious decrees (fatwas), and parliaments instead of religious councils in all matters of life and legislation other than the customary religious rituals. These rituals embody obedience to the Prophet, [although this is] connected with obedience to God. This [distinction] is in agreement with the following Qur'anic verse:

<quote>

"And obey Allah and the Messenger, that you may obtain mercy" (Sura 3, Al 'Imran, v. 132).

</quote>

16) People are free to express their views through the different means of communication available, and any aberration will vitiate and impair the implementation of God's Word in the Islamic society, and jihad will therefore be compulsory for its restoration. Jihad does not only mean the use of force, although force can be one stage in the course of holy war, but speaking truth to authority when needed and at the right time may also be seen as a form of jihad. We see how this jihad of the word and being steadfast to truth are the more efficient types of jihad in contemporary times. As for military jihad, such as defense of the homeland, it is a legitimate right for people everywhere. Similarly, the use of force in emergency cases such as war or self-defense is also legitimate.

17) Killing for the cause of proselytization and conversion to Islam or the persecution of other religious creeds is strictly forbidden:

<quote>

"O you believers! When you go out fighting in the cause of Allah, be careful in discerning precisely: do not say to him who offers you peace. 'You are not a believer,' wishing the gains of this worldly life ... " (Sura 4, al-Nisa', v. 94).

</quote>

Hence, the distinction between dar al-islam and dar al-harb is erroneous and delusive; instead we have the abode of faith (dar al-iman) and the abode of infidelity (dar al-kufr), as God says:

<quote>

“Yet most of the people will not believe, though you are keen to make them believe” (Sura 12, Yusuf, v. 103).

</quote>

Therefore this distinction does not justify enmity, hatred, and killing, as evident in the Qur’anic verse:

<quote>

“And if it had been the will of your Lord, all mankind would have believed, all of them together! Do you (O Muhammad) want to compel mankind to become believers?” (Sura 10, Yunis, v. 99).

</quote>

18) The concept of jizya, the tax on free non-Muslims under Muslim rule, was a strictly political form of taxation that was applicable to a specific historical period.

19) All people have the right to be judged justly and fairly:

<quote>

“... and when you judge between people, you should judge justly” (Sura 4, al-Nisa’, v. 58).

</quote>

20) Material and intellectual creativity is encouraged and respected in Islamic society:

“O my people! Give full measure and full weight in justice! And do not decrease others of their possessions” (Sura 11, Hud, v. 85).

21) Work, diligence, profit and saving are matters that are reserved for everyone and are not predestined. Man is free to labor and struggle for his sustenance:

<quote>

“While Allah has created you and what you make” (Sura 37, al-Saffat, v. 96).

“So that they may eat of its fruit. It was not their hands that made this; will they, then, not give thanks?” (Sura 36, Ya Sin, v. 35).

</quote>

22) A government is really a contract between the citizens and the ruling authorities, regulated by a constitution in which the principle of rotation of rule is preserved for the practice of democracy and the maintenance of trust. If the state does not abide by the conditions of the contract, it loses the confidence of its citizens and the ability to rule:

<quote>

“O believers! Fulfill your obligations” (Sura 5, al-Ma’ida, v.1).

</quote>

23) Woman is a counterpart to man’s striving for procreation, industry, livelihood, and inheritance. God has regulated the issue of inheritance between male and female in His Holy Book:

<quote>

“... Men shall have their share of what they earn, and women shall have the same of what they earn ...” (Sura 4, al-Nisa’, v. 32).

“Allah recommends you for your children; a male shall inherit a double share of that of the female” (Sura 4, al-Nisa, v. 11).

“And that is He who creates the pairs, males and females” (Sura 53, al-Najm, v. 45).

“Anybody—male or female—who does righteous deeds and he is a believer, We shall make him live a good life ...” (Sura 16, al-Nahl, v. 97).

“... the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and they guard, in their husband’s absence, what Allah would have them guard ...” (Sura 4, al-Nisa’, v. 34).

“If a wife fears ill-treatment or desertion from her husband, there shall be no blame on them both if they arrange an amicable settlement between them ...” (Sura 4, al-Nisa’, v. 128).

</quote>

24) Freedom of conscience (freedom of expression without fear) is ensured to every person, whomever he may be:

<quote>

“O you believers! Stand firm for Allah, and bear true witness. Do not let your hatred for other people lead you to injustice ...” (Sura 5, al-Ma’ida, v. 9).

“O you believers! Stand up firm for justice, be witnesses to Allah even though it is against your own selves, your parents, or your kinfolk ...” (Sura 4, al-Nisa’, v. 135).

</quote>

There is a charter for political action like other covenants, and which does not deviate from the principal point of departure represented in the covenant of Islam. It is based undisputedly on the freedom of the people to choose, since they are worshippers of God. These are matters that every one who is active in political or national causes should be aware of and committed to:

1) People are free to choose and adhere to their beliefs and political views. There is no place for violence or political assassinations, especially where there are differences of religious creed or political views.

2) Political pluralism is an essential condition for the regulation of authority and the state. The freedom to form political parties, committees, associations, clubs, and the freedom to publish newspapers, journals, and magazines is a basic right to all citizens, provided that they announce their work and objectives in detail.

3) The only way to reach power must be through elections and the principle of rotation of power.

4) Opposition is present in free expression and multiple parties. This is the ideal and indispensable condition for encouraging good and prohibiting evil. Political work cannot be undertaken without it. If an individual, a party, or coalition comes into power, this does not entail the elimination or uprooting of an opposition, even if it is a minority.

5) No one, be it a particular party or an institution, has the right to present itself as the sole measure of justice or authority over others or to condemn anyone without evidence.

Doctor Muhammad Shahrur

Damascus, 25th of July 1999

12 Rabi‘ al-Awwal 1420

In Remembrance of the Birth of Greatest Prophet, Muhammad (PBUH)